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Transcript
Israeli Sociology's Position in International Sociology
and the Challenges It Faces1
Sammy Smooha, University of Haifa, Israel2
INTRODUCTION
The current social sciences have formulated their concepts, theories and research
methods on the basis of Western societies, in which only 0.7 out of 6.7 billion people
live. Western societies see their knowledge as valid and universal but it is hard to
justify this claim because, unlike in the natural sciences, it is almost impossible in the
social sciences to develop universal knowledge irrespective of its location and time.
The universality of social sciences is a project that requires participation and
cooperation of researchers from all over the world.
This particularly holds true for sociology. It is a scientific discipline that has
evolved in the twentieth century in Western Europe and North America. Its
knowledge draws on life experiences in the West. Yet, for this knowledge to be truly
universal, it has to be tested in other parts of the world. The enormous human and
social diversity demands contextualization and cross-validation of sociological
generalizations and research techniques.
As in other fields of science, Western sociology is hegemonic, and the US is by
far the leading power. The hegemonic West is where sociological knowledge is
produced, criteria of excellence in sociology are set up, most sociologists work, the
next generation of sociologists is trained, and sociological journals and funding
foundations prevail. Outside the West, data are gathered, Western theories are
applied, and other sociological activities are carried out on a small scale.
Hegemony also means that Western sociology determines the fate of other
sociologies (Connell 2007). Intellectual, academic and material dependence on
Western sociology obliges sociologists in the periphery to apply Western models that
in many cases do not fit non-Western societies well and result in sloppy science. It
also makes it very difficult to create and to maintain a high quality, autonomous, local
and critical sociology. New theories and perspectives and alternative discourses
(Alatas 2009) that emerge in the periphery do not gain international legitimacy and
potency unless they are recognized, accepted and disseminated by the West.
This situation raises two questions: How do national sociologies outside the West
manage under conditions of Western hegemony and inequality? What should they do
1
The author organized a roundtable discussion on this topic in the annual meeting of the Israeli
Sociological Society, held in February 17-18, 2009 at the Mikhlalah LeMinhal-Masloul Academie. He
wishes to thank all the invited participants without shifting any responsibility to them: Meir Amor, Sara
Helman, Deborah Kalekin-Fishma, Gustavo Mesch, Uri Ram, Zeev Rosenhek, Moshe Semyonov,
Judith Shuval, Ephraim Ya'ar, and Yuval Yonay. He wishes to thank Yuval Yonay for his comments
on the first draft of this paper.
2
The author is the President of the Israeli Sociological Society. He can be reached at
[email protected].
1
SMOOHA
2
in order to be productive and respectable and to take part in a global effort to make
sociological knowledge genuinely universal?
These questions will be taken up with regard to Israeli sociology. I will start with
discussing the forces that have made Israeli sociology Western. Then I will trace the
history of Israeli sociology. This will follow by an elaboration of how Western
sociology is practiced in Israel. The last part will deal with the practices of Israeli
sociology that should be modified and the ways in which its position in international
sociology can be raised.
DETERMINANTS OF THE CHARACTER OF ISRAELI SOCIOLOGY
The rise, shape and quality of Israeli sociology, like any other social scientific
discipline, are determined by several factors. The primary one is the existence of
social and political conditions that allow academic sociology to act and to prosper.
Democratic and well-off society would support autonomous and competent sociology
(Merton 1973; Popper 1971). Diverse and deeply divided society promotes alternative
perspectives in sociology. Another factor is the situation of science and higher
education in which sociology operates. If they have certain standards and enjoy
academic freedom and good funding, sociology would have to follow suit. The third
factor is world sociology. If it is open and inclusionary, Israeli sociology can enter.
Israeli Society
Since Israeli society is the subject matter and the empirical field for Israeli
sociologists, two questions must be explored: What kind of sociology does Israeli
society enable and support? In what trajectory does Israeli society push Israeli
sociology? In order to answer these questions, we should delineate first the distinct
features of Israeli society.
Israel within the pre-1967 borders, with an area of 20,770 sq km, has a population
of about 7 million citizens. This number excludes about 3.5 million non-citizens who
are not members of Israeli society – the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and
East Jerusalem, and the Druzes on the Golan Heights.
Israel is usually portrayed as a small state, but due to its constant growth and the
emergence of many very small states in the world during the last several decades, it is
really a medium-sized society. It has the critical mass of a medium-sized society in
terms of territory, population, GNP, geo-political location, military, niche in the
international mass-media, and global influence, without being a superpower. In all
these respects Israel does not fall behind, for instance, the four Scandinavian
countries.
Israel should be seen as a society in formation, undergoing continuous
construction and crystallization and its elites regard it as an arena for fulfilling a
vision and large-scale projects. These grand state objectives include achieving peace
and security, the repatriation of the 7.5 million Diaspora Jews, the assimilation of
Jewish immigrants, the creation of an independent and high-income economy, the
development of Hebrew culture, and Jewish settlement of lands not presently
populated by Jews.
Israel is a post-industrial, information society whose high-technology enables the
majority of the employed to work in services and to enjoy a relatively high standard
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of living. Over 75% of the Israeli workforce works in services (neither industry nor
agriculture). In 2006 the GDP per capita was $20,384 and the PPP per capita was
$24,680. Israelis' purchasing power was a bit less than that of Italians, Greeks and
New Zealanders, but only about half of US residents. At the same time, around a
quarter of the Israelis are officially classified as poor and over half of the employed
do not make enough money to pay income tax. Israel is an associate member of the
European Market, in the process of being admitted into the OECD, and its economy is
becoming increasingly globalized, privatized and deregulated.
Israel is a society with blurred geo-political and social boundaries. The state does
not have internationally recognized and secure borders. It controls areas and noncitizen populations beyond its pre-1967 borders and about 300,000 Jewish settlers live
there. Full membership in Israeli society is not clear because membership does not
overlap with citizenship and takes various degrees and shapes. While a non-ultraorthodox, Israeli-born Jew is considered a full member of society, the status of many
persons is ambiguous. Ultra-orthodox Jews have their separate institutions and
communities and avoid full participation in the economy and military service.
Palestinian-Arab citizens (17% of the total population) are outsiders in a state that
defines itself as the homeland of the Jewish people. Non-Jewish immigrants (a quarter
of the million immigrants from the former Soviet Union who arrived in the 1990s) do
not enjoy the same rights as Jewish Israelis. Israeli citizens who emigrated and live
permanently abroad and Diaspora Jews have some stake in Israeli society because the
Law of Return allows them to come over and to become instant citizens in Israel.
As a warfare society, Israel constantly mobilizes its population and resources for
coping with an enemy that threatens it. It is still in a state of hostility with the Arab
world (despite the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan) and spends 9% of its GDP
and the lion's share of foreign aid on national security. Israelis are still a nation in
arms, subject to long, mandatory, regular and reserve military service. The Israeli
military is still the most central institution in society. It plays a central role in the
identity and life experience of Israelis because the Arab-Israeli conflict is existential,
protracted, multi-dimensional, and violent. Since 1967 occupation has become a
pivotal agent of change and a key bone of contention in Israeli society and politics.
Israel is a deeply divided society. Like most societies, it has multiple divisions, but
it is deeply divided between Arab and Jewish citizens and between religious and
secular Jews. The Arab minority and the Jewish orthodox and ultra-orthodox
minorities are separated from the mainstream in culture, institutions and communities,
and are dissident in ideology. The disagreements are sharp and ideological, and the
level of mobilization and struggle of these minorities is high. Israel is liable to intense
internal conflicts, mass unrest and political instability, which are common in deeply
divided societies like Sudan, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. Yet, it maintains political
stability and ethnic and religious quiet.
Israel is a democratic society. It maintains all the democratic procedures such as
separation of powers, a multi-party system, regular elections, changeover of
governments, free media, impartial judiciary, and a military under civilian rule. It
grants civil and political rights to all permanent residents who wish to be its citizens.
Yet, Israeli democracy is a diminished democracy: it lacks a constitution and does not
sufficiently protect individual and minority rights; it has a permanent emergency state
(since its proclamation in 1948) that provides the military with sweeping powers; it
lacks de facto separation between state and religion causing ample religious coercion;
and it accords Jews with preferred status while denying rights and freedoms to a
substantial part of the population who live under protracted occupation (since 1967).
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Unlike other revolutionary Western societies, such as France and the United
States, that ceased to be revolutionary, Israel is still an ideological society. Zionism
sets the priorities, the thoughts and actions of the elites and masses. It is hegemonic.
The idea that a Jewish state should serve Jews’ demography, security, wellbeing,
interests, culture, language, and symbolic system, is taken for granted. As a visionary
state, Israel implements large-scale projects. The policy of all Israeli governments has
remained more ideological than pragmatic.
Israel is a Jewish society in which the cultural heritage and interests of the Jews
predominate. It is legally defined as a Jewish and democratic state. It sees itself as the
successor of the Jewish Commonwealth that was destroyed by the Romans in 70AD.
Zionism is a de facto state ideology. There is a large and permanent Jewish majority
and the state sees its main duty as the consolidatation and enlargement of the Jewish
majority. Hebrew is the dominant language. The Law of Return determines
population policy. There are ramified relations between Israel and the Jewish
Diaspora. The heroes, days of remembrance and commemoration, names of places
and streets, and the calendar, of the state are Jewish. Jews as individuals and as a
community enjoy state preference.
Finally, Israel is an overburdened society whose political system is over-occupied
with lingering heavy difficulties. Many of Israel’s problems are still unsettled. They
have cumulated and exacerbated over the years. The main barriers for successfully
grappling with the hurdles are the existence of deep divisions that make it difficult to
reach agreements and compromises, the low governability of the political system
(many political parties, governments composed of coalitions, an executive branch
devoid of sufficient powers), and the gradual disappearance of effective and
charismatic leaders.
The historical development of Israeli society is also important. The State of Israel
was established by the new Jewish community that was formed during the first half of
the twentieth century. One of the responses to the “Jewish Question” in Europe was
the creation of the Zionist movement that stands for the normalization of the Jewish
people. This radical remedy calls for the return of Jews to their historical homeland,
the construction of a new Jewish society, a new Hebrew language, a new Hebrew
culture, a new Jew, and a new Jewish state. The newcomers managed in several
decades to implement this revolution in Jewish life, cumulating in the proclamation of
the State of Israel in 1948. While this grand project for Jews meant a national
liberation, the indigenous Palestinian-Arab people experienced it as colonialism, and
their resistance to it led to their dispossession, the destruction of hundreds of villages
and towns, the exiling of half of the people, denial of statehood, and, since 1967,
subjection to continued and burdensome occupation.
The new Jewish state and society were formed by the political and social left. The
left stood for a separate Jewish society, social-democratic values, new social forms
(the Kibbutz, the Moshav, the Histadrut, youth movements), and a Jewish state in part
of the Land of Israel only, thereby enabling the formation of a separate Palestinian
state. Its creativity and popular support were on the wane, and in 1977 it lost power to
the right which has dominated politics and policies since then.
In addition to the political shift to the right, Israel has been undergoing other
large-scale transformations. Phenomenal growth has been taking place in population,
land settlement, built-up area, the economy, the standard of living and the level of
education. Globalization was another decisive trend, intensifying Israel’s integration
into the world economic and state system and reshaping the role of the state. The
privatization of state companies and services complements these changes.
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Liberalization is an additional process that has reoriented Israelis to a discourse of and
insistence on individual rights and liberties, personal interests, neo-liberal values, and
a de-emphasis of social solidarity and cohesion.
These processes of change caused further fragmentation of Israeli society. The
hegemony of the founding East European Jewish group was gradually replaced by
dominance. Various population groups moved from the periphery toward the center
but have remained peripheral. They include Mizrahim (Near Eastern Jews), Russian
and Ethiopian immigrants, ultra-orthodox Jews, and Arab citizens – they make
together the large majority of the Israeli population.3
What are the implications of these changing features and trends of Israeli society
for Israeli sociology? First and foremost, Israel is sufficiently democratic to allow the
existence of independent social sciences and humanities in general and sociology as
an autonomous science in particular. Despite the imperfections and low quality of
Israeli democracy, it is open, stable and vibrant enough to permit the operation and
even the flourishing of an independent academic sociology. Second, Israel can
economically afford the prevalence of sociology as a research, teaching, and academic
endeavor. This is true despite the fact that sociology is not a practical and policyoriented profession. Third, the strong orientation of Israel to the West would push
Israel to develop sociology according to Western standards. Fourth, the pluralistic
structure of Israeli society would in the long run encourage the rise of pluralistic
sociology. A significantly heterogeneous and conflict-laden society, like Israel, is an
optimal platform for pluralistic sociology with different schools of thought,
methodologies and latent ideologies. It is not easy to maintain a continuous hegemony
in a democratic and divided society because the non-dominant groups are granted
sufficient space to voice grievances, to conduct struggle and to form opposing views
and ideologies. Yet, since it is really hard to shatter group dominance and hierarchy,
equality of popularity and impact and fair competition of different streams in
pluralistic sociology should not be expected.
And finally, Israel’s distinct features make it a paradise for sociologists. Israeli
society is new, changing appreciably and quickly, highly diverse, deeply divided,
receiving constant waves of immigrants, creating novel social forms, and full of
problems, ambiguities and challenges. Sociologists who study Israel have the
privilege of observing, as in a laboratory, how social patterns are forming,
crystallizing and transforming.
Israeli Science and Academia
Sociology is part and parcel of Israel's science. Hence, it takes the same shape that
other scientific disciplines have taken in the Israeli academia.
From their inception, Israel's sciences and institutions of higher learning have
developed according to Western standards. The pioneering academic and research
institutes were the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (founded in 1925), the TechnionIsrael Institute of Technology (founded in 1924), and the Weizmann Institute of
Science (formally opened in 1949 but with beginnings in the 1930s). All of them were
3
For an overall analysis of Israeli society, see Eisenstadt 1985; Rebhun and Waxman 2004; Shafir and
Peled 2002; Kimmerling 2001; Dowty 1998; Horowitz and Lissak 1989.
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established by Jewish scientists from Europe, designed to be European, and geared to
become institutes of global excellence.
Science and technology took their shape during the 1950s, Israel's first formative
decade. The government, led by Ben-Gurion, resolved to make them leading
undertakings in Israeli society, and secured their high level by providing the necessary
institutional arrangements. Established by law in 1958, the Council on Higher
Education was entrusted with the exclusive authority to establish and to accredit
institutions of higher learning and their academic programs and degrees. The law
provides for full academic freedom and self-administration of the academic
institutions despite their state funding. The standards for accreditation of institutions
and appointments and promotions of academic staff were set to meet Western levels.
During the 1960s, new universities were opened as branches of the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem and became independent during the 1970s. In addition to
local graduates, the new universities recruited faculty from graduates of top American
universities and some from Great Britain. These recruitment procedures consolidated
the Western nature of Israeli science.
During the 1990s scores of colleges were recognized in addition to the seven
research universities. A two-tier system of 63 institutions emerged: a top tier of
research universities and a bottom tier of mostly undergraduate colleges (most of
them are not funded by the state; no community colleges are in existence). As a result
the system of higher education shifted from elite to mass education, allowing for
further expansion of the middle class and for the upgrading of the economy.
Israel has indeed succeeded in reaching Western levels and contacts in the
academia, science and technology. The participation rate in tertiary education in 2005
was 55% in Israel as compared to 51% average in 15 EU countries. Universities in
Israel are of high quality in terms of citation indexes and rankings. For instance, Tel
Aviv University ranks third among 35 top European universities and 147th among the
top 500 universities globally, with a mean of 20.8 citations per faculty (Brezis 2008).
The national expenditure on research and development (R&D) as a percentage of
GDP in Israel in 2006 was 4.5%, the highest of all OECD countries; and the index for
final expenditure on R&D per capita was 118.4 for Israel as compared to 100 baseline
for the US, ranking third among members of OECD (CBS 2008: Table 28.14).
Israel has very strong academic and scientific ties with the West. In science, it is
an associated member of the EU, which underwrites a lot of joint projects and plenty
of co-authored papers by Israeli and EU scientists (Bar-Ilan, Glänzel, and Zimmerman
2008). Israel-US cooperation in research and development is intense, evident in joint
projects and papers, and in the fact that many Israelis do their doctoral and postdoctoral studies, spend sabbaticals, attend conferences, and settle down in the US.
Israel’s academic and scientific integration into the West is very asymmetric,
however. Israeli students attend Western universities, Israeli scientists work in the
West and receive grants from the West, but only few international students study in
Israel and few international scientists work in Israel. Israeli-Jewish university
graduates and scientists immigrate to the US, while there is almost no parallel inflow
of non-Jews to Israel. The reasons for this skewed internationalization of science in
Israel are rather clear. Hebrew language is a formidable obstacle. Israel’s character as
a Jewish state means that a non-Jew encounters serious difficulties in obtaining Israeli
citizenship and in being accepted as a full member of society. There is also no
economic incentive because salaries in Israel are a half to two-third the salaries in the
West. Furthermore, the security situation deters foreign students and scientists from
coming and settling down in Israel.
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A combination of factors accounts for the Israeli success story in science. They
include the high investment in R&D, a highly educated workforce, the high
technology of Israel Defense Forces, an inflow of highly skilled immigrants from the
West and the former Soviet Union, a post-industrial economy, a spirit of
entrepreneurialism, and ongoing government support (Bar-Ilan, Glänzel, and
Zimmerman 2008).
The more critical question is, nevertheless, what drives Israel to integrate into the
West in science and technology. Collective identity is a prime mover. Israel has the
self and international image of a Western state. The founding elite wished to create a
Western state and society for Jews. If Israel is a center of scientific excellence, it
would live up to these expectations and aspirations. Since over 90% of contemporary
Diaspora Jews live in the West, if Israel becomes a Third world country it would lose
its appeal to them and might cease to be the homeland of the Jewish people.
An additional consideration is Israel's small to medium size. Limited size restricts
the economic potential and global influence and increases the threat of parochialism
and isolation (Ben-David 1964). The menace of localism also inheres in the national
language (Hebrew) that only a fraction of the world population knows. Development
of science and technology is the most effective means to overcome small or modest
size. Integration into the successful and powerful West clears the way for growth,
competition for ample resources, and the need to meet higher standards. The sure way
to escape parochialism is to compete in the global scientific market.
A third and decisive drive for incorporation into the West is the prolonged and
bitter conflict with the Arab world. It is believed that Israel can survive in its hostile
environment only if it maintains a quality edge over its neighbors. Only if it is
superior in know-how to its enemies, it can stay alive. Israel cannot afford losing any
war or lingering behind Arab or Moslem states that reject and even seek to eliminate
it if possible. National resilience requires high standards of education and science. If
Israel integrates into the West, it also receives protection from and access to Western
resources. While it is a felt necessity to excel and to Westernize, it is also a validation
of the negative view that Israel is a foreign body in the Arab East. This is a vicious
circle that further propels Israel to widen the quality gap with its Arab and Moslem
neighbors.
The implication of the nature of academia and science in Israel for Israeli
sociology is clear. Israeli sociology has no choice but to be Western because it is part
and parcel of the Israeli academic and scientific system which is Western. Academic
sociologists who do not play according to Western rules cannot survive in Israeli
academia.
International Sociology
The nature of international sociology determines the space open for Israeli sociology.
Sociology emerged as a separate academic discipline in the West in the twentieth
century. Over the years sociology spread to non-Western countries and its world
center shifted in the 1930s from Western Europe to the US.
Although world-system theory is mostly economic analysis, we may benefit from
applying it to "sociology world system". Suppose we put Western countries in the
core category of sociologies, with US sociology as the hegemonic sociology, and the
sociologies in Great Britain, Germany, France and Canada as advanced players, and
the sociologies in other Western countries at the margin of the core. It is possible to
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place in the semi-periphery the sociologies in Japan, India, Russia, Brazil, as well as
the sociologies in Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic, to name just a few. The
remaining national sociologies would fit into the periphery. Membership in these
three categories is determined by the amount of scientific resources and knowledge
output, and by relations of dependency and subordination.
Sociologists in the contemporary world face, both as individuals and members of
communities of scholars, the hegemony of US sociology. As indicated above, the
hegemony of US sociology draws on enormous resources and substantial yield. There
are numerous departments and research centers of sociology in the US with thousands
of academic and non-academic full-time sociologists. They train hundreds of graduate
students and host many visiting international sociologists. Several foundations fund a
large number of sociological studies. There are many sociological journals in which
considerable numbers of articles are annually published. This also holds true for
publishers of books. Countless national, regional, and specialized conferences are
held every year.
US sociology is mostly academic. Sociologists engage with each other and stay
away from the general public, policy makers and mass media. They do not have a
political agenda. They shy away from public sociology (Burawoy 2005). Yet, US
sociologists are more involved in public affairs and make more social critiques than
other social scientists.
In Israeli eyes, US sociology is different from the image in the minds of its heavy
critics both within and outside the US. Although US sociology builds largely on
empirical data and studies of US society, it is aware of this limitation on its
universality and remains open to international input.4 Sociology departments in the
US accept graduate students and international faculty as visitors and permanent
members. American journals welcome foreign contributions. Professional
associations and conferences admit non-US participants. Some US foundations fund
foreign sociological research. To put it in clearly favorable terms, American sociology
is willing to share its wealthy resources with sociologists in other countries.
Furthermore and most importantly, US sociology is regarded by Israeli
sociologists as pluralistic. Since the turning point in the late 1960s, it has become
quite diverse. Quantative and qualitative research methods are widespread and
legitimate. All kinds of theories and conceptual schemes are available. For instance,
Marxist, neo-Marxist and post-Marxist theories abound. Likewise, there are colonial
and post-colonial models, as well as assimilationist, transnational, and multicultural
approaches, and also feminism, queer, network and rational choice perspectives, to
name just a few. US sociologists adopt new perspectives from other countries such as
dependency theory from Latin America and ideas from European critical thinkers
such as Foucault, Bourdieu, Habermas and Gramsci. While it has liberal and
conservative sides, US mainstream sociology is predominantly liberal and left of
center ideologically.
The hegemony of US sociology is far from being despotic, exploitative,
condescending, and exclusionist. Non-US sociologies can cooperate with it and avail
4
In an unpublished study of the publications in American Sociological Review, American Journal of
Sociology, and Social Forces, in the years 2006 and 2007, it was found that 62 to 67 percent of the
articles focus on the US, while the rest are either international or about other countries (McDaniel
2009). The fact that 33 to 38 percent of the articles in these top sociology journals focus on non-US
countries should be considered high – contrary to the author's interpretation – and greatly appreciated,
demonstrating the openness of US journals to other parts of the world.
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themselves of its enormous resources. Everyone can find in US sociology things he or
she likes.5
The pluralistic character of US sociology, as seen by Israeli sociologists of
different schools of thought, makes it a positive frame of reference and a good
partner. Israeli sociologists feel close to it and even part of it.
Phases in the History of Israeli Sociology
Israeli sociology has undergone several stages (Herzog 2000, 2009; Ram 1995, 2006).
The initial stage took place from the 1920s to the 1940s, by and large before the
proclamation of the state in 1948. The three founding fathers of sociology were
Arthur Ruppin, Martin Buber and Arye Tartakover, all of them worked at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. They were educated in Europe. Their main interest was the
sociology of the Jewish people. They saw the new Jewish community in the Land of
Israel/Palestine (nicknamed “the Yishuv”) as one of the Jewish communities around
the world. At that time there was no sociology department at the Hebrew University,
and the sociological study of Jewry was part of the humanities. Although all of these
scholars were self-styled Zionists and committed to the Jewish people, they deviated
from the mainstream views dominant in the Yishuv, and were among the leading
figures in a movement that rejected the idea of a separate Jewish state and advocated a
binational state. In their scientific works, they combined global-cosmopolitan and
local-national perspectives.
Israeli sociology practically began in 1949 when a Sociology Department was
established at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, led by S.N. Eisenstadt from 1950
to the mid 1960s. Eisenstadt shaped the character of the emerging Israeli sociology.
He shifted the unit of analysis from the Jewish people to Israeli-Jewish society. He
determined that Israeli sociology should always deal with universal issues and
investigate them using Israeli and non-Israeli data. Moreover, he argued that the
theories and methodologies of Israeli sociology should be the same as those of
Western sociology and the only difference may be in the data used. These rules
ensured the integration of Israeli sociology into Western sociology. Eisenstadt and his
students studied many contemporary issues in Israel such as Jewish immigrants and
their absorption, ethnic tensions between European and non-European Jews, and the
life in Moshavim and kibbutzim, and even advised the authorities in these matters.
They conceived of these local and peculiar questions in universal-theoretical terms of
immigration, melting pot, modernization, nation-building, and the study of
agricultural cooperatives.
While Eisenstadt himself published several influential books on Israeli society,
most of his numerous and important works are not on Israel but rather on modernities,
empires, civilizations, generations, comparative politics, change, and many other
issues that cut across the social sciences and humanities. He personified and led the
universalization of Israeli sociology, and pushed his students in this direction. He
contributed to the theories of modernization and functionalism-structuralism. His
student Joseph Ben-David advanced the sociology of science and another student Eric
Cohen developed the sociology of tourism.
5
Uniform US economics as a science stands in sharp contrast to pluralistic US sociology. It is
neoliberal in theory and ideology and standard in research methods. It streamlines economics all over
the world according to a single mold.
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The change of Israeli society during the 1970s left its deep mark on Israeli
sociology. The Labor establishment lost its hegemony and the right wing ascended to
power. Many groups both in the center and periphery challenged the status quo.
Substantial changes took place in the system of higher education in general and in
sociology in particular. Tel Aviv University, the University of Haifa and Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev became independent with departments of sociology or
behavioral science. The Sociology Department at the Hebrew University lost its
monopoly and even its centrality. Control of the Israeli Sociological Society, which
was established in 1967, gradually moved from the Hebrew University to Tel Aviv
University and then to other universities.
In addition to the transformation of Israeli society, the turning point in Israeli
sociology in the late 1970s was caused by changes in the Israeli and Western
humanities and social sciences. Critical schools in history, philosophy, arts, law,
education, anthropology and psychology took shape and potency. The Zionist
ideology and narrative that had nourished social science writings were challenged.
Specialists in the humanities and social sciences, many of them trained abroad, began
to apply ideas and theories from the West to Israeli society and history, and offered
alternative interpretations of the mainstream ideas of the founding generation of
scholars. Israeli sociology was part of this deep transformation which was a delayed
reaction to the profound transformation that had swept humanities and social sciences
in the US and Western Europe since the late 1960s. Mainstream and conservative
streams of thought lost their exclusive power. As US sociology lost its core and
became pluralistic, encompassing diverse theories and methodologies, Israeli
sociology followed suit. The change was prompted by the crises caused by the 1973
war, the ascendance to power for the first time in 1977 of the political right, and the
First Lebanon War of 1982. These crises dispelled national myths and narratives,
engendered distrust in the system, and enhanced the readiness for a new critical
discourse among the public at large, the humanities and social scientists, and the
sociologists.
By the mid 1980s Israeli sociology had become pluralistic in many respects, much
like American sociology. Sociologists worked in different universities, studied
different issues, applied different theories and methods, and proposed rivaling
analyses. The new stream of critical sociology took hold and permeated various
spheres alongside mainstream sociology, and after the mid 1990s a new stream of
radical sociology gradually emerged from the midst of critical sociology.
In most of the numerous colleges that were founded since the 1990s, separate
behavioral science departments were built. Sociology became a cornerstone in them,
thereby expanding significantly the number of academic sociologists in Israel. The
limited research that is conducted in these colleges follows, nevertheless, the same
Western standards prevalent in Israeli research universities.
ISRAELI SOCIOLOGY AS WESTERN SOCIOLOGY
In What Way Is Israeli Sociology Western?
The Western nature of Israeli sociology is evident in many respects (Ben-Yehuda
1997). The following are the most pivotal features of the Western character of
sociology in Israeli research universities.
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Theories and research methods. Israeli academic sociologists are knowledgeable
of and use the diverse and advanced theories and methods of Western sociology. They
apply the entire gamut of theoretical perspectives, including colonialism, postcolonialism, post-modernism, post-nationalism, multiculturalism, multiple modernity,
globalization, feminism, networks, rational choice theory, and homosexual/lesbian
analysis. They make use of all kinds of quantative and qualitative methods, including
cutting edge techniques such as structural equation modeling and social network
analysis.
Publications. Israeli sociologists are geared to publish mostly in American
journals. Rather than descriptive accounts of the Israeli case, Israeli sociological
papers apply and test general theories, using Israel as an empirical field. Publishing in
high ranking journals is the explicit goal.
English language. Most of the Israeli sociological publications are in English.
There are only one Hebrew journal in sociology and one Hebrew journal in behavioral
sciences.6 These two periodicals cannot possibly include the high output of Israeli
sociologists. Some of the Hebrew publications appear also in English, but not the
other way round, because English is considered a superior language in sociological
publications in Israel. The rationale for the insistence on English is double –
competition on the world scientific market encourages the production of high quality
knowledge and promotes excellence, and reaching a world audience breeds
international exposure, the use of the scientific findings as well as national reputation
and pride.
Promotions. Procedures for recruitment and promotions are strictly Western. The
standards are contributions to science, to students and to the institution, of which
contribution to science is the main yardstick. It is measured by number and quality of
articles in top-ranking English journals. Publications in non-English languages
(Hebrew, German, French, Spanish, Arabic, Russian, etc.) and book chapters (in any
language) either do not count or are given limited weight under special conditions. An
ad hoc confidential committee is set up for every candidate for promotion. Reviews
from around six peer referees from top universities in the West, mostly in the US, are
decisive. The critical question each referee is asked is whether the candidate would be
promoted in one's own institution. The criterion for winning the top title of (associate
or full) professor is reputation and leadership in the international community. To
reach the rank of full professor after recruitment to a tenure-track appointment, an
Israeli sociologist needs to pass four reviews (for recruitment to lecturer, and for
promotion to the ranks of a senior lecturer, an associate professor, and a full
professor) as compared to three reviews in the US.
Conferences. Israeli sociologists take part in American sociological conferences in
their area of interest and in the annual meeting of the American Sociological
Association. Some also participate in European and international conferences.
Participation in these types of conferences is a path to creating an international
reputation. On the other hand, since participation in the annual meeting of the Israeli
Sociological Society is not highly rewarding, most Israeli academic sociologists do
not attend it after they reach tenure (at the rank of a senior lecturer).
Research grants. The lion's share of funding for sociological research in Israel
comes from the ISF (Israel Science Foundation), Israel Foundations Trustees (the
6
Established in 1999 and appearing twice a year, the sociological journal is called Sociologia
Yisralelit. It is published by the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Tel Aviv University,
and is sponsored by the Israeli Sociological Society and distributed to its members. The behavioral
science journal is Megamot, appears six times a year, and is published by the Szold Foundation.
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12
Israeli branch of the Ford Foundation), GIF (German-Israeli Foundation), BSF
(United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation), and several government offices.
Applications are usually submitted in English in order to allow for international
reviewing. Standards are strictly Western, competition is tough, and rejection rates are
extremely high.
Networking. Israeli academic sociologists maintain ties with Western colleagues
in their specialty through membership in sections and research committees in
professional associations, distribution lists, conferences, workshops, invited talks, coauthorships, and sabbatical leaves. They regard networking greatly for its scientific
merits and access it yields to valuable resources.
Doctoral and post-doctoral studies. Israeli research universities have graduate
studies in sociology. It takes about three years to complete a masters degree with a
research thesis and about five additional years to obtain a doctoral degree. While postdoctoral fellowships are available, a sociologist who receives a doctoral degree in
Israel has to pursue post-doctoral studies in the West in order to get a tenure-track job
in an Israeli research university. Quite few Israelis do their graduate studies in
sociology in leading universities in North America and Great Britain, and they are
informally given preference in recruitment to locally trained Israelis.
Sabbatical and other leaves. A regular academic position in a research university
in Israel is entitled for a full sabbatical year. Academic sociologists usually spend
their sabbatical and non-sabbatical leaves in the US. The time is used for research,
writing, teaching, meeting with colleagues, and attending conferences. The latent
functions of these leaves are to gain a better command of English, a deeper
understanding of Western civilization, increase the chances for immigration (“brain
drain”), and the enhancement of Israel studies abroad.
Curricula. A bachelor degree in sociology in Israeli universities and colleges is a
specialized degree requiring 60 credits to complete while the course load for a masters
degree with a thesis is around 30 and without a thesis is around 40 credits. Most of the
teaching material is either in English or in Hebrew translation of English writings and
textbooks. The goal is to foster in the students Western analytical thinking and
familiarity with theories and research methods. Students are heavily exposed to
Western sociology. The only Israeli material is a required course on Israeli society.
International evaluation of departments. The Council on Higher Education began
in the academic year 2004-05 to evaluate university departments. Each year
departments in a given field all over the country are evaluated by an international
committee consisting of leading professors from the US with some from Europe. Each
department submits a detailed self-evaluation in English, the committee makes
campus visits and issues a report, and the departments are expected to follow the
committees' recommendations. This auditing system is intended to bring Israeli
university departments to top Western standards. There are plans to evaluate
sociology departments all over the state in the academic year 2009-10.
Where Is Israeli Sociology Located in International Sociology?
It can be argued that Israeli sociology belongs to the bottom of the Western core. The
main consideration for this classification within the Western core is its clear Western
character, strong ties with Western sociology, Western self-identity and deep
identification with US sociology. The international image of Israeli sociology is also
Western. The inclusion of Israeli sociology in the core is further justified by the fact
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that it is not dominated by the Western core but is rather accepted and treated as a
regular core member.
The low status of Israeli sociology within the Western core is due to its lower
output and influence. Israeli sociologists apply, but do not produce, theories and
methodologies. They publish in Western journals but do not have English journals in
which Westerners publish. They occasionally serve on advisory boards of Western
journals but do not control these journals. They receive research grants from Western
foundations, but do not give grants to Western sociologists. They frequent Western
sociological conferences, while Western sociologists do not attend Israeli conferences
unless they are extended special paid invitations. They receive training and spend
sabbatical leaves in the West, but not the other way round. They need
recommendations from Western sociologists for their promotions, but not vice versa.
Moreover, Israeli sociological publications are well cited, but almost always in
reference to the empirical case of Israel and not as general, theoretical, or
methodological references.
This set of practices reveals Israeli sociologists' meager impact and marginality
within the Western core.
Is Israeli Sociology Pluralistic like Western Sociology?
As mentioned above, by the mid 1980s Israeli sociology had become pluralistic in
many respects, much like US sociology. By the end of the 2000s, Israeli sociologists
work in different universities and colleges, study a variety of issues, apply numerous
theories, use all kinds of quantative and qualitative methods, including the most
advanced techniques, and propose rivaling analyses. Almost all areas of interest are
found in Israeli sociology, including stratification, labor market, organizations,
education, social movements, politics, military, demography, immigration, culture,
consumption, religion, mass media, family, health, crime, body, gender, and ethnicity.
In the annual meeting of the Israeli Sociological Society held in mid February 2009,
120 papers were presented in these areas.
The pluralistic nature of contemporary Israeli sociology can be best demonstrated
by its three schools of thought that coexist and compete in the study of Israeli society.
These are mainstream, critical, and radical sociology. They fit well the pluralistic
nature of Israeli society, and by offering competing versions of the reality and future
vision, they make sociology open and relevant. They differ markedly on many core
issues, among which are colonialism, societal boundaries, democracy, centrality of the
Israeli-Arab conflict, Zionism, the desirable character of the state, the nature of
sociological knowledge, and the role of the sociologist (Smooha 2009).
The mainstream school is the oldest and most dominant, though no longer
hegemonic. It is the default position of most Israeli sociologists who implicitly or
explicitly accept the mainstream assumptions about Israeli society. According to the
mainstream perspective, Israeli society is a non-colonial nation: its boundaries are
confined to the pre-1967 borders and exclude the Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip; the political system is a Western liberal democracy; the Israeli-Arab
conflict is not a formative factor in the crystallization of Israeli society and its
institutions; Zionism is a national liberation movement of the Jewish people and the
ideology underpinning the State of Israel; and Israel should remain a Jewish-Zionist
and democratic state as it declares itself to be. These are the tenets of the founding
fathers of Israeli sociology and the first generation of sociologists that they raised.
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According to the Israeli mainstream sociology, the role of the sociologist is to produce
professional knowledge and to put it to the service of the state when requested. The
produced scientific knowledge is objective and the sociologist should be ready to
harness it for the benefit of the public.7
The critical stream questions most of the stances of the mainstream on the core
issues, but critical sociologists differ from each other in the extent of their
disagreement. For this reason, the camp of critical sociologists which has grown from
the mid 1970s has become quite heterogeneous. For instance, with regard to the issue
of colonialism, the critics think that there is a colonial or post-colonial element in
Israeli society, but they do not systematically apply the colonial model to the study of
Israeli society. They have reservations about the characterization of the political
regime as a Western-liberal democracy, and see it rather as a second-rate democracy.
They attribute a certain formative weight to the Israeli-Arab conflict. Concerning the
sociologist's role, they reckon that it is not easy to produce impartial scientific
knowledge but that one should strive to do so. They concede biases in research,
support intervention in social problems and seek social change. In their attitude
toward these and other core issues, critical sociologists take a midway position
between mainstream and radical sociologists.
Radical sociology draws on a small number of sociologists emerging from among
critical sociologists in the mid 1990s. Radical sociologists reject most of the views of
the main- and critical streams. They conceive of Israel as a colonial or post-colonial
society: its boundaries expand to wherever the Israeli military controls and hence its
population includes the non-citizen Palestinians under occupation; Israel is not a
democracy because it violates the principle of equality between all citizens, and
especially between Arabs and Jews and between women and men; the Arab-Israeli
conflict is a formative dispute that shapes social institutions and propels significant
societal transformations; Zionism is a nationalist, colonialist and racist movement that
should vanish; the state should become a civic-liberal or binational state in which all
citizens or national populations will be equal; Israel has to disengage from the Jewish
Diaspora and become a multicultural society in the fullest ideological sense, namely, a
society of diverse communities such as Arabs, ultra-orthodox Jews, Ashkenazim,
Mizrahim, Russians, Ethiopians, and more. The role of the sociologist is to enlist
one’s scientific discipline for advancing this political agenda. The sociologist should
be involved and work for social change. Knowledge is not objective but rather a
means for change.
The pluralistic character of Israeli sociology shows the high degree of academic
freedom and autonomy granted in Israeli society to academia in general and sociology
in particular.8 More generally, it demonstrates that Western sociology, in which Israeli
sociology is a member, is far from being homogeneous and closed-minded but rather
diverse and tolerant of various views, including radical sociology whose ideas are
7
Israeli mainstream sociologists feel uneasy about the rise of critical and radical streams of sociology
and label the 1990s as the lost decade of Israeli sociology (Apestein 2003).
8
The strong neoliberal pressure that the Israeli government has been exerting on Israeli research
universities since the general faculty strike of 1994 creates much apprehension in the academia. The
demands are for public accountability, financial responsibility and restructuring, to be manifested in
professional administration, increased differentiation of salaries, introduction of personal non-tenured
contracts, more power to the board of governors, greater weight to financial considerations, more
orientation of research to industry and public policy, and independent evaluations on regular basis. It is
feared that these comprehensive reforms would weaken the autonomy of the universities and the
academic freedom of their academic staff, and would especially hard hit critical, non-policy and nonpublic sciences, among which sociology is one of the most vulnerable disciplines (Helman 2009).
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censured as “subversive” and “anti-Israeli” by the Jewish majority and Zionist
establishment.
The pluralistic makeup of Israeli sociology stops short, however, of the social
composition of Israeli sociologists. They are by and large Jewish, European, male,
native-born, of upper-middle class, secular, and resident of the urban center. Israeli
sociology has become more representative over the years but this select and privileged
group continues to represent the perspectives of the dominant group in Israeli society.
Is Israeli sociology Universal or Sui Generis?
From its inception Israeli sociology has developed as a member of Western sociology
and escaped the destiny of sui generis sociology.
Doing sociology in Israel is by design like doing sociology in the US, Great
Britain and other Western countries. It is the goal and common practice to
conceptualize any research question in general and theoretical terms and to utilize
standard methods to investigate it, so that Israeli data would look as common, nonunique data, and the research project would look as a standard project conducted in a
Western research university. This approach saves sociology from degeneration into
myopic parochialism and into a set of idiosyncratic, descriptive and historical
accounts, devoid of theoretical and universal value and deprived of the valid
knowledge cumulated over time about the research question under investigation. By
playing according to the Western rules, Israeli sociologists insure acceptance into
Western-US sociology and entitlement to its material, prestigious and symbolic goods
– grants, journals, book publishers, conferences, distribution lists, sabbatical leaves,
and most importantly recommendation letters for promotion.
Another driving force behind universal sociology is the vested interest in the
normalization and legitimization of Israeli society by presenting it as essentially
similar to Western societies. The strong Western orientation and self-image of Israeli
elites, including sociologists, ease the task of viewing and analyzing Israel as a
Western social type. The fact that Israel has indeed certain Western features eases its
sociological treatment as Western.
The great gains of molding Israeli sociology in a Western mold incur costs to
Israeli sociologists, however. The “public” part of Israeli sociology is much weaker
than the “professional” part, although greater than in US sociology. What in particular
inhibit public sociology in Israel are the limited writings in Hebrew.
Yet, the real price paid is the unavoidable distortion of sui generis Israeli realities.
The view of Israel as Western requires one to underplay, to explain away, or even to
disregard the un-Western features and their repercussions. In order to maintain such
an outlook one must ignore the facts that Israel declares itself to be the homeland of
the Jewish people, not of its citizens, that no “Israeli people” consisting of all Israeli
Jewish and non-Jewish citizens is in existence, and that there is no de facto separation
between state and religion. This is also the practice of non-mainstream sociologists.
For example, radical sociologists analyze Israeli society by the colonial model. They
have to explain away many non-colonialist properties such as that Jewish “settlers”
had pre-existing ties and claims to the land, did not have colonialist intentions, the
land had little resources to offer, and the “settlers” were not emissaries of any mother
country (empire).
Sociologists could have drawn on Israeli data for rectifying and universalizing the
Western models that have evolved on the basis of Western experience. They hardly do
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16
so. Because of their clear bias against sui generis sociology, they find it sufficient to
apply Western ideas to Israel and to take exception of the differences. Mainstream
sociologists miss the opportunity to develop a new model or to present a revised
Western model based on Israel.9 In the same vein, radical sociologists "normalize"
Israel by presenting it as a typically colonial society. They do not seize upon the
possibility of contributing a novel model of colonialism or a major corrective to the
colonialism literature.
The Challenges for Israeli Sociology
It is both inappropriate and unrealistic to expect of Israeli sociology to disengage from
Western sociology. It is against its self-view and self-interest. It is like asking
Western sociology to stop being Western. The same claims made to Western
sociology apply to Israeli sociology because it is part and parcel of the Western camp.
Any step to ameliorate Western sociology can also strengthen Israeli sociology. Yet,
even if Israeli sociology remains Western, it can take measures to reach a better
balance in its orientation and practices. Some of the possible changes are briefly
spelled out below.
Greater appreciation of uniqueness. Israel is not a regular Western society and
state. It deviates from Western patterns in many areas (Smooha 2005). Israeli
peculiarities should be more seriously considered. Greater appreciation of the unique
features of Israel will increase both the understanding of Israel and the contribution of
Israeli sociology to world sociology (Shenhav 2000).
Israeli sociologists should be more mindful of the special conditions and
characteristics of Israeli phenomenon under investigation when they apply general
models. They should avoid imposing these models on Israeli data so as not to distort
or misinterpret the data.
Israeli sociologists can contribute to global sociology by showing how the Israeli
experience bears on general models. Since any theory applies only under specified
conditions, its testing in Israeli society can help reformulate the theory and these
conditions. This is the sure way to universalize Western sociology that is based on
Western experience. By doing so, Israeli sociologists can be more innovative in their
contributions to world sociology and go beyond the presentation of Israeli data and
application of Western theories to them.
More comparative studies. Paradoxically the benefits of a greater appreciation of
uniqueness can also be achieved by conducting more comparative studies that include
Israel. Israel will be better understood when compared with other societies and states.
The inclusion of Israel in comparative studies can improve general models. As a case
in a comparative study, semi-Western Israel can facilitate the contextualization of
theoretical generalizations.
More public. Israeli sociology should become more public in order to be more
relevant and contributive to society. This necessitates more attention to practical
implications, engagement with policy makers, the media, and the public at large. One
unintended outcome of this reorientation might be greater attraction of students to
sociology.
9
There are some exceptions, one of which is “the model of ethnic democracy” (Smooha 2002), a new
non-Western type of political system, neither liberal nor consociational, a model generalized from the
Israeli political regime and applied elsewhere.
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In order to become more public, Israeli sociologists should publish more in the
local language. While it is easier and more patriotic to write in Hebrew and to reach
the Israeli public, it is rather disadvantageous. Since knowledge of Hebrew in the
world is very limited, Hebrew writing would cut off Israeli sociologists from world
sociology. This damage can be minimized if a critical mass of the sociological
writings will appear both in English and Hebrew.
Greater US-European balance. Israeli sociology is definitely more oriented and
connected to US sociology than to European sociology. During the 2000s Europe is
becoming a stronger and more independent center of science, including the social
sciences. This is the clear and aggressive policy of the EU to which Israel is affiliated.
Israeli sociologists are increasingly cooperating with German sociologists and
attending conferences in Europe. Israel is closer to Europe in space, society, and state
than to the US. It has much to gain by drawing closer to Europe (Bar-Ilan, Glänzel
and Zimmerman 2008; Brezis 2008).
Regional cooperation. Israeli sociology is mostly integrated into US sociology, to
some extent into West-European sociology, and not at all into regional and Asian
sociology. There is a need to reorient Israeli sociology to the sociologies in Arab,
Moslem and Mediterranean countries of the region where Israel is located. Regional
cooperation will enable Israeli sociologists to get data on non-Western societies, to
conduct joint research, to initiate regional conferences, and to build bridges between
the peoples in neighboring countries. While Israeli sociology is boycotted by Arab
and many Moslem countries, it is welcomed by sociologies in the Far East and should
take advantage of cooperation with them.
Strengthening the local sociological community. The above steps would have the
consequence of strengthening Israeli sociologists as a community of scholars. Greater
orientation to the internal and the local will yield greater involvement in the Israeli
Sociological Society, its sections and annual meetings.
A serious consideration of these proposed reforms would sharpen the dilemma
between social relevance and academic excellence (Azarya 2009). The choice has
been forced on Israeli sociologists by the Israeli academia which puts excellence
much before relevance. It is much easier for sociologists in North America and
Western Europe to strike a balance between the two. Sociologists in Israel and outside
the West who wish to access and seize upon Western resources (journals, publishers,
research foundations, teaching positions, and more) must play according to the
Western rules, deemphasize the special features of their societies and present
knowledge relevant to the West or generalized in nature.
CONCLUSION
Israeli sociology has evolved since 1948 as a branch of Western sociology, and more
precisely as a branch of US sociology. Israeli sociologists practice sociology as US
sociologists do in mid-level to high-level universities. They collect data and apply
Western theories and methods but hardly produce new ideas. They are privileged in
gaining access to the affluent resources of US sociology but their works are seldom
quoted in contexts other than the narrow empirical Israeli case.
In the division between core and non-core sociologies, Israeli sociology belongs to
the core but lies on its margin. The standing on the receiving end is to the satisfaction
of Israeli sociologists as a whole, regardless of their school of thought. Membership in
the exclusive club of Western sociology fits their self-identity and international
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18
image. The Western standards imposed by the Israeli science and academia also play
a major role in the Western functioning of Israeli sociology.
While it is out of the question that Israeli sociology would join the non-Western
camp, it is appropriate to ask whether it can upgrade its standing by moving from the
margin to a more central locus in the Western core. The chances for this move to
occur are slim indeed. Sociology in Israeli research universities does not attract the
best students who opt for high income professions such as computer science, business
administration, law, medicine, brain studies, and clinical psychology. Sociology is
also not prioritized in academic development plans and funding foundations policies.
An additional blow to Israeli sociology is the brain drain caused by lower resources
and fewer tenure-track jobs available in Israel to sociologists.
What are the chances that Israeli sociology makes the necessary changes in order
to strike a better balance between its orientation and practice of sociology and its
contribution to international sociology? Possible reforms include greater appreciation
of the uniqueness of Israeli society, conducting more comparative studies that contain
Israel, making more of an effort to reach out to the public, establishing ties with
sociologists in the Near and Far East, and strengthening the local community of Israeli
sociologists. The prospects for these measures to be implemented are small. These
changes run the risk of parochialism and weaker access to ample US resources. They
might make Israeli sociology more relevant but less excellent. Yet, greater balance in
Israeli sociologists' relations with Europe and the US is likely to take place thanks to
the gradual rise of a strong and rich sociological center in Europe.
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