Download Transcription Delphine ALLES This part of the course is about

Transcription Delphine ALLES
This part of the course is about frontier issues in the South China Sea,
which need to be studied in order to understand the origins of strategic
interactions in Southeast Asia.
In Eastern Asia, to understand strategy, you have to look at history and
tradition: they weigh heavily on contemporary political relations, be they
be marked by tension or by cooperation among countries of the region. To
demonstrate this, the case of the South China Sea is particularly
interesting. This maritime area is at the heart of present tension between
China and several countries of Southeast Asia, and among those countries
themselves. In this presentation we shall show first what is visible:
present tensions and their apparent reasons; and also what is less visible:
the historical roots of the disputes, and how they can be explained by the
foundations of the strategic postures of the States concerned.
To understand the tensions we are talking about you only have to look at
the map of the various claims. They mostly concern two main groups of
islands, the Paracel and the Spratly islands. As the map clearly shows, the
Peoples Republic of China is claiming most of the zone, but that is not the
only claim. The Paracel islands in the north are mainly claimed by China
and Vietnam, whereas different parts of the Spratlys are claimed by China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
The immediate explanation for these tensions at first sight seems
relatively simple: in 1982, the United Nations adopted a Convention on the
Law of the Sea, which defines the rights and duties of States concerning
the use of the oceans, and in particular the limits of territorial waters
and of the exclusive economic zones that determine the rights of States
regarding the use and exploration of fisheries resources. The sovereign
rights of States apply in their territorial waters, i.e. out to 12 nautical
miles; beyond that there is a further 12 miles, the contiguous zone, and
then the 200 miles of the exclusive economic zones. That looks simple, but
in the South China Sea the territories are so close to each other that the
Convention, by freezing maritime frontiers, inevitably led to an
accumulation claims.
The interest countries show for the zone is stimulated by its proven or
potential resources. First, fisheries resources: the submarine biodiversity
is particularly rich, for the time being anyway - overfishing is causing
irreparable damage.
Then, hydrocarbons, with reserves of offshore natural gas and oil (although
they have not been entirely proven).
Lastly, the zone is of unquestionable strategic importance, because the
maritime traffic towards Southeast Asia has to pass through it, and also
the submarines of the countries of the region, which can easily hide in the
particularly irregular submarine topography. It should be borne in mind
that the main Chinese submarine base is on the island of Haïnan, in the
North of the zone.
And yet all this is only the visible part of the problem: what we do not
see are the origins of the tensions and their mark on the history of the
region. That is what we will look at now.
What we see in the area is the meeting of two concepts: On the one hand,
the heritage of world visions rooted in History, which have fashioned the
strategic traditions of the States of the region and which compete with
each other; on the other, the generalisation in Asia of modern standards,
such as the sovereign nation-state, with its own territory, capable of
challenging the claims of the former powers.
Historically, the islands have been occupied by several empires. Chinese
historians consider that a presence of the Northern Song dynasty can be
demonstrated on the Paracel and Spratly islands around the 10th century BC.
This is however challenged, in particular by Vietnam and the Philippines,
who claim to have settled there, even on the islands supposed to be
uninhabitable. In 1992, the People’s Republic of China adopted a Law on the
Sea asserting Chinese sovereignty over the islands, and this has been
confirmed by several official maps of the region. The most recent,
published in June 2014, extends still further the maritime zone claimed and
confirms its importance, as it now is enshrined in the official map of the
country.
These Chinese ambitions are linked to the anteriority they claim and which
is contested, but there is more to it than that. According to the world
vision of the ancient Chinese empires, summed up in the term “tianxia”, or
“under the heavens”, the world is a single entity destined to be governed
by a universal emperor established in the centre of the Forbidden City,
while the rest is organised in concentric circles round the empire. The
calling of the Empire is therefore to be universal, and that of the world
to pay tribute to it. From this angle Southeast Asia is a “Chinese
peninsula”, and not a group of sovereign political units. Such a vision has
had a lasting influence on the way Chinese leaders consider the rest of the
region, and has produced a strategic culture based on the assertion that
China has pride of place over its neighbours. In 2010, for instance, the
Chinese President reacted to protests by ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) member States by stating a simple truth - which is not as
simple as all that: “China is a big country. The other countries are small.
That is the way things are”. In reality things are more complex, because
that kind of assertion of Chinese power runs counter to the basic
principles of modern international relations, which can be invoked by the
weakest States.
At the end of the decolonisation process, all the countries of the region
became sovereign States. This had two consequences: For the first time the
former empires, which had always been defined by their centre and not by
their frontiers (which were in fact fluctuating marches) were obliged to
define precisely the limits of their territory, which led them at times to
express their claims somewhat forcefully; at the same time, the new
sovereign States were able to lean on an external, universal standard to
demand to be treated equally and with respect by the most powerful
countries, which enabled them to put forward their own territorial claims,
thereby challenging Chinese influence.
It can therefore be said that the present disputes are a direct consequence
of the transformation of former empires into sovereign territorial States.
This evolution is not only the root-cause of the tensions; it is also the
keystone of the models of cooperation and dispute-resolution in the region.
In Southeast Asia, the principle of sovereignty is the sine qua non of any
form of cooperation. This principle implies mutual recognition of States,
non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and decision by
consensus. Those are the bases of the agreements envisaged for the South
China Sea, which explains why the process is taking so long and why the
agreements are nonbinding. Such is for instance the case of the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which has been under
discussion since 2002 and which contains no binding commitment, but which
has advanced matters, in that the discussions have clarified the nature of
the disputes and encouraged exchanges in a multilateral environment.
When countries are prepared to have bilateral negotiations, there can be
positive results. In June 2014, for instance, Indonesia and the Philippines
succeeded in reaching agreement on their maritime frontiers; the
negotiations had started in 1994. And in 2003 Malaysia and Singapore agreed
to take their territorial dispute to the International Court of Justice.
And there are other examples.
Generally speaking, the States of the region try to reach a peaceful
settlement of their disputes whenever possible, without giving up too much
of their territorial sovereignty. And in any case, they have no option, if
they do not want to weaken by their disputes their position in the face of
increasing demands by China.
And so the region remains in a situation that could be called “strategic
ambiguity”, that can be summed up in three points:
There are first the States who have no open dispute with China, but who
have to be careful about their relations with their neighbours, and also
with the United States. Such is the case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and also
Thailand. These States try to remain neutral, urging a multilateral
approach, but without playing the part of a mediator as might have been
expected of them.
China only accepts bilateral negotiations, because that is how it can exert
the most pressure and strengthen its strategic clout in the region.
Lastly, the United States had announced a “strategic pivot”, reorienting
its foreign policy towards Asia to support its allies in the face of
increased Chines pressure. The lack of concrete results so far tends to
increase the strategic uncertainty in the area, however.
We have therefore a tense situation, with States consolidating their
positions and at times engaging in maritime jousts, like between China and
Vietnam in May 2014 when they led to anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam. At the
same time the status quo is maintained, as it is the least uncomfortable
situation in that it allows countries to assert both their ancestral
territorial claims and the key principles of modern international
relations. The status quo will last until the situation explodes, either
because of a genuine need of energy resources or sparked by the people
themselves, who, becoming more and more out of control, decide to take into
their own hands matters which until recently were dealt with exclusively by
States.
The strategic situation in Southeast Asia is therefore a perfect
illustration of the interaction between political and strategic visions
inherited from the distant past, international standards recently
appropriated by the governments of the region, and inescapable social
dynamics.