Download Supplement – Rhodesians on the Western Front

ANDY OLVER
RHODESIANS ON THE
WESTERN FRONT
The Experience of the Rhodesian Platoons of the
King’s Royal Rifle Corps in Northern France and Flanders
1914 -1918
Cover photograph - Australian gunners on a duckboard track
in Château Wood near Hooge, 29 October 1917.
The photo was taken by WW1 photographer James Francis “Frank” Hurley, OBE. Hurley was an Australian
photographer and adventurer. He participated in a number of expeditions to Antarctica and served as an official
photographer with Australian forces during both world wars.
In 1917 Hurley joined the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) as an honorary captain and captured many stunning
battlefield scenes during the Third Battle of Ypres. In keeping with his adventurous spirit, he took considerable
risks to photograph his subjects, also producing many rare panoramic and colour photographs of the conflict.
Hurley kept a diary in 1917-1918 describing his time as a war photographer.
Preface
With the centenary of the commencement of the First World War falling shortly after the period
covered by the 9th edition of the ‘Sunset Call’, the MOTH Matabeleland newsletter, I felt it fitting that I
include a short four or five page account of the experiences of Rhodesians in WW1. Accordingly I
chose to focus on the experience of the “Rhodesian” platoons of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps in the
trenches of Northern France and Flanders. Well, that proved a far larger task than envisaged and this
still incomplete account now measures some forty pages. As such it is now included as a separate
supplement to the ‘Sunset Call’.
It is my intention to continue to research and provide a comprehensive account of the Rhodesian
Platoons on The Western Front. The account, as it currently stands, essentially covers the period from
the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914 to 20 March 1918, the date which marks the end of static
entrenched warfare on the Western Front and a return to open warfare.
I need to apologise here for the incomplete source referencing and absence of a bibliography. This will
be corrected in the larger “work in-progress”.
Andy Olver
Bulawayo, 14 August 2014.
Introduction
The First World War was sparked in the Balkans when, on 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip1 shot and
killed the Austro-Hungarian heir, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who had been invited to Bosnia and
Herzegovina's capital, Sarajevo, to inspect army manoeuvers. Princip’s bullet struck the Archduke in
the neck and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, in the abdomen. Both died. It was “the shot that
was heard around the world”. Spurred by imperialism, militarism, chains of alliances, nationalism, and
finally the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, what had started out as a localised Balkans conflict, was
quickly catapulted, with Britain’s declaration of war against Germany on 4 August 1914, into a global
conflict - and the world was never the same.
Europe quickly became engaged in a gruesome struggle disfigured by mechanised warfare previously
unimaginable: submarines, battleships, aircraft, tanks, machine guns, flame-throwers and legions of
poison gas—the largest-scale use of chemical weapons in history. After the initial battles of 1914, both
sides held an entrenched line that stretched some 700 kilometres from Nieuport on the Belgian coast
to Pfetterhouse on the Swiss border. The trench line was the result of the stagnation of battle where
both sides "dug in" and settled down to a war of attrition, with little movement for over three years.
The name given to this fighting zone in France and Flanders, where the British, French, Belgian and
(towards the end of the war) American armies faced that of Germany, is “The Western Front”.
The intense and mechanical destruction of Northern France and Flanders created a new and terrifying
landscape that had, until then, only ever been imagined or seen in medieval visions of hell: one of mud,
bloated corpses, barbed wire and shell-holes through which wound a series of rotten, death-strewn
trenches - an inconceivable maze of thousands of miles of freezing, disease-ridden and rat-infested
tunnels where men subsisted below the earth. They rose from this hell only to be fed into a far worse
one—no man’s land - the human meat-grinder. The human cost of casualties and dead in such a
grinding type of siege warfare would be recorded in the tens of thousands in a single day.
The First World War was a disastrously wasteful affair; one that Pope Benedict XV publicly declared
an unjust war, a mad form of collective European suicide. The pontiff rightly judged that there were no
salient moral issues dividing the combatants. These countries should not have been at war, let alone
slaughtering their boys by the millions.
During this “war to end all wars ”, Southern Rhodesians served in over eighty British imperial
regiments, but the largest concentration was in the regular 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the King’s Royal
Rifle Corps (KRRC) where wholly “Rhodesian” platoons, numbering 60 to 90 men at full strength, were
formed.
It was in the trenches of the Western Front that Southern Rhodesia’s main contribution to World War
One was made and it is on that front and the major battles in which the “Rhodesian” Platoons of the
KRRC fought between November 1914 to March 1918 (the 2nd and 3rd phases of the war2), that this
account focuses.
Gavrilo Princip was a Bosnian-Serb student and member of the secret Black Hand Society (a nationalist movement favouring a union
between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia). Princip was one of three men sent by the Serbian Army’s Intelligence Department to assassinate
Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand during the latter’s visit to Sarajevo to inspect army manoeuvres in late June 1914.
1
The war on the Western Front was fought in 4 phases: Phase 1 (Aug to Nov 1914) - a war of encounter and movement, leading to both sides
digging-in and trench warfare beginning; Phase 2 (Nov 1914 to Jul 1917) - entrenched warfare in which the British worked to the French
strategy; Phase 3 (Jul 1917 to Mar 1918) - trench warfare in which British and Commonwealth forces begin to play a leading role; and,
2
Phase 4 (Mar to Nov 1918) - return to open warfare as German offensives are held and Allied offensives succeed.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RHODESIAN PLATOONS OF THE
KING’S ROYAL RIFLE CORPS IN NORTHERN FRANCE AND FLANDERS
1914 -1918
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________
1.
OUTBREAK OF WAR
Britain declared war on Germany at 23h00 GMT on Tuesday 4 August 1914. Word of the declaration
reached Salisbury during the night. Early on Wednesday 5 August, the British South Africa Company
(BSAC) administrator of Southern Rhodesia, Sir William Henry Milton, wired Whitehall: "All Rhodesia
united in devoted loyalty to King and Empire and ready to do its duty”. Similar messages of support had
been received from each of Britain’s overseas territories. In response King George V sent the following
message to his Colonies:
I desire to express to my people of the Overseas Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have
received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days. These spontaneous
assurances of their fullest support recall to me the generous, self-sacrificing help given by them in the
past to the mother country. I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibility which
rests upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm and
resolute, trusting in God. -George R.I. (The Daily Mirror, 5 August 1914)
At around 8.00 am on 5 August Milton officially announced to his countrymen that Southern Rhodesia
was at war. The ''Bulawayo Chronicle'' and “Rhodesia Herald” newspapers published special editions
the same day to spread the news; it took about four days for word to reach the whole country.
The news of Britain’s declaration of war was greeted throughout its
overseas possessions by British settlers with patriotic fervour. In Salisbury
a packed meeting at the Drill Hall turned into stirring and emotional
outpourings of support for the Mother country. In Bulawayo mass meetings,
awash with pro-Empire sentiments, were held at the Drill Hall and
Bulawayo Club. Gatooma prepared to form a special unit for military
service, while in Umtali residents demonstrated their concern for Belgium
which the German Army had just invaded. The enthusiasm to answer the
call was infectious and all the talk was of war. By 13 August over 1,000
young Rhodesian men had volunteered for service. However it would be
some four and a half months before the first Rhodesians would see action
on the Western Front.
Rhodesians leave for war.
As a commercial venture, the BSAC needed to carefully consider the financial implications of the war
for its chartered territory should it commit directly to the war effort. In the face of the BSAC’s resulting
inaction, the Rhodesian public’s frustration came close reaching boiling point. A number of letters
were received by the Press strongly urging the BSAC to commit to the war effort and ‘German baiting’
became endemic. In September a number of German settlers were taken prisoner and sent to an
internment camp in Johannesburg. Impatient and frustrated at the BSAC’s apparent inertia, many
individuals paid their own way to England to join British Army units. Most of the colony's contribution
to the war was made by Southern Rhodesians’ individually. By the end of October 1914 about 300
Rhodesian volunteers were on their way as part of the massive satanic spasm that was to spew forth a
conflagration the likes of which the world had never before experienced.
Throughout the duration of the war, which was expected to be over by Christmas, drafts of young
Rhodesians would arrive on the Western Front. Though it was one of the few combatant territories
not to raise fighting men through conscription, by the war’s end in November 1918, proportional to
white population, Rhodesia contributed more manpower to the British war effort than any other
British dominion, including Britain. White troops numbered 5,716, about forty per cent of white men
in the colony. The Rhodesia Native Regiment enlisted 2,507 black soldiers, about thirty of whom
scouted for the Rhodesia Regiment and around 350 served in British and South African units. Of a total
of 7,436 Southern Rhodesians of all races, over 800 lost their lives on operational service during the
war, with many more wounded.
___________________________________________________
2.
FORMATION OF RHODESIAN PLATOONS WITHIN
THE KING’S ROYAL RIFLE CORPS (KRRC)
At the commencement of the war the renowned KRRC Regiment comprised four regular battalions –
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions. On 12 August 1914 the 1st and 2nd Battalions, having enjoyed a
five-year period of home service, left the comforts of home for France as members of the 1st and 2nd
Infantry Divisions respectively, and by 23 August both battalions had taken up positions near Mons in
Northern France.
In November 1914 the 3rd and 4th Battalions, drained by four and a half debilitating years in India,
were recalled to their base at Winchester. On 21 December, after a brief period of training and refitting, both battalions were sent to France where, on 5 January 1915, they took over trenches from
the French at Dickebusch near St. Eloi, north of Ypres.
Men of the original Rhodesian Platoon of the KRRC
Taken in November 1914 at the KRRC training depot at Sheerness before
the Rhodesian platoon went to the Western Front. Centre of the second
row from the front sit the Marquess of Winchester and Captain John
Brady. Only 12 members of this original platoon survived the war.
In October 1914, on board the ship that took the
first draft of Rhodesians from Cape Town to
Southampton was Henry Paulet, 16th Marquess of
Winchester, who had links with Southern Rhodesia
dating back to the 1890s. Coming across Captain
John Banks Brady who led the Rhodesian
volunteers, the Marquess asked where Brady’s
party was headed. Brady said they were on their
way to war in France. The Marquess suggested to
Brady that since it might be difficult to prevent his
men from being separated during the enlistment
process, it might be wise for the Rhodesians to join
the King’s Royal Rifle Corps3 (KRRC) where he
could keep a close watch on them through his
connections with the Winchester-based regiment.
On arrival in England the Rhodesians underwent
several weeks training at the KRRC training depot
at Sheerness on the Isle of Sheppey in Kent. The
training was intensive and went on from 06h00 to 21h00, seven days a week. While At Sheerness the
Rhodesians broke the Regimental rifle range record of seven years’ standing. Most, if not all of the
Rhodesians knew their way around a rifle, having spent much time in the Rhodesian bush hunting big
game; whereas many of their English counterparts had never held a rifle. Each batch of Rhodesians
that passed through Sheerness lived up to the reputation established by that first draft of being “crack”
shots.
In December the Rhodesians were sent to France, joining the 3rd Battalion KRRC (3/KRRC), mustering
as No. 16 “Rhodesian” Platoon, ‘D’ Company, with Captain Brady as its commander. In the wake of the
formation of an explicit KRRC “Rhodesian” platoon, Rhodesian volunteers began to concentrate in the
KRRC and in particular, within the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, both of which raised Rhodesian platoons.
The Regiment was soon thought of as Rhodesia’s ‘own’ regiment.
As the war progressed the KRRC raised a further 22 battalions. Rhodesians served in a number of
these, but not in sufficient numbers to form “Rhodesian” platoons.
3
The King’s Royal Rifle Corps was not a Corps, but a Regiment.
3.
IN NORTHERN FRANCE AND FLANDERS
During October and November 1914, the 1st and 2nd KRRC Battalions, both in France since August,
had suffered terrible casualties at the First Battle of Ypres (21 Oct – 13 Nov). During the battle three
companies of 2/KRRC had become isolated and despite putting up a desperate fight, were never seen
again. Accordingly the Battalion needed to quickly make up its numbers and on 26 December a draft of
newly arrived Rhodesians joined 2/KRRC on the Western Front. The Rhodesian draft was quickly
formed into a “Rhodesian” platoon that soon earned for itself a great reputation for valour and good
shooting. On 5 January, the 1st and 2nd Battalions joined the 3rd and 4th Battalions in the reserve
trenches north of Ypres.
When the Rhodesians arrived on the Western Front the first thing they saw were lines of wounded
soldiers being taken to the rear. As they got closer they could feel the earth shake and hear the
constant ‘crump crump’ of artillery shells. The sound was loud enough to make their ears ring and
became their bone-shattering companion for the next three years. Next they saw a series of muddy
trenches littered with the waste of war. Boxes, cart wheels, wire and often the bodies of the dead and
dying were strewn everywhere. These were the reserve trenches, far enough from the battle for
soldiers to try to grab a little rest from all the death and madness in the front line.
THE STRATEGIC OUTLOOK IN EARLY 1915
With the beginning of trench warfare in late 1914 both sides began assessing options for bringing the
war to a successful conclusion. Overseeing German operations, Chief of the General Staff Erich von
Falkenhayn preferred to focus on winning the war on the Western Front as he believed that a separate
peace could be obtained with Russia if it was allowed to exit the conflict with some pride. This
approach clashed with Generals’ Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff who wished to deliver a
decisive blow in the East. As heroes of Tannenberg4 they were able to use their fame and political clout
to influence the German leadership, and as a result, the decision was made in 1915 to focus on the
Eastern Front.
In the Allied camp there was no such discord. The British and French were keen to expel the Germans
from the territory they had occupied since August 1914. For the French it was a matter of national
pride and economic necessity as the occupied territory held much of France's industry and natural
resources. Instead, the challenge faced by the Allies was where to attack. This choice was largely
dictated by the Western Front terrain. In the south, the woods, rivers, and mountains precluded a
major offensive, while the sodden soil of coastal Flanders5 fast turned into a quagmire during shelling.
In the center, the highlands along the Aisne and Meuse Rivers too, greatly favoured the defender. As a
result the Allies focused their efforts on the chalk lands along the Somme River in Artois and to the
south in Champagne. These points were located on the edges of the deepest German penetration into
France and successful attacks had the potential to cut off the enemy forces. In addition, breakthroughs
at these points would sever German rail links east which would compel the Germans to abandon their
position in France.
THE FIRST CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE (20 DECEMBER 1914 – 17 MARCH 1915)
An assessment by the French High Command in November 1914 noted that the German offensive on
the Western Front had ended and four to six German corps were being moved to the Eastern Front.
Consequently, a French offensive would assist the Russian army on the Eastern Front by forcing the
Germans to keep more forces in the west. As a result the First Champagne Offensive, a joint FrenchBritish initiative centered upon the Reims region, was planned.
4
The Battle of Tannenberg was perhaps the most spectacular and complete German victory of the First World War. The encirclement and
destruction of the Russian Second Army in late August 1914 virtually ended Russia's invasion of East Prussia before it had really started.
5
Flanders refers to the entire Dutch-speaking and northern part of Belgium.
Map of the 1914-1918 Western Front Battlefields
The offensive, rather than a mass offensive, was essentially a series of on-going attacks against points
of tactical worth. However, the Allies were up against a well-entrenched enemy and their gain in
ground was minimal and costly. For the four regular KRRC battalions a trying period of alternate spells
of trench warfare and rest with training and fatigues followed. Fighting continued without a break
until mid-February, during which the Rhodesians sustained a number of casualties and attempted to
come to terms with the suffering and horror of trench warfare.
For the Rhodesians, coming from the open sun-splashed southern African veld, the confinement, mud
and winter’s cold alone, were a nightmare. The Rhodesians had only two blankets each and had to
sleep as close as possible to one another just to survive. The winters’ could get so cold that water was
carried to the soldiers as blocks of ice. Men would wake after a few hours sleep only to find their
eyelids frozen shut. Their feet would swell to three times their normal size because they had been
standing for a week in ice-cold water up to their knees. Ice would form around the rim of a boiling mug
of tea after it had been carried just twenty paces. Within forty-eight hours of the Rhodesians reaching
the trenches, Brady, then commanding the “Rhodesian” Platoon 3/KRRC, reported that some of his
men had contracted frostbite.
In the trenches death was a constant companion and at once the Rhodesian platoons began suffering
regular heavy casualties. In busy sectors the constant enemy shellfire brought sudden and random
death. The uninitiated were quickly cautioned against their inclination to peer over the parapet into
‘No Man's Land’. Many soldiers died on their first day in the trenches from of a precisely aimed
sniper's bullet.
Under these conditions the numbers of the Rhodesian platoons in 2nd and 3rd KRRC Battalions began
to decline, their ranks being filled by newly arrived Rhodesian volunteers. Rhodesian volunteers
continued to arrive piecemeal in England throughout the war, so Rhodesian formations on the
Western Front received regular reinforcements in small batches. However, because casualties were
usually concentrated in far larger groups, it would often take a few months for a depleted Rhodesian
unit to return - Phoenix-like - to full strength. A cycle developed whereby Rhodesian platoons in
Belgium and France were abruptly decimated and then gradually re-built, only to suffer the same fate
on returning to the front line.
Once in the trenches the Rhodesian’s shooting skills were clearly evident. Lieutenant General Sir
Edward Hutton records that:
When the opposing forces first settled down to trench warfare the Germans very soon attained an
ascendancy in sniping. The 2nd Battalion (KRRC), during the winter of 1914-15, received a draft of
Rhodesians. A section of snipers was made up from them under Lieutenant L. C. Rattray. In the words of
the 2nd Battalion 'Records': “Thanks to their enterprise and accurate shooting, we soon got the upper
hand of the German snipers, and this ascendancy was maintained throughout the campaign and in
every section of the line before the Battalion had been three days in the trenches. (A Brief History of the
King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 1755-1918, 2nd Edition, p. 57).
Following a pause by the French in mid-February to re-organise, the offensive was resumed without
any significant gains until 17 March when it was called off by the French, owing to the strength of
German counter-attacks, combined with a costly lack of success. The First Champagne Offensive was a
failure with casualties in the region of 90,000. It was also a harsh lesson for the Rhodesian soldier on
how to stay alive in the trenches.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES (19 APRIL TO 13 MAY 1915)
The Second Battle of Ypres was the only major attack launched by the German forces on the Western
Front in 1915. The attack was used as a means of diverting Allied attention from the Eastern Front and
to remove the Ypres salient by introducing a new weapon, chlorine gas.
In the first week of April two British Divisions (which included the 3rd and 4th KRRC battalions) and a
Canadian and the French (Algerian) Division, were moved to a bulge in the Allied line in front of the
city of Ypres. This was the infamous Ypres salient where the British and Allied line pushed into the
German line in a concave bend. The Germans held the higher ground and were able to fire into the
Allied trenches from the north, south and east.
On April 22, following an intensive artillery bombardment, 5,700 canisters of chlorine gas was
released into a light northeast wind. Captain Hugh Pollard, in his “The Memoirs of a VC (1932)”,
describes what followed:
Dusk was falling when from the German trenches in front of the
French line rose that strange green cloud of death. The light
north-easterly breeze wafted it toward them, and in a moment
death had them by the throat. One cannot blame them that they
broke and fled. In the gathering dark of that awful night they
fought with the terror, running blindly in the gas-cloud, and
dropping with breasts heaving in agony and the slow poison of
suffocation mantling their dark faces. Hundreds of them fell and
died; others lay helpless, froth upon their agonized lips and their
racked bodies powerfully sick, with tearing nausea at short
intervals. They too would die later – a slow and lingering death of
agony unspeakable. The whole air was tainted with the acrid
smell of chlorine that caught at the back of men's throats and
filled their mouths with its metallic taste.
The gas affected some 10,000 troops, half of whom died within ten minutes of the gas reaching the
front line. It also left a gaping four-mile hole in the Allied line.
German troops pressed forward, threatening to sweep behind the Canadian trenches and put fifty
thousand Canadian and British troops in deadly jeopardy. Here, through terrible fighting, withered
with shrapnel and machine-gun fire, violently sick and gasping for air through urine soaked and
muddy handkerchiefs, the Rhodesian platoon fought, sustaining terrible losses. All through the night
the British and Canadian troops fought to close the gap. Little ground was gained and casualties were
extremely heavy, but the attacks bought some precious time to close the flank.
On 24 April the Germans, aiming to obliterate the salient once and for all, launched a violent
bombardment followed by another gas attack. This time the target was the Canadian line, which
bravely held on until reinforcements arrived.
Following a failed Allied counter-attack, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force
(B.E.F.), Field Marshal John French, executed a planned withdrawal on 1-3 May. On 5 May a further
withdrawal was made nearer to Ypres with the Canadians and 4/KRRC in the front-line and 3/KRRC in
close support. On the 9th, 3/KRRC relieved the Canadians who had been badly mauled, while 4/KRRC
fought hard to repulse a German infantry attack.
On 10 May, after a large German bombardment and strong covering rifle and machine-gun fire, a
German infantry advance was halted, enabling the 3rd and 4th KRRC Battalions to lend close support
to the Canadians against a concentrated enemy attack to the south. The two KRRC Battalions fought
side-by-side with great effect and individual acts of gallantry were many. By 18h00 the bombardment
ceased and further advances by the enemy were checked. By midnight the bare remnants of 4/KRRC
were withdrawn and on the following day moved to a temporary bivouac where the men lay down to
sleep for a full night's rest after twenty-six battle-intensive days in the trenches.
Two nights later, on the night of 12 May, 3/KRRC was the recipient of yet another intense
bombardment which called for reinforcement by the North Somerset Yeomanry. Together they
defeated the German infantry attempt to advance. Finally, on the 14th, after acquitting themselves
with splendid gallantry and a continuous spell of twenty-five days of active work in the trenches,
3/KRRC and the men of the now much depleted Rhodesian platoon, were at last able to get much
needed rest in a bivouac four miles west of Ypres.
The resolute valour of the two KRRC battalions was rewarded by a message from H.Q. Army Corps:
"The G.O.C. is lost in admiration at the way in which the 3rd and 4th Battalions have stuck out the
pounding which they have received." On 14 May 4/KRRC, sadly reduced, merged with the remnant of
the Canadian Light Infantry and marched again into the trenches until 17 May, when the Battalion
moved to billets in the rear.
The Rhodesian Platoon 3/KRRC incurred heavy losses during the battle and the fatalities for the two
KRRC battalions were numerous, losing 1,035 men. 3/KRRC lost 542 men - seventeen officers and 525
other ranks killed, wounded and missing while 4/KRRC, in the three days from 8 to 10 May, lost 493
men - fifteen officers and 478 other ranks killed, wounded and missing.
Total losses during the battle are estimated at 69,000 Allied troops (59,000 British, 10,000 French),
against 35,000 German, the difference in numbers being explained by the use of chlorine gas. The
Germans' innovative use of gas set the trend for the rest of the war.
During the Second Battle of Ypres, Private John Condon, sheltering in a trench to escape from the
artillery and grenade onslaught of the advancing enemy, was killed by chlorine gas. Private Condon
was just fourteen years old. The boy soldier had claimed that he was eighteen when he enlisted two
years earlier. John Condon was World War One’s youngest British fighter and just one of thousands of
lads who lied about his age to fight for his country. (Daily Mirror, 29 July 2014)6. It was also during
the Second Battle of Ypres that Canadian Army surgeon John McCrae was driven to write the famous
WW1 poem, “In Flanders Fields”.
THE BATTLE OF AUBERS RIDGE (9 MAY 1915)
It was not long before the Rhodesian platoon of 2/KRRC was in the thick of it. A Franco-British
offensive, intended to exploit the German diversion of troops to the Eastern Front by pushing the
Germans off the dominating high ground of the Loretto and Vimy Ridges north of Arras, and disrupting
6
The legal age limit for armed service overseas was nineteen.
vital German rail supply routes, was planned. The British attacks on the German line took place on the
flat Flanders plain at Aubers Ridge and Festubert.
The British First Army, employing a pincer movement, was to attack two areas of the German front
line either side of the Neuve Chapelle battlefield. The Southern pincer, comprising the 2nd Infantry
Brigade, was to attack on a one and a half mile front from the Rue du Bois. The 2nd Infantry Brigade
comprised: Fire and support trenches - 1st Northamptons and 2nd Royal Sussex Battalions; 2nd line 2nd KRRC and 5th Royal Sussex Battalions, and 3rd line - 9th Liverpools and 1st Loyal North
Lancashire Battalions. The Northern pincer, comprising battalions of IV Corps, was to attack on a one
mile front opposite Fromelles. The attacks were intended to make two breaches in the German
defences after which the infantry were to advance to and hold Aubers Ridge about two miles beyond.
In the weeks leading up to the attack the Germans had energetically improved the defences in this
area and the troops opposite 2/KRRC shouted across that they were expecting an attack. Air
observation had also revealed that the German front line defences at Aubers had been strengthened.
During the night of 8 May 2/KRRC moved into battle positions while the Royal Engineers bridged a
large ditch between the support and fire trenches, and also the ditches in front of the Brigade’s fire
trench.
The morning of 9 May was bright and good for observation and at 05h00 the British guns bombarded
the enemy’s breastworks, wire and support trenches until 05h30 when the shelling became intense.
Clouds of dust were raised so that it was not possible to see much beyond the breastworks.
During the intense bombardmentthe firing
line and supports of the 2nd Royal Sussex
and 1st Northamptons, climbed over the
parapet, two men of each platoon carrying
a light bridge, and ran forward to gain a
line about eighty yards from the enemy’s
parapet. The machine-gun fire was heavy,
cutting the men down, even on their own
ladders and parapet steps, but they
pressed forward as ordered. When the
bombardment ceased at 05h40 the men of
2/KRRC and 5/Royal Sussex were arriving
in the vacated fire trenches. Shortly after
their arrival, two 2/KRRC Companies –
one of which included the Rhodesian
Platoon - and nearly all 5/Royal Sussex,
crossed the breastwork and went forward in support. As soon as the British guns ceased, the enemy’s
fire increased and the two leading battalions lost very heavily, chiefly from the German machine-guns
which swept across the few yards of open ground between the British trenches and those of the
enemy. The men of 2/KRRC and 5/Royal Sussex continued to advance bravely but only very few
succeeded in getting as far as the enemy’s wire with many wounded or pinned down in No Man’s Land
by withering rifle and machine-gun fire.
At 06h05, 2/KRRC sent a message that the enemy’s wire had not been cut by the bombardment, and
later a similar report was received from 1/Loyal North Lancs. At 06h20 the assaulting troops could
advance no further.
At 08h20, without any change in the situation, the 1st Guards Brigade was ordered to relieve the 2nd
Infantry Brigade which was to withdraw and re-form behind the breastworks. This was done as far as
possible, but as any movement by those who were lying out between the British and the enemy’s
parapets at once attracted enemy fire, only a few men managed to make it back to their trenches
before dark, with hundreds more – Rhodesians among them - still pinned down in No Man's Land,
unable to advance or fall back.
Lt. Colonel Langham, Commander of the 5/Royal Sussex, which had to ‘mop up’ after the assault
wrote:
We had, therefore, to mop up on the front of the two assaulting Battalions and it means sending up a
third Company to follow the KRRCs and 'mop up' behind the Northants. After a bombardment of 40
minutes the advance began. Three Companies of the 2nd Battalion [KRRC] and all the Northants went
out over and got to from 40 to 80 yards from the German lines. "C" Company, less one platoon, “A"
Company, less one platoon and the whole of "B" Company, went out in the second line, and two
Companies of the KRRCs. Then the most murderous rifle, machine gun and shrapnel fire opened and no
one could get on or get back. People say the fire at Mons and Ypres was nothing to it. No ends of brave
things were done, and our men were splendid but helpless. They simply had to wait to be killed. After
some considerable time, we got orders to retire, but this was easier said than done. Some men were 300
yards out from our parapet, many dead and some even on fire; and in two cases, men of ours who were
burning alive, committed suicide, one by blowing out his brains and another cut his own jugular vein
with the point of his bayonet.
David Tuffley provides the following first-hand account by his maternal grandfather, Private Albert
Money, who fought in a 2/KRRC Company beside the men of the Rhodesian platoon:
We got up alright on the night of the 8th, it was very cold, they gave us a good dose of rum in the
morning around 5:00 a.m. I gave my mate mine, he was shaking but not with fear, he was a brave fellow
but that was his second time out, he went through all the battle of Mons and the Aisne and Marne and
at Ypres.
We had a fine Captain, Hesseltine, that was his second time, but he said to us, "We are going into this
charge so we will do the best we can”. None of that silly talk, we must do this and do that, he spoke like a
man, they all said they would follow him to the last man and I believe them too.
The poor old Northamptons were in the firing line and we [2/KRRC] were reinforcements. The
bombardment started at 0500, steady for half an hour and 10 minutes as hard as they could go, about
five to seven hundred guns going off, all sorts.
Just at half past five the Northamptons had to leave their trenches and get up to the Germans under the
ten minutes, heavy bombardment, as soon as they left we had to rush across the open and take them
over [occupy the front line] while the Northamptons charged. The Germans were pouring shrapnel
between the reserve trenches and the firing line. We could see the Northamptons going over the open in
good order, through the smoke. It was simply raining lead, what with shells and machine guns, they had
to get over a bit of a river, three or four yards wide and ten feet deep, nearly full of barbed wire.
Our engineers put small bridges over the night before, just room for one man to run over...a good target
and playing on them with machine guns, not much chance to get over. Some got across and some tried
to jump across the water. If you got in it, then ten to one you would never get out, no chance at all if you
were wounded. That is where a lot of the missing of the Northamptons are, poor fellows.
We started over to reinforce them when they got half way, no time to see who was dropping. I saw two
of my section get hit, I got about 250 yards when I got hit...I stopped one through the hip but had sense
enough not to stop, the ditch was only eight yards in front. I got there and stayed, had a look to see how
the wound was, cut all my equipment off and had a rest. The ditch was full of wounded and dead.
My leg was dead, could not move it, fellow nearly blind with blood got my waterproof off to cover me up
with and then the order came along to tell the Northamptons and the King's Royal Rifles to get back the
best way they could. Couldn't take the position and no more reinforcements.
They were coming back one at a time, those wounded in the ditch where I was all started back,
crowding over me so I was left with the dead. The ditch was very narrow and only two feet deep and I
was lying the wrong way around to get out. Tried to turn around but no hope, put the waterproof sheet
over me and had another rest.
I knew it was no use staying there if they made a counter charge so had another try and got around and
pulled myself along the ditch hand over hand and into the one with water; had a rest every ten or fifteen
yards. Got out once but could not get the leg out hanging over the side, but the Germans saw me and the
bullets started spitting all around, so just rolled in again.
I got up to our wire entanglement and there was a great shell hole so could get no nearer. One of the
Black Watch had been watching me coming along, he called over to me and asked if I could get any
nearer. I said "No", and he said "Right, I will come and get you over the top". He came, got in the shell
hole and pulled me over his back and up to the parapet and dumped me on the top and some others
pulled me over, no time for gentle handling. Then he went over again and brought in another, he went
over himself then went under fire again in the open and went to some of the dead and got four
[waterproof] sheets, overcoats and water-bottles and fixed the two of us up. I will never forget his
bravery and kindness. The last I saw of him he said "I am going in this next charge." I wished him luck,
but before he went I know for a fact he went back and brought four more fellows who were wounded. I
am sorry I did not ask his name. (‘A Soldier’s Tale: Wounded at Battle of Aubers Ridge, May 1915’,
Griffith University, Australia. Web site: http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/~davidt/ z_ww1_slang/).
A second bombardment and attack was planned for 11h30 but was cancelled owing to the extremely
heavy casualties of the 2nd Brigade. Instead, the 1st Brigade would carry out the attack. At 17h00 the
1st Brigade moved up into the front trenches while 1/Loyal North Lancs were to hold the fire trench
during the attack of the 1st Brigade. The bombardment commenced at 17h20 following which the 1st
Brigade attacked from the left half of the line, the Black Watch and Cameron Highlanders being the
assaulting battalions. As the assaulting troops advanced, many officers and men of the 2nd Brigade
who had been lying out in the open since early morning, joined in the assault. At 18h15 1/Loyal North
Lancs was ordered to support the Black Watch, but a few minutes later, when it became apparent that
the 1st Brigade attack had no chance of getting through, this was cancelled.
The Northern pincer assault achieved its first objective and the Rifle Brigade bombers extended the
trench system they occupied to 250 yards broad. However, by 06h10 the front and communication
trenches were very crowded and chaotic; German shelling added to the confusion and the fire across
No Man's Land was so intense that forward movement was all but impossible.
At 02h30 on 10 May, British units that had made it to the German lines were withdrawn and all
further orders for renewing the attack were cancelled.
Mile for mile, Division for Division, Aubers Ridge had one of the highest rates of loss during the entire
war. British losses on 9 May were 11,497 of which 451 were officers, the vast majority of which were
sustained within yards of their own front-line trench. The Rhodesia Platoon sustained heavy losses
with the Battalion losing 251 men, including eleven officers. Total Southern pincer casualties were
6,696 of which 256 were officers. Northern pincer casualties were 4,801, of which 195 were officers.
Aubers Ridge was an unmitigated disaster for the British army. No ground was won and no tactical
advantage gained. It is very doubtful if it had the slightest positive effect on assisting the main French
attack to the south which did not quite achieve the capture of the crest of Vimy Ridge despite the
expenditure of 2,155,862 shells!
By the end of the offensive there were approximately 216,000 casualties - 100,000 French, 26,000
British and 90,000 German.
After the First Champagne Offensive the Western Front under British control in the Artois and
Flanders sectors enjoyed a relatively quiet summer with no major attacks being attempted, although
both sides continued to lose hundreds of men to sporadic shelling, sniper fire and enemy raids. For the
men of the 2/KRRC Rhodesian platoon, four months of severe trench work followed during which the
platoon sustained its usual weekly toll of casualties. Even in 'quiet times' a battalion could lose fifty
men each month. In addition to these ongoing losses the Rhodesian platoons lost a large number of
men to officer training. By mid-1915 so many Rhodesians were withdrawn for officer training that
Captain Brady was forced to appeal for more volunteers through the Salisbury and Bulawayo presses.
During their several months on the front line the Rhodesian’s natural leadership and fighting qualities
had come to the fore. They and other colonial troops were generally regarded as being physically
superior to their British comrades and displaying more intelligence, imagination and initiative. For
their sins the Rhodesians were often given specialised and dangerous work such as the “post of
honour”- the trench, crater or position closest the enemy. Rhodesians excelled as snipers, ‘bombers’
(specialised grenade throwers) or Lewis gunners. At one stage in ‘D’ Company 2/KRRC, all the
‘bombers’ were Rhodesians, as were the best snipers, Lewis gunners and other specialists. Wherever
Rhodesians fought on the Western Front, they were conspicuous. A member of the proud Indian Sikhs
said of the ‘Africans’; “English Tommy good, Australian very good, but Africans go like hell plenty much”.
The Rhodesian’s became particularly proficient at carrying out of raids across No Man’s Land, a task
feared and dreaded by most soldiers. Trench raids were small scale attacks on an enemy position.
Surprise was everything, for an expected raiding party could literally be cut to pieces by rifle and
machine-gun fire. On occasion raids would develop into dramatic and bloody miniature battles as
vigilant enemy machine-gunners detected the approach of the raiding party.
Raids were made by both sides and always took place at night for reasons of stealth. Small teams of
men would blacken their faces with burnt cork before crossing the barbed wire and other debris of No
Man's Land to infiltrate enemy trench systems.
Trench raiding was very similar to the brutality of medieval warfare insofar as it was fought face-toface with crude weaponry. Trench raiders were lightly equipped for stealthy, unimpeded movement.
Typically raiding parties were armed with deadly homemade trench raiding clubs, bayonets,
entrenching tools, trench knives, hatchets, pickaxe handles and brass knuckles. The choice of
weaponry was deliberate: the raiders' intention was to kill or capture people quietly. Trench raiders
were also armed with modern weapons such as pistols and hand grenades, though these were only
used in an emergency.
Standard practice was to creep slowly up on the sentries guarding a small sector of an enemy front
line trench and then kill them as quietly as possible. Having secured the trench the raiders would
complete their mission objectives as quickly as possible, ideally within several minutes. Often
grenades would be thrown into dugouts where enemy troops were sleeping before the raiders left the
enemy lines to return to their own.
Trench raiding had multiple purposes. Typically, the intention would be to capture, wound or kill
enemy troops; destroy, disable or capture high value equipment such as the MG08 machine gun;
gather intelligence by seizing important documents or enemy officers for interrogation;
reconnaissance for a future massed attack during daylight hours; or to keep the enemy feeling under
threat during the hours of darkness, thereby reducing their efficiency and morale.
Of the trench raid, Edmund Blunden (in Leo van Bergen, Before My Helpless Sight - Suffering, Dying and
Military Medicine on the Western Front 1914 – 1918) says it is the ideal way for soldiers to commit
suicide without ever being found out, since anyone who volunteered to take part had a good chance of
not coming back. Blunden states this repeatedly in his book. He writes that the word “raid” may be
defined as the one in the whole vocabulary of the war which instantly caused a sinking feeling in the
stomach of ordinary mortals. Blunden states, “I do not know what opinion prevailed among other
battalions, but I can say that our greatest distress at this period was due to that short and dry word –
‘raid’ ”. The Rhodesians had become adept at this form of warfare.
THE SECOND CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE (25 September - 6 November 1915)
In the autumn of 1915 the French and British Armies carried out a second large-scale, two-pronged
offensive against the German positions which, by this time, were well-consolidated and proving
increasingly difficult to penetrate. The Second Champagne Offensive had the objective of forcing the
German Third and Fifth Armies in the Argonne sector to withdraw along the Meuse river towards
Belgium. A simultaneous attack by French and British forces from Vimy Ridge to La Bassée, called the
Artois-Loos Offensive (25 September - 15 October 1915), aimed to break through the German Front in
Artois. This would compel the German Second and Seventh Armies, caught between the two attacks, to
pull back to the Belgian border in order to protect their road and rail routes on the Douai plain.
The Artois-Loos offensive saw the first use of a gas cloud weapon by the British Army at the Battle of
Loos. It was at this battle that the Rhodesian platoon 2/KRRC, which had already experienced
countless horrors and sustained heavy casualties, was to experience more tragedy. Captain Brady,
who had transferred to 2/KRRC some two months earlier, was to be a part of the experience.
Recognising the obvious signs of impending attack, the Germans spent the summer strengthening
their trench system, ultimately constructing supporting line fortifications three miles deep.
THE BATTLE OF LOOS (25 September - 8 October 1915)
The Battle of Loos involved fifty-four French and thirteen British divisions on a front of some ninety
kilometres running from Loos in the north to Vimy Ridge in the south. On 21 September the British
began a four-day artillery bombardment of the German lines, intent on destroying the enemy trenches
and clearing the barbed-wire entanglements. Over 250,000 shells were fired, seriously depleting the
British store of munitions.
Order of Battle – Battle of Loos
At 06h30 on 25 September the attack was launched. The 1st Division, of which the 2/KRRC and the
“Rhodesian” Platoon were a part, took the centre, facing a section of the line known as "Lone Tree,"
named after the only tree still standing between the two lines. The attack was to commence with the
release of chlorine gas which was expected to blow into the German lines. This was to be followed
immediately by an attack, with the honour of “going over” first, being given to the 2nd Infantry
Brigade with 2/KRRC and the 1/Loyal North Lancs in the forefront. At 06h00 the whistles blew and
the gas and smoke bombs were fired while the two battalions went over the top, walking or trotting
towards the German trenches with rifles at the high port and bayonets fixed. Unfortunately, before the
gas had reached half the distance across, the wind changed and blew it back onto the advancing
battalions causing 2,500 casualties, though only seven died from the gas. Captain Brady and a number
of Rhodesians were gassed but all were able to keep advancing7.
Having endured the chlorine gas, 2/KRRC crossed No Man’s Land under the protection of a thick
blanket of smoke, but it was the very thickness of it that was their undoing. It was not until the
German trenches near Lone Tree had been reached that it was seen that the trenches were intact and
strongly covered by wire. Regardless, 2/KRRC and 1st Loyal North Lancs, with the 2nd Sussex in
immediate support continued the attack, but no progress could be made. Despite the great sacrifice
and gallantry displayed by all ranks, the attack proved fruitless and after suffering great loss, 2/KRRC
had to be withdrawn until the regiments on the flanks, more fortunate in finding the enemy's
entanglements destroyed, had carried the Lone Tree trenches and taken some 400 prisoners. During
the battle the Rhodesian Platoon suffered devastating casualties.
The British attack achieved some success north of Loos and by the end of the first day had passed
through Loos village and reached the outskirts of the industrial town of Lens. There was also some
success in the north where a German strong point - the Hohenzollern Redoubt - was stormed and
taken. Elsewhere, the soldiers discovered that neither the German trenches nor the barbed-wire had
been cleared by the four-day bombardment and they found themselves pinned down in No Man's Land
by intense enemy artillery and machine guns.
Worthy of mention here is that despite these setbacks, the controversial General, Douglas Haig
(nicknamed “The Butcher”), then Commander of I Corps, requested that two additional “New Army”8
Divisions, that had never seen combat, be brought forward. The “New Army” Divisions attacked on the
afternoon of 26 September.
The delay in waiting for the New Army Divisions had allowed the German Fourth Army to bring in
reserves which reinforced a new German Second Position located on higher ground with good views
across the British attack area. When the New Army attacked, the German machine guns went to work,
cutting them down by the hundreds. German soldiers climbed above their parapets and fired their
rifles into the mass of men trying to advance, and still the New Army columns kept coming, and still
the German machine guns fired. Finally, the British could go no further, blocked by impenetrable
barbed-wire and brutal machine-gun and rifle fire. A German Regimental Diarist described the scene.
Never had the machine-gunners such straightforward work to do nor done it so unceasingly. The men
stood on the fire-step, some even on the parapets, and fired exultantly into the mass of men advancing
across the open grassland. As the entire field of fire was covered with the enemy's infantry the effect
was devastating and they could be seen falling in hundreds.
A German soldier provides the following account:
We were very surprised to see them walking. We had never seen that before. The officers went in front.
I noticed one of them walking calmly, carrying a walking stick. When we started firing we just had to
load and reload. They went down in their hundreds. You didn't have to aim. We just fired into them.
The fierceness of the fighting during the Battle of Loos was such that only 2,000 of the 8,500 soldiers
killed on the first day of the attack have a known grave. The death toll at Loos was greater than in any
previous battle of the war. During the battle 2/KRRC lost 506 men – eighty-six killed, 328 wounded,
seventy-six gassed and nineteen missing.
Among those killed at the Battle of Loos was Second Lieutenant John Kipling (1/Scots Guards), the
only son of Nobel Prize-winning author Rudyard Kipling. A shell blast had apparently ripped off young
7
By 6 July 1915, the entire British army was equipped with the "smoke helmet" which was a flannel bag with a celluloid window, which
entirely covered the head. In April 1916 the more effective British small box respirator was first introduced to British soldiers - a few months
before the Battle of the Somme. By January 1917, it had become the standard issue gas mask for all British soldiers.
The New Army, often referred to as Kitchener's Army or, disparagingly, Kitchener's Mob, was an (initially) all-volunteer army formed in the
United Kingdom following the outbreak of hostilities in the First World War. It was created on the recommendation of Horatio Kitchener,
then Secretary of State for War. The first New Army divisions were used at the Battle of Loos.
8
John Kipling’s face and with the fighting continuing, his body was never identified. Rudyard Kipling
later wrote a haunting elegy to his son and to the legions of sons lost in the Great War:
That flesh we had nursed from the first in all cleanness was given
To be blanched or gay-painted by fumes – to be cindered by fires
To be senselessly tossed and re-tossed in stale mutilation
From crater to crater. For this we shall take expiation.
But who shall return us our children?
During the battle the British suffered 50,000 casualties. German casualties were estimated at
approximately half the British total. The British failure at Loos contributed to Haig's replacement of
General John French as Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F. at the close of 1915, this despite Haig’s
reckless sacrifice of thousands of British troops.
By this stage of the war the Rhodesian platoons had suffered appalling losses, only to be replenished
by new drafts from Southern Rhodesia, to be followed later by further losses and further drafts.
However, despite their losses, the Southern Rhodesians had distinguished themselves through their
gallantry and had gained a reputation as brave and valiant soldiers and their sniping skills continued
to receive wide acclaim.
In November 1915, the 3rd and 4th KRRC Battalions, having endured twelve grinding months on the
Western Front, were sent to Salonika in neutral Greece to assist the Serbian Army which was in full
retreat from Bulgarian forces.
____________________________________________________
4.
THE SALONIKA CAMPAIGN
OCTOBER 1915-NOVEMBER 1918
The Salonika Front is arguably one of the most forgotten in terms of where British and Commonwealth
troops served in the Great War. The Salonika Front has become known as the “forgotten front” and the
troops that fought there – “The Gardeners of Salonika”9 - could well be called the “forgotten army” of
the First World War. The British troops of the British Salonika Force (B.S.F.) had many names for this
theatre of war, some unpublishable, but the commonplace ‘Muckydonia’ (a play on the region’s other
name, Macedonia) summed up how many of them felt about being there. The campaign was, from the
British perspective, always destined to be a 'side show'. But when the moment came for the force to
push north in September 1918, its assault along the front into Macedonia was so intense it bore
comparison with the heaviest fighting of the Great War.
A result of the First Balkan War (1912-13) fought between the Balkan League, comprising Greece,
Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire, was a reduction in size of the Ottoman
Empire and the creation of an independent Albanian state while enlarging the territorial holdings of
Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. Dissatisfied with its share of the spoils, Bulgaria, attacked its
former allies, Serbia and Greece, in June 1913 (the Second Balkan War) - a result of which was the loss
to Bulgaria of most of its Macedonian region to Serbia and Greece.
Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, Austria-Hungary delivered a
series of ten demands to Serbia intentionally made unacceptable, intending to provoke a war with
Serbia. When Serbia agreed to only eight of the ten demands, Austria-Hungary declared war on 28 July
1914. Serbia had an experienced army, having fought two successful Balkan wars in the previous two
years, but it was also exhausted and poorly equipped, which led the Austro-Hungarians to believe that
it would fall in less than a month. Serbia's strategy was to hold on as long as possible, while also
constantly worrying about its hostile neighbour to the east, Bulgaria.
By 12 August, Austria-Hungary had amassed over 500,000 soldiers on Serbian frontiers, and Serbia
mobilised some 450,000 troops, but because of the poor financial state of the Serbian economy and
losses in the Balkan Wars, the Serbian army lacked much of the modern weaponry and equipment
necessary to engage in combat with its larger and wealthier adversaries. Over the course of the
following thirteen months the Serbians fought several battles against the Austro-Hungarian and
Bulgarian armies, which though not suffering ultimate defeat, severely weakened the Serbian army.
Germany was also keenly interested in Serbia in that if Serbia fell, they would then have a rail link
from Germany, through Austria-Hungary and down to Istanbul and beyond. This would allow the
Germans to send military supplies and troops to help the Ottoman Empire.
On 7 October 1915 the Austro-Hungarians and Germans launched an assault on Serbia crossing the
Drina and Sava rivers and after fierce street-by-street fighting, occupied Belgrade on 9 October. Serbia
had appealed to the British and French governments for military support and in early October, a small
two Division strong Franco-British force began landing at Salonika on the Aegean Sea coast. French
forces numbered 34,000 and the British forces (the 10th ‘Irish’ Division), 14,000. Additional British
reinforcements were soon to follow, including the Rhodesian Platoon of 3/KRRC. The French were
under the command of General Sarrail and the British under Lieutenant General Sir Bryan Mahon.
Clemenceau, France’s wartime leader, scornfully branded the Allied forces at Salonika as “The Gardeners of
Salonika” as they were perceived as doing little more than digging trenches.
9
On 14 October 1914, the Bulgarian Army attacked Serbia from the north of Bulgaria towards Niš and
from the south towards Skopje. The Bulgarian First Army defeated the Serbian Second Army at the
Battle of Morava, while the Bulgarian Second Army defeated the Serbians at the Battle of Ovche Pole.
With the Bulgarian breakthrough, the Serbian position became untenable; the main army in the north
(around Belgrade) could either retreat, or be surrounded and forced to surrender.
Meanwhile, the newly arrived French and British divisions had marched north from Salonika under
the command of General Sarrail. However, the British War Office was reluctant to advance too deep
into Serbia, so the French divisions advanced on their own to the Vardar River. In the Battle of Kosovo
the Serbs made a last and desperate attempt to join the two Allied divisions that had made a limited
advance from the south. However, by the end of November the French Division had to retreat in the
face of massive Bulgarian assaults. The British at Kosturino were also forced to retreat and by 12
December all Allied forces were back in neutral Greece. Fortunately the Bulgarian Army was not
permitted by the German High Command to enter Greek territory, as they still hoped that the
unpredictable Greeks would enter the war on their side.
With no relief coming from the Allied forces,
Serbian army commander, Marshal Putnik,
ordered a full retreat, south and west through
Montenegro and into Albania. The weather
was terrible, the roads poor, and the army had
to help the tens of thousands of civilians who
retreated with them with almost no supplies
or food left. But the bad weather and poor
roads worked for the refugees as the Central
Powers forces could not press them hard
enough, and so they evaded capture. Many of
the fleeing soldiers and civilians did not make
it to the coast, lost to hunger, disease and
attacks by enemy forces and Albanian tribal
bands. The circumstances of the retreat were
Serbian Army during its retreat towards Albania
disastrous and all told, only some 155,000
Serbs, mostly soldiers, reached the Albanian coast on the Adriatic Sea. Despite the Central Powers'
victory, the battered, seriously reduced and almost unarmed Serbian Army was carried to various
Greek islands (many to Corfu) by Allied transport ships. The evacuation of the Serbian army from
Albania was completed on 10 February 1916. The survivors were so weakened that thousands of them
died from sheer exhaustion in the weeks after their rescue. Marshal Putnik had to be carried during
the whole retreat and he died a bit more than a year later in a hospital in France. Six months after its
evacuation, and having been rebuilt almost from scratch, the Serbian Army was again in the front
lines.
It had been an almost complete victory for the Central Powers at a cost of around 67,000 casualties as
compared to around 90,000 Serbians killed or wounded and 174,000 captured. The only flaw in the
victory was the remarkable retreat of the Serbian Army. As a result of Serbia’s defeat, the Germans
opened the railway line from Berlin to Constantinople, allowing Germany to prop up the Ottoman
Empire.
Between November 1915 and January 1916 the British reinforcements – the 28th, 22nd, 26th and
27th Divisions - in that order - landed at Salonika. As part of the 27th Division were the 3rd and 4th
KRRC Battalions of the 80th Infantry Brigade.
After withdrawing from Serbia the Allies first priority was to set up defensive positions around
Salonika, assuming that Bulgarian forces would try and advance into Greece. The expected invasion
never took place. Instead, the Bulgarians dug in and fortified their positions along the Greek-Serb
border from the coast of Albania to Lake Doiran and the Bulgarian border.
In their turn, the Franco-British forces were chiefly engaged in the creation of a bastion about eight
miles north of Salonika connecting with the Vardar marshes to the west and the lake defences of
Langaza and Beshik to the east and so to the Gulf of Rendina (Orfano) and the Aegean Sea. The area
became known as ‘The Birdcage’ on account of the immense quantity of wire used.
In January 1916, the British 80th Brigade,
including the 3rd and 4th KRRC Battalions,
was posted on the extreme right of the
British line at Rendina Gorge on the Gulf of
Rendina/Orfano, about forty miles from
Salonika, where they were put to work
entrenching their position. In due course the
Allied Army, reinforced by a reconstituted
Serbian Army of 80,000 and Russian and
Italian forces, was brought up to a strength
of 350,000 men, opposed to whom were
310,000 Germans, Austrians, Bulgars and
Turks. Despite this build-up of troops there
was very little action over the next four
months. The bigger enemy was the weather
and malaria.
According to the KRRC men’s diary, they claimed that "...the weather conditions are worse than the
enemy itself". During the summer months in the central Struma valley the temperature could reach
118 degrees Fahrenheit. Men fainted in their scores while marching and one young soldier died on the
side of the road. Sometimes the rain would reduce the ground to a sea of mud – and with the heat and
the rain came the mosquitoes and malaria which took a large toll amongst the soldiers.
In 1916/17, of the 300,000 British and French troops based in Salonika, some 120,000 became unfit
for active service due to malaria. Allied with other diseases, at one point it reduced the effective
strength of the Allied force to 100,000.
The casualties of the Central Powers in the war zone were also dramatic, but reportedly considerably
lower: probably due to its forces holding the healthier higher ground, allied with better anti-malarial
drug regimens and disease control measures.
On 26 May the perfidious, and still
neutral Greeks, handed over to the
Bulgarians the Fort at Rupel, a
strategic fortification above the
deep gorge along which the River
Struma led into Bulgaria.
In late July 1916, after preparing
Salonika’s defences, the Allies
commenced
their
offensive,
advancing to the River Struma and
Lake Doiran without opposition
and establishing a stable front,
holding a line from the Gulf of
Rendina on the right to Albania on
the Adriatic on the left. The River
Men of the 1st Royal Irish Regiment marching into the Struma Valley, June 1916
Vardar divided the British from
the French - the British being on the right of the line. The two KRRC Battalions were pushed forward
from Rendina Gorge to the unfordable Struma, holding about six miles of the front between Lake
Tahinos and the mouth of the Struma on the Gulf of Rendina. The fighting during this phase was not
severe, though many casualties were caused by malaria, and it was only patrol work and small mobile
columns that kept the troops from stagnating.
It was not until August that shots were first exchanged with the Bulgarians when on 17 August, a joint
Bulgarian-German offensive was launched, just three days before a scheduled French offensive. The
enemy force in front of the 80th Brigade outnumbered it occasionally, perhaps as much as by ten-toone. So far as the two KRRC Battalions were concerned, an offensive movement was impossible, but a
post on the further bank on the enemy's side of the Struma was occupied by two battalions, one of
which was 3/KRRC.
On 23 August, a British column with Major Alexander MacLachlan in command, was tasked with
blowing up three bridges over the River Angista, a tributary of the Struma in the vicinity of Kuchuk.
The Rhodesian platoon and the remainder of 3/KRRC, commanded by Lieut. Colonel W. J. Long, was in
support. The three bridges, despite heavy Bulgarian fire, were successfully blown and the columns
withdrew with minimal casualties. The attack achieved early success thanks to surprise, but after two
weeks the Allied forces held a defensive line with the B.S.F. taking up positions at Doiran.
THE MONASTIR OFFENSIVE (12 September – November 1916)
Having halted the Bulgarian offensive, the Allies staged a counterattack, the Monastir Offensive,
starting on 12 September. The offensive intended to break the deadlock on the Macedonian Front by
forcing the capitulation of Bulgaria and relieving the pressure on Romania. The offensive took the
shape of a large battle and lasted for three months.
The terrain was rough and the Bulgarians were on the defensive, but the Allied forces made steady
gains with the B.S.F. advancing into the Struma Valley to the east. On 30 September, after eighteen
days of heavy fighting, the Serbian Drina Division finally captured Kajmakcalan from the exhausted 1st
Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Balkan Infantry Division and achieved a breakthrough in the Bulgarian
defensive line.
A major problem for the Bulgarians was that their army and resources were stretched to the limits
from Dobruja to Macedonia and Albania. With the Germans heavily engaged on the Western Front in
the Battle of the Somme, Germany could spare few reinforcements. Consequently, Bulgaria turned to
the Ottoman Empire which provided some 24,600 men over October-November. With an impending
offensive of the Romanian and Russian forces against the Bulgarian Third Army in Dobrudja (situated
between the lower Danube River and the Black Sea), General Sarrail planned to use this by
coordinating it with a renewed push against the Bulgarian Eleventh Army's ‘Kenali Line’ and
eventually knock Bulgaria out of the war. On 4 October the Allies attacked with the French and
Russians in the direction of Monastir. The Allies had 103 battalions and 80 batteries against 65
battalions and 57 batteries of the Central Powers.
In early October, with the French, Serbian and Russian forces engaged at Montasir, the B.S.F. launched
diversionary operations on the River Struma towards Serres. The campaign was successful with the
capture of Rupel Pass and advances were made to within a few miles of Serres. It was during this
period that a fine piece of work was executed by No.2 “Rhodesian” Platoon, 3/KRRC, commanded at
the time by Lieutenant F. D. Fletcher. Headquarters was anxious to capture a prisoner for
interrogation purposes and Fletcher with the Rhodesians, who had honed their trench-raiding skills
on the Western Front, volunteered for the job. With blackened faces and armed with crude but lethal
trench-fighting weapons, the Rhodesians stealthily made it to the enemy trench line and quietly
disposed of the sentries. After a sharp fight in the enemy trench and another with an enemy patrol, the
raid was swiftly and successfully executed. It was also during this period, on 31 October, that the
Rhodesians, with the remainder of 3/KRRC and a Shropshire Light Infantry battalion, took part in a
successful holding attack against a whole Turkish Division. Their losses were very small. The Turks,
who had relieved the Bulgarians, lost heavily and apparently thought a major attack had been
repelled.
After several failed Serbian attacks against the Bulgarian defensive position in the area of the River
Crna, the renewed Serbian forces finally crossed the left bank of the river at Brod on 18 October and
fortified it. Over the next two weeks the battle raged back and forth with massive casualties suffered
by both sides. On 7 November the Serbian artillery started intense fire against the Bulgarian force and
after three days Bulgarian losses became so immense that on 10 November it abandoned its positions
to the Serbians. Despite the arrival in early November of two more German Divisions to help bolster
the Bulgarian Army, the French and Serbian Army captured Kaymakchalan, the highest peak of Nidže
mountain, and on 19 November compelled the Central powers to abandon the town of Monastir. The
Bulgarians established a new position on the Chervena Stena - Makovo - Gradešnica defensive line.
Almost immediately it came under attack but this time the new position held firm because the Allies
were exhausted, having reached the limits of their logistical capacity. Thus all French and Serbian
attempts to break through the line were defeated and with the onset of winter, the front stabilized
along its entire length. On 11 December General Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, called off the
offensive.
An outcome of the Monastir Offensive was the depletion of the Rhodesian Platoon. The fighting had
been intense in certain sectors and by January 1917, the veteran No. 2 “Rhodesian” Platoon had
dwindled to a mere twenty-six men. The platoon’s Commanding Officer, Lieutenant A. H. Miller wrote:
“I suppose there is no chance of reinforcements being sent to us for, if possible, it is our wish to keep the
Rhodesian platoon going till the end”.
During 1917, there was comparatively little activity on the British part of the front in Macedonia. In
March the two KKRC Battalions, as with the whole British 27th Division, withstood further Bulgarian
attacks. The Official History records the Bulgarians using gas for the first time in a bombardment on
17-18 March on British lines between Doiran and the Vardar, and French lines across the river. In the
course of three nights they fired about 15 000 asphyxiating shells on a small sector of British trenches,
inflicting about 113 casualties, of whom only one died. German and Bulgarian chemical harassment
fire, with deadly poison and tear gas, directed mainly against artillery batteries, continued to the end
of the war, causing their temporary neutralization.
On 22 April the battle for a British breakthrough in the Bulgarian positions began and continued
intermittently until 9 May 1917. The assault commenced with a bitter four-day artillery barrage in
which the British fired about 100,000 shells. As a result, the earthworks and some wooden structures
in the front positions were destroyed. The Bulgarians also opened fire from their batteries between
Vardar and Doiran. Bulgarian General Vladimir Vazov ordered fire day and night on the Allied
positions. The initial several-hour struggle between the British and Bulgarian batteries was followed
by a one-hour Bulgarian counter-barrage in which 10,000 shells were fired.
Two days later, on the night of 24-25 April, the British infantry companies began an attack against the
Bulgarian 2nd Brigade and after a bloody fight, managed to take the "Nerezov", "Knyaz Boris" and
"Pazardzhik" positions. Bulgarian counter-attacks repulsed the British. The artillery duel continued
until 9 May but due to heavy casualties the British had to abandon all attacks. The British lost 12,000
killed, wounded and captured of which more than 2,250 were buried by the Bulgarian defenders.
By April General Sarrail’s army had been reinforced to the point that he had twenty-five divisions: 6
French, 6 Serbian, 7 British, 1 Italian, 3 Greek and 2 Russian. In late April the Allies launched a second
major offensive which made little impression on the Bulgarian defences. The main thrust was made by
French and Serbian forces to the west while the British launched diversionary attacks at Lake Doiran.
The British forces faced some hard fighting. The attacks gained a considerable amount of ground and
resisted strong counter-attacks, and any question about the fighting ability of the Bulgarians was
dispelled. However, both attacks eventually failed with major losses. After the failed Lake Doiran
offensive, the British retreated to their original positions behind the Jumeaux Ravine; the Bulgarians
erected banners to tell them ‘We know you are going to the mountains, so are we’. The British action in
May triggered a series of attacks elsewhere on the front by the other Allies, known as the Battle of
Vardar. The campaign settled down to a stalemate. The offensive was called off on May 21 and the
B.S.F. took up a defensive position on the Struma. For the next six months little of major consequence
took place.
At the commencement of 1918 the two KRRC Battalions, with the remainder of the 80th Brigade,
moved northward to the Struma valley. Here a number of patrol encounters took place and much skill
was displayed, particularly by 4/KRRC on 15 and 16 April. By this time the vacillating Greeks had
determined to throw in their lot with the Allies and brought up troops by degrees to the amount of
about 400,000 men. This of course helped the general situation and enabled the British Government to
withdraw some of its battalions to France, where, in view of the successful German advance, their
services were badly needed. Among the battalions to be withdrawn was 4/KRRC which returned to
the Western Front in the summer of 1918, embarking at Itea on 25th June.
In late June 3/KRRC, with the remainder of the 80th Brigade quit the Struma Valley and after a march
of about sixty miles westward took over the position previously held by the French in mountainous
country west of the River Vardar. At this point the enemy's shell-fire was heavy and on 1 August the
trenches held by 3/KRRC were unsuccessfully attacked. However, partly through malaria and partly
by the enemy's shell-fire, 3/KRRC losses had been very heavy, and at the beginning of September it
could only muster for fighting purposes about 130 rank and file.
In the middle of September a general advance was begun. The French and Serbians broke through the
enemy's line between Monastir and the Vardar, and a day or two later a successful attack was made by
British and Greek troops at Doiran, the enemy retreating in disorder. The 80th Brigade was not part of
the force engaged but shared in the subsequent pursuit of the enemy. By 21st September the
Bulgarians were in full retreat through the Kosturino Pass and on the 22nd September they crossed
the frontier into Serbia, but an Armistice with the Bulgarians on the 30th September brought
hostilities to a close.
In October 3/KRRC and the Rhodesians marched into Bulgaria. Like a pack of dominoes, Bulgaria then
Austria fell and the whole Central Axis began to crumble. The war began in the Balkans and arguably
ended there thanks in large part to the supreme efforts of the British forces.
By the end of the war, of the original seventy men of No.2 “Rhodesian” Platoon, 3/KRRC that had
arrived at Salonika in December 1915, only twelve remained. Fifty-eight Rhodesians died in this harsh
and beautiful place where so many soldiers now lie buried in a corner of that foreign field.
____________________________________________________
5.
TRENCH WARFARE
Trench warfare has become a powerful symbol of the futility of war. Its image is of young men going
"over the top" into a hail of fire leading to near-certain death. It is associated with needless slaughter
in appalling conditions, combined with the view that brave men went to their deaths because of
incompetent and narrow-minded commanders who failed to adapt to the new conditions of trench
warfare: class-ridden and backward-looking generals put their faith in the attack, believing superior
numbers, morale and dash would overcome the weapons and moral inferiority of the defender. The
British and Empire troops on the Western Front were commonly referred to as "lions led by
donkeys"10. It has been estimated that up to one third of Allied casualties on the Western Front were
incurred in the trenches.
For the Allies, life in the trenches was far worse
than for the Germans. Often German trenches were
even described as comfortable, with electricity,
kitchens and beds (Fussell 1977: p. 44).
Conversely, Allied trenches (left) were usually
temporary in nature, squalid, badly drained and ill
supported against cave-in and damage. Where the
trenches had been bombed out, the front line
sometimes consisted only of shell holes in which
the men fought and died.
As Fussell describes it, there were usually three
lines of trenches: a front-line trench located fifty
yards to a mile from its enemy counterpart,
guarded by tangled lines of barbed wire; a support
trench line several hundred yards back; and a reserve line several hundred yards behind that. A wellbuilt trench did not run straight for any distance, as that would invite the danger of sweeping fire
along a long stretch of the line; instead it zigzagged every few yards.
There were three different types of trenches: firing trenches, lined on the side facing the enemy by
steps where defending soldiers would stand to fire machine guns and throw grenades at the advancing
offense; communication trenches; and "saps," shallower positions that extended into no-man’s-land
and afforded spots for observation posts, grenade-throwing and machine gun-firing. In total the
trenches built during World War I, laid end-to-end, would stretch some 25,000 miles - 12,000 of those
miles occupied by the Allies, and the rest by the Central Powers.
While the trench system protected the soldiers to a large extent from the worst effects of modern
firepower, trench life was horrific. For many veterans the dominant feature of life in the trenches was
the problem of trench rats. Rats – big, brown, black and bloated - thrived literally in their millions
among trenches in most Fronts of the war. Trench conditions were ideal for rats. Empty food cans
were piled in their thousands throughout “No Man's Land”, heaved over the top on a daily basis. Aside
from feeding on rotting food in discarded cans, rats would invade dug-outs in search of food and
shelter, crawling across the face of sleeping men in the process. McLaughlin (Ragtime Soldiers, p.54)
writes: “On the whole...they [the trenches] were fetid holes in which men lived a dank, subterranean
existence like constantly endangered moles, sometimes asphyxiated by their braziers or buried alive by
shell-fire”.
The phrase, “lions led by donkeys” is thought to have originated in 1854/55 during the Crimean War when a
letter was reportedly sent home by a British soldier quoting a Russian officer who had said that British soldiers
were ‘lions commanded by asses'.
10
As they gorged themselves, many rats reportedly grew to the size of cats. However the feature that
caused the most revulsion among soldiers was that rats openly fed on the decaying remains of
comrades killed while advancing across No Man's Land. Attacking and eating the eyes of a corpse first,
rats would steadily work their way through the remainder of the body in a short space of time. One
soldier described finding a group of dead bodies while on patrol: "I saw some rats running from under
the dead men's greatcoats, enormous rats, fat with human flesh. My heart pounded as we edged towards
one of the bodies. His helmet had rolled off. The man displayed a grimacing face, stripped of flesh; the
skull bare, the eyes devoured and from the yawning mouth leapt a rat.” The earth contained the remains
of thousands of rotting corpses – a virtual rat’s banquet.
Rats were not the only source of infection and nuisance.
Lice were a never-ending problem, breeding in the
seams of filthy clothing and causing men to itch
unceasingly. Lice caused Trench Fever, a painful disease
that began suddenly with severe pain followed by high
fever. Recovery - away from the trenches - took up to
three months. Lice were not identified as the cause of
Trench Fever until 1918. Frogs, slugs, beetles and nits
also crowded the trench with many men choosing to
shave their heads to avoid nits. Trench Foot, a fungal
infection of the feet caused by cold, wet and unsanitary
trench conditions, was also a problem. It could turn
gangrenous and result in amputation.
Patrols would often be sent out into No Man’s Land. Some men would be tasked with repairing or
adding barbed wire to the front line. Others would go out to assigned listening posts, hoping to pick up
valuable information from the enemy lines. Sometimes enemy patrols would meet in No Man's Land.
They were then faced with the option of hurrying on their separate ways or engaging in hand-to-hand
fighting. They could not afford to use their handguns while patrolling in No Man's Land for fear of the
machine gun fire it would inevitably attract.
Finally, no overview of trench life can avoid the
aspect that instantly hit new-comers to the lines: the
appalling stench given off by the numerous
conflicting sources. Rotting carcasses, human and
animal, lay around in their thousands. For example,
some 200,000 men were killed on the Somme
battlefields, many of whom lay in shallow graves. The
reek of rotting corpses was not easy to take.
Lieutenant Hutchinson, a Rhodesian serving with the
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders wrote of his
trench cutting into a line of graves from an earlier
battle which contained grisly ‘semi-digested’ corpses:
“We dig; a limb, already black, oozes from the sodden
ground; a hand propped against barbed wire waves a
continual ‘good bye’” (Ragtime Soldiers p.53).
In her memoirs (Testament of Youth, 1933), British writer, feminist and pacifist Vera Brittain, provides
the following extract from a letter from her fiancé Roland Leighton, an officer who served with the
Worcestershire Regiment in France.
Among this chaos of twisted iron and splintered timber and shapeless earth are the fleshless,
blackened bones of simple men who poured out their red, sweet wine of youth unknowing, for nothing
more tangible than Honour or their Country's Glory or another's Lust of Power. Let him who thinks
that war is a glorious golden thing, who loves to roll forth stirring words of exhortation, invoking
Honour and Praise and Valour and Love of Country. Let him look at a little pile of sodden grey rags
that cover half a skull and a shin bone and what might have been its ribs, or at this skeleton lying on
its side, resting half-crouching as it fell, supported on one arm, perfect but that it is headless, and with
the tattered clothing still draped around it; and let him realise how grand and glorious a thing it is to
have distilled all Youth and Joy and Life into a foetid heap of hideous putrescence.
Brady wrote of finding seven corpses, four German and three British, in the bottom of a trench. A
dozen men had difficulty in pulling even one of them from the mire for burial as the clothing and
equipment had become mud and water-soaked and enormously heavy.
Overflowing latrines would give off a foul
odour and add to the already overpowering
stench. Brady (Ragtime Soldiers p.54)
comments on trench hygiene: “From the
sanitation point of view you can visualize the
state of things which must exist with the men
crowded in a stooping posture for forty-eight
hours, unable to move either to the rear, right
or left without becoming at once a target for
rifle fire at point-blank range”. What he was
getting at was that the men had to defecate
and urinate where they stood or crouched.
Since they were often reduced to boiling water
from the trench bottom and considering that
trenches often contained unburied corpses
and dead and rotting rats, it is surprising that
the appalling conditions did not kill the men.
Men who had not bathed in weeks or months would emit the suffocating stench of dried sweat, though
the feet were accepted as giving off the most disgusting odour. The smell of cordite, lingering poison
gas, creosol (used to stave off disease and infection), rotting sandbags, stagnant mud, cigarette smoke
and cooking food added to the all pervading stench.
The soldiers suffered physical and psychological consequences of the trench war. In the words of
writer Philip Gibbs, those in the trenches “...lived in a world which is as different from this known world
of ours as though they belonged to another race of men inhabiting another planet”. Simply staying
physically and mentally in control of oneself in the trenches required courage of a high order.
Combatants on the Western Front faced extremely harsh conditions in the muddy and rat infested
trenches. Left alone with their thoughts, soldiers would experience a variety of emotions including
depression, fear, confusion, helplessness and regret. A. D. Macleod (Journal of the Society of Medicine,
2004, p. 87) writes that “The profound psychological effects of trench warfare, compounded by the
effects of “shell shock” - a helplessness appearing variously as panic and being scared, flight and/or an
inability to reason, sleep, walk or talk - drove many soldiers to the brink of suicide”.
Estimated suicides during the Great War still remain unknown. According to
the Military historians, a large number of combatants committed suicide
between 1914 and 1918. Deeply depressed and physically worn-out soldiers
took their lives inside the trenches. In his evidence before the War Office
Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, J. F. C. Fuller said healthy fear
degenerated first into indifference and later into obsessive fear, and the
chances of this happening were greater than in previous wars because of
new military technologies that increasingly depersonalized war. Soldiers
who could not control their fear sought the physical way out of misery, selfmutilation or even suicide. Since the early months of the war, desperate
British and Empire soldiers killed themselves, or attempted to. The rate
among soldiers increased in the final phase of the conflict. In August 1918
there were officially 3,500 cases. In November, the last month of the war,
there were more than 5,100. Few would doubt that the true figure was
higher.
In 1917, 2nd Lieutenant Siegfried Sassoon, the renowned WWI poet wrote ‘Suicide in the Trenches’:
I knew a simple soldier boy
Who grinned at life in empty joy,
Slept soundly through the lonesome dark,
And whistled early with the lark.
In winter trenches, cowed and glum,
With crumps and lice and lack of rum,
He put a bullet through his brain.
No one spoke of him again.
You smug-faced crowds with kindling eye
Who cheer when soldier lads march by,
Sneak home and pray you'll never know
The hell where youth and laughter go.
6.
2/KRRC CONTINUE THE FIGHT
In early June 1916, the “Rhodesian” Platoon of 2/KRRC was about sixty strong but had incurred heavy
losses when “going over the top” in an attack on the Triangle near Fosse 8 in the Loos sector. In
another attack on Wood Lane seventeen members of the platoon were lost. In a further attack at the
same time, the platoon’s strength stood at seventeen or eighteen and thirteen were lost, including two
killed, leaving just four or five men. The platoon was rebuilt from the wounded and a fresh draft of
twenty-five Rhodesians and stood at ninety strong on 30 June, the eve of the Battle of the Somme.
THE SOMME OFFENSIVE (1st July - 18th November 1916)
The Battle of the Somme was one of the largest of World War I and one of humanity's bloodiest. More
than one million men were killed or wounded on the Somme.
At Verdun, French and German troops were bogged down in a battle of attrition. The aim of the joint
French-British Somme offensive was to relieve the pressure on Verdun and push the British line
forward in what was termed “The Big Push”. The attack was preceded by an eight-day bombardment
of the German lines beginning on 24 June. The expectation was that the bombardment would destroy
all forward German defences, enabling the attacking British troops to virtually walk across No Man's
Land and take possession of the German front lines from the battered Germans. 1,500 British guns,
together with a similar number of French guns, were used in the bombardment.
Following the artillery bombardment, a creeping barrage would precede the advancing infantry to the
German front line and then onwards to the second and third trench lines. Twenty-seven divisions
(750,000 men) went into the attack of which over 80% (610,000 men) were from the B.E.F. Ranged
against them in the German trenches were sixteen divisions of the German Second Army. The odds
were apparently stacked heavily in the B.E.F’s favour.
However, the advance artillery bombardment failed to destroy either the German front line barbed
wire or the heavily-built concrete bunkers which the Germans had carefully and robustly constructed.
During the bombardment the German troops sought effective shelter in the concrete bunkers.
Emerging from the bunkers after the bombardment, the Germans manned their machine guns with
great effect.
The attack was set for 07h30 on 1 July. At 07h30 whistles
blew all along the British Front Line north of the Somme
River. Thousands of British troops clambered over the
trench parapet into No Man's Land making for the German
Front Line, among them the 90-strong Rhodesian Platoon of
2/KRRC.
The first attacking wave of the offensive was by no means a
surprise to the German forces. Consequently the B.E.F.
made strikingly little progress and for the most part was
forced back into its trenches by the deadly German machine
gun response. Many troops were killed or wounded the
moment they stepped out of the front lines into No Man's
Land. The attack soon stalled and deteriorated into
disaster.
British troops advance during the Battle of the Somme
The tragedy and heartbreak of the day unfolded as tens of thousands of British troops were cut down
and wounded or killed by German machine-gun and rifle fire, many not even reaching the German
wire on the other side of No Man's Land. For the Rhodesian Platoon the outcome was catastrophic.
Of the ninety Rhodesians present at roll call on the evening of 30 June, just ten remained alive and
unwounded by the end of 1 July. Despite the appalling losses during that first day - 58,000 British
troops alone - Haig persisted with the offensive in the following days. The first day on the Somme was
the first of 141 days of the Battle of the Somme. In the days and weeks that followed little progress
was made.
After two weeks of battle, the Germans were still holding firm in the north and centre of the British
sector—here the advance had stopped and the Allied line had been split into sections by a right angle
at Longueval-Delville Wood, meaning that an advance on a wide front would result in the attacking
forces diverging as they advanced. In order to "straighten the line", General Haig decided to exploit the
advances made in the south by taking and holding Longueval. This would protect the right flank and
allow the Allies to advance in the north and align their left with that of the XIII Corps on the right. The
XIII Corps, of which 1/KRRC and a few Rhodesians were a part, was ordered to capture Longueval.
To capture Longueval, the XIII Corps would first have to clear Trônes Wood and Delville Wood. If left
in German hands, Delville Wood would permit unhindered shelling of the town and would provide
ideal cover for the assembly of German reinforcements for a counterattack on Longueval.
The Division Commander of the 9th Scottish Division, Major-General W. T. Furse, ordered that once
the town had been secured, the 27th Infantry Brigade of the 9th (Scottish) Division was to take
Delville Wood. The 1st South African Brigade was to be kept in reserve.
The attack on Longueval met with initial success - then resistance stiffened. Furthermore, the 27th
Brigade which was intended for the attack on Delville Wood had been committed in support of the
26th Brigade in the attack on Longueval. Major-General Furse thus had no option but to commit his
last reserve—the 1st South African Brigade.
THE BATTLE OF DELVILLE WOOD
The 1st South Africa Infantry Brigade comprised the 1st Infantry Regiment (Cape), the 2nd Infantry
Regiment (Natal and Orange Free State), the 3rd Infantry Regiment (Transvaal and Rhodesia) of which
“A” Company included some ninety Rhodesians, and the 4th Infantry Regiment (South African
Scottish). Delville Wood was the 1st South Africa Infantry Brigade's first engagement.
With the 1st South African Infantry Regiment engaged in a supporting role in an attack on the German
second line on the Longueval-Bazentin le Petit ridge, the remaining three South African regiments
were to take and hold Delville Wood as soon as the entire town of Longueval was in Allied hands.
Furse thus ordered Brigadier General Henry Lukin to deploy his 1st South African Brigade to advance
and capture Delville Wood as soon as Longueval was in Allied hands. However, due to the limited
progress being made in Longueval, Lukin was ordered to “take the wood at all costs” and instructed
that his advance was to proceed, even if the 26th and 27th Brigades had not captured the northern
part of the town.
At 06h00 on 15 July 1916, the three remaining regiments advanced towards the wood with the 2nd
and 3rd Regiments in the lead, followed by the 4th Regiment which was in support. The 3rd Regiment,
commanded by Lt. Col. E. F. Thackeray, was sent to the far side of the wood, the 2nd Regiment off to
the north and “C” Company, 2nd Regiment manned the southern perimeter close to Longueval.
The South Africans advanced and their broad line of
skirmishers pushed its way rapidly through the wood,
sweeping all opposition before it. By noon they
occupied the whole tract with the exception of the
north-west corner. This was the corner which abutted
upon the houses north of Longueval, and the
murderous machine-guns in these buildings kept the
South Africans at bay. By night, the whole perimeter of
the wood had been occupied, and the brigade was
stretched round the edges of the trees and
undergrowth. Already they were suffering heavily, not
only from the Longueval guns on their left, but from
the heavy German artillery which had their range to a
nicety and against which there was no defence. With
patient valour they held their line and endured the
long horror of the shell-fall during the night.
By 10h00 casualties were mounting. Later during the morning, the 3rd Regiment (Tvl/Rhod)
progressed well towards the east and north east of the wood taking three German officers and 130
men prisoner, but their losses, and those of the other South African units were very heavy. By 14h40,
Lt. Colonel Tanner reported to Lukin that he had secured the whole wood, with the exception of a
strong German position in the north west adjoining Longueval. Through the whole of the 16th the
shelling was terribly severe, the missiles pitching from three separate directions into the projecting
salient. As dusk fell, the South Africans and Rhodesians manning the perimeters, entrenched
themselves, despite non-stop enemy shelling and sniping. Through the whole of the 16th the German
shelling was terribly severe, the missiles pitching from three separate directions into the projecting
salient.
During the night of 16/17 July the north-west corner of Delville Wood was subjected to an Allied
artillery barrage to support a combined attack by the 1st South African Infantry Regiment and the
27th Brigade, both of which had been called up in support. The Germans were becoming more active
in the north western sector of Delville Wood and at 14h00 German batteries began bombarding the
wood followed by an attack from the north-west, but they were halted and then driven back by a
counter-attack. During the night of 17/18 July the British artillery fired on the Germans who were east
of Delville Wood with many shells falling short, some amongst the South Africans. This was followed at
08h00 on 18 July by a German artillery barrage on the wood, but this time from three sides. The
bombardment continued for seven-and-a-half hours. At times the incidence of explosions was seven
per second. On that day, in an area less than one square mile, 20,000 shells fell. Such was the ferocity
of the fighting that for every one South African or Rhodesian wounded, four were killed.
All companies were by now calling for reinforcements or requesting authority to withdraw from the
area being pounded by artillery. The reply was that "...Delville Wood is to be held at all costs". Casualties
were mounting by the hour in all sectors and in the early afternoon, “A” and “C” Companies of the 3rd
Infantry Regiment (Tvl/Rhod) were overrun by the Germans, who approached from the rear through
the devastated wood. Mud had caused most weapons to stop working and the troops had now been
without food for over seventy-two hours, and more importantly – they were now without water. The
terrain all but dictated that most of the combat within the wood was hand-to-hand fighting and
casualties were high.
Another German attack at 17h00 was rebuffed but by now Companies were reduced to so few men
that they could no longer be considered as viable fighting units. The South Africans and Rhodesians
still held an uncertain perimeter but German incursions through their line into the wood were now
becoming more and more frequent, simply due to the lack of troops to cover the long perimeter line.
The Germans commenced their advance from the north into Delville Wood at 06h00 on 19 July,
attacking “B” Company of the 3rd (Tvl/Rhod) Regiment. The 2nd Regiment had been decimated the
previous day and had left a large gap on the left flank of the 3rd Regiment and this was where the
German penetration was made.
The Wood was by now devoid of any vegetation and German
machine guns and snipers were taking their toll. Continued
calls for reinforcements were not met as fighting on all
remaining fronts prevented any troop movement and had
already consumed all available reserves. Despite their
perilous situation the South African survivors continued to
fight. During the whole of the 19th these fine South African
and Rhodesian soldiers held on against heavy pressure.
However, with so few men left, the German assault could not
be countered and the remaining members of the 3rd
Regiment, of which there were few, were taken prisoner.
At 16h15 Brigadier-General H. W. Higginson of the 53rd Brigade reported that the Suffolk Regiment
and 6th Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment had been ordered to relieve the South Africans. When the
Suffolks and Berks eventually reached them, Thackeray and his remaining two officers, both wounded,
led the 120 survivors of the 3rd (Tvl/Rhod) Regiment out of the Wood. Sadly, the contribution from
most of the Rhodesians had ended that day. Only ten Rhodesians made it out of the Wood with another
80 Rhodesians killed, missing or captured.
After finally reaching safety, Lt. Col. Thackeray reported: "I am glad to report that the troops under my
command carried out your instructions to hold Delville Wood at all costs and that not a single
detachment of this regiment retired from their position, either on the perimeter of the Wood or from the
support trenches."
Total 3rd (Tvl/Rhod) Regiment casualties were 771, of whom 190 were captured or missing and 581
killed.
One of the few Rhodesian soldiers’ of who survived the first day said of it:
“God knows I never wish to see such horrible sights again...for a moment you would be rational, and
just long for the one and only thing that seemed possible – death...at times I wished it would come fast,
anything to get out of that terrible death trap and murderous place.” (McDonald, p.62)
A South African Delville Wood survivor described the day:
Every semblance of a trench seemed full of dead, sodden, squelchy, swollen bodies. Fortunately the
blackening faces were invisible except when Verey lights lit up the indescribable scene. Not a tree
stood whole in that wood. Food and water were very short and we had not the faintest idea when any
more would be obtainable. We stood and lay on putrefying bodies and the wonder was that the
disease (dysentery) did not finish off what the shells of the enemy had started. There was hand-tohand fighting with knives, bombs, and bayonets; cursing and brutality on both sides such as men can
be responsible for when it is a question of "your life or mine”.
By the time Delville Wood was finally cleared of Germans on 3 September, not one tree in the wood
was left untouched and the immediate landscape was littered with just the stumps of what had been
trees. It was not surprising that men who fought there referred to it as the “Devil’s Wood”.
Historians agree that the losses incurred by the South African Infantry Brigade holding Delville Wood
had no strategic purpose, as did that of the entire Somme offensive, of which Delville Wood formed a
small part.
During the first half of 1917 the Rhodesian Platoon of 2/KRRC was, for the most part, engaged in
operations on the Flanders coast, except when “at rest”. Rest generally lasted about 4 days during
which the battalion underwent retraining, parading, inspections, boxing and playing soccer.
Unfortunately the rest was sometimes interrupted when, as experienced by the Rhodesians, they were
called on to destroy enemy communication lines or rebuild demolished railway lines. Nevertheless,
the majority of rest periods alleviated the constant threat of death and the psychological effects of the
constant stress and trauma of trench warfare and to some extent, renewed most men.
While occupying front sectors of the line and being called on to participate in minor battles, the
Rhodesian platoon continued to suffer losses. In an engagement at Lens on 2 July 1917 a Rhodesian,
Captain Collins, was wounded. He had been hit twice in the same leg and in the hand by bullets, but
kept going until a piece of shrapnel sliced cleanly through his steel helmet and cut into his skull.
During the same action a shell hit eight men of 2/KRRC and all were literally blown to bits along with
sixteen horses. Eight days later on 10 July, greater tragedy was to befall 2/KRRC and the Rhodesian
platoon at Nieuport.
OPERATION HUSH (NIEUPORT, JULY 1917), THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
Germans occupied most of the Belgian coast and used its ports as bases for submarine and surface
raiders which were sinking British ships and harassing British ports and the critical supply routes
across the English Channel. The threat to British naval supremacy resulted in a proposal that an
amphibious landing be made on the Belgian coast, supported by a breakout attack from Nieuport and
the Yser bridgehead. It was called “Operation Hush”.
In early May, Haig set the timetable for his Flanders offensive (The Third Battle of Ypres), with 7 June
the date for the preliminary attack on Messines Ridge. A week after the Battle of Messines Ridge, Haig
gave his three objectives to his Army commanders - wearing out the enemy, securing the Belgian coast
and connecting with the Dutch frontier. This was to be achieved by the capture of Passchendaele
Ridge, an advance on Roeselare and “Operation Hush”, an attack along the coast with an amphibious
landing, with the proviso that...if manpower and artillery were insufficient, only the first part of the
plan might be fulfilled. On 30 April 1917 Haig told General Gough of the Fifth Army that he would
command the "Northern Operation" and the coastal force, despite Cabinet approval for the offensive
not being granted until 21 June. On 20 June, the British XV Corps took over the French sector on the
Belgian coast and the responsibility for implementing “Operation Hush”.
On the east side of the Yser River a small part of land was still in the hands of the French army on the
location where the river flowed into the North Sea at a city called Nieuport. This sector was taken over
on 4 July from the French by the British 1st Division, some 600 yards north of the Yser.
Commencing in the North Sea, the 2nd Infantry
Brigade’s 2/KRRC and 1st Northampton
battalions occupied a 1400 yard frontage in the
“dune“ trenches. The two battalions had the
97th Infantry Brigade on their right.
The German MarinesKorps Flandern patrols
detected the British-French changeover on the
20th. A report was sent to MarinesKorps
Flandern Commander von Schroeder who
correctly interpreted it as the prelude to a
British attack along the coast. Schroeder
immediately started planning “Operation
Strandfest” (“Beach Party”), a pre-emptive
strike to eliminate the Yser bridgehead.
Meanwhile, the British set about improving the
defences in the bridgehead. Australian
tunnellers were used to lay land mines and
bombs under the German trenches but their
work was not complete when “Operation
Strandfest” began. Nor was all the British
artillery in place. Only 176 of the planned 583
guns and howitzers were available to defend
the bridgehead. On the 6 July, the
MarinesKorps Flandern began a half-hearted
artillery bombardment, which continued for
the next three days.
Fog and low cloud had prevented detection of the German build-up and eager to determine the reason
behind the German bombardment, the Rhodesian Platoon of “B” Company, 2/KRRC, under 2nd Lieut.
T. P. McDowell, was sent to carry out a raid for interrogation purposes. Unfortunately the German
soldier they captured was killed along with one Rhodesian. Seven other Rhodesians, including
McDowell, were wounded.
At 05h30 on 10 July the massed German artillery, including three 24cm naval guns, shore batteries
and 58 artillery batteries, opened up on the British positions in the bridgehead, demolishing all but
one of the bridges over the Yser in the process and isolating the 2/KRRC and Northamptonshire
battalions. Mustard gas was used for the first time in the barrage.
The tragedy that unfolded was recorded by Arthur Conan Doyle (The British Campaign in France and
Flanders, Volume 6, 1917) who at the time was visiting the British and French front lines as a war
correspondent:
“The seven previous weeks of comparative peace was broken by one tragic incident, which ended in
the practical annihilation of two veteran battalions which held a record second to none in the
Army....The 1st Division had taken over the sector which was next to the sea, close to the small town of
Nieuport. The frontage covered was 1400 yards... The positions had not been determined by the British
commander, but were the same as those formerly occupied by the French. It was evident that they
were exceedingly vulnerable and that any serious attempt upon the part of the Germans might lead to
disaster, for the front line was some six hundred yards beyond the Yser River, and lay among sand
dunes where the soil was too light to construct proper trenches or dug-outs. The river was crossed by
three or four floating bridges, which, as the result showed, were only there so long as the enemy guns
might choose. The supporting battalions were east of the river, but the two battalions in the trenches
were to the west, and liable to be cut off should anything befall the bridges behind them.... Upon July
10, the day of the tragedy, the two battalions in front were the 2nd King's Royal Rifles, next to the sea,
and the 1st Northamptons, upon their right.... The story of what actually occurred may be told from
the point of view of the Riflemen [2/KRRC], who numbered about 550 on the day in question. Three
companies, A, D, and B [of which the Rhodesian platoon was a part], in the order given from the left,
were in the actual trenches, while C Company was in immediate support. The night of July 9-10 was
marked by unusually heavy fire, which caused a loss of seventy men to the battalion. It was clear to
Colonel Abadie and his officers that serious trouble was brewing. An equal shell-fall was endured by
the Northamptons on the right, and their casualties were nearly as heavy. So weakened was A
Company in its post along the sand dunes that it was drawn into reserve in the morning of July 10, and
C Company took its place. During this night an officer and twenty men, all Rhodesians, from B
Company, were pushed forward upon a raid, but lost nine of their number on their return. From 8:50
in the morning until 1 p.m. the fire was exceedingly heavy along the whole line of both battalions,
coming chiefly from heavy guns, which threw shells capable of flattening out any dug-out or shelter
which could be constructed in such loose soil. For hour after hour the men lay motionless in the midst
of these terrific ear-shattering explosions, which sent huge geysers of sand into the air and pitted with
deep craters the whole circumscribed area of the position. It was a horrible ordeal, borne by both
battalions with the silent fortitude of veterans. Many were dead or shattered, but the rest lay nursing
the breech-blocks of their rifles and endeavouring to keep them free from the drifting sand which
formed a thick haze over the whole position.... There was no telephone connection between the Rifles'
Headquarters and the advanced trenches, but Lieutenant Gott made several journeys to connect them
up, receiving dangerous wounds in the attempt. About twelve, the dug-out of B Company was blown in,
and a couple of hours later that of C
Company met the same fate, the greater
part of the officers in each case being
destroyed. An orderly brought news also
that he had found the dug-out of D
Company with its inmates dead, and a
dead Rifleman sentry lying at its door....
The telephone wire to the rear had long
been cut, and the doomed battalions had
no means of signalling their extreme need,
though the ever-rising clouds of sand
were enough to show what they were
enduring. No message of any sort seems to
have reached them from the rear. The fire
was far too hot for visual signalling, and
several pigeons which were released did
This photograph, from a German source, shows an overrun 2/KRRC trench
following Operation Strandfest in July 1917. The bunker was in the extreme
northern position on the Western Front and directly overlooked the beach and
the North Sea; both of which are visible in the background.
not appear to reach their destination.
With sinking hearts, shaken and dazed
survivors waited for the infantry attack
which they knew to be at hand....
The divisional artillery was doing what it could from the other side of the Yser, but the volume of fire
from the heavies was nothing as compared with the German bombardment. To add to the misery of
the situation, a number of German aeroplanes were hawking backwards and forwards, skimming at
less than 100 feet over the position, and pouring machine-gun fire upon every darker khaki patch
upon the yellow sand....
Great hopes were entertained that some diversion would be effected by the gunboats upon the flank,
but for some reason there was no assistance from this quarter. Hour after hour passed, and the
casualties increased until the dead and wounded along the line of both battalions were more
numerous than the survivors. At 3 p.m. the regimental dug-out of 2/KRRC showed signs of collapse
under the impact of two direct hits. Those who could move betook themselves to an unfinished tunnel
in the sand in which a handful of Australian miners were actually working. These men had changed
their picks for their rifles, and were ready and eager to help in the defence of the position. In little
groups, unable to communicate with each other, each imagining itself to be the sole survivor, the men
waited for the final German rush. At 7:15 it came. A division of German marines made the attack, some
skirting the British line along the seashore and approaching from the flank or even from the rear. As
many 2/KRRC Riflemen as could be collected had joined the Australians in the tunnel, but before they
could emerge the Germans were dropping bombs down the three ventilation shafts, while they sprayed
liquid fire down the entrance. The men who endured this accumulation of horrors had been under
heavy fire for twenty-four hours with little to eat or drink, and it would not have been wonderful if
their nerve had now utterly deserted them. Instead of this, everyone seems to have acted with the
greatest coolness. "The Colonel called to the Riflemen to sit down, and they did so with perfect
discipline." By this means the spray of fire passed over them. The entrances were blown in, and the last
seen of Colonel Abadie was when, revolver in hand, he dashed out to sell his life as dearly as possible.
From this time the handful of survivors, cut off from their Colonel by the fall of part of the roof, saw or
heard no more of him. The few groups of men, 2/KRRC or Northamptons, who were scattered about in
the sandy hollows, were overwhelmed by the enemy, the survivors being taken. Four officers, who had
been half-buried in the tunnel, dug their way out, and finding that it was now nearly dark and that the
Germans were all round them, proceeded to make their way as best they could back to the bank of the
river. An artillery liaison officer made a gallant reconnaissance and reported to the others that there
was a feasible gap in the new line which the enemy was already digging. The adjutant of the battalion,
with the second-in-command, and his few comrades, who included an Australian corporal, crept
forward in the dusk, picking their way among the Germans. Altogether, there were 4 officers, 20
Australians, and 15 Riflemen. One of the Australians, named McGrady, was particularly cool and
helpful, but was unfortunately killed before the party reached safety.... As the British emerged into the
gloom from one end of the tunnel, a party of Germans began to enter at the other, but were so skilfully
delayed by two Riflemen, acting as rear-guard, that they were unable to stop the retreat. The men
streamed out at the farther end under the very noses of their enemies, and crept swiftly in small
parties down to the river, which at this point is from 70 to 100 yards broad. Across their path lay a
camouflage screen some twelve feet high, which had been set on fire by the shells. It was a formidable
obstacle, and held them up for some time, but was eventually crossed. Here they were faced by the
problem of the broken bridges, and several were shot while endeavouring to find some way across.
Finally, however, the swimmers helping the others, the greater number, including the four KRRC
officers, got safely across, being nearly poisoned by gas shells as they landed upon the farther side.
So ended an experience which can have had few parallels even in this era of deadly adventure. Of the
2/KRRC, it was found next day that 3 officers and 52 men had rejoined their brigade. If so many got
away it was largely due to the action of Rifleman Wambach, who swam the canal with a rope in his
mouth, and fixed it for his more helpless comrades. Even fewer of the Northamptons ever regained the
eastern bank. "Like the Spartans at Thermopylae the men of Northampton and the Riflemen had died
where they had been posted. Heroism could do no more." Out of about 1200 men, nearly all, save the
casualties, fell into the hands of the victors.
Such was the deplorable affair of Nieuport, a small incident in so great a War, and yet one which had
an individuality of its own which may excuse this more extended account. The total German advance
was 600 yards in depth, upon a front of three-quarters of a mile”.
The official report succinctly commented on the fate of 2/KRRC: “An eyewitness who swam the Yser
says that the last he saw of them was in the death grips of the enemy. Very little hope is entertained as
regards the missing men” (Ragtime Soldiers, p. 64). The ''Bulawayo Chronicle'' ran a eulogy for the
Rhodesian Platoon, comparing the platoon’s valiant stand to that of Allan Wilson against Lobengula’s
warriors on the banks of the Shangani in 1893 – and comparable it was.
Total British casualties amounted to approximately 3,126 killed, wounded and missing. Some 1300
were taken as POWs. Of the 3,126 casualties, 50 officers and 1,253 other ranks belonged to the valiant
2/KRRC and Northamptons battalions. Despite the thorough preparations, the amphibious assault
never went ahead. The expected gains from the Third Battle of Ypres never materialised.
On 12 July the ragged but splendid remnants of 2/KRRC marched to Le Clipon camp near Dunkerque
where it went through a period of re-organising and training. In September more Rhodesian
volunteers had arrived and were utilised to re-form the Rhodesian Platoon.
In September Captain Brady transferred to 1/KRRC as the Battalion’s second-in-command and on 6
November a reconstituted 2/KRRC marched to a forward camp in the Ypres Salient and took over the
Paddebeek sector between Poelcapelle and Passchendaele where it was involved in a number of
engagements with the enemy. In February 1918, 2/KRRC’s front extended from 1,000 yards north of
Poelcapelle to a point about 1,000 yards south-east of that village. On 17 February the enemy raided
2/KRRC lines with a party of 40 men, led by 2 officers. The raid was repulsed with severe loss to the
Germans who left behind 19 dead, 1 wounded prisoner and 1 machine gun. 2/KRRC’s only loss was
2nd Lieut. Wilmot, who was in command of the post. On 20 March the Germans attempted another
raid on 2/KRRC lines which was repulsed, the enemy leaving three prisoners and many dead.
It is here, at the end of almost three and half years of grinding “entrenched warfare” during which
there were over over one and a half million British and Empire casualties, that we leave the
experiences of the Rhodesian platoons on the Western Front. The Rhodesian platoon of 2/KRRC
continued to fight throughout the final phase of the war on the Western Front. The following provides
a synopsis of the final phase (21 Mar to 11 Nov 1918), Armistice, demobilisation and the reaction at
home.
_____________________________________________________________________
7.
THE FINAL PHASE (21 MARCH – 11 NOVEMBER 1918)
The last great German offensive was launched on March 21, 1918, with Operation "Michel". It was
opened with an unprecedented 6,000 gun barrage which delivered a lethal gas attack deep into Allied
lines. At one point, the Germans advanced 14 miles in one day, more than at any other time during the
fighting in the West. During the first six weeks of fighting, the Allies lost 350,000 casualties, but more
troops were rushed in from across the channel, and American units began arriving for the first time.
The attack was quickly followed by a second offensive at Ypres, but this was halted after a brief threat
against the channel ports. Another German blow to Allied lines fell with the twin operations "Blucher"
and "Yorck," whose combined might drove south toward Paris, occupying Soissons and nearly cutting
off Reims. The spearhead of their advance penetrated as far as Chateau-Thierry, only 56 miles from
Paris. This operation however, suffered from the same flaw as many which had preceded it. Ludendorf
had not planned for this offensive to succeed. It had been intended as a feint in order to draw French
troops away from the main offensive to the north, and so the astounding achievements were not
exploited because inadequate reserves were available. Still, the Allied situation was very grim and
they were forced to issue a "backs to the wall" order.
The German troops were quickly tiring from the prolonged effort, as well as giving in to periods of
looting. The economic blockade of Germany had cut off many vital supplies and back home, many
people were literally starving. Many German troops were chronically undernourished, and whenever
they encountered Allied food stocks, much time was lost as these desperately famished troops gorged
themselves. So the last German offensive, an attempted pincer operation around Rheims, was finally
stopped with concentrated artillery and aircraft attacks. By late June, German strength on the Western
Front fell below that of the Allies, and the final Allied assault was not long in coming.
The first attacks were made in July by the French west of Rheims. This was followed by a British
offensive at the Amiens Bulge and a general offensive toward the Hindenburg Line. The Americans
under General John Pershing attacked the St. Mihiel Salient south of Verdun and then attacked through
the Argonne west of Verdun as part of a general advance. The Germans were now steadily pulling
back, and even though the Allies continued to suffer tremendous losses (The Americans lost 100,000
casualties just fighting through the Argonne region), they were now inspired by the continued German
retreat. The French and British continued to advance and on 29 September 1918 the German Supreme
Army Command informed Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Imperial Chancellor that the military situation
facing Germany was hopeless. Ludendorff, probably fearing a breakthrough, claimed that he could not
guarantee that the front would hold for another 24 hours and demanded a request be given to the
Entente for an immediate ceasefire. The Kaiser concurred.
All combatant countries were anxious to agree an armistice and a German delegation crossed the front
line in five cars. They were taken by train to the secret destination, aboard Ferdinand Foch's private
train parked in a railway siding in the forest of Compiègne some 60 kilometres north of Paris. An
armistice was agreed and signed at about 5.15 am on Monday 11 November, coming into effect at
11.00 am (Paris time) on 11 November.
The only German to keep fighting was Field Marshal Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa, who was
beginning his invasion of Northern Rhodesia. He surrendered on November 23, immediately upon
hearing of the surrender.
The foundation for the association between Rhodesia and the KRRC, laid by Henry Paulet, Marquess of
Winchester in October 1914, was fortified by the brave men of the “Rhodesian” platoons and
continued well into the 1950’s. This association endured in the form of affiliation between the KRRC
and the Rhodesia Regiment's new incarnation which adopted aspects of the KRRC uniform and a
similar regimental insignia.
During the course of the war 57 percent (12,824 officers and men) of the KRRC were killed. KRRC
battalions gained 8 Victoria Crosses, three to 2/KRRC, and 2,128 other decorations…Rhodesians
among them.
8.
ARMISTICE AND DEMOBILISATION
At the front, information about the imminent ceasefire had spread among the forces of both sides in
the hours before. The fighting in many sectors however, continued right until the appointed hour.
When the guns stopped firing there was no fraternisation and little rejoicing – just bewildered relief.
The dominant feeling among the soldiers was silence and emptiness after fifty exhausting months of
war.
The conclusion of a conflict of such cataclysmic proportions and involving millions of people cannot be
easily encapsulated. Those who fought on the Western Front provide the best insight.
Major Keith, Officer Australian Corps
Nearby there was a German machine-gun unit giving our troops a lot of trouble. They kept on firing
until practically 11 o'clock. At precisely 11 o'clock an officer stepped out of their position, stood up,
lifted his helmet and bowed to the British troops. He then fell in all his men in the front of the trench
and marched them off. I always thought that this was a wonderful display of confidence in British
chivalry, because the temptation to fire on them must have been very great.
A British corporal reported
The Germans came from their trenches, bowed to us and then went away. That was it. There was
nothing with which we could celebrate, except cookies." (Leonhard, Jörnm, Die Büchse der Pandora Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs, 2012).
George Grosz, a German soldier
I thought the war would never end. And perhaps it never did, either. Peace was declared, but not all of
us were drunk with joy or stricken blind. Very little changed fundamentally, except that the proud
German soldier had turned into a defeated bundle of misery and the great German army had
disintegrated. I was disappointed, not because we had lost the war but because our people had
allowed it to go on for so many years, instead of heeding the few voices of protest against all that mass
insanity and slaughter.
Marine Hubert Trotman, Royal Marine Light Infantry
As we advanced on the village of Guiry a runner came up and told us that the Armistice would be
signed at 11 o'clock that day, the 11th of November. That was the first we knew of it. We were lined up
on a railway bank nearby, the same railway bank that the Manchesters had lined up on in 1914. They
had fought at the battle of Mons in August that year. Some of us went down to a wood in a little valley
and found the skeletons of some of the Manchesters still lying there. Lying there with their boots on,
very still, no helmets, no rusty rifles or equipment, just their boots.
Corporal Reginald Leonard Haine, 1st Battalion, Honourable Artillery Company
It wasn't like London, where they all got drunk of course. No, it wasn't like that, it was all very quiet.
You were so dazed you just didn't realise that you could stand up straight and not be shot.
Sergeant-Major Richard Tobin Hood Battalion, Royal Naval Division
The Armistice came, the day we had dreamed of. The guns stopped, the fighting stopped. Four years of
noise and bangs ended in silence. The killings had stopped. We were stunned. I had been out since
1914. I should have been happy. I was sad. I thought of the slaughter, the hardships, the waste and the
friends I had lost.
While the individual soldier on both sides dealt with his emotions and attempted to rationalise the
reason for the mass slaughter that had taken place and his part in it, London and Paris were
celebrating.
In London work ceased in shops and offices, as news
of the armistice spread. Crowds surged through the
street, often led by airmen and Dominion troops on
leave. Omnibuses were seized, and people in strange
garments danced on the open upper decks. A bonfire
heaped on the plinth of Nelson's column in Trafalgar
Square has left its mark to this day. Total strangers
copulated in doorways. They were asserting the
triumph of life over death. The celebrations
continued with increasing wildness for three days,
when the police finally intervened and restored
order.
In Paris, news of the signing of the armistice was officially announced towards 9:00 am. At 11:00 am
the multitudes gathered in the streets went wild with delight and bells rang and flags waved
throughout Paris.
In Rhodesia, news of the armistice was received on 11 November and was announced to the Salisbury
folk by the frenzied sounding of the Castle Brewery siren. Street parties erupted almost immediately,
and in the evening the people let off fireworks and lit a huge bonfire on Salisbury kopje. Bulawayo
threw a huge party which lasted non-stop for forty-eight hours; there were processions and on 12
November the entire Bulawayo population flocked into the streets to cheer and dance to the strains of
an outdoor band. Everywhere there were parties and civic functions to celebrate the end of four years
of war. Smaller towns marked the armistice with their own celebratory functions and events. All
looked forward to the return of their husbands, sons, sweethearts and fathers. However, the
dismantling of such a huge war machine would take time which meant that the Rhodesian soldiers in
Europe would not be home for Christmas.
The original British demobilisation scheme proposed that the first men to be released from service
should be those who held jobs in key branches of industry. However, as these men were invariably
those who had been called up in the latter stages of the war, it meant that men with the longest service
records were generally the last to be demobilised. The scheme, as shown in 1918 by the small-scale
mutinies at British army camps in Calais and Folkestone and by a demonstration of 3,000 soldiers in
central London, was potentially a serious source of unrest.
Thus, one of Churchill's first acts as the new War Secretary in January 1919, was to introduce a new
and more equitable demobilisation scheme. Based on age, length of service and the number of times a
man had been wounded in battle, it ensured that the longest-serving soldiers were generally
demobilised first. The new system defused an explosive situation.
Nevertheless, demobilised soldiers from the Dominions were often left waiting in Britain for long
periods until transport could be found to ship them home. Frustrated by the delays and eager to get
home to their families and sweethearts, soldiers at a camp for Canadian forces in Rhyl mutinied in
March 1919. The mutiny was only suppressed after a number of men were killed. A few months later,
rampaging Canadian soldiers broke into a police station in Epsom, killing one policeman and causing a
serious riot.
It was shortly after New Year that the first small group of Rhodesians arrived home from Europe.
Small groups of soldiers would return in dribs and drabs over the course of the next twelve months.
For some, in hospitals in France and England, it would be several months before they could be
discharged. Many had been severely wounded on the Western Front, some dismembered, others
horribly disfigured and many suffering from shell shock and other psychological problems. Some
never made it home. Those with the most severe afflictions had, of necessity, to spend rest of their
days in Britain so as to receive the requisite treatment and care.
More than any other group, disabled veterans symbolised the First World War's burdens. Long after
the Armistice, the sight of empty sleeves tucked into pockets recalled sad memories of the war and its
long drawn suffering. For the disabled themselves, as one veteran explained, the Great War 'could
never be over.' Years after their demobilisation, disabled veterans bore the sufferings war inflicted.
They lived with injuries that robbed them of their independence. Some had lost their faces, arms,
hands, legs, been blinded or suffered from racking gas-induced coughs or uncoordinated movement
brought on by shell-shock. Each disabled veteran appeared to bring the war's horrors home with him.
Once home the soldiers’ found work with varying success. There was little security or public
assistance or any guarantee that the ex-soldiers would be able to find employment.
The difficult situation facing soldiers was not limited to unemployment. Among them there was a
strong sense of comradeship, a sharing of wartime memories and experiences. While this shared
experience formed bonds between former soldiers, it also had the effect of alienating them from the
thousands who had not participated in active service in the War. Where once soldiers had a purpose
and place in society, they now felt displaced and isolated. The soldiers had a strong sense of Rhodesian
pride after their exploits on the Western Front and in other theatres of war, and took offence at people
who did not understand what they had been through.
The former soldiers had to carve a new position for themselves in society, to rediscover a peaceful
lifestyle and settle down to a productive and meaningful life. It was not always easy for the soldiers to
reintegrate into Rhodesian society. Not all Rhodesians understood the importance of the Rhodesian
soldier in the War, or where he belonged in society. They had shared experiences that only other
soldiers could understand.
Rhodesians fought and died on all the Western Front battlefields immortalised by the British Army –
Aubers Ridge, Nieuport, Ypres, Loos, the Somme, Delville Wood, Passchendaele and many others.
Rhodesians bore the full impact of the war on the Western Front and it had its terrible effect on the
Rhodesian soldier and Rhodesian society as well. Over twelve percent of Rhodesians who went to the
Great War died with many more maimed, crippled or broken in spirit. This terrible casualty rate more
than decimated the white manhood of the fledgling colony.
Lest we forget.