Download The Soviet economy 1976-1985

The soviet economy 1976-1985 [reading]
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How did B.’s early rule contributed to the crisis after 1976?
Before considering the economic crisis that emerged under B. it is necessary to examine the
system that existed when he came to power. This provided a context for the main problems
faced by Soviet leaders, and why particular reforms were (or were not) attempted.
I- The planned economy
Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, there were attempts to end all capitalist ownership,
and so create a socialist and eventually a communist society.
A system of state planning began, with the main means of production taken into state ownership,
and the state directing economy.
A- The economy under Stalin
Under Stalin, this central control and direction was developed further. In 1928, he launched the
USSR’s first FYP, in a bid to create ‘socialism in one country’. This plan was supposed to make
the Soviet Union self-sufficient in both agriculture and industrial production.
The desire for autarchy was partly due to the fact that no successful worker’s revolution had
come to the aid of the USSR. In the late 1920s, the USSR was isolated. It was surrounded by
hostile, powerful capitalist states that had already tried to overthrow the world’s first workers’
state. Stalin claimed that the Soviet Union had ten years to catch up with the West in order to be
able to withstand the next attack. (This attack was widely expected, and finally came in 1941)
The massive push to expand and modernise the Soviet economy would be achieved by central
control of the economy and state planning.
Under the centrally planned Soviet economy (also known as ‘command economy’), the planning
departments decided what economic activity should be carried out by the production entreprises
(industries and state farms). The planning departments therefore made decisions on matters
such as the rate of growth, and the prices and amounts of materials, energy, labour and goods
to be used.
The Soviet government (largely under the control of the Communist Party) directed the
economy via a number of economic planning committees and bodies. The various government
and republican ministries supervised the implementation of the economic plan drawn up by
these bodies. Of these planning organizations, the most important was the Gosplan. Gosplan
was responsible for preparing the various types of plans. The most common of these was the
FYO, which were first used under Stalin.
The system of central planning led a to number of economic problems, which in turn affected
political developments. These would eventually result in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
B- Khrushchev’s reforms
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The USSR achieved major economic growth under Stalin, through his FYPs. The USSR also
played a major role in the defeat of Nazi Germany in WWII, and established a series of satellites
states on its eastern borders. After Stalin died in 1953, there was a brief period of collective rule,
but, by 1955 Khrushchev had become the dominant leader.
Despite the achievements made under Stalin’s regime, Khrushchev soon realised that the
country’s rigid command economy needed to be modernized. If it was reformed, the was
convinced that the USSR could overtake the capitalist West and demonstrate the superiority of
a planned socialist economy.
In order to succeed, K.’s modernisation programme required various economic reforms. K. and
his supporters made bold claims that the USSR’s economic growth would enable it to rapidly
overtake the Western capitalist economy. However, they knew that agricultural production
(always the weakest part of the Soviet economy) was actually declining, and that Soviet
machinery needed updating.
K.’s plans were sometimes contradictory, and frequently subject to change. The plans centred
on relaxing central control on the economy, by giving factory managers more autonomy (control
over their own entreprises). The belief was that this would allow the, to manage more efficiently
and so increase their workers’ productivity rate. To encourage people to work harder, K. wanted
to increase standards of living and provide more consumer goods.
However, many older members of the Communist party did not fully support him. Various
failures in K.’s economic reforms- as well as certain problematic developments in politics and
foreign affairs- led party members to overthrow K. in 1964.
II- The Soviet economy 1964-1970
B. came to power in Oct 1964, when leading members of the Soviet Communist Party decided it
was time to replace K. Brezhnev became first secretary of the CPSU, while Kosygin became
PM.
A. Industry and the Kosygin reforms
B. ‘s period of rule was characterised by what has called entropy or ‘stagnation’. Although B.
had some interest in agriculture, he was mainly forced on party matters. Eventually, K.’s
economic reforms were either abandoned or slowed down and, in many ways, the old methods
of management continued.
At the beginning of B. rule, there were some attempts at industrial reform. The main person
responsible for these efforts was Alexei Kosygin.
As PM, Kosygun pushed hard for increased investment and real economic reforms. He tried to
make the economy more efficient and dynamic, especially through increased production of
consumer goods. In Sept 1965, he revived Khrushchev’s 1962 plans to give factory managers
greater control over certain decisions. However, many managers were too afraid of failure.
Kosygin stressed that the framework of the established planning system would remain- with the
addition of some ‘market’ elements. However, the desire to give extra powers to managers (and
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so reduce the influence of Gosplan) had political consequences. In particular, it reduced the
authority of the various economic ministries and of the CPSU itself. Many of Kosygin’s
colleagues therefore opposed this shift from centralised planning to a system partly based on
profit-making and managerial initiative.
Although Kosygin was given formal approval by the Central Committee to press ahead with his
plans, Brezhnev decided not to support Kosygin against his party critics. Significantly for future
economic developments in the USSR, Brezhnev then did what he could, behind the scenes, to
obstruct Kosygin’s plans.
There were some successes and improvements during the 8th FYP (1965-70). By 1970, the
output of factories and mines had risen 138%, compared to 1960. However, these increases in
production were not maintained, and plan targets were frequently not met. By 1970, there were
signs of a move back towards greater central control.
B- Agriculture
As early as March 1965, Brezhnev used his increasing political strength to insist on a bigger
allocation of agriculture funding, to pay for more chemical fertilizers and advanced mechanical
equipment, in order to overcome grain shortages. This took resources away from Kosygin’s
industrial plans. However, increased state investment in agriculture (combined with the effect of
industrial reforms begun by K. and Kosygin) led to improve agricultural production. From 1960
to 1970, Soviet agricultural output increased at an annual average of 3%.
III- Brezhnev’s policy 1970-76
By the end of the 1960s, most Politburo members believed they had established the best
methods of maintaining both political rule and economic growth- ways that avoided the
brutalities of Stalin and the erratic approach of K. They believed this approach would
successfully and safely stabilise the Soviet Union.
In fact, in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union seemed to be strong and secure. In addition to its
military strength (almost equal to that of the US), it was the world’s second-largest industrial
economy, producing more steel, oil, pig-iron, cement and tractors than any other country in the
world. There were even some people in the West (not supporters of the USSR) who thought
that the centrally planned economy might succeed in out-producing advanced capitalist states in
many other economic areas.
A- Agriculture and industry
After 1970, Brezhnev maintained the established system of organizing the collective farms or
kolkhozy. Output quotas were still set centrally, along with instructions on what crops to plantand even when to plant them. B. shared K.’s belief that combining farms to form bigger kolkhozy
would raise productivity. He also still insisted on massive increases in government financial
support investment, and this figure did not include the sums spent on chemical fertilizers,
tractors and other farm equipment.
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Despite the need to be more flexible, the USSR continued with FYP.
The 9th FYP ran from 1971 to 1975. This projected a slight increased in the production of
consumer goods from light industry, such as furniture and radios.
However, as before, the bulk of the money was made available for medium and heavy industry.
As a consequence, by 1975, the production of consumer goods had expanded at a rate that
was 9% lower than the rate of increase in industrial goods.
B- The oil crisis, 1973
The USSR was a major oil and natural gas producer, so it benefited at first from high oil prices
after the 1973 world oil crisis. The oil crisis also coincided with a boom in raw materials. As the
prices of raw materials rose faster than prices for manufactured goods, the USSR could afford
to import grain and technology from the West.
Even though its coal production declined slightly, the leadership was not worried, as the Soviet
Union had plenty of oil. Consequently, the USSR did not respond to the crisis by making more
efficient use of oil to reduce consumption. Nor did it push through economic reforms to
modernize its economic structures and machinery by increasing efficiency and productivity in
the way that Western capitalist economies did. Thus, B. and his colleagues missed an excellent
opportunity to seriously reform the Soviet economy. They did not seem to realise that, without
such reforms, there would be both economic and political trouble in the decades ahead.
What were the main features of the Soviet economy under B. from 1976 to 1982?
I- The 10th FYP
This period witnessed the 10th FYP (1976-80). For the 1st time, the Soviet economy showed
signs of slowing down. However, as the world’s second-largest producer of gold, the USSR
benefited from the sharp rise in the price of gold, which went up to 75% in 1979. Although its
foreign debt was about $17,000 million, the USSR could comfortably service this debt, as long
as prices remained high for its natural resources- gold, oil and gas.
The situation under B. seemed likely to continue in the same way. The building of the BaikalAmur Mainline (BAM) railway would link Siberia to the Pacific. This was important for the future,
as Siberia was rich in coal, iron, copper, timber, and especially oil and natural gas. Though no
fundamental changes took place, there were limited attempts at reform.
A- Agriculture
By the late 1970s, collective farms received 27% of all state investment, not including farm
machinery and chemical fertilisers. Around 40% of the Soviet population still worked on the land.
Like K., Brezhnev believed that increasing the size of the kolkhozy would lead to more efficient
farming and thus increasing production. In 1976, the Politburo therefore issued a resolution
calling for several kolkhozy to be combined, in an attempt to increase production. However,
despite the massive state subsidy for food and agriculture, many kolkhozy operated at a loss.
This was partly because charges for fuel and machinery went up. These expenses wiped out
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any advantage from the higher prices paid by the state for farming produce. For example, oil
costs in 1977 were almost twice those of the late 1960s, while the price of some agricultural
equipment more than doubled.
Generally, the government did not press for reform- though Brezhnev did authorize decrees in
1977 (and again in 1981) that allowed peasants to have private plots that were up to 0.5
hectares (1.2 acres). As some people feared that such changes might lead to total decollectivisation, publication of the 1977 decree was delayed until 1978.
To keep kolkhozy workers happy, B. decided to increase the prices paid to them for their
production. Meanwhile, subsidized food prices for consumers were kept low, thus satisfying
industrial workers. At the same time, life for workers on collectives improved, as they were paid
a regular wage instead of having to wait to see what profit there was to share out at the end of
the year. Also, for the first time, they received a pension and an internal passport that allowed
them to travel to the cities.
However, these changes did nothing to solve the underlying problems affecting agriculture.
These were:
● a shortage of skilled labor
● the payment of farm workers by quantity rather than quality of output
● the difficulties of transporting produce
● the central imposition of quotas
● machinery that was often too large to use on some farms.
Although there was a record grain harvest in 1978 (235 million tonnes), the following year
produced only 179 million tonnes- about 47 million tonnes short of target. This led to the
embarrassing spectacle of the Soviet Union having to buy 20 million tonnes of grain from
Canada and the US. Though gross agricultural output by 1980 was 21% higher than the
average for 1966-1970 (with cereal production rising by 18%), these figures masked significant
weaknesses. Output in most other areas of agriculture also declined. For example, sugar-beet
production decreased by 2% in the period 1970-80.
This situation had arisen despite the fact that, by 1981, state support for agriculture and food
already amounted to $33,000 million. B.’s response was simply to increase state investment
and subsidies- though he did also support plans for land reclamation and improved irrigation.
Because of the cult of personality that was growing up around him, there were few who dared
point out that this increased state investment would not solve the problems in the long term.
Those who favored significant reform tended to remain silent. They knew they would risk
demotion if they argued for the introduction of material incentive and changes to the way work
was allocated on the farms, as ways of increasing production. However, some reform-minded
local party officials (such as Gorbachev) did introduce some of these changes.
B- Industrial reform
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It was during the 10th FYP that signs of a real slowdown in industrial growth became apparent.
The planned increase in industrial production for 1979 was 5.7%, but this actual increase was
3.4%. Meanwhile, coal production actually declined.
In 1979, a decree on industry was issued. This decree called for scientific planning and, once
again, the again avoidance of running deficits in the annual accounts. But this did not result in
much improvement, and economic trends continued to be disappointed. The official statistics
insisted that industrial output rose by 4.4% a year in the period 1976-80. In reality, it showed a
steady decrease in the rate of expansion: in 1966-70, official statistics had claimed that the
annual rise was 8.5%. However, it should be remembered that official statistics-especially from
one-party states- are not always reliable.
Though the manufacturing industry was performing less well than the extractive industries, such
as gas, oil, and coal, there was little fresh thinking in the Politburo about the economy. Their
increasingly unfounded belief was that the USSR could make steady economic advances
without any major reforms.
One area where reform was seen concerned the creation of ‘associations’ where factories with
complementary activities could join forces to help each other. In fact, the first ones had been
formed before 1976. By 1980, there were over 4000 such associations, which were responsible
for more than ½ of total annual industrial production. Such associations could be formed without
prior permission from Gosplan and the various economic ministries in deficits were no longer
acceptable. However, even this reform was undermined by the fact that central authorities still
retained much control over investment, prices, wages, and hiring and firing workers.
In addition, old problems continued. In order to fulfill the quotas set by the FYPs, factory
managers had to ‘bend’ the rules: skilled workers had to be paid more than the figure set by the
central authorities. Managers found it difficult to deal with unskilled workers who were late, lazy
or even drunk. Often, because of the shortage of labour (made worse by a slow-down in the rate
of population growth) workers held more than one job, and would split their time between them.
Many tended to put more effort into protecting and extending their perks than their actual work.
Some people stayed away from their official employment in order to work on their own plots or
did ‘unofficial’ jobs. Some even stole equipment from factories, which was then exchanged from
other item that were in short supply.
C- Consumer goods
K. had aimed to increase the supply of consumer goods. This policy was continued by B. and
Kosygin, partly in order to avoid any dissatisfaction and protest, which might arise if workers did
not see improvements in their living standards. A workers’ protest movement was developing in
Poland with the rise of (initially illegal) trade union Solidarity.
The Soviet Communist Party wished to avoid anything similar happening in the USSR. For this
reason, there was a temptation to make concessions before reform. B. therefore tried to reduce
wage differentials. In particular, he ensured that industrial and other blue-collar workers were
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better-paid than various professional groups. For example, in 1970s, a bus driver received 230
roubles a month, compared to a secondary teacher’s 150 roubles.
Under B.’s rule, the numbers of families owning electrical goods increased significantly from 32%
to 86% and televisions from 51% to 86%. Even though investment in the industrial consumer
goods sector fell behind plan projections, the situation did improve.
There was, however, a slow-down in the production of some consumer goods after 1976.
People (usually women) often had to queue for considerable amounts of time when certain
items were in short supply. Nevertheless, B. repeated his promises about increasing and
improving the quality of consumer goods at both the 25th Party Congress in Feb 1976 and the
26th Congress in Feb 1981- just before he died.
D- Social developments
For ordinary Soviet citizens, many aspects of life improved under B. In addition to statesubsidised prices for the main foodstuffs (such as bread, potatoes and meat), the Soviet
people’s social wage* included cheap prices for clothing, electricity, gas and coal, and
subsidised rents and public transport. Incredibly, the prices paid by people in the USSR for such
items were not much higher than those paid during Stalin’s first FYP of 1928-32.
Social wage: This term refers to measures of economic and social well-being other than wagesand included job security. B and his colleagues felt it was important to maintain the large estate
subsidy of this social wage. Though social wages can be very important, they are not usually
taken into account when considering the efficiency of an economic system. Yet people tool all
these advantages for granted- along with free sanitation, healthcare and education. B.’s
successes in 1970s (compared with the situation he had inherited in 1964) were not
acknowledged, but he and the politburo were blamed for the relatively slow rate of progress.
In addition, trade unions opened more holiday centres for their members on the Baltics and
Black Sea costs (those who could be trusted) were treated to officially organized trips to Eastern
and even to Western European countries.
However, there was a slow-down in upward social mobility, as the expansion of management
posts began to slow, thus reducing opportunities for promotion. In fact, this slow-down first
started in the 1950s, and it increasingly became a source of dissatisfaction. There were also
other social problems linked with the slowing down and stagnation of the economy- these
included rising rates of alcoholism, divorce and suicide.
E- Developed socialism
Despite these social problems, as early as 1966 the Soviet leaders felt confident enough about
their system to describe it as ‘developed socialism’. As a result of such achievements as the
1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the FYPs and the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union had
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moved a new and higher period of development. The phrase ‘developed socialism’ was later
included in the 1977 constitution.
What economic reforms were attempted in the period 1982-85?
When B. died in Nov 1982, he had been in power for 18 years- the longest period of office held
by any Soviet leader after Stalin- There was considerable stability and continuity during his rule,
and consequently the reality of economic stagnation had been hidden from many observers,
However, even B. had been prepared to admit the existence of economic problems. At the 28th
Party Congress in 1981, he spoke of the impact of a difficult world economic situation. But he
also drew attention to domestic economic weaknesses, such as shortage of food and consumer
goods. This turned out to be B.’s last attendance at a Party Congress. In fact, as early as 1980,
his declining health was apparent. Other Soviet leaders thus began to think about who should
succeed him.
In his final years as leader, B. considered attempts to move closer to Communist China and so
reduce military expenditure, thus releasing money for economic improvements. But this had led
to grumblings from the Soviet High Command. In response to these criticisms, in Oct 1982, B.
made a speech attacking the ‘political, ideological and economic offensive against socialism’,
being waged by the US.
A B.’s health declined, it became clear that the person maneuvering to take place was Yuri
Andropov. When B. finally died in Nov 1982, the announcement of his death was delayed, to
allow time for the succession to be worked out. The Politburo met before the Central Committee
and Andropov was immediately appointed as general-secretary. Although PM Tikhanov
nominated Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov was backed by minister of defence Marshal
Ustinov, in what appeared to be almost a coup by the military and the KGB.
I- Andropov and reform
Andropov's time in Hungary meant he saw at first hand Hungarian attempts to introduce more
liberal economic reforms and policies by reducing the influence of central planning agencies.
Significantly, it was he who recommended that Janos Kadar should be the one to replace Nagy.
His attitude to reform was also influenced by his career in the KGB, as he has received accurate
report about economic situations both in the USSR and abroad. This meant that Andropov knew
before he became leader of the USSR what the main problems were, even though official
propaganda tried to gloss over some of them. He also maintained contact with Soviet personnel
in various foreign countries. This gave him a broader knowledge and perspective on economic
and political issues than many of other leading Soviet figures.
Consequently, even before he came to power, Andropov made speeches criticizing certain
failures. However, his main aim was to reform and modernize the Soviet economy.
He was not a ‘liberal’ in the sense that he wished to end the Soviet planned system. He just
wanted to make it more efficient and productive. In many ways, his attitudes and policies were
similar to K.’s, and also pre-dated the early reforms attempted by Gorbachev after 1985. In any
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case, Andropov’s time for reforming the Soviet economy was to be short- he was only in power
for 15 months.
Andropov quickly started his reforms- and his first campaign was against absenteeism from
work. A report in 1982 showed that, at any time, 30% of people of working age were recorded
as absent from work for ‘personal reasons’. Emphasizing the need for efficiency and discipline,
he established the ‘People’s Control’ inspectorate. These inspectors went around public areas
such as cafés and cinemas, questioning people about why they were not at work. Andropov’s
speeches, would only come from hard work and greater productivity. One of the main reasons
for absenteeism was drunkenness and even alcoholism. This was a growing problem in the
Soviet Union, and Andropov launched a campaign against alcohol abuse.
It was relatively easy to launch campaigns, but actually making fundamental changes was more
difficult. Many people avoided doing anything that removed their perks and benefits, or
disturbed their everyday lives. To help carry through his reforms, Andropov quickly appointed
those who supported him and his aims. He also demoted some of those who favoured
continuing with B.’s ‘drift’ (his policy of doing very little and avoiding serious reforms).
Andropov’s team tended to be younger party member- Nikolai Ryzhkov became the Central
Committee secretary in charge of the new economic programme, and Grigori Romanov was
given control of heavy industry.
Another Andropov supporter and protégé was Gorbachev, the youngest member of the
Politburo. He typified those who were frustrated by the conservatism of the party members who
had come to power under B.
After becoming general-secretary, Andropov used Pravda, the newspaper of the CPSU, to
identify the abuses that were damaging the Soviet economic system. He also suggested
reforms, including setting up smaller enterprises and increasing productivity in different sectors
of the economy. For example, transport organizations were told that, if they wanted to continue
receiving high levels of state funding, they needed to show higher productivity.
In August 1983, Andropov made another speech in which he drew attention to ‘accumulated
inertia’, which he said the USSR needed to overcome. By eradicating this inertia, the entire
massive Soviet economy would be transformed into an efficient and well-functioning one.
The reforms Andropov favoured were influenced by the Hungarian policies implemented under
Kadar. In Jan 1984, steps were taken to give more powers to factory managers in what was
called ‘limited industrial experiment’, in branches covered by 5 industrial ministries. In particular,
managers were to have more power over decision-making- including decisions relating to
production and sales. Any workers whose jobs ‘disappeared’ as a result of increased labour
productivity would be allocated to other enterprises. However, central planning bodies and
structures would remain. In some respects, these reforms were similar to these attempted by
Kosygin.
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These early reforms were limited, but seemed to point in a clear direction. However, Andropov’s
poor health affected his ability to push his reforms through against the opposition and inertia he
encountered. He was a realist about such problems. Therefore he did not make optimistic
statements and promises, as K. had done in the 1960s. In fact in 1983, Andropov contradicted
B.’s claim that the USSR had reached the stage of ‘developed socialism’. Instead, he said that
the Soviet Union was only just beginning to construct a society.
By mid-1983, it was obvious that Andropov’s health was poor, and in Nov 1983, he was unable
to attend the traditional Red Square parade. Despite being in hospital with serious heart and
kidney problems, he still tried to push his reform programme. In Dec, he issued another call for
people to work harder- and, at the same time, removed a few more Brezhnevites from top
positions. His health continued to decline, and on 11 Feb 1984, he died.
II- Chernenko and ‘drift’
Andropov had not had sufficient time to push ahead with his reforms. or to overcome the
obstructionism that tried to neutralise their impact. Although his attempts had encourage other
to think in similar ways about reform (and had led to the emergence of reform-minded politicians
such as Gorbachev and Ryzhkov), the Soviet Union entered a period of ‘drift’ after his death. It
seems that Andropov hoped that Gorbachev would replace him. G. had managed the internal
party election in late 1983, which had resulted in the replacement on 1 in 5 of the party
secretaries.
Despite G.’s effort, those opposed to reform started planning their moves as soon as it became
clear that Andropov’s health was failing.
The Brezhnevites decided that Konstantin Chernenko was their preferred candidate, and
Chernenko became the next general-secretary. At 72, Chernenko was the older man ever to
become Soviet leader. Most importantly, he was the candidate favoured by the conservative
anti-reform faction. Thus, all reforms were put on hold for the next 13 months- especially as
Chernenko’s health was also poor, and his leadership skills were limited. These weaknesses
perhaps explain why the ‘old guard wanted him to succeed Andropov.
Although Chernenko gave limited approval to some of Andropov’s reforms, his approach was
designed to establish ‘stability’. He used a phrase that neatly summed up his attitude to reform:
‘Look before you leap’. Consequently, he attempted to create a government based on coalition
of Andropov and Brezhnev supporters- only 4 new ministers were appointed, and were no
changes to the Politburo.
Chernenko did not press ahead with economic reforms. Indeed, although Gorbachev was not
arguing for reduced defence spending (so that more could be invested in consumer goods
production), the conservative military anti-reform group managed to get a planned 12% increase
in the defence budget announced. Chernenko carried on with Andropov’s campaign against
corruption and also decided to concentrate on education.
In Aug 1984, Chernenko became seriously ill. Though he recovered for a time the government
was increasingly run by the defence minister Dimitri Ustinov (1908-1984) and Gorbachev. By
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then, Gorbachev had become chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Soviet Union.
He had then took charge of ideology and this apparently made him Chernenko’s unofficial
deputy. Following a series of bad harvests, Gorbachev lost his responsibility for agriculture in
the autumn of 1984. However, he soon returned to favor, and his political position was
strengthened when Ustinov died in Dec 1984.
In early 1985, Chernenko’s health deteriorated further. Now the 2 groups became rivals and
started to compete with each other. One group favored Gorbachev and other younger
enthusiastic reformers. The other group favoured stability and more experienced personnel.
Significantly, in the Soviet Union’s press releases to foreign media Gorbachev was increasingly
given a high profile. This indicated that he was likely to be the next leader. Finally, on 10 March
1985, Chernenko died. Supported by the Andropov faction, the KGB and those wanting reform,
Gorbachev became the next general-secretary. At 54, he was the youngest member of the
Politburo.
What impact did the Cold War have on the Soviet economy?
It is not possible to fully understand the increasing problems of the Soviet economy without
examining the impact of the Cold War. In particular, it is necessary to consider the cost of the
arms race. In their attempts to catch up, and then keep up, with the US rearmament (both
nuclear and conventional), the Soviet leader placed an increasingly heavy burden on the Soviet
economy.
I- Economic stagnation
As discussed earlier, the official line was that, because of central state planning the USSR was
able to out-perform capitalism in caring for its citizens. For example, it guaranteed employment,
health care, shelter, clothing and pensions, along with subsidized travel and food. However, in
1976, many leaders accepted that the Soviet economy had fallen behind the advanced capitalist
countries of the West in civilian technology. They also acknowledged that more needed to be
done to increase the availability of consumer goods and improve their quality.
Nevertheless, no significant industrial or agricultural reforms were introduced. This is where the
Cold War (especially its accompanying arms race) was a major factor in the crisis and ultimate
collapse of the Soviet economy: in addition to massive food subsidies, a huge part of the annual
budget was taken up by the nuclear arms race.
II- Defence spending
After WWII, all Soviet leaders (concerned with both defence and deterrence) were determined
to develop and maintain a strong military capability. As well as possessing a strong conventional
force, the USSR managed to end the USA’s nuclear weapons monopoly in 1949. The Soviet
Union was then determined to build up its nuclear defences.
However, this policy required massive defence spending. By 1980, B.’s determination to catch
up and maintain parity with the US meant that 12% of the USSR’s GNP went on defence. As for
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the GDP of the USSR was about ½ that of the USA, the USSR had to spend twice as much
proportionally- just to keep up.
The huge amount of money and resources taken up by defence led to the arms industry being
known as the ‘steel eaters’. The problem with this was that, as has been seen, the Soviet
economy was slowing down. As a result, the production of more and better consumer goods
became to decline, and the economy continued to stagnate.
III- Economic warfare
In fact, the arms race can be seen as a form of Cold War economic warfare because it forced
the Soviet Union to divert proportionately more of its GDP from civilian to military expenditure.
This, in turn, restricted the Soviet government’s ability to respond to increasing civilian demand
for continued improvements in living standards and the availability of newer consumer goods.
According to some historians, the US did not end détente and launch a Second Cold War
because of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Nor was the US responsible to the fact that
the USSR had narrowed the nuclear missile gap. Instead, the real US aim was to destabilise the
Soviet economy.
After 1977, when Jimmy Carter became US president, this approach was stepped up.
Brezizinski, Carter’s national security adviser, was very influential- and he believed that a new
arms race would ruin the Soviet economy. Indeed, CIA experts reported that the Soviet
economy was extremely weak. They claimed that increased defence spending could also cause
serious problems for the Soviet Union and its control of Eastern Europe.
By the early 1980s, the crisis threatening the Soviet economy was clear. Essential, the gross
domestic output of the Soviet economy was needed for two main purposes. One part was
needed just to keep the economy at its current level (the necessary product). The other part
could then be used to increase living standard, invest in improved industrial production and
throughout the 1970s, there was a slow-down in the growth of the total gross domestic output,
resulting in a relatively smaller surplus. Meanwhile, a growing proportion of the necessary
product was being absorbed by state subsidies for food, rents and public transport.
In addition, much of what was produced was such poor quality that it was unusable. It seems
that one obvious remedy would be to greatly reduce the defence budget, and so fund increased
investment in the civilian economy.
Brezhnev’s foreign policy was based on heavy defence spending and not angering the West.
The assumption was that such strength and reasonableness would result in détente. Then the
West would agree to weapons reductions and loans, which would enable the Soviet economy to
improve through better funding. However, this policy failed in the late 1970s. At this point, the
West began to abandon détente and instead embarked on a Second Cold War, developing and
deploying newer and more expensive nuclear weapons. This growing threat from the USA
meant that calls to reduce Soviet military expenditure had few supporters before Gorbachev
came to power. This form of economic warfare by the US therefore posed an ever-increasing
challenge for the USSR.
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