Download Starting from Reinach`s account of social acts, I inquiry the problem

Francesca De Vecchi, The efficacy of social acts
Italo-Polish Symposium on Social and Legal Philosophy
Gdansk University, 16th-19th January 2008
Starting from Reinach’s account of social acts, I tackle the problem of the efficacy (Wirksamkeit)
of social acts: the fact they are processes, which produce something (schaffen, erzeugen), the fact
that by accomplishing social acts something new enters the world (tritt in der Welt ein). For
example:
Ein Mensch erteile einem anderen ein Versprechen. Eine eigenartige Wirkung geht von diesem Vorgange
aus, eine ganz andere, als wenn etwa ein Mensch dem anderen eine Mitteilung macht oder eine Bitte
ausspricht. Das Versprechen schafft eine eigentümliche Verbindung zwischen zwei Personen, kraft deren,
um es zunächst ganz roh auszudrücken, die eine etwas verlangen darf und die andere verpflichtet ist, es zu
leisten oder zu gewähren. Diese Verbindung erscheint als Folge, als Produkt gleichsam des Versprechens
(SW, 147)
One person makes a promise to another. A curious effect proceeds from this event, an effect quite
different from the effect of one man informing another of something, or making a request of him. The
promising produces a unique bond between the two persons in virtue of which the one person — to
express it for the time being very roughly — can claim something and the other is obliged to perform it or
to grant it. This bond presents itself as result, as a product (so to speak) of the promising (En.tr., 8).
Beside promising, there are many other social acts: commanding, requesting, enacting, informing
etc. Reinach presents many examples of social acts constituting the social act’s family, and define
them according to their different products as well as to their different components.
Now, the problem is: how do social acts bring forth their “products”? More precisely: how do
social acts have to be made in order to produce their effects? And: what is the nature of this
efficacy? In fact, it is not a mere causal and physical relation:1 these products are not physical. So,
further: what kind of entities are these “products”?
1
This phenomenon is similar to the way in which «by saying or in something we are doing something»—this is the
case of performative acts—as well as to the way in which illocutionary acts are bound with effects, investigated by
Austin (and then, more in-depth, by Olivecrona with respect to legal implications of these effects by Olivecrona, Law
as effect, 1971). Cf. J.L. Austin (1962), How to do things with words, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1980, p. 12 and ff.,
and pp. 115-120. «We shall shortly return to the senses in which the successful or consummated performance of an
illocutionary act does bring in “consequences” or “effect” in certain senses. … I must point out that the
illocutionary act as a distinct from the perlocutionary act I connected with the production of effect in certain senses:
(1) … the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake. (2) the illocutionary act “takes effect”
in certain ways, as distinguished from producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in the
“normal” way, i.e. changes in the natural course of events. Thus “I name this ship the Queen Elisabeth” has the effect
of naming or christening the ship; then certain subsequent act such as referring to it as the Generalissimo Stalin will be
out of order. (3) We have said that many illocutionary acts invite by convention a response or sequel. Thus an order
invites the response of obedience and a promise that of fulfilment. The response or sequel may be “one-way” or
“two-way” …» (Austin, 1962, p. 116-117). Searle assigns to performatives acts the role of instituting social reality
(cf. Searle 1995). But as phenomenologist, Reinach, differently from Austin and from Searle, looks for the essences
1
In order to examine this problem and answer these questions, I shall distinguish two levels:
1) The eidetic level: social acts have an essential and a priori legality, which necessarily binds the
act and its consequents, independently of what the agents really do and independently of any
positive law.
2) The level of spontaneity, freedom and voluntariness: social acts are free and voluntary acts of
persons, and their “products” depend on the freedom and the will of social acts’ authors, they
spring from, and cease to exist because of such free and voluntary acts.
Now, the eidetic level defines the essence of social acts which implies that social acts have a
certain structure as well as certain necessary properties, among which the property of being free
and voluntary acts, and of producing some effects. The relation between social acts’ essential and
a priori structure -- which is independent of what the authors of socials acts do -- and spontaneity
of social acts is that freedom represents the tangential point between the essential legality of the
act, the type, and its possible tokens or instantiations. These tokens can be perfect realisations of
the paradigm of the act, realisations of one of its modifications and realisations of something
which is only one or some parts of the acts, but not the act itself as its type and its modifications
actually imply. For example, I can simply have the will to make a promise or/and I can simply
decide to utter this will: in these cases, I -- i.e., my capacity of freedom or spontaneity – do not
perform a promise and do not produce the effects of the promise. But the promise as such, its
eidetic type, rests untouched.
Starting from these distinctions, and with explicit reference to Reinach, I shall develop my paper
according to the following steps:
i) By considering the case of promising and its effects (claim and obligation), I define the
ontological status of these effects and the nature of the promising and claim/obligation relation.
My aim is to show, on the one hand, that social acts bring forth effects in a specific way,
distinguished from producing effects in the sense of external events (i.e., this is not the case of a
causal relation between external events), and on the other, that they produce new and very
particular entities: the social and legal ones, which are temporal (but neither physical, nor
psychological and not even ideal entities), for which necessary and synthetic a priori laws are
valid.
How does the act of promising produce claim and obligation? The relation between the act of
promising and claim/obligation is a necessary relation (like the relation of ideas) and it is a
ground-consequent (Grund -Folge) relation like the relation between states of affairs.
of these phenomena. Defining social acts and their effects means bringing their definition onto the level of what is a
matter of a priori necessity.
2
ii) I define social acts as mental and external acts at the same time, and as complex acts, constituted by many
components. “External” means that they involve other persons. Their components are:
intentionality (a specific one), spontaneity, turning to another subject and being grasped, body
(language or mien or gestures) and soul (internal experience) of social act. All these elements
together constitute social acts as an absolutely new concept (neue Sachlage).
My purpose is to show the dependency of their efficacy on their structure and components. I
illustrate this dependency by means of some cases of social acts’ modifications.
iii) By defining their being free and voluntary acts in terms of authorship and position takings, I show
the implications of this fact with respect to their efficacy:
1. The opening of a new series of events, which are individuals’ acts and actions;
2. Their «Deontic power»;
3. The Institution of the social level as a “thirdness”, a higher order level with respect to the
intersubjective (I-you) level.
The aim of the present paper is to outline some fundamental distinctions and aspects concerning
the problem of the efficacy of social acts that is part of my work, yet in progress, about social
acts. Certainly, there are other and maybe more exactly distinctions and aspects that must be
identified. My hope here is that will be the start of a fruitful discussion.
i) Ontological status of social and legal entities and the nature of the promising and claim/obligation relation
By shifting from the natural attitude to the eidetic vision (this is a topos of the phenomenological
method, it means «zu den Sachen selbst» («to the things in themselves!»)), Reinach defines the
particular ontological status of promising and claim/obligation relation.2 Promising and
2
To understand the nature of these entities, we return to the quotation with which we have started. I shall now add
its following part:
«Ein Mensch erteile einem anderen ein Versprechen. Eine eigenartige Wirkung geht von diesem Vorgange aus ....
Das Versprechen schafft eine eigentümliche Verbindung zwischen zwei Personen, kraft deren, um es zunächst ganz
roh auszudrücken, die eine etwas verlangen darf und die andere verpflichtet ist, es zu leisten oder zu gewähren. Diese
Verbindung erscheint als Folge, als Produkt gleichsam des Versprechens. Sie läßt ihrem Wesen nach eine beliebig lange
Dauer zu, andererseits aber scheint ihr die Tendenz immanent zu sein, ein Ende und eine Auflösung zu erfahren ....
Diese ganze Sachlage kann uns selbstverständlich oder merkwürdig vorkommen, je nach der Einstellung, in der wir
an sie herantreten. ... wie es aber auch sonst vorkommt, daß uns vor einem längst bekannten Gegenstande auf
einmal die Augen aufgehen, daß wir das, was wir unzählige Male schon gesehen haben, nun zum ersten Male wirklich
sehen, in seiner ganzen Eigenart und eigentümlich Schönheit, so kann es auch hier geschehen. Da ist etwas, das wir
als Versprechen kenne oder doch zu kennen glauben. Wird diese Versprechen vollzogen, so tritt mit ihm etwas
Neues ein in die Welt. Es erwächst ein Anspruch auf der einen, eine Verbindlichkeit auf der anderen Seite. Was sind
das für merkwürdige Gebilde? Sie sind gewiß nicht nichts. Wie könnte man ein Nicht aufheben durch Verzicht oder
durch Widerruf oder durch Erfüllung? Aber sie lassen sich auch unter keine der Kategorien bringen, die uns sonst
geläufig sind. ... So scheinen sie denn zeitliche Gegenständliche einer ganz besonderen, bisher nicht beachteten Art
zu sein.
Wir sehen, daß von ihnen bestimmte unmittelbar einsichtige Gesetze gelten: ein Anspruch auf eine bestimmte
3
claim/obligation are no longer to be considered physical and psychological entities because they
endure even when we are not aware of them, and they can last for many years. Moreover, they
are not ideal entities because these latter are eternal, while claim and obligation are characterised
by a beginning and an end. What kind of entities are they? They are social and legal formations
(Gebilde) for which synthetic and a priori laws are valid, for example, «in the “concept” of claim
nothing is “contained” in any possible sense about the fact that the claim dissolves under certain
circumstances» (SW, 148; en.tr.9). And which are independent from the agents’ behaviour and
from their description in all positive law: promising implies an obligation and a claim, even if, for
example, I don’t fulfil my obligation to perform the promise I made, and even if positive laws can
define promising otherwise and attribute different implications to it.
Ein streng gesetzlicher Mechanismus des sozialen Geschehens bietet sich uns hier dar; es handelt sich um
unmittelbar einsichtige Wesenszusammenhänge und wahrlich nicht um «Schöpfungen» oder
«Erfindungen» irgendeines positiven Rechtes (SW, 167).
A mechanism of social interaction which is subject to strict a priori laws shows itself here; we have to do
with immediately evident laws of essence and with nothing less than with the «positings» or «inventions»
of some positive law (En.tr., 27).
Now, the question is: how does the act of promising produce claim and obligation? Reinach
answers this question by confronting the causal relation between external events with the relation
between promising and claim/obligation. By selecting out some differences between the two
types of relation, Reinach defines the properties of the promising and claim/obligation relation.
a) It is a necessary relation of ideas:
The cause and effect relation is not «a self-evident and necessary relation of essence» (Reinach agrees
with Hume): «that fire produces smoke, this is surely not intelligibly grounded in the essence of
fire, as it lies in the essence of the number 3 to be larger than the number 2. There is no doubt
that the causal relation is no necessary “relation of ideas”» (En.tr. 15). Instead the relation between
promising, as ground (Grund), and claim/obligation, as consequent (Folge), is a necessary relation:
Leistung erlischt in dem Augenblicke, da die Leistung geschehen ist. Das ist kein Satz, den wir aus vielen oder allen
bisher beobachteten Erfahrungsfällen gewonnen haben könnten, sondern es ist ein Gesetz, welches allgemein und
notwendig im Wesen des Anspruchs als solchem gründet. Es ist ein apriorischer Satz im Sinne Kants und zugleich
ein synthetischer. Denn «im Begriffe» des Anspruchs ist davon, daß er unter bestimmten Umständen erlischt, in
keinem möglichen Sinne etwas «enthalten» (SW, 147-148)»
«One person makes a promise to another. A curious effect proceeds from this event, an effect quite different from
the effect of one man informing another of something, or making a request of him. The promising produces a
unique bond between the two persons in virtue of which the one person — to express it for the time being very
roughly — can claim something and the other is obliged to perform it or to grant it. This bond presents itself as
result, as a product (so to speak) of the promising. It can, according to its essence, last ever so long, but on the other
hand it seems to have an inherent tendency towards meeting an end and a dissolution … (En.tr. 8)».
4
it has the necessity characterising a relation of ideas, but involving—this is the novelty and
specific character of these entities—temporal entities.
… im Wesen eines derartigen Aktes gründet, unter bestimmte Umstände Anspruch und Verbindlichkeit
zu erzeugen. So ist es also keineswegs die Erfahrung, welche uns über die Existenzialverknüpfung dieser
Gebilde belehrte oder auch nur eine mitwirkende Rolle hätte; es handelt sich vielmehr um einen
unmittelbar einsichtigen und notwendigen Wesenszusammenhang (SW, 155).
… It lies in the essence of such an act to generate claim and obligation under certain conditions. And so
it is by no means experience in the sense of observation (Erfahrung) which instruct us, not even indirectly,
about the existential connection of these legal entities; we have rather to do here with a self-evident and
necessary relation of essence (En.tr. 15).
b) We can establish claim/obligation’s existence (as consequents) only by founding it onto the
promising’s existence (as ground):
Wir werden jetzt auf einen weiteren Unterschied aufmerksam, der wohl noch eigentümlicher erscheinen
mag. Ist die Folge in der äußeren Natur einmal da, so kann sie uns – idealiter gesprochen – jederzeit zur
selbständigen Gegebenheit kommen. Die durch den Stoss mit der Stange verursachte Bewegung der
Kugel kann ich für sich wahrnehmen, ohne daß ich noch einmal in der Wahrnehmung oder in Gedanken
auf den Stoss zurückzugehen brauchte. ... Der Akt, in welchem die Wirkung zur Gegebenheit kommt,
bedarf keiner Fundierung durch einen die Ursache erfassenden Akt. Dagegen ist es nicht möglich, einen
Anspruch oder eine Verbindlichkeit selbständig in ihrer Existenz zu erfassen. Will ich mich von der
Existenz der Bewegung überzeugen, so brauche ich nur die Augen aufzumachen. Bei Ansprüchen oder
Verbindlichkeiten aber ist es unumgänglich, immer wieder auf ihren «Grund» zurückzugehen. Erst
dadurch, daß ich die Existenz des Versprechen noch einmal feststelle, kann ich die Existenz dessen, was
aus ihm folgt, feststellen. Einen selbständigen existenzfeststellenden Akt, der inneren oder äußeren
Wahrnehmung vergleichbar, gibt es hier nicht. Das ist sicherlich eine sehr merkwürdige Tatsache, aber es
ist eben eine Tatsache (SW, 155-156).
Our attention is now called to another difference, which may seem to be a more curious one. If in the case
of external nature the consequent is there, it can at any time—we speak here of an ideal possibility—be
given by itself and through itself. The movement of a ball which comes from being hit by a stick can be
perceived by itself, without me having to go back either in perception or in thought to the blow. … the
act in which the effect is given does not need to be grounded in an act apprehending the cause. By
contrast, a claim or an obligation cannot be grasped trough itself. If I want to convince myself of the
existence of the movement, I have only to open my eyes. But with claims and obligations there is no way
to avoid always going back to their “ground”. Only by once again establishing the existence of an act of
promising can I establish the existence of that which follows from it. There is here no act which,
comparable to an act of inner or outer perception, can by itself establish this existence. That is surely a
very curious fact, but it is a fact all the same (En.tr., 15-16).
c) This relation is analogous to the relation between states-of-affairs:
c1) In order to grasp a state of affairs grounded in other state of affairs, I have to go back to the
grounding state of affairs, just as much as I have to go back to the underlying act of promising in
order to establish the existence of the claim;
5
Eine Analogie für sie können wir auf einem sonst wenig verwandten Gebiete finden. ... Ein durch
andere Sachverhalte begründeter Sachverhalt besteht auf Grund dieser Sachverhalte, entsprechend wie ein
Anspruch, der aus einem Versprechen erwächst, eben dadurch existiert. Wenn ich aber den Bestand des
Sachverhalte neu erfassen will, so steht mir kein frei und selbsterfassender Akt zur Verfügung. Es bleibt
mir nichts anderes übrig, als auf die begründeter Sachverhalt zurückgehen und ihn aus diesen nochmals
abzuleiten, genauso wie ich auf das zugrunde liegende Versprechen zurückgehen muß, um die Existenz
des Anspruchs abermals festzustellen (SW, 156).
We can find an analogy to this in an area which is otherwise unrelated. … A state of affairs grounded in
other states of affairs exists through these others, even as the claim deriving from an act of promising exist
through this act. If I want to grasp the state of affairs anew, there is no act of grasping it through itself
which is available to me. I have no alternative but to go back to the grounding states of affairs and to
derive it from them again, just as I have3 to go back to the underlying act of promising in order to
establish again the existence of the claim (En.tr. 16).
c2) For the sphere of state of affairs as well as for the promising and claim/obligation relation, if
we want to apply the principle according to which the same causes have the same effect, we
cannot apply the reverse principle, that is, that the same effect always has the same causes. It is in
fact not valid.
Ein Sachverhalt kann aus sehr verschiedenartigen Sachverhaltsgruppen folgen und gefolgert werden. Auch
in diesem Punkte weist das Gebiet, welches uns hie speziell beschäftigt, die größere Verwandtschaft mit
der Sachverhaltssphäre auf. Der gleiche Anspruch und die gleiche Verbindlichkeit können aus sehr
verschiedenen Quellen entspringen (SW, 156).
A given state of affairs can follow from, and be derived from, very different kinds of states of affairs. In
this point, too, the sphere which here especially interests us shows a greater affinity with the sphere of
states of affairs. The same claim and the same obligation can derive from very different sources (En.tr.,
16).
ii) Definition of social acts as complex and constituted acts: their components and their modifications
I maintain that the problem of the efficacy of social acts, the fact they have some effects,
concerns the problem of their constitution—the different components that make them a neue
Sachlage—: their efficacy depends on their structure and it also depends on the possible
modifications of this structure.
In agreement with Reinach (1913, § 3, «Die sozialen Akte»), I define social acts as a class of acts,
i.e., intentional experiences (Erlebnisse), belonging to the larger class of spontaneous acts and I define
spontaneous acts the acts in which the self shows itself active and to be the author (Urheber) of the
act. Now, social acts are external and communicative, spontaneous acts: they are addressed to
someone (fremdpersonal), they require uptake (vernehmen) by another person and they are performed
in the very act of speaking, i.e., in the act of being announced (Kundgabe) (cf. SW, 158-159).
Hence, social acts are very sui generis acts: they are not merely mental acts; they are also external
acts at the same time, that is, they involve other persons (cf. Benoist 2005a).
6
Reinach does not identify social acts with speech acts. For him, language is necessary as a means
of communication: «social acts, like any acts of other persons, can only be grasped through some
physical medium». They need an «external side», a «body», i.e., the language, but also «mien» and
«gestures», which expresses the «internal experience», the «internal side», the «soul» of social acts.
Hence, in some cases we can perform social acts without language: for example, «a command can
be expressed in mien or gestures» (cf. SW, 160, En.tr. 20), or we can also think about the case of
the «silent prayer … which has to be considered as a purely interior social act» (SW, 161;tr.en.
21)).
For Reinach, only «the turning to another subject (die Wendung an ein anderes Subjekt) and the need
of being grasped (Vehrnemungsbedürftigkeit) is absolutely essential for every social act (ist für jeden
sozialen Akt absolut wesentlich)» (SW, 161-162; En.tr., 20): it is the necessary and sufficient condition
for social acts.
Now, intentionality, spontaneity (in the next point I will explain the meaning of spontaneity),
turning to another subject and being grasped, body (language or mien or gestures) and soul
(internal experience), all these elements together constitute social acts. Social acts are an
absolutely new situation (neue Sachlage), irreducible to other old notions: to a purely external
action, a purely internal experience, to the fact of announcing such an experience to others (cf.
SW, 159; En.tr. 19). Rather, social acts are all these three things together.
To complete the definition of social acts, I also have to specify the role of the internal experience,
the «soul» of social acts, with respect to the constitution of social acts: the internal experience
grounds the social acts. In Reinach’s words, «every social act presupposes as its foundation some
internal experience whose intentional object coincides with the intentional object of the social act
or is at least somehow related to it». For example, «informing presupposes being convinced about
what I inform someone of». «Commanding presupposes as its foundation … the will that the one
who is commanded carry out my command (SW, 162, En.tr. 22) as well as promising presupposes
the will of promisor to perform the promised action (cf. SW, 166; En.tr, 25-26).
I would like to point out that Reinach can actually find out and define social acts thanks to his
use of Husserl’s theory of ontological dependence (cf. III Logische Untersuchung) as well as of
Husserl’s mental and intentional acts theory. As regards the latter, Reinach improves and enriches
Husserl’s intentional paradigm with respect to the acts connected with sign-uses: the Husserlian
«bedeutende Akte», acts of meaning (cf. Husserl, I, V, VI Logische Untersuchungen). By modifying the
role of language in the acts of meaning, he turns them into linguistic acts, i.e., acts essentially
bound up with sign-uses, which have a specific intentionality. By analysing the act of asserting,
Reinach defines the intentional «sense» or «matter» of these linguistic acts, i.e., the way in which
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they refer to their intentional object, not as a representational (Vorstellen) and objectifying one (as
in the case of acts of perception, on which Husserl builds his intentional paradigm), but as a
simple and «spontaneous meaning» (Meinen) in which the intentional object is not present in the
consciousness. By «spontaneous meaning» acts, we point to (abzielen auf) something objectual that
is not present, but that stands at a distance from us, we bring something about with it, we manage
it (cf. Reinach 1911, En.tr. 330-331). This is a teleological, engaging and also poietic sense of
intentionality. Reinach anticipates Searle’s distinction between different directions of fit of
intentional experiences (cf. Searle 1982). In such a way, Reinach attains the discovery of social
acts (cf. De Vecchi 2007).3
Social acts can have the efficacy they have only thanks their structure of complex and composed
acts and thanks their specific (non representing and objectifying) intentionality. To illustrate the
dependency of social acts efficacy on their structure, I will now briefly mention some modifications
of social acts.
Components and effects of social acts are susceptible of modifications. Reinach distinguishes 4
types of possible modifications (see SW, 162-165): a) pseudo-performance of the social acts; b)
conditional social acts; c) collective social acts; d) representative social acts). To these
modifications, I will add e) the case of the non-performance of social acts (cf. SW, 159).
Husserl had already discussed the notion of modification of an act: perceiving can be modified
into imaging, judging can be modified into supposing (Husserl 1900-1, 1913). In the case of
social acts, the problem is to understand whether and when these modifications are variations of
the essential definition of social act, i.e., the modified act is yet the same act (for example a
promising or informing), or whether they bring about something different, i.e., an act which is no
longer definable as a social act or as an act representing a different type of social act, hence not
the same act.4
Les us consider cases e) and a).
3
More precisely, by modifying the role of language in acts of meaning, Reinach conceives a trilateral dependence
relation between the «quality» (the «force» and kind of the act), the «matter» (the «sense» of the act), and the signs:
these acts become essentially bound up with signs uses, they become properly linguistic acts (cf. Reinach 1911,
Mulligan 1987). By modifying the «matter», from a presenting (Vorstellung) matter to a simple and «spontaneous
meaning» (Meinen), Reinach is able to define positively «communicative acts» which for Husserl belong merely to the
class of «not-objectifying acts» (together with willing acts, emotions), and opens the way to the discovery of social
acts (cf. De Vecchi 2007).
4
This problem is similar to the problem of the player which violates the rules of the game (a card-sharper): what
does it mean that he plays the game violating the rules of the game? What is he really doing by this? Is he playing
another game? Doesn’t he play anymore at all? The problem is the relation between his action of violating the game’s
rules and the game’s rules themselves. By consciously violating the game’s rules, in a certain respects, he confirms the
game’s rules just because he plays “against” them and he’s still playing, but in an other sense, he doesn’t play
anymore because the game is something that all players do together by respecting the same rules. Hence, by violating
the game’s rules, he is not playing a different game, because in this case, he would be the only player, who knows
these rules. About this and similar problems concerning the game’s rules, cf. the works of Conte*, Di Lucia*,
Lorini*.
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e)For Reinach, the Vernehmungsbedürftigkeit, the fact of being grasped, is the necessary and
sufficient condition for social acts. It may happen that an individual gives a command without
the commandee being in position to learn it. In such a case, the act misses his mark (ihre Aufgabe
verfehlt) (SW, 159). Such kinds of commands are «like spears that, having been thrown, fall to the
earth without having hit their target» (En. tr. 19).
Now, in this case, the act is not performed, hence we have no social act, and no efficacy of social
acts. What happens here is that the social act is reduced to the simple expression of the agent’s
will, and only two of its components—the internal experience and its utterance—are present.5
Nicht durch ohnmächtige Erklärungen des Willens konstituiert sich – wie man geglaubt hat – die Welt der
rechtlichen Beziehungen, sondern durch die streng gesetzliche Wirksamkeit sozialer Akte (SW, 166).
It is not —as one had thought —through impotent declarations of intention that relations of rights are
constituted but rather through the strictly apriori efficacy of the social acts (En.tr. 26).
a) Pseudo-performance (Scheinvollzug) of social acts
Neben ihrem vollen Vollzug steht ein Scheinvollzug, ein abgeblasstes, blutloses Vollziehen – der Schatten
gleichsam neben dem körperlichn Ding (SW, 162-163).
Besides their full performance (voll Vollzug) there is a pseudo-performance (Scheinvollzug), a pale, bloodless
performing —the shadow, as it were, next to the bodily thing (En. tr. 22).6
In this case, the modification regards the internal experience, which is a necessary component of
the social act in the following sense: pseudo social acts don’t presuppose the type of experiences
they normally possess. A pseudo-promise doesn’t presuppose the will to perform the promise.
In this case, what happens is more than «only the speaking of the words» (En.tr., 20). The act is
performed, but «it is a pseudo-performance; the performing subject tries to present it as genuine».7
What about the efficacy of social acts in this case? Reinach doesn’t say anything about it with
respect to pseudo-questions, pseudo-commands or other social acts. He only talks about the case
of the pseudo-promise, and he admits not to be able to decide with certainty whether claim and
obligation proceed from a pseudo-promise just as from an authentic one (cf., SW, 168; En.tr. 28).
I think that a pseudo-question can have the same effect as a genuine question—the answer—, as
well as a pseudo-command can produce the effect that the commandee performes the
5
With respect to Austin’s classification of infelicities of the performative acts, this would be the case of Misfired, Act
purported but void, Misexecution (B): the act is void or without effect (Austin 1962, 1980 impression, p. 16-18).
6
Cf. also SW, 100, the definition of lying as a case of pseudo-assertion, Schein-Behauptung.
7 In Austin classification of the infelicities of performative acts, this modification corresponds to the case of «abuses»
and concerns the sincerity or insincerity condition of the act (G.1, Austin 1962, p. 18).
9
commanded thing, but on the condition that the addressee of the act doesn’t learn that the agent
of the act is insincere.
b) Conditional, c) collective and d) representative social acts complicate and enrich the structure
of social acts and consequently the constellation of the effects of social acts. Reinach describes
them very finely and presents very interesting cases (cf. SW, 162-169). Unfortunately, I don’t
have the time to address these issues here.
iii) Social acts are free and voluntary acts: authorship and position takings of second degree
Reinach affirms that social acts’ products are legal and social formations (Gebilde) which «can
spring from free acts of persons» and «can be grounded (ihren Grund haben) in voluntary acts as
such» (SW, 153; En.tr. 13). Only persons are the bearer of social acts and the formations of
which they are the sources (cf. SW, 151; En.tr. 11). «Only that which springs from free acts can
also be abolished by free acts (Nur was aus freien Akten entspringt, vermag durch freie Akte wieder
aufgehoben zu werden)» (SW, 153; en.tr. 13).
I want to emphasise that social acts are free and voluntary acts, and that this property is
connected to their efficacy. Now, in which sense are social acts free and voluntary?
By referring to Reinach’s, I have said that social acts belong to the larger class of spontaneous
acts and that spontaneous acts are experiences which not only belong to a self, but in which the
self shows itself active (tätig) and shows itself to be the author or the originator (Urheber) of the act. I
argue that, here, Reinach distinguishes between authorship and ownership of the act. 8 This is a
distinction that he uses also to define the concept of cause and responsibility in penal law: I am
responsible of a fact I have caused, if this fact belongs to me in this specific sense that I really
wanted it and that its realisation depended on me, that is, I am its author (cf. Reinach 1904). The
author is the wilful source of the act, and not only its agent: there is here a sense of autonomy and
self-determination of the self. And the author of spontaneous acts is no longer the subject of a
causal succession of mental states: he can choose to do otherwise.9 These are here the two classical freewill conditions.
8
Authorship refers to the initiation or the source of the act, i.e. it involves a sense of being the wilful initiator of the
act: examples of acts in which the subject reveals himself as the author of the act are asserting, deciding, preferring,
forgiving. Ownership, instead, refers to the simple fact a subject has experiences, and these experiences belong to
their subject, but this subject is not their author. This is the case of passive experiences like sensations (I feel pain in
my legs), but also the case of emotions (experiences in which we are happy or sad, enthusiastic or indignant) and of
dispositional states (for example, experiences in which we have some wish or resolution) (cf. SW, 158; en.tr. 18). This
distinction is very used today in cognitive sciences and psychology, for example to analyse the problem of the
«inserted thoughts» (cf. Gallagher, 2000, Coliva 2002).
9
Instead, sensations and emotions are not spontaneous because I cannot do otherwise: I cannot avoid feeling a pain
when I knock my leg against the table or I cannot avoid feeling sad when I receive some bad news or I cannot avoid
feeling indignation towards a sentence that I consider unjust.
10
The fact that I am the author, the source, the originator of the act, means that what I do totally
depends on me. In other words, spontaneous acts are free and voluntary acts. They are
centrifugal acts—from the self to the world—just such as a blow that the self lands from its
inside (cf. Pfänder, 1911).10 Examples of spontaneous acts are deciding, asserting, promising,
forgiving, etc. Deciding, asserting are internal spontaneous acts, while promising and forgiving
are external spontaneous acts, hence social acts.
Now, I maintain that spontaneous acts are second-order position-takings: by spontaneous acts, we
take a position with respect to the data that we have endorsed or ignored, and we can turn it into
the ground of an act. This is a level of higher order than the level of acts by which we take a
position with respect to our sensations and emotions: for example, I can assume or endorse the
indignation I felt, or I can take my attention off it or even repress it, if I like. I can manage it (cf.
Stein, 1922, Annahme, Ablehnung, Zuwendung; Husserl Ideen II, § 61; De Monticelli 2007).
We said that every social act is based on an internal experience whose content is the same as
the content of the social act: for example, promising presupposes a will, informing a conviction,
asking a question, an uncertainty, etc. (cf. SW, 162; en.tr. 21-22). Now, we better understand the
sense of its foundation: social acts are position-takings of second degree with respect to these
experiences: by promising, I endorse the will to promise you something.
1. Social acts start a new series of events, which are individuals’ acts and actions
The social acts’ agent is hence the author of a social—interconnected human actions—circuit.
The efficacy of social acts concerns also the fact that spontaneous (free and voluntary) social acts
bring forth effects on other persons they are addressed to and they influence them. In this sense,
too (beside the particularly ontological status of social entities, cf. supra i)), this efficacy is not
causal and physical.11
That spontaneous acts are free-will and voluntary acts also appears to be evident if we consider the nature of the
utterance that is specific to the socials acts. To put it with Reinach: «One should not confuse the utterance
(Ausserung) of social acts with the involuntary way in which all kinds of inner experiences such as shame, anger, or
love can be externally reflected. This utterance is rather completely subject to our voluntariness and can be chosen
with the greatest deliberation and circumspection, according to the ability of the addressee to understand it» (Reinach
1913, SW: 160; Eng. tr.: 20).
11
Cf. Husserl Ideen II, p. 192: «Es gibt <neben der Kausalität> eben noch eine andere Form des Wirkens der
Personen von Personen auf Personen; sie richten sich in ihrem geistigen Tun aufeinander (das Ich auf den Anderen
und umgekehrt), sie vollziehen Akte in der Absicht, von ihrem Gegenüber verstanden zu werden und es in seinem
verstehenden Erfassen dieser Akte (als in solcher Absicht geäußerter) zu gewissen persönlichen Verhaltungsweisen
zu bestimmen. Umgekehrt kann der so Bestimmte auf diese Einwirkung willig eingehen oder sie unwillig ablehnen
und seinerseits, dadurch, dass er nicht nur danach handelt, sondern die Willigkeit oder Unwilligkeit durch Mitteilung
verständlich macht, den ihn Bestimmenden wieder zu Reaktionen bestimmen. Es bilden sich so Beziehungen des
Einverständnisses: auf die Rede folgt Antwort; auf die theoretische, wertende, praktische Zumutung, die der Eine
dem Anderen macht, folgt die gleichsam antwortende Rückwendung, die Zustimmung (das Einverstanden) oder
Ablehnung (das Nichteinverstanden), ev. ein Gegenvorschlag usw. …. Die sich im Erfahren von den Anderen, im
Wechselverständnis und im Einverständnis konstituierende Umwelt bezeichnen wir als kommunikative».
10
11
In Reinach’s social acts account there are echoes of the Kantian idea of freedom: this is the act
that, without being a natural cause or a natural effect, begins a new series or chain of events. Kant
affirms:
Wenn ich jetzt (zum Beispiel) völlig frei, und ohne den notwendig bestimmenden Einfluss der
Naturursachen, von meinem Stuhle aufstehe, so fängt in dieser Begebenheit, samt deren natürlichen
Folgen ins Unendliche, eine neue Reihe schlechthin an, obgleich der Zeit nach diese Begebenheit nur die
Fortsetzung einer vorhergehende Reihe ist. Denn diese Entschließung und Tat liegt gar nicht in der
Abfolge bloßer Naturwirkungen, und ist nicht eine bloße Fortsetzung derselben, sondern die
bestimmenden Naturursachen hören oberhalb derselben, in Ansehung dieser Eräugnis, ganz auf, die zwar
auf jene folgt, aber daraus nicht erfolgt, und daher zwar nicht der Zeit nach, aber doch ins Ansehung der
Kausalität, ein schlechthin erster Anfang einer Reihe von Erscheinungen genannt werden muß. (I. Kant, ,
Transzendentale Dialektik, Dritte Antinomie, B479; A451)
If, for example, I am entirely free, and get up from my chair without the necessarily determining
influence of natural causes, then in this occurrence, along with its natural consequences to
infinity, there begins an absolutely new series, even though as far as time is concerned this
occurrence is only the continuation of a previous series. For this decision and deed do not lie
within the succession of merely natural effects and are not a mere continuation of them; rather,
the determining causes of that series entirely cease in regard to this event, which indeed follows
upon that series, but does not follow from it; and therefore it must be called, not as far as time is
concerned but in regard to causality, and absolutely first beginning of a series of appearances. [I.
Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B479; A 451, En. Tr. Cambridge: CUP, 1998]
But in the case of social acts the series of events, produced by human free acts in a non causal
and physical fashion, are specifically other kinds of human acts and actions.
Wir treten in eine nähere Analyse einzelner sozialer Akte ein. Zunächst die Mitteilung. … Es liegt in
ihrem Wesen, sich an einen anderen zu wenden und ihren Inhalt ihm kundzutun. … mit diesem
Innewerden des Inhaltes ist das Ziel der Mitteilung erreicht. Die Reihe, welche mit dem
Herausschleudern des sozialen Aktes eröffnet wird, ist hier bereits abgeschlossen.
Bei anderen sozialen Akten ist die Sachlage etwas kompliziert. Greifen wir zunächst die Bitte und den
Befehl heraus. … Wir haben hier soziale Akte, welche, im Gegensatz zu der Mitteilung, ihrem Wesen
nach auf korrespondierende oder besser auf respondierende Betätigungen hinzielen, mögen diese
Betätigungen auch realiter nicht zustande kommen. Jeder Befehl und jede Bitte zielt ab auf ein in ihnen
vorgezeichnetes Verhalten des Adressaten. Erst die Realisierung dieses Verhaltens schließt endgültig den
Kreis, welcher durch jene sozialen Akte eröffnet ist (SW, 161).
We now turn to a closer analysis of particular social acts. And first, the act of informing. … It belongs to
its essence to address another and to announce to him its content. … With this becoming aware of its
content the goal of the informing is reached. The circuit which is opened with the sending out of the
social act is here closed.
With other social acts things are somewhat more complicated. We begin by selecting out requesting and
commanding for a closer inspection. … We have here social acts which, by contrast to informing, aim
by their nature at corresponding, or better, at responding activities, whether these activities really come to
pass or not. Every command and every request aim at an action on the part of the addressee which is
prescribed by the act. Only the performance of this action definitively closes the circuit opened by these
social acts (En.tr., 21).
12
Es das Versprechen eröffnet, ähnlich wie der Befehl und anders wie die Mitteilung, einen Kreis weiteren
Geschehens. Auch es zielt ab auf ein Verhalten, freilich nicht auf ein Tun des Empfängers, sondern des
Versprechenden selbst. Dieses Tun braucht, anders als bei der Frage, kein sozialer Akt zu sein (SW, 165166).
Promising inaugurates a train of events (einen Kreis weiteren Geschehens), like commanding and unlike
informing. It too aims at an action, though of course not at one of the recipient of the act, but at one of
the promisor himself. This action need not be a social act, as in the case of questioning (En.tr., 25)
The performance of social acts implies the opening of a new series or circuit of events in an
intersubjective sphere that didn’t exist before the performance of that act. In the case of
informing, this series ends immediately: It is sufficient that the addressee becomes aware of the
content of the informing. In other cases, for example, requesting and commanding, the circuit
opened by the fact of sending out the social act ends when the addressee has performed the
action requested or commanded (cf. SW, 161). In the case of promising, it «finds its natural end»
when the agent performs the thing promised. Otherwise, there are two other solutions which
imply the performance of other social acts: «the promisee waives; the promisor revokes» (SW,147148; En.tr. 8). These effects properly constitute the conditions of satisfaction of social acts.
2. «Deontic power»
Social acts, as well as the acts and actions they produce, have a «deontic power» (Searle 2001): for
example, when I promise to do something, I commit myself to performing the promise, and so I
engage myself with respect to my future behaviours («Every obligation refers to a future behaviour
(Verhalten) of its bearer», as Reinach writes (SW, eng. tr.: 11)). Of course, we have to distinguish
between this deontic power, the engagement and the duty of the agent to perform the promise he
made, as well as the duty of the addressee to perform the order received, from the necessity
defining the essence of the promising and claim/obligation relation (cf. Di Lucia 2003).
3. The institution of the social level as a “thirdness”, a higher order level with respect to the intersubjective (I-you)
level
Together, performing subject and addressee of social acts institute the social level as a “thirdness”
that transcends the two subjects. I mean that the agent of the social act is the author of
something objective, reducible neither to him or to the addressee, nor to the sum of the two, and
that the social level differs from the I-you level. The efficacy of social acts distinguishes them
from intersubjective acts. Social and legal entities are produced by social acts (which are
addressed to other persons and grasped by them), and not by simple intersubjective acts.
Moreover, social acts differ from intersubjective acts because the act’s object is not the addressee,
13
like in empathy or sympathy (Stein 1917, Scheler 19263), but what I—the author—am going to
do by my addressing to you (promising, questioning something).
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14
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15