Download Final V Fine Paper 2011

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What successes and failures culminated in U.S. and Chinese
rapprochement during the Nixon Administration?
Valerie Bayarddevolo-Fine
Teaching American History Project
DBQ Project – History Paper
May 19, 2011
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Mao, Nixon and Rapprochement
By the time of the Korean War, the United States and China had ceased
communication. China, finding ideologically common ground, had chosen to “lean to one
side” and favor the Soviet Union.1 The United States scrambled to stop losing more than
China on the Asian continent to the communists. To the consternation of the United
States , the Soviet-Chinese alliance remained relatively durable; however, by 1962, the
Sino-Soviet alliance was failing, upsetting global politics once again, and from 19621972, the U.S. and China began exploring a different relationship. Rapprochement, a
French word meaning to establish or reestablish harmonious relations, between the U.S.
and China became a possibility.2 Due to both internal and external factors, the U.S. and
China found themselves on a roller coaster of a path toward rapprochement, which
eventually culminated in a successful and historical dialogue between the two nations in
1972.
One of the most sensitive issues facing US-Sino relations was Taiwan. After the
end of Chinese Civil War in 1949, the U.S. supported nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek
fled to Taiwan and declared Taiwan the main government of China. Mao Zedong’s
communist forces took control of mainland China and declared his territory the true
China. Both men promised to recapture the other’s territory to unite all of China under
their particular leadership and political ideology. Neither the U.S., nor the UN,
1
"Foreign News: Leaning to One Side - TIME." Breaking News, Analysis, Politics, Blogs, News Photos, Video, Tech
Reviews - TIME.com. Sept.-Oct. 1949. Web. 12 Mar. 2011.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,800683,00.html
2
"Rapprochement | Define Rapprochement at Dictionary.com." Dictionary.com | Free Online Dictionary for English
Definitions. Web. 14 Mar. 2011. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rapprochement>.
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recognized Mao’s China, and the U.N. seated Taiwan as one of the five permanent
members on the UN Security Council. The US positioning of the 7th Fleet to patrol the
Taiwan Strait only increased the hostility. While there were many other pressing issues,
the question of Taiwan remained the most sensitive of subjects and was one of the
obstacles to rapprochement. It was up to the two leaders, Nixon and Mao, to overcome
these obstacles.3
As early as 1962, the U.S. state department, foreign policy staff and intellectuals,
had begun to discuss what to do about mainland China: “The time was now ripe, they
felt, to pursue a multiple strategy: containment, yes, but no longer isolation. Surely it was
time for us to move from posture to policy--to end the travel ban, as a first step, to press
for "contacts.”4 The quiet conversations had begun, but the path to rapprochement began
several years after the Sino-Soviet split when the climate in each nation began to shift in
1968. One shift began in China. Amidst its intense domestic factional strife of the
Cultural Revolution, the Chinese, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, were forced to
look outward across ideological belief systems due to external threats, namely violent
border incidents with the USSR, and the USSR’s increasing military capability in East
and Central Asia.5 The shift began in the United States when Richard Nixon, an anticommunist warrior, was elected president in 1968. Nixon needed to end the war in
Vietnam, and in doing so tried to open channels of communication and review the U.S.
policy towards China. The timing seemed to be right for both the U.S. and China to end
3
4
5
Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: a History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia UP, 2010.
Thompson, James. "Dragon under Glass." Atlantic Monthly Oct. 1967. The Atlantic Online. Web. 12 Mar. 2011.
<http://http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/china/thomson1.htm
"Modern History Sourcebook: Pravda: Editorial: The Anti-Soviet Policy of Communist China, February 16, 1967."
FORDHAM.EDU. 02 Feb. 1967. Web. 12 Mar. 2011. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1967pravda-china.html.
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their long silence towards each other and reach out to each other to serve ambitious ends
of securing borders, reducing nuclear threats, obtaining recognition in the UN, figuring
out the Taiwan question, increasing trade, and ending the war in Vietnam.6
Though Nixon had earlier indicated that he wanted to acknowledge China’s
importance in the world in a Foreign Affairs article in 1967, it wasn’t globally official
until Nixon gave his inaugural address to the United States on January 20, 1969.7 In his
speech, Nixon stated that the United States was willing to develop relations with all
countries of the world. It appears that Mao had been following Nixon’s candidacy and
had “immediately caught the subtext in Nixon’s statement.”8 Upon reading Nixon’s
speech, Mao ordered his newspapers to print the entire speech, an act that had previously
been unheard of. It is possible that Mao was preparing his people for a shift in public
opinion in favor of the U.S. In March 1969, serious Sino-Soviet border clashes broke out
which resulted in heavy casualties for both sides. Since both nations at this point had
nuclear weapons, this became quite serious. Though the Soviets demanded negotiations,
the Chinese responded by building up their military.
A second step towards rapprochement, for Nixon, was to give Mao another signal.
In July 1969, Nixon eased twenty year-old trade and travel restrictions and cut off
patrolling the Taiwan Strait.9 Expecting some sort of response from Mao, he received
none immediately. At this point, Nixon sent state department officials in Warsaw, Poland
to attempt to make a secret connection through Pakistani channels with the Chinese
6
Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: a History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia UP, 2010.
“Asia after Vietnam.” Foreign Affairs, October 1967 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-vietnam (accessed February 18, 2011)
8
Chen, Jian. Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2001. Print, p239.
9
Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: a History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia UP, 2010.
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charge`.10 Finally, the connection was made in December 1969 and the Chinese agreed to
renewed Sino-American talks by early 1970.
The road to rapprochement was not smooth. The determination of the leaders, as
much as anything, helped navigate the obstacles. When America invaded Cambodia in
May of 1970, Mao sharply criticized the U.S and forestalled any previously agreed to
talks. Mao, further, never really stopped proclaiming that China needed to support the
anti-American struggles throughout the world. Neither Nixon nor Chinese foreign
minister Zhou Enlai, however, stopped pushing the dialogue. Indeed, it was Zhou, who
helped Mao see the Americans as a way to counter Soviet Pressure.11 As a great signal
that China would be receptive to the Americans, Mao had invited his old American friend
from his revolutionary days in the Chinese Civil war, the writer Edgar Snow to visit
China. In conversations to Snow, Mao stated that he would be happy to talk to Nixon. 12
Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, understood the signal and Nixon
countered by calling for the UN to find a place for China. This call pressed the Taiwan
question, which still would not be fully answered, but both sides agreed that eventually
there would be “one China, but not now.”13 Flexibility was apparent Nixon removed the
rest of the travel restrictions to China.
Despite these advances, by early 1971, however, the leaders were again at an
impasse over the Taiwan issue and the military conflict in Vietnam. The ‘triggering
event’ to this stalemate unexpectedly in the form of ping pong. This well-known event is
10
Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: a History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia UP, 2010.
11
Ibid.
Snow, Edgar and Mao Zedong, October 1, 1970 at the National Day celebration in Tiananmen Square Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China. Web. 15 Feb. 2011.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/premade/28067/sino-us2.htm
12
13
Cohen, Warren. P218.
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called “Ping Pong Diplomacy” in both nations.14 The U.S. Ping Pong team was playing in
a tournament in Japan and, for the first time since the Cultural Revolution, China also
sent a team. During the tournament, the Chinese and American players had several
unplanned encounters with each other. The Chinese delegation reported back home to
Mao, “some American players were very friendly to our players at yesterday’s reception,
and had talked a lot.”15 This, as well as other encounters, prompted China to invite the
American ping pong team to play in China, a first time ever in the People’s Republic of
China. Nixon responded by announcing the lifting of any remaining trade restrictions,
and signaled his interest in going to China. The widespread reporting of this cultural
exchange helped to ease popularly held pre-conceptions in each country and helped
further the rapprochement of the two nations.
From this point began a series of secret trips made to China by National Security
Advisor, Henry Kissinger. These trips were set up by backdoor channels via such nations
as Pakistan and Romania. It was through the hard work of Kissinger and Zhou Enlai that
on July 15, Nixon announced to the world that Kissinger had met with Zhou and that he
had accepted an invitation to visit China the next year.16 In the mean time, the U.S.
supported the seating of the People’s Republic of China in the UN, and moved a step
closer to the “one-China” policy.17
In February 1972, Richard Nixon flew to China. He and Kissinger met with Mao
and Zhou and all of their translators and staff. It was a historic moment viewed on TV
14
Chen, Jian. Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2001. Print, p258.
Ibid.
16
Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: a History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia UP, 2010. Print. P218
17
"Kissinger's Secret Trip to China." The George Washington University. Web. 16 Mar. 2011.
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/>.
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around the world. The U.S. and China issued the joint Shanghai Communique` at the end
of the visit which pledged that both countries would work for "normalization" of relations,
expand contacts and trade opportunities. It also declared that neither the U.S., nor China would
seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and would be against any nation that attempted to do
so.
After Nixon’s visit, there were still obstacles to complete rapprochement with
China. The Taiwan issue persisted for Nixon and for future presidents as well. “It was
clear that the principal obstacle to regular diplomatic relations, to “normalization” with
China, was not the American role in Vietnam but rather Taiwan.”18 Domestic issues,
namely Watergate, prevented Nixon from finishing his international agenda. Indeed, in
the wake of Watergate, Nixon increasingly relied on conservative Republicans who
supported Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in Taiwan and who remained bitter enemies to
Communist China. Nixon’s attention to the Taiwan issue waned and so did the issue of
recognizing China in the UN. Nixon’s resignation from the presidency in 1974 led to
long delays and changes in U.S. and China’s efforts at rapprochement. It would not be
until after Mao’s death and long after Nixon left office that the UN would recognize
China, but their efforts to normalize relations had paved the way for future leaders to
continue the process. On the road to rapprochement, Nixon and Mao faced many
challenges and successes; however, eventually their historic meeting in 1972 paved the
way for future presidents and leaders to make great strides in the ongoing process of
normalization in relations.
18
Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: a History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia UP, 2010.
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Works Cited
Chen, Jian. Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina,
2001. Print.
Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: a History of Sino-American Relations.
New York: Columbia UP, 2010. Print.
"Foreign News: Leaning to One Side - TIME." Breaking News, Analysis, Politics, Blogs,
News Photos, Video, Tech Reviews - TIME.com. Sept.-Oct. 1949. Web. 12 Mar.
2011. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,800683,00.html>.
"Kissinger's Secret Trip to China." The George Washington University. Web. 16 Mar.
2011. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/>.
"Modern History Sourcebook: Pravda: Editorial: The Anti-Soviet Policy of Communist
China, February 16, 1967." FORDHAM.EDU. 02 Feb. 1967. Web. 12 Mar. 2011.
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1967pravda-china.html>.
"Rapprochement | Define Rapprochement at Dictionary.com." Dictionary.com | Free
Online Dictionary for English Definitions. Web. 14 Mar. 2011.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rapprochement.
Thompson, James. "Dragon under Glass." Atlantic Monthly Oct. 1967. The Atlantic
Online. Web. 12 Mar. 2011.
<http://http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/china/thomson1.ht
m
"White House Press Office." Nixon Presidential Library & Museum. Web. 12 Mar. 2011.
<http://nixon.archives.gov/forresearchers/find/textual/central/s.
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