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University of Arkansas, Fayetteville ScholarWorks@UARK Theses and Dissertations 12-2015 On the Evolutionary Origins of Religious Belief Robert Duane Howard University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, Comparative Methodologies and Theories Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Howard, Robert Duane, "On the Evolutionary Origins of Religious Belief " (2015). Theses and Dissertations. 1362. http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/1362 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact [email protected]. OntheEvolutionaryOriginsofReligiousBelief Athesissubmittedinpartialfulfillment oftherequirementsforthedegreeof MasterofArtsinPhilosophy by RobertHoward UniversityofArkansas BachelorofArtsinPoliticalScience,2013 December2015 UniversityofArkansas ThisthesisisapprovedforrecommendationtotheGraduateCouncil. _____________________________________________ ProfessorEricFunkhouser ThesisDirector _____________________________________________ _______________________________________________ ProfessorEdMinar ProfessorThomasSenor CommitteeMember CommitteeMember Abstract Religiousbeliefisabyproductofevolutionarilydesignedcognitivemechanisms. Theubiquityofreligiousbeliefandexperienceacrosshumanculturesisexplainedbyour commonhumanpsychology;ourdomain-specificcognitivemechanismsgiverise, collectively,tothephenomenonofbyproductreligiousbelief/experience.Inthisthesis,I willexaminewhatIcallreligion-generatingcognitivemechanisms,andIwillarguethat byproductrawgod-beliefsaredevelopedbyculturesintorefinedgod-beliefs.Theserefined god-beliefsareco-optedbyevolutionaryprocessesandareculturaladaptations.My conceptionof“religiousbelief”intermsofrawandrefinedgod-beliefsallowsa disambiguationoftheterm“religion,”anditcontributestotheongoingdebatebetween byproducttheoristsandadaptationistsbyclarifyingthatrawgod-beliefsarebiological byproductswhilerefinedgod-beliefsareculturaladaptations. ©2015byBobbyHoward AllRightsReserved Acknowledgments IextendmythankstotheUniversityofArkansasPhilosophyDepartment,without whichmyMaster’sdegreeandthesiswouldhavebeenimpossible.Thisdepartmenthas mademygraduateexperiencewonderful. Further,I’dliketoextendspecialthankstoDr.EricFunkhouser,whoseexpertise andexcellenceinadvisinghelpedthisthesistobecomethebestversionofitself.I’dliketo thankDr.EdMinarandDr.TomSenorfortheirserviceonmythesiscommittee. Dedication OntheEvolutionaryOriginsofReligiousBeliefisdedicatedtomymomanddad,John andBeckyHoward. TableofContents 1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..1 2. TheMechanisms…………………………………………………………………………………….6 A. FolkPsychology&TheoryofMind…………………………………………………………..12 B. PromiscuousTeleology…………………………………………………………………...……..17 C. Anthropomorphism………………………………………………………………………………..19 D. AgencyDetection……………………………………………………………………………………23 E. Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………………29 3. CulturalEvolutionandGod-Beliefs…………………………………………………………30 A. VirusesoftheMind&MemeTheory………………………………………………………35 B. Group-LevelSelection……………………………………………………………………………41 C. AdaptiveCost/BenefitAnalysis………………………………………………………………48 C-1. CostorInvestment?................................................................................................................49 C-2. Health&WellBeing………………………………………………………………………………..53 C-3. GroupCohesion&Pro-SocialBehavior…………………………………………………….58 C-4. ReligionasCostly……………………………………………………………………………………62 4. Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………….66 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………...75 1.Introduction Religiousbeliefhasbeenasubiquitousaphenomenonasanyotherinhuman history.Nearlyeveryhumanculturehashadatitscoreasetofbeliefsandassumptions thatcouldbedeemedreligious.Humansocietiesbuildworldviewsandinterpretive frameworks,andthroughouthistorywehaveappealednearlyuniversallyinour storytellingtostuffthatisnotnatural.By“stuffthatisnotnatural,”Imeananythingthat doesnotfitintoaphilosophicallynaturalisticphysicormetaphysic.Forinstance,trees havespirits,thecosmoshasacreator,myancestorsaretryingtocommunicatewithme, inanimatestuffisanthropomorphized,theEarthisrestingonagiant,deifiedturtle,andso on.Nearlyeveryexpressionofhumanityhasfeaturedasapartofitsworldviewsomenonnaturalisticreligiousstorythatdoessignificantexplanatorywork(Boyer,2001). Wehaveknownofthepervasivenessofreligiousbeliefandpracticeinhuman cultureforalongtime,andforalongtimereligiousbeliefwasimmuneto“explainingaway” andacademicinquiry(Bloom,2007).However,relativelyrecentadvancesinthefieldsof empiricalpsychology,cognitivescience,andevolutionarypsychologyhavegivenriseto excitingresearchprogramswhosegoalitistoexplainwhyreligiousbeliefissouniversal. Itisimportanttoclarify:whenIsay“religiousbelief,”IdonotreferexclusivelytoWestern conceptionsofthedivineortotheexpansivesystematictheologiesofthevarious establishedandorganizedreligions.Thosethingsarecertainlyincludedunderthe umbrellaofthisinquiry,butIalsoincludebeliefsaboutancestralspirits,the anthropomorphizingoftheelementsintheenvironmentaroundus,afterlifebeliefs,beliefs associatedwithreligiousrituals,conceptslikeKarma,etc.Forourpurposes,let’scallany 1 suchreligiousbeliefagod-belief.Itistheoriginsofsuchgod-beliefs,ingeneral,thatIwill investigateinthisinquiry. Theseresearchprogramstaketwomainapproachesintheirendeavorstoexplain theoriginsofsuchgod-beliefs.Thefirstapproachtoexplainingthenaturaloriginsofthese beliefsisthe“Adaptationist”approach,whichpostulatesthatgod-beliefsareadvantageous biological(orcultural)adaptationsthatconfersomedegreeofreproductivefitnessto believingindividuals(orsocieties).Underthisview,theubiquityofgod-beliefsisexplained bythesurvivalbenefitthesebeliefsconfertotheirrespectivesubjects.Thatis,the evolutionary“winners”ofhistorywereofthereligioussort.Thesecondapproachto explainingthenaturaloriginsofgod-beliefsisthe“Byproduct”approach,whichdraws heavilyfromcognitivescienceandfromthecognitivescienceofreligion(CSR).The Byproductviewisaptlytermeda“byproduct”viewofreligiousbelief,becauseitpositsthat god-beliefsarethenatural,structuralbyproductsofbrainsliketheoneswehappentohave. Underthisview,theubiquityofgod-beliefsisexplainedbythefunctioningofourcognitive structuresindomainsforwhichtheywerenotevolutionarilyselected;structural byproductsareselected,butnotselectedfor.Literally,byproductgod-beliefsarebyproduct beliefs,ratherthanbyproductbiologicalstructures.Wewillexplorethedetailsofthese accountslateron. Mostcontemporaryresearchpitstheseapproachesagainstoneanotheras alternativehypotheses,butIthinkthereisroomforeachcamptocomplementtheother. Indeed,Iwillarguethatthetruthoftheevolutionaryoriginsofourgod-beliefsliesina fusionoftheByproductandAdaptationistapproaches.Thedebatebetweenbyproduct theoristsandadaptationistsconcerningtheoriginsofreligiousbeliefcanberesolvedbya 2 disambiguationoftheterm“religion.”“Religion”isacomplicatedamalgamofrawgodbeliefsandrefinedgod-beliefs(muchmoreonthislater).ItisclearthatbothByproduct theoristsandAdaptationistsmakecrucialcontributionsinunderstandingtheevolutionary originsofgod-beliefs,morebroadlyconstrued,somyaccounttakesa“both-and”approach. Iwillfavortheworkofcognitivescientistsofreligion,whichaccountsforboththe genesisofthesegod-beliefsandsomeoftheircontentinawaythattheAdaptationist accountscannot(ordonot,presently).Iwilladvocatefora“byproduct”orbiological spandrel1viewoftheoriginsofsuchbeliefs,butIwillalsocontendthatthesebeliefs,at somepointinevolutionaryhistory,cametolendsurvivalfitnesstotheirbelievers.So,the workbeingdonebyevolutionarypsychologistsinthisarea,farfrombeingwrongor misguided,isextremelyvaluable;ithelpsustoexplainthingsliketheevolutionand transmissionofgod-beliefsacrossculturesandacrosstime,theadaptivevalueofsuch beliefs,andhowcertainspandrelorbyproductbeliefsmighthavebeenco-optedbynatural selectionandmadesalientfactorsinculturalandbiologicalevolution.Withaviewlike mine,god-beliefsarethebyproductsofourcognitivemachinery,buttheyaredynamicand adaptivelyusefulbyproducts. Myprimarycontentionisthefollowing:thecognitivestructuresstudiedinthefield ofCSRprovideuswithbyproductrawgod-beliefs,anditisbythehoningforcesofcultural evolution,culturallearningandtransmission,andhumanexperience(and,perhaps, 1Theterm“spandrel”isanarchitecturaltermco-optedbyGouldandLewontin(1979)in theirlikeningofcertainbiologicaltraitstostructuralbyproducts.Aspandrelisastructural byproductofanarchitecturalarch—thespandrelofanarchservesnorealarchitectural purpose.Wecanconceiveofbiological“spandrels,”then,asbeingtheselected(butnot selected-for)byproductsofselected-forbiologicalstructures.Strictlyspeaking,god-beliefs arenotbyproductbiologicalstructures.Theyarebyproductbeliefs.Shortly,wewill specifytheconditionsforabelief’sbeingabyproduct. 3 revelation)thatourevolutionarilyancientrawgod-beliefsweredevelopedintoourmore evolutionarilyrecent(and“cultural”)refinedgod-beliefs.2Theserawgod-beliefsaremost properlyunderstoodasthecognitivefoundationsofthevariousrefinedgod-beliefs;raw god-beliefsarethebyproductsofourcognitivemechanisms,whilerefinedgod-beliefsare theresultofculturalevolutionaryprocesses(atboththeorganismic-groupandcultural levels).Mybyproductclaimisstrong:ourcognitiveprocessesprovideuswith“religious” notionsoftheworld,asabyproductofthenaturalfunctioningofourbrains.Byvirtueof thesortsofcognitivemechanismswepossess,wenaturallyconceiveoftheworld “religiously,”anditactuallytakesintellectualwork,socialization,oreducationtoconceive oftheworldcontrarytothesebyproductreligiousbiasesandtendencies.Itisourcommon humanpsychologythatexplainstheubiquityofreligiousbeliefsacrossthehuman experience.Theobserveddifferencesinrefinedreligiousbeliefsacrosscultures,then, ultimatelyamounttoaccidentsofenvironment,culturalhistory,religiousstorytelling,and evolutionaryhistory. Ausefulwayofunderstandingtheraw/refinedgod-beliefdistinctionisintermsof DanielKahneman’s(2011)System1/System2conceptualizationofhumanpsychology.In fact,thedistinctionImakebetweenthetwotypesofgod-beliefsisverymuchinthespiritof Kahneman’swork.AccordingtoKahneman,thehumanmindoperatesontwodifferent levels.System1isthoughttobecomposedofthosecognitiveprocessesandmental activitiesthatareunconscious,automatic,fast,serial,efficient,associationist, evolutionarilyancient,etc.System2,however,isthoughttobecomposedofthose 2Therewillbemuchmoreonthislater,butrawgod-beliefsincludethingslikethefolk psychologicalbeliefsandintuitiveteleologicalnotionsdeliveredtousbyourcognitive mechanisms,whilerefinedgod-beliefsincludemoredeveloped,theologicallyinvolvedbelief systems(liketheism,orBuddhism). 4 cognitiveprocessesandmentalactivitiesthatareconscious,deliberate,slow,rulefollowing,resource-demanding,rational,relativelyevolutionarilynew,etc.Eachofthese systemsdescribesaverydifferentkindofmind,andtheactivitiesofthetwotypesof processesworkingintandemareconstitutiveoftherangeofourhumanpsychology.To whateverextentarawgod-beliefisformedbyunconsciousSystem1processes,weshould callit“automatic”or“unconsciouslydelivered.”Towhateverextentarefinedgod-beliefis formedbyconsciousSystem2processes,weshouldcallit“deliberate.”Itismyhopethat thisinvocationoftheSystem1/System2conceptualizationofthemindwillproveusefulas weproceed.Indeed,conceivingofrawgod-beliefsasthenaturalbyproductsofSystem1 processes(i.e.,rawgod-beliefsas“automatic”)goesalongwaytowardexplainingthe pervasivenessofgod-beliefsacrosshumanexperience. Twofurtherpointsshouldbequicklymadebeforewecontinuethispaper.First,the theorizinginthefieldsofCSRandevolutionarypsychologyhastendedtooutpacethe experimentalcapabilitiesofbothempiricalpsychologistsandcognitivescientists.Iwilltry toavoidconjectureandtosticktoinformationonwhichthefieldhasreachedsomethingof aconsensus.AsImentionedearlier,CSRisanemergingfield,andmanyofitsideassimply cannotbetestedyet.Moreover,itisdifficulttoknowwhichofthetheoriesinCSRandin evolutionarypsychologyareeveninprincipletestable,andwhichoneswillonlyeverbe conjecturalexplanatorystories.Inconsideringevolutionaryaccounts,Ioftenfindmyself musing,“Ithinkthisparticularadaptationiststoryisneat,buttowhatextentisitentirely madeup?”Iwillbracketthe“just-sostory”objectionssothattheconversationcantake place,butadaptationiststoriesshouldbereceivedwithagrainofsalt. 5 Thesecondpointthatneedstobemadeisthatindiscussingthesedomain-specific RGCMs,themechanismsareoftenreferredtoaspromiscuousorasmalfunctioning.Itis importanttonotethatthereisaheavycommitmentinthefieldsofevolutionary psychologyandCSRtothefalsityofgod-beliefs,tothenotionthatsuchbeliefsaremistaken fictions.However,asshouldbeclear,howgod-beliefsareformeddoesnotnecessarily speaktothetruthorfalsityofsuchbeliefs.Theprocessbywhichreligiousbeliefsare formed,however,doesspeaktotheirjustification.Thislineofresearchraiseschallenging andinterestingproblemsfortheism,problemsthatthetheistneedstoaddress.3Forthe reader’ssake,Iwantedtospotlightthebiasesatworkinthesefieldsandtheimplicationsof thelanguagethatisfrequentlyused. 2.TheMechanisms Thecognitivescienceofreligionappealstoanarrayofcognitivefacultiesthat,asa whole,isresponsibleforourexperienceoftheworldaroundus.Thesecognitivefaculties arehighlyspecializedsystemsthatperformdomain-specifictasks.Ifthebrainwerean automanufacturingplant,thenourcognitivemechanismswouldbetheparticularsteps alongthewaytobuildingacar.Somedobodywork,someworkinelectrical,somerunthe transmission,etc.Themechanismsareexpertsatwhattheydo,andthepresenceofeach oneisbestexplainedbytheadaptiveadvantagethatitsproperfunctioningconferredto 3Thetheistmightbeginbyaskingsuchquestionsas:IsitpossiblethatsomeoftheRGCMs, intheirgenerationofgod-beliefs,arenotoperatingoutsideofthedomainforwhichthey wereoriginallydesigned?IsitpossiblethattheseRGCMsweredesignedbyGod,orthatthe evolutionaryprocessesresponsiblefortheseRGCMsaredirectedbyGod?MightGodhave beeninvolveddirectlyintheformationofourcognitivestructuresthroughoutour evolutionaryhistory(oratcertaincrucialmomentsinourevolutionaryhistory)?Doesan evolutionarystoryliketheoneIwillproceedtotellinthisthesisactuallyunderminethe justificationofthetheist’sbeliefs? 6 ourancestors.So,theevolutionarypsychologist’sviewofthebrainisthatitisamassof highlyspecializedtask-performersthatwasbuiltbytheselectivepressuresofevolutionary history(Pinker,1997;Lyons,2001). Assuch,CSRseekstoexplainthephenomenonofgod-beliefsinthehuman experiencebyappealingtothesecognitivemechanisms.I,alongwithotherbyproduct theoristslikePascalBoyer(2001)andScottAtran(2002),rejectanystoryaboutthe originsofgod-beliefsthatappealstoasinglecognitivemechanism,religionmodule,or religiongeneinordertoexplainthegenesisandpervasivenessofgod-beliefs;suchastory wouldbefartoosimple,anditwouldbeinadequatetothetaskofexplainingthevastrange ofvaryinggod-beliefsinthehumanexperience.4Mytheoryisthatthereisasuiteof cognitivemechanismsthatisresponsibleforthegenerationofourbyproductrawgodbeliefs.Anystorythatseekstoexplaintheoriginsofreligiousbeliefbyappealingtoasingle, unifiedcognitivesystemisprobablydescribing,withverybroadbrushstrokes,thesuiteof mechanismsIwillexamineinthefirstpartofthispaper.Let’scallthissuiteofmechanisms ourReligion-GeneratingCognitiveMechanisms(RGCMs). AccordingtotheByproductview,theseRGCMsperformdomain-specific, evolutionarilyselected-forcognitivefunctions(Cosmides&Tooby,2001),andthe 4ThestatusofsomethinglikeAlvinPlantinga’s(2000)“divinesense”isworthconsidering, here.Thetheistmightjustcallmyreligion-generatingcognitivesuitea“divinesense”— however,thissuiteofcognitivemechanismsisresponsibleformorereligiousbeliefsthan justWesterntheism.ItisproblematicforPlantingathatthe“divinesense,”ifitreallyisjust thereligion-generatingcognitivesuite,leadssometoformreligiousbeliefsthatarecontrary totraditionaltheisticbeliefsaboutGod.Ofcourse,thetheistmightjustsaythatthe“divine sense”issomethingdifferentthanthesetofcognitivemechanismsIwillexamine.Buteven ifPlantinga’s“divinesense”istakenbythetheisttobeasufficientexplanationforWestern theologicalbeliefs,thereremainsawholehostofothernon-Western,non-theologicalgodbeliefsthatstandinneedofexplanation.And,presumably,thatiswhereaccountslikemine wouldcomein. 7 byproductsoftheproperfunctioningoftheseRGCMsarerawgod-beliefs;again,such byproductbeliefsareselected,butnotselectedfor.Wewilloperatewithaveryspecific definitionoftheterm“byproduct”;forourpurposes,abyproductbeliefisanybeliefthat emergesasabyproduct(orspandrel)ofproperlyfunctioningcognitivemechanisms performingtheirfunctioninanimproperdomain5.Wewillsaythatacognitivemechanism isproperlyfunctioningwhen,andonlywhen,themechanismisappliedinthedomain(s) forwhichitwasdesignedbyevolutionaryprocesses(i.e.,isfunctioningintheparticular waythat,inourevolutionarypast,yieldedsurvivalbenefittoourancestors).Again,a byproductbeliefisjustabeliefthatariseswhenacognitivemechanismisappliedinan unintendeddomain.Wewillconsiderparadigmexamplesofbyproductbeliefslater (“intuitivetheism,”“hypersensitiveagency-detection,”etc.).AnRGCMisresponsiblefor producingbyproductbeliefstowhateverextentitoperatesoutsideofthedomainforwhich theRGCMwasoriginallydesignedbyevolutionarypressures. If,however,theoriginofagivengod-beliefcanbeexplainedexclusivelybyreference toevolutionarypressuresoccurringatthebiologicallevel,theproblemsfacedinour evolutionarypast,andtheadaptiveadvantagesthebeliefconferstoitsbeliever,thenthe god-beliefoughtnottobeconsideredabyproduct,butratheranadaptation.Rawgodbeliefsarethebyproductbeliefsofcognitivemechanisms,anditisonlyafterthese byproductbeliefsundergosignificantdevelopmentintorefinedgod-beliefsthattheycome tolendadaptiveadvantagetotheirrespectivebelievers(seeSection3).Typically, byproductsarenotthoughtofintermsofadaptivevalue—thatis,theyareregardedas purelystructuralbyproducts,orastheadaptivelyneutralconsequencesofselected-for 5By“improperdomain,”Imeanthosedomainsforwhichthecognitivemechanismswere notselectedbyevolutionarypressures. 8 biologicalstructures.Myaccountoftheoriginsofgod-beliefsdivergesfromstandard Byproductaccountsofreligiousbeliefinmyclaimthatgod-beliefs,whileinitially byproducts,aredevelopedbyevolutionaryprocesses(attheculturalandgrouplevels)into systematicworldviews;itisafterthisdevelopmentthatgod-beliefsconfersignificant adaptiveadvantagetotheirbelievers.Imaintainthatmyaccountisabyproductaccountof theoriginsofreligiousbeliefs,becausegod-beliefsattheirbiologicaloriginsarebyproducts, becausebyproductrawgod-beliefspersistintothepresent,andbecausewecandistinguish byproductrawgod-beliefsfromtheirgroupadaptationcounterparts,refinedgod-beliefs. Myviewiscontrarytotheviewsofhard-lineevolutionarypsychologistsand biologists,whoseektoexplainthephenomenonofreligiousbeliefstrictlybyappealto evolutionarypressuresatthebiologicallevel.Theirpuritanicaladaptationistapproach wandersintomurkywaters.Itisunclearwhattheirclaim—thatreligiousbeliefsare selectedfor—entails,asitisunclearhowabeliefcouldbeselectedforatabiologicallevel. Thequestionmustbeasked:inevolutionbynaturalselection,what,exactly,arethebasic unitsofselection?Genesthataffectthesurvivabilityandtheabilityofanorganismto reproducearethefodderofevolutionaryprocesses.Genesareselected,whichmeansthat neuralprocesses,psychologicalstructures,andperhapsevenbelief-formingtendencies maybeselectedfor;however,theclaimthatthereligiousbeliefsthemselvesareselectedfor (i.e.,religiousbeliefsasbiologicaladaptations)isdubious.Itseemstheonlywaytoget suchaclaimoffofthegroundwouldbetopositthatthecontentsofourreligiousbeliefs themselves(aswellasotherofourbeliefs)arepackagedneatlyintoourgenesor psychology.Butweshouldstayawayfromsuchfull-boreinnatenessclaims. 9 Anotherdifficultyfacedbyadaptationistsinexplainingtheoriginsofreligiousbelief isthesheercomplexityofreligioussystems.Religiousbeliefandreligioussystemsarethe confluenceofmultipleelements(supernaturalagentbeliefs,music,ritualpractice, formalism,emotionallychargedsymbolsandexperiences,morality,societalstructureand organization,etc.),andeachoftheseelementshasitsownuniqueevolutionaryhistory independentofthephenomenonofhumanreligion,morebroadlyconstrued(Sosis,2009). Inlightofthevastlydifferentevolutionaryoriginsofitsconstituentparts,“religion”does notseemtobethesortofthingthatcouldbeselectedfor,astheadaptationistcontendsitis. Certainly,atsomepointinhistorythesedifferentelementsofreligionbegantogiveriseto religiousbeliefsandsystems,butthisfactultimatelylendsitselftothebyproduct perspectiveforwhichIargue.If“religion”justisalloftheseotherselected-forfaculties operatingintandeminsomeevolutionarilyunintendedreligiousdomain,thenweshould saythatreligiousbeliefisabyproduct. Duetothesedifficultiesthatfacetheadaptationistapproach,Iproposemy byproductstorytoaccountfortheoriginsofgod-beliefs—theyarethenaturaloutputsof thefunctioningofourcognitivemechanismsinevolutionarilyunintendeddomains.These variouscognitivemechanismsarethemselvestheproductsofevolutionbynatural selection—theywereselectedforbyvirtueofthefactthattheirfunctioningintheproper domainconferredgreatadaptiveadvantagetoourancestors.(Successfulfolkpsychology andtheoryofmind,agencyattribution,teleologicalnotions,etc.,areclearlytoourbenefit, andcanbeeasilyconceivedofasadaptations.Moreonthisshortly.)Ourrawgod-beliefs arethenaturalbyproductsofthesecognitivesystems.InSectionThreeofthispaper,I discussingreaterdetailhowmybyproductaccountdivergesfrommoretraditional 10 byproductstories6—religionasweknowittodaycanhardlybeconsideredtobethemere byproductofourcognitivemechanisms. Iconcedetotheadaptationistssomeofthegroundtheyoriginallyclaimed:itis clearthatreligiousbelief(initsrefinedforms)confersadaptiveadvantagetothe individualsandsocietiesthatadheretosaidreligiousbelief.Butbecausenotalladaptively advantageoustraitsarenecessarilyadaptations(Sosis,2009),thefactalonethatrefined god-beliefsconferadaptiveadvantagetoindividualsandsocietiesisinsufficienttowarrant theirclassificationasadaptations.Atsomepointinourevolutionaryhistory,our byproductgod-beliefsweredevelopedintoreligiousstoriesandexplanations,andthese culturalideas/beliefsbecameunitsofselection(attheculturalandgrouplevels)byvirtue oftheirinfluenceonthewaywe(asindividualsandsocieties)liveourlives.Throughthe processesofmulti-levelselection,religiousbeliefbecameawinningevolutionarystrategy andselectablegrouptrait.Iappealtothemechanicsofmemetransmission,multilevel selectiontheory,andculturalevolutiontoexplainthetransitionfromrawgod-beliefsto refinedgod-beliefs.Myaccountoftheoriginsofgod-belief,then,isafusionofthe AdaptationistandByproductapproaches. 6Byproducttheorists(Gould&Lewontin,1979)typicallyholdthatbyproductsarethe inevitablestructuralbyproductsofothertraits,andthattheytendtobeadaptivelyneutral. Iagreethatbyproductgod-beliefsaretheinevitablybyproductsofourcognitive mechanisms,butIaddtotheirstorythatourbyproductgod-beliefsare,atsomepoint, developedintorefinedgod-beliefs.Further,byproductsaretypicallyviewedasstatic structuralinevitabilities,butIconceiveofrawgod-beliefsasbeingdynamicbyproductsthat areaccessibletotherestofourpsychology(becausetheyarebeliefs).Inthisway, byproductbeliefsaffect—andareaffectedby—ourdeliberatebelief-formationprocesses andtheoutputsoftheseprocesses.Unlikethespandrelsofevolutionarybiology, byproductgod-beliefsarenot“structures.”Thespandrelsofevolutionarypsychologyare processesandbeliefs. 11 IndividualRGCMsonlytellapartofthestory.TheentiresuiteofRGCMsprovidesus withacumulativefoundationfortheformationofgod-beliefs.Itisthesuiteofthese mechanismsworkingintandemwithourbelief-formationprocessesthatexplainsour consciousassenttogod-beliefs.So,IwillnotconsiderindividualRGCMsandtheir respectivecognitivebiasesinisolation;rather,Iwillapproachtheissuewithanenlarged scopethatconsidersthebroadercognitivesuitetobetheoriginforagivengod-belief.Now, letusmoveontotheRGCMsthemselves,innoparticularorderofimportance.Notethat therewillbesignificantconceptualoverlapbetweenthesedifferentmechanisms.Bythat,I meanthatitisdifficulttotellwhereonemechanism’sdomainstartsandtheotherstops,as thesemechanisms’purviewsaresoconceptuallyrelated. A.FolkPsychology&TheoryofMind ThefirstRGCMwewillexamineisthecognitivesystemresponsibleforwhatsome havetermedourintuitive“folkpsychology.”Thissystem’soutputsrendertousour “theoryofmind”—ourbeliefsabouttheminds,beliefs,intentions,andgoalsofthebeings aroundus.Both(1)theevolutionarilyintendeddomainofourintuitivefolkpsychology and(2)thismechanism’spurportedtendencytoformfolkpsychologicalbeliefsregarding thingsoutsideofitsintendeddomainarerelevanttoourunderstandingtherelationship betweenthisRGCMandtheoriginofcertaingod-beliefs. Ofcourse,a“theoryofmind”issupposedtoformbeliefsregardingactualminds. However,ourfolkpsychologicalsystemsseemtooftenjumptheboundariesofthedomain forwhichtheywereselected(people,animals,beingsinthenaturalworld,etc.)andapply ourtheoryofmindtothingsnotinthatdomain(thingsthatdonotactuallypossessminds, 12 beingsthatdonotactuallyexist,mereconcepts,etc.).Folkpsychologicalmechanismsare responsibleforbyproductrawgod-beliefswhentheoryofmindisappliedtothingsthatare notintheintendeddomainoffolkpsychology;forinstance,wesometimesattribute personalitiestothingsliketrees,stars,mountains,andsoon.Ourfolkpsychological mechanismwasselected-forbynaturalprocessesbecauseofthesurvivalbenefitsit conferredtoourancestorsbyitsproperfunctioning;itisapparentthatitistoorganisms’ adaptiveadvantagetobeabletotrackthementalstatesandintentionsofthebeings inhabitingtheworldaroundthem. Theclaimthatsuchgod-beliefs(beliefsaboutthementalstatesoftrees,stars,non- existentbeings,andsoon)arebyproductsofourfolkpsychologicalmechanismsdepends ontheassumptionthatourfolkpsychologicalmechanismsdonotconferadaptive advantagetobelieversintheattributionofmentalstatestothingsweconsidertobenonmembersofthemechanism’sintendeddomain.Ifthefolkpsychologicalmechanismsdo (anddid,inourevolutionarypast)conferadaptiveadvantagetothebelieverintheir attributionofmentalstatestothingsofthatsort,thengod-beliefsoughtnottobe consideredbyproducts.Theclaimthattheautomaticattributionofmentalstatesto inanimatethingsintheworldaroundusmightbeadaptivelyadvantageousissuspect.On theotherhand,itisclearhowtheabilityto“mindread”thebeingsaround(beingsthat actuallyhavebeliefs,goals,andintentions)wouldbetoourevolutionaryadvantage. Theoryofmindisalsoactiveinourexplanationsoftheeventsweexperienceinthe worldaroundus,anditplaysacentralroleintheinterpretationandpredictionofthe behaviorofotherminds.PsychologistJesseBering(2006)saysthefollowingaboutour folkpsychologicalsystemsandtheirroleinexplainingeventsandpredictingbehaviors: 13 Consider,forinstance,thatonedayallhumanbeingsbecamehard-coresolipsists… Imagine,say,thateveryonewasstruckdownwithautismorotherwiselostthe capacitytothinkaboutotherminds,whatwouldhappenthen?I’dventurethat churchattendancewouldreachanall-timelownextSunday.Herethenisonekey ingredientforbeliefinGodorspirits:aninnatedispositiontoseeothersnotjustas ambulantobjectsorbrain-deadsacksofmeat,butasthinking,feelingbeingsthat, justlikeoneself,arecausalagentswhodothingsintentionally…Inthecaseofpeople ordeities,weappealtoothermindstoexplainandpredictbehaviors,tounderstand whyothersdowhattheydo.7 Beringpositstheoryofmindasakeyingredientforformingbeliefsaboutgodsorspirits (god-beliefs),andhetiesitdirectlytotheformationoforganizedreligion.Itshouldnotbe surprisingthataninabilitytoreasonaboutotherminds,ingeneral,wouldleadtoan inabilitytoreasonaboutnon-naturalminds.Theclaimisthatweusethesamefolk psychologicalmechanismsinreasoningaboutthemindsofGodandnon-physicalbeings,in general,aswedoinourreasoningaboutthemindsofphysicalandnaturalpersons.In reasoningaboutnon-actual,non-physicalminds,ourintuitivefolkpsychologieshave activated—asabyproductofproperlyfunctioningtheoryofmind—thesetofinferences andexpectationstypicallyreservedforactual,physicalmindsandhaveappliedthissetof inferencesandexpectationstonon-actual,non-physicalminds.Theguardrailsofthe intendeddomainhavebeenjumped. Justasourintuitivefolkpsychologyhelpsustoexplaintheeventsthatweassociate withactualbeingsbyappealingtotheirgoals,intentions,desires,etc.,amalfunctioningfolk psychologymayhelpustoexplaineventsintheworldbyappealingtothegoals,intentions, desires,etc.,ofeither(1)somethingthatdoesnotactuallyexistor(2)somethingthatdoes exist,butthatisonlyimproperlythoughttopossessthegoals,beliefs,anddesires associatedwithmindedness.Ultimately,suchamisapplicationofamechanism’sproper 7Bering,2006,pg.147. 14 functiontosomeimproperdomaincouldhelpexplainthepervasivenessofgod-beliefs pertainingtothegoals,intentions,anddesiresofthegods,spirits,God,ourancestors,etc., thatarecommonlybelievedin.Inthisway,folkpsychologicalsystemsactasanRGCM. Bering(2006)citeshis“PrincessAlice”experiments,inwhichhetestedforthepoint inhumandevelopmentatwhichachildcouldrecognizeintentioninexternaleventsaswell asagency,ratherthanmerelyagency.ThesePrincessAliceexperimentsaresupposedto showtheabilityinchildrentoruninferencesfromthepresenceofanunseenprincessand theoccurrenceofotherwiseunexplainedeventstotheconclusionthattheseunexplained eventsareperformedforareasonbytheunseenprincess.8Thechildrenaretoldthatthe princessiscommunicatingwiththem,butitisnotuntilacertaincapacityisdeveloped— second-orderreasoning(“EventXmeansPrincessAlicewantsmetodoYforsomereason Z”)—thatthechildrencaninterprettheunexplainedeventsintermsofthespecificgoals andintentionsthattheysubsequentlyattributetoPrincessAlice.So,itisnotuntilwereach acertainpointofcognitivesophistication—accordingtoBering,aroundsevenyearsold— thatweareabletoapplytheoryofmindtonon-physicalagentsinordertoevaluatethe intentionofnon-physicalagentsinthevariousphenomenawehaveexperienced.Oncethis pointofcognitivesophisticationisreached,itseemsgod-beliefsasexplanatoryhypotheses foreventsareanaturaloutputofourcognitivemachinery—wenaturallyexplaineventsin 8OnethingtonoteregardingBering’sPrincessAliceexperimentsisthatBeringexplicitly toldthekidsinhisexperimentsthataspirit—PrincessAlice—wasgoingtobepresentin theroom,andthatshewouldhelpthemperformcertaintasks.So,itisnotasifthekids wereautomaticallypositingdisembodiedagentsastheexplanationsofvarious phenomena—thechildrenwereovertlyprimedtoreferencePrincessAliceinexplaining variouseventsfromthestart.Intheroom,lightswouldturnonoroff,pictureframes wouldfallormove,etc.,cuedbytheexperimenters.Thechildrenweretaskedwith discerningwhatPrincessAlicemeantbytheseevents,inrelationtodifferentproblemsthe childrenweregiventosolve.Thechildrentookthevariouseventstobeassistanceand inputfromPrincessAlice. 15 termsofthegoals,desires,andintentionsof“gods.”God-beliefsasreasonedexplanations forvariousphenomenaseemtobematurationallynatural,atleastincaseslikethePrincess Aliceexperiments,inwhichtheexistenceofanunseenbeingisassumedfromthestart. Clearly,arobustfolkpsychologyandtheoryofmind—bywhichwecanmake judgmentsabouttheminds,intentions,andfeelingsofothers—isanecessaryconditionfor theoriginofcertainkindsofgod-beliefs(god-beliefsregardingdisembodiedagentsand theirintentionsforcertainevents).Thatwecanformbeliefsaboutthemindsofnonphysicalentities(realorfictitious)isabyproductofthefolkpsychologicalRGCM,because theobjectsoffolkpsychologicalgod-beliefsarenotmembersoftheevolutionarilyintended domainofthefolkpsychologicalRGCM.ThefolkpsychologicalRGCMaccountsforaspecific rangeofgod-beliefs—thatrangeofgod-beliefsthatincludesbeliefsaboutthementalstates ofinanimateobjectsinourenvironment,explanatoryhypothesesregardingspecificevents andtheintentionsoftheagent(s)believedtoberesponsibleforthoseevents,etc. Thecognitivemechanismsrequiredforinteractingwithpersonsinthenatural worldandattributingtothemtheresponsibilityfortheeventsweexperiencearethevery samecognitivemechanismsresponsiblefortheformationofcertaingod-beliefs.Theseraw god-beliefs,however,findtheirorigininthemisapplicationoffolkpsychological mechanismstoanimproperdomain.Inshort,Ihavedescribedthisparticularcognitive systemasitworksinitsproperdomain(i.e.,thedomainofthingsinthenaturalworldthat haveminds),andIhaveproposedthatourfolkpsychologysometimesdoesoperateoutside ofitsproperdomain(i.e.,outsideofthedomainofthingsinthenaturalworldthatdohave minds).Whethertheobjectsofhumangod-beliefsarefictitiousorinanimate,thesebeliefs aretheproductsofthesystemsinourbrainsthattracktheintentionsofactualphysical 16 agentsandminds.Thus,humanfolkpsychologicalmechanismsareprimecandidatesfor beingconsideredRGCMs;theirgod-beliefoutputsaretobeconsideredbyproductsto whateverextenttheyaredeliveredtousbythemisapplicationoffolkpsychological systemstoimproperdomains. B.PromiscuousTeleology ThenextRGCMwewillconsideristhecognitivesystemresponsibleforwhathas beentermed“intuitivetheism.”DeborahKelemenhascoinedthephrase“promiscuous teleology”(Kelemen,2004)inreferencetothismechanismandthebiaseswithwhichit providesus.Kelemensaysthefollowingabouttheteleologicalintuitionssheandher colleagueshaveobservedatworkinchildren: …Whenaskedtoidentifyunanswerablequestions,American4-and5-year-olds differfromadultsbyfindingthequestion“what’sthisfor?”appropriatenotonlyto artifactsandbodyparts,butalsotowholelivingthingslikelions(“togointhezoo”) andnonlivingnaturalkindslikeclouds(“forraining”).Additionally,whenasked whethertheyagreethat,forexample,rainingisreallyjustwhatacloud“does” ratherthanwhatitis“madefor,”preschoolersdemur,endorsingtheviewthat naturalentitiesare“madeforsomething”andthatiswhytheyarehere.9 Initially,onthebasisofobservingagents’object-directedbehavior,children understandobjectsasmeanstoagents’goals,thenasembodimentsofagents’goals (thus“for”specificpurposesinateleologicalsense),and,subsequently—asaresult ofagrowingunderstandingofartifactsandthecreativeabilitiesofagents—as intentionallycausedbyagents’goals.Abiastoexplain,plusahumanpredilection forintentionalexplanation,maythenbewhatleadschildren,intheabsenceof knowledge,toageneralized,defaultviewofentitiesasintentionallycausedby someoneforapurpose.10 9Kelemen,2004,pg.295. 10Kelemen,2004,pg.296. 17 ThesamefindingshavebeendocumentedinKelemen’sstudieswithBritishchildren,which shetakestohavesufficientlycontrolledforthe“relativelypronouncedculturalreligiosity” oftheUnitedStates. Thesefindingsindicategoodevidencefortheclaimthatchildrenare“intuitive theists”—thatchildreninterpretnaturalphenomenaashavingbeenintentionallydesigned byaGod.Putanotherway,childrenintuitivelyholdtogod-beliefsregardingtheperceived designandorderoftheworldaroundthem.Shelistssomecapacitiesthatshetakestobe prerequisitetosuch“intuitivetheism”:thecapacitytomaintainamentalrepresentationof agod,despiteitsintangibility;theabilitytoattributetothatspecialagentmentalstates thatdistinguishitfrommorecommonplaceagents;andtheabilitytoattributedesign intentionstoagentsandtounderstandanobject’spurposeasderivingfromsuch intentions.AlloftheseabilitiesarefoundtobepresentinthesubjectsofKelemen’s experiments.Sheinsiststhatthedetailsregardingchildren’s“emotionalormetaphysical commitments”areirrelevant;rather,whatisimportantiswhetherchildren“makesenseof theworldinamannersuperficiallyapproximatingadulttheism,”awayofinterpretingthe worldthatmaybedevelopedorhonedbyagivenreligiousculturebutthatfindsitsorigins primarilyin“cognitivepredispositionsandartifactknowledge.” Thisstudyoftheintuitivetheismofchildrenisimportant,becauseitshedslight ontothecognitivemachinery,biases,andexplanatoryinferencesatworkinthehuman mindpriortomuchculturalorenvironmentalindoctrination.So,thephenomenonof intuitivetheisminveryyoungchildrenlendssupporttotheideathateventhroughoutour adultlives,itismostnaturalforushumanstoappealtoteleologicalreasoningand explanationinmakingsenseoftheworldaroundus.Wenaturallyunderstandagentsto 18 havedesignintentions,andweseethingsinourenvironmentasderivativesofthose intentions.Wehavetolearntodootherwise. Thecognitivesystemsresponsibleforchildren’sinherentpredispositionsto interprettheworldaroundthemintermsofpurpose,design,andagencyintentionislikely activeinthedeliveranceofmanyofourrawgod-beliefs.“Intuitivetheism”isthesumof suchastrongteleologicalbiasashasbeendocumentedbyKelemen;oftheperceptionofan ordered,designed,and“artifact”world;oftheintuitionthatitisagentswhoare responsibleforwhatweperceivetobedesignedandmeaningful;andoftheinnatehuman drivetopursueexplanation.Towhateverextentthesystemresponsibleforrecognizing artifacts,intention,anddesignoverlayssuchteleologicalnotionsontoanaturallyformed, inanimate,andnon-designedworld,ourteleology-trackingRGCMisoperatingoutsideofits intendeddomain;inasmuchasthenaturalworldfallsoutsideoftheproperdomainofthis RGCM,teleologicalbeliefsaboutthe“purpose”and“design”ofthenaturalworldarerightly consideredbyproductrawgod-beliefs. C.Anthropomorphism Thecognitiveprocessesassociatedwithanthropomorphismareournextareaof examination.AnthropologistStewartGuthrie,whowasamongthefirsttoconceiveof agencyandagencydetectionascentraltoacognitivetheoryofreligion(Westh,2013), developedatheoryofanthropomorphismtoexplainreligion(Guthrie,1993).11According toGuthrie(1993),religionjustisanthropomorphism(whereanthropomorphismisthe ascriptionofhuman-likecharacteristicstonon-humanentitiesorobjects).Dueto 11DavidHume(1779)alsodiscussedtheroleofanthropomorphisminhisDialogues ConcerningNaturalReligion. 19 evolutionarypressuresandtheprimacyofourabilitytorecognizeotherhumanagentsin theenvironmentaroundus,anoveractivetendencytoanthropomorphizetheworld aroundushasbeenworkedintoourhumanpsychologybynaturalselection(Guthrie, 2002).Itwouldhavebeenbetterforourancestors,Guthriewrote,towronglyperceivea bear-likeboulderasarealthreat,ratherthantoperceiveaboulder-likebearasabigrock. Theadaptivepayoffofhypersensitivitytothepresenceofpredators,oragentsin general,shouldbeapparent:wereonetomistakearealthreatforanon-threat,thelossto theindividualwouldbepotentiallycatastrophic,butwereonetomistakeanon-threatfora threat,thelosstotheindividualwouldbemarginal.Theideaisthatovertime,evolution wouldfavorthoseindividualswhoseabilitiestodetectpredatorsweresohonedastogive themfalsepositivereports,overthoseindividualswhoseabilitieswerenotsimilarlyhoned. Thosewithrelativelyclumsyabilitiestodetectpredatorswouldlosestakeinthegenepool, relativetothosewhocouldsurvive,reproducemore,andtakealargershareofthe population.Thus,itisthoughtthatourtendencytohyper-sensitivelyanthropomorphize evolvedovertimetoyieldagooddealoffalsepositives. Asthemisperceptionofbear-likequalitiesinaboulderisnot,strictlyspeaking, anthropomorphism,somethingneedstobesaidhereabouttherelationshipinevolutionary historybetweenanorganism’shypersensitivitytoanimismanditstendencyto anthropomorphize.Later,Imentionthepossibilitythatanimacy-detectionisan evolutionaryprecursortoagency-detection—ahypersensitivitytoanimacylikelywould haveprecededthedevelopmentofeffectiveagency-detectiondevices.Here,Guthrieis explainingwhyatendencyto“anthropomorphize”mighthavebeenworkedintoour psychology,andheappealstothemisperceptionofanimacyinordertodoso.Ibelievehe 20 usestheterm“anthropomorphism”ratherlooselyasanumbrellaterm,suchthat anthropomorphismincludesthedetectionofmereanimacy.WesthsummarizesGuthrie’s position: Soeveniftheperceptualstrategyofanthropomorphismgeneratesmassiveoverdetection,ithashadadaptivevaluenevertheless,asthepriceoffalsepositivesis muchlowerthanthepriceofmissingimportantcues.Perfectparanoiaisperfect awareness.12 Anthropomorphismasatheoryfortheoriginsofreligiousbeliefcoversawidearray ofagencyattribution(Westh,2009):theperceptionoffacesinclouds(Guthrie,1993),the perceptionofhumanshapesinRorschachinkblots(Guthrie,1980),themistakingof mailboxesforhumans(Guthrie,1980),talkingabouttablesashavinglegsandgenesas beingselfish(Guthrie,2002),andsoon.Theprocessesandmechanismsof anthropomorphismarealsothoughttoberesponsibleforourperceptionofnatural disastersasdivinepunishment(Guthrie,1980)andourinclinationstowardperceiving intelligentdesigninnature(Guthrie,1993).Inlightofcontemporaryresearchinthearea (agencydetection,intuitivetheism,etc.),Ithinkitisperfectlyreasonabletobeskepticalof theideathatanthropomorphismandthemechanismsassociatedwithitarealone responsibleforsuchabroadarrayofdifferenttypesofgod-beliefs.Manygod-beliefsare muchmorethan—ormerelyofadifferentkindthan—thesortsofbeliefsweformabout facesinthecloudsorourmistakingofbouldersforbearsatadistance.Manyofourgodbeliefsaremoreinferentiallyinvolvedandmoreconceptuallycomplicatedthanthemere misperceptionofhumancharacteristicsinnon-humansornon-agents.Instead,Ibelieve thatindescribingasingleprocessofanthropomorphizing,Guthriewasplowingtheground 12Westh,2009,pg2. 21 fortheresearchbeingdonetodayonthemultiplicityofdomain-specificcognitive mechanismsthatareinfactresponsibleforeachofthesortsofgod-beliefsandphenomena thathesoughttoexplain Alongthislineofthought,Westh(2009)hascontendedthattheterm anthropomorphismisanumbrellaterm,butthatitdoesnotadequatelyexplaincertainvery specificphenomena: Thereisnoconvincingargumentthat,forexample,seeingfacesinthecloudsor humanshapesinRorschachinkblotssomehowinvolvestheattributionofagencyor mind.Therefore,itwouldseemthatBoyerandGuthrieareinfacttalkingabout differentthings.TheagencydetectionofBoyerandBarrettisaveryspecific psychologicalmechanism.Bycontrast,theanthropomorphismofGuthrieisan umbrellatermthatcertainlycoversthepsychologicalmechanismofagency detection,butonlyasoneamongmanyotherphenomena.13 Theexactboundariesanddomainsofthesedifferentmechanismsare,atthispoint,unclear. Theprocessofanthropomorphismisprobablybestunderstoodasanadequateexplanation forcertainkindsofgod-beliefs(e.g.,perceptualbeliefsaboutstufflikefacesintheclouds, facesinRorschachinkblots,abiastoprojecthumancharacteristicstoinanimateobjectsin theworldaroundus,etc.),butasonlyacourse-grained,inadequateexplanationforother kindsofgod-beliefs(e.g.,activelyseeingintentionandpurposeinevents,theattributionof agencyandintentiontoinanimateobjects,theformationofbeliefsaboutancestralspirits, etc.). Despitetheexplanatorylimitsofanthropomorphism,though,itdoesseemtobean importantfactorinexplainingtheoriginsofgod-beliefs.Perhaps,forinstance,beliefsabout thepersonalitiesofmountainsortreesfindtheiroriginsinachancearrangementof featuresonagivenmountainortreethatisvaguelyreminiscentofahumanface;ourfacial 13Westh,2009,pg.4. 22 recognitionsystemskickin,andweproceedtoanthropomorphizetheinanimateobjects aroundus.Agenerationlater,themountainortreemightbeconsideredadeity.Sucha storyisreasonable.Towhateverextenttheprocessesofanthropomorphismareappliedto improperdomains—thatis,toanythingthatisnotactuallyahuman—theresultisa byproductbelief. D.AgencyDetection AgencydetectionisournextRGCM.AnthropologistPascalBoyer(2001)has claimedthathumanssufferfroma“hypertrophyofsocialcognition.”PsychologistJustin Barrett(2004)haspositedthatwepossess“hypersensitiveagencydetectiondevices.” Barrettdescribestheagencydetectiondevice: WhenHADDperceivesanobjectviolatingtheintuitiveassumptionsforthe movementofordinaryphysicalobjects(suchasmovingonnon-inertialpaths, changingdirectioninexplicably,orlaunchingitselffromastandstill)andtheobject seemstobemovinginagoal-directedmanner,HADDdetectsagency.14 TheseHADDshyperactivelyattributeagencytothestuffinourenvironment,andasaresult theseattributionsareoftenwrong.Attherecognitionofagent-likebehavior—an otherwiseinexplicablechangeindirection,stop-and-gomovement,etc.—theagency detectiondeviceflagsanobject(agentornot)asanagent.Anykindofbehavioror movementthatmightbeperceivedasgoal-directedorastheproductofmindednessis enoughtoactivateHADD,andtheendresultistheunconsciouspresentationofnon-agents asagentsandtheconsciousformationoffalsebeliefsregardingtheagencyofwhatare actuallynon-agents. 14Barrett,2004,chapter3. 23 BloomrecountstheexperimentsconductedbyHeiderandSimmelinthemiddleof thetwentiethcentury: HeiderandSimmel(1944)…madeasimplemovieinwhichgeometricalfigures— circles,squares,triangles—movedincertainsystematicways,designed,basedon thepsychologists’intuitions,totellatale.Whenshownthismovie,people instinctivelydescribethefiguresasiftheywerespecificpeople(bullies,victims, heroes)whohavegoalsanddesires…15 BloomgoesontomentionsubsequentresearchperformedbyhimselfandVeres(1999),in whichitwasfoundthat“youcangetmuchthesameeffectwithmovingdots,aswellasin movieswherethe‘characters’arenotsingleobjectsatall,butmovinggroups,suchas swarmsoftinysquares.”Thegeneralideaisthatattheperceptionofanobjectorevent thatwedeemtohavebeendesignedorordered,orattheperceptionofsomethingthat seemstobehaveaswewouldexpectanagenttobehave,ourbrainsareapttoascribe agency(ordesign,oragencyintention)tothatobjectofourperception. IthinkitisworthinvestigatingtheimplicationsoftheexperimentsrunbyHeider andSimmel,andthenlaterbyBloomandVeres.Inonesense,theagencydetectorsofthe participantsinthestudiesgotitwrong:clearly,dotsandfigures,althoughtheybehavelike agents,areonlyimproperlyattributedgoals,desires,andpersonality.However,inanother sense,theagencydetectorsoftheparticipantsinthestudiesgotitright:thedotsand shapeswere,indeed,designedandprogrammedintentionallybyanothermind(ascientist’s mind)toactinwaysthatwouldgiveoffairsofagency.Itshouldnotbesurprisingthat peoplereadilyrecognizedtheintentionofanothermindintheperceptionofanactually createdartifact—beitatool,anexperimentalprogram,oranythingelse—thatisbehaving inintentionalways.So,Ithinkitisappropriatetoask:towhatextentweretheagency 15Bloom,2007,pg.149. 24 detectorsactuallyactingoutsideoftheirintendeddomainsintheseexperiments?Arenot therecognitionofagencyintentionandtheawarenessofcreatedartifactsnotcriticaltasks ofanagencydetectionmechanism?Itisclear,however,thattheagencydetectionsystem wasnotselected-forsoastotrackdotsonacomputerscreen;so,whiletheagency detectionmodulecorrectly(inasense)perceivedagencyandagentintentioninthedotson thescreen,wearejustifiedinsayingthatitdidsoonlyasabyproductoftheagencydetectionmodule’sproperfunctioning(i.e.,itsevolutionarilyintendedpurposeof perceivingagencyintrueagents,ratherthanindotsonacomputerscreen). Bloom(2007)says,“Wearehypersensitivetosignsofhumanagency,somuchso thatweseeintentionwhereallthatreallyexistsisartificeoraccident.”Theproposed cognitivemechanismthatleadsustoascribeagencytothingsthatveryclearlyarenot agents(likegeometricalfiguresordots)isprobablyfoundationaltoourunderstandingthe originsofmostkindsofgod-beliefs.ImportanttorememberatthispointisBering’s(2006) workontheattributionofagentintentiontoevents(thePrincessAliceexperiments).Given thiscombinationofcognitivebiases—thebiastoattributeagencytotheobjectsinour environment,togetherwiththebiastoascribeagencyintentiontotheeventswe experience—wecanbegintoseehowthehumanexperiencelendsitselftotheformationof god-beliefs.Itshouldperhapsbenosurprisethatsuchgod-beliefsoverlayourexperienceof theworldinthewaythattheydo,ifwegrantthattheseagency-detectionandintentionattributionbiasesaresopervasive. PsychologistScottAtransaysaboutourhypersensitive,“trip-wire”agency attribution: Theconceptofsupernaturalagentisculturallyderivedfrominnatecognitive schema—“mentalmodules”—fortherecognitionandinterpretationofagents,such 25 aspeopleandanimals.Inparticular,suchconceptsaretriggeredbyanagentdetectionmodule.Thisisasortofinnatereleasingmechanism,whoseproper (naturallyselected)domainencompassesanimateobjectsbutwhoseactualdomain (ofstimulithatmimictheproperdomain)extendstomovingdotsoncomputer screens,voicesinthewind,facesintheclouds,andsmokefromaburning building…16 Hecontinues: Soulsandspirits,whichderivemuchoftheirinductiveforcefromanalogytothe dissociatedthoughtsofdreamsandthedisembodiedmovementsofshadows,are near-universalcandidatesforreligiouselaboration.Thisisbecausesouls,spirits, dreams,andshadowshavemanypsychologicallyco-occurringthematicassociations (e.g.,immaterialityandunworldlieness,nightanddeath).Theyalsosystematically manipulateinnate,modularizedexpectationsaboutfolkmechanics,folkbiology,and folkpsychology.17 So,byAtran’sestimation,agencydetectionisrelevanttotheRGCMhypothesiswhenagency detectionoperatesoutsideofitsnaturaldomain(thatdomainfullofobjectsthatare actuallyagents). Boyer’s(2001)theorythatsuchgod-beliefshaveasortofincreasedstayingpoweris relatedtoAtran’sideasaboutthewayourconceptsofthenon-naturalmanipulateour innateandmodularizedfolk-mechanics,folk-biology,andfolk-psychology.Boyer’sideais thatourgod-beliefshaveviolatedcertainessentialexpectationswehaveabouttheworld, expectationsdeliveredtousbyourlearned“conceptualtemplates.”God-beliefsare counterintuitive,totherightdegree.Forinstance,theconceptualtemplatefortheconcept “person”probablyincludestheconstituentconceptofan“embodiedbeing.”Itistotally natural—or,inlinewithourconceptualtemplates—forustoconceiveofapersonas havingabody,becausehavingabodyisconstituentofbeingaperson.However,manygodbeliefsregardingpersonsviolatethatcentralexpectation;spirits,souls,anddeitiesare 16Atran,2002,pg.266. 17Ibid.,pg.266. 26 oftenconceivedofaspersonshavingnobody.Toputitsimply,Boyerpositsthatsuch supernaturalconcepts,wheninviolationofourconceptualtemplates,arememorableand demandingofattention.Itisimportantthatthesupernaturalconceptsviolatecorepartsof ourconceptualtemplates,buttheymustconformtotheconceptualtemplateclosely enoughthatthesupernaturalconceptdoesnotdevolveintoconceptualabsurdity.The conceptofapersonwithoutabodyissolid;theconceptofapersonwithnobodyormind, butthatisactuallyaplace,isbasicallymeaningless.AccordingtoBoyer,storiesthat includesuchcounterintuitive,supernaturalconceptsaredisproportionatelyeasierto remember,areeasiertotell,andarethereforeprimecandidatesforculturaltransmission. Thesekindsofbeliefsarerenderedtousintuitivelyduetoadegreeofconceptualsimilarity betweenthemandourother,moreordinarybeliefs.Wewilltalkmoreaboutthislater. Inexplanationofwhytheagencydetectionsystemsooftenoperatesoutsideofits intendeddomain,Atransays: Allsupernaturalagentconceptstriggerournaturallyselectedagency-detection system,whichistrip-wiredtorespondtofragmentaryinformation,inciting perceptionoffigureslurkingintheshadowsandemotionsofdreadorawe. Mistakinganonagentforanagentwoulddolittleharm,butfailingtodetectanagent, especiallyhumanoranimalpredator,couldwellprovefatal;it’sbettertobesafe thansorry.Theevolutionaryimperativetorapidlydetectandreacttorapacious agentsencouragestheemergenceofmalevolentdeitiesineveryculture,justasthe countervailingevolutionaryimperativetoattachtocaregiversfavorstheapparition ofbenevolentdeities.18 Atrandescribestheadaptiveadvantageofanagencydetectiondevicethatregistersfalse positives:itissimplybetterthatwehavea“trip-wire”mechanismthatsometimes mistakesasound,movement,orinanimateobjectforanagent(friendorfoe)thathas intentionsdirectedtowardus,ratherthantohaveamechanismwithahigheractivation 18Atran,2002,pg.267. 27 thresholdthatfailstodetectactualagentsinourenvironment.Atrantheorizesthatover time,thelatterwaswinnowedfromthegenepooltotheadvantageoftheformer.Asa result,wedoirrationalthingslikeformbeliefsaboutspiritswhenwehearbumpsinthe night,orweperceivephantoms“lurkingintheshadows.”Ourbrainsgivethesethings agency,quiteoutsideofourcontrol.Thus,withourtrip-wireagencydetector,muchofthe worldaroundusispresentedtousautomaticallythroughthefilterofagencydetection. Westh(2009)saysthefollowingregardingtheevolutionaryoriginsofagency detectiondevicesinourcognitivemachinery: StewartGuthrie,bypositingastrongcontinuitybetweenanimismand anthropomorphism,gavethecognitivemechanismsunderlyinggodconceptsan extremelydeepevolutionaryhistory.Animism,inthisview,evolvedfirstasa mechanismofpredatorevasion;astheevolutionarypressureofhumansocial groupsintensified,anthropomorphismdevelopedasacognitivestrategy.The mechanismofhyperactiveagencydetectionpositedbyBoyerandBarrettshares moreorlessthesameevolutionarynarrative.19 IbelieveWesth’sconclusionsareright.Itseemsreasonablethatanoverlysensitiveagency detectiondevicewasbestowedtousthroughtheprocessesofnaturalselectionasnew, uniquelyhumanevolutionarypressuresemerged.Itseemsreasonabletobelievethatthis HADD’sevolutionarypredecessorwasasimplermechanismdesignedfordetecting animacy,morebroadlyconstrued.Thishighlyattunedmechanismwouldhavedeliveredto ourancestorsfalse-positivedetectionsoffoes,predators,etc.,andthiswouldhavebeento ourancestors’benefitintheirancientenvironments.Itcertainlyseemstobethecasethat suchanagencydetectiondeviceasHADDactshyper-sensitivelytoattributeagencyto inanimateobjects.Suchhypersensitivity,bothinourevolutionarypastandcontemporarily, helpstoyieldthepanoplyofgod-beliefsthatcharacterizeshumanculturesandworldviews. 19Westh,2009,pg.18. 28 Whethertheobjectsofourgod-beliefsarerealorimagined—gods,spirits, anthropomorphizednaturalobjects,etc.—theagencydetectionRGCMissurelyactiveinthe formationofthesegod-beliefs. E.Conclusions Imentionedtowardthebeginningofthisthesisthatitisdifficulttodetermine where,exactly,onecognitivemechanismendsandwherethenextbegins.Youcan probablyseethatbynow.ThemechanismsIhavediscussedsofar—intuitivefolk psychologyandtheoryofmind,promiscuousteleology,anthropomorphism,andagency detection—seemtohavevastareasofconceptualoverlap.Forinstance,oneprobably cannotmeaningfullytalkaboutourbiastoattributeagencyandagencyintentiontothe worldarounduswithoutalsotalkingaboutintuitivefolkpsychology(whichisreallyjust theabilitytoformbeliefsaboutothers,pertainingtotheiragency).Oneprobablycannot talkmeaningfullyaboutpromiscuousteleologyandagencyintentionwithoutsome content-richtheoryofmindorartifacttheory.Itisdifficulttosaytheextenttowhichthese differentmechanismsarerelated;Ibelieveitisfairtosay,though,thateachofthem performsdistinctfunctions,andthatthesedifferentfunctionsarewhyeachofthemhas attracteditsownsetofresearchers. TheseRGCMsleadustoexperienceandconceiveoftheworldinacertainway:in termsofbyproductrawgod-beliefs.Rawgod-beliefsaredeliveredtousasbyproductsof theunconsciousprocessesofourreligion-generatingcognitivemechanisms—the mechanismsresponsiblefortheoryofmind,promiscuousteleology,anthropomorphism, andagencydetection.Withtheserawgod-beliefsasourstartingpoints,webuildour 29 inferentialbeliefsystems(ourrefinedgod-beliefs).Itisthisnaturalwayofexperiencingthe world—throughthefilterofourRGCMsandrawgod-beliefs—thatultimatelyexplainsthe ubiquityofreligiousworldviewsandsystems.Indeed,itisthestrongByproductclaimthat wenaturallyexperiencetheworldinthisway—coloredbytheautomaticprocessesthat yieldintuitivetheism/promiscuousteleology,anthropomorphism,hypersensitiveagencydetection,andourascriptionofmentalstatestotheworldaroundus.Byvirtueofthekind ofcognitivestructuresourbrainshave,itisnotnaturaltoconceiveoftheworldcontraryto theserawgod-beliefs.Thesebyproductrawgod-beliefsarenotadaptations,becausethey contributenoadaptivebenefittospeakof.Rather,theyarebyproductsofmechanismsthat areadaptations—mechanismsthatapplytheoryofmind,notionsofteleology,andnotions ofagencyinevolutionarilyintendeddomains. Inthenextsectionofthispaper,Iwillexaminehowgod-beliefsare“pickedup,” developed,andtransmittedbyhumancultures.TheybeginasbyproductsofRGCMsand areeventuallydevelopedbysocietiesintheaimtohaveexplanatorystoriestotell. Learning,evolutionaryforcesoperatingattheculturallevel,andcontingenthistorical events(andperhapsrevelation)areallactiveinthedevelopmentofrawgod-beliefsinto refinedgod-beliefs.Iwillexaminewhytheserefinedgod-beliefsareselected-forby evolutionaryprocessesatthegroupandculturallevels,andIwillconsiderthesortsof adaptivebenefitstheyconfertotheirrespectivebelievers. 3.CulturalEvolutionandGod-Beliefs Sofar,Ihaveproposedthatthehumanbrainpossessescertainreligiongenerating cognitivemechanisms.Thesemechanismsconstituteareligion-generatingsuite,the 30 processesofwhichgiverisetothenaturalhumantendencytoformbyproductgod-beliefs. Ourpropensitiestoconceiveoftheworldinteleologicalterms,tohyper-sensitivelyproject agencyandagentintentionintotheworldaroundus,andtoprocesstheworldthroughthe filterofourintuitivefolkpsychologicalmechanismsdosomeseriousexplanatoryworkin theareaof“religion.”Itistheserawgod-beliefsthatareeventuallydevelopedintoour refinedgod-beliefs. Mybyproductstoryfortheoriginoftheserawgod-beliefsleavesmuchinneedof explanation.Ihavearguedthattheserawgod-beliefsarebyproducts,ratherthan adaptations;thebyproductswereselected,ratherthanselected-for.Rawgod-beliefsstill characterizehumanpsychologytoday—theanthropomorphizingofinanimateobjects,the intuitivedesign/causalhypothesestowhichweintuitivelyhold,thehypersensitive attributionofagencytotheenvironment,etc.—but“religion”isafarmoreinteresting phenomenonthanwhatIhavedescribedsofar.Anaccountofthesebyproductbeliefs hardlyservesasanexplanationfortherichlandscapeofreligiousworldviewsthat characterizesthehumanexperience.Thereisclearlymoretoreligiousbeliefasweknowit todaythanthemerebyproductgod-beliefsdeliveredtousbyourcognitiveprocesses. Refinedgod-beliefsarefarmoreevolutionarilyconsequentialthanrawgod-beliefs, andassuchtheyhaveplayedaformativeroleinthedevelopmentofhumansocietiesand culture.AsIwillargueinthecomingpages,itisrefinedgod-beliefs(ratherthanrawgodbeliefs)thathaveconferredadaptiveadvantagetotheindividualsandgroupsthathave possessedsuchbeliefsthroughoutrecentevolutionaryhistory.Religionisawinning evolutionarystrategy.Howdothebyproductrawgod-beliefsdeliveredtousbyour cognitivesystemsbecomemoredevelopedandsystematic?Howdotheycometoorganize 31 entirecultures?Whydoweassenttothem,andwhydotheypersist?Therawgod-beliefs areourstartingpoint,butitishumannaturetotellstoriesandtopursueexplanation beyondtheintuitionsdeliveredbyourcognitivemechanisms.Thesestoriesand explanationstaketheformofculturallytransmittedcreationmyths,systematictheologies, folklores,etc.Withourrefinedgod-beliefs,wetellrich,complicated,andfancifultales. Thissectionofthepaperwilldiscussthedevelopmentofreligionasagroupand culturaladaptation,anditwilluserecentresearchinevolutionarybiologyandgroup selectiontheorytoshowhowreligionitselfconfersadaptiveadvantage.Iwillarguethat religion—atthegrouplevel—isadaptivelyadvantageous,andthatthesurvivalbenefits grantedbyrefinedgod-beliefshelptoexplainwhygod-beliefsaresocommontohumanity.I willalsoexaminethenaturalprocessesbywhichreligiousbeliefs,concepts,andideashave becomesoubiquitousandvariedthroughouthumanexperience. PsychologistsBarrettandKeil(1996)haveframedthedifferencesbetweenwhatI havecalledourrawandrefinedgod-beliefsinontologicalterms.Theyspecificallyaddress theintuitiveanthropomorphizingofthetheisticconceptofGod,andtheypresent experimentalfindingsthatsuggestweactuallyhavetwodifferentsetsofreligiousbeliefsat workregardingGod.20Onesetisourintuitive,anthropomorphizedsetofbeliefsaboutGod, andtheotherisournon-intuitive,“theologicallycorrect”setofbeliefsaboutGod.Thetwo setsareincommensurable,becausetheypertaintodifferentontologicalcategoriesof existence—theontologyofthingsinthenaturalworld,andtheontologyofGod: Ifthesereligions,whichhavehadaprofoundimpactonWesterntheological concepts,attributetoGodavastlydifferenttypeofexistencethanourown,howdo 20BarrettandKeilfocusexclusivelyonadistinctionbetweenthetheist’s“theologically correct”and“anthropomorphized”conceptsofGod,whileIhavepresentedadistinction betweenrawandrefinedgod-beliefs,ingeneral. 32 wecrossthisontologicalgapandunderstandGod...IfGodisrevealedthrough naturalisticmeansandinnaturalisticterms,howthendowemakesenseofthis revelation?Howdoweincorporatenaturalfeaturesintoourrepresentationofa nonnaturalentity?Ananalogousproblemmightbetoconsiderwhatitwouldbe liketobeabat(Nagel,1974).Theotherstateofbeingissodifferentthatthetask seemsimpossible.21 Theyposethequestion:ifGod,accordingtoone’stheology,isofadifferentontological categorythanhumankind—i.e.,spaceless,timeless,unbound,etc.—howcouldhumankind possiblyaccuratelyconceiveofGod?IfGodwererightlyconceivedofasbeingofadifferent ontologicalcategorythanus,anyattempttoanthropomorphizeGodwouldradically misrepresentHimorHer(orWhatever).Iwouldposeafurtherquestion:Howcouldour “theologicallycorrect”god-beliefspossiblyhavedevelopednaturallyiftheirobjects(God, gods,spirits,etc.)are,atrockbottom,ofadifferentontologicalcategoryfromusandfrom anythingelseweexperience? BarrettandKeil(1996)offermoreonthesetwodifferentbeliefsetsthatrun simultaneously,butincompatibly: Despitetheologicaldescriptions,peopleseemtoincorporateanthropomorphicand naturalisticcharacterizationsintotheirintuitiveGodconcepts…Perhaps conceptionsofGodmustbeanthropomorphic,evenwhiletheologicalbeliefs maintainotherwise.Itmaybethatthe“theologicalGod”isradicallydifferentfrom the“intuitiveGod”normallydescribedineverydaydiscourse.Evenindividualswho explicitlyendorsethetheologicalversionofGodmightnonethelessimplicitly embraceaverydifferentversioninmostoftheirdailythoughts.22 Psychologistshavelongassumedthatanthropomorphiclanguagereflects underlyingcognitiveanthropomorphism.Freudinitiatedthislineofthoughtmost dramaticallywiththesuggestionthatGodconceptsareprojectionsofone’sfather andthatthestartofreligionisthe“humanizationofnature.”23 21BarrettandKeil,1996,pg.220. 22Barrett&Keil,1996,pg.223. 23Ibid.,pg.221. 33 TheyprovidedatasuggestingthatwhenpressedtotalkaboutGod,peopletendto anthropomorphizeHim(toputHisactionsintospatial,temporal,andsequentialterms, restrictHimtoonlyhavingoneconversationatatime,etc.),regardlessofhavingavowedto “theologicallycorrect”doctrinalbeliefsaboutHisdivineattributes(existenceoutsideof time,omnipresence,etc.): …subjectsdouseanthropomorphicconceptsofGodinunderstandingstorieseven thoughtheymayprofessatheologicalpositionthatrejectsanthropomorphic constraintsonGodandGod’sactivities.Itappearsthatpeoplehaveatleasttwo parallelGodconceptsthatareusedindifferentcontexts,andtheseconceptsmaybe fundamentallyincompatible.24 Perhapsstoriesinvolvinganatemporalandomnipotentagentcreateprocessing difficulties,andanefficientwaytodealwiththeproblemistouseasimplerGod concepttounderstandstories.25 Allofthisgoestohighlightthedistinctionbetweentheintuitivegod-beliefsdeliveredto individualsbytheircognitivemechanismsandthemorereflectivegod-beliefsthatare developedbysocietiesandculturesthroughculturalevolutionandlearning(andinthe theist’scase,revelation). Theideaisthatourintuitivegod-beliefsarecognitivelyeasiertograsp.Theyare morenatural.Inparticular,thebeliefsonemightprofessinthedomainoftheologyare quiteunnaturalandcognitivelycounterintuitive—somuchsothatwhenundercognitive load(aswhenaskedtorecounttalesaboutGod),ourcognitivesystemstendtoshirk theologicalconceptionsofGodformoreintuitive,anthropomorphicconceptionsofGod (Barrett&Keil,1996).BarrettandKeilwereconcernedwiththe“ontologicalgap”between ourintuitive,anthropomorphicbeliefsaboutGodandourmorecounterintuitive, 24Ibid.,pg.240. 25Ibid.,pg.243. 34 theologicalbeliefsaboutGod.Therestofthissectioninquiresintotheriseofsuchan “ontologicalgap.”Although,perhapsourparticularsubjectmattercallsforareappropriationoftheirlanguage;let’scallthedistancebetweenourrawgod-beliefsandour refinedgod-beliefsa“cognitivegap.”Theformerareevolutionarilyolderandcognitively easier,whilethelatterareevolutionarilyrecentandmorecognitivelydifficult.Theformer arethenaturalbyproductsofourcognitivemechanisms,whilethelatterarethe counterintuitiveoutputsofgenerationsofstorytelling,culturalselection,andhuman reasoning. Wenowturntoexaminingthedevelopment,transmission,andadaptivevalueof refinedgod-beliefsandreligioussystems. A.VirusesoftheMind&MemeTheory “Virus”isaloadedterm.Butitisatermthat,asusedbelow,iswellsuitedforits intendeduse.Someevolutionarybiologistsandevolutionarypsychologistshavelikened thespreadofreligiousworldviewstothespreadofviruses.Tosome,the“virus”ofreligion isdetrimentaltohumansociety;toothers,thenegativeconnotationsassociatedwiththe word“virus”arenotnecessarilyappliedtoreligion.Hereisaclearsummaryofthe“virus view”fromevolutionarybiologistRobertTrivers(2011): Whatsomehaveisametaphor.Religionisaviralmeme;thatis,itisnotanactual virus,whichcaneasilybringapopulationtoitsknees,butratheritismerelya thoughtsystemthathappenstopropagateasifitwereavirus,tothedetrimentof thosewiththebeliefsystem.Despiteitsnegativeeffects,itapparentlygenerates insufficientselectionpressuretosuppressthespreadofthisnon-coevolving nonorganism.26 26Trivers,2011,pg.278. 35 Oneofthebiggestproponentsofthe“virusview”ofreligionisevolutionarybiologist RichardDawkins(2003).Dawkinsdevelopedawayofthinkingabout“unitsofculture”— thestuffthatgetstransmittedfromonegenerationofasocietytothenext—thatlikens suchunitsofculturetopathogens.Dawkins’spointwasthatunitsofculturelikereligious beliefs“infect”themindsoftheindividualstowhomtheyaretransmitted,andthat religiousbeliefsareparticularlysuccessfulviruses.Dawkins(1976)cashedouthistheory inthelanguageof“memes.”His“virus”positionasideforthemoment,Dawkins’sworkon memesisextremelyhelpfulformypurposes.Boyer(2001)explainsDawkins’smeme theory: [Dawkins]summarizedallthisbydescribingcultureasapopulationofmemes, whicharejust“copy-me”programs,likegenes.Genesproduceorganismsthat behaveinsuchawaythatthegenesarereplicated—otherwisethegenesinquestion wouldnotbearound.Memesareunitsofculture:notions,values,stories,etc.that getpeopletospeakoractincertainwaysthatmakeotherpeoplestoreareplicated versionofthesementalunits.27 Inthisaccount,familiarreligiousconceptsandassociatedbeliefs,norms,emotions, arejustbetter-replicatingmemesthanothers,inthesensethattheircopy-me instructionsworkbetter.28 Ifyouwillrecall,Boyer(2001)laidoutsomenecessaryconditionsforthesuccessful culturaltransmissionofa“godconcept.”Heproposedamodelofsuccessfultransmission thatrequiredthe“godconcept”toviolatecertainconceptualexpectationstoan appropriatedegree.Forinstance,theconceptslike“god”and“spirit”aretransmittedso well,becausetheyfitnicelyintotheconceptualtemplatewehavefortheconcept“person,” withtheexceptionofahandfulofcounterintuitiveviolations(likenothavingabody,being atemporal,beingabletopassthroughthings,etc.).Thesecounterintuitive“god”and“spirit” 27Boyer,2001,pg.35. 28Ibid.,pg.37. 36 conceptsarestrangeandmemorable,buttheyalignwiththe“person”conceptclosely enoughthattheyarenotrenderedunintelligibleinourconceivingofthem.So,these conceptsarecounterintuitivetotheappropriatedegree,andourstoriesinvolvingthese conceptsare,asaresult,culturallytransmittedinadisproportionatelysuccessfulway. (Someofthishelpsustounderstandwhygod-beliefspersist,despitetheexplanatory alternativeswehaveathand—theyareconsistent,tojusttherightdegree,withour intuitiveexpectationsoftheworldaroundusandwithourconceptualtemplates.Moreon “persistence”later.) BoyertakesDawkins’smemetheoryandexpoundsonit.Boyer’sworkrepresents thebeginningsofourabilitytounderstandhowourrefinedgod-beliefsmighthaveevolved fromourrawgod-beliefs: Culturalmemesundergomutation,recombinationandselectioninsidethe individualmindeverybitasmuchandasoftenas…duringtransmissionbetween minds.Wedonotjusttransmittheinformationwereceived.Weprocessitanduse ittocreatenewinformation,someofwhichwedocommunicatetootherpeople.29 Ourreligiousconcepts,evenaftercountlessgenerationsofculturaltransmissions,bear significantresemblancetooneanotherandtoourmoreprimitivegod-beliefs.Our conceptualtemplates(whicharethebasicbuildingblocksforourunderstandingofthe world)arefundamentallyunchangedbytheprocessesofevolution;thisservestopreserve certaincrucialbitsoftheinformationthatwetransmitculturallyovertime.Italsohelpsto explainwhyourgod-beliefssharesomuchincommon,cross-culturally.Memetheory,then, workswellinhelpingtoshowhowculturallytransmittedbeliefs—likevariousgodbeliefs—mayevolveovertimeintotherichvarietyofbeliefsweseeintheworld;and,with 29Boyer,2001,pg.39. 37 Boyer’sadditions,memetransmissiontheoryservesasausefulexplanationofthedifferent culturalthemesthataresharedincommonbymanypeoplegroups.Theprocessofmeme transmission,then,isonemechanismthataccountsforthespreading,transformation,and persistenceofreligiousconceptsandgod-beliefsoverevolutionarytime.Itistheselection ofideas. Intheculturaltransmissionofourgod-beliefsovertime,wedowitnessimportant changesinthecontentofthosetransmittedbeliefs.Butourcognitivemachinerykeepsus honest.PeoplelikeBoyercontendthattheseconceptualtemplatesanchorus,inan importantsense,tothecross-generationallypreservedbitsofthesebeliefs(prevailing themesandvalues,commondenominatorsacrossreligiousstories,etc.).Someofthese cross-generationallypreservedtemplatesarepresumablysharedbyall,byvirtueofour sharedevolutionaryhistories,whilesomeofthemarerelativetospecificculturesand societies,byvirtueoftheiruniqueevolutionaryhistories.Thishelpsusanswerthe question:whatarethemechanicsofthedevelopmentofrefinedgod-beliefsfromrawgodbeliefs?Atthispointwecanonlyspeculate,butIthinkBoyer’sandDawkins’sworkmakes itreasonableforustosupposethatourrefinedgod-beliefsaretheresultofalonglineof culturallytransmittedreligiousbeliefsthathavebeenpassed,withsignificantoverall variation,fromonegenerationofourspeciestothenext. Thestorywouldneedtobesomethinglikethis:We(humans)beganwiththe intuitivebyproductgod-beliefsprovidedtousbyourcognitivemechanisms.Atsomepoint, ourancestorsbegantotellexplanatory,religiousstories.Thesestorieswouldhave providedanswersandexplanationsforunexplainedphenomena,wouldhaveexplainedour ancestors’placeintheworld,wouldhaveprovidedthemwithasenseofmeaning,and 38 wouldhaveunifiedvariouscultures.Thesestorieswereadaptive,specifictothe environmentinhabitedbyagivenpeoplegroupandspecifictothecontingenthistorical eventswithwhichagivenpeoplegroupwasrequiredtoreconciletheirexistence.Aswe learnedaboutourenvironment,aboutourselves,andaboutthevariousgodsthatwe believedin,thesereligiousstorieswouldhavemorphedovertime.Thevariationinthe contentofmemesoverevolutionaryhistoryprovidedfodderfortheprocessesand pressuresofnaturalselectionandadaptation,buttheconstancyofourconceptual templatesacrosstimeandcultureskeptourgod-beliefsand“godconcepts,”toanimportant degree,anchoredtotheiroriginalcopies.Asaresultofthislongprocess,weareleftwith thegod-beliefspossessedbybelieverstoday,theworldover.Eachcultureholdsitsown uniqueevolutionaryhistory,inevitablyprovidinguswiththediverselandscapeofreligious storiesandworldviewsthatwefindinmoderntimes. Therearevariousconventionstowhichwemightappealtohelpexplainthe formation,development,andspreadofreligiousbeliefsacrosstime.Forinstance,societies throughouttimehavetransmitteduniquecreationmythsandfolklores,andtheyhavetold storiestotransmitnotonlythesemyths,butalsothehistoryofthegivensociety. Accordingtomyaccount,primitiveversionsofthesemythsandfolkloreswouldhavebeen heavilyinformedbyrawgod-beliefs,bythereligiousnotionsnaturallydeliveredtothemby theircognitiveprocesses.Indeed,primitiveculturestoldstoriesabouttheirhistoriesthat werelacedwithreligiousconcepts,non-naturalevents,anddivinecharacters,totheextent thatinmanycasesitisdifficulttodeterminefactualhistoryfrommeremyth.Early societiessawtheirhistoriesinlightofthesereligiousnarratives.Associetiesgrew,spread, madeconquest,andestablishedtradewithotherpartsoftheworld(orregion),their 39 storiesspread.Withtheriseofmoreadvanced(andwritten)language,religiousideas wouldhavebecomemoreeffectivelycommunicable.Withtheriseofreligiousinstitutions andcentersoflearning,religiousconceptsandstorieswouldhavebeensolidified, canonized,andpreservedforlatergenerations.Withtheriseofreligiouskingdomsand states—ortheirmoreprimitivecounterparts—religiousbeliefandparticipationwould havebecomeasourceofgroupidentity,andparticipationinthereligiousidentityofa societymayhavebeencompulsory(ensuringthespreadofreligiousideas). Thisisallconjectural,butwecanprobablyonlytellthesketchofanevolutionary storyintryingtoaccountforaphenomenonthatissoancientandvariedas“religion.” Throughoutevolutionaryhistory,therewouldhavebeenanextraordinarynumberof evolutionaryeventsandpressures.However,Ihavesetouttoexplainthemechanismsat workineachstageofthatprocess,soastoshowthatsuchanadmittedlyvaguestoryis plausible.ForreasonsIwilldiscussshortly,Irejectoutofhandthelanguageusedby Dawkinsinhischaracterizationofreligiousbeliefasa“virusofthemind”—aparasitic maladaptationthatexiststothedetrimentofbelievingindividualsandcultures.Asifthe pervasivepresenceofreligiousbeliefsinthehumanexperiencewerenotenough evidence30,thereisanenormousbodyofresearchandliteraturethathighlightsthe adaptivebenefitsofgod-beliefs(moreonthis,shortly). 30Granted,manyharmfulvirusesarepervasive,andthismightseemtoserveasa counterexampletowhatIjustsaid.However,biologicalvirusesinnaturehaveinterests thatareservedbytheharmthatiscausedtotheirhosts;biologicalvirusescanexisttoour detriment,anditistotheiradaptiveadvantagetodoso.Cultural“viruses,”ontheother hand,aregivenlifebytheirhost(thebeliever)duetothebenefitsthatareconferredtothe believer.Weshouldexpectthat,overtime,maladaptivecultural“viruses”wouldbe selectedagainst,andthatourpsychologieswouldbesoconstitutedbyevolutionary pressuresastopropagatebeneficialviruses. 40 B.Group-LevelSelection BiologistandanthropologistDavidSloanWilsonhasdonesignificantworktoshow thatreligion—asamoralsystemthatfacilitatesspecificgroupbehaviors—isaproductof whathecalls“multilevelselection”(Wilson,2003).Herejectstheideathatthe phenomenonofreligionasweknowittodayistheresultofevolutionbynaturalselection operatingstrictlyatthegeneticlevel.Instead,headvocatesforagroup-levelselection modelinorderexplainvarioussocieties’religiousworldviews: Amiddlegroundisbecomingestablishedinwhichgroupsareacknowledgedto evolveintoadaptiveunits,butonlyifspecialconditionsaremet.Ironically,in humangroupsitisoftenreligionthatprovidesthespecialconditions.Religion returnstocenterstage,notasatheologicalexplanationofpurposeandorder,butas itselfaproductofevolutionthatenablesgroupstofunctionasadaptiveunits—at leasttoadegree.31 Inhiswork,Wilsonadvocatesforthereturnofgroupselectionasaviablewayofthinking aboutthedevelopmentofcultures,societies,andorganisms.Herecountsthefalling-outof thisparticularviewamongevolutionarybiologistsinthelatterhalfofthetwentieth century: Althoughmanysocialscientiststaketheorganismicconceptofsocietyforgranted, evolutionarybiologistsinthe1960srejectedgroupselectionsostronglythatit becamehereticaltothinkof“societyasanorganism”…forhumansoranyother species…Theillusionofadaptationatthegrouplevelcanbeexplainedintermsof individualsincreasingthefitnessoftheirgenesinthebodiesofothers,reciprocal exchange,orevenmoreself-servingbenefitssuchasdownrightdeceptionand exploitation.32 Wilson,though,takesissuewiththishardlineevolutionarybiologicalapproach. 31Wilson,2003,pg.6. 32Ibid.,pg.12. 41 Thegroupselectiondynamicentersinwhenweconsiderthatmuchofreligious belief—andthebehaviorthatresultsfromit—isstrictlysocial.Religiousbeliefsdetermine howindividualmembersofacommunityoughttotreatoneanother,howtheyoughtto regardthemselves,andhowtheyoughttotreatthoseoutsideoftheircommunity. Religiousbeliefhaspracticalimplicationsintheareasofmorality,publichealthand hygiene,andthestructuringofsociety.Whenthetraitunderconsiderationisanon-social behaviorthataltersthefitnessoftheindividualalone,itisnotappropriatethatwe considerthattraittobeaproductofgroup-levelselection.Butwhenthetraitunder considerationisasocialbehavior(pertainingtogroupmorality,health,structure,etc.), thentheindividual’sfitnessisnotproperlyconsideredinisolation;thetraitsoftheothers inits“trait-group”mustbeconsidered.Forsocialbehaviors,thefunctioningofthesocial groupasawholemustbeconsidered.Wilsonpositsthisintimaterelationbetweentraits andgroupsinhismultilevelselectiontheory.33Alongthesedimensions,groupsare consideredorganismsintheirownright,completewithgrouptraitsthatareupfor selection. Becausereligiousbeliefstendtofacilitatethemoralsystemsandorderofagiven society,thereligiousbeliefsofgroupsasawhole—beliefsthatleadtosocialandpro-social behaviors—areupforselectionatthegrouplevel.Totheextentthatsuchreligiousbeliefs positivelyaffecthowthegroupfunctions,positivelycontributetothesurvivalofthegroup relativetoothergroups,andfacilitatethetransmissionofreligiousbeliefsthrough biologicalreproductionorthroughculturalreproduction(i.e.,theconversion/assimilation ofotherpopulations),thereligiousbeliefsareproperlyregardedassuccessfulstrategies 33Ibid.,pg.15. 42 fortheirrespectivegroups.Towhateverextentreligionfacilitatesgreatergroupcohesion andthereproductivesuccessofthegroup’sindividuals,agroup’sreligionisappropriately conceivedofasanadaptivelyadvantageousstrategy.Boththegenesandthebeliefsofthe groupsthatemployrefinedgod-beliefsasadaptivelyadvantageousstrategiesshouldbe expectedtobefavoredinfuturegenerations.Groupsthatutilizeeffectivereligiousbelief systemsasculturaladaptationsareexpectedtosucceeddisproportionatelywell.The culturaltraitsofthesegroupsareselected,andthegroupsbecomesuccessfuladaptive units.Whenthishappens,accordingtoWilson,asocietyorgroupbecomesa“higher-level organisminitsownright.”34Aslongasweconceiveofreligionasaphenomenonthat successfullyfacilitatesgroupbenefit,religionshouldbeconsideredanadaptationdesigned bytheforcesofculturalevolutionandgroup-levelselection. Wilsongoestobatagainstthetoo-narrowexplanationsofreligiousbelief conventionallytakenbyevolutionarybiologistsandpsychologists.Hethinksthestoryis morecomplicated,andthatsomeevolutionarystoriesdonotleaveroomforlearning, development,andsoforth: [What]wemustunderstandfromanevolutionaryperspectiveisthatmoralsystems includeanopen-endedculturaldimensioninadditiontoaninnatepsychological dimension.Ourgeneticallyevolvedmindsmakeitpossibletohaveamoralsystem, butthespecificcontentsofmoralsystemscanchangewithingroupsandvary widelyamonggroups,withimportantconsequencesforsurvivaland reproduction.35 [Thealgorithmofevolutionarypsychologistsisasfollows:]Foranyparticular featureofhumanbehaviorandpsychology,trytounderstanditasagenetically evolvedadaptationtoafeatureoftheancestralenvironment.Thentrytoimagine thepsychologicalmechanismasaspecializedmodule…Mycomplaintisnotthatthe [described]algorithmiswrongbutthatitispartial,seemingtoexcludethe 34Ibid.,pg.17. 35Ibid.,pg.28. 43 possibilityoflearning,development,culture,andotheraspectsofhumanmentality asopen-endedprocesses.36 WhatWilsoncallsforisamodelofourpsychologythatallowsfor“open-endedprocesses.” BorrowingfromPlotkin(1994),hearguesthatweoughttounderstandourcognitive processesas“Darwinmachines,”asevolvedsystemsthataccommodateevolutionwithin theirownstructures.HeciteshumanrationalthoughtasanexampleofaDarwinmachine, asitgeneratesandprocessesnovelrepresentationsinternally.Religionasweknowit today,Wilsonargues,isnotaphenomenonforwhichourancientenvironmentsand evolvedcognitivemechanisms(and,therefore,genes)arefullyresponsible.Rather, modernmanifestationsofreligion(refinedgod-beliefs)areevolutionarilyrecent developmentsthatcomeinresponsetoevolutionarilyrecentenvironmentsandselection pressures—andthisdevelopmentofreligionislargelycultural,ratherthangenetic. Religiousbeliefsareproperlyconceivedofastheoutputsofour“Darwinmachine”rational belief-formationprocesses.Theevolutionofculturalbeliefsystems,then,isnotoccurring atthelevelofourgenesorcognitivemechanisms,butratheratthelevelofcultural knowledge.37 Wilson’sviewsaresummarized,withanemphasisontherolethatgroupselection playsintheemergenceof“organismicgroups”: Organismicgroupsdonotautomaticallyevolvebutrequireaprocessofgroup selection.Groupselectioncanbeapotentevolutionaryforce,despiteits widespreadrejectionduringtheageofindividualism…Moralsystemshavean innatepsychologicaldimensionbutalsoanopen-endeddimensionthatallows humanhistorytobeseenasafast-pacedevolutionaryprocesswithculturalrather thangeneticmechanismsofinheritance.38 36Ibid.,pg.29-30. 37Wilson,2003,pg.31,35. 38Ibid.,pg.36-37. 44 Moralsystemsincludebothaninnatepsychologicalcomponentandanopen-ended culturalcomponentthatenablesgroupstoadapttotheirrecentenvironments. Beliefinsupernaturalagentsandotherelementsthatareassociatedspecifically withreligioncanplayanimportantroleinthestructureandfunctionofmoral communities.39 JustasWilsonconcedesthatthedevelopmentofmoralsystems(andreligions,inasmuch asreligionsfacilitatemoralsystems)isduetobothan“innatepsychologicalcomponent” andan“open-endedculturalcomponent,”weshouldgrantthattheemergenceofgroupsas adaptiveunitslikelyincorporatesasimilarcombinationof“innatestuff”and“open-ended” stuff.Weprobablydohaveadaptivelyadvantageousinnatetendenciesthatleadus,as individuals,toformintosocialgroupswithotherindividuals,quiteindependentfrom religioussystemsorbeliefs.Forexample,kin-selectionandreciprocalaltruism mechanismsprobablyserveasthecognitivefoundationforgroup-orientation,whilethe cultural-leveladaptationofreligion(i.e.,religionasafacilitatorofmorality)hasonly reinforcedourpropensitytobuildsocietiesandliveourlivesingroups.Wilson’spoints contributewonderfullytoourunderstandingofreligioussystemsasgroupadaptations designedtosolveevolutionarilyrecentproblems.Thereisnoneedforan“either/or” approachtoallofthis;inaccountingforwhyhumansaresocialcreatures,itisprobable thatevolutionarybiologistsandevolutionarypsychologiststellanimportantpartofthe story(adaptationistexplanationsthatexplorethebenefitofkin-selectionandreciprocal altruismmechanismsatthelevelofindividuals),whilethesocialscientistsandWilsontell theremainderofthestory(multi-levelselectionexplanationsthatexplorethebenefitof religionatthelevelofsocieties). 39Ibid.,pg.44. 45 Boyer(2009)provideshisowntakeonculturalevolution,inspiredbytheworkof culturalanthropologists: …whatweobserveasculturalrepresentationsandpracticesarevariants(of culturaltraits),foundinroughlysimilarformsinaparticularplaceorgroupbecause theyhaveresistedchangeanddistortionthroughinnumerableprocessesof acquisition,storage,inference,andcommunication.40 TheyrecounttheworkofBoydandRicherson(1985): …thespreadofspecificvariantsofculturalrepresentations(suchasaparticular religiousbelieforconceptrepresentedbyahumanmind)isseenaspartly analogoustothespreadofallelesinagenepool.Inparticular,thetoolsof populationgeneticscanbeappliedtothespreadofculturaltraitsandallowusto predicttheirspread,givensuchparametersastheinitialprevalenceofatrait,the likelihoodoftransmission,andvariousbiases.41 ThisismuchlikeWilson’sproposal.AlsodiscussedistheworkofDanSperber(2000),in whichtheculturaltransmissionofbeliefsispresentedinan“epidemiologicalmodel.”In suchamodel,theprocessofbelieftransmissionishighly“entropic”—thatis,the communicationofbeliefsproducesalargenumberofdifferentrepresentationsinalarge numberofdifferentminds.Thatthereissomecommonalityamongthesedifferent representationsdemandsexplanation,andtheexplanationisfoundinthefactthatpeoples’ “inferencesareguidedbytacitprinciplesthathappentobeidenticalinallnormalminds” (Boyer&Bergstrom,2008).ThissoundsakintoAtran’s(2002)accountof“evolutionary landscapes”andBoyer’s(2001)theoryaboutconceptualtemplatesandrelatedautomatic inferencesystems.Allinall,thesebodiesofwork(alongwithmemetheory)providea compellingcaseforthepositionthatculturalevolutionexplainsthetransmissionand developmentofourvariousrefinedgod-beliefs. 40Boyer,2009,pg.290. 41Boyd&Richerson,1985,pg.113. 46 Notallreligionsarecreatedequal.Thistruthgivesstrengthtoa“multilevel selection”hypothesislikeWilson’s.Somereligiousbeliefslendtotheirrespectiveculture greatadaptiveadvantage,andotherreligiousbeliefsdonot—itisthisdisparitythatgives theprocessesofselectionattheculturallevelsomethingtoworkwith.Inadditiontothe memetheorypresentedbyDawkinsandBoyer(whichhelpsustounderstandhow religiousbeliefschangeconceptuallyacrosstimeviaculturaltransmissionandviathe variousmechanismsinplacethataffecthowwellweretaincertaintypesofbeliefs), Wilson’s“multi-levelselection”takeonreligiousbeliefsgoesalongwaytowardaccounting forthevastlydiversebodiesofgod-beliefsthatweobserveacrosshumanculturesacross time. Assuch,Ibelievethatwecanreasonablyconcludethatthediversityofgod-beliefsin humanexperienceislargelyexplainedby: 1. Thebyproductrawgod-beliefsprovidedbyourRGCMs, 2. Theprocessesofculturalevolutionandmultilevelselection,andtheadaptive advantageconferredtoaculturalgroupbyitsrespectiverefinedgod-beliefs (thisincludesmemetheoryandthedifferentratesofsuccessof“copyme” programsintheculturaltransmissionofgod-beliefs),and 3. Themanifoldofhumanexperience(i.e.,acrosstime,peoplehaveexperienced theworldinradicallydifferentenvironmentsandwithradicallydifferent historicalcontingencies). Eachoftheseisacrucialfactorinunderstandingtheorigin,development,anddiversityof ourgod-beliefs. 47 C.AdaptiveCost/BenefitAnalysis Onewaytoproceedinconsideringthenotionthatourvariousgod-beliefsmaybe adaptations(eitherculturalorbiological)istoperformacost/benefitanalysisofsorts.We needtoweighthecostsofreligionagainstthebenefitstodetermineifwecanplausibly believethatreligioussystemsmighthaveconferredadaptivebenefittotheirrespective adherents.Fortunately,thebodyofresearchinthisparticularareaisrich.Withafew exceptions,theliteratureindicatesthatwehavegoodreasonforbelievingthatreligious beliefsandsystemsareadaptationsatthegrouplevel,andthatrefinedgod-beliefsalso conferadaptivebenefitstoindividualbelievers.Beforeweproceedintothedetails,itwill beusefultokeepinmindthatourgod-beliefsareoperatingattwodifferentlevels—the intuitivelevelandthereflectivelevel.AtthereflectivelevelarewhatIhavetermedour refinedgod-beliefs;thesearethemoresophisticated,inferential,andsociallyoriented beliefs.AttheintuitivelevelarewhatIhavetermedourrawgod-beliefs;thesearethe byproductsofournormalcognitiveprocesses.Wehaveconceivedoftheserawgod-beliefs asthebarefoundationsfortheconstructionofrefinedgod-beliefs.Betweenthesetwo levels,thereisa“cognitivegap”;theformerareevolutionarilyancientandcognitivelyeasy, whilethelatterareevolutionarilyrecentandtendtobemuchmorecognitivelydifficult. Thesetwo“levels”warrantdifferentempiricalapproaches.Anthropologistsand socialscientistsofreligionhavemadethesocietal-levelrefinedgod-beliefsthetargetof theirwork,whileevolutionarypsychologistsandcognitivescientistsofreligionhave targetedthecognitive-level,rawgod-beliefswiththeirwork.Sincethesocialreligious beliefsareevolutionarilyrecent(recent,thatis,relativetotheevolutionarilyancient intuitionsofferedtousbyourRGCMs),thestudyofmodernreligioussystemsisrelevantto 48 understandingtheiradaptivebenefit.Sincethecognitivereligiousbeliefsare evolutionarilyancient,thestudyofmodernreligioussystemsisquiteirrelevantto understandingtheunderlyingcognitivemechanisms(unlessweareconsideringhowour rawgod-beliefsmighthavegivenrisetoourrefinedgod-beliefs);thepsychologicalstudyof therelevantcognitivemechanisms,though,doesgiveusvaluableinsightintohowourraw god-beliefsmayhavehelpedustosurviveancientenvironments.Bothapproaches—the cognitiveandtheanthropological—ultimatelyappealtoevolutionaryprocesses. So,Inowofficiallypropose:“Refinedgod-beliefsareadaptivelyadvantageous,both forindividualorganismsandforgroups.”42Thenextpartofthepaperwillserveto examinethisproposition.Bynomeanswillthissectionbeacomprehensiveexaminationof theadaptivecostsandbenefitsofreligion.Rather,Iwillhitthemaintalkingpointsofthose whoadvocateforthefitness-enhancingnatureofourgod-beliefs.Iwilldomybesttoavoid evolutionary“just-so”stories—convenient,adhocexplanatoryhypothesesthatoftencome underfirefromthecriticsofevolutionarytheory—andwillinsteadsticktothetaskof showingthereasonabilityofbelievingthatreligiousbeliefsarefitness-conferring adaptations. C-1.Cost,orInvestment? Onthefaceofthings,god-beliefsasweknowthemtoday—systematizedworldviews withvaluesandgoalsthatareseeminglyopposedtohumans’adaptiveadvantage—seem incrediblymaladaptive.Manyreligioussystemsestablishmoralboundariesintheareasof procreation,bodilydefense,andtheaccumulationofpersonalresources,andthisseemsto beasure-firestrategyforevolutionaryfailure.Yet,herewearetoday,withentirelistsof 42Inallcases,refinedgod-beliefsaretransmittedculturally. 49 thoushallnot’sthatplacerestrictionsonthingslikeextra-maritalsex,violence,and materialabundance.Atfirstglance,thisseemsanunwiseevolutionarystrategy.Afterall, inthenaturalworldthewinnersarethosewhocanreproducesuccessfully(relativeto others),killtheirenemies,andnotstarvetodeath. Thatconsidered,ifwearetoproposethatgod-beliefsareadaptations,ratherthan maladaptations,wemustcontendthatthebenefitstoreligiousbelieversoutweighthe apparentcosts.BoyerandBergstrom(2008)havedonejustthat,attackingtheapparent costshead-on: Astrikingcharacteristicofmostreligiousthoughtandbehavioristhattheydonot seemtoconferanydirectfitnessadvantageonthepractitioners.So,froman evolutionaryviewpoint,mostreligiousphenomenamightseemtobeeither maladaptiveoradaptivelyneutral.43 However,evolutionarybiologyalsodocumentsspecificwaysinwhichfitnesscosts canbecomeadaptive.Thisisparticularlysointhecaseofsignaling,anareaof intenseworkinrecentevolutionarybiology…Signalingrequiresthecoevolutionof senderandreceivercapacities…biologistshavefocusedespeciallyoncostlysignals, whicharereliablebecausetheyaredifficulttofakeandtherebyprovidedirect indicesofthefitnessqualitiestheyaresupposedtoadvertise.44 BoyerandBergstromhaveproposedthat,whilereligioniswhattheycalla“costlysignal,” thesuccessfulperformanceofsuchacostlysignalactuallyleadstogreateradaptivebenefit atsomelaterpoint,asa“delayedreward.”Theypointout,“Cooperationoftenrequiresthat peoplesacrificeanimmediatebenefitforadelayedreward.”So,theirnotionofreligious beliefasacostlysignalonlyworksifweunderstandreligiousbeliefinthecontextofintragrouprelationships.Theirconceptionofreligiousbeliefsascostlysignalshelpsusto 43Boyer&Bergstrom,2008,pg.115. 44Ibid.,pg.115. 50 understandtheadaptivebenefitsofreligionintermsoftheadaptivebenefitsofgroup membership,relations,andcooperation. BoyerandBergstrom(2008)discussthecostsandbenefitsoftheperformanceof suchcostlysignals: Inamoregeneralway,religiousthoughtandbehaviorwouldseemtomobilize cognitiveresourcesawayfromsurvivalandreproduction,beingfocusedon nonphysicalimaginedagency.Assumingthatreligiousactivityiscostly,doesit providesignals?Toalargeextentitdoes,giventhatmostactivityofthiskindis bothpublicandformalized,sothatpeople’scommitmentstothelocalritualsystem areobservablebyall(Sosis2003).Onthebasisofacomparativestudyofsmall communities,Sosisshowedthatcostisindeedanimportantfactor.Religious groupsthatrequireagreaterinvestmentincostlyritualstendtoremainmore cohesive…45 Iftheirstoryiscorrect,itindicatesthatgroup-membershipandtheadaptivebenefits thereofaremoreadvantageoustotheindividualthanaretheindividual’sabilitiesto cognizeaboutnon-religiousthings(likesurvivalandreproduction).Theydonotsayitso boldly,buttheproposalisessentiallysomethinglike:thepreciousresourcesspenton religiousthoughtandritualareadropinthebucketcomparedtotheresourcesgainedby groupidentity,intra-grouptrust,reciprocatedaltruism,sharedresources,etc.Atthevery least,thecostsareeventuallyoutweighed.So,perhapssuchcostlyreligioussignalsare bestregardednotasbeingadaptivelybeneficialorcostly,butasbeingadaptiveinvestments. Religioussignalingisanespeciallyeffectivemechanismforcommunicatinggroup identification,becauseareligioussignaltendstobeabindingsignal.Inonesense,religious signalsare“binding”justinthattheytendtobecostly.Costlyreligioussignalstieoneto one’sreligiouscommunityinimportantways—significantresources,time,andenergyare spentinparticipatinginagroup’sreligiousidentity;costlysignalsarehardertofakethan 45Ibid.,pg.116. 51 inexpensivesignals.46Wecanregardreligioussignalstobe“binding”inanothersense whenweunderstandwhat,exactly,isbeingcommunicatedbythesignalerinhisorher participationinagivenreligiouspractice.Signalingone’saffiliationwithaparticular religionisnotlikewearinganamebadge—itcommunicatessomuchmorethanjustassent toaparticularreligiousworldviewandadesiretoreapthebenefitsofgroupmembership. Religioussignalingcommunicatessharedvalues,sharedpriorities,one’sintentionto belongtothegroup,one’sintentiontomakesacrificesforthegroup,one’sintentionto treattheotherindividualsofthegroupasofone’s“in-group,”etc.So,signalingreligious affiliationis“binding”inthesensethatitallowsotherstoexpectcertainthingsofthe signaler. Signalingreligiousaffiliationis“binding”inonefinalaspect:religiousbeliefholdsa privilegedplaceinpeoples’livesandinsociety.One’sreligiousbeliefsencompassthe individual;asociety’sreligiousbeliefsactasguidingprinciples,corevalues,andsocial norms.Signalsbasedonnon-religiousideologycouldverywellbeusedtocommunicate groupidentity;itseemsreligioussignaling,however,enjoysauniqueabilityto communicatetoothersthewaythatoneseesoneselfandone’srelationshiptotheworld,to thedivine,andtootherpeople.Truly,religioussignalingisdifficult(andrisky)tofake,asit 46“Inexpensivesignals,”intherealmofreligiousbelief,mightincludethingslikeverbal commitment,mereprofessionofabelief,etc.“Costly”religioussignalsincludethingslike participationincommunityritual,spendingvaluableresourcesandtimedemonstrating one’sdevotiontoareligioussystem,denyingone’sdesiresandinterestsincommitmentto areligioussystemthaturgespro-socialoraltruisticbehavior,etc.Itisthese“costly” signalsthatmakereligiousidentificationhardtofake.Sure,anyonecancommitverballyto abeliefsystem.Theideaisthatone’saccesstogroupmembershipwouldbecontingenton one’swillingnesstospendtheresourcesonthesesignals.“Costly”signalsarehardtofake, asreligionstendtobedemanding.Thecostsofbeing“foundout”mightincludeostracism orthewithholdingofthebenefitsofgroupmembership.(Orthingslikebeingstonedto death,orbeingburntatthestake.) 52 signalscoremetaphysicalcommitments.Groupsthatsignalgod-beliefsinreligiousritualor inreligiousorganizationenjoyanaddedbenefitofbeingpronouncedlytight-knit (Norenzayan&Shariff,2008)—thishelpstoexplainwhyreligionandthesignalingof religiousaffiliationwerefavoredoveralternativekindsofsociety-organizingbeliefsystems andthesignalingassociatedwiththem. God-beliefsmightalsobeappropriatelyconceivedofasasocialgatekeeper.Ifthe abilitytosuccessfullysignalareligiousworldviewiswhatconferstoyouthecrucial benefitsofbelongingtothelargergroup,thenthosebenefitsarenotconferredifthesignal isnotsent.Religiousandritualadherencemight,inaliteralsense,beatickettothe adaptivebenefitsofgroupmembership—bothinourevolutionarypastandinthepresent. Itmightbeworthclarifyingthatthe“rituals”thatserveascostlysignalsmaybeas “primitive”asthingslikeinitiationrites,oras“modern”asthingslikechurchattendance. Nomatterwhereoneisalongthespectrumofculturalreligiouspractices,theideaisthat suchasignalisinitiallycostly,buttheneventuallyyieldsareturn.Allofthisisnottosay thattherearenot,infact,costsassociatedwithourgod-beliefs(particularly,ourrefined god-beliefs).Rather,itisjusttheclaimthatthebenefitsofsuchbeliefs—thebenefits associatedwithgroupmembershipandinclusion—cometofaroutweightheinitialcosts bothofbelievingacertainwayandsignalingthosebeliefs. C-2.Health&WellBeing Anotherapproachindeterminingtheadaptivebenefitofreligionandgod-beliefsis inthedirectpsychologicalstudyofmodernreligiousadherents.Whateverbenefitorcost canbefoundinthestudyofmodernreligiosityisusefulforus,inasmuchasthesecosts andbenefitstellusaboutthecostsandbenefitsofthereligioussystemsofourevolutionary 53 past.Towhateverextentpresentdayreligiousbeliefsarelikethebeliefsofourancestors, suchpsychologicalstudiesmaycontributetoansweringthequestionofwhetherornot religionisanadaptation.PsychologistKennethPargament(2002)hasconductedresearch inthisarea.Heliststheconditionsunderwhichreligiousbeliefsconferwell-beingorharm totheiradherents: Someformsofreligionaremorehelpfulthanothers.Areligionthatisinternalized, intrinsicallymotivated,andbuiltonabeliefinagreatermeaninginlife,asecure relationshipwithGod,andasenseofspiritualconnectednesswithothershas positiveimplicationsforwell-being.Conversely,areligionthatisimposed, unexamined,andreflectiveofatenuousrelationshipwithGodandtheworldbodes poorlyforwell-being,atleastintheshortterm.47 PargamentfocusedhisresearchonthemodernAmericanreligiouslandscape,butIbelieve hisfindingsalsogiveusstructureforunderstandingtheadaptivecostsandbenefitsof othernon-Westernornon-modernreligions. TherearecertainkeythemesinPargament’sfindingsthatcanserveascriteriafor evaluatingtheadaptiveadvantageordisadvantageofreligiousworldviewsthatlookquite differentfromWesterntheism.Suchcriteriaincludethesuccessfulinternalizationof religiousbeliefs,theintrinsicmotivationofone’sreligiouspractices/behavior,asenseof greatermeaningasderivedfromone’sreligiousbeliefs,asenseofspiritualsecurityas conferredbyone’sreligiousbeliefs,andasenseofspiritualconnectednesswithothers.It isupforempiricalresearchtodecidethis,butIwouldimaginethatevenabsentaliteral conceptof“God,”ifagivenreligion,spiritualworldview,orculturalpracticemeetsthe benefit-conferringstructureoutlinedbyPargament,wemightreasonablyexpectitto conferthesamewell-beingandbenefitsthattheparticularreligionsPargamentstudieddid 47Pargament,2002,pg.177. 54 infactconfer.Giventhis,itisnotbeliefin“God,”perse,thatconferssuchbenefits;rather, thepsychologicalbenefitsareproductsofthestructureofthereligion.Inprinciple,such benefitscouldbehadwithastrictlysecularworldview,wereitasecularworldview structuredsoastofacilitatethecommonthemesstudiedbyPargament. Pargamentalsodrewconclusionsaboutwhichtypesofpeoplemostbenefitfromthe typesofreligionhestudied: Noteveryoneexperiencesthesamebenefitsfromreligion.Religiousnessismore helpfultomoresociallymarginalizedgroups(e.g.,olderpeople,AfricanAmericans, women,poorpeople)andtothosewhoaremorereligiouslycommitted. Religiousbeliefsandpracticesappeartobeespeciallyvaluableinmorestressful situations…thatpushpeopletothelimitsoftheirownpersonalandsocialresources. SomeevidencealsosuggeststhatreligionisparticularlyhelpfultoRomanCatholics dealingwithcontrollablelifestressorsandtoProtestantscopingwith uncontrollablelifeevents.48 Pargamentsummarizesthatthe“efficacyofreligiondependsonthedegreetowhichitis wellintegratedintopeoples’lives.”Individualswhomostbenefitfromtheirreligionare oneswhoareapartofasocialenvironmentthatencouragestheirfaith.Alsobenefitingare thosewhoarebestabletoblendtheir“religiousbeliefs,practices,andmotivations harmoniouslywitheachother.”Conversely,individualswhodidnotfitthose descriptions—individualswhosereligiousidentityisnotsupported,whosereligionisunfit fortheirproblems,andwhosebeliefsandpractices“lackcoherencewitheachother”— receivedharm.Individualswhowereunabletofullyintegratetheirreligiousbeliefs actuallysufferedintheirwell-being. Pargament(2002)mentionsmarginalizedgroupsasthosepeoplewhobenefit particularlywellfromreligion(becausereligiousbeliefsareembeddedmoredeeplyinto 48Ibid.,pg.178. 55 theirculture)andstressfulsituationsasthoseeventsthatbestelicitparticularbenefitfrom religiousbeliefs(becausefaithisaneffectivecopingmechanisminresponsetoevents outsideofone’scontrol).Ashasalreadybeenmentioned,whatneedstobeempirically studiediswhetherornotnon-religiousworldviewsconferpsychologicalwell-beingtotheir adherents,ifthebenefit-conferringconditionsofthesereligiousbeliefsystems (Pargament’sinternalization,intrinsicmotivation,coherence,etc.)aremetbythenonreligiousworldviews.Itisunclearhowsalientafactorreligionitselfisinthese psychologicalstudies—themoresalientfactorscouldbethesocialandpsychological factorswehavediscussed. OnewaytointerpretPargament’sfindingsisthatthepsychologicalwell-beingwas notconferredbythereligiousbeliefsatall,butbytheabilityofanindividualtointernalize theirchosenworldview,beapartofasupportivecommunity,comeupwithacoherent worldview,etc.Onemightcontendthatitisnotreligiousbeliefitselfthatconfersadaptive benefit,butratherthepsychologicalabilitytocopewiththeworldviewsprovidedbysuch religiousbeliefs.Afterall,someofPargament’smostimportantfindingsdetailhowitisthe peoplewhohavenotfullyintegratedreligionintotheirlivesthataremorepsychologically atrisk.Anyhow,allofthataside,Pargamentwouldprobablyinsistthatthemostfitnessenhancingreligionsaretheonesthatproducebelieverswhocanmeetthosecriteriafor receivingpsychologicalbenefits;ifareligioncanfacilitatethepsychologicalwell-beingof itsadherents,itisproperlyregardedasfitness-conferring.Thereligionsthatcannot facilitatethosethingsactuallydopsychologicalharmtoadherents(i.e.,leadtheir lukewarmadherentsintoresource-demandingcognitivedissonance).Theindividuals 56 withinsuccessfulreligionswhodonotmeetthevariousstandards(internalization, intrinsicmotivation,etc.)alsosuffercostsaccordingly. Thereisalsoanimportantrelationshipbetweenreligionandbehaviorsthatare conducivetophysicalhealth.BiologistRobertTrivers(2011)discussesthisrelationship. Herecognizesthatreligionsoftenencouragehealthybehavior,andhereferencesthe effectsofreligiousbeliefonimprovedimmunefunction.Triversalsocitesthepositive effectofmusiconimmunefunction.Medicineandmusicbothprovideplacebobenefitsto some,andbothwere“originallyembedded”withinreligion.49However,manyofthehealth benefitsofreligiousbeliefandaffiliationmightbeduetothebenefitsofpositivebeliefand groupmembership,ingeneral,andnottoreligiousbelief,inparticular.But,insofaras religiousbelieffacilitatesanindividual’spositivebeliefandmembershipinasupportive group—i.e.,insofarasreligiousbeliefconferstothebelievertheadvantagesthatcomewith thosethings—thenreligiousbeliefisrightlyconsideredtobeincrediblybeneficial.Trivers alsodiscussesthepositiveimmuneeffectsofdisclosingtrauma,andhecontendsthat religiousdisciplineslikeconfessionalsandprivateprayersmayeachfacilitatethis benefit.50 Thesethingstakentogether,astrongcasecanbemadeforthepositiveeffectsof religiononphysicalandpsychologicalhealth.Overthecourseofculturalevolution,we wouldexpectthereligionsandculturalpracticesthatfacilitatepsychologicalandphysical well-beingtobesuccessfulrelativetobeliefsystemsthatdonot.Aswehaveseen,one issueofcontentionishowsalientafactorreligiousbeliefitselfactuallyis;itispossiblethat themoreefficaciousfactorsarethingslikepositivebeliefandsupportivegroup 49Trivers,2011,pg.279. 50Ibid.,pg.287. 57 membership,ingeneral.Regardless,inasmuchasreligionfacilitatesbeneficialthingslike positivebeliefandsupportivegroupmembership,religioncanitselfbeappropriately construedasanadaptivelyadvantageousstrategy. C-3.GroupCohesion&Pro-SocialBehavior PsychologistsAraNorenzayanandAzimShariff(2008)discusstheadaptive advantagesofreligiousbeliefs,relativetothedevelopmentoflarge-scalesocietiesandprosocialbehavior: Religiousprosociality,thus,mayhavesoftenedthelimitationsthatkinship-based and…reciprocity-basedaltruismplaceongroupsize.Inthisway,thecultural spreadofreligiousprosocialitymayhavefacilitatedtheriseofstable,large, cooperativecommunitiesofgeneticallyunrelatedindividuals.51 Thecognitiveawarenessofgodsislikelytoheightenprosocialreputational concernsamongbelievers,justascognitiveawarenessofhumanwatchersdoes amongbelieversandnonbelieversalike.However,supernaturalmonitoring,tothe degreethatitisgenuinelybelievedandcognitivelysalient,offersthepowerful advantagethatcooperativeinteractionscanbeobservedevenintheabsenceof socialmonitoring.52 Becausekinshipselectionmechanismsandreciprocalaltruismmodelsputabiologicalcap onthesizeofsocialgroups,theriseoflargecommunitiesofgeneticallyunrelated individualsneedsexplaining.NorenzayanandShariffproposethatitisreligiousprosocialitythat,infact,enabledsocietiestomovepasttherestrictionsplacedongroupsizes bytherelativelyweakhumanabilitytomonitorgroupmembers’behavior;itwastheprosocialbehaviorthatresultedfromreligiousbeliefs,theyargue,thatfacilitatedtheriseof largersocieties.Inshort:ifreligionprovidesaGodorgod-conceptthatservestomonitor myneighbor’sbehaviorinawaythatIcannot,thenthatGodorgod-conceptwilleffectively 51Norenzayan&Shariff,2008,pg.58. 52Ibid.,pg.58. 58 facilitatemytrustingmyneighbor,mygoodfaithtowardmyneighbor,andmycontinued altruismtowardmyneighbor.Further,ifaGodorgod-conceptprovidedbyareligious systemcanstandintofacilitateabehaviortowardstrangersthatmirrorsmybehavior towardmykinortowardthosewhohaveactedaltruisticallytowardme,thensuchaGodor god-conceptcanbeexpectedtocontributetothegrowthandstabilityofagroupentity. NorenzayanandShariffdiscusstheeffectsofreligiousbeliefongroupcohesionin particular: …religiousbehaviorthatsignalsgenuinedevotionwouldbeexpectedtomobilize greatercooperationandtrust,andwheninternalandexternalthreatstogroup survivalarehigh,religiousgroupswouldbeexpectedtooutlastsecularones…large societiesthathavesuccessfullystabilizedhighlevelsofcooperativenormswouldbe morelikelythansmalleronestoespousebeliefinmorallyconcernedgodswho activelymonitorhumaninteractions.53 Attitudinalsurveysshowthatreligiousindividualsareperceivedtobemore trustworthyandmorecooperative.54 NorenzayanandShariffconcludethat,towhateverextentreligiousbeliefcanbeeffectively signaled,thenitmightenhancein-grouppersonaltrust,lowerthecostsofmonitoring others’behavior,andtheneventuallyreinforceintra-grouppro-socialtendencies.Insmallscalesocieties,freeloadingisnotmuchofanissue,asthebehaviorsofindividualscanbe easilymonitored.However,inlarger-scalesocieties,thebehaviorofindividualsismuch moredifficulttokeeptrackof;assuch,inlarger-scalesocietiesfreeloadingisaweightier issue.So,religionmightproperlyberegardedasasuccessfulanti-freeloadingadaptation, bywhichcommittedindividualsarepressuredtocooperatenotbyotherindividuals,butby 53Ibid.,pg.59. 54Ibid.,pg.60. 59 God,god-concepts,orreligioussystemsofmoralnorms,obligations,andexpectations.The costofsuchsignalsholdsthesignalersaccountabletotheircommitments. ManyofNorenzayanandShariff’s(2007)conclusionsarebasedonresearchthey conductedintheareaofreligiousprimesandeconomicgames.Theirfindingsare fascinating:primingtheirsubjectsimplicitlywithGod-conceptsledtheirsubjectsto allocatemoremoneytoananonymousstranger,relativetowhenaneutral(orno)concept wasactivated.Theirconclusionsarethattheimplicitactivationofreligiousconceptsgave individualsagreatertendencytowardpro-social,moralbehavior.Theyproposetwo explanationsofthepro-socialbehavior(2007):(1)suchGod-conceptsareunconsciously linkedtoconceptsofgenerosity,andwhenaGod-conceptisactivatedthereisan “ideomotor”effect(apowerofsuggestion)ongenerosity,and(2)theactivationofaGodconceptactivatesinthesubjectsa“feltpresenceofsupernaturalwatchers.”Iseenoreason whybothcannotbethecase;ifgod-conceptprimeshavean“ideomotor”effectonmore generousbehavior,itmightbethatthegod-conceptprimeshavean“ideomotor”effecton thenotionofanall-seeingwatcherandanypro-socialbehaviorassociatedwiththat. Interestingly,thepro-socialeffectwasactivatedjustasstronglywhensubjectswere primedwithconceptsassociatedwithsecularmoralauthority—governmentprimes,police primes,lawprimes,etc.NorenzayanandShariff(2008)discussthesefindingsandtherise ofmorally“reliable”secularinstitutions: Althoughreligionscontinuetobepowerfulfacilitatorsofprosocialityinlarge groups,theyarenottheonlyones.Theculturalspreadofreliablesecular institutions,suchascourts,policingauthorities,andeffectivecontract-enforcing mechanisms,althoughhistoricallyrecent,haschangedthecourseofhuman prosociality.Consequently,activemembersofmodernsecularorganizationsareat leastaslikelytoreportdonatingtocharityasactivemembersofreligiousones… therearemanyexamplesofmodern,large,cooperative,andnotveryreligious 60 societies…that,nonetheless,retainagreatdegreeofintragrouptrustand cooperation.55 So,both“God-concept”and“secularmoralauthorityconcept”primesleadindividualsto greaterpro-socialbehavior.Thisisamattertobesettledbyempiricalpsychologists,butit seemsthatthecommonthreadbetweenthosetwokindsofprimesarethenotionsof “authority”and“beingwatched.”RegardlessofwhethertheprimeisaGod-authorityora secular-authority,itmightbetheactivationofan“authority”conceptthatissufficientfor theactivationofthetendencytowardpro-social,morallyresponsiblebehavior.Thatwe havesocial,moralauthoritiesthataresecularisadistinctlymodernphenomenon—it mightbethatour“moralauthority”conceptsaresoconceptuallyrelatedtoour“God” conceptsthattheactivationofa“secularmoralauthorityconcept”actuallyactivatesour “God”concepts,too.Thereismuchgroundforinsightfulempiricalwork,here.Atthevery least,thetwo(“God”conceptsand“secularmoralauthority”concepts)aresufficiently related,suchthattheactivationofeachindividually,independentfromtheintended activationoftheother,successfullyyieldspro-socialbehavior. TheinformationprovidedbyNorenzayanandShariffgivesusgoodreasonto supposethat“Godconcepts”mighthavehelpedtofacilitatetheriseoflarge,stable societiesinourevolutionarypast.Theseconceptsarethoughttoengenderintra-group trustandcooperation,andtheyarethoughttohavecontributedtotheemergenceof particularkindsofgroupsthatwouldhavebeenmoresuccessfulthantheirrivals(i.e.,the kindsofgroupsinwhichindividualsareprimedbytheircultureandreligionforpro-social behavior).Contemporarystudiesofthesepro-socialreligiousprimes(andnowsecular 55Norenzayan&Shariff,2008,pg.62. 61 primes)areglimpsesintoourevolutionarypastthathelpustounderstandtheinner workingsofourancestorsandtheirdevelopingsocieties.Further,theyreveal,tosome extent,theevolutionaryeffectthatreligiousbeliefsandsystemsmighthavehadonthem socially. C-4.ReligionasCostly Givencurrentevents,itmightseemstrangethatIamarguingthatreligiousbeliefs areadvantageous,inanysense.Indeed,theresponsibilityformuchviolentconflictin historicalandmoderntimesbelongstothosemotivatedbyreligiousreasonsorbyreligious conflict.Crusades,Inquisitions,andwitchhunts,forinstance,werecarriedoutforthe gloryofGod;theriseandfallofIslamickingdomsintheMiddleEasthasbeencharacterized byreligiousconquestandSunni-Shi’aideologicaldisputes;thedistinctlymodernthreatsof terrorism,violentreligiousextremism,andreligiouspersecutionarecarriedoutby practitionersfromnearlyeveryprimaryworldreligion;entireminoritygroupsarewiped fromexistenceinreligiously-motivatedgenocide;andreligiousconflictsteersmany nations’geopoliticsandmilitaryengagement. Inlightofthesethings,astatementlike,“Religiousbeliefisadaptivelyadvantageous,” mightseemabsurd.Afterall,noneofthoseconsequencesofreligiousbeliefis “advantageous”inanynormalsenseoftheword.Imustconcede,ofcourse,thatreligious conflictisindeedcostly.Whenreligiousconflictbecomeswar,itisimpossibletodenythat theeconomic,societal,andhumantollsof“religion”arefrighteninglyhigh.So,inorderfor metomaintainthatreligiousbeliefsareadvantageous,Imustdosoinlightofthese undeniabletruths.Myclaimmustbethat,despitetheseapparentcosts,god-beliefsyieldto usanetadaptiveadvantage. 62 Wewillbeginwithreligiouswarandconflict.Itseemsimpossibletosaythat religiousbeliefisadaptivelybeneficialtoindividualsengagedinreligiousconquest—beit religiousconflictonthescaleoftheCrusades,orreligiousconflictbetweentwo neighboringtribes.Clearly,sincerelyheldreligiousbeliefsaredetrimentaltoonewhodies inreligiousconflict(assuming,ofcourse,thatitwasareligiousbeliefthatlandedthis individualorhissocietyinviolentconflict).Religiousbeliefsareequallycostlytothe culturethatiswipedouteitherbyforcedassimilationintoaninvadingreligioussocietyor byacatastrophiclossofpopulationinviolentconflict.Putinverycrassterms,religious beliefiscostlytothelosersofreligiousconflict.However,whatisreligiousbelieftothe winnersofreligiousconflict?Iproposethat,forthevictorsofreligiouslymotivatedconflict, religionisasuccessfultoolofconquest;itisaunifier,motivator,justifier,andcultural symbol.Religionprovidesjustificationforgoingtowar(andforreapingthebenefitsof war).Certainly,therearematerialandhumanlossestoallsidesinnearlyeveryviolent religiousconflict;however,therearealsowinnersinmostsuchconflicts.Foragiven society,forinstance,warisagreatmeansofmaterialgain—anenemy’sresources,an enemy’spopulation,anenemy’sstrategiclocation,anenemy’sexploitedlabor,etc. Itistruethatthewinnersofreligiouslymotivatedconflictalsosufferlossesof resourcesandlife.Icangrantthis,however,andsimultaneouslymaintainthatreligious beliefisadaptivelyadvantageousatthegrouplevel,aslongasthesocietyinquestiongains morethanitloses—resources,location,ideologicalsupremacy,thepopulationofa conqueredpeople,etc.Certainly,atleastsomereligiouslymotivatedconflictsin evolutionaryhistoryhaveresultedinanetlossforareligiousgroup.However,myposition (thatrefinedgod-beliefisawinningstrategy)dependsonlyonthepropositionthat 63 religiousconflictsresultedinanetgainforthoseinvolvedofthereligioussort.Inthisway, refinedgod-beliefcanbeconceivedofasadaptive,eveninlightoftheresourceslostbythe winningside.Itisworthnoting,too,thatwarriorscanbekilledandcropsburned(or whatever),butthatreligiousconceptsandideasarenotsimilarlydestructible.Lossesthat areshortofcatastrophictoareligiousgroupthathas“won”(orlost)agivenconflictmight servetogalvanizetheirreligiousconcepts,stories,andculture.Whateverthecase,success atwarisagreatwaytomitigatecompetitionwithneighboringgroups.Attheculturallevel, warisalsoasuccessfulstrategyofideologicalconquest:howbettertoensurethespreadof asociety’sbeliefsandvaluesthanbythatsociety’simpositionofitsbeliefsupon neighboringpopulations? Ifreligioncanbeproperlyconceivedofasamotivatorforwarandconquest,asI believeitcan,andifthebenefitsofwartoasocietyandtoitsindividualssometimes outweighthecosts,thenacasecanbemadethatreligiouslymotivatedwarisactually,inat leastsomecases,beneficialtothecultureorsocietythatholdsthosereligiousbeliefs.56 Thus,thegenesandideologiesofthepeoplewhoholdtothosereligiousbeliefsenjoy relativesuccessinthenextgeneration.Certainly,thecostsofreligiouswararemassive, andthesecostsreflectnegativelyupontheadvantageousnessofreligiousbeliefto whateverextentsincerereligiousbelieversarethelosersinagivenconflict.However,such conflictsalsohavewinners,andthewinnersenjoybenefits;towhateverextentsincere religiousbelievers(individualorgroup)“win”inagivenconflict,thebenefitsreflect positivelyupontheadvantageousnessofthewinner’sreligiousbeliefs.Presumably,to whateverextentgod-beliefsmakeasocietybetteratwar—forinstance,towhateverextent 56Thatis,inthesecasesreligionhelpstofurtherthesurvivalandspreadofthatculture. 64 fightingforreligiousreasonsemboldensanarmy,makesthearmyfearlessofdeath,etc.— suchgod-beliefsyieldtothatsocietyevenfurtherbenefit. Letitbeknownthatinusingtermslike“winner”and“successfulstrategy,”Iamnot advocatingforreligiouswarorprovidingjustificationforreligiouswar—thatmuchshould beclear!Rather,Imeantoshowthatthereismoretotherelationshipbetweenreligious conflictandevolutionthanjustmassivecost;infact,therearewinners.Ialsothinkit helpfultopointoutthatmassivelycostlyconflictisnotuniquetoreligiousbelief.Secular andatheiststateshavecommittedatrocitiesagainsthumanitywithoutreligiousmotivation orjustification;seeHitler’s,Stalin’s,andMao’scontributionstothebloodytwentieth century.Thecarnagewroughtinthesesituationsisideological,butitisnotcharacterized bygod-beliefs.Imentionthis,becausereligionhasfarfromcorneredthemarketinarmed conflict;societiesareperfectlycapableoffindingreasonforgoingtowarwithother societies,oroffindingjustificationfortheeradicationofminoritygroupsfromtheir population,sansreligiousbelief.Certainly,theabilitytowageareligiouswar,andthe justificationfordoingso,isabyproductofreligiousbelief;buthumansocietiesexcelat wagingwarindependentofreligiousbelief.Itisamischaracterizationofgod-beliefs(andof thehistoryofviolentconflict)tosaythatgod-beliefsaremaladaptationsthatgiverisetothe humancapacitytokillandbekilledinwar.Tocharacterizegod-beliefsinthiswayalso betraysanassumption—thatthe“religiouswars”weobserveinmoderntimesaretruly religiousinnature.Granted,somereligiousconflictistrulyreligiousinnature;other “religiousconflict,”however,ismoreplausiblypoliticalorgeopoliticalinnature,with religiousideologyusedasajustificationforconflictorasatoolforrecruitmenttoacause. 65 Asidefromviolentreligiousconflict,theothercommonlyenumeratedcostsof religiousbeliefincludetime,resourceallocationandopportunitycost,pain(physicalor emotional),costlycommitmenttoritual,adherencetomoralnormsandstandardsthatare adaptivelycostly,etc.(Sosis,2009).Onthesurfaceofthings,eachofthesecanindeedbe understoodasacost.However,Ihavepresentedevidence(Norenzayan&Shariff,2008)for theconclusionthatitwasgod-beliefsthathelpedenablehumangroupstogrowbeyondthe relativelysmallgroupsizesofourdistantancestors,andIhavepresentedBoyerand Bergstrom’s(2008)argumentthatreligiousbeliefisbestunderstoodasacostlysignal. Eachofthecostslistedabove,inadditiontobeingunderstoodasevolutionarilycostly,may beunderstoodasanevolutionaryinvestment.Iftheorganismsthatinvestinthesecostly practicesreaptheadaptivebenefitsofgroupmembershipandstablegroupcohesion (religionasacostlysignalthatyieldsapayoff),thensuchinitiallycostlypracticeswere wiseadaptiveinvestments,indeed.Iftheorganismsandsocietiesthatarereligiousare madestrongerandmorestablebytheirreligiousbeliefs,thentheinitialcoststhatcome withparticipationinreligionarejustsubsumedbythebroadersuccessfulstrategyof refinedgod-beliefthatisimplementedatthegrouplevel.Inbothcases,thebenefits outweighthecosts. 4.Conclusions Areourgod-beliefsevolutionarilycostlyorevolutionarilybeneficial?Ihavebuilta caseforthenetadaptiveadvantageofrefinedgod-beliefs,byshowingtheeffectsthat religionandreligiousbehaviorhaveonanindividual’saccesstogroupmembership (religionasanadaptiveinvestment/costlysignal),groupcohesion(religionasafacilitatorof 66 theriseoflarge,stablesocieties),pro-socialbehavior(religionasamoralizingforce), psychologicalwell-being(religionasasourceofindividualsecurityandwell-being),and physicalhealth(religiousproscriptionsasconducivetophysicallyhealthybehavior).Those whowouldarguethatourgod-beliefsaremaladaptiveneedtoshowthatthecostsofsuch beliefsoutweighthebenefitsthatweresurveyedintheprevioussection. Thecostsofreligiousbeliefthatareoftencited—religiousconflictandcostly adherencetosocialnorms,forinstance—arenotnegligible.Indeed,manypeoplehavedied orlosttheircultureinthenameofgod-beliefs,andthatseemsobviouslycostly.Ina possibleworldinwhichtherewerenotraceofreligiousbelief,however,therewould certainlybeotherreasonsforconflict(likescarcityofresources).Ihavearguedthatitwas religionitselfthathelpedtofacilitatethedevelopmentofhumansociety.Insofaras religionfacilitatesgroupcooperationandthebenefitsthatcomewithit(group membership,groupcohesion,andaltruism),religionoughttoberegardedasimmensely beneficial.Indeed,fortheretoberecognizablehumansocietiesorculturesinanother possibleworldthatlacksgod-beliefs,someothersocietalgluewouldbeneededtostandin for“religion”anditsroleinthecohesionofsociety.Inourworld,itwasreligionthatinfact servedasthisglue.Intheimaginingofaworldwithoutreligiousconflict(andtherefore withoutreligiousbelieforitsevolutionarybenefits),perhapswecanhaveourcakeandeat it,too;butperhapswecannot. Theoriginsofourgod-beliefscannotbeadequatelyexplainedbyappealtoselective pressuresoccurringatthegeneticlevel.Thefoundationsofreligiousbelief—rawgodbelief—arenotadaptationsthatwereselected-for.Rather,whatwasselectedwere cognitivemechanismsthatyieldbyproductrawgod-beliefs.Thesemechanismscomposea 67 religion-generatingcognitivesuite,theRGCMsofwhichoperateinevolutionarily unintendeddomainstoyieldtheirbyproducts.Thereligion-generatingcognitivesuite facilitatestheformationofbyproductgod-beliefs,andthesebyproductsaredevelopedover timebyculturesintorefinedgod-beliefs;theserefinedsystemsofbeliefaretheadaptively advantageoustraitsofgroupsandcultures.Thatis,theyyieldcertainbehaviorsthatare beneficialtobothgroupsandindividuals.Theprocessesofmulti-levelselectiondotheir workontheseconsequentbehaviorsandgroup-organismictraits.Individualsand societieswiththeproperkindsofreligiousstoriestotell(refinedgod-beliefs)wouldhave yieldedadaptivelyadvantageousbehaviorsandsurviveddisproportionatelywell,relative tothosewithouttherightkindsofadaptivelyadvantageousrefinedgod-beliefs. IhaveadvocatedforafusionoftheByproductandAdaptationistaccountsforthe phenomenonofreligiousbelief.Ihavearguedthatourrawgod-beliefsarethecognitive byproductsofbrainsliketheonesthatwehave,andthatourrefinedgod-beliefsareformed byhumanprocessesoflearning(including,forthetheist,revelation),rationalization,meme transmission,andgroup-levelselection.Rawgod-beliefsarethearchitecturalspandrelsof ourcognitivemechanisms—thespacesbetweenthe“arches”ofourcognition.Thecontent ofourrefinedgod-beliefsisdeterminedbyculturalevolutionandthecontingenciesof humanculturaltransmissionandstorytelling.Modernbeliefsystemsareindeedthe productsofselection,butatthegrouplevel,ratherthanatthegeneticlevel.Thesespecific beliefsystemsledgroupsandculturesinourevolutionarypasttobehaveincertainways; theseparticularbehavioraltendenciesledtotheirgroups’successand,therefore,tothe continuedtransmissionoftheirrespectiveculturalstoriesandtotheflourishingofthe individualsofthesesocieties. 68 Itisamistaketoappealexclusivelytoadaptationiststoriesinexplainingthe phenomenonofreligiousbelief,anditisamistaketoconceiveofrefinedreligiousbeliefsas themerebyproductsofourcognitivestructures.Weneedultimatelytoappealtoboth kindsofstories.Theadaptationiststoriesofferedbyevolutionarypsychologistsmightbe abletoaccountforspecificcognitivemechanisms(theRGCMs),psychologicalprocesses, andbelief-formationtendencies,buttheyfailtoaccountfortheoriginsoftheinitialcontent ofourgod-beliefsinawaythatourbyproductstorycan.Itishighlyquestion-beggingto positthatbeliefsthemselvesareselectableatthegeneticlevel,orthatreligiousbeliefs themselves(thatis,thosebeliefsthataredemonstrablyculturallytransmitted)are transmittablegenetically.Itisalsodifficulttoseehowadaptationiststoriesmightexplain theconfluenceofthevaryingsystemsandcomponentsinvolvedinreligiousbeliefsand systems—morality,ritual,beliefsinsupernaturalbeings,emotionalsymbolismand experience,etc.—eachofwhichhasitsownuniqueevolutionaryhistoryapartfromreligion, morebroadlyconstrued.Ifreligionjustistheconfluenceofthesevarioussystemsinan evolutionarilyunintendedreligiousdomain,thenreligionoughttobeconceivedofasa byproduct.However,thatrefinedgod-beliefsareculturaladaptationsisclear. Oneisrighttoask,“Why,despitetheexplanatoryalternativestoreligionthatwe haveathand,anddespitethecontradictionsinherenttomanyreligioussystems,dosuch god-beliefspersist?”Wemightaddtothatquestion,“Whyarethesereligiousstoriesso unified,andwhyaretheysoagreeduponwithinagivensociety?”Afterall,itseems strange,giventheabilityoftheempiricalsciencestodebunkmanyofourreligiousclaims, thatreligionremainsasubiquitousasitis.Ifreligionisproperlyconceivedofasa“virusof themind,”shouldwenotexpectscienceandtechnologytoserveascapable“anti-viral” 69 medications?AsImentionedabitearlier,someofthesereligiousbeliefsactuallyfitquite wellintotheintuitiveconceptualexpectationsthatwehavefortheworldaroundus (although,successfulgod-beliefs,accordingtoBoyer(2001),willviolateconceptual expectationstotheproperdegree).Indeed,weshouldexpectourrefinedgod-beliefs,ifthey didevolvefromourintuitiverawgod-beliefs,toalignconsistentlywiththesereligious biases.Thisconsonanceofourrefinedgod-beliefswithourintuitiveunderstandingofthe worldaroundus(deliveredtousbyourRGCMs)shouldonlybeexpectedtoreinforcethe variousreligiousbeliefstowhichpeoplehold. Inexplainingthepersistenceofreligiousbelief,itisimportanttonotethat,while ourscientificmethodhasmovedusbeyondneedingtopositbeliefinGod(orgods)inorder topossesssatisfactoryexplanationsofthephenomenaweexperience,thestrong Byproductclaimstillstands:that,byvirtueofthewayourbrainsarestructured,we naturallyconceiveoftheworldintermsofgod-beliefs.Thescientificmethodandempirical sciencescanleadustodisavowcertaingod-beliefs,butIfinditunlikelythatourempirical pursuitswilleversuccessfullyoverridethebyproductbeliefsofthestructuresofour brains;wecannot,afterall,convinceourowncognitivemechanismstostopforming byproductgod-beliefs.Thatis,wecannotstepawayfromourowncognition(Kahneman, 2011).Perhapsreligiousbeliefpersists,becauseourautomaticrawgod-beliefspersist.To expectreligiousbeliefnottopersististoexpectpeopletoignorethereligiousinclinations deliveredtothembytheirbrains—thatthingsaredesigned,thatthereisagency“outthere,” thattheobjectsofourperceptionhavementalstates,etc.—andtooperatebyworldviews thatareveryunnaturalforpeoplewithbrainslikeourstohold.Ifthesereligiousbiasesare aspervasiveasIhavemadethemouttobe,thenastrictlysecularworldviewisactually 70 inconsistentwithmuchofthehumanexperience.Bythat,Imeanthatitwouldbestrange foronetodenyone’sreligiouslybiasedinclinations,ifweassumesufficientignoranceof anynon-religiousexplanationforthephenomenathatwenaturallyexplainbyappealto god-beliefs.Addtothisone’splacementinareligiousculturalcontext,anditisevenless surprisingthatone’sgod-beliefspersistinthemidstofalternative,non-religiouswaysof seeingtheworld. Perhapsthemostobviousexplanationonemightofferforwhycertainreligious beliefspersististhattheytellatruestoryaboutthewaytheworldactuallyis;or,itmaybe thattheytellapartiallytruestoryaboutthewaytheworldis.Thisiscertainlypossible.It isnotpossible,however,thateveryreligiousstoryexplainshowtheworldactuallyis,for acrossreligiousstories(andwithincertainindividualstories)thereisgreatincompatibility. Therearenumerousreligioustraditions,forinstance,thatclaimtoworshiptheone,true (and,therefore,mutuallyexclusive)God.So,ifwearetoexplainwhyreligiousbelief persistsbygrantingthattheymightpossiblybetruebeliefs,weneedtofigureoutwhich religiousbeliefsaretrueandwhicharefalse.But,thoughinprinciplepossible,thatwill takeusfarafieldofthescopeofthispaper.Instead,Iofferthatreligiousbeliefpersists, becausereligiousworldviewsarecomposedofbeliefsthatpersistentlymeshwiththe believers’experiencesoftheworldaroundthem.Thehumanexperienceyieldsapanoply ofvaryingreligiousbeliefs,becausepeopleexperiencetheworlddifferentlyandform religiousbeliefsaccordingly;thedifferingreligiousbeliefspersist,becausethebeliefs’ consonancewiththebelievers’experiencesoftheworldaroundthempersists. Ifreligiousbeliefswereoutrageouslyandobviouslyfalseorself-contradictory,and werethisoutrageousfalsityorself-contradictionobvioustothebeliever,weshouldexpect 71 thesebeliefsnottopersist.Similarly,itseemsthat,werethereligiousbeliefsincoherentor conceptuallyabsurd,wewouldexpectthemnottobepropagated(muchasBoyer(2001) insistedwithhismodelofintuitiveconceptualtemplates).However,religiousbeliefdoes persist.Ibelieveweareanchoredtoourreligiousworldviewsbecause1)itismostnatural forustoconceiveoftheworldinreligiousterms,asIexplainedearlier,andbecause2) thesereligiousbeliefsandexplanationsareconsistentlyre-confirmedtousbyour experiencesoftheworld(whichareeithertrulyreligiousinnature,merelyperceivedtobe religiousinnature,orsimplydonotcontradictwiththereligiousexplanationswehave formedforthem).Itisalsolikelythatourgod-beliefsenjoytheboonsofthevarious familiarityandconfirmationbiasesatworkinourpsychologies. Thepersistenceofourgod-beliefsmightalsobepartiallyexplainedbytheriseof verycomplicated,rigorous,andsystematizedrefinedgod-beliefs.Suchextensivebelief systemshavegivenrisetoentirefieldsofintellectualpursuit(theology,anthropology, philosophyofreligion,etc.).Abelief,orbeliefsystem,shouldbeexpectedtopersistmore easilywhereverwehavethesehighlyintellectualized,counter-intuitiveapproachestogodbeliefs(rememberBarrett&Keil’s“ontologicalgap”and“theologicalcorrectness”).Such approachestogod-beliefsspendconsiderableeffortexplainingawayanyseeming inconsistencybetweenagod-beliefandthebeliever’sexperienceoftheworld,orany incompatibilitybetweenagod-beliefandsomecontrarybodyofevidence.Ifabeliever(or culture)ishelpedtoreconcilehisorhergod-beliefswithotherideasormattersoffactthat arecontrarytohisorhergod-beliefs,suchreconciliationshouldbeexpectedtoaidinthe beliefs’persistence.Manyrefinedgod-beliefsenjoythisstatusofhavingbeenreconciledto 72 bodiesofevidence(orideas)thataretothecontrary—thankstophilosophicaltheology, theisticapologetics,andsoon. Asforwhyagivensociety’sreligiousstoriesseemsounifiedandagreed-upon,I believewecanpursueasimilarexplanation:weshouldexpectonetoassenttosome degreetoanexplanatorystory,religiousornot,totheextentthatthereligiousstory mesheswithone’sexperiencesofone’senvironment.Thefactthataparticularreligious storymakessenseofalocalenvironment(or,dependingonthegod-belief,theentire cosmos)serves,formany,asgoodreasonforbuyingintothatparticularstory.Giventhat everyoneinaparticularenvironmentwillhaveverysimilarexperiencesofthat environment,weshouldnotbesurprisedthatthereligiousexplanationsoftheir environment—events,phenomena,thenaturalenvironment,theirplacementthere,etc.— aresharedincommoninthewaythatreligionsseemtobesharedincommon.Theclaimis notthatthepersistenceandunityofreligiousstoriesarerational,orthattheyoughtto persistoroughttobeunified(although,theymayverywellberational,anditmaywellbe thecasethatbelieversarejustifiedinmaintainingtheirbeliefs).Rather,myclaimisjust thatthepersistenceandunityofreligiousbeliefsystemscanbeunderstoodbyappealto theexperiencesofbelievingindividuals. Theimplicationsfortheismofanevolutionaryaccountlikemineare,atthispoint, unclear.Ontheonehand,thatreligiousbeliefisabyproductofourcognitivestructures shouldgivethetheistpause,asshouldtheideathatGodorspiritsmaybethespandrelsof evolutionaryprocessesandcognitivemechanisms.Ontheotherhand,however,allofour cognitiveandbelief-formationfacultieshavetheirorigininevolutionaryprocesses.At somelevelofgenerality,thefollowingholds:ifthetheistoughttobeconcernedaboutthe 73 justifiabilityandtruthofhisorhergod-beliefsinlightoftheirevolutionaryorigins,thenthe theist(andnon-theist)alsooughttobeconcernedaboutthejustifiabilityandtruthofother typesoftruthclaimswemakeabouttheworldinlightoftheirevolutionaryorigins.Tobe sure,manyofournon-religiousbeliefsareempiricallyverifiableandtestableinwaysthat ourgod-beliefsarenot,andthesestandardsofjustificationservetoisolateournonreligiousbeliefsfrombeingunderminedbyanevolutionarystory.However,god-beliefs mayhavetheirownstandardsofjustification:factorslikereligiousexperience,miracles, andreliabletestimonymayreasonablybetakentoisolateatleastsomeofourgod-beliefs frombeingunderminedbyanevolutionarystory. Perhapsmyraw/refinedgod-beliefdistinctionwillproveusefultothetheistinthis realm:itmaybethatabyproducttheoryoftheoriginsofreligiousbeliefsseriously underminesthejustificationofrawgod-beliefs(becausetheyaredeliveredtousbytheoffline,automaticprocessesofourcognitivemechanismsfunctioninginanimproperdomain), whileitfailstosimilarlyunderminethejustificationofrefinedgod-beliefs(becausethey includeclaimsthataremoreintellectually,empirically,andinferentiallyinvolved).Itismy hopethatfutureresearchinthisfieldwilltakeonamoreeven-handedtone,ratherthan beginningwiththepresuppositionthat“Allgod-beliefsarefalse.”Certainly,god-beliefsare notfalsemerelybecausetheiroriginscanbeexplainedbyappealtoevolutionaryprocesses. 74 Bibliography Atran,Scott.InGodsWeTrust:TheEvolutionaryLandscapeofReligion.Oxford:OxfordUP, 2002.Print. Barrett,JustinL.,andFrankC.Keil."ConceptualizingaNonnaturalEntity: AnthropomorphisminGodConcepts."CognitivePsychology31.3(1996):219-47. 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