Download Hemerijck - Social Policy

Scientific Council for
Government Policy (WRR)
Prof. Dr. A.C. Hemerijck
director
Role of the WRR
•
•
•
•
Policy making (Heclo) = puzzling + powering
WRR: puzzling
Mandate to advise government
Government obliged to respond
Characteristics of the WRR
•
•
•
•
•
•
Scientific/academic
Multidisciplinary
Policy oriented
Intersectoral
Long term perspective
Independent
Scientific/academic + mulitdisciplinary
•
•
•
•
Members of Council are professors
Member of Staff have PhDs
They also teach at university
Law, economics, socioligy, political science
etc.
Policy oriented + Intersectoral
•
•
•
•
Council for government policy
Good contacts with policy makers
Complex societal problems
Not restricted to single sectors or policy silos
Long term perspective
• 25 years ago: predicting the future
• 25 years later: formulating future adequate
policy directions
Independent
• “We don’t have to listen to the prime
minister…
…the prime minister has to listen to us.”
• Special law on WRR
• Own working program
WRR
=
council
+
staff
Council
•
•
•
•
•
Legal mandate 1976
Chairman Wim van de Donk
Other members (8)
Nominated by the cabinet
Working council (3 days a week)
Staff
• Academic staff (25-30)
• Support staff (10)
• Organisation under Ministry of General Affairs
(Prime Minister’s Office)
• Budget for external studies
Council AND staff
• Project teams
• Staff and Council meetings
• The primacy of argument
Various projects
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Dynamism in Islamitc activism
Climate strategy
Welfare state
Labour market, flexibility & security
National identity
Infrastructure
Security
Innovation
Religion
Europe
Recalibrating Work and
Welfare in the Wider Europe
Anton Hemerijck (WRR, Erasmus University Rotterdam,
Antwerp University)
Outline
1. European orientations and welfare regimes
2. ‘Goodness of fit’ and the imperative of
welfare recalibration
3. Welfare performance at a glance
4. Sequential (self-)transformation and the
politics of recalibration
5. Why we need a new welfare state
6. Conclusions (role of EU)
Paul Pierson (2001)
In an atmosphere of austerity a
fundamental rethinking of social
policy seems a remote possibility.
1. European orientations and
welfare regimes
European orientations
• Normative: nobody left behind (significant
redistribution)
• Cognitive: social policy (potentially) as a
productive factor
• Institutional: democratically endorsed negotiated
reformism (gradual transformative rather than
punctuated change)
• Mutiple equilibria effective, legitimate and coherent
Four (or five) welfare clusters
• Scandinavian (generous/universal/tax)
• Anglo-Saxon (targeted on need/tax)
• Continental (encompassing breadwinner
insurance – contributions)
• Mediterranean (insider protection, no safety
net, familialism)
• New member states (mixed Beveridgean and
Bismarckian catch-up – far less coherence)
2. ‘Goodness of fit’ and the
imperative of welfare
recalibration
“Goodness of fit”
• Welfare state institutions (policy legacies,
administration, financing and spending levels)
Compatible with:
• Structure of (international) economy (technology)
• Social (family and demographic) structure and value
orientations
• EU (and international) political economy
Postwar “goodness of fit”
• Sovereign industrial economies based on exploiting
existing (US) technologies
• Nuclear male breadwinner family social structure,
young population (PAYGO)
• Limited international competition (foreign investment
highly regulated)
• EU limited goals – the expansion of heavy industry,
the liberalization of trade, CAP, the deregulation of
product markets (much later)
• All four original regimes equally viable to the 1980s
“Goodness of fit” in question
• Accelerating economic internationalization and
techological change
• Post-industrial differentiation (shift to services,
feminization labour market, adverse demography,
family destabilization)
• Relative austerity (standing commitments/low
growth)
• EU not mandated to push through socially invasive
and politically salient reforms (semi-sovereign
welfare state)
Diverse systems no longer
(equally) viable
• Scandinavian (public finance/flexibility problem –
largely resolved)
• Anglo-Saxon ([child] poverty/inequality problem –
improved under New Labour)
• Continental (inactivity/employment/pension problems
– catching up dualization)
• Mediterranean (segmentation/perverse familialism
with declining fertility - divergence)
• More intense social problems in NMS, but also
high growth
The imperative of recalibration
•
•
•
•
Functional evolution of socio-economic risks
Distributive social groups and generations
Normative social justice considerations
Institutional roles and responsibilities
(organization of social policy)
3. Welfare performance at a
glance
Total social expenditure in % of
GDP, 1980-2003
40
United States
Spain
United Kingdom
Italy
France
Germany
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
35
30
25
20
15
Source: OECD.
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
10
Employment/population ratios,
1980 – 2006
90
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source: OECD.
Source: European Labour Force Survey.
5,9
4,7
Poland
Greece
Malta
7,6
2,8
Hungary
Italy
2,3
4,5
1,3
4,5
Slovakia
Spain
Romania
Belgium
Luxembourg
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
12,7
34,9
61,8
62,0
62,4
62,4
60,3
61,0
12,2
22,1
19,8
51,1
47,4
46,3
53,0
53,0
54,0
54,6
51,9
48,2
56,8
54,6
65,3
65,8
66,7
63,5
58,8
17,7
40
France
6,8
Cyprus
50
59,3
7,0
Lithuania
28,0
25,3
49,4
67,3
70,7
72,2
73,4
Employment rate
Ireland
6,4
7,9
Slovenia
Portugal
6,3
4,6
0
Latvia
Germany
Austria
Estonia
27,6
28,1
60
United Kingdom
Netherlands
12,6
10
Finland
Sweden
31,3
30
Norway
20
25,7
70
Denmark
Female employment and share of
women’s part-time work, 2006
80
Part-time employment % of the total female population of the same age group
-7,4
3,3
16,9
9,2
Source: European Labour Force Survey.
Poland
Malta
Belgium
Italy
4,7
10,0
9,9
28,1
30,0
32,0
32,5
32,6
33,2
41,7
42,3
38,1
33,6
Slovenia
15,7
45,2
43,6
39,6
35,5
33,1
9,5
7,0
1,6
9,6
6,7
48,3
67,5
69,6
2006
Slovakia
Luxembourg
Hungary
Austria
France
Bulgaria
Romania
Greece
Spain
Czech Republic
Netherlands
48,9
Germany
10,7
49,6
Lithuania
50,1
53,1
Ireland
54,5
53,3
Portugal
58,5
60,7
57,4
Latvia
30,0
53,6
18,8
45,0
Cyprus
12,8
8,9
United Kingdom
15,0
Finland
9,4
Estonia
-15,0
9,3
60,0
Denmark
-13,3
8,0
4,1
0,0
Norway
Sweden
Employment rates of older workers
(55-64), 2006 (1997)
75,0
Difference 1997 to 2006
Standardized unemployment rates
(2007/1997)
12,0 11,1
2007
9,6
10,0
8,4 8,3 8,3 8,3
8,0
8,0
7,5 7,4
6,9 6,9
Difference 2007 to 1997
6,4 6,4 6,1 6,1
6,0
6,0
5,3 5,3
4,8 4,7 4,7 4,6 4,5
4,4 4,3
4,0
3,9 3,7
3,2
2,6
2,0
2,0
1,3
0,0
0,0
-0,3
-1,3
-2,0
-0,9
-1,5
-1,5 -1,7 -1,4
-1,5
-1,7 -1,6
-2,1
-3,2
-4,0
-3,8
-4,9
-5,2
-6,0
-5,4
-5,8
-8,0
-8,4
Norway
Netherlands
Denmark
Cyprus
Lithuania
Austria
Ireland
United States
Luxembourg
Estonia
Slovenia
United Kingdom
Latvia
Sweden
Italy
Romania
Malta
Finland
Czech Republic
Source: European Labour Force Survey.
Bulgaria
Hungary
Belgium
Portugal
France
Spain
Greece
Germany
Poland
Slovakia
-10,0
y60_64
y55_59
y50_54
y45_49
y40_44
y35_39
y30_34
y25_29
f
y20_24
m
y15_24
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
y15_19
y60_64
y55_59
y50_54
y45_49
y40_44
y35_39
y30_34
y25_29
y20_24
y15_24
y15_19
Life course employment rate in
Sweden 1995 and 2005
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
f
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
0
0
y60_64
50
y55_59
60
y50_54
70
y45_49
70
y40_44
80
y35_39
80
y30_34
90
y25_29
90
y20_24
100
y15_24
100
y15_19
y60_64
y55_59
y50_54
y45_49
y40_44
y35_39
y30_34
y25_29
y20_24
y15_24
y15_19
Life course employment rate in
Spain 1995 and 2005
m
60
50
Fertility (1970-2003)
Fertility rate, 1970 and 2003
4,50
4,00
3,50
3,00
2,50
1970
2,00
2003
1,50
1,00
0,50
CZ
HU
PL
SK
IT
G
R
PT
ES
IE
UK
DE
FR
NE
BE
AT
DK
F
SEI
0,00
Correlation between total fertility rates
and female employment rates in 2003
2.1
2
IE
1.9
FR
1.8
1.7
FI
UK
LU
BE
1.6
1.5
EE
IT
GR
1.3
1.2
ES
DE
HU
SK
PL
SE
NL
CY
EU 25
1.4 MT
DK
PT
CZ
LT
LV
SI
55
60
AT
1.1
30
35
40
45
50
65
70
75
Correlation between total fertility and
female unemployment in 2003
2
IE
UK
DK
NL
SE
CY
AT
1.5
HU
LU
BE
Correlation = - 0,52
FR
FI
EU 25
MT EE DE
IT
PT
SI
CZ
LV
ES
LT
GR
SK
PL
1
0.5
0
0
5
10
15
20
Childcare use and costs (2001)
Childcare: costs and usage (2001)
70
60
Net costs as % of APW
50
40
Kosts as % of net family
income
30
Number of children in
registrated childcare
20
10
G
R
PT
IE
U
K
AT
FR
N
E
BE
E
D
FI
SE
D
E
0
Public social expenditure and
education in per cent of GDP, 2004
9
DK
Spending on education in % of GDP
8
SE
7
FI
6
BE
SI
5
HU
PL
LT
LV
FR
AT
PT
UK
EE
NL
MT
IE
IT
CZ
SK
DE
ES
LU
4
GR
3
10
Source: Eurostat.
15
20
25
Social expenditure in % of GDP
30
35
Contingent convergence
• Clear shift away from early exit (supply reduction) to
raising participation (also women, young and elderly)
• Convergence towards higher participation better
educated younger cohorts
• Fiscal cost-containment but no retrenchment
• Equity and efficiency (Scandinavian success)
• Social services and human capital lagging behind
• Long incubation periods
4. Sequential (self-)transformation
and the politics of recalibration
Sequential transformative change
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
From Keynesian synthesis to pragmatic monetarism
Cost competitive wage bargaining (de-indexation)
Broaden base taxation
Activating social security
Active labour market policy
Minimum income protection innovation
Pension restructuring (contribution/benefits in line with increased life
expectancy) toward a cappuccino three-tiered model
Dual-earner-family-friendly services
Human capital impulse
Financial hybridization provisions (family services and health care)
Process: from corporatist class-based bargaining towards (soft)
concertative multi-level problem-solving
– With temporal “joint-decision traps”
The politics of recalibration
• Exposing drawbacks of welfare status quo
(cognitive)
• Legitimize new policies (effective) and principles
(normative)
• Framing reform resistance as problematic
• Efforts at political consensus-building
• Phasing in (two-tiered) reform
• Rethinking roles and responsibilities
• Dual importance of EMU/Single Market and
Employment Strategy (closing and opening reform
pathways)
5. Why we need a new welfare state
Ageing societies
• Social security is strongly redistributive over the life
cycle: the ageing of societies puts tough fiscal
pressures on public spending
• The debate on ageing has been overly focussed on
pension reforms and savings
• Of vital concerns is how social policy interact with
fertility, education and labour supply (the future tax
base)
Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, Myles
The gender dimension
• Women an important resource/capability
– Pool of underutilised labour supply
– Provider of future labour supply
– Complicated relation with social security system
– Main providers of child and elderly care
Family policy, female economic
activity, child poverty and fertility
Female labour force participation
+/-
-
+
+
Family policy
-
Fertility
-
Child poverty
Human capital and family policy
• Knowledge intensive economies push up skills premiums:
youth with poor cognitive skills or inadequate schooling today
will become tomorrow’s precarious worker.
• Sustaining the welfare of a large aged population
necessitates high-productive labour force: strong social
inheritance not affordable.
• Cognitive inequalities are substantially lower in Scandinavia
and the trend towards declining social inheritance coincides
with expansion of universal day care.
• Sharing the costs of raising children to avoid population
decline (and meet child rearing preferences) and its
consequences for growth and intergenerational equity
Ten priorities
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Mobilizing active popupation
Child-centered investment strategy (fertility)
Raising and broadening human capital base
Flexicure labour markets
Dual earner family support coherence
Gender equality
Later and flexible retirement (quality work)
Migration and integration through employment participation
Strong anti-poverty strategies (minimum income protection)
Fiscal prudence (but no orthodoxy) in the face of ageing
Normative recalibration
• Serving citizens to reach their full potential across
life course
• Connected to dynamic (international) economy and
social change
• Dynamic equality from freedom from want
(protection/redistribution) to responsibility sensitive
freedom to act (resources/capabilities)
• Policy redirection to address family contingencies
6. Conclusions
• Welfare states as ‘evolutionary systems’ with temporary (dis-)
equilibria and windows of opportunity for gradual
transformative change
• Focus on connection and interplay between challenges and
welfare regimes (goodness of fit)
• More coherence through a life course perspective
• Seek positive feedback fertility, (flexible) labour market
participation, human capital formation, less poverty
• More tailored combinations of income policy and social
services and governance structures for managing transition to
the post-industrial economy
• Hard to imagine welfare recalibration without EU (EMU/EES)