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Transcription Delphine ALLES This part of the course is about frontier issues in the South China Sea, which need to be studied in order to understand the origins of strategic interactions in Southeast Asia. In Eastern Asia, to understand strategy, you have to look at history and tradition: they weigh heavily on contemporary political relations, be they be marked by tension or by cooperation among countries of the region. To demonstrate this, the case of the South China Sea is particularly interesting. This maritime area is at the heart of present tension between China and several countries of Southeast Asia, and among those countries themselves. In this presentation we shall show first what is visible: present tensions and their apparent reasons; and also what is less visible: the historical roots of the disputes, and how they can be explained by the foundations of the strategic postures of the States concerned. To understand the tensions we are talking about you only have to look at the map of the various claims. They mostly concern two main groups of islands, the Paracel and the Spratly islands. As the map clearly shows, the Peoples Republic of China is claiming most of the zone, but that is not the only claim. The Paracel islands in the north are mainly claimed by China and Vietnam, whereas different parts of the Spratlys are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The immediate explanation for these tensions at first sight seems relatively simple: in 1982, the United Nations adopted a Convention on the Law of the Sea, which defines the rights and duties of States concerning the use of the oceans, and in particular the limits of territorial waters and of the exclusive economic zones that determine the rights of States regarding the use and exploration of fisheries resources. The sovereign rights of States apply in their territorial waters, i.e. out to 12 nautical miles; beyond that there is a further 12 miles, the contiguous zone, and then the 200 miles of the exclusive economic zones. That looks simple, but in the South China Sea the territories are so close to each other that the Convention, by freezing maritime frontiers, inevitably led to an accumulation claims. The interest countries show for the zone is stimulated by its proven or potential resources. First, fisheries resources: the submarine biodiversity is particularly rich, for the time being anyway - overfishing is causing irreparable damage. Then, hydrocarbons, with reserves of offshore natural gas and oil (although they have not been entirely proven). Lastly, the zone is of unquestionable strategic importance, because the maritime traffic towards Southeast Asia has to pass through it, and also the submarines of the countries of the region, which can easily hide in the particularly irregular submarine topography. It should be borne in mind that the main Chinese submarine base is on the island of Haïnan, in the North of the zone. And yet all this is only the visible part of the problem: what we do not see are the origins of the tensions and their mark on the history of the region. That is what we will look at now. What we see in the area is the meeting of two concepts: On the one hand, the heritage of world visions rooted in History, which have fashioned the strategic traditions of the States of the region and which compete with each other; on the other, the generalisation in Asia of modern standards, such as the sovereign nation-state, with its own territory, capable of challenging the claims of the former powers. Historically, the islands have been occupied by several empires. Chinese historians consider that a presence of the Northern Song dynasty can be demonstrated on the Paracel and Spratly islands around the 10th century BC. This is however challenged, in particular by Vietnam and the Philippines, who claim to have settled there, even on the islands supposed to be uninhabitable. In 1992, the People’s Republic of China adopted a Law on the Sea asserting Chinese sovereignty over the islands, and this has been confirmed by several official maps of the region. The most recent, published in June 2014, extends still further the maritime zone claimed and confirms its importance, as it now is enshrined in the official map of the country. These Chinese ambitions are linked to the anteriority they claim and which is contested, but there is more to it than that. According to the world vision of the ancient Chinese empires, summed up in the term “tianxia”, or “under the heavens”, the world is a single entity destined to be governed by a universal emperor established in the centre of the Forbidden City, while the rest is organised in concentric circles round the empire. The calling of the Empire is therefore to be universal, and that of the world to pay tribute to it. From this angle Southeast Asia is a “Chinese peninsula”, and not a group of sovereign political units. Such a vision has had a lasting influence on the way Chinese leaders consider the rest of the region, and has produced a strategic culture based on the assertion that China has pride of place over its neighbours. In 2010, for instance, the Chinese President reacted to protests by ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member States by stating a simple truth - which is not as simple as all that: “China is a big country. The other countries are small. That is the way things are”. In reality things are more complex, because that kind of assertion of Chinese power runs counter to the basic principles of modern international relations, which can be invoked by the weakest States. At the end of the decolonisation process, all the countries of the region became sovereign States. This had two consequences: For the first time the former empires, which had always been defined by their centre and not by their frontiers (which were in fact fluctuating marches) were obliged to define precisely the limits of their territory, which led them at times to express their claims somewhat forcefully; at the same time, the new sovereign States were able to lean on an external, universal standard to demand to be treated equally and with respect by the most powerful countries, which enabled them to put forward their own territorial claims, thereby challenging Chinese influence. It can therefore be said that the present disputes are a direct consequence of the transformation of former empires into sovereign territorial States. This evolution is not only the root-cause of the tensions; it is also the keystone of the models of cooperation and dispute-resolution in the region. In Southeast Asia, the principle of sovereignty is the sine qua non of any form of cooperation. This principle implies mutual recognition of States, non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and decision by consensus. Those are the bases of the agreements envisaged for the South China Sea, which explains why the process is taking so long and why the agreements are nonbinding. Such is for instance the case of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which has been under discussion since 2002 and which contains no binding commitment, but which has advanced matters, in that the discussions have clarified the nature of the disputes and encouraged exchanges in a multilateral environment. When countries are prepared to have bilateral negotiations, there can be positive results. In June 2014, for instance, Indonesia and the Philippines succeeded in reaching agreement on their maritime frontiers; the negotiations had started in 1994. And in 2003 Malaysia and Singapore agreed to take their territorial dispute to the International Court of Justice. And there are other examples. Generally speaking, the States of the region try to reach a peaceful settlement of their disputes whenever possible, without giving up too much of their territorial sovereignty. And in any case, they have no option, if they do not want to weaken by their disputes their position in the face of increasing demands by China. And so the region remains in a situation that could be called “strategic ambiguity”, that can be summed up in three points: There are first the States who have no open dispute with China, but who have to be careful about their relations with their neighbours, and also with the United States. Such is the case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and also Thailand. These States try to remain neutral, urging a multilateral approach, but without playing the part of a mediator as might have been expected of them. China only accepts bilateral negotiations, because that is how it can exert the most pressure and strengthen its strategic clout in the region. Lastly, the United States had announced a “strategic pivot”, reorienting its foreign policy towards Asia to support its allies in the face of increased Chines pressure. The lack of concrete results so far tends to increase the strategic uncertainty in the area, however. We have therefore a tense situation, with States consolidating their positions and at times engaging in maritime jousts, like between China and Vietnam in May 2014 when they led to anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam. At the same time the status quo is maintained, as it is the least uncomfortable situation in that it allows countries to assert both their ancestral territorial claims and the key principles of modern international relations. The status quo will last until the situation explodes, either because of a genuine need of energy resources or sparked by the people themselves, who, becoming more and more out of control, decide to take into their own hands matters which until recently were dealt with exclusively by States. The strategic situation in Southeast Asia is therefore a perfect illustration of the interaction between political and strategic visions inherited from the distant past, international standards recently appropriated by the governments of the region, and inescapable social dynamics.