Download The French and Antique Monuments in Algeria

“Il faudra faire comme les Romains”:
The French and Antique Monuments in Algeria
1830 - 1870
Michael Greenhalgh
Department of Art History
Australian National University
Canberra ACT0200 AUSTRALIA
[email protected]
The French could not have survived their invasion of Algeria without systematic recourse
to the Roman infrastructure. The only alternative would have been a radically greater
investment from France in money, troops and materiel, and this would probably have been
politically impossible and financially difficult. What is more, their attitude to the country was
highly coloured by their knowledge of Roman history; and their plans for the country,
especially models of colonisation, and stance vis-a-vis the natives, were much influenced by
what the Romans had done.
Beginning with a sketch of the “mentalities” involved, this paper concentrates on the
strategic use the French made of three types of antiquities - roads, fortresses, and cisterns and
their feeding aqueducts - during the early stages of the occupation of the littoral and
expansion into the hinterland, describing in detail what they did to the antiquities to make
them serviceable for modern war. After demonstrating the intensity of destruction by
examining the case of Tebessa, and outlining how French attempts at colonisation also
depended heavily on Roman models, the paper concludes by setting the reuse of antiquities
by the French against the broader context of mediaeval and Renaissance reuse and destruction
in Italy, and on the mainland of France.
Since the fact so impressed the French, it is appropriate to emphasise here the profusion
and near-pristine state of Roman and Byzantine monuments in Algeriawhen the invasion
began in 1830. Diehl reviewed the archaeology of Algeria after 60 years of occupation, and
marvelled that in the South se rencontraient à chaque pas des villes mortes, abandonnées,
mais non détruites, demeurées telles que les avait laissées, il y a douze siècles, la catastrophe
qui mit fin à la domination byzantine, avec leurs hautes murailles presque intactes, leurs rues
et leurs places nettement dessinées, avec la masse imposante de leurs temples, de leurs
théâtres, de leurs arcs de triomphe. L’Arabe, qui ne bâtit guère, n’avait trouvé nul profit à
démolir ces édifices, et dédaigneusement il avait épargné ces cadavres de cités1. The South
of Algeria was relatively untouched by the French, the distance from Algiers to the southern
border being greater than that in the other direction to Paris. Even today, Algeria is rich in
monuments, but characteristically less so in the North, which saw the preponderance of
French building and colonising activity and hence of destruction.
We may also anticipate the conclusion to this paper - namely, the disastrous effect the
French occupation had on the monuments - by underlining the immense infrastructure they
had to build or repair in order to survive the early decades in a largely hostile land. Roman
1
C. Diehl, Les Découvertes de l'archéologie française en Algérie et en Tunisie, Paris 1892 (extrait de la Revue Int. de
l'Enseignement 15th aout 1892.
1
monuments were used where possible, as we shall see; but modern warfare and the demands
of 19th-century settlement dictated a need for additional infrastructure which required
immense quantities of building materials, often at the expense of the easily-available
antiquities. This could happen because the army was but little subject to political control from
Paris: apart from brief periods (1848-51, and 1858-60), Algeria was under military rule
between 1834 and 1870, with an army and administrators subscribing to the view that no
permanent peace was possible with an undefeated Islamic state 2. Thus by only 25 years after
the initial conquest, it was estimated that the French had put into Algeria 5350km of roads
“faites ou projetées”; aqueducts totalling 132,941 metres, providing 24,108,310 litres of water
daily; and by 1850, 869 bâtiments d’utilité publique tels que fontaines, lavis, abreuvoirs,
halles marchés, abattoirs, pépinières, hôpitaux, églises, mosquées, écoles, lycées, salles
d’asile etc; in addition were built 20 lighthouses; barracks for 40,000 men, and military
hospitals for 5,0003. And they were able to build so much because so much had been built by
the Romans, and survived. It is such large-scale building, provoked in large part by an
expanded military presence for further conquest, and in support of colonisation, which put
intolerable pressure on the ancient monuments. The all-encompassing nature of the
destruction is hard to grasp, unless we have recourse to accounts of the monuments before the
French landed. Much of the material destroyed was stone building blocks – apparently
anonymous, but in fact a great loss because they represented the “skeleton” of ancient
settlement. Also destroyed in large quantities were the plentiful inscriptions funerary and
civic, by which the Romans had proclaimed the permanence of their civilisation, and which
the Byzantines had frequently reused in decorative display by incorporating them in the walls
of the fortresses they built.
The Romans and the French as Civilizing Forces
The French conquest began with a hesitant and uncertain occupation of the coastal cities
of Algiers, Bone and Oran, with Bougie added in 1833. Indeed, the French had invaded
Algeria without following any clear plan, and found themselves ill-equipped to deal with the
guerilla warfare waged by Abd el Kader. For 15 years, this heroic figure blocked French
expansion in the province of Oran – that is, all the West of Algeria. This fact was tacitly
confirmed in Bugeaud’s treaty with him in 1837. The war (it was no less – Algeria cost the
lives of 150,000 soldiers in the first 40 years) affected the Roman monuments through the
changing strategies of the different French commands. Marshal Vallée had constructed
heavily fortified defences, often on Roman citadels (e.g. Cherchel, Medea, Miliana), and
waited for the enemy. But when Bugeaud replaced him in 1840, he opted for attack, with
lightly-armed mobile troops: this highlighted the importance of those Roman forts in the
province of Oran (Abd el Kader’s stronghold) which could be used against a guerilla
campaign. 1847 marks the end of this strategy, and also the recall of Bugeaud, whose
enthusiastic plans for the foundation of military colonies on the Roman model had fallen on
deaf ears in Paris, and failed on the ground in Algeria.
The French army, harrassed as much by public opinion back home as by the Arabs and
Berbers on the ground, needed the example of the Romans as some justification for the
feasibility of what they were attempting in Algeria. But not everyone was convinced. Even
2
D. K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1830-1914, Ithaca 1973, p.109.
3
Archives de la Guerre, Vincennes, hereafter SHAT (Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre),
1K214/131: Appendice au Cours d'Histoire Militaire de l'Algérie. 6 Leçons. Document marked
Ecole Impériale Spéciale Militaire 1855-6". pp. 44-5.
2
the generals were not all happy, Desmichels asking in 1839 pourquoi voudrions-nous nous
engager dans une guerre infructueuse, seulement pour acquérir un peu de gloire et pour
annoncer par des bulletins pompeux que nos troupes sont toujours dignes de l’admiration du
monde? 4
A large difference between the natives and the French was measured in their attitudes to
the Roman remains, the latter believing the very fact that the natives had left the Roman
monuments alone was an indicator of their fecklessness and lack of interest in civilisation
itself. The usual technique when discussing the matter was to contrast current living
conditions of the indigenous populations with the grandeur of the past, as in Dr Bonnafont’s
Réflexions sur l’Algérie, particulièrement sur la Province de Constantine, sur l’origine de
cette ville, ... etc, published in Paris in 1846. On the ruins of Tiffech, for example, in the
valley of Mersouk-Khaal, he observed that Nous comparions ces constructions grandioses et
immobiles des temps anciens avec ces habitations flottantes et fragiles des temps actuels! …
quand cet Arabe a passé sans émotion pendant plus de mille ans devant ces créations
imposantes de l’homme; quand il a pu rester indifférent à tout ce que les Romains ont fait et
exécuté devant lui; lorsque le temple de Sigus, la citadelle de Tiffech, le pont de Constantine,
l’enceinte de Miliah, les citernes et le cirque de Russicata, et par dessus tout le théâtre et le
superbe arc de triomphe de Jmilah n’ont réveillé dans l’âme engourdie de ce peuple
stationnaire et indifférent aucun genre de progrès en faveur de ce que nous appelons
civilisation; lorsque, disons-nous, ces monumens n’ont pu rien obtenir sur l’esprit de la
population nomade de l’Afrique ... ne doit-on pas désespérer de l’amélioration de cette race
qui sacrifie tout à l’habitude de son égoisme et à la manie de son indépendence individuelle?
(pp. 8-9, 16-17). Admirable sentiments indeed, but also shot through with irony, because the
French were to destroy immense quantities of Roman remains in their occupation of Algeria,
and neglect others (such as the Roman bridge at Constantine, which collapsed in 1857, and
was not rebuilt). They began early, with an attempt in 1831 to acquire antique columns and
marbles, already in reuse, from a demolished mosque in Algiers: the Minister of War himself
had requested them, and Lieut-General Berthegene replied that they were already spoken for
for the new mosque and, in any case, were of meagre beauty5.
The stance that the Arabs were children, to be nurtured and helped, had a long life.
Gustave Boissière, rejecting the notion that extermination was the aim of the conquest,
preferred to believe that si c’est plutôt civiliser la terre et civiliser l’homme, si c’est remplir
envers les enfants attardés de la famille humaine les devoirs de protectrice affection où sont
tenus les frères ainés, si c’est faire la conquête des âmes après avoir fait celle du sol, nulle
nation n’est plus que la France capable de cette noble et généreuse mission. France’s mission
was to make of Africa non point une autre France, non point une France nouvelle, mais une
partie intégrale de son être même, un des nobles et essentiels organes de l’existence de la
patrie. Had he only stopped to think, he could have proved from his own observation how
foolish was his sweeping statement, for he noted how the walls of the casbah at Constantine,
once the Byzantine fortress, portent, encastrées dans leur pierres, comme des titres de
noblesse, les inscriptions qui décoraient les temples et les monuments de l’Acropole. Thus the
Arabs were indeed passively, if not actively, interested in retaining the display of ancient
inscriptions – the same principle as buying someone else’s ancestral portraits and hanging
4
SHAT H227, General Desmichels, Réflexions sur l'état actuel de l'Algérie, sous les rapports
militaires et politiques suivies d'un nouveau système d'occupation de ce pays, 7 October 1839, fol 7r.
5
SHAT 1H7 Génie en Algérie (hereafter Génie) , Correspondance en France, correspondance
intérieure, etc mars-mai 1831. Letter from Lieut-General Berthegene to Minister of War, Maréchal le
Duc de Dalmatie, 8 June 1831.
3
them in the hall.6 And inspection of mosques in Algeria would have underlined the longestablished local taste for reusing classical antiquities, especially marble columns.
There is plenty of evidence that the highest officers encouraged a commitment to the
Roman past, doubtless because it was in this context that the French, nurtured on the vitality
of Antiquity and the important lessons it could still yield, saw themselves. For example, in
1857 General Durrieu bade his officers accompany him on a visit to Roman remains in the
province of Mascara, 24km from their camp. The account remarks on how Roman occupation
est écrite en nombreux caracteres. They searched for inscriptions (which implies that they
would have been able to read them), but without success, pour percer le silence de ces
tombes colossales. Civilisation, they remarked, est comme le soleil, elle a ses nuits et ses
jours, ses plénitudes et ses éclipses. On peut dire des romains qui ont habité l’Afrique ce
qu’on dit des martyrs: Leur cendre fut une semence7.
In a further example, when Chef du Génie Captain Antonin wrote a Mémoire militaire
sur la Place de Sétif on 28 February 1857, this historical account was considered by a
committee which recommended on 4 January 1861 that it be put in the archives of the Génie
ou il sera utilement consulté. The copy-document is signed by Charon, General de Division;
Genet, secretary and Lieut-Col de Génie; Charrier, Chef de Bataillon, Chef d’Etat Major du
Génie en Algérie; and Randon, Secretary of State for War8. This is presumably some
indication of the impact the document made, and of the value that was placed upon it.
The French belief in their civilising influence (which of course they shared with the
ancient Romans) survives into the 20th century9, echoed by the Italians in the 1920s and
1930s. For example, the Governor of Libya, Italo Balbo himself, proclaimed in print that
attraverso le vicende storiche, dall’origine di Roma al Medioevo fino all’ero moderno,
balzera una verita storica irrefragabile: l’influenza civilizzatrice dell’Italia sulla tripolitania
attraverso i secoli, costante e ininterrotta - and a commentator pointed out,in his study of
relations between Venice and the Regence of Algiers that Venice seppe tenere alto il
prestigio dell’Italia e portare un nuovo soffio di vita civile. Fino agli ultimi anni essa seppe
far rispettare i trattati e mantanere fra quei popoli alto il concetto della superiorita delle
gente latine10. Without such sentiments, and the reassurance provided by the evidence of
what they construed as the Roman success in colonising Algeria, the French would surely
never have stayed the course11..
Reconnaissance and Materiel: Roman Roads
The Army survived and sometimes prospered on the quality of its documentation and
reconnaissances, which was usually high, and frequently set in a well-researched historical
context. Officers schooled in the classics were often conscious of following in Roman
footsteps, and noting down the antique remains that could be of use to a modern army –
6
Gustave Boissiere, L'Algérie Romaine, 2nd rev. aug. edition, 2 vols, Paris 1883, p.644, pp.121-2.
SHAT MR882.2, Succession de Colonjou, Algérie: une promenade militaire dans le tell, en 1857,
p.9.
8
Génie 1H910: Place de Sétif, 1839-1903.
9
A. Conklin, A mission to civilize: the republican idea of empire in France and West Africa 1895-1930, Stanford 1997.
10
G. Cappovin, Tripoli e Venezia del secolo XVIII, Verbania 1942, p.29-30; Balbo is quoted from
the preface to P. Toschi, Le fonte inedite della storia della Tripolitania, 1934.
11
An overview of the topic is provided in M. Greenhalgh, "The New Centurions: French Reliance
on the Roman Past during the Conquest of Algeria", in War & Society 16: 1 (May 1998), pp.1-27;
7
4
roads, bridges, aqueducts, cisterns, forts and signalling posts – as well as those signs of
antique colonisation which encouraged at least some of their number to believe that a French
occupation would be fruitful. A good example of the genre is G. Tatareau’s 72-page
Mémoire sur la Province d’Oran, of 25 February 1833. This has a Description Physique (pp.
1-16), Statistique (pp.17-39), listing all towns, agriculture, commerce - and also Roman ruins,
p. 18. Communications (pp. 40-57), Considérations Militaires (pp. 58-68) and Précis
Chronologique (pp. 69-72). Two years later, he was to produce a book-length account of the
same province12.
The French were familiar with Roman roads and their construction, because both French
and Italians had even conducted excavations on stretches of such roads in France and Italy in
the 18th century to try and learn how they were made, so that they could perhaps build
likewise. In fact, as they soon discovered, Roman techniques were too costly in labour to be
employed for anything more than the repair of existing roads. In Algeria, however, Roman
roads abounded, frequently in good or repairable condition. The French badly needed such
roads, just like the Romans, for moving their troops, baggage and especially artillery; whilst
the local inhabitants used only horses, and generally kept to tracks. Any earlier intelligence
was useful, and it is characteristic of French needs that it was the Tabula Peutingeriana, a
mediaeval copy of a map of the Rom world; that came to their aid; so that they were using
some sources perhaps 1500 years old in origin. This can be exemplified in Pellissier’s
Mémoire sur la Géographie ancienne de l’Algérie13, in which he bemoaned the lack of
modern maps of Algeria. Remarking on the great number of ruins on the road from
Constantine to Sétif, he noted (p. 97) that first making a large-scale map, un simple
rapprochement entre cette carte et la table de Peutinger suffira pour leur donner, avec
exactitude, les noms qui leur conviennent. Note that here there semes to be a trusting
willingness to have the Tabula annotate the modern map, and not vice versa, which we might
surely have expected, given the superiority of 19th-century mapmaking over the schematic
Michelin-guide-like approach of the Tabula Peutingeriana.
In such good repair were some Roman roads that distances could be measured in Roman
miles, on the maps produced by the Service Topographique of the Army. At Oran in 1837, for
example, Capitaine d’Etat Major de Martimprey provided a map of the Province, marking
ancient cities and roads, and using this measure, with scales in kilometres and leagues
alongside it14. Roman milestones survived in large quantities to confirm such scales.
The crucial questions the French had to ask about Roman roads in Algeria were twofold,
namely, Could such roads be repaired, and at what cost? and Would they take artillery? The
answer to the first question was almost invariably affirmative: repairing Roman roads was
cheaper than building new ones. Indeed, the French recognition of the travaux gigantesques
frequently needed to build roads may help explain their interest in the Roman achievement15.
Thus in 1832, Lieut-General Pelet already knew that the Roman road between the bay of
Stora (the port) and Constantine (a distance of a little over 50 miles) could be repaired: les
dégradations que les pluies y ont occasionnées pendant une longue durée de siècles, l’ont
ruinée comme toutes les autres voies du même genre en Barbarie. Mais à l’aide de quelques
travaux, on parviendra facilement à en rattacher les parties interrompues et à la rendre
12
MR1316, item 12;1316 item 6, G. Tatareau, Voyage dans la Province d'Oran, 5 September
1835, 266 pages plus index .
13
MR1314 item 16, 7 August 1843, 121 pages, written at Sousse.
14
MR881: Journal des Expéditions dans la Province d'Oran depuis l'expédition de Mascara ...
1835-1836-1837.
15
MR882.2 Lieutenant Grangez, Mémoire historique et militaire sur la ville de Blida, June 1848,
30 pages. cf. pp.2-3 for the work required around Blida.
5
praticable à l’artillerie. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que notre artillerie a acquis aujourd’hui
une notabilité qui ne connaît presque plus d’obstacles16. This was later confirmed, when
General Berthezune remarked in a letter of 8 November 1839 that the trip between Stora and
Constantine took 4 days, but that le chemin est assez bon et paraît permettre d’y mener de
l’artillerie17. Captain Niel provided the context: déjà du temps des Romains, une belle voie
était ouverte dans cette direction, et elle avait été construite avec tant de soin que partout on
en suit les traces et que sur plusieurs points elle est si bien conservée qu’on a peine à croire
qu’elle ait quinze siècles d’existence. On another stretch at the Oued Baba, Niel notes (with
an eye to French commerce) that il est hors de doute que sur plusieurs points de cette
traverse on aperçoit la trace des travaux qu’avaient été exécutés les Romains pour
l’améliorer - the suggested reason being the coming of prosperity to Russicada (hence to the
Stora region as far as Constantine), and the need to transport wheat18.
The answer to the second question, however, depended on the route followed. Whilst
Roman roads were splendid on the flat, and able to take the pounding that guns and limbers
inflicted, they frequently marched in a straight line over the hills, often involving gradients
too steep for artillery to manage. So for most areas of a very hilly country (and, to make
things more difficult, generally corrugated East to West), new, linking stretches of road
needed to be constructed - another trigger for depradations on any conveniently sited Roman
remains, no matter how spectacular. The French possessed one advantage the Romans lacked
– namely gunpowder. This meant that they could build near-level roads where the Romans
simply had to go over or go round. Marshall Vallée reported to the Minister of War on 26
Oct 1838, concerning the road from Constantine to Stora: On a suivi dans presque tout le
développement qui est de plus de cinq mille mètres le trace de l’ancien sentier Romain; ce
qu’on a fait n’est qu’un sentier et non plus que les houlets chargés y passent facilement. Dans
la suite, il faudra penser à une voie plus large, plus directe, moins ondulée. La Poudre nous
permettra de faire à cette égard ce qui eût été presque impossible aux Romains. Un pont
simple et solide bâti par eux sur le plus considérable des ruisseaux qui tombent dans la mer
entre Russicada et Stora, subsiste encore, et nous a été un grand secours...19
Security behind Roman Walls: Constantine & Philippeville
A glance at the map will show the key position of Constantine in the east of Algeria,
while any views of the vertiginous and rocky site of the city will demonstrate its ability to
withstand siege. General Clausel’s failed expedition against Constantine, with much loss of
life, provoked his recall in 1837. That same year his successor, Danremont, lost his life in that
town’s expensive capture. The new commander, Marshal Vallée, secured the region by
founding Philippeville (on the Gulf of Stora, some 3 miles from the Roman port of Stora,
which had been occupied in 1838) as Constantine’s seaport. For this he was to use the
remains of the Roman city of Russicada.
In many instances throughout Algeria, all that needed doing to ancient walls was to make
good what the Romans or Byzantines had left behind, which was usually easily visible. So
when the Army of Africa camped in the bay of Stora for the first time, in 1838, they took
16
SHAT Papiers Pelet, supplement, Algérie 1832-1850, carton 1319.
ibid.
18
H227 Mémoires divers: 1839: Reconnaissances faites dans la province de Constantine en 1837,
1838 & 1839, 1839, 69 pages. cf pp.49, 53.
19
Génie 1H58: Correspondance, 1838: Rapport sur les Travaux exécutés au Fort de France et
dépendances, pp.7-8.
17
6
shelter in the remains of the Roman fort at Russicada, renaming it Fort de France. The fort
was, dans une position qui paraît aussi favorable à la défense qu’aux nombreux
établissements civiles et militaires qu’on y formera indubitablement par la suite. The Roman
citadel was still useful: il est revêtu, sur presque tout son contour, avec d’énormes pierres de
grès que le temps a dérangées, mais qui, dans leur état actuel, présentent encore une défense
respectable20. If the general officers had been reading the Army Mémoires enthusiastically,
they would have know that Colonel Pretot had noted in a reconnaissance as early as 1834 that
Stora peut redevenir en peu de tems ce qu’il étoit sous les Romains21 - that is, a port guarded
by nearby Russicada..
The rebuilding of Roman Russicada as Philippeville was quickly undertaken, in order to
protect communications between Constantine and the sea. Niel had no hesitation in invoking
the Roman strategy for the defence of Stora, slightly adapted to modern artillery: Pour
occuper cette rade, il faudra faire comme les Romains un établissement à Russicada, rétablir
leur voie le long des falaises, la protéger par les postes ou des blokhaus, et enfin construire
sur une des montagnes qui domine Stora, un fortin avec des obusiers qui défendra le
mouillage22. Thus in 1838 was projected un ouvrage romain mis rapidement en état de
défense et qui servira de point de départ à des parapets en terre formera l’enceinte de la
ville. The soldiers were to clear a still-functioning Roman cistern of the trees that partially
blocked it, so that le monument sera … rendu à l’admiration dont il est digne comme oeuvre
d’art et par sa remarquable conservation. The task of doing the actual work to reestablish the
Roman fortifications at Philippeville fell to the engineers, so we find Chef de Bataillon Niel
[later a Marshal of France] going over the ground at Stora, and re-establishing both the ring
of Roman forts, and the road from Constantine to Stora. On another stretch of the same road
at the Oued Baba, he discerned Roman improvement works, perhaps executed when
Russicada rose to prosperity23. The vaults to other Romans cisterns were repaired in 183924,
and those below what was to become Fort Royal, holding more than 10,000 cubic metres,
were refurbished after 184325.
If Russicada and Stora were one part of the equation, then Constantine itself was the
other part. The willingness to reuse Roman remains, and the speed with which this was often
done, is explained by the early recognition on the part of the highest French officers that
surviving Roman remains could help fix their occupation of Algeria. Positive enthusiasm is
exemplified by the actions of Marshall Vallée who, as part of his plan for the consolidation of
the North, sought a strong defensive position by establishing his HQ in the Roman citadel
(the Kasbah) at Constantine, the stones of which were still in place. He wrote from there to
the Minister of War on 8 Oct 1838 that other blocks were to be used to raise Fort de France,
20
Génie Article 8 Section 1 Algérie, Mémoires généraux, 1843, carton 5: Colonel Vaillant, Rapport
sur l'établissement de l'Armée d'Afrique près de Stora, 10 Oct 1838, p.3.
21
MR1314 item 33: Colonel Prétot, Notices sur divers points du littoral de la Régence d'Alger,
considérés dans leurs rapports avec la conquête, le commerce et la colonisation ultérieure du pays,
7 January 1834, pp.63ff.
22
Génie Article 8 Section 1 Algérie, Mémoires généraux, 1843, carton 5: Le Commandant Niel,
Reconnaissance sur Stora, 13 April 1838, pp.3-4.
23
H227 Mémoires divers: 1839, Reconnaissances faites dans la province de Constantine en 1837,
1838 & 1839, 1839, 69 pages; see pp.49, 53.
24
Génie Art 8 Sect 1 Philippeville, Carton 1, 1839-40, 2 Mémoires by Brincard, dated 1839.
25
H230 bis, Mémoires divers 1844-59: Notice sur le manque d'eau à Philippeville et à Stora et sur
les travaux à éxecuter pour y rémédier, 1843, p.2.
7
on the highest hill26. The convenience of reusing the Roman spolia is demonstrated by the
speed with which the new-old fort was refurbished: for only three days later, on 11 October,
Vallée could head another letter to the Minister “Fort de France”. In this second letter he
notes that he is following the Roman system of separate forts linked by chemins de ronde
surrounding the city: Les Romains, qui nous ont précédé sur le point de 2000 ans, avaient
suivi le même système et nous avons trouvé sur plusieurs points les fondations de leurs
ouvrages encore intactes: elles nous servent a élever les retranchements qui doivent pour
toujour éloigner les Kabyles de l’ancienne Rusticade27 - the Kabyles being the fierce
tribesmen in the surrounding mountains:
The remainder of October 1838 was spent building the surrounding forts, using the
plentiful Roman blocks 28. As for communications, Vallée would use the Roman road to Sétif
(nearly 100 miles from Constantine): elle a de l’eau et du bois à toutes les étapes. Nous
avons d’ailleurs la certitude de retrouver la voie romaine dans cette direction. Elle pourra
être utilisée sur une grande partie de son développement et de notre communications, et sans
exiger plus de travail aura une solidité à l’épreuve du temps29. This assertion was denied by
the Commandant Supérieur du Génie in 1864: probably because he had to consider European
attack with cannon, rather than native attack with guns, he found the walls inconsistent, too
thin, and easy to attack - and Stora was no better30. This distinction is important, because
great damage was done to the antique monuments when updating fortresses, sometimes
yearly, against perceived European threats.
By 1839, plans were afoot for simply heightening the wall of the Casbah at Constantine,
and adding crenellations31. This wall waslate Roman and as the Colonel du Génie recognised
in 185332, érigé semblablement sur les ruines de l’ancien Capitole romain, et reconstruit par
des mains inhabiles avec les débris des monuments romains. Il serait difficile d’assegner
aucune époque à l’origine de cette construction qui présentait sur ses murs des vestiges de
tous les âges. In another section of the same wall, new building was to go directly on top of
the Roman wall, et sera d’une grande utilité pour la construction de ce bâtiment, car elle est
fondée avec des pierres de taille énormes sur un terrain fort inégal. To assist in making
Constantine habitable, the Roman quarries at Mansourah were opened in 1840,in order to
make use of the light-weight and porous building stone, avec laquelle les Romains ont
construit les voûtes des citernes et qui pourra être employé pour celles de l’hôpital33.
In a very few years, then, the French had secured the dearly-bought Constantine, in large
part by duplicating what the Romans had done, even to simply building up existing walls.
26
Génie 1H58: Correspondance, 1838, Dispatch to Minister of War 8 Oct 1838 from Marshal
Valée, at Constantine, p.5.
27
Génie 1H805: Constantine: Plan and elevation of the fortifications of Constantine, 1838, with the
breach in the wall made by the French.
28
Génie 1H58: Correspondance, 1838, cf. Vallée's report to the Minister: Rapport sur les Travaux
exécutés au Fort de France et dépendances, 26 Oct 1838.
29
Génie 1H58: Correspondance, 1838: Valée to the Minister, 23 October 1838.
30
Génie 1H833: Place de Philippeville: Correspondance for 1864.
31
Génie 1H805: Constantine: 1 oct 1838, Note explicative du projet d'organisation de la casbah,
by Vaillant, Directeur des Fortifications.
32
Ibid., 20 Feb 1853, Mémoire sur la place de Constantine by L. Baron, Colonel du Génie. pp.5ff
for a Historique de la Place; p.7 for the Casbah.
33
Génie 1H805: Constantine: Apostilles for 1840 Projets, p.4.
8
Refurbishing Roman Forts throughout Algeria
Everywhere they went, the French kept their eyes open for useful materials and forts. At
Biskara, no enceinte remained, but a new one could be constructed from the debris; at Tiaret,
On a conservé dans l’enceinte provisoire qui suivit le trace de la muraille de l’ancien poste
Romain, and they simply rebuilt what had fallen down; at Miliana and at Djidjelli, similar
making-good took place34. At Djidjelli, for example, in spite of the poor state of the Roman
walls, work was set in hand to repair them, including digging down to the foundation: these
were found to be in good condition, and so the walls were rebuilt on top of them35 - a
procedure already proposed in 184136.
Because it was frequently remarked that the founding of French settlements on top of Roman ones was far
from a coincidence, we can surmise that the French often expected to be able to rebuild Roman remains, and
were not often disappointed. Indeed, just a little excavation could reveal, as at Orleansville in 1844, the walls
of the Roman settlement standing up to six metres high, some of them completely buried, with only a few
large blocks breaking the surface elsewhere37. Given the date, it is reasonable to assume that the excavation
was organised in order to find building materials for the French fortifications or housing. One reason for
acting in such a cavailer fashion with the antiquities is that certain aesthetes disapproved of those from the
“decline” of Late Antiquity. Thus at Oran, while the more sensitive souls certainly deplored the fate of the
amphitheatre, part-occupied by French troops for barracks, part-stripped of marble by “modern vandals”;
they were equally pained by the Chateau Neuf, built sometime during or after Late Antiquity, faites de
pièces et de morceaux, sans art, sans goût, et sans régularité38.
On many occasions, Roman forts were marked out for use in case there was trouble
during offensive actions. Thus a fort near Mactar was important because it was situated on
the line the Division would need to take if retreating to either Arzon or Oran39.
Characteristically, the rapporteur goes further, admiring the pierres de taille de grande
dimension, des fragmens de fortes colonnes, une suite de voûtes le long de l’escarpement,
quelques restes encore debout et plusieurs inscriptions, ne laissent aucune doute sur
l’existence de grandes et belles constructions dont chaque jour les derniers vestiges
disparaissent sous de nombreux et vivants figuiers. At the same time, it was recognised that
the very size and quantity of the Roman blocks meant that the French could plan for
expansion. So at Khramis, in 1843, a fort went up on the ruins of a Roman fort, in a wellchosen position; the French defences were smaller than the Roman ones, large blocks from
which were used in the buildings de sorte que si plus tard on veut élever une étage sur ces
constructions premières, on pourra faire supporter aux fondations le surcroît de maçonnerie
34
MR H229, General Charon, Mémoire militaire sur l'Algérie, 1848, pp.344, 187-9, 275ff.
Génie 1H922: DjiDjelli, considérations générales, fortifications de la place 1840-1876:
Mémoire to Minister of War from Villeneuve, 2 regiment Legion Etrangere, 21 jan 1842, p.2 for a
report on the abundant stone; ibid., P.Durand de Villers, Lieut de Génie, 24 august 1849, Djidjelli:
Mémoire générale sur les emplacements occupés par les troupes, pp.8-9 for overview of the state of
the Roman walls.
36
Génie 1H922: DjiDjelli, considérations générales, fortifications de la place 1840-1876: Mémoire
sur l'état actuel de la place, sur les travaux exécutés en 1840 et sur ceux que l'on propose pour 1841,
Captain du Génie Mally, april 1841.
37
MR 1315 item 3: Considérations militaires sur les nouveaux établissements de la province
d'Alger, 1 February 1844. by M. de Lallemand.
38
MR1316 item 13: Mémoire descriptif et militaire sur Oran et ses environs..., November 1839, by
de Granout, 52 pages; p.19 for quote.
39
MR1316 items 14-15: Lieutenant Malroy, Mémoire d'une reconnaissance de positions défensives
sur la Macta, 2 November 1839, 9 pages & envoi.
35
9
sans qu’on ait à craindre de les voir s’affaisser40. Frequently, the very existence of Roman
ruins was cited as proof-positive of the existence of building materials suitable for the
nurturing on the same site of large cities, as at Bougie, where seven layers of city from the
Phoenicians onwards were recorded41.
The town of Sétif provides a good illustration of the way ancient fortifications were
reused. ; and we can trace, sometimes year by year, the depradations of the French on the
Roman monuments. When the French arrived there in 1839, their forces were so small that
they took possession of the later Byzantine enceinte, rather than the much larger Roman
one42. A plan of 1844 shows the relationship between the two enceintes43; and another of 28
May 1846 shows the French also camped outside the Byzantine enceinte and inside the
larger, earlier Roman one, less of which was now visible. It was clearly fast disappearing:
although a Mémoire of 1844 noted the work needed to empêcher la dégradation du mur
romain44. Another Mémoire by the Chef du Génie of 28 Feb 1857, Captain Antonin, notes
that Les ruines de sa première enceinte dont les fondations étaient encore visibles à notre
arrivée... - but no longer45. In spite of the fact that this enceinte was some 460m west to east,
and 310m north to south, with walls standing to between 1.5m and 2m in height, little now
remained. For sixteen years, he wrote, Sétif had been exploited as a quarry, and was still far
from exhausted. But then, he also noted that in 1857 there were 178 masons and stone-cutters
at Sétif. With the population rising from 3164 in 1856, to 9257 in 1876, the thirst for building
materials is easily understood. The smaller Byzantine enceinte was also quickly destroyed.
An account of 1848 describes it as rectangular, with ten large towers, which existait encore il
y a quelques années46, but had now disappeared
Feeding the Troops: Roman Cisterns, Aqueducts and Granaries
If expeditions were to be sent into unconquered territory, then supplies of water and food
were needed. Many of the reconnaissances in Algeria, and later in Tunisia, marvelled at the
quality and extent of Roman remains; and it is likely that the details we find in reports were
given with a view to possible re-use at a later date. It is conceivable that the very existence of
Roman water supplies in Algeria came as something of a surprise, in view of Capt. of Génie’s
Rapport sur l’utilité des sondes dites anglaises, for the digging of wells and cisterns47.
Nevertheless, prudence is all; and in 1837 Lieut-Col Guillemain writing on the Expedition de
Constantine to the Minister of War, complained of the impossibility of carrying enough
ammunition or provisions, and of the need for fortified provision dumps on the road from
Bone to Constantine. He emphasized the need to reuse the Roman cisterns at Guelma, where
d’actives recherches devront être faites dans le but de retrouver ces précieuses ressources. If
they could indeed be brought back into service, then Guelma semble disposé pour être la
40
MR1315 item 4, Mémoire sur le Levée à la Boussule des environs du Camp de Khramis des Beni
Ouracs, by Capitaine Koch, October 1843, p.2.
41
1H47: Génie en Algérie, letter of 23 Sept 1836 from Colonel of the 45th at Bougie.
42
MR H229, General Charon, Mémoire militaire sur l'Algérie, 1848, p.336.
43
Génie 1H910: Place de Sétif, 1839-1903, Plan d'ensemble des environs de Sétif, 31 July 1844.
44
Génie 1H910: Place de Sétif, 1839-1903: Mémoire sur les Projets pour 1844, 1 May 1844,
Apostilles du Chef de Génie.
45
Génie 1H910: Place de Sétif, 1839-1903, Captain Antonin, Mémoire militaire sur la Place de
Sétif, .5.
46
MR1317 item 69, Tacot, Notice sur la subdivision de Sétif, 20 August 1848.
47
Génie 1H501, 19 march 1830.
10
première station entre Bone et Constantine48. He suggested such stations should be
constructed from wood, which was in very short supply in Algeria, and shipped out as kits
from Toulon (this actually happened, because we have a report on them: 1837, but no exact
date) - although he admits that in some parts it would be better to use the pierres sèches (i.e.
antique blocks) that one finds.
Even with better roads and resupply by ship from France, water had to be found locally,
and Roman cisterns remained a staple feature of French reconnaissances in Algeria and in
Tunisia49. For example, a reconnaissance in Tunisia in 1881 noted a Roman city 16km from
El Djem with two cisterns: Dans la plus grande des deux la voûte est soutenue par 74 gros
piliers en pierre de taille d’un mètre de côté. Les deux citernes se communiquent entre
elles50; a series of itineraries from Sousse punctiliously note all antique cisterns en route51;
and reconnaissances between Tunis and Zaghouan (this latter the site of still-working Roman
fountains) lists cisterns still in use, some lined with de beaux blocs rectangulaires ... belles
pierres de taille, the largest some 48 feet in length52. Such reliance upon Roman water
supplies was far from new: further up the coast, the cisterns of Carthage were of inestimable
help to the Emperor Charles V, camped before the walls of Tunis; and some of these were
also still in use in the later 19th century53.
Storage for dry goods was also in short supply, as an all-Algeria survey revealed in 1847.
Grain storage facilities were everywhere deficient. Ancient silos were commonly used and, at
Milianah, even an old Mosque. At Sétif, the Procès-Verbal notes the three Roman towers of
the enceinte converted into silos, where jusqu’à présent conservé en parfait état le blé qu’on
y a renfermé54.
Colonisation
From the first landings, with which the French government during a fit of ennui tried to
distract people’s attention from poor government by filling their eyes with the sight of
glamorous foreign adventures55, colonisation was on the agenda, and the existence of Roman
remains in areas now desertified was frequently used as a powerful argument in favour of
what French colonisation might achieve. A watch was kept on the littoral, which was sized up
for possible trade-routes into the interior for the colons56. But strategy is also part of the
equation, and discussions continued about whether the ancient city of Batna, or that of
48
Génie 1H400: Affaires générales, expéditions et reconnaissances, note on the Expédition de
Constantine to the Minister of War, January 1837.
49
cf. the Tunisian reconnaissances in MR1321B, MR1322 & MR1323.
50
MR 2H43, Journaux des Marches et Opérations (JMO) des Grandes Unités (1881-1883)
Tunisia. 48e Regiment d'Infanterie Ier Battaillon, p.10.
51
MR1322 Tunisie: Service des Renseignements mai 1885 - mai 1886.
52
MR1322 28 May 1880, Caidat de Mornak, p.72.
53
MR1323 Caidat de la Marsa, 26 November 1886, pp.49-51, for notes on Carthage, especially on
its cisterns.
54
Génie 1H415: Bâtiments militaires; cf. also the Travail relatif aux moyens d'emmagasinement à
créer dans les diverses places de la Division d'Alger, undated.
55
S. H. Roberts, The history of French colonial policy 1870-1925, London 1929, p.176.
56
MR33/1314 Colonel Prétot; Notices sur divers points du littoral de la Régence d'Alger,
considérés dans leurs rapports avec la conquête, le commerce et la colonisation ultérieure du pays, 7
January 1834, passim.
11
Lambaesis, was the better centre for colonisation, with charts of useable Roman roads
forming part of the information they had gathered57.
Voices of reason tended to go to Roman example for their rationale. Thus Chef de Génie
Devay,writing on 11 April 1844, from Mascara58, put the French efforts into their broader
perspective. The French must attach themselves to the soil of Algeria by establishing a
prosperity based on agriculture. Just where to do this in the valley of the Oued-el-Hammam
was indicated by the traces left by Roman domination: toute une ville est là pour ainsi dire
encore debout pour attester l'antique prospérité du pays. He went on to discuss the cost of
erecting a dam to re-fructify the country around. He had found canals and dikes, which ne me
laissent aucun doute sur l'exécution ancienne de cette disposition et sur la possibilité de son
rétablissement avec le moins de frais possible puisque les massifs de culée et même leurs
parements extérieurs existent encore. And he concluded by noting that such work would help
colonisation here,because nous nous mettrons enfin sur la voie pratique rationelle et
méthodique qui eût assuré aux Romains la possession indéfinie de cette terre d'Afrique et la
Barbarie. So that instead of the current rage de l'extermination, the French would take a leaf
from the Roman book: nous resserrons un à un les divers noeuds de ce réseau colonisateur
dont la science politique de Rome avait cru devoir enlacer sa conquête et fortifier sa
domination.
No less a person that Bugeaud himself saw colonisation through Roman eyes, stipulating in
1844 the need for what he called légions de colons-militaires to settle and anchor the new
territory, with the sword and the plough. This was his answer to the political problem of the
enormous cost of complete military conquest, the funds for which would never be voted.
However, with 10,000 colons-militaires a year, he believed the country’s future could be
secured59. Because large sums of money were still being expended by 1850, General de
Rumiguy suggested the same solution once more60.
Indeed, the traces of Roman colonisation were there for all to see, and impelled the
French toward very grand plans which re-iterated the Roman procedures and achievement
without in any way extending or changing them. Thus Chef de Génie Gaubert was intent on
learning every lesson he could from the Romans, whom he clearly admired and, and in whose
footsteps he was not too proud to follow. Thus, at Tlemcen, he observed the widespread
ruins: the French could rebuild the city, and re-establish it because it was on a direct line from
the Sahara to the sea. As for the position at Tikembritt, les Romains avaient fondé sur ce
Mamelon, un fort dont les restes sont encore très visibles et dont l’enceinte qui a un énorme
développement est encore parfaitement marquée, les pierres de taille y abondent, et
suffiraient à l’établissement d’un poste moderne, car dans notre opinion, il serait inutile de
chercher à imiter ce travail gigantesque. But if Tikembritt were to be re-established, what
about resupplying it? Was the river navigable that far? Once again, the Romans provided the
answer once more: en examinant avec attention les berges de la rive, on remarque au pied du
rocher une petite anse qui offre quelques traces de construction; tout porte à croire que les
Romains s’en sont servis comme point de débarquement. rien n’empêche d’agir comme eux.
57
MR59-60/1317 Lieutenant Champion de Nansouty & Sub-Lieutenant Durun, Mémoire sur Batna
et Lambaessa, avec les recherches historiques, 13 August 1847, 33 pages and plans & croquis.
58
Génie 1H403, Reconnaissances, expéditions 1844- 1847, Reconnaissance de l'Habra, pp.3, 11, 14;
59
H229, Rapport de M. Bugeaud [Marechal, duc de l'Isly] sur les moyens d'affermir et d'utiliser la
conquête de l'Algérie, 15th January 1844, p.8.
60
H229, 30 March 1850, General de Rumiguy, Algérie: Organisation des colonies militaires, p.1.
12
Why, he asked, do the reconnaissance completely oneself, when the Romans have already
done the work?61
However, had the French bothered to enquire sufficiently closely, evidence was also
available from the ruins themselves that establishing colonies was not necessarily going to be
easy. There were isolated reports which underlined this fact: in 1856 Captaine de Lambilly
could point to the failure of Byzantine colonies – which had been built on top of Roman ones.
It was the Byzantine forts, and older, reused sculptured blocks, which proved his point: dans
plusieurs de ces ruines on reconnaît les traces de ce second passage des Romains. On y voit,
et cela principalement dans les anciens forts, des pierres, les unes sculptées et juxtaposées
dont les sculptures ne correspondent pas entr’elles, les autres présentent des inscriptions
renversées, pierres qui dans la construction primitive devaient avoir une position plus
normale et que les nouveaux Romains de l’Orient n’auraient retirés des ruines que pour
remplacer tant bien que mal, soucieux avant tout de se créer un abri et un rempart62.
Bugeaud’s period of experimentation with military colonisation, from 1841 to 1848,
expired with his resignation, and was buried by the chaotic failures of many of those who
arrived as a result of the system of land-grants, and then following the 1848 and 1870
revolutions. Together with locusts, drought and cholera, the low quality of many of the
settlers persuaded the Emperor that colonisation had hitherto failed, and in consequence a
more consistent policy was put in place in 1878, which lasted until 190463. As a result, the
ancient monuments suffered greatly from the predatory building of the colonists, whose
interest in the past which they had acquired by settling in Algeria was generally low.
Destruction by Ledger: Tebessa
Record-keeping in terms of building-work was usually punctilious; and it was plentiful
since annual requests by the Engineers for building starts or alterations had to go through a
well-tried process. This involved a formal livret with historical background, justification and
estimates, submitted for comments to the Director of Fortifications at each centre. The
ledgers therefore allow us to trace the alterations, projected and completed, made to Roman
monuments, especially walls, and the often very large costs involved - none better than at
Tebessa (Departement of Constantine, 12 miles from the Tunisian border, and 79 miles from
Bône), where the Roman triumphal Arch of Caracalla (214 AD), still the jewel of the city,
forms part of Belisarius’ Byzantine walls (the Roman city was far more extensive).
The monuments of Tebessa were noted well before the city was garrisoned. Out on patrol
during 1842 in what was as-yet unconquered territory, and far from safety, time was taken to
record the city’s antiquities. Still occuped by Arabs, Tebessa was first sketched by LieutGeneral de Négrier’s column, whilst encamped under the city’s walls, probably in order to
show what needed doing in order to repair the fortifications for occupation. Time was also
taken to explore the environs of Tebessa; and eventually the Commandant du Génie at
Constantine wrote a 3-page letter to Charon, Colonel de Génie at Algiers, detailing the finds
and reproducing the two inscriptions; it is three-quarters on the Tebessa remains, including
the arc de triomphe, debout et bien conservé. La pûreté de cette architecture de l’ordre
61
Génie 1H756: Tlemcen 1 June 1847, Projet d'établissement militaire et agricole sur la basse
Tafna.
62
MR1317/100-101, Capitaine de Laubilly, Mémoire sur Ain Beida et ses environs (Province de
Constantine), 16 October 1856, 41 pages. 23ff.
63
Roberts, French colonial policy, p.216.
13
Corinthien et la richesse des dessins rappellent les beaux temps de Rome64. Perhaps with a
view to publication, General de Négrier himself wrote five pages of description of the Roman
city, with measurements of wall-heights and tower dimensions.Indeed, an annexed undated
note in a different hand says they should be published même lithographiés au Dépôt de la
Guerre, en nombre d’exemplaires suffisant pour pouvoir être répandues et insérées avec les
plans au Moniteur65. On 29 June 1842, de Négrier’s description did indeed appear in the
Moniteur, noting inside the town near the El-Kedim Gate a petit temple conservé tout entier
dont la forme et les détails d’architecture rappellent la maison Carrée de Nîmes, with
monolithic columns in red marble, which the Arabs had turned it into a soap factory, and
which was subsequently a prison, canteen, parish church and museum.
So thorough appear to have been the plans for Tebessa and its region that the engineers
ranged throughout the area to find other suitable antique sites which would link Tebessa with
the sea. General Charon suggested in 1848 that the French army occupy Tebessa, dont les
communications avec le littoral traversera les térritoires des Maractas et des Mannenchas, et
laissera ainsi Guelma à l’Ouest: Soukaras, on the Bône-Tebessa road, 25 leagues from Bône,
has good water, and les matériaux propres aux constructions, tels que pierres à chaux,
moellons à bâtir, pierres de taille, y sont abondants … On trouve à M’da-Ouzonch qui est
l’ancienne Madaure des ruines considérables et les matériaux de construction sont fort
abondants à l’exception toutefois des longues pièces de bois ... L’emplacement de l’ancienne
cité serait très propre pour une ville nouvelle que l’on pouvait faire très régulière ... At
Guelma l’enceinte du poste est formée d’une muraille crenelée flanquée de tours; elle est
construite avec les matériaux trouvées sur place. Le poste militaire offre une surface de 5
hectares environ .:. Plusieurs voies romaines aboutissaient autrefois à Kalama ... en
parcourant le pays on retrouve quelques vestiges de ces anciennes voies qui peuvent faciliter
l’étude de voies nouvelles carrossables 66.
The state of Tebessa, as drawn by de Négrier in 1842 (see above), shows that the
Byzantine enceinte, built by Justinian’s general Belisarius, was in a remarkably good
condition. But an auxiliary fort, projecting from this late Roman predecessor, was soon
planned and, by 1852, Belisarius’ work could be described by General d’Artois in his
summary of Engineers’ work throughout Algeria as in a poor state, yet nevertheless peut être
conservée longtemps avec quelque entretien, grace aux fortes dimensions des matériaux
superposés les uns sur les autres, presque partout sans mortier67. This is confirmed by the
Mémoire pour les projets de 1860-1, dated 31 March 1860, page 16, where it is pointed out
that some of the 5-6 cubic-metre blocks recourant ces vides ne se soutiennent que par un
miracle d’équilibre. In other words, the French marvelled at an antique engineering feat they
could not match, and hence reused what they found wherever possible.
There are three recurrent problems the French army faced with Roman and Byzantine
enceintes, all exemplified at Tebessa. The first is that much of the stonework, especially in
the towers of Tebessa’s enceinte, was too unsteady to take artillery; this resulted in
demolition and the scavenging of the Roman blocks. Presumably there is a difference
64
Génie 1H402, Reconnaissances et expéditions, 1840- 1843, Expédition de Constantine à Tébessa
du 4 mai au 17 juin 1842.
65
MR1317 items 19-20, General de Négrier, Quelques notes sur Tébessa, undated, but "1842?" in
pencil on page 1.
66
H229, General Charon, Mémoire militaire sur l'Algérie, 1848, PP.324, 327-9.
67
Génie Article 8 Section 1 Tebessa 1842-1875: Extrait du Rapport d'ensemble de M. le Général
d'Artois sur l'inspection des trois directions du Génie en Algérie, 1852, Tebessa; and Installer une
poste militaire à Tébessa. Projet du Commandemant Supérieure de Génie, 6 Dec 1852.
14
between what looks solid to an archaeologist, and to an artillery officer. Thus the assessment
by the archaeologist Moll in 1862 that the masonry, especially of the towers, was dans un état
de conservation remarquable, et il est facile de voir que l’ingénieur a mis beaucoup de soin à
leur construction68 is at variance with the artillery officer’s judgment. The second problem is
the need to deploy firearms right around the courtine, rather than just ballistae from the
towers, as the Romans had done. This necessitated protection for the soldiers - that is,
crenellations. How were these to be provided? In 1858, it was proposed to dismantle
completely stretches of the Byzantine walls, and relay them more firmly; but this was
reckoned too expensive, so jointoyer avec soin le parement extérieur de ces murs - that is,
pointing - was substituted! As for a proposal to lower the height of the walls for the soldiers
to deploy their weapons over it, la véritable force de la place de Tébessa doit consister dans
son réduit, dont les maçonneries anciennes sont fort élevées et coûteux de percer des
créneaux dans des murs de pierre de taille de cette épaisseur; et leur usage serait
incommode. Il serait préférable de déraser les murs actuels à la hauteur des terre pleins, et
de faire les murs au dessus en maçonnerie de moellons69.
The third problem concerned weighing up the possibility that a European attacker with
cannon, rather than an Arab with a rifle, might approach the walls - in which case the stronger
the defences were the better. Tebessa’s position near to the Tunisian border caused anxieties,
and it is perhaps these which provoked the plan for 1852-3 to throw the Arabs out of the
Casbah (i.e. the old Byzantine fortress), to remake the Roman wall there with antique blocks
to a height of four metres, and to establish a European colony outside the fort with water
drawn through existing Roman pipes. All this would be easy: l’ancienne muraille bien qu’en
assez mauvais état de conservation, peut encore présenter un obstacle suffisant dans le cas
d’une attaque faite par une troupe indigène généralement sur les lieux; de la pierre de taille
en abondance et pouvant être mise immédiatement en oeuvre presque sans le secours des
tailleurs de pierre70. This accords with Lieut de Génie Masson’s Mémoire Militaire sur
l’Expedition de Tebessa en 1846, where he describes the Byzantine enceinte at Tebessa,
sketches of what would need to be done to repair it, and suggests using the Casbah for troups,
as well as refurbishing the water conduit, etc71.
Reworking the ancient fortifications was expensive. Thus the Etat estimatif des dépenses
à faire aux fortifications, projets pour 1862-3, quotes, p.1, for 230 cubic metres of
“reworking of stones from the ruins” [ébauchage de pierres de ruines] for the demolition and
rebuilding of a tower, plus another 150 cubic metres of pierres de ruine for the courtine.
Work began on the wall in 1862, when courtines 7-8 and 8-9 were demolished, and on
sostitua à cette partie de la vieille enceinte un mur complètement neuf, following a ministerial
decision of 9 March 1868 to strengthen the fortifications.
Indeed, just how seriously the “three problems” listed above were taken may have been
something of a moveable feast, depending on local circumstances. Thus when heavy rains
provoked a landslip which brought down a 14.5 metre stretch of Byzantine wall (courtine
sections 11-12) at Tebessa on 4 March 1880, the ancient blocks were put back exactly as they
were - suggesting either that funds were very short, or that Byzantine walls still provided an
68
P. E. Delair, Essai sur les fortifications anciennes, ou introduction à l'histoire générale de la
fortification des anciens, Paris 1875, pp.129-30, citing Moll, “Mémoire historique et archéologique
sur Tébessa”, Societe Archéologique de Constantine 1862, p. 77.
69
Tebessa, 30 may 1858, Projets, Aposilles du Commandant Sup2rieur.
70
Génie 1H878: Tebessa: Projets pour 1852-3, and Mémoire sur le projet d'un établissement
français à Tébessa: agrandissement en dehors de la ville actuelle.
71
Génie 1H 403: Reconnaissances, Expéditions, 1844-1847; op.cit. pp.11-12.
15
adequate defence. The second is the more likely, because the Byzantine enceinte was
improved by the addition of a “chemin de ronde” on top in 187872 - an addition the Engineers
had been requesting for twenty years.
The Arch of Caracalla remained a problem; the Director of Engineers suggested in 1862
incorporating its south façade in the enceinte, et que sur les trois autres faces il serait dégagé
et débarrassée des constructions byzantines qui obstruent les arceaux latéraux 73. But the
Commandant Superieur in the following year notes that any alterations must relate to the
conservation of this historic monument, and that it follows that c’est au service civile à
provoquer la modification ou le déplacement de la partie 9-12 de l’enceinte et à en supporter
les frais (sic!)74. This was the more pressing because the engineers projected encasing the
arch within a new star-shaped defence (“ouvrage à cornes”), and siting riflemen on top of the
Arch. If this was bluff, it seems to have worked, for funds were found to isolate the Arch:
Depuis cette époque d’importantes travaux de consolidation et de déblais exécutés sur les
fonds des budgets civils ont permis de dégager complètement le pied du monument, de
raccorder l’ancien sol romain avec la ville, la rue de rempart et le terrain extérieur ... Nous
ferons remarquer en outre, qu’en appuyant l’enceinte au monument, on avait à démolir, dans
un avenir peut être peu éloigné, les extrémités des deux courtines neuves à construire, que le
prix des terrains va chaque jour en s’élevant à Tébessa - so the proposition was evidently
“sold” because it was the cheaper option75.
In the 1870s, the pace of engineering work increased. Whereas from 1865, on s’est
contenté de mettre l’enceinte byzantine à l’abri de l’escalade en y fermant de nombreuses
brèches et en lui donnant partout une hauteur minimum de 6 mètres au dessus du chemin de
ronde extérieur76, much more extensive work was required, in order (for example) to lower
the Roman Towers 9 & 12 to courtine level, because they were in any case overlooked. But
this was projected with some trepidation, because ces tours, souvenirs de l’occupation
romaine, sont jusqu’à un certain point de véritables monuments historiques, qu’il convient de
ne pas dénaturer plus qu’il n’est absolument nécéssaire. Included in the plans are pen and
wash plans and elevations of both these towers, both of which have already been modified for
canon embrasures, and the note that the stonework to be used as parement nu de pierres de
ruines, rustique pour surfaces planes77.
The scale of rebuilding in the 1860s and 1870s is reflected in the actual accounts. In
1872-3, 15 days of work are projected à couper de vieilles pierres; but in 1864-5, for
repairing the enceinte, we have, cited here just one example78 of which there are many echoes
in succeeding years:
Maçonnerie de pierres de taille de ruines
Taille plane, rustique
Transport, pierre de ruines:
(Livres)
3048.44
2013.78
1429.83
72
cf. Génie 1H878: Tebessa: various.
Génie Article 8 Section 1 Tebessa 1842-1875: Apostilles du Directeur 30 December 1863, p.5.
74
Génie Article 8 Section 1 Tebessa 1842-1875: Apostilles du Commandant Supérieur, Projets pour
1864-5, pp.5-7.
75
Génie Article 8 Section 1 Tebessa 1842-1875: Mémoire sur les projets pour 1864-5, p.8/
76
Génie Article 8 Section 1 Tebessa 1842-1875: Etat sommaire for 1871, p.2.
77
Génie Article 8 Section 1 Tebessa 1842-1875: Etat estimatif des dépenses à faire aux
fortifications de la place de Tébessa, projets pour 1872-3, page 2,
78
Génie Article 8 Section 1 Tebessa 1842-1875: Etat estimatif, Projets pour 1864-5, p.23.
73
16
TOTAL COST:
6633.20
When we put such costs together with the 400 cubic metres of antique blocks reworked
and reused in 1862-3 alone (see above), the continuing scale of destruction, year after year, is
obviously gigantic – and these figures are only for military reuse: equally high figures are
generated by the buildings erected to service the needs of the colons.The large cost of
maçonnerie indicates reworking of Roman blocks, while the large cost of transport suggests
that these did not come from Tebessa itself. A good candidate for a source of large Roman
blocks is Kalaa, some 37 miles to the north-west, where in 1852 les pentes jusqu’à la plaine
sont couvertes de ruines Romaines, there are the ruins of a late Roman fort, and between
Kalaa and Ain Ksiba a Roman monument with walls still two to three metres in height and,
nearby, a Marabout au milieu de vastes ruines Romaines, qui ont servi à le construire79.
By the 1880s, it at first appears that the wind had changed in favour of preserving the
monuments at Tebessa, but this was probably just a cost-saving measure - witness the notes
of the Chef du Génie in 1887, regarding the Byzantine infill to the Roman theatre, using
column-shafts some one metre in diameter. This, he averred, constitue sans contredit une des
parties les plus pittoresques de l’enceinte et présente, au point de vue archéologique, un
spécimen des plus intéressants des procédés expéditifs de construction employés par Solomon
pour se retrancher dans Tébessa. He continued: Les piliers du théâtre sont en mauvais état. A
ce titre, ils sont à conserver précieusement, conformément à toutes les instructions laissées
dans la place par les Inspecteurs généraux du Génie, qui ont toujours recommandé de ne pas
enlever à l’enceinte son caractère actuel. C’est pour nous conformer à l’esprit de ces
instructions que nous avons laissé subsister non seulement les filières du théatre, mais encore
les colonnes accumulées par les byzantins. Du reste, ces colonnes pèsent environ 5 à 6000
kilogrammes chacune et leur enlèvement entraînerait une dépense assez considérable80.
Given the history of the defences at Tebessa, recounted above, this officer’s piety is touching;
and in spite of any such desire on the part of Inspectors General to retain the monuments
(which is not reflected in the archives), much was lost. The Arch of Caracalla, the Temple of
Minerva on the old Forum, and Solomon’s Byzantine citadel (with some of the later additions
removed), survive today – sentinels to the change to a civil administration in 1870, with a
museums and collecting policy, rather than to any change of heart on the part of the French
army.
Prizing Spolia: European Middle Ages, French Algeria
The French commitment to preserving the Roman past of Algeria was tenuous indeed.
Given the officers’ education and range of classical interests, not to mention the solid cultural
achievements of Napoleon Bonaparte’s earlier attempted conquest of Egypt (namely the
magnificent multi-volume Description de l’Egypte, and the Egyptian vogue it provoked back
in Europe), this is curious. The Middle Ages in Europe, who displayed their Roman heritage
with pride and élan whether it was found locally or imported, incorporated antiquities both
into their city walls and into the life of the streets. In Algeria, on the other hand, apart from
giving French settlements on top of Roman remains inspiring Roman street-names, and
collecting together into small museums those antiquities not commandeered for Paris, there
were no campaigns in our time-frame for any comparable display of antiquities. Algeria in
the decades after the initial landings was often too dangerous to cultivate the arts of peace;
79
MR882.2: Lieutenant Warnet, Mémoire sur la subdivision de Bône en 1852, pp.35-7.
Algérie 1H878: Tebessa, Projets pour 1887, 12 avril 1887, Apostilles du Chef de
Génie.
80
17
and THIS NEXT BIT NEEDS CLARIFYING – RESTATE DEPENDENCE, SAYS EPG
granted, new techniques of fortification, and new types of artillery, put the ancient Roman
and Byzantine enceintes in urgent need of renewal. Nevertheless, it is easy to believe that
some prime opportunities were missed, apparently through a lack of heroic arrogance - the
kind of bombast that had inspired Napoleon. Thus when the ruins of a Temple of Diana were
uncoverd at Sétif, the blocks were simply laid out on a boulevard, without any thought of
reusing them in any modern construction. And when the Porte Napoleon WHERE?? was to
be finished (that is, a reworking of the existing Roman double archway: original project dated
20 Oct 1853), the Directeur des Fortifications poured cold water on the idea of having the
date in Arabic numerals, which he thought vulgar; and he thought the idea of a crowning
eagle was un ornement prétentieux, qui dans l’exécution risque d’être grossier et ridicule81.
Lack of enthusiasm, downright hostility (il faut en finir avec cette porte82), and
difficulties in finding suitable blocks (as well no doubt as the need to spend money on
essentials rather than decoration) reduced the project from columns, to pilasters, and finally to
simple arches, with no decoration at all. What a lack of panache!
Conclusion
In 1892 Diehl, reviewing the study of archaeology in Algeria83, could deplore the ravages
wrought by the French,so much more extensive than those under la barbarie musulmane. The
archaeologists were in continual struggle against the colonists; but in fact tous, maçons,
entrepreneurs, colons, ingénieurs des ponts et chaussées, officiers du Génie, et jusqu’aux
administrateurs eux-mêmes, ont rivalisé de zèle destructeur, with the result that Lambaesis,
intact in 1844, and which he believed to be the only surviving Legionary Camp surviving,
had already lost one of its two ancient forts, and had a prison built on the remains of the other
in 1848, whilst temples and nymphaea had been carelessly demolished, and inscriptions
hammered out to reuse the stones - with the result that over half the inscriptions collected by
Renier84 had now disappeared.
Elsewhere, the same story: in 1840 the theatre at Cherchell was nearly intact, but was
now only a hole. In 1873, the amphitheatre had seven ranks of seats - ten years later, all had
been pillaged. When the Constantine-Batna road was built, spolia were used, and over 300
inscriptions disappeared in the work. Getting around laws for preserving antiquities was
easy: when a law was promulgated resiling to the State monuments and inscriptions, they
simply went around and se hâtaient d’effacer sur les pierres tout signe d’antiquité, afin de
conserver des matériaux utiles dont ils se jugeaient les propriétaires légitimes. Indeed, Diehl
claimed to have seen in government offices at Algiers long and methodical lists of Roman
monuments which could be quarried for building stone. Even trophies taken for Paris were
treated badly: Diehl noted the story of 12 marble statues, acquired by a French consul in the
South, which were shipped to Toulon for the Louvre, on a French warship. They languished
in the Arsenal for 35 years, and only got to their destination à la suite d’une réclamation
formelle.
81
Génie 1H910: Place de Sétif, 1839-1903: Apostille du Chef de Génie, Fortifications, projets pour
1853: Couronnement et fermeture de la porte Napoléon.
82
Génie 1H910: Place de Sétif, 1839-1903, Apostilles du Directeur, 1855/6 projects, p.7.
83
C. Diehl, Les Découvertes de l'archéologie française en Algérie et en Tunisie, Paris 1892 (extrait
de la Revue Int. de l'Enseignement 15th aout 1892, pp.10-19.
84
Léon Renier, Inscriptions romaines de l'Algérie, Paris 1855.
18
The French occupation of Algeria was therefore disastrous for the monuments precisely
because they could not survive without reusing the Roman infrastructure of the country. As
Berthier writes, Les premiers temps de la conquete française furent funestes aux ruines des
villes par nous réoccupées. La construction d’Aumale, de Khenchela, de Philippeville, s’est
faite aux dépens des restes d’Auzia, de Mascula, et de Rusicade. Constantine a fait
disparaître peu à peu tous les vestiges romains qui se voyaient encore en 183785.
But we should nevertheless not underestimate the range of the French achievement.
Berthier quotes86 from a paper by G.L.S. Mercier of 1949, that the Americans obliterated
their natives, whereas il appartenait à la France, à son Génie profondément humain, à
l’action de ses soldats, de ses administrateurs, de ses colons, de faire une démonstration qui
n’a, jusqu’ici, été égalée nulle part à aucune époque de l’histoire, celle de l’implantation de
plus d’un million d’Européens en majorité Français, dans un térritoire ou la part de
l’autochtone s’est développé parallèlement, où son enrichissement a marché de pair avec
celui des immigrants, et que cette population autochtone a, en un siècle, plus que sextuplé.
How, then, do we square this truly monumental disaster with the high level of interest
amongst French officers for the antiquities of Algeria from the beginning of the conquest? As
we have seen, the reporting of the historical context was required in engineering project
submissions; but nobody required officers to go exploring for inscriptions and statues. Part of
the answer lies in the interest in the national past in the 19th century, which grows apace with
the development of archaeology; and in Algeria this was only partly an acquired past, because
of the proud heritage of the monuments of Provence, not to mention self-identification of the
French conquerors with their Roman forbears. THIS NEXT BIT NEEDS EXPLAINING
AND EXPANDING, AND LINKING TO THEME: Another perhaps lies in the
contemporaneous preparation of the military Carte de France in 1841, which required the
filling of predetermined chapter headings by the officers concerned, from (1) Physical
description and (2) Statistics to (5) History, with 5.2 always dealing with the military history
of the area. So just when officers in Algeria are recording Roman and Phenician monuments,
their colleagues at home are sketching dolmens, Roman camps, and chateaux along the Loire.
So the conclusion must be the same paradoxical connection that affects tourism and
antiquities today – namely that their popularity (for whatever reason) is a powerful force for
their destruction. But the characteristic that distinguishes 19th-century attitudes from those of
the Middle Ages is precisely their disinclination to incorporate them into modern
constructions for decorative or emblematic reasons. The French army’s use is much more
pedestrian and, because of the numbers of troops to be serviced, much more destructive. It is
difficult not to imagine what the Roman and Byzantine fortresses of Algeria would have
looked like today had Napoleon been in charge – or, indeed, that Pageant-Master of the
French Republic during the Revolution, whose genius he recognised, namely Jacques-Louis
David. Paris today bears many signs of Napoleon Bonaparte’s triumphalism (Champs
Elysées, Arcs de Triomphe du Carrousel and de l’Etoile, the Colonne de la Grande Armee in
Place Vendôme). With the broader camvas of Algeria on which to work, the Roman triumphs
of her monuments would surely have been melded with contemporary needs, in an echo of
the exploitation of their antique heritage by mediaeval Italian City-Republics.
85
86
A. Berthier, L'Algérie et son passé, Paris 1951. p.68.
ibid., pp.178f.
19