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Security at the Poles: the Arctic and Antarctic
Introduction
Caution should be exercised about labeling every form of pollution or humaninduced scarcity as a threat to security. But if the most serious warnings about
global warming turn out to be correct, mankind faces a security problem on par
with great-power war.
Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2003.
To discover that the food which for generations has nourished them and kept
them whole physically and spiritually is now poisoning them is profoundly
disturbing and threatens Indigenous Peoples’ cultural survival. . . . The
Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic continue to see contaminant and climate
change variability as a major threat to our collective survival as Peoples.
A Statement prepared by the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat on
behalf of Arctic Council Permanent Participants: A Call for Further
Action (Nilsson/Huntington 2002: v)
1.1 Introduction
Environmental security is a concept that has been, and continues to be,
subject to controversy. Should environmental issues be “securitized”? If so, in which
cases? Security is, even amongst many critical security studies scholars, an issue of an
immediate threats that requires urgent action, and such immediacy is often not clear
and present when it comes to the environment: “The environmental sector displays
more clearly than any other the propensity for dramatic securitizing moves but with
comparatively little successful securitization effects” (Buzan/Wæver/deWilde 1998:
74). Often, to add “ugency” to the environmental security recipe, conflict is added.
Homer-Dixon’s (1991; 1994; 2000) argument that under certain conditions of
environmental scarcity, the likelihood of conflict increases, is now well known (as are
the critiques – see for example Nils Petter Gleditsch 1998). Additionally, as Krause
and Williams argue, environmental security is problematic in that 1. the traditional
machinery of security (the military) has largely been exempt from environmental
considerations and been a source of environmental degradation; 2. “securing” today’s
North American lifestyles is largely contrary to the goals of “securing” the
environment; 3a. development (ie: “modernity”) appears to work against
environmental protection; and 3b, current modernization practices are not sustainable,
and therefore a possible threat to environmental security (Krause/Williams 2003).
Herein lies a central problem with much of the environmental security debate –
economic development and the environment, both apparently important to security,
are pitted against one another, and there is little available in the way of a solution.
Against this background of controversy and scepticism, I wish to examine how
environmental security fits into the broader security debate, and then discuss the
relevance of environmental security in two regions that are relatively peaceful and
pristine – the Arctic and Antarctic. The overarching question is whether or not the
concept of security is relevant and useful here, and if so, in what way? In this chapter
I will argue that the concept is relevant, but the nature of security in these regions is
very context dependent. I will also argue that environmental security needs to be
understood in its varying forms (from state-based environmental security to ecological
security), and that in the context of the poles, and more specifically with regard to
climate change in these regions, security is best understood in relation to societal and
human security (thus, in the ways humans interact with their environment and
interpret threat or opportunity in that environment).
The security of the Arctic and Antarctic are deeply connected to the
environment, both with regard to the impacts of humans on the environment, but also
with regard to the subsequent impacts of the environment upon humans. Despite these
regions being on the “outskirts” of our social focus, these regions need to matter to the
rest of the world: the environmental linkages between the polar climates and the rest
of the planet are extremely complex and non-linear (SCAR 2005b), and the Arctic and
Antarctic influence climate over a large part of the globe (IPCC 2001). In both the
Arctic and Antarctic (but more so in the Arctic) it becomes very clear that the
‘categories’ we use to identify security, from military to human security (see chart in
next section), are very fluid, and by and large very closely linked. Economic security
cannot be completely isolated, for example, from environmental security or political
security. Food security is connected to environmental, health, and economic security,
and so on: “. . . the interconnectedness of Arctic ecosystems makes multi-lateral
cooperation for the protection of the environment a necessity for both Indigenous
Peoples and Arctic nation states” (Nilsson/Huntington 2002; v). The complexity of
security in both regions when taking a wide security approach is far too extensive to
be covered in one chapter. This chapter therefore will focus on the impacts of climate
change and how this environmental phenomenon has and continues to impact the
Arctic and Antarctic security dynamics.
I will first present a discussion of environmental security perspectives,
followed by a description of the regions. The Arctic and Antarctic make for an
interesting comparative contrast in both their natural environments, as well as the
ways we have treated these regions. The next section therefore will examine some of
the empirical evidence demonstrating the impacts of climate change on these regions,
and assess to what extent, and/or how, these impacts can be interpreted in terms of
security.
1.2 The Security Debate
Figure 1: Relations of Security1
Stages of Analysis
[Individual ↔ Societal/Identity] ↔National/State ↔ International/global
Dynamics
of Security
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human security (personal, political, environmental, economic, food, health, community)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Societal (identity/community) security
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(“ecologically widened”)
Environmental security
(state based)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Regional security (state and/or identity based)
---------------------------------------------
Domestic security (police, social)
-------------------------------
Traditional security (state; international)
Figure one attempts to illustrate the relations between the various “types” of
security commonly debated and discussed today. This is a very general
characterization, and cannot be understood to have any real meaning without knowing
the context (in other words, these relations of security produce one set of pictures
within a polar context, and a very different set of pictures within the Sub-Saharan
context). The debate centres less on the identification of threats, and more so on
assumptions about who (or what) provides security. Most conceptions of security
assume that the state is the main, if not sole, provider of security, regardless of the
security referent (state, society or individual). Security however, like power, can be
viewed both positively as well as negatively (Hoogensen 2005b; Bleiker 2000).
Security exposes vulnerabilities and sources of fear (negative security), but it also
speaks to capabilities and enabling (positive security) – people, societies, groups have
been able to ensure their security by a variety of means, to ensure that life continues,
to even make sure a good life can be found (Bajpai 2004). This allows for a more
complex application of the security concept in contexts of both conflict and nonconflict (such as the poles), and allows us to show the relationships between those
who identify threats (states, communities, individuals) and those who provide security
(states, communities, individuals).
1
The following discussion is a further development of an earlier work which has appeared in
Hoogensen, 2005b. The stages of analysis are indicated in bold script as individual, societal/identity,
national/state, and international/global. The stages are presented horizontally in an attempt to avoid a
prioritization of one stage over another. The arrows between them stages indicate relationships, where
many of the stages have overlapping relationships. The individual and societal/identity stages are
bracketed together to indicate an additional strength in their relationship, while societal/identity,
national/state, and international/global are italicized to indicate a recognized additional
interconnectivity between them. The dynamics of security are indicated by dotted lines and arrows
spanning across those stages to which they most relate. Environmental security is shown to have either
a state-based or “ecologically widened” meaning, the latter of which brings environmental security
closer to a human security framework.
Environmental security has a special role in the debate, as it finds itself
”employed” by at least two different referents, the state and the individual (human
security). These two are distinct as they do not have the same meaning. It is also
important to keep this in mind with regard to the polar regions – the environment is
intimately linked to human activity and human needs, both in causing environmental
degradation, but also as a crucial source of livelihood for both indigenous as well as
non-indigenous peoples.
1.3 Environmental Security
Discussions about global environmental threats (and indirectly, security) largely
began with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972
(Buzan/Wæver/deWilde 1998). The term environmental security was popularized in
the Brundtland Commission (1987) report Our Common Future. At that time the term
largely reflected traditional security definitions, in that linkages were made between
the environment and large scale warfare, particularly nuclear war. It also highlighted
the extent of environmental degradation and devastation that would be and is caused
due to other weapons of mass destruction, and the arms “culture” (ibid). Additional
attempts at widening security to include, among other things, the environment have
followed (Ullman 1983; Mathews 1989). There has been movement beyond such a
tight link with traditional security interests, but there is no agreed upon definition of
environmental security. “The ways in which environment and security are related,
however, are not easily summed up” (Moss 2003). However, many of the operational
definitions of environmental security have not moved too far beyond the state focus,
as demonstrated by a definition employed by the US government:
Environmental security is an element of regional and national security. It
encompasses the mitigation and prevention of energy threats, including threats
to sources and supply lines, and environmental risks and related stresses that
directly contribute to political and economic instability or conflict in foreign
countries or regions of importance to the United States. Moreover, it addresses
selected energy, environmental, and related national security concerns that pose
a direct conflict with United States foreign policy (U.S. Department of State
2001).
As noted earlier, one of the criticisms waged against the notion of environmental
security is that it is largely a tool of the state – a concept so readily employed by the
military, and potentially used as a justification for the continued exploitation of
resources to “secure” the North’s consumerist lifestyle, is not a concept that reflects
the concerns of those interested in the survival of the earth’s varied and diverse
ecosystems (Dalby 1997).
However, an “exploitative” focus is not a given at the state or inter-state level.
The 2004 Hague Conference on Environment, Security and Sustainable Development
claimed that it was very important to link the environment to security, particularly as
global actors continue to fail to meet the challenges of increasing ecological
problems, particularly climate change (Spencer 2004). The European Commission, as
the executive body of the European Union, does not explicitly equate environmental
issues with security, instead emphasizing sustainable development as the important
and overriding concept. The move however is towards a human security perspective:
Poverty is closely linked to environmental issues. The poorest people are the
most dependent on natural resources for survival, which they are often forced to
over-exploit. They are also the worst affected by a degraded environment…
(European Commission 2006a).
Humans are identified as in threat and/or vulnerable to a degrading environment, and
highly dependent upon a degrading exploitation of natural resources in which to
survive.
Jon Barnett (2001) favours the definition of ecological security over
environmental security; the former identifies ecosystems and ecological processes as
the security referent, seeking to maintain ecological equilibrium, whereas the latter is
rooted in the state and the defence of natural resources for the state. He argues
however that the term “environmental security” has more political saliency, and is, in
short, far more influential in policy circles than is ecological security (which rings of
more extremist, Green agendas).
There are two possible and complementary ways in which to re-orient this
understanding of environmental security, such that it need not be a choice between
state-based environmental exploitation and eco-extremism. The first is by examining
environmental security in relation to human security, and the second is embodying
environmental security with a stronger ecological security orientation (as Barnett
suggests). By so doing, environmental security can move away from its state-based
roots and reflect both the mounting concerns about environmental degradation, as
well as emphasize the importance of human relationships to the environment. Both
approaches are necessary to a more effective understanding of environmental security
– ecological security stresses the interconnectedness of all elements within a system,
both how they impact as well as are impacted by the system, whereas the human
security approach examines the impacts of the system upon humans (identified as
threats). A “widened” environmental security approach brings the ecological and the
human together: “ . . . reformulate environmental security in terms of human security
and peace, and drawing on the insights of ecological security” (Barnett 2001: 122).
1.4 The Arctic and Antarctic regions
The Arctic and Antarctic are unique as regions, climatically, socially, and
politically. While the Arctic region is a shared territory between eight sovereign
nations (Russia, Canada, USA, Norway, Sweden, Denmark (Greenland), Finland and
Iceland), Antarctica is an international territory that recognizes no territorial claims by
any state, agreed upon through the Antarctic Treaty that came into force in 1961.
Antarctica is additionally a continent surrounded by water; there is no question
pertaining to the boundaries of this region. The Arctic however, is unique as it is not
composed of eight complete states; almost all of the eight states that govern the Arctic
are partially located outside of the Arctic region and have their political centres far to
the south of the region (Young/Einarsson 2004). The Arctic is composed of a part of
each of the eight (with the exception of Iceland). It is also predominantly an ocean,
surrounded by land (Verhaag 2003). This is not a typical definition of a region, which
is traditionally determined by state boundaries (Hoogensen 2005a; Buzan/Wæver
2004; Morgan/Lake 1997). In fact, because the Arctic is not defined by state
boundaries, there is little agreement on what the boundaries of the Arctic actually are
(Verhaag 2003; Hassol 2004; Young/Einarsson 2004). The “lines” often used to
define the Arctic include the Arctic Circle (defined by the latitudinal point where the
sun does not come above the horizon at winter solstice and does not fall below the
horizon during summer solstice), the latitude of 60 N, treelines, the extent of
permafrost and sea ice, climatic boundaries, and internal political jurisdictions (for
example, Nunavut, Northwest Territories, Nenets autonomous region, etc). For the
purposes of this chapter the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR)/Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) Arctic will apply.2 The region of
the Antarctic is here defined as the Antarctic continent, the Southern Ocean south of
the Antarctic convergence (approx. 58S), and the sub-Antarctic islands.3
Both regions are, relatively speaking, extremely cold, although Antarctica is
considerably colder that the Arctic, and far less habitable for humans (Verhaag 2003).
These colder temperatures have given way to some dominating stereotypes as cold,
barren, generally lifeless (besides a smattering of Inuit and polar bears), and just
generally “a desolate hinterland of little international relevance” (Young 1989 in
Verhaag 2003). This view has and continues to negate not only the diversity of life in
these regions and particularly the far North, but also the cultural heritages, resilience,
and experiences of various and different Arctic peoples. The temperatures in the
Arctic in fact vary a great deal; the Norwegian Arctic is considerably warmer, at least
on the coast due to the Gulf Stream, than the Canadian or Russian Arctic. This in turn
has affected the levels and types of habitation in the Arctic.
The stereotypical view of the poles as cold and largely uninhabited has also
distorted perceptions about how many people live in these regions. In total, within the
Arctic boundary mentioned above, and ranging in density across the eight Arctic
nations, over 4 million people live in the region (Bogoyavlenskiy/Siggner 2004). The
distribution of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples varies widely across the
Arctic; in the Canadian Arctic for example, Nunavut is composed of 85% Inuit,
whereas the Yukon Territory is 75% non-indigenous (AHDR 2004). Across the whole
of the Arctic, non-indigenous peoples number in the majority (ibid). There are no
indigenous inhabitants in the Antarctic, however it is “populated” by permanent and
summer staff at research stations, ranging from approximately 4000 in the summer,
and 1000 in the winter.
Both the Arctic and Antarctic are rich in natural resources; Antarctica in
marine and wildlife, minerals, oil and gas, as well as fresh water (over 70% of the
Earth’s fresh water is in Antarctica), and the Arctic in marine and wildlife, on and offshore oil reserves, and coal (Joyner 1987; Verhaag 2003).
1.4 Climate Change and Security in the Arctic
Of all the environmental issues that have emerged in the past few decades,
global climate change is the most serious, and the most difficult to manage. . .
Climate does not just affect people directly: it also affects all other
environmental and ecological processes, including many that we might not
recognize as related to climate. Consequently, large or rapid climate change will
represent an added threat to other environmental issues such as air and water
quality, endangered ecosystems and biodiversity, and threats to coastal zones,
wetlands, and the stratospheric ozone layer (Dessler/Parson 2006: 1-2).
2
The AHDR uses the AMAP definition of Arctic boundaries with a few differences pertaining to
jurisdictional and administrative boundaries. Thus the Arctic in this case includes Alaska, Canada north
of 60N and including northern Quebec and Labrador, Greenland, Faroe Islands, Iceland, the northern
parts of Sweden, Norway and Finland, and northern Russia (Murmansk Oblast, Nenets, YamaloNenets, Taimyr, and Chukotka autonomous regions, Vorkuta city, Norilsk, Igsrka and the areas of
Sakha Republic closest to the boundaries of the Arctic Circle). AHDR, 17-18.
3
This definition of the Antarctic region is taken from the definition provided in Climate Change 2001
(IPCC).
Climate change is similarly of such a scope that it warrants urgent attention and
securitization. . . . The problem of climate change thus strikes at the heart of the
Western development model based on both increasing applications of energy
and comparative advantage. . . . In this respect ‘securitising’ climate change to
motivate action is justifiable (Barnett, 2001: 118 italics mine).
The scientific and political hesitancy to link climate change to specific events, so
prevalent in the past, has been significantly eroded, as new research is demonstrating
direct links. One such study examined the European heat wave of 2003: “. . the hottest
year on record since 1500 – and demonstrated that the human-induced contribution to
the atmosphere has doubled the risk of heat waves of this magnitude” (Kimble 2005).
In its 2004 report, the European Environment Agency (EEA) identified climate
change indicators in the categories of the atmosphere, cryosphere (ice, glaciers),
marine environment, terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity, water, agriculture,
economy and human health (EEA 2004). “One of the most identifiable visual impacts
of climate change in Europe can be observed in the cryosphere through the retreat of
glaciers, snow cover and Arctic sea ice. . . . In Europe, a large number of all
catastrophic events since 1980 are attributable to weather and climate extremes:
floods, storms and droughts/heatwaves” (ibid: 4, 5).
The polar regions, particularly the Arctic, make for a clear case study of the effects
of climate change. They are undergoing visible change, and in this respect might be
considered the “hardest hit” so far. In the Arctic context, adaptation, flexibility and
building capabilities and capacities has always been a part of Arctic life (ACIA 2004);
whereby communities by and large ensured their own (positive) security according to
their needs. The problem now is that factors, particularly environmental, are changing
so fast that it is very difficult for communities to adapt quickly enough. We therefore
need increased awareness about insecurity of the Arctic to be able to provide what is
now needed for adaptation, prevention, and rectification, if possible. We can also look
to the Antarctic as a possible guide.4
Security in the Arctic:
Security considerations in the Arctic have been traditionally dominated by
national security agendas focused on territorial integrity of the state through political
and military means. Within the traditional parameters, security requires a sense of
urgency and legitimacy to use extraordinary means (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde,
1998). Security exists to secure the state, largely regardless of, and disconnected from,
its ’contents’. Insofar as this traditional approach has affected the Arctic, it has been,
for example, an early warning zone for incoming missiles (between the USA and the
Soviet Union), or as in the case of Iceland and Greenland, ‘stepping stones’ of
security between Europe and North America (Solheim 1994). In fact, if the Arctic had
any meaning to security at all during the Cold War, it was as a military “theatre” for
the USA and Soviet Union and their nuclear arsenals, as well as nuclear targets
4
The ways in which Arctic communities are trying to adapt to rapid change in the region is the subject
of a number of new international research projects, in particular connected to the upcoming
International Polar Year (IPY) 2007-2008. These projects are meant to fill a knowledge gap on how
communities are and will be able to provide security for themselves in increasingly unpredictable
environments.
(Heininen, 2004). It additionally served well as a region for testing weapons as well as
conduct military training (ibid). The relevance of the traditional level to the Arctic can
be seen in the renewed interest in oil extraction and export from the Barents region,
whereby Russia and Norway are still in dispute over jurisdiction of the Svalbard
continental shelf, and where the USA is increasingly looking to the Barents sea as a
source of oil to reduce its dependency upon the Middle East.
Although the military and political aspects of security are still considered relevant in
the Arctic context, a broader sense of security issues is beginning to dominate,
particularly with regard to the environment: the extraction of natural resources
(primarily oil), the increase in persistent organic pollutants, and the preservation of
the Arctic ecosystem (Verhaag 2003). The military focus on the Arctic as an
expression of security has slowly given way, particularly after the fall of the Soviet
Union, to a broader securities approach, including environmental, political, societal
and health securities, among others. These are not divorced however from the military
legacy as a large degree of the environmental problems now experienced in the Arctic
stem from previous military activities, particularly regarding nuclear waste (Heininen,
2004; St.meld.nr.30, 2005). Traditional (read “military”) security would not, contrary
to our argument here, take the environment into account when determining the
security needs of the region. In the traditional image, unless the environment and
environmental change can be demonstrated to cause conflict or war, it is not an issue
for security (Gleditsch, 2003). As such, the debates surrounding the evolution of
human and societal securities are very relevant to the Arctic, particularly as they allow
for the expression of environmental and identity securities, and therefore go beyond
the traditional state-based security interests (although this is still relevant given that
eight sovereign states govern the Arctic region). The multiplicity of securities is
equally relevant to the case of Antarctica, where states have agreed through an
international treaty to freeze territorial claims on the continent and instead take as a
primary focus the security of the environment (Joyner, 1987; Verhaag, 2003; SCAR
2005a; SCAR 2005b). In both cases, global warming has a significant and profound
impact on the securities of the polar regions.
The impacts of climate change are most profoundly felt in the polar regions,
particularly the Arctic (Gabrielsen and Winther, 2004; Hassol, 2004; IPCC, 2001).
The warming temperatures are already now impacting wildlife as well as Arctic
human communities, and will have increasing affects on energy, marine life and
activities, transport, fisheries, and culture.
In a little less than two decades, an increasing amount of contaminants have
reached the Arctic from non-Arctic sources (industry and agriculture in the south),
through atmospheric as well as water (oceans and rivers) transport systems (Norstrom,
et.al, 1988; Muir, R. J., et.al, 1988; Malmquist, 2003). These toxins are transferred to
the Arctic at increasing rates as the sea ice melts. The sea ice is critical to both wild
and human life, and the effects of climate change on the sea ice will impact Arctic eco
and social systems with threats and challenges never before faced in the region
(Gabrielsen and Winther, 2004).
The most recent Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) indicates that
climate change is indeed occurring, with global temperatures increasing at
unprecedented rates (Hassol, 2004). As such, the key findings of the report indicate
that the Arctic is warming much more quickly than originally thought, with greater
impacts than originally predicted. What this means is that the Arctic is now predicted
to warm between 4-7 C in the next century, thereby increasing the current rate of sea
ice and glacier melt, increasing Arctic precipitation and reducing seasonal variation
(shorter, warmer winters), and increase insect outbreaks, forest fires, and invasion of
non-indigenous species, all of which will impact humans and wildlife alike, including
the erosion of cultural and social identity of many Arctic peoples (among other
insecurities) (ibid).
The Arctic ice is, in many respects, the “canary in the mine” that serves as a
warning of what we can expect with climate change (Gabrielsen and Winther, 2004;
45). Models that have been instrumental in the creation of the ACIA demonstrate that
changes in the ice will not become significantly noticeable before the year 2020, but
then show very rapid ice melt thereafter, indicating that most of the Barents Sea will
be ice free by 2050, and by 2075 the “entire area between northern Novaja Zemlja,
Frans Josef Land and Svalbard will be, practically speaking, ice free year-round”.
(Gabrielsen, 2004; page?) The absence of ice increases the ocean drift, bringing
environmental toxins such as persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and Polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) to the Arctic even more quickly than before. These toxins enter the
marine ecosystem and going through processes called biomagnification (increasing
toxicity as one moves up the food chain) and bioaccumulation (increasing toxicity as
the animals get older) (AMAP, 2002). These processes are able to take place as they
are not soluble in water but are very soluble in fat, and are thus retained in the fat
stores of animals and humans. As the sea ice continues to melt, the animals dependent
upon the ice for survival and hunting begin to starve and live off of their own fat
stores. The toxins are then released into the animal systems, usually during critical
times of pregnancy and nursing. Thus far the only immediate solution is to reduce
marine food source intake, upon which many Arctic communities rely.
The impacts this measure has upon Arctic communities can be enormous. It
reduces access to traditional food sources, and assumes ready access to market
economy foods. A recent study written by Marcelle Chabot for the Nunavik Regional
Board of Health and Social Services indicates that 2/3 of the Inuit in Kuujjaq live in
fear of going hungry. Food insecurity goes hand in hand with the economic
insecurities faced in this community, where many people live off of a state-based
income, access to alternative sources of income are limited, and debt and substance
abuses compound the financial difficulties. Without material resources, access to
foods, particularly store-bought foods, becomes increasingly difficult. Although 68%
of the general population lives in fear of hunger, this number increases to 71% for
women and 74% for children (Chalbot, 2004). Access to traditional foods is under
threat for those who do not own or have access to the necessary hunting equipment or
must stay away from traditional foods due to toxicity levels (Chabot, 2004).
To say, therefore, that the environment plays a crucial role in the security of
the Arctic is an understatement. Environmental securities have significant impacts on
women and men of the Arctic, both connected with economic securities (for those
economically dependent upon the sea and land) as well as with health securities and
cultural securities, among others. Decades of research has already taken place with
regard to the impacts of persistent organic pollutants (POPs), mercury and lead on
Arctic wildlife, and more recently Arctic scientists have put human communities in
focus (Gabrielsen, 2003). POPs have been linked to increases in breast cancer,
impacts on reproductive health, and transfer to children through breastmilk (Taking
Wing 2002). For example, children and pregnant women in Norway are additionally
warned against eating particular products containing cod livers that would not have
undergone processing for cleaning of pollutants. Sockeye salmon are returning to their
spawning grounds in Canada and Alaska and transporting higher and higher levels of
contaminants such as methyl-mercury, and higher levels of mercury have been
reported in the Russian Arctic. Higher levels of mercury have been identified in
maternal blood and hair samples as well as cord blood in northern Quebec mothers
(Gabrielsen 2003). In general, there are noticeable trends of increased toxicity in
human systems in the Arctic regions.
Research efforts are currently underway to investigate the possibility of
pollutants causing mixed gender in men living in North Norway, as has already been
noted in polar bears. A number of polluting chemicals emanating from agriculture and
industry mimic sex hormones such as estrogen and are known as endocrine disrupting
chemicals (EDC) (Nordlys, 09.07.04). Research has already documented that
pollutants exported from southern regions have resulted in low sperm counts and poor
sperm quality amongst men living in northern regions. Further investigations are
being made into the possibility that these chemicals are causing testicular cancer as
well. The health of the ecosystem, impacted so greatly as it is by climate change, is
integrally linked to the culture of many indigenous peoples in the Arctic (as well as
non-indigenous). Environmental exploitation without any sense of sustainability
threatens Arctic lifestyles and well-being by wreaking havoc on cultural, ethnic and
national identities and security.
Security in Antarctica
Climate change or global warming has had an already significant impact on
the biodiversity of Antarctic life. According to the Scientific Committee on Antarctic
Research (SCAR), the increased human traffic to Antarctic has caused “considerable
damage by way of local species extinctions and wholesale alteration of ecosystems.”
(SCAR, 2005a; 3)5. The incidence of invasive species has drastically increased to
Antarctica and the sub-Antarctic islands. This has largely been due to human traffic –
coming in through clothing, baggage, attached to fresh vegetables, hulls of ships,
anchor chains and in ballast water (ibid). Due to “dramatic” increases in temperatures
over the past 50 years, the usual climatic barriers have been less effectual against
colonization of invasive species introduced by human activity (ibid). In fact, te
Antarctic Peninsula has warmed more than anywhere else on the planet (SCAR,
2005b). Access to Antarctica has increased so much so that tourist numbers have
increased four fold since 1992 (reaching over 24000 tourists by the 2001-2002
season), never mind the numbers of researchers (over 4000 in 2001-2002), and the
numbers of ships arriving from all over the world (60 ships from approximately 30
cities from around the world) (SCAR, 2005a). Human contact is threatening the very
region of the world that humans have decided to protect.
Ice core samples taken on Antarctica have demonstrated that climate has
always changed, however they also demonstrate that human activity has increased
levels of greenhouse gases at unprecedented rates (BAS, 2005a). The possibility of ice
melt on Antarctica is extremely serious as the ice sheets contain vast reserves of water
and would contribute to global sea rise, and measurements of sea ice is considered to
be a “very sensitive indicator” for climate change (BAS, 2005b). Current research
anticipates modest rises in temperatures over the next 50 years on Antarctica, but due
to the lack of long-term data (little is known beyond the past 50 years) it is very
5
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, or SCAR, was assigned the task of being the
“primary source of objective, independent scientific advice to the Antarctic Treaty parties” (SCAR,
2005b; 1). “Studies by SCAR scientists increasingly show how Antarctic processes contribute to the
working of the Earth System, and vice versa, and of how the south polar environment is influenced by
human activities originating both within and outside the region. They also indicate what needs to be
done to safeguard the environment.” (ibid; 2).
difficult to know if and how climate is changing on the continent (ibid; IPCC, 2001b).
Where reported warming has had an impact is on the Antarctic Peninsula which has
experienced the highest rise in temperature in the whole of the Southern Hemisphere,
and which has been attributed to the melting of the Wordie Ice Shelf and part of the
Larsen Ice Shelf, and has left a research station stranded on an island (ibid; ibid).
Sea ice plays a critical role in the development of ocean circulation, salinity
and temperature change, as well as sea levels. Humans rely on the oceans, albeit to
varying degrees, the world over. Therefore climate change impacts on the oceans will
likewise impact humans – lifestyles, cultures and identities, economies, and so forth.
Conditions in the Southern Ocean surrounding Antarctica have an effect on the
development of global fisheries. With changes in temperature some fisheries will
disappear while others will likely develop (although not necessarily within the same
regions), which will impact distribution and value of particular stocks, as well as
“increase or decrease local economies by hundreds of millions of dollars annually”
(IPCC, 2001b). The krill fishery in the Southern ocean for example is documented to
be affected by sea ice position, such that the further south the position of sea ice (ie:
melted), the lower the production of krill (ibid).
Although climate changes in the Antarctic are predicted to be considerably
slower than in the Arctic, these changes could initiate “millennial scale processes with
the potential to cause irreversible impacts on ice sheets, global ocean circulation, and
sea level rise.” (IPCC, 2001b: 831). The Antarctic, therefore needs attention and
protection. What is interesting is that those nations which are interested in the
Antarctic have been well aware of these needs of this special region for a significantly
long time, and have acted to protect the region. The Antarctic Treaty System, in force
since 23 June 1961, was enacted to ensure “in the interests of all mankind that
Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and
shall not become the scene or object of international discord” (SCAR, 2005). This
treaty system provides security in a fashion directly opposite to traditional, territorial
and state security in that it prohibits any military activity, nuclear activity or waste,
promote international scientific cooperation, and holds in abeyance any territorial
claims (ibid; Verhaag, 2003). The treaty system also includes later agreements such as
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention for
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals and the Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), as well as the Convention on the
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (which has not been ratified).
The parties to these agreements have agreed to give up “some sovereignty” on
Antarctica in exchange for protecting the natural and scientific wealth of the region
(Verhaag, 2003; 577).
Concluding remarks
This chapter has provided just a small snapshot of some of the security issues in the
Arctic and Antarctic, clearly however from non-traditional security perspectives. As a
point of departure security is examined from the margins or from positions of nondominance. The Arctic and Antarctic are good examples of both marginalized regions
(generally speaking, although each of the eight countries of the Arctic treat this region
quite differently), as well as, in the case of the Arctic, a region inhabited by those who
have traditionally been placed at the margins, indigenous groups. The experiences in
the Arctic are varied, and the in/securities in one part of the region are not necessarily
the same in another part. However there are enough similarities to argue for attention
to be drawn to this region and examine how people live and cope in a region with
significant and special challenges. Both regions demonstrate the extreme importance
of the environment and the human relationship with the environment to security,
particularly human and societal securities (with regard to traditional versus market
economies, culture and identities based on relations with environment from fisheries
communities to indigenous communities, health and food securities, and so forth).
These securities perspectives are important to the respective foreign policies of the
countries which play roles in both of these regions as they are both of international
concern, but they also demonstrate the importance of securities approaches to other
policy areas (domestic), making visible the in/securities which are usually hidden
behind “state” security.