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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
Volume 22: April 2014
Academic year 2013-2014
Editor in Chief
Rodrigo Vaz
Catholic University of Portugal
Portugal
Editorial Board
Caitlin Bagby, USA
King’s College, London, United Kingdom
Péter Király, Hungary
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Andrijana Nikic, Montenegro
University of Montenegro, Montenegro
Reint-Jan Groot Nuelend, The Netherlands
University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Vit Simral, Czech Republic
IMT, Lucca, Italy / Charles University, Prague / Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
Advisory Board
Manuel Garreton, Chile,
João Carlos Espada, Portugal,
Carole Pateman, England,
Leonardo Morlino, Italy,
Phillippe Schmitter, USA
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
Table of Contents
Editorial Message.......................................................................................................................................... 4
Rodrigo Vaz
Part 1 – IAPSS Think Tank Working Papers
Introduction to Objectives of the United States Foreign Policy ........................................... 5
IAPSS Think Tank Working Group 1
African and Latin American Political Regimes in Perspective: A Regional Analysis
of Emerging Socio-Political Trends .................................................................................................... 16
IAPSS Think Tank Working Group 2
From Mere Presence to “Actorness” in International Affairs: Upgrading the EU’s
Role to Global ............................................................................................................................................... 21
IAPSS Think Tank Working Group 3
Part 2 - Regular Articles
Terrorist Attacks & Presidential Approval Rating ................................................................... 27
Elizabeth Bennett
The politics of writing history: historians' debates and high-school history
teaching in post-socialist Romania .................................................................................................. 45
Sergiu Delcea
Beyond Compatibility : Replicating High-Performing Asian Economies...................... 56
Meicen Sun
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
Editorial Message
Dear Reader,
First of all, let me welcome you to this last issue of POLITIKON, the IAPSS journal of Political
Science.
I am privileged to introduce to you the first working papers produced by the IAPSS Think Tank.
Under the theme ‘Global Governance and New Trends’, they focus on the US Foreign Policy,
Latin America and African Political Regimes and the role of the EU in global politics. This issue
also features articles selected and reviewed from the last call for papers which cover issues as
diverse as Eastern European politics, American Presidencies and terrorist attacks and the rising
Asian economies.
This is also the last issue I am responsible for, as my mandate as Editor-in-Chief expires with its
publication, having already stepped down as Head of Academic Department last February. For
that, I would like to thank everyone working at the Department for these last two years, and in
this context particularly to the Editorial Boards who I worked with. To the two IAPSS
Publications Coordinators I worked over these two years I would like to extend a special word of
gratitude. Both Gabriela Marzonetto and Alexandru Volacu were crucial to the development of
POLITIKON, the Academic Department and the Association. Alexandru Volacu follows me as
Head of the Academic Department and I want to express him my confidence in the excellent
work he made us used to and which I am sure he will extend to the whole Department.
For now, I will leave you with the excellent articles this issue’s authors have submitted. The
topics covered are very heterogeneous and diverse, and I am sure you will find many that suit
your likes. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact Alexandru Volacu directly at
[email protected].
Keep up the IAPSS spirit.
Rodrigo Vaz
Editor-in-Chief
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
Introduction to Objectives of the United States Foreign Policy
IAPSS Think Tank
Working Group 1 : Chander Busham NAGAR, Per HELBERG, Fanny POTKIN
Introduction
F
oreign policy of any country is
had not yet entered the industrial revolution.
not simply an assemblage of the
There were no great discrepancies in
policy statements of a country,
national wealth and the United States (U.S.)
but it also refers to the commitments, the
was essentially self sufficient. As like the
current
and
case of colonial India, it engaged extensively
objectives of a government. Thus, in order
in foreign commerce, but its own resources
to understand the foreign policy of any
enabled it to do so advantageously and it
government it becomes vital to understand
enjoyed a high relative standard of living.
form
of
interests,
aims
the country’s national interests and the
strategies adopted to achieve it. It has
already been proved several times that no
government is able to formulate its foreign
policy on a clean slate, its policy is always
conditioned by its past circumstances.
The
fundamental
principles
of
United States foreign policy have been stated
in general terms on numerable number of
occasions. Some of the statements are
general in nature. Some of them were quite
relevant from the various point of views. An
The case of United States of America is
important view in this regard is to study the
much similar to those of the India’s foreign
history of United States Diplomacy. By
policy
its
going through the various texts we can reach
independence. The first prime minister of
to this conviction that there are certain
India Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru, has himself
underlying concepts and principles which
drawn parallel and former Ambassador of
had played an important part in U.S. foreign
the United States of America, Chester
policy throughout all, or most of the history
Bowles has given his view that India’s policy
of the United States.
in
the
first
quarter
of
is practically indistinguishable from the
foreign policy of the United States from
1787 to 1937. The United States won its
independence in an un-crowded world that
The most basic fundamentals of the
U.S. foreign policy are those of the “Security
expansion and neutrality”. The other view
quotes some of the fixed points in the U.S.
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
foreign policy like isolationism, the Monroe
rights of Mississippi
Doctrine, freedom of seas and the open
Spanish New orlean, a problem posed by the
door policy”.1 Another view held the
British impressments of seaman & neutral
following
rights.
principles
like
(i)
Sovereign
Another
navigation ports,
aspect
of
the
U.S.
independence, (ii) Continental Expansion,
fundamental in matter of foreign policy is
(iii) Avoidance of the ordinary vicissitudes
the
and ordinary combinations, and collisions of
expansion, which found expressions in three
the
major
European
politics,
(iv)
the
American
military
drive
for
campaigns
continental
against
the
neocolonization principle, (v) the non-
Western American Indian’s between 1790
transfer principle especially in case of no
and 1794. Under this previow, the difference
transfer by one European power to another
in
of
fundamental has no parallel text in India’s
any
possession
in
the
Western
Hemisphere, (vi) Freedom of the seas for
neutral ships in time of war and freedom of
navigation of the international rivers, (ix) the
right of expatriation and the wrong of
imprisonment
(x)
a
feeling
of
anti-
imperialism2.
geographical
surroundings,
this
case.
In the matter of peace and war, the
foreign policy matters of the United States,
as is being considered it as an alternative
means of pursuing the independence voiced
the hope, that the U.S. may hope to become
The geographical factor also plays an
an arbiter of Europe in America and to be
important role in the U.S. foreign policy.
able to incline the balance of European
The presence on its western side of a
competition in the part of the world as the
continent that was relatively sparse and
national
whose primitive inhabitants were no military
determined renunciation of war as a means
match for a modern state. This fact invited a
of achieving foreign policy is unmatched in
policy of expansion that transcends the
the history of the United States foreign
frontiers of the United States borders. It has
policy3.
been stated that “the Americans possessed a
choosen country with room enough for their
descendents
to
the
thousanth
and
interest
may
dictate.
The
The Course of the Postwar Foreign
Policy of the United States
thousandth generations. The theme of the
Before World War – II the United
protection of the U.S. sea-based trade also
States had only intermittently played a vital
forms a vital significance in the U.S. foreign
role in the World affairs. It emerged from
policy. This theme appears in negotiations
the second world war as one of the super
for commercial privileges like concerns over
power. Much of the U.S. post world War –
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
II policy had centered around her efforts to
the league of nations in 1919. India also
adjust her view position and to the realities
participated in the San Francisco Conference
of the post war world. In the post war years
in 1945 and signed the Charter of United
the U.S. entered into forming military
Nations. Another important milestone in
alliances with old friends in Western Europe
same path of progress was the convening
and Latin America and with new friends in
the Asian Relations Conference in New
Asia, nevertheless all of the alliance had been
Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Asia
subject to increasing stress. As a matter of
after a long period of quiescence suddenly
fact, the unsatisfactory state of relations
became vital in world affairs. This was the
between communist and non-communist
major basis of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru’s
states, the postwar era had been projected as
perception of Asia in the early years of
an era of conflict4.
India’s independence. The temper of the
By the year 1946, the United States
began to show signs of awakening to the
nature of Soviet threat and heading toward a
new dimension of foreign policy. The new
departure in the foreign policy was stated on
12 March 1947, when the U.S. President
George Truman delivered his famous
‘Truman doctrine, Speech. In the speech he
stated the ‘containment of Soviet Union as a
prime objective of the U.S. foreign policy5.
India’s Foreign Policy Objectives and
U.S. :
Asian Relations conference was set by Pt.
Nehru in his inaugural address. His address
continues four major elements. Firstly, he
proclaimed India’s entry in the global scene.
Second, he emphasized the need for Asian
Unity. Thirdly, he called for avoiding
expression
of
anti-western
sentiments.
Finally, he attached considerable importance
to the imperative of greater regional
cooperation6.
When India became free on 15 Aug,
1947, the Indian National Congress, became
a center of power with Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru
fledged
as the first Prime Minister of India. Pt.
international personality after the attainment
Nehru was the architect of India’s foreign
of its independence on 15 Aug. 1947. The
policy and his influence was overwhelming
interim government of the independent
in the formulation of policies objectives. The
India was formed on 2nd Sept., 1946.
governing considerations in Pt. Nehru’s view
Before, this date, the external relations of
in regard to foreign policies are three :
India
became
a
full
India were conducted by British governing
bodies.
India
attained
the
very
first
recognition at international level after joining
a.
The newly independent countries
inclusive of India, must not be
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
b.
Vol. 22, April 2014
used as pawns by the other states
another, which have led in the past to world
for their personal interests. They
wars and which may again lead to disasters
must have a free hold in deciding
on an even vaster scale. We believe that
about themselves.
peace and freedom are indivisible and the
There
was
urgent
need
to
provide a fair and equitable
social and economic foundation
for
our
newly
formed
democracy.
c.
denial of freedom anywhere must endanger
freedom elsewhere and lead to conflicts and
wars. We are particularly interested in the
emancipation of colonial and dependent
countries and people and in the recognition
in theory and practice of equal opportunities
There was a need for the
for all races. India seek no domination over
maintenance of the territorial
others and we claim no privileged position
integrity of India7.
over people. But it do claim equal and
honourable
treatment
for
our
people
The Congress first outlived the foreign
wherever they may go and we cannot accept
policy of free India in the Jaipur session of
any discrimination against them9”.
the Indian National Congress in Dec, 1948.
The resolution on foreign policy adopted at
Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru was fully aware of
Jaipur stated that, “ the foreign policy of
the main task of India’s foreign policy, that
India must necessarily be based on the
is the promotion of its national interest.
principles that have guided the congress in
During his speeches he felt the supreme
the past. These principles are the promotion
need for peace in building up a new India.
of world peace, the freedom of nations,
As the circumstances of our country were
racial equality and the ending of imperialism
not favourable at the time of independence.
and colonialism. In particular, the Congress
In view of the interdependent world, he felt
emphasized on the freedom of the nations
that trouble anywhere in the world would
of Asia and African continents, who have
influence India’s plan for building up its
suffered under various forms of colonialism
economy. He was anxious to maintain
for many generations8. The speeches of Pt.
friendly relations with all the neighbours in
Nehru presents a clear cut thought of his in
Asia and to cooperate with them in
regard to India’s foreign policy objectives. In
international
a speech broadcast to the nation on 7th
independence, the “Cold War”10 and had
Sept, 1946 he quoted, “We propose as far as
already started. The polarization of a large
possible, to keep away from the power
part of the world into the Soviet block and
politics of groups, aligned against one
Western block led by United States of
affair.
By
the
time
of
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
America had taken shape. In view of this
level. Several of these objectives were
India decided to keep away from the politics
common by nature. A former foreign
of alignment.
secretary of India, Muchkund Dubey stated
In the interest of economic development
of India, for maintaining the independence
of action in foreign affairs for safeguarding
the security of nation and for working
effectively for world peace, India decided to
keep away from the rival power blocks and
followed an independent foreign policy. In a
speech being delivered at Indian Council of
World Affairs, New Delhi on 23 March
1949, Pt. Nehru stated When I say that we
should not align ourselves with any power
block, obviously it does not mean that we
should not be closer in our relation with
some countries in comparison to a few other
one. At the present moment, you will see
that as a matter of fact we have for closer
relations with some countries of West, then
with others. The closer relation will no
doubt developed and we will encourage
them
to
develop11.”
The
that “The primary purpose of any country’s
foreign policy is to promote its national
interest, to ensure its security, safeguard its
sovereignty, contribute to its growth and
prosperity, further, generally enhance its
stature, influence and role in the comity of
nations. A country’s foreign policy should
also be able to serve the broader purpose of
promoting
peace,
disarmament,
development and of establishing a stable,
fair
and
equitable
global
order”12.
According to him, the goals of India’s
foreign policy are simple and straight
forward. The primary and overriding goal
has always been the maintenance and
promotion of international peace and
security. The objectives by nature are
fundamental and generally accepted by the
people13.
following
India immediately after independence
quotations of Pt. Nehru’s speech clearly
had to determine its policy objectives under
indicate one thing, that both the blocks were
difficult
having a great expectations in regard to
partition of India and creation of Pakistan
India’s stand on foreign policy matters just
had left a deep wound of hatred and ill will.
after the independence. Secondly, it also
Before partition, India was till than one
revealed the India’s important geostrategic
economic unit. The division of economic
position in Asia.
assets had created many economic problems,
The foreign policy makers of India set
out certain so as to lay down basic principles
to formulate the policy upto a full fledged
circumstances.
Internally,
the
with the most challenging one was not very
comfortable with the advent of cold war
posture. It was in this situation, that India
decided that the world peace would be a
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
cardinal feature of India’s foreign Policy.
several international agencies like W.H.O.,
Peace meant not only avoidance of war, but
UNICEF, UNESCO etc. for the betterment
also reduction of tension prevailing in view
of these causes. India voluntarily chose to
of cold war. India had joined the league of
remain a members of the Commonwealth of
nations earlier and also supported the
Nations. It is the association of free and
creation
sovereign countries who were colonies in the
of
United
Nations
for
the
attainment of such cause.
A related objective was to root out the
case of war by measures such as liberation of
subject people and the elimination of racial
discrimination. In order to follow this goal,
India decided to follow an independent
foreign policy. Thus, the pursuit of peace
became a vital aspect in the foreign policy
declaration. Pt Jawaharlal Nehru always
quoted Mahatma Gandhi’s teaching as a
basis for foreign policy formulation. He
once quoted in the United States, “Gandhian
ethics was the cornerstone of India’s foreign
policy’. He insisted that physical force need
not necessarily be the arbiter of man’s
destiny and that the method of waging a
struggle and the way of termination are of
paramount significance14.
Another vital objective of foreign policy
esstwhile British Empire now recognises the
British Queen only
as Head of the
Commonwealth, not as crown of Republics
like India. Before 1949, only. The Bristish
Dominions were members of, what was then
known as British commonwealth, All the
dominions had the British Crown as their
monarch also. India decided not to leave the
commonwealth even after it decided to
become a republic and censed to accept the
British monarch as the head of the state.
India
owed,
along
with
some
other
countries, common allegiance to a particular
way of life. India considered the continued
cooperation with the common wealth of
mutual benefit to India and all other
member countries15.
U.S. Concern Over India’s Independence
& Before :
was “Elimination of Disease and Illetracy”.
In the struggle of independence,
These are ills not only of Indian society, but
India has drawn inspiration from the United
also of most of the developing countries of
States. The U.S. was the first colonized
Aisa and African continent. Whereas India’s
country to get freedom from bi-imperialism
domestic policy was aimed at the removal of
and as such became a modal of emulation.
these diseases, it was closely related with the
In this background and because of the
question of foreign aid and assistance. India
shared democratic values, it was expected
had preferably chosen to cooperate with
that the Indo-U.S. relations would acquire a
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
pattern of positive relationship. Whatever
and elsewhere were political, appointees,
the United States perceptions in the early
since then they had been career officials and
period
she
since 1924, they had been regular part of the
occupied a special place in their concept of
foreign services of the early starting avenue
world affairs. Because of this fact United
between the India and United States foreign
States realized that India was the only
relations.
of
India’s
Independence,
country in the Asian Region which was
deeply
committed
to
the
democratic
principles and had the determination, will
and also the capacity to progress. India and
U.S., though wide apart geographically have
been intimately connected by the fact, that
both are the largest democracies of the
world.
During 1865 and 1940, American
missionaries played a dominant role in the
early relations between U.S. and the Indian
Sub-continent. The American missionary
came to India in the early part of the 19th
century, but there were relatively few of
them, prior to the American war of
independence. After 1865, their number
The Indo-U.S. relations date back to
increased rapidly and Indian sub-continent
the times when the Britishers were here and
became the major field of American
India was still engaged in her war of
missionaries enterprise. In general, the
independence prior to the decade of
American missionaries had not only been
twenties. The contact between the people of
the largest single group of Americans in
two nations was limited only to the
India, but they have also had the most
missionaries and trade. The commercial
intimate contacts with Indian and have
contacts with India date back from the
probably made the greatest impact on Indian
period immediately following the American
philosophies and literature16.
revolution, when enterprising merchants in
colonial America seeking new fields of
commercial enterprises and finding the
markets of Europe largely closed to them.
Trade with India began to increase again in
the early 20th century and it had of course
expanded greatly in the post-independence
period of India, but the number of consular
establishment in India had never been so
great as it was during the 1850’s. Until 1906,
During the era of Indian Struggle
for independence, the American intellectual,
the politicians and the press were quite
sympathetic to the Indian National freedom
struggle, that some of them were critical of
British rule in India. The U.S. president
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was sympathetic
to the Indian national freedom struggle. The
U.S. Senator Blaine’s resolution on July
American consular representatives in India
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
17,1930 expressed support for the Indian
fact a war for the liberation of its peoples, it
national movement.
must assure the sovereign equality of the
The Indian opinion sought the
American intervention in their efforts in the
struggle for the attainment of independence.
Mahatma Gandhi wrote a letter to the U.S.
president Roosevelt on 1 July, 1942
people though out the world. The U.S.
leadership
perceives
this
demand
in
somewhat substantive way. The future gains
from India always dominant in the U.S.
policy towards India.
appealing him to help the Indian cause. He
The U.S. Senate foreign Relations
quoted, “both the India and U.S. believe in
committee also took a firm stand. It stated
knowledge and righteousness, and must
the demand that India might be given a
make common cause to fight war for the
status of autonomy. It further stated, the
common enemy of our countries17”. The
only way to get the people of India to fight
U.S.
forwarded
is to get them to fight for India. The
America’s moral support by sending two
committee demanded a status of autonomy
special envoys colonel Louis Johnson and
for India19.
President
Roosevelt
William Philips. William Philips in his
suggestions, advised the President to press
for
India’s
freedom
struggle
to
her
excellency of England. On 14 May 1943, he
wrote to the president by assuming that
India is known to be an important base for
the U.S. future operations against Burma
and Japan. It would seems to be of highest
importance that the U.S. should have around
itself a sympathetic India rather than, an
indifferent
and
hostile
nation18.
Nevertheless, On the occassion of the Quit
During
the
period
of
intense
negotiations for partitioning the country, the
United States closely followed the Indian
situation and was the only country to receive
advance briefing from England. Ultimately,
when it found, the partition to be inevitable,
it gave up its mediatory efforts, lest this
should be misunderstood to be taking sides
and thereby jeopardize ties with the
successor countries India and Pakistant20.
The
first
prime
minister
of
India Movement, the Indian offer of the
independent India Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
wartime collaboration in exchange of the
was conscious of the importance of the
political concessions was viewed by the U.S.
United States, while drawing the resolution
as a feeling of blackmail. The U.S. was not
for the All India Congress Committee in
prepared to perceive the Indian demand.
1952, he stated that “the next 100 years are
Yet, the then U.S. secretary of state Sunner
going to be the country of America”. As a
Wells stated, that if the Indian struggle is in
growing power, the United States is un12
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
doubtly going to play a very major role in
States to make up a lost ground in South
the years and generations to come21.
Asia22.
In India, even before the transfer of
In order to cover the new emerging
power, while there as an interim government
vacuum in the relations, the U.S. invited Pt.
was in the power, India was informed by the
Nehru to visit the U.S. He made an official
U.S. Secretary of State Lord Byrns that
visit in 1949. Pt. Nehru received a warm
United States would be happy to receive Sir
welcome from the government and the
Girija Shankar Vajpayee as Charg. D.
people of the United States. Addressing a
Affairs, the appointment of an Indian
joint
Ambassador in Washington D.C., the state
Representatives and the Senate, Pt. Nehru
capital of the United States of America. On
recalled the “declaration of independence”
April 10,
which greatly influenced him and the Indian
four months
independence,
Henry
before India’s
Grady
of
the
House
of
was
Constitution. He States, “I have come to
appointed the first American Ambassador to
United States, on a voyage of discovery of
India. He presented his letter of credence on
the mind and heart of America and to place
1 July 1947. He expressed the belief that in
before the American, our heart and mind”.
the context of the cold war it would be
Pt. Nehru in this manner describes his visit
better for India to be on he Western bloc.
as “Discovery of America”23. At this time,
This feeling of the United States formed a
the United States was favourably disposed
sympathetic turn in its perception towards
towards India. Although, some
India. In the initials phase of India’s dealing
differences inherent by nature and a conflict
in the international affairs, Pt. Nehru called
in opinion had started cropping up the
an international conference on Indonesia.
issues of foreign policy on world problems
India also decided to remain as a part of
like colonialism, communism, disarmament,
Common
Kashmir issue
Wealth
F.
session
Association.
The
etc.24. The
basic
first ever
withdrawal of the French and the Dutch
differences in opinion came to light with the
from the South East Asian region, the
Indian support over the Chinese admission
emergence of Communist China and India’s
to United Nation (U.N.) and the U.S.
sympathetic attitude towards her, made a
perceive, this as ‘timid’, short sighted an
sense of vacuum being created in the
irresponsible step25. In a similar other
bilateral relations between India and U.S. It
move, Indian opinion outraged at the
could only be pervasive for India to play a
indiscriminate bombings in South Korea.
leading role in this area. India seen as an
The Institute of Pacific Relations Organized
unparalleled opportunity for the United
a conference at Lucknow in Oct. 1950, in its
13
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
report it lamented American action and
migration, (iv) Transition from
consequently, India remain apart on the
colonial to National economy,
resolution, authorizing the U.S. Army
(v) Agriculture & industry (vi)
General
Labor
Mc. Aurthor to head the U.N.
issues,
(vii)
Cultural
force to intervene in Korean crisis. This was
Affairs, (viii) Status of women,
much resented by the Americans, who were
Harcharan Singh Josh, “India’s
irritated by this attitude of the Indian
Foreign Policy, Nehru to Rao
leadership26.
(N. Delhi – 1994) P. 12-13
7.
India,
References :
1.
these policies as the basis of U.S.
policy.
Norman
D.
8.
United States” Scientific Book
agency, Calcutta, 1970, P. 646647.
3.
Edwin.
C.
Hyot,
“The
9.
opcit. Sisodia, P. 2.
10.
Cold war defines as a phase of
relations
between
U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. in which no
direct war occurred. There were
“Foreign
policy criticisms occurred rather
than direct use of weapons as
Comparison.” P. 161.
and
Rajkumar,
Policy”. (N.Delhi 1952) P. 59.
Policies of India and U.S., A
Palmar
N.V.
hostile
ibid. P. 646-647.
Era”.
Background of India’s Foreign
“The foreign policy of the
2.
Gandhi
Delhi 1985) P. 7.
Palmer, Haward C. Perkins,
4.
Indira
(Inter, India Publications, New
Nathaneil Peffer has quoted
foreign
Sisodia S.S., “Foreign Policy of
means.
Perkins,
“International Relations”. CBS
Publishers, Delhi, P. 651-252.
11.
opcit. Sisodia, P. 4.
12.
Muckhand
ibid. P. 654- 655.
6.
The Asian Relations conference
Studies”,
comprise of major themes like (i)
P.117.
(ii) Racial problem, (iii) Issue o
“India’s
Foreign policy in the evolving
5.
National Liberation movement,
Dubey,
Global order in International
13.
April
–June
1993.
ibid. P. 117
14
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
14.
15.
Vol. 22, April 2014
J. Nehru, “Inside America”, New
Indian Journal of Asian Studies,
Delhi. P. 34.
July 1978, Vol. 18, No.2.
Mahendra
Kumar,
“India’s
Foreign Policy”.
16.
The writings of the Indian
philospher like Raja Ram Mohan
21.
opcit. Kamat, P. 208.
22.
New York Times, 31 Aug, 1949.
23.
J.L. Nehru, “India’s Foreign
Policy, Selected Speeches”. Sept-
Raj deeply influenced by the
thoughts
of
the
1946- April 1961, Publication
American
Division, Govt. of India, N.
missionaries. Vadilal Dagli, “
Two
decades
Relation”.
of
Vohra
Delhi, 1961, P.589.
Indo-U.S.
&
Comp.
24.
Publishers, 1969, P. 160.
17.
except the Kashmir dispute. As
Pakistan has joined the South
The Hindustan Times, 22 June
East Asian Treaty Organization
1960.
18.
ibid.
19.
Kamath, “ The United States and
All issues are generally debatable
(SEATO), thus obviously got a
favour from the United States.
25.
New York Times, 12 Oct, 1950.
India”. P. 128.
20.
R.C. Joshi, “ The American
Effort to Avert the Impending
Partition of India 1946-47”.
15
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
African and Latin American Political Regimes in Perspective: A
Regional Analysis of Emerging Socio-Political Trends
IAPSS Think Tank
Working Group 2 : Wilneida NEGRÓN, Jean PEÑA PAYANO, Carolina URREGO
SANDOVAL, Pedro CAPRA VIEIRA
Introduction
T
his year’s IAPSS Africa and Latin
American Think Tank Team will
examine current socio-economic
trends and their impact on
political regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America. Our four policy papers will
be centered on the following themes:

First - Characterization and
differentiation of the regions;

Second - Analysis of emerging
democratic trends such as: direct
democracy, multiparty systems and
democracy innovations;

Third - Trade-related development
assistance policies in Africa and
trade relations with Latin America;

Fourth - Emergence and impact of
Internet and social media in these
territories.
This first paper provides an introduction to
these regions and the topics we’ll be
exploring in the future.
In comparing two regions as diverse and
vast as Sub-Sahara Africa and Latin America,
it’s helpful to begin by discussing the
misconceptions and generalizations often
used to describe and label them.
Characterization:
Fragile States
Failed
and
While Sub-Saharan Africa (from here on out
referred to as Africa) and Latin America
provide fruitful comparisons, we must avoid
broad generalizations. Common among
policy makers is the use of concepts such as
fragile and failed states. The latter, has been
subject to critiques which deem it as
simplistic, misleading, and politicallyproblematic (Andersen, 2007; Bøås &
Jennings, 2005; Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009).
As a result, this paper recognizes the need to
avoid this bias by contextualizing the current
key trends in these non-Western countries
within their respective domestic and regional
experiences and realities.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that: 1) state
failure, whether understood as a process or
feature of political systems, is undoubtedly
an issue of domestic politics that in
International Relations has become a postCold War phenomenon. Failed states are
states unable to carry out their major
functions such as provision of security,
economic services, norm regulation, and
political participation. 2) Fragile states are
identified as those able to perform most of
these activities but which are faced with
increasing difficulties and vulnerabilities e.g.
vulnerability to poverty, food insecurity,
natural hazards, conflict, macroeconomic
shocks (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Collier,
2009; Naudé et al., 2011).
In Latin
16
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
American, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Guatemala are often labeled as fragile states;
while in Africa, Angola, Chad, Nigeria,
Sudan, DR Congo ., and Timor-Leste often
receive this label.
Political Regimes in Latin America
& Africa
When examining political regimes in these
regions, the conversation often falls to
success and failures of democracy. Both
regions have experienced waves of
democratization since the 1980’s and have
seen the number of military dictatorships
and one-party systems go down. However,
their transition experiences diverge in that
political regimes in Africa have evolved
within
neo-patrimonial,
personalistic
(Bratton & van de Walle, 1997) rather than
corporatist regimes as often seen in Latin
America.
Even though, some political regimes in
Africa continue to demonstrate personalistic
traits, leaders are starting to let go of old
patrimonial habits as citizens increasingly
demand less corrupt and more competent
leaders to represent them in the global
economy. Kenya provides a good example
of this.
Latin America has evolved from a region
where dictatorships prevailed for most of
the twentieth century to a region where only
a single openly authoritarian regime (Cuba)
exists today (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán,
2013). This transformation is often
attributed to the region’s political context,
strong normative preference for democracy
among citizens, and a lack of radical policy
preferences among key actors (Mainwaring
& Pérez-Liñán, 2013).
Political reforms in both areas have led to an
increase in multiparty politics - which
presents unique implications for their
political regimes.
The Rise of Multiparty Politics
Vol. 22, April 2014
Instead of single-party politics or military
rule, multiparty politics has dominated
political regimes in Africa and Latin
America.
Multiparty democracy swept
across Africa in the early 1990s, as singleparty states and authoritarian leaders bowed
to pressure from outside and within.
Overall, multiparty regimes in Africa have a
higher failure rate than in Latin America.
Also, multiparty regimes in Africa have
suffered from perpetual ‘democratic leaders’,
which hold on to power beyond their term
limits. For example, Uganda is officially a
multiparty
democracy,
however,
its
President, Yoweri Museveni, has been in
power since 1986. Cameroon's President
Paul Biya has also removed term limits and
former Nigerian President Olusegun
Obasanjo unsuccessfully tried to do the
same.
In Latin America, recent periods of
economic instability have tested the strength
and durability of multi-party systems. Even
so, young democracies have shown that
while their party systems display high levels
of instability, their political regimes have
been more stable than expected. Thus, the
crisis of the party system has not translated
into a crisis of the democratic regimes
(Milmanda, 2013).
Emergence of Direct
Participatory Budgets,
Democracy Innovations
Democracy,
and Other
Growing disillusionment in political regimes
and institutions has led to demands for more
responsive and effective political institutions.
Democracy innovations such as direct
democracy and participatory budgets are
examples of new institutional arrangements
which seek to increase citizen participation
in decision-making.
In Latin America
democracy some democracy innovations
include: participatory budgeting in Brazil, the
“Mesas de Concertacion”, in Peru, “Auditorias
Articuladas” in Colombia, the “Consejos
Gestores” in Brazil, and the “Consejos
Autogestivos” in Mexico are just some
examples of these new citizen-led
17
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
arrangements (Dagnino, Olvera & Panfichi,
2006).
Although occurring less in Africa, some local
governments have experimented with
participatory institutions (see Santos, 1998;
Heller, 2001; Fung & Wright, 2003).
Examples include participatory budgeting in
South Africa and recent mobilization in
hopes of implementing direct democracy
institutions in Kenya.
Although promising, it’s still unclear
whether democracy innovations can coexist
with traditional representative institutions in
these regions and what their impact can be.
Economic Transformations:
Inequality & the Rise of the
Middle Class
Recent economic transformations in Latin
America and “dual transitions” of economic
and political reform in Africa have produced
high level of dynamic economic growth. As
a result and despite the global financial crisis,
Africa is currently home to some of the
fastest growing economies in the world
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, and
Tanzania.
This growth has helped build a burgeoning
middle class, which has created new markets
for goods and services. In addition to
growing consumer markets, African
countries have discovered additional natural
resources which if managed properly, could
help spur further economic growth and
development in the region.
Nevertheless, despite this growth, the
regions are still affected by high levels of
economic inequality and political exclusion.
The situation is direr in Africa, were almost
one out of every two Africans continues to
live in extreme povertyi. Optimistically, the
World Bank (2013) suggests that this rate
will fall to between 16& and 30% by 2030.
Vol. 22, April 2014
As discussed earlier, democratization in
Africa has had a significant impact in the
promotion of international trade as a key
element to development. The existence of
democratic governments has also facilitated
international support from donors.
For our policy paper exploring aid trends,
we will opt for a more policy-oriented
analysis than the previous ones. In this
paper, we will focus on the characteristics
and implications of the Aid for Trade
initiative in Africa and its relationship with
democratization
processes
and
the
promotion of international and intraregional trade.
Several reasons for focusing on Aid for Trade
are:
First, unlike other forms of development
assistance, it focuses on matters of economic
growth and job creation, helping developing
countries to move from reliance on aid to
the use of trade to generate higher standards
of living. Also, since it was launched in the
2005 World Trade Organization (WTO)
Ministerial meeting, it represents an
acceptance by donors that trade is an
important
means
to
growth
and
development. However, substantial supplyside investments and policy reforms are
necessary to help developing countries lower
the cost of trading, increase productivity,
help firms diversify into new export
products, and integrate into global value
chains. Thus, it seeks to mobilize resources
to assist developing countries to build supply
capacity and trade-related skills.
Second, Aid for Trade is growing in
importance. It now accounts for 25% of
total Official Development Assistance
(ODA) (OECD, 2011). Its disbursements
have grown steadily - almost doubling for
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
category in which Sub-Saharan Africa is the
largest regional recipient. Disbursements
have increased from US$ 4.8 billion in 2005
to US$ 8.8 billion in 2010 (UNCTAD,
2012).
New Aid Trends: Aid for Trade
18
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
The Initiative does not substitute other
ODA disbursements but rather calls for
more resources which are directed to: (1
building productive capacity; (2 economic
infrastructures; (3 trade-related adjustment;
and (4 trade policy and regulations. By
addressing these constrains, it seeks to help
LDCs be more active players in global
trading - helping them tackle obstacles to
trade by mainstreaming trade policies into
national development strategies, setting up
the structures needed to coordinate the
delivery of technical assistance and
promoting trade capacity building.
Emerging Trends in Societies
Latin America and Africa Social Media
and Internet; the New "Public Space"
Internet, communication, technologies
(ICTs) are transforming world politics. The
current “information revolution" is based on
rapid technological advances in computers,
communications, and software that in turn
have led to dramatic decreases in the cost of
processing and transmitting information1. In
a world that’s increasingly complex and
globalized,
there
is
a
growing
interdependence among societies around the
globe. After decades of political change,
especially the formal acquisition of
participatory democracy, now we can see the
increase of political participation in the
regions’ citizens.
Africa and Latin America have not been
spared from the disruption of the Internet
and social media. Although, Africa lags
behind most other regions when it comes to
number of Internet users, there are still an
estimated 100 million users since the end of
2010. This number is expected to grow as
the number of people with Internet access
has quadrupled since 2000 and cell-phone
usage has been greater in Africa than in any
other region of the world. Currently, seven
1
Understanding International Conflicts, and
introduction to theory and history. Joseph Nye, Jr.
7th edition.
Vol. 22, April 2014
in ten Africans own their own mobile
phones, with access essentially universal in
Algeria and Senegal, according to
Afrobarometer findings from across 34
countries.
Still, the shortage of electricity and
broadband infrastructure, coupled with the
high cost of hardware will continue to
present barriers to Internet access.
However, Africans are increasingly using
ICTs in their social and political life. For
example, in Botswana, voters are
progressively bypassing traditional media
and turning to social networks for their
news.ii At the same time, in 2009, Facebook
became the most visited website in Africa
and Twitter and YouTube, rank among the
most visited websites in most African
countries2. The number of Facebook users
in Africa grew from 10 million in 2009 to
over 17 million in 20103.
On the other hand, Latin America has the
fastest growing Internet market in the world,
having increased 12% in the past year to
more than 147 million unique visitors in
March 2013iii. Brazil for example is home to
the region's largest number of Internet users,
62 million. Latin America also leads the way
in regards to number of social network
users.
Impact of Increasing Urbanization
Lastly, we will explore urbanization in Africa
and Latin America. In Africa, more than
30% of all Africans now live in cities (up
from 15% in 1965) – and this number is
expected to rise. Also, Latin America is
more urbanized than any other region in the
developing world, with 75% of its people
living in cities todayv.
2
See more at:
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/dece
mber-2010/social-media-boom-beginsafrica#sthash.EB1Z2CB2.dpuf.
3
Ibid
19
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
In Africa, the shift from rural to urban life
has been crucial for galvanizing economic
development because cities bring people
with goods and ideas together with those
who have capital. Urbanization in Africa, is
also forcing members of different tribes to
interact with each other. In Latin America,
urbanization has raised concerns regarding
Vol. 22, April 2014
crime and drug use. All of which can be
explored in a future paper.
20
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
From Mere Presence to “Actorness” in International Affairs: Upgrading
the EU’s Role to Global
IAPSS Think Tank
Working Group 3 : Josep GOMILLA PUIGSERVER, Magdalena NASIENIAK, Rachel
PETILLO, Scott Nicholas ROMANIUK
Introduction
T
he European Union (EU), with
its 504 million citizens, forms
one of the largest markets
worldwide
accounting
for
approximately 25% of the world
economy. Its (global) role, to a large extent,
has been based on its ability to act as a
standard-setter through the promotion of its
normative foundations, such as democracy
and human rights, liberal-market economies,
and multilateral governance, making it one
of the major development assistance
donors.4 The actual performance of the EU
presents an ambiguous assessment of the
EU’s “actorness.”5
agenda (dominated
financial policy).
by
economic
and
This policy paper aims to review the EU’s
current performance with reference to the
main areas of European foreign policy and
external governance, and to comment on the
potential to upgrade the EU’s role one of
global “actorness.” The simple scale of
issues related to EU policy makes the EU, at
least, prima facie present on the international
stage; however, its “actorness” depends on a
capacity to perform coherently, consistently,
and effectively.
The complex cross-pillar structure of EU’s
external action is one of the main reasons
for the EU’s lack of overall effectiveness,
and thus, the restructuring of the
institutional system has emerged as the key
provision for upgrading the EU’s global
performance. The current economic crisis
has created an unfavourable environment
for upgrading the EU’s performance to that
of global by prompting a widespread
austerity approach linked to the reduction of
the EU’s budget and diversion of the EU’s
attention from external events to an internal
4
In the academic literature the EU has been
referred to as a normative/civil/ethical power. See,
for example Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power
Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 40(2): pp. 235-58;
Larsen, H. (2002). The EU: A Global Military
Actor?, Cooperation and Conflict, 37(3): pp. 283302; Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical
Power Europe?, International Affairs, 84(1): pp. 111.
5
21
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
Figure 1: EU population in comparison with rest of the world (%). Source: Eurostat (2013). “The
EU in the World 2013: A Statistical Portrait,” Belgium 2012.
Figure 2: EU’s GDP share in comparison with the rest of the world (%). Source: Eurostat (2013)
‘The EU in the World 2013: A Statistical Portrait’, Belgium 2012.
Policy-Making System
Upgrading of the High Representative for
the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) was seen as a solution for bridging
divisions at the institutional level as well as
various policy areas within the realm of
external action. The new actor (the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy) was tasked with performing
functions
of
the
former-High
Representative, the Commissioner for
External Affairs, and the rotating Council
presidency. This tripartite position enabled
the establishment of a position from which
overseeing and coordinating the EU’s
external relations across various institutional
levels and policy areas could be possible.
However, with no explicit system of
deputation this became a near impossible
task.
The newly established European External
Action Service (EEAS) along with upgraded
EU Delegations abroad, provided an
additional institutional base for ensuring
coherence and consistency within EU
22
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
external action. The post of the President of
the European Council (EC) is to contribute
by providing strategic guidance at the
highest political level. Maintaining distinctive
decision-making procedures even though the
pillar-structure was formally abolished
undermined the latter provision. Therefore,
while the policy areas concerning trade and
development are pursued within a
Community-framework and correspond
method, the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) is maintained within the
intergovernmental
framework6.
Nevertheless, with the introduction of a legal
“personality” of the EU, negotiating and
reaching international agreements is now
subject to a single legal procedure and so
ensures a legal basis for the EU’s global
performance.
With only general provisions and no clear
division of labour, the new set-up was
determined to a large extent by the
subsequent informal adaptation. The Arab
Spring (including the military operation in
Libya), the Palestinian bid for its statehood
at the United Nations (UN) level, and the
war in Syria, provided a challenging context
for testing the new European foreign policy
and security apparatus while proving that the
impact of the supranational leadership when
it came to ensuring a coherent response
among the member states (MS) remained
limited. The unclear division of labour
triggered turf wars among the various actors,
which brought about further confusion as
regards the EU’s external representation.7
Exporting Values: The EU’s European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
Since 2004, the ENP has been employed by
the EU as an instrument of coherence as
Vol. 22, April 2014
part of its external policy. This change of
strategy in the external action is a
consequence of the weakness of the
Declaration of Barcelona in 1995. The ENP
strategy in 2004 and 2007 focus its goals and
give specific weight to potential MS. In this
sense, places like the South Caucasus and
Belarus obtained more importance8 in the
external action arena.
During the last nine years, the ENP has
been understood as an instrument to export
EU rules and values to its neighbours9.
While there is no clear definition of “shared
European values,” the inquiry here looks a
those values commonly associated with the
Copenhagen political criteria developed by
the EU in the context of the 2004 eastward
enlargement10. So-called “European values”
distribution has been one of the most
conflictive points during recent years and
one of the main reasons for difficulties in
ENP implementation. The gap between the
ENP as a program and the political,
economic, and, social reality of the third
partners reached its climax when the
uprisings known collectively as the “Arab
Springs” occurred in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region.
During the March 2013 ENP revision, the
EU changed its imposing democratic and
human rights values so that it could assume
the role of observing-actor while
simultaneously allowing the internal politics
of the states in ENP to assume their own
course. Notwithstanding this change, the
EU continues to employ the ENP with
democracy promotion as one of its main
goals, yet the EU has demonstrated an
understanding that objectives are achieved
6
The original plan to establish a single legal
framework for the “Union’s External Action” as
expressed in the Constitutional Treaty was not
maintained in the Lisbon Treaty.
7
The 2010 EU-summit in May of 2010 was
allegedly cancelled by US President Barack Obama
due to turf wars at the European level about who
should represent the EU – the Spanish PM who was
then chair of the Council Presidency or Herman von
Rompuy who was President of the EC.
8
COM (2004). 373 Relative to the ENP.
Del Sarto, R. A. (July 14, 2013). “Normative
Empire Europe: The EU and its Borderlands,”
Conference at the ENP PhD Summer School,
College of Europe, July 14, 2013.
10
G. Bosse (2007). “Values in the EU’s
Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or
Reflection of a Coherent Policy?,” European
Political Economy Review, 7: pp. 38-62.
9
23
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
when governments and civil society are both
ready and willing to act accordingly11.
Despite its efforts to change and adapt the
ENP to new and emerging geopolitical
realities, the EU should step-up and
streamline its responses to some of the
existing conflicts that are currently taking
place within its neighbourhood. The EU lost
a lot of time while deciding its position at
the beginning of the Syrian “conflict.” Its
lack of agility in reaching a quick and
common response was observed during
previous weeks with respect to the refugee
shipwrecks that have taken place off the
coast of Lampedusa, Italy. No solution has
been reached even after the October 24,
2013 EC summit.
The EU can still strengthen its common
responses regarding an extensive range of
issues. The upcoming Eastern Partnership
Summit provides a solid venue for the EU
to present itself as a strong actor with
specific and readily applicable expertise. The
ENP will face major challenges as part of
EU external policy and governance,
however, it presents the EU with major
opportunity to come forward as a actor able
to resolve conflict and crises quickly while
the international community looks on.
ESDP/CSDP: EU Military Capabilities
“The Union must have the capacity for
autonomous action, backed up by credible
forces, the means to use them, and a
readiness to do so, in order to respond.”12
This sentiment was express by France’s
former-President Jacques Chirac and
former-Prime Minister (PM) Tony Blair at
St. Malo in 1998 where and when issues of
the Petersburg tasks, Amsterdam Treaty, and
progression of both CFSP and ESDP were
addressed. The Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) evolved from the
European Security and Defence Policy
11
JOIN (2013). 4 Final. European Neighbourhood
Policy: Working Towards a Stronger Partnership.
12
Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on
European Defence, St. Malo, December 4, 1990.
<www.atlanticcommunity.org/SaintMalo%20Declaration%20Text.html>.
Vol. 22, April 2014
(ESDP), both of which constituted a major
part of the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). The ambitions
embedded within the CSDP are part of the
EU’s strategic vision to act strongly and
coherently in the face of regional, interregional, and international conflict and
crises.
Approval of the European Security Strategy
(ESS) in 2003 stands as a momentous
occasion in the development of the EU and
it’s “actorness” for signalling the first
instance in which the EU drafted and
implemented a joint security strategy akin to
the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the
US. Several successful missions characterize
the CSDP as a praiseworthy instrument of
EU state-building and legitimizing condition
of the Union as a major player at home and
abroad. Recent intervention missions of the
EU include “EUFOR Concordia” (Republic
of Macedonia) (together with NATO
military assets), “Operation Artemis”
(Democratic Republic of Congo) (together
with the UN), and further missions in
Georgia, Indonesia (Aceh), Sudan, Palestine,
Ukraine-Moldova, and Iraq. The EU
Operations Centre, sited in Brussels,
commands a still-limited military force. Five
national operations headquarters (HQs) also
comprise the general structure and content
of this particular domain of EU policy.13
Criticism regarding the EU’s current state of
military strength, partially prompted by
sharp budget reductions made across the
European continent, has made comparable
the EU of today with its former-state in
1991, when Belgium’s foreign affairs
minister described Europe as a “military
worm.” While national constituents of the
EU have shown discordant commitments
and contributions to the Union’s overall
military strength, they have (more
importantly) made deep cuts to their
respective defence budgets resulting
extensive military discharges and military
limitations in numerous dimensions. With its
13
EU Operations Centre.
<www.consilium.europa.eu>.
24
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
reliance on military assets from NATO, the
US, and lack of capacity to project its
existing military capabilities far abroad and
in ample force, the EU’s CSDP arguably
brandishes a spear with no head.
Beyond Europe: The EU Worldwide
Regional cooperation between the EU and
Africa started in the 1980s as a way of
achieving change in trade policies2, not only
in Africa but also in lesser-developed
countries
(LDCs).
Europe-Africa
cooperation gradually evolved since the
1980s, culminating in the EU-Africa summit
in Cairo (2000). The Lisbon Treaty (2007)
saw a politicisation of cooperation, and the
Joint Africa-EU Strategy was approved.
From 2008-2010, the EU and Africa
developed an Action Plan (AP), which was
updated in 2011. This “Second Action Plan”
emphasizes the most recent “priorities,”
including policy dialogue and coordination,
as well as strengthening capacities of African
Union (AU) bodies. The main issue
regarding EU-Africa relations consists of
hidden neo-colonialism nestled within
various development policies.
The EU represents a model for Latin
American countries in addition to the EEAS
(MERCOSUR) being a primary success
story of the application of the European
model in the region. American presence in
the region can potentially temper the effects
of such a model. Despite the applicability of
the EU model to Latin America, relations
between the two remain conditioned by
variable global governance dynamics. The
behaviour of the United States (US) after
9/11 has shifted the position of the EU to a
closer relationship with Latin American
countries. However, trade-related issues,
which the crisis has made more problematic,
still pose an obstacle to the promotion of
values in the region, which are vital to assess
the success of the European model on a
global level.
With their large populations and economic
growth record and potential, Asian countries
play a central role in Europe’s foreign policy
Vol. 22, April 2014
strategy. The EU exports a wide range of
products and commodities to Asia including
normative aspects of security and human
rights. Since the establishment of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), the EU
has been adopting a “comprehensive”
approach toward Asia based on the so-called
“Three Ds:” Defence, Diplomacy, and
Development. In 1996, a platform of
dialogue was established through the Asia
Europe Meeting (ASEM), foreseeing
summits every two years with the next one
scheduled to take place in Brussels in 2014.
In 2001, the EU adopted the “Europe and
Asia” Strategy with a strong commitment
toward mutual security objectives being
injected into the 2003 ESS that was also
reflected in the subsequent strategy adopted
for the period 2014-2020.
Conclusions
The EU’s ability to act globally has been
influenced by its complex structure of
external
action
formulated
through
distinctive decision-making processes and
various actors at both European and
national levels. Even though the Lisbon
Treaty formally abolished the three-pillar
architecture, it has been maintained
informally as an inter-governmental method
of the CFSP. Such a complex structure
requires extensive coordination and
proactive leadership in fostering common
positions between various European and
national actors, and across various policy
areas. While stronger and more determined
coordination and clear division between the
EEAS and the Commission should be
ensured, the political will of the MS is key to
ensuring that the new institutional
architecture leads to the upgrading of the
EU’s external role and its performance.
Greater involvement of foreign ministers
through their particular thematic or/and
geographical specialisations could contribute
to a greater sense of ownership at the
national level toward the EU’s external
action.
25
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
The EU also needs to clarify its interests and
projected values in order to ensure an
element of strategic guidance. The
availability of the diverse toolbox at the
disposal of the EU makes it a potentially
strong actor in the complex thematic and
geographical issues of the contemporary
international environment, which requires a
comprehensive approach toward such issues
as climate change, energy security,
sustainable development, and migration,
among others. The recent exercise of the
European Global Strategy (EGS) undertaken
by think tanks in Sweden, Spain, Poland, and
Italy has offered a unique platform for
discussing items of the EU’s future strategic
agenda. Both the breadth and depth of EU
policy externally clearly makes the EU
present on the global scale. Nevertheless,
with recent events shifting international
attention away from Europe, budget cuts,
prolonged downturn, inconsistent policy,
this will not be enough to ensure much less
maintain its global role. Effective leadership
and clear strategic priorities are required in
order to successfully exercise EU influence
externally, but most of all, the EU needs to
take decisive steps regarding its image in
order to restore its attractiveness as an actor
capable of being truly global.14
14
Africa Continues to Grow Strongly but Poverty
and Inequality Remain Persistently High, World
Bank 2013
ii The rising power of social media in African
politics.
iii 2013 Latin America Digital Future in Focus
iv 2013 Digital Future in Focus
v Population Reference Bureau, 2012 World
Population Data Sheet, 2012.
26
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, April 2014
Terrorist Attacks & Presidential Approval Rating
Elizabeth BENNETT15, New York University
Abstract
A
fter the attacks of September 11th the U.S. focused much of its foreign policy efforts on the War on
Terror and prevention of another attack on U.S. soil. This paper will look at terrorist attacks
dating back to 1970 in order to fully understand the impact of terrorist attacks on U.S. presidential
approval ratings and the existence of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect during different administrations.
Location, lethality, style, and political affiliation of the president will be variables focused on in a pre
and post 9/11 context. This paper will give special consideration to 9/11, excluding the attacks in many cases, in
order to view if there is a significant stable impact on approval ratings from terrorist attacks over time.
15
Elizabeth Bennett, 22, Albany NY, is a graduate student at New York University pursuing an
M.A. in International Relations/International Security. In 2013 she received her Bachelor of
Science degree in Managerial Economics from Bentley University. Her interests include security
studies, terrorism, and South Asia/Middle East affairs.
27
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
P
Vol. 22, March 2014
Introduction
resident George W. Bush’s first
term in office was met with an alltime high presidential approval rating of 90
percent. This spike in approval ratings after
the attacks of September 11th is attributed to
the nation uniting under the president for
support and leadership, an effect know as
the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, previously
applied to international crisis and is now
viewed with terrorist attacks. This study
looks at this type and similar effects on how
terrorist attacks are a determinate of United
States presidential approval. Attacks both
domestic and abroad will be used at that
were against U.S. citizens and U.S. interests.
Although the statistics have few domestic
attacks included, tactics and strategies used
by terrorist organizations are evolving,
keeping relevant the real and perceived
threat of large-scale domestic attack.
Presidential
approval
rating
fluctuations are attributed to many inputs,
economic and otherwise. If terrorist attacks
do have a significant effect on approval
rating then the characteristics of the attack
will be analyzed as well. As mentioned there
has been a domestic terrorist attack in just
more than one percent of all months from
1970 to 2010, so it is this infrequent type of
attack that tends to result in a large rally
round the flag effect. For a presidential
administration the goal of limited U.S.
deaths in these attacks have been successful,
with only three attacks with more than 100
Americans died. But depending on the type
of lethal attack used by the group could
determine the outcome of the impact. To
view the impact of these effects, this paper
will look at 1) the number of attacks per
month, 2) the location of the attack being
domestic or in the Middle East, 3) the
number of U.S. citizens killed in different
attack types such as bargaining (hijacking,
skyjacking, and kidnapping), bombings and
infrastructure attacks, 4) the impact of being
a Republican president when there is a lethal
attack, and 5) the impact of being a
Republican president during a domestic
attack.
Terrorist methods, tactics, and
targets have and continue to evolve but the
impact of these attacks on approval ratings is
predicted to show stability over a
considerable amount of time. As the fight
against terrorism wages on presidential
approval ratings remain susceptible to
attacks and public perception of the
handling of an attack.
And although
terrorist attacks are only one of many
variables in approval ratings, attacks from
pre and post 9/11 remain a significant
variable.
Literature Review
Since the attacks of September 11th
(9/11) several studies have explored the
relationship between terrorist attacks and the
presidential approval rating. Controlling for
the economy, scandals, and war, Guilmartin
(2004) analyzes presidential approval ratings
from 1942-2002 concluding there is a
significant relationship between the
incidence of terrorist attacks and the
approval rating. This study showed that
after a lethal terrorist attack Republican
presidents experience an increase in
approval rating relative to Democrat
presidents as well as a relative increase for a
Republican presidents when attacks are
kidnappings, hostages, and hijackings
involving American citizens. And lastly
Guilmartin finds that terrorist attacks in the
Middle East are positively related to
approval in the month following the attack.
There have been additional studies
on the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect dating
back to President Carter up to the most
recent administrations. The ‘rally round the
flag’ effect introduced by Mueller (1973) has
three main aspects: an international event
that sparks crisis, the event must involve
president directly, and the event must be
sharp, focused and dramatic. Brody (1984)
further explains that the phenomenon
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
results from an international crisis where the
country is united around the president,
stating the effect will only last as long as the
crisis. Callaghan and Virtanen (1993) cite
the great increase in Carters presidential
approval rating at the onset of the Iranian
hostage crisis, thus showing the bipartisan
impact and susceptibility of all political
groups to this effect. In this case
independents increased their approval of
Carter by 27 percentage points and
Republicans and Democrats by 10 and 14
percentage points respectively.
Further
studies by Hetherington and Nelson (2003)
compared presidential approval to three
major terror attacks, showing President
George W. Bush’s presidential approval
rating that increased from 57 percent to 90
percent after the attacks of 9/11.
A study differing from most in its
field by Johnasen (2008) uses an increase in
the level of terror alert to view the impact on
presidential approval. Controlling for war,
campaigning, and the state of the economy
the hypothesis states: when there is a change
in the terror alert level, presidential approval
increases. In this study the hypothesized
relationship between approval ratings and
the level of the terror alert (Johnasen).
Using the data and results, Johnasen
concludes the relationship between the
increase of 33 percentage points in
presidential approval for George W. Bush is
not directly from the rally round the flag
effect yet more from a public evaluation of
the president’s handling of the crisis and
resulting foreign policy. Shambaugh (2004)
using Gallup Poll data from 1980-2003,
demonstrates that the “best predictor of
presidential approval following an attack is
the level of presidential approval before the
attack”.
Acknowledging the change in
approval ratings may be from a lack of
public awareness and with increased salience
of terrorism after an attack it is expected to
have a larger impact on presidential
approval, in particular when the human and
material cost of terrorism is high.
Vol. 22, March 2014
While the sheer incident of a
terrorist attack can directly impact approval
rating, many studies test the type of terrorist
attack to show level of significance on
presidential approval. Using data from
Terrorism in the 20th Century, Guilmartin breaks
down attacks into categories: was the attack
domestic or was it against U.S. citizens
abroad, if the attack was foreign, was it in
the Middle East, how many people were
killed, and what tactics were used- bombing,
kidnapping,
assassination,
skyjacking/hijacking, or hostage taking, and
how many attacks occurred between polling
periods.
Guilmartin’s results show by
breaking down the type of terrorist attack
that every person killed in a terror related
“hostage,
skyjacking,
hijacking,
or
kidnapping situation, there is a predicted
increase of .06 points approval” whereas
bombings resulted in a negative correlation
with presidential approval.
James and Rioux (1998) add in a
variable for the use of force after a terror
attack on presidential approval. This variable
is used along with time, economy, crisis
level, region of attack, U.S. response,
U.S.S.R. activity in attack, and causalities.
The use of force is measured in ranges of:
no use of force, minor use of force, one
major force component or strategic nuclear
unit, or two or three major force
components are used, plus at least one
strategic nuclear unit. This study finds the
positive impact of rally effect resulting from
a terrorist attack is sensitive to the resulting
use of force and depending on the level
applied the resulting costs could outweigh or
negative the initial approval increase.
Further James and Rioux show that with a
use of force the members of the presidents
opposing party will show the greatest
decrease in support.
Studies
on
determinants
of
presidential approval use both economic and
noneconomic indicators to analyze impacts
of each. Fox & Phillips use real GDP
growth, target unemployment, and inflation
to view the importance of economic
29
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
conditions to people when determining
presidential approval. Winder (2002) also
uses unemployment and inflation rate, as
well as the honeymoon effect in a regression
of presidential approval. This study by
Winder breaks down the importance of
economic variables concluding although
both coefficients for unemployment and
inflation were negative, economic variables
more significant to males than females in
their approval of the president. Both Fox
and Phillips and Berlemann and Enkelmann
include variables for scandal and war, where
scandal is included that represents the
negative public personal and political
incidents, such as Watergate and the IranContra scandal, to control for shift in
popularity due to these events. These
studies factor in the impact of terror attacks
retain focus on economic determinants and
from that which economic determinant is
most influential for the political party of the
president (Berlemann and Enkelmann).
This study will use similar
framework as prior studies to control for
variables of: honeymoon, war, scandal, and
unemployment. Using the rally round the
flag effect as basic framework for time series
analysis beginning at 1970 terrorist attack
characteristics will be used to analyze the
various types and degree of the effects.
Location is an important variable in terrorist
attacks and approval ratings, like similar
studies a dummy variable for domestic
attacks will but used, as well a variable for
terrorist attacks in the Middle East. Other
variables such as attack lethality and attack
type will be used in a similar manner to prior
studies. All of these terrorist attack variables
will largely determine if a rally effect takes
place and if so the scale and duration of the
effect.
Theoretical Model
Much presidential literature shows
the strong correlation between economic
indicators such as unemployment and
approval ratings. Concluding a negative
correlation as unemployment goes up
presidential approval goes down. Similarly,
Vol. 22, March 2014
there is a strong positive correlation between
GDP growth rates and approval rating. A
non-economic indicator such as scandal is
unanimously believed to have a negative
effect on approval rating. But in other
factors such as domestic and international
crisis have more variation in their outcomes.
John Mueller (1973) first introduced
the rally around the flag effect. This theory
includes three aspects: event is an
international event that triggers crisis,
second that the event must involve the
president directly, and third that event must
be dramatic and focused. This effect, when
all three aspects are met, can greatly increase
presidential approval. This theory states it is
a natural reaction and a symbol of unity to
support the president in the time of crisis
regardless of politics or policies. The
duration of this effect is believed to be only
a few months, regardless of the outcome of
the crisis. It was Hetherington and Nelson
(2003) that first applied this rally round the
flag effect to the attacks 9/11 increasing the
scope of this effect to domestic crisis. This
effect is clearly visible after the attacks of
9/11 with the spike in President George W.
Bush approval ratings, figure 1. At this point
once the ‘rally round the flag’ effect was
applied to domestic events such as 9/11,
various characteristics were introduced in
order to further analyze the degree of impact
from a domestic terrorist attack. Major
variables include the location of the attack,
the lethality of the attack, and political party
of the president at the time of the attack.
Five different OLS models will be
used in order to test the impact of these
factors on the rally round the flag effect. In
around 44 percent of the months in dataset
there has been no incident of terrorist
attacks (figure 2) and almost 99 percent of
the months there were no attacks on
domestic soil (figure 3).
Attacks in the
Middle East occurred more frequently with
24 percent of the months experiencing an
attack in the Middle East (figure 4). The
lethality of all of the terrorist attacks has
been minimal since 1970 in this dataset there
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, March 2014
is only two recorded attacks with 100 or
more U.S. citizens killed, once of which
being 9/11. Since this variable is measured
in one U.S. citizen killed it will still remain
an important factor in approval ratings.
measured by the frequency of attacks in said
month and in the prior month for the lagged
variable num_montht-1.
With over 400 months (figure 5)
with no attack or an attack resulting in no
U.S. lives lost, it is predicted that a high
profile attack like a hijacking will result in a
positive impact on approval ratings. For the
most part, Americans have been free of
terrorist attacks at home and abroad. But
when attacks do occur it is likely that
Americans look to the president for unity
and support until the situation has been
resolved or diffused.
To analyze the impact of the varying
types of lethal of attacks on presidential
approval the following variables are used:
number of U.S. killed (nkilledUS), number
of U.S. killed in bombing attack
(nkilledUSbomb), number of U.S. killed in
infrastructure attack (nkilledUSinfra), and
number of U.S. killed in bargaining attack
(nkilledbar). The number of U.S. killed is a
measure of how many U.S. citizens were
killed in a month with an attack. To
separate by attack type, the number of U.S.
killed in a bombing attack is measured in
number of U.S. citizens killed in a bombing
type attack in that month. Number of U.S.
killed in bargaining attack and infrastructure
attack are similar variables to number U.S.
killed in bombing but the type of attack is
changed to view effect.
Data and Variables
The dependent variable for this
study is national presidential approval rating
on a monthly basis from 1970-2010 that
results in 491 observations for this data set.
Data for this variable was collected from
Gallup, where the polling question asks
people if they approve or disapprove of how
the president is handling his job. Statistics
on this variable and all independent variables
can be found in table 1.
Data for the independent varaibles
on terrorists attacks comes from the Global
Terrorism Databse. Here only attacks were
used if the target was a U.S. citizen or if the
attack was against U.S. interests, including
ships, buildings, etc., regardless of the
location or magnitude of the attack. These
terrorist attacks are additionally sorted by
attacks perpetrated by a group of 53 foreign
non-state organizations identified by the
Department of State as posing the greatest
threats to U.S. citizens. The independent
variable, terrorist attack, is a dummy variable
that will have a 1 if an attack occurred in
that month and a 0 if no attack occurred.
The lagged incidence of terrorist attacks will
show the delayed influence, measured if an
attack happened in the previous month.
The variable num_month is the number of
terrorist attacks per month that will be
Terrorist Attack Variables
The variables analyzing the location
of the attack have been coded into two
dummy variables: domestic and Middle East.
Domestic is given a 1 if attack occurred in
the United States and a 0 if attack occurred
anywhere else. Middle East is given a 1 if
the attack occurred in the Middle East and a
0 if attack occurred anywhere else. An
interaction term of GOP_nkilledUS is used
to view the impact of the number of U.S.
citizens killed in an attack if the president
was a Republican, relative to a Democrat
president. And lastly GOP_Domestic was
coded to look at the impact on ratings
during a Republican presidency if there was
a domestic attack relative to the impact if the
president was a Democrat. This data viewed
on a monthly basis is from the Global
Terrorism Database and descriptive statistics
for this data can be found in table 1.
Economic and Other Variables
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Presidential approval ratings are susceptible
to the state of the economy, war, and
scandal during the time in office. To control
for the amount of time the president has
been in office the log of time is used, which
is measured by number of days the president
has been in office. And the honeymoon
variable is created to control for the
honeymoon effect a president enjoys the
first seven months of his administration,
here a 1 is entered for the first seven months
of each president’s term and a 0 for all of the
other months outside of the honeymoon
time frame.
Due to the influence the
economic conditions have on presidential
approval rating each month, the variable of
lagged unemployed is used to control for the
effect of changing economic conditions
during a presidency. This national monthly
data was obtained from the St. Louis Fed
and is measured in percentage points.
A control for the attacks of 9/11
was created due to the outlying nature of the
attack and great effect on presidential
approval rating. Here a 1 is entered during
the first four months after 9/11 and a 0 for
all other times. The next variable is a
dummy for GOP that is a measure of the
president’s political party, if Republican will
be coded as a one 1 and all other political
affiliation is given a 0. Finally to control for
personal and administration scandal, the
dummy for scandal variable is included.
During the times of Watergate 04/197307/1974, Iran-Contra 12/1986-12/1988,
and the Lewinsky scandal 01/1998-08/1998
a 1 was entered and all other times a 0 was
assigned. Data on scandals is sourced from
“Presidential Scandals and Job Approval”.
Descriptive statistics for this data is found in
table 1.
Empirical Methodology
With approval ratings influenced by
both economic and noneconomic indicators
in order to view the effects of all of the
variables five OLS regression models were
run under: number of attacks per month,
location of attack, lethality and type of
Vol. 22, March 2014
attack, lethality of attack when president was
Republican, and impact of a domestic attack
when a Republican is president. If the first
model results in a significant impact on
presidential approval ratings, the subsequent
models will provide clarity on significant
attack characteristics and their impact.
The following OLS regression models
use the same dependent variable: presidential
approval rating on a monthly basis from
1970-2010.
In order to test if the
occurrence of a terrorist attack is significant
on presidential approval ratings the
following model was used:
PAR=
B0+B1(num_montht-1)
+
(1) B2(lntime) + B3(honeymoon) +
B4(wartimet-1) + B5(unemploymentt-1) +
B6(scandal)
+B7(Indicator_911)
+B8(monthdummy2)
+…B18(monthdummy12)+B19(yeardumm
y2)+…B58(yeardummy41)
It is expect when there is a terrorist attack in
the prior month it will result in a positive
effect on PAR (B1>0). This conclusion is
drawn from the rally effect theory a
president experiences after a terrorist attack.
All of the models include: the log of days in
office (lntime), honeymoon, unemployment,
scandal, wartime, a 9/11 indicator, and
month and year dummies. Both controlling
for time president has been in office
honeymoon is expected to be positive
(B3>0) while the log of time is expected to
be negative (B2<0). Scandal is included due
to the public nature of these adverse events
and it is expected to have a negative impact
on popularity for the presidential
administration (B6<0). The wartime dummy
variable because presidential approval prone
to public perception of the war is anticipated
to result in a negative coefficient (B4<0).
The lagged unemployment percentage is
included in all of the models due to the
inverse relationship between increasing
unemployment and presidential approval
(B5<0) (Fox and Phillips).
Again because the attacks of 9/11 are a
considerable outlier in, a variation of this
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
first model will be run to test if effect of a
terrorist attack has been stable over a long
period of time or if it has become significant
in the decade since 9/11. To do this all of
the dependent and independent variables
remain the same, but the time frame of the
model is shortened 1970-2000, in order to
exclude 9/11.
PAR=
B0+B1(num_montht-1)
+
B
(lntime)
+
B
(honeymoon)
+
2
3
(1a
) B4(wartimet-1) + B5(unemploymentt-1) +
B6(scandal) +B8(monthdummy2) +
…B18(monthdummy12)
+B19(yeardummy2)+…B58(yeardummy32
)
The mean for attacks per month prior
to 9/11 is equal to 1.33 which is slightly
higher than the mean post 9/11 of .718
so it is predicted that the coefficient will
be significant and very similar to the
coefficient in the first attack. This
result should exhibit that although the
post 9/11 world has increased notice on
counterterrorism and terrorist attacks
the effect of an attack on approval
ratings has been consistent over a
considerable amount of time.
To analyze the effect of location of a
terrorist attack two dummy variables were
coded, domestic and Middle East, to regress
against presidential approval. Both the
current and lagged month a used in the
model along with all of the economic and
time control variables from the prior
regressions. The location model is as
follows:
PAR= B0+ B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon)+
(2) B3(mideast)+ B4(mideastt-6)+ B5(domestic)+
B6(domestict-6)
+B7(unemploymentt-1)+
B8(wartimet-1)+
B9(scandal)
+
B10(Indicator_911) + B11(monthdummy2)
+…B21(monthdummy12) +B22(yeardummy2)
+…B61(yeardummy41)
For this model it was projected that an
attack that occurred in the Middle East
would result in a negative coefficient (B34<0) for both the current and lagged
months. The negative coefficient for Middle
Vol. 22, March 2014
East lagged six months (MidEastt-6) is
predicted to show the degree in which the
public approves the president’s handling of
the attack in the long term. But if the attack
was domestic then the coefficient for this
dummy variable is expected to be positive
(B5-6>0), resulting in a rally around the flag
effect for the current president.
Since most terrorist attacks are unique
these characteristics will have a varying
effect on presidential approval rating. The
lethality of an attack (nkilledUS) is a variable
which impact depends on the total U.S.
citizens killed and the style of attack used by
perpetrators. The following model was used
to differentiate number of deaths and deaths
resulting from a specific attack type.
PAR= B0+B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon)
+B3(nkilledUSt-1)
+B4(nkilledUSt-2)
+B
B6(nkilledbart-2)
5(nkilledbart-1) +
(3)
+B7(nkilledbombt-1)+ B8(nkilledbombtB9(nkilledinfrat-1)
+
2)+
B10(nkilledinfrat-2)
+B11(wartimet-1)+
B12(unemploymentt-1) + B13(scandal)
+B14(Indicator_911)
+B15(monthdummy2)
+…B25(monthdummy12)
+B26(yeardummy2)+…B64(yeardummy41
)
When breaking the characteristics of an
attack down it is expected the coefficient for
number of U.S. citizens killed lagged one
month will be negative (B3<0), showing an
inverse relationship with increasing number
of U.S. deaths and approval. Also the same
negative sign is expected for number killed
in a bombing (B7<0) and number killed in an
infrastructure (B9<0) attack lagged one
month. For the number of U.S. citizens
killed in bargaining attack (hijacking,
skyjacking, kidnapping), due to the increase
in media coverage, it is predicted that the
coefficient for this variable would be
positive (B5>0), resulting in a rally around
the flag effect.
For the next model the political party of
the president is coded as a dummy variable
with a 1 for Republican and 0 for a
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Democrat.
An interaction term,
GOP_nkilledUS was created to analyze the
effect of a lethal terrorist attack for a
Republican president relative to a Democrat.
This variable is lagged for one and two
months
(GOP_nkilledUSt-1,
GOP_nkilledUSt-2). The following OLS
model was used:
PAR=
B0+
B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon)+
(4) B3(GOP)+
B4(nkilledUS)+
B5(gop_nkilledUSt-1)+
B6(gop_nkilledUSt-2)
+B7(wartimet)+B
(unemployment
)
+
B
1
7
t-1
9(scandal) +
B10(Indicator_911)
+B11(monthdummy2)
+…B21(monthdummy12)
+B22(yeardummy2)
+…B61(yeardummy41)
For this model, it is predicted that if the
president is a Republican a terrorist attack
will have a larger positive impact on
approval ratings than if president was a
Democrat. Although this effect is projected
to be small, it is significant in recalling that
number of U.S. killed is measured per
individual victim of the attack.
Following the same method as
model (4) here models (5) and (5a) look at
the impact on a Republican president if
there was a domestic attack, relative to if
president was a Democrat. The following
OLS model was used:
PAR= B0+ B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon)+
B4(Domestic)+
(5) B3(GOP)+
B5(GOP_Domestic)+B6(unemploymenttB7(wartimet-1)+ B8(scandal) +
1)+
B9(Indicator_911) + B10(monthdummy2)
+…B20(monthdummy12)
+B21(yeardummy2) +…B60(yeardummy41)
For this model it is predicted that a
Republican president would receive great
positive effect from a domestic attack than a
non-Republican president, resulting in a
positive coefficient (B5>0). Just as in model
(4) the effect of this interaction term will be
small.
Vol. 22, March 2014
Because the rally around the flag
effect for President Bush was so great from
the 9/11 attacks to test the stability of the
coefficient in model (5), this model excludes
9/11 looking at the dataset from 1970-2000
on a monthly basis. The following OLS
model, (5a), was used:
PAR= B0+ B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon)+
(5a) B3(GOP)+
B4(Domestic)+
B5(GOP_Domestic)+B6(unemploymenttB7(wartimet-1)+ B8(scandal) +
1)+
B9(monthdummy2)
+…B19(monthdummy12)
+B2(yeardummy2) +…B59(yeardummy32)
It is predicted for this model and interaction
term GOP_Domestic that the coefficient
will be positive (B5>0), indicating a higher
approval rating for Republicans than nonRepublican presidents following a domestic
attack. This coefficient is predicted to be
significant but smaller than the same
coefficient in model (5).
Findings
Because this data set is a time series,
it is to be expected that presidential approval
rating from this month to be related to that
of previous months. For all of the models a
correction for serial correlation is used.
For model (1), reported in table 2,
the results predicted the number of attacks
coefficient to be positive and significant at
α= .05. The positive coefficient of .362
means with an increase of one more attack
in the prior month, presidential approval
rating will increase by .362 percentage
points. Predicted approval rating at the
beginning of a president’s administration
(first twelve months) is 4.65 percentage
points higher than after the honeymoon
period. Once this time period is over the
model predicts a decay in support with the
log time of time coefficient -2.66, significant
at α= .01, suggesting an increase of 100
percent days in office will decrease approval
rating 2.66 percent.
34
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
For economic variables, results were
as predicted and similar the conclusion of
Fox & Phillips. Unemployment as predicted
has a negative significant coefficient of 2.19,
meaning with an increase of unemployment
by 1 percent, presidential approval ratings
decease by 2.19 percentage points,
significant at α= .05. Scandal was to capture
the negative personal events in presidential
administrations, the coefficient of -9.73,
significant at α= .01, is as predicted. Lastly
the control for 9/11 is used due to the
magnitude of this event, as theorized with
the rally round the flag effect this coefficient
did in fact come out positive equal to 20.53,
with significance at α= .01.
With an original Durbin Watson
statistic of 1.153, indicating a positive
correlation, a correction for serial correlation
was run on this model resulting in a new
Durbin Watson statistic of 2.09. After
running this correction the new coefficient
remains positive at .0288 but is now not
significant at α = .05. Number of attacks
per month, with lost significant, can still be
seen as a preliminary indicator that the
incidence of terrorist attacks has some type
of an impact on presidential approval
ratings.
In order to further conclude terrorist
attacks are significant excluding 9/11 this
same regression was run but with a limited
time frame from 1970-2000. Results from
this new model (1a) are in table 2, it is seen
in the coefficient for number of attacks per
month from the prior month is equal to .383
percentage points and significant with α=
.05, which is very similar to the original
coefficient including 9/11.
From this
coefficient it can be concluded that the
structural effect of terrorist attacks on
approval ratings has been stable over a long
period of time, even though in the post 9/11
world there is an increased importance
counterterrorism and the perceived role of
the president in preventing attacks.
Location of the attack can be a
determinate in the scale of the ‘rally round
the flag’ effect as discussed in prior studies.
Vol. 22, March 2014
Results from model (2) are seen in table 2.
The OLS model predicted that a domestic
attack would have a larger positive impact
on approval ratings then if attack were not
on U.S. soil from the current month. The
model predicted a negative impact from an
attack 6 months prior in the Middle East on
approval ratings. This model also included
the log of time, honeymoon, scandal,
wartime, 9/11 indicator, and month and year
dummies all as controls. This OLS model
concluded that a domestic attack will result
in an increase of 8.06 percentage points in
approval rating, relative to if attack was not
domestic, significant at α= .01. Similarly this
model provided expected results for the
Middle East coefficient for an attack 6
months prior equal to -2.01 with
significance.
Because of serial correlation and a
low original DW statistic of 1.16, again
suggesting positive correlation, a correction
for this serial correlation was run. After the
correction the DW statistic was transformed
to 2.07. The coefficient for Domestic
remained significant at α= .05 with a p value
of .016 and a coefficient of 4.48. This result
confirms with prior studies by Callaghan and
Virtanen the ‘rally round the flag’ that in this
model shows an increase in approval rating
of 4.48 percentage points, relative to attack
that was not domestic. The coefficient for
an attack in the Middle East 6 months prior
remained significant for α = .05 with a p
value of .012 and maintained the negative
impact with a coefficient of -1.37 percentage
points. This coefficient shows an attack in
the Middle East lagged 6 months is a
referendum on the presidents handling of
the situation.
It was hypothesized that varying
attack styles resulting in U.S. citizens being
killed would have different impacts on
presidential approval in model (3). When
there is an increase in one more U.S. citizen
being killed in a bargaining style attack
(hijacking, kidnapping, and skyjacking) that
is type of attack would be the only one to
have a positive result on presidential
35
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
approval. This attack style is high in profile
and receives more media attention and
public awareness. If the attack was
bargaining style, an increase of 1 in the
number of U.S. killed in the attack, from two
months prior, results in a decrease of -.942
percentage points in approval. For the
number of U.S. killed in a bombing the
coefficient was -.9089075. The number of
U.S. killed in an infrastructure attack had the
largest negative coefficient of -9.98.
To compare which of the attack
types had the largest impact on approval
rating standardized betas where computed
for all three attack types: bargaining attack=
-11.12, bombing attack= -.829 and
infrastructure attack= -.053. Bargaining was
predicted to have the largest positive impact
out of the three; from these standardized
betas for every one standard deviation
increase in number of U.S. killed in an attack
presidential approval will go down 11.2
standard deviations.
To correction for serial correlation, a
new regression was run resulting in a
transformed DW statistic from 1.22 to
2.097. The results from this regression again
resulted in all negative coefficients:
bargaining attack= -.443, bombing attack= .405 and infrastructure attack= -4.52. For
no level significance at α=.01, .05, or .1 were
the variables significant. Although this
model lost significance after the serial
correlation correction, the results reveal that
no different style attack will yield a positive
impact on presidential approval.
Finally in the last models it is seen
that political party of the president matters.
The interaction term GOP_nkilledUS in an
attack in OLS model (4) supports Fiorina
and Guilmartin’s testing and conclusion that
a Republican president will receive more
confidence during times on international
crisis. For this model the dummy variable
for GOP, was significant at α= .01 with a
coefficient of -18.79. The next variable,
number of U.S. killed in an attack, was
significant at α= .01 with a coefficient of
Vol. 22, March 2014
.0117.
This interaction term with a
coefficient of .0066 confirms the positive
put small increase of an increase in one U.S.
citizen killed in an attack. These OLS results
all were significant but positively correlated
with a DW= 1.106.
To correct for this serial correlation,
a new model was run with a transformed
DW=2.077. The results for this model were
the same as predicted. The coefficient for
the interaction term GOP_nkilledUSt-1 in an
attack, one month lagged was equal to .0066.
With significance at α= .01. This model
confirms in removing correlation, the theory
for Fiorina and Guilmartin’s conclusion is
again supported for in a terrorist attack
under a Republican president an increase
U.S. citizen is killed one month prior has an
approval rating .006 percentage points
higher than a Democrat president.
The next two models analyze the
impact of a Republican being in office when
a domestic attack occurs. The coefficient of
this interaction term GOP_Domestic in
model (5), table 2, was equal to 13.61 with
significance at α= .01. Because of the
positive correlation shown in the original
DW=1.141, a correction was run
transforming the DW statistic into 2.084.
The new coefficient for GOP_Domestic is
equal to 10.73 significant at α= .01. This
interaction term shows that if a president is a
Republican, a domestic attack will result in
approval 10.73 percentage points higher
relative to a non-Republican president.
This importance of this term is
limited due to the spike in approval
Republican President George W. Bush
received on 9/11. To view if this impact
was stable over a long period of time, the
model (5a) was run with data from 19702000, excluding 9/11. The coefficient for
GOP_Domestic after a correction for serial
correlation was equal to 2.207, but no longer
with significance. After excluding 9/11
from the time frame, the model shows a
Republican president when a domestic
attack occurs will have an approval rating
36
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
2.207 percentage points higher than nonRepublican presidents. Although this value
is insignificant it supports the theory of
Fiorina and Guilmartin in Republican
presidents receiving higher levels of
confidence in international crisis.
Conclusion
The models demonstrate that
although terrorist attacks are not the only
determinate for approval ratings, the
terrorist attacks remain a significant variable.
Terrorist attacks are related to approval
rating in the following ways: 1) Domestic
attacks in the current month are positively
related to presidential approval while attacks
in the Middle East from 6 months prior are
negatively related and significant. This
suggesting the relationship between attacks
in the Middle East is judgment on how the
president handled the situation.
2)
Bargaining
type
attacks
(hijacking,
kidnapping, skyjacking) are not positively
related to approval ratings regardless of the
increased media attention.
3) For
Republican presidents that experience a
domestic attack or an increase in U.S. deaths
in an attack from the prior month receive
high approval ratings than that of any other
political party.
This analysis supports the rally
around the flag effect literature, especially
for Republican presidents and those
presidents who experienced domestic
attacks. From these relationships the impact
of a domestic attack and differences in
political parties are most significant. We
have only seen 6 domestic terrorist attacks
since 1970 but combined these attacks have
killed over 3,000 people and it will be these
domestic attacks from the current month
that will have one of the largest effects on
approval ratings. The analysis of the impact
of a president being a Republican resulted in
small but significant results, again
confirming Fiorina’s theory that Republican
presidents historically receive higher
confidence during international crisis. When
a domestic attack occurs and when there is
Vol. 22, March 2014
an increase of lives lost in an attack from
prior months Republican presidents are
receiving higher approval ratings, relative to
Democrat presidents.
Terrorist attacks are only one of
many non-economic and economic variables
that are determinants of presidential
approval. But the above relationships remain
consistent and relevant in this type of
presidential approval rating analysis. It is
only recently, post 9/11, that the rally round
the flag effect has been applied to terrorist
attacks, domestically and abroad. And while
terrorist attacks continue to happen the rally
around the flag effect and other effects will
continue to play a role in presidential
approval ratings.
Works Cited
Bali, Valentina. "Terror and elections:
Lessons from Spain." Electoral
Studies (2007).
Brody, Richard A. "International Crises: A
Rallying Point for the President?"
Public Opinion (1984).
Bureau of Counterterrorism. 2012.
November 2012
<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/index.h
tm>.
Callaghan and Virtanen. "Revised Models of
the "Rally Phenomenon": The Case
of the Carter Presidency." The
Journal of Politics (1993).
Department of Homeland Security. "Fiscal
Year 2012 Budget ." 2012. U.S.
Department of Homeland Security .
November 2012
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/asse
ts/budget-bib-fy2012overview.pdf>.
Deptartment of Homeland Security.
Preventing Terrorism Results. 2012.
December 2012
<http://www.dhs.gov/topic/preven
ting-terrorism-results>.
Fox, Gerald and Earl Phillips.
"Interrelationship between
presidential approval, presidential
votes and macroeconomic
37
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performance, 1948–2000." Journal
of Macroeconomics (2002).
Gallup. Presidential Approval Ratings. 2012.
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/1166
77/presidential-approval-ratingsgallup-historical-statisticstrends.aspx>.
Global Terrorism Database. October 2012.
Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and
Variables. October 2012
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/do
wnloads/Codebook.pdf>.
Guilmartin, Eugenia. "Terrorist Attacks and
Presidential Approval from 19492002." (2004).
Hetherington and Nelson. "Anatomy of a
Rally Effect: George W. Bush and
the War on Terrorism." Political
Science and Politics (2003).
James, Patrick and Sébastien Rioux.
"International Crises and Linkage
Politics: The Experiences of the
United States, 1953-1994." Political
Research Quarterly (1998): 781-812.
Johansen, Morgen. "Terror Tactics:The Link
between Terror Alerts and
Presidential Approval." (2004).
LaFree, Yang and Crenshaw. "Trajectories
of Terrorism: Attack Patterns of
Foreign Groups That Have Targeted
The United States, 1970-2004."
Criminology & Public Policy, Vol. 8
no. 3 (2009): 445-473.
Lebo, Matthew and Daniel Cassino. "The
Aggregated Consequences of
Motivated Reasoning and the
Dynamics of Partisan Presidential
Approval." Political Psychology
(2007).
Library of Congress. Military History and
Military Science: Wars . 2012.
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<http://www.loc.gov/rr/main/alco
ve9/military/wars.html>.
Lledbetter Iii, Titus. Alabama, Colorado
Delegations Go To Bat for United
Launch Alliance. 8 October 2012.
<http://www.spacenews.com/articl
e/alabama-colorado-delegations-gobat-united-launch-alliance>.
P, Fiorina. Morris. ""Electoral Politics in the
Wake of 9/11."." American
Government in a Changed World.
NY: Longman Publishing Group,
2002.
Pellerin, Cherly. Report Urges Lifting Some
Satellite Export Controls. 18 April
2012. 2012
<http://www.defense.gov/news/ne
wsarticle.aspx?id=67993>.
Shambaugh, George. "Public Prudence, the
Policy Salience of Terrorism and
Presidential Approval following
Terrorist Incidents." International
Security and Arms ontrol Section of
the American Political Science
(2004).
St. Louis FED. Civilian Unemployment Rate
(UNRATE). 2012.
<http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred
2/series/UNRATE>.
Stapley, Criag. "The Domestic Rally Effect
and Terrorism." Global Security
Studies (2012).
State, U.S. Dept. of. Foreign Terrorist
Organizations. September 2012.
<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/oth
er/des/123085.htm>.
Willer. "HE EFFECTS OF
GOVERNMENT-ISSUED
TERROR WARNINGS ON
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL."
CURRENT RESEARCH IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2004).
38
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, March 2014
APPENDIX 1
Figure 1
President George W. Bush’s Presidential Approval Rating
Jan-01 thru Feb-02
Figure 2
Frequency of Attacks per month
39
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, March 2014
Figure 2a
Attacks per Year
Figure 3
Frequency of Domestic Attacks per Month
40
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, March 2014
Figure 4
Frequency of Attack in the Middle East per Month
Figure 5
Frequency of Lethal Attacks per Month
41
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, March 2014
APPENDIX 2
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Dependent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Presidential
Approval
Terrorist Attacks
Description
Presidential approval rate,
measured in percentage points
Terrorist attack, measured by
number of terrorist attacks in a
month
Attacks per month
Total terrorist attacks per
month, measured in number of
attacks
Total U.S. Killed
Total number of U.S. citizens
killed in attack, measured in
number of U.S. deaths
Total Killed in
Total number of U.S. killed in
Bargaining Attack
bargaining style attack
Total Killed in
Total number of U.S. killed in
Bombing Attack
bombing attack
Total Killed in an
Total number of U.S. killed in
Infrastructure
infrastructure attack
Domestic Attack
Was the attack perpetrated on
U.S. soil, measured by location
Middle East Attack
Did attack happen in Middle
East region, measured by the
location of attack
GOP*Number of
Interaction term between GOP
U.S. Killed
and number of U.S. killed in an
attack
GOP*Domestic
Interaction term between GOP
and if attack was domestic
U.S. in Wartime
Was U.S. at war during time of
attack
Unemployment
National unemployment rate,
Rate
measured in percentage points
Honeymoon
Popularity boost for first 12
months, the 1st month =12, and
so on until the 12th month=1, &
0 for months thereafter
GOP
Dummy Variable. Equal to 1 if
president was a Republican
Log of Time in
Log of the amount of time
Office
president has been in office,
measured in number of days
Scandal
Dummy Variable. Equals 1 for
the period 04/1973-07/1974,
12/1986-12/1988, 01/199808/1998
9/11 Indicator
Dummy Variable. Equal to 1 for
5 months after 9/11 attack
Number of observations
Sample
Statistics
51.601
(12.067)
0.562
(0.497)
Sample Statistic
(1970-2000)
52.07
(10.97)
1.179
(1.738)
1.33
(1.912)
7.36
(142.82)
6.527
(142.43)
.7128
(10.999)
.0041
(.0638)
.0122
(.10998)
.2383
(.4265)
7.189
(142.818)
.0061
(.078)
.3177
(.466)
6.3
(1.527)
.169
(.3752)
.0054
(.0732)
.124
(.3300)
6.35
(1.434)
.1586
(.366)
.6599
(.4742)
6.697
(1.060)
6.70
(1.025)
.1039
(.3054)
.1370
(.3444)
.0081
(.09)
491
371
Notes: Mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) reported above. The mean for number of attacks per month post 9/11 was
.718.
42
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, March 2014
Table 2: Regression Output
Model
Effect of
Number of
Attacks per
Month
(1)
Dependent
Variable
Log of Days in
Office
Honeymoon
Presidential
Approval
-2.66***
(.6898)
4.65*
(2.562)
.362**
(.1696)
Number of
Attacks per
Month
Domestic
Effect of
Number of
Attacks per
Month
1970-2000
(1a)
Presidential
Approval
-3.49***
(.794)
3.72
(2.66)
.383**
(1.80)
Effect of
Location
(2)
Effect of
Number of
U.S. Killed
(3)
Presidential
Approval
-2.859***
(.807)
7.35**
(3.07)
Presidential
Approval
-2.94***
(.844)
7.598**
(3.14)
4.48**
(1.86)
.819
(1.72)
-.390
(.538)
-1.36**
(.5401)
Domestict-6
Middle East
Middle Eastt-6
Number Killed
US
Number Killed
Bargaining
Attack
Number Killed
Bombing Attack
Number Killed
Infrastructure
Attack
GOP
.443
(.3598)
-.443
(.3598)
Unemploymentt1
Scandal
9/11 Indicator
Month Dummy
Year Dummy
R-Squared
Observations
Effect of
Political
Party with
Domestic
Attack
(5)
Presidential
Approval
-2.80***
(.803)
8.08***
(3.06)
Effect of
Political
Party with
Domestic
Attack
(5a)
Presidential
Approval
-4.21***
(.953)
7.808**
(3.27)
-.897
(2.599)
-.703
(2.96)
-2.96
(6.32)
-26.95***
(8.14)
10.73***
(3.644)
5.65**
(2.36)
-1.37
(.914)
-6.64***
(2.31)
10.49***
(3.90)
Yes
Yes
.4257
491
2.207
(4.23)
2.16
(2.87)
-2.46**
(1.20)
-5.64**
(2.42)
.0104***
(.0015)
-.405
(.3602)
-4.52
(3.57)
-4.49
(5.87)
.0066***
(.0016)
GOP*Number
U.S. Killed
GOP*Domestic
Wartimet-1
Effect of
Political
Party with
Number of
U.S. Killed
(4)
Presidential
Approval
-2.74***
(.763)
7.96**
(2.90)
9.22***
(2.04)
-2.19**
(.793)
-9.73***
(2.11)
20.53***
(3.38)
Yes
Yes
.7826
491
9.61***
(2.22)
-3.33***
(.962)
-9.67***
(2.16)
Yes
Yes
.7289
371
5.88**
(2.38)
-1.55*
(.928)
-6.90**
(2.35)
8.73**
(3.87)
Yes
Yes
.4293
491
5.46**
(2.61)
-.881
(.998)
-6.496**
(2.36)
4.41
(4.76)
Yes
Yes
.3870
491
8.45***
(2.43)
-1.72**
(.873)
-6.98**
(2.22)
10.07**
(4.57)
Yes
Yes
.4915
491
Yes
Yes
.2476
371
Notes: Variable coefficient and standard error (in parenthesis) reported above. Asterisks denotes significance at different levels of: *** p
value≤0.01 **0.01<p value≤ 0.05 *0.05 <p value ≤0 .1. Models (2), (4), (5), and (5a) results shown after serial correction correlation.
43
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, March 2014
Table 3: Serial Correlation Correction
Model
(1)
(1a)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(5a)
Original DW Statistic
1.153
1.0613
1.158
1.216
1.106
1.14
1.039
Transformed DW Statistic
2.089
2.119
2.067
2.097
2.077
2.08
2.116
44
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, March 2014
The politics of writing history: historians' debates and high-school
history teaching in post-socialist Romania
Sergiu DELCEA16, Central European University, Budapest
Abstract
A
fter exhibiting one of the "hottest" instances of ethno-national related violence in all post-socialist
transitions, early 90s Romanian society seemed to have "cooled" down in terms identitarian conflicts,
hence making it even more surprising why an apparently small-scale debate concerning history
textbooks quickly spiraled to the point of becoming a fully-fledged public scandal against a
Government dubbed as "Anti-Romanian". The aim of this paper is thus to contribute to the
overarching research question: Why did nationalism remain such a powerful force despite the fall of the Ceausescu
regime? To provide a comprehensive answer the article looks at two, tightly interwoven, sides of cultural
reproduction: the politics of history-teaching in Romanian high-schools and its more general background historians' debates on nationalism. The conclusion reached through this analysis is that a conservation of ethnocentered nationalistic thinking about history was generated by a distorted understanding of professionalization of
history qua science.
16
Sergiu Delcea is a second year MA student in the Nationalism Studies Programme, Central
European University, Budapest, with a previous background in Political Science (graduated BA
studies in 2012) from the University of Bucharest. He is currently a member of the editorial
board for the IAPSS blog A Different View, where he is exploring his current research interests
that revolve around linking nation-building processes and welfare-regime construction (with a
focus on Eastern Europe).
45
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
T
he sweeping events of Eastern
Europe in 1989 were intuitively expected to
bring a sharp break with the past and all its
"obsolete" elements: centralized economies,
monolithic Party rule and rampant ethnonationalism. Interestingly enough though
post-socialist transitions seemed to be more
complex than this envisaged one-way road,
with societal cohesion towards the goal of
re-uniting with the "West" being oftentimes
questioned. Naturally, in such a scenario,
cultural reproduction remains an important
element
of
stability
and
cohesion(Paraianu:2001, 111 in Trencsenyi
et al. (eds):2001). What follows logically is
that perceptions of the past and more
importantly, their massification, via history
teaching are put in a very intricate position.
The aim of this paper is to focus on
post-socialist Romania, trying to contribute a
possible answer to a huge over-arching
question: Why did nationalism remain such a
powerful force despite the fall of the Ceausescu
regime? The intuitive consequence foreseen
by many was that the oppressive ethnocentric discourse of the Ceausescu regime
would generate a backlash effect of
complete refutation towards manifestations
of nationalism. Much to the contrary,
Romania seemed to exhibit a continuation
of strong nationalist feelings (the violent
events of Targu Mures are most often
quoted in this line of thought). Despite the
fact that violence occurred only in this
singular event, the huge scandal prompted
by alternative history textbooks in the late
90s showed clearly that Romanian policy
makers were still very much attached to
older interpretations of history, which were
used to draw popular attachment and
legitimacy.
Using this example, I will expand the
discussion and analyze the broader topic of
historical myth-making as a basis for
identity-building in post-socialist Romania.
My main argument is that although there has
Vol. 22, March 2014
been a liberalization of historical research
and historiography in the post-socialist
setting, the nation-building inner logic, so
dear to communist state-makers, is still very
much preserved. While the old historians are
preserving it via the classical proxy of antiHungarian rhetoric (and the age-old of myth
of Romania protecting the "West"), the new
wave of "de-mystifying" historians have
fallen to the other extreme of considering
Romanian history purely as a succession of
national myths (with the apparent aim of
creating a quasi-void on which a more
European identity might be built - obviously,
still identity-building!). To be precise, I am
not arguing that the presence of some form
of nationalism is the central cause of
Romanian laggard transition (Petrescu:2001
in Trencsenyi et al (eds):2001). What I will
argue throughout this paper is that the
outward liberalization of Romanian
historiography is still done under the old
template of "historia magistra vitae"
(Iggers:2010, 35-36) which entails a clear
instrumentalization. This idea is perfectly
caught by Dumitru Nalin who argues that
the core of the problem lies in the use of
discourses about the philosophy of history
in a debate that was intended to be political
(Nalin:2002, 44). The consequence of this
continuation of patterns is that nationalism
in post-1990s Romania was perpetuated (at
least in part) by a lack of modernization of
history as a science.
Structurally I will divide the paper
into two main parts: an analysis of the 2000
alternative textbook scandal and a widening
of the discussion through the debate
between the "old guard" historians and the
new "de-mystyfiers"17. Certainly, the second
part cannot be fully mapped in the narrow
17
To be clear, I am not arguing that all Romanian
historians fall into this model. What I am arguing is
that on a large scale (i.e. mass-media and nonuniversity school-teaching) this is the fundamental
divide. As noted by Paraianu in the early 2000s
when the original textbook scandal erupted Western
academic debates about Romanian history were not
very well integrated into the Romanian academia
thus making it methodologically sound to analyze
the divide I have selected.
46
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
confines of this paper (for in-depth analysis
Iordachi&Trencsenyi:2003, 415-453) and
therefore I will focus on the debates spurred
up by Lucian Boia and his followers, and the
rather recent critique put forward by a group
of University Babes-Bolyai of Cluj lead by
Ioan-Aurel Pop (member of the Romanian
Academy). It feels methodologically sounds
to do this selection because Prof. Boia's
works have been best-sellers (albeit not
instantly in some cases), achieving this status
by taking a controversial stand on topics
such as Romanian national history and
nationalism in general. Interestingly enough,
despite having originally been published
before the 1999 textbook scandal, Boia's opus
had not achieved public notoriety until then.
Certainly, any direct link cannot be inferred
but this intertwining does point towards a
clear tendency.
The alternative textbook scandal - What
image of the nation is the Romanian
educational system disseminating?
According to Brubaker, the tendency
to view the nation as incomplete makes the
state adopt an active political stance
(Brubaker:1996, 63). After the abrupt fall of
the Ceausescu regime, the Romanian policymakers were faced with the daunting
challenge of re-structuring an obsolete
educational system, which was massproducing obedience towards a unitary
teleological vision of the "socialist nation"
(Petrescu:2007
in
Jarausch&Lindenberger:2007). The early
reforming of this system was a tenuous
process, torn between the need for a new
approach and the overwhelming mass of
personnel inherited from communism.
History-teaching continued to be rather
monolithic: while certain aberrations were
abandoned, the core teleology and "hard
truths" (i.e. continuity, unity, nationhood)
were maintained.
During the early 90s, public debate
towards
alternative
text-books
and
interpretations was limited, while grass-
Vol. 22, March 2014
roots pressures for reforms tended to focus
more on the quantitative side (i.e.
refurnishing schools, heating systems etc.)
rather than on fundamental epistemological
issues. History-teaching reform in Eastern
Europe
followed
three
important
dimensions: ideological reconsideration,
lightening the syllabus and teacher
innovation (Nalin:2002, 41).
In the
following, I will attempt to analyze the first
two criteria in the context of the Romanian
text-book scandal, which escalated almost
instantaneously from a scholarly debate into
a fully-fledged political scandal where the
opposition labeled the Government as
having "Anti-Romanian feelings". This
scandal highlights that despite its outward
liberalization the post 1989 Romanian nonuniversity education system still aimed at
mass-producing the communist creed of
"good Romanian citizens with a love of
country and past"(Nalin:2002, 43) The main
point of contention in these early attempts at
reforming the system was the introduction
of alternative text-books for final year highschool students, which were supposed to
focus exclusively on Romanian national
history. One interesting side-note must be
made here: within the Romanian education
framework study of national history is
reserved for the last year of the high-school
studies, which overwhelmingly overlaps with
the age of vote-right acquisition. Although a
direct link is not easily measurable, there
seems to be an intricate underlying logic
between a particular way of understanding
Romanian history and the transformation of
students into "good" citizens.
The first major shock came as a
result of Romania's efforts to join the EU,
namely the late 90s-early 2000s European
recommendation of moving towards
liberalized history teaching emphasizing the
European dimension of regional evolutions.
In the autumn of 1999, historian Sorin Mitu
was publicly scorn by the opposition parties
for coordinating a text-book that introduced
perceived identity-threatening topics: the
idea of constructed nationhood, the brief
hint that mechanisms of the historical
imaginary plays a role in the image of the
47
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Romanian ethno-genetic process, the
downplay of some national heroes
(Paraianu:2001, 95-97 in Trencsenyi et al
(eds):2001). As an accomplished historian
Mitu was trying to bring his text-book at a
crossroads between the aforementioned
goals: attempting to tear down Romanian
perennialism
and
lightening
an
overburdened curricula. The intellectual
background here is rather interesting to
note: the EU directive involved integrating
national histories into a broader narrative,
which generated a divergence between
Romanian historians acting as textbook
authors - some continued to stress the old
myth of Romania having protected Europe
from the Ottoman invasion, while Mitu was
pursuing the more delicate aim of
introducing Western-inspired scholarly
perspectives on Romanian history.
A broad comparative overview
between Mitu's textbook and the available
alternatives
uncovers
the
following
differences: instead of certainty the author
proposes understanding the construction of
a narrative (Iggers:2010, 41-43 and
White:1973); instead of heroes of Europe
medieval rulers approached as boyars with
personal aims and agendas; nationhood not
as fact but construction, with state-hood
being another purpose on the agenda rather
than an "eternal dream". By contrast, other
manuals kept to the hardcore myths
(Manea&Teodorescu:1994 for example),
stating that the Romanian nation is a fact, a
result of a 2000-year old teleological
evolution (eerily reminiscent of the
communist
discourse).
To
further
complicate the issue, Mitu was not
outwardly anti-Hungarian: the arrival of the
Hungarians in Transylvania is depicted in a
moderate stance, with an eye on both
narratives, clearly leaning towards caution
when looking at 12-13th century sources
(Mitu et al:1999 textbook). Much more
abrupt is the textbook's stance on 19th
century nation-building: top-down eliteconstruction of the nation, an idea perceived
as radical by hard-core historians and
particularly by politicians. Instead of
following main-stream public discourse
Vol. 22, March 2014
which was constantly including issues on
perceived
Hungarian
revisionism
(Paraianu:2001, 105 in Trencsenyi et al
(eds):2001), Mitu's textbook hints towards
the fact that Romanian and Hungarian
narratives should be seen as intertwining
histories.
The critique was violent, straightforward and mirrored a very simple
template: if Hungarian text-books state it as
fact that the Romanian ethno-genetic process
took place in the South of the Danube, why
should Romanian schools teach teenagers
that the North-Danubian continuation
narrative is a hypothesis and not fact?(A.
Nastase apud Paraianu:2001 in Trencsenyi et
al. (eds):2001) The siege mentality so dear to
communist nation-forgers pervades this
rhetoric and points towards an important
direction: the Romanian education system,
particularly
through
history-teaching
(Nalin:2002, 40), was mass-producing
attachment to a very organic definition of
the nation. The point of contention raised in
the Romanian media was not that of
whether high-profile Western academic
studies (that Mitu was mirroring, being
himself a prominent name in the field Mitu:2001) are suitable for high-school
pupils, but that the author is falsifying what
"The Romanian Academy in its entirety has
certified" (C.T. Popescu apud Paraianu:2001,
107 in Trencsenyi et al (eds):2001). On the
other hand, I disagree with general assertion
that in a turbulent political context a grassroots level "longing" for the nation
(Verdery:1993, 192), substituting distorted
understandings of democratic values and
practices (Gaber:2006, 35-39), was the
logical fallback point. Rather I would concur
with the argument that what should have
been an academic debate was quickly
enveloped in politics, pointing towards the
direction that this clash was perceived by
society as a manifestation of "conflicting
interests" (Nalin:2002, 44-45). Consequently,
it feels safer to assume that at a grass-roots
level the scandal was perceived through a
political lens: emphasizing a complete break
with the old-guard politicians inherited from
communism, the CDR Government
48
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
appeared to back an anti-national version of
history, which meant a huge blow to their
popularity.
Although alternative manuals had
existed for quite some time in the Romanian
education system, this complete deviation
from the norm happened to overlap with an
EU recommendation, which Romania had
recently
started
negotiating
with.
Consequently, there is yet another paradox:
the intellectual origin of Mitu's purported
"Anti-Romanian" character is not based on
European discourse, but on globalization a
la americaine! (C.T. Popescu apud
Paraianu:2001 in Trencsenyi et al (eds):2001)
The siege mentality is obvious: if the EU
cannot be directly blamed due to immediate
interests, the need for a new scapegoat
arises. Reflected in the history textbooks the
issue was simple: Romania's return to
Europe is natural because ever since the
Middle Ages Romanians have protected
Christian Europe from the "onslaught" of
the Ottoman Empire. Quite to the contrary,
the image of the US becomes blurred in with
that of a "West" that abandoned Romania at
Yalta, the 1918 unification became a purely
Romanian victory rather than a contextual
exploitation of Wilson's 14 points and so on
(these were not novel issues but rather a
continuation
of
what
communist
historiographers had stated for over 20
years). Instead of an integration of regional
narratives, the Romanian education system
made it clear to its pupils that EU
integration is not an ongoing process but
part and parcel of some sort of "national
pride".
Last but not least one important
point should be tackled here: does history
teaching matter that much? In his critique to
Boia, Pop argues that society does not listen
that closely to historians making it hard to
assume that there would be some sort of
grass-roots pressure against a perceived
obsolete philosophy of history (Pop:2011,
180). Certainly, this argument does hold
some validity in the sense that it is extremely
hard (if not impossible) to assume that
society is made up of social scientists that
would immediately react to a change such as
Vol. 22, March 2014
that proposed by Mitu's textbook.
Nonetheless I draw attention again to the
important issue of politicization. Even if
society does not listen to historians and their
debates, it seems safe to assume that when
politicians render the impression that the
textbook will fuel sensitive issues such as
purported Hungarian revisionism, society is
likely to respond. The obsessive use of
"what history are we teaching our children?"
rhetoric is likely to directly influence the
significantly greater electorate schooled in
communism (the 10 years since the fall of
communism were not sufficient to consider
a generational change), who was socialized
with the fundamental myths of continuation,
unity and the nation. Consequently it seems
rather clear that cultural reproduction in
post-socialist Romania was still revolving
around national identity. This scandal
highlights that despite an outward rhetoric
of breaking with the ethno-centered
communist approach to nationalism, the
underlying
truth
is
that
national
identification was still a key coordinate of
post-socialist Romanian society and its
politics.
Summing up, there are a few key
issues to be noted from the history textbook scandal: despite outward liberalization
the education system was still focused on an
identity-building
style
of
cultural
reproduction; while nationalist rhetoric is
not an outward and open tool of electoral
competitions and politics, there seems to be
a rather tacit acknowledgment that certain
"lines"
connected
with
national
identification must not be crossed clearly
pointing towards the direction that
nationalism qua ideology was still a force in
post-socialist Romania.
Beyond the textbooks - historians,
historiography and nationalism in postcommunist Romania
To being with, in the post-socialist
context national historiographies in Eastern
Europe were expected to depart from their
underlying parochialism and start employing
49
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
a more "Western" framework and
methodology (Iordachi&Trencsenyi:2003,
416). The envisaged liberalization would
entail a renouncing of the communist
teleology, a re-consideration of the
exaggerations concerning Romania's history.
Reconciliation with the past glossed with
remarkable ease over communist influence
on historiography, considering it a mere
compromise with the totalitarian state rather
than analyzing its very intricate effects. The
point here is to analyze the intellectual
background on which the Romanian
textbook scandal fell: it is not only that a
politicized education system disseminates a
nation-building rhetoric, but academic
debates also seem to revolve around it.
Although this stepping back to a more
theoretical level might seem a bit far from
the very concrete issue of high-school textbooks, one can argue that it is impossible to
consider text-book authors as a "special
group" of historians to be delineated from
the broader academic debates. Most
aforementioned authors are university
professors fairly well connected with the
zeitgeist of historians' debates in Romania
hence solidifying the link between these
seemingly disengaged lines of analysis.
What emerges is a very complicated
picture: a large number of communisteducated historians faced with political
pressures for reconsideration, free from
oppressive
ethno-national
ideological
boundaries, yet faced with an abrupt return
to a democracy with a very unclear place in
Romanian history (intellectual and political
history). This provides a fertile ground for
vicious circle effects both for demystification efforts as well as for hard-core
supporters of the old interpretations. In the
following, I will argue that in fact this
vicious circle effect did happen in the case of
the most systematic effort at demystification. Equally interesting is the fact
that instead of focusing on certain
methodological aspects that are obviously
shaking in Boia's argumentation, critics have
responded in a predictable manner: national
teleology. What will be drawn is the rather
logical conclusion that both discourses fall
Vol. 22, March 2014
into the trap of the East/West divide
framework (Brubaker:1998 in Hall(ed):1998),
thus ensuring the survival of some forms of
nation-building rhetoric and logic.
Before any conclusions on cultural
reproduction can be made a brief overview
of the main spokes-persons for both sides
of the debate is needed. In the Romanian
context, a bhuge shock was generated by
Lucian Boia's 1997 work History and Myth in
Romanian Consciousness (for a synthetic
presentation of the author's main approach
see Stancu:2012, 56-67; Boia:2001) followed
by an ample series of publications, by the
same author, dedicated to the mechanisms
of historical imaginary, a methodology that
had previously not gained much ground with
Romanian historians. By employing a lax
definition of historical myths Boia attempts
a blending in of modernist theories on
nationalism (Boia often quotes Anderson's
classical works for instance, Anderson:1991)
and Hayden White's approach to
historiography (White:1993), reaching the
conclusion that what is being taught as
Romanian history is mostly a well-plotted
narrative instrumentalized from its earliest
beginnings qua science for the sole purpose
of nation-building. The gist of Boia's opus is
epitomized by the following idea: since unity
and the nation are being considered by
historians as fundamental for Romanian
history, this points towards a very
fragmented polity who was held together by
powerful symbolic myths, most of which
revolved around organic ties and cultural
homogeneity. He goes on to argue that
historians cannot seek truth but must
contend with putting forward convincing
narratives, inextricably linked with moral
judgments
(Pop:2011,
20-25).
Not
surprisingly this approach shocked (although
it is important to say that for some years the
book was not a best-seller) violently
contradicting the cause-effect teleology
employed by the bulk of Romanian
historians.
A coherent reaction in the form of a
book appeared rather late, in 2011 in the
50
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
guise of Ioan Pop's18 Istoria, Adevarurile si
Miturile[History, Truth and Myths]. Written
with a collective tone, Pop proceeds with a
step-by-step analysis of Boia's framework
and arguments reaching the following
conclusions: the lax use of myths (which
have a conceptual background and
framework of their own) makes it possible
to consider any passed event as fiction for
the simple fact that the modern historian did
not partake in them directly, but relies on
written accounts which according to Boia
are meaningless stories; the critical reader of
History and Myth is left with a sense of having
been taken through an exercise in
convenience sampling by putting together
seemingly methodologically inconsistent
examples; Boia's approach to nationalism
gives the impression that nation-building is a
normatively undesirable process of elitemanipulation, myths representing the only
point of cohesion of the national
community. This book encompasses a
blending in of criticism aimed at
methodology with epistemological concerns,
attempting to "rehabilitate" the image of the
Romanian historian.
For the sake of space I will not
provide a thorough individual analysis but
rather focus on the purported aims of the
debaters: reconciliation with the past in the
sense of better delineating the place of
nationalist rhetoric and nation-building
projects in Romanian history, with an eye on
regional European integration. In itself this
points to a clear direction: Romanian
historians seem to take a very normative
approach to nationalism, focusing on the
new teleology of EU integration19. It is
important to bear in mind this stake since it
18
Ioan Aurel Pop - member of Romanian Academy,
fairly accomplished historian of the Middle Ages,
Professor at Babes-Bolyiai University of Cluj.
19
Again I emphasize that it is beyond any shadow of
a doubt that there historians who fall outside the
framework of this debate, but Boia and his
followers seem to have gained public notoriety to
rival that of the 1999 textbook scandal.On the other
hand, Pop's reply although not highly mediatized is
written as a collective response, thus permitting us
to use overarching categories such as "Boia and his
followers", "main-stream Romanian historians".
Vol. 22, March 2014
appears to be the center of the normative
vicious circle around which both sides of the
debate gravitate.
Since the paternalistic argument is
rather straight-forward I shall start by
analyzing cultural reproduction through this
lens. Although Pop's approach is not
stereotypical of the old-guard historians, his
nuancing does not hide the perennialist tone:
the Cluj historian argues that there is an undeniable "core" to nationhood (although he
is very far from the classical use of the
notion in Benner:2001, 155-174) and it is the
"honest historian's mission" (a phrase that
he uses obsessively) to uncover the truth
(similar approach as in Berindei:1997). For
this type of discourse national identity is
salient, the purpose of historians being to
come as close as possible to a purist type of
objectivity in uncovering the national past.
This discourse would aim to go beyond
normative debates since in this line of
thinking a historical fact cannot be good or
bad, it simply exists. The immediate proxy
through which this intellectual strand of
thought reaches main-stream audiences is
simple and potent: ancient hatreds. By
continuous referrals to purported Hungarian
revisionism this discourse remains at least
latent in Romania. The vicious circle is
rather obvious: even if free from political
constraints, historians will continuously
uncover the truth that will always be a part of
a national past regardless of methodology and
outward
liberalization
of
discourse.
Consequently, instead of escaping the
oppressive ethno-centrism of communist
historiography, paternalist post-socialist
Romanian historians continuously operate
within its framework ensuring its cultural
reproduction (albeit in a more toned-down
fashion). In this sense there is no
reconciliation to be done with the past:
communism did not have an impact on
Romanian nation-hood whose "natural"
place is in the European community from
whom it was temporarily disconnected.
The case of the de-mystification
trend is somewhat more complicated as it
supposedly draws on a purely Western
methodology .Boia's main point is that
51
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
history writing cannot be separated from the
historian's belief system hence making it a
futile effort to search for "truth" since
history itself is a narrative. Two important
consequences can be drawn from here about
Boia's approach: although modernist in the
sense of recognizing the importance of
constructionist approaches, there is a
pervading sense of normative judgment. The
veil seems to be better lifted when one takes
a closer look at Boia's subsequent works that
complement his opus: Romanian national
history is not only a myth, but it is a bad
myth in the sense of espousing non-Western
values (Boia:2001). Since the shortcomings
of this East/West ethnic/civic approach are
well documented, for the purpose of this
paper suffice it note a more subtle
observation on the Romanian demystification trend: in itself it creates the
myth that "everything is a myth", which is
envisaged as a foundation for a new identitybuilding in a Western-civic-normative
understanding! However, the issue here is
still nation-building, although in a different
scope: the teleology of civic nationhood and
"Western
liberalism".
Certainly,
the
communist template is abandoned, yet the
inner logic of identity creation through
history is maintained. The normative
argument of this de-mystification is that
once the realization that Romanian history
of a myth is acknowledged, a new identity
can be constructed, supposedly better
managing the delicate regional integration of
historical narratives.
There is one underlying thread
connecting these two issues in a very subtle
way: both strands consider themselves as
"de-mystifiers"! In a very ironic twist the
early 90s historians considered their mission
to de-mystify communism, Lucian Boia and
his followers claim to de-mystify the entirety
of Romanian historiography and its
nationalist-orientation, while Ioan Pop
opens his laborious critique with the clear
aim of tearing down the "Lucian Boia
myth"! (Pop:2011, 120) Acknowledging the
very strong point that one can analyze this
issue through the obvious need for truth in
the post-socialist setting (Nalin:2002, 44), I
Vol. 22, March 2014
draw attention to another important
dimension to be noted here: if myths are, by
and large, considered identity building
blocks then de-mystification efforts clearly
signal the presence of perceived identitythreats and nation-building rhetoric. In the
post 90s Romanian environment the issue of
reconciliation with the past is aligned with
delineating a "true" historical identity: a
communist-shaped one, or an older version
rooted in the perceived democratic inter-war
(hence communism being perceived as a
past-discontinuous). This seems to point
towards some sort of "new nation
syndrome"
(Petrescu:2007,
39
in
Jarausch&Lindenberger:2007),
again
strengthening the argument of cultural
reproduction towards identity-building.
Even if one concurs with Pop's idea that
society rarely listens to historians, the
overarching sense of a vicious circle persists:
post-socialist Romanian historiography is
spinning around everyone "de-mystifying"
everyone for the sake of "truth". Although
Boia and his followers disagree with the idea
that the historian is looking for "truth" they
are putting forward the very normative
argument that "Eastern" nationalism is the
sole cause of Romania's economic and
political problems (a rather similar argument
to be found in Petrescu:2001 in Trencsenyi
et al. (eds):2001). This is the point of the
myth that "everything is a myth": identityvoid on which a purported "better" nationalidentity be constructed. Either side seems to
fallen into a teleological trap: nationalidentity as a salient category (be it
constructed, or perennial the pervading idea
seems to be that there it is a clear
developmental-historical goal). Certainly,
both sides acknowledge that the goal of EU
integration is an on-going progress,
nonetheless they seem tied down to finding
a "hard-core" starting point for a quasihistorical quasi-cultural argument of why
Romania should join the EU.
52
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Conclusions
Broadly speaking,
historical
discourse in post-socialist Romania seems to
gravitate around the very political goal of
EU integration, attempting to put forward a
hard-core argument of why Romanian's
particular historical trajectory recommends it
as a natural enlargement goal.
The 1999-2000 alternative text-book
scandal and the vicious "de-mystification"
circle seem to be powerfully intertwined:
although
oppressive
ethno-national
discourses are not used in political
competitions, there is an institutionalized
cultural reproduction that ensures the
presence of a latent nationalist discourse.
The background is not purely political
rhetoric, as historians themselves seem to be
locked into a debate in which everyone
espouses a more "truthful" history than the
other. The criticism that society does not
follow historians fails when faced with the
institutionalization of a rigid ethno-centered
approach to history. Certainly, the
polarization between the text-books and
historians must not be directly equated with
a societal polarization. On the other hand,
polarized historical narratives seemed to
point towards normative stances more than
actual methodologies of historical research:
the teleology of the East/West ethnic/civic
divide.
To be fair to the sides, I am not
arguing that they are putting forward
pseudo-scientific research, rather that the
conclusions they seem to draw have less to
do with history than with the politics of
nation-branding
and
nation-building.
Consequently, post-socialist Romania seems
to be exhibiting an exaggerated identity crisis
based on its efforts to join the EU and the
continuous struggle for reconciliation with
the past. The natural backlash effect of the
communist ethno-centered discourse is that
open nationalist rhetoric does not raise
much political support (being perceived as
extremist), yet socialization is still done
under a very rigid pattern that continuously
emphasizes the mythology of continuation,
Vol. 22, March 2014
unity and nation-hood. Institutionalized
cultural reproduction seems be revolving
around a different type of discourse
(certainly, it is far-fetched to call either Boia
and his followers or the critics as
"communists"), which touches however on a
hard-core set of issues that is continuously
preserved.
All things considered, nationalism in
post-socialist Romania appears not to be a
freak occurrence, nor is it a persona non grata
of public discourse. The efforts of tearing
down socialist legacies (institutional and
intellectual) seem locked, for the time being,
in a vicious circle. Nonetheless, open and
fair debate has taken a fairly solid grip in the
Romanian environment, leaving the door
open for the possibility of reconciliation
with the past and a fair reconsidering of
Romania's place in an integrated regional
narrative.
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Adevarul si Miturile [History, Truth and
Past: The Question of National Identity in
Myths - own translation throughout the
Romanian
paper], (Virtual: Cluj),
Studies
1990-2000,
published in East-European Politics and

Lucia
Virgiliu
National
and Democratic Consolidation in Central

Sorin,
the
the Theory of Nationalism. (Cambridge

Mitu,
Ovidiu Pecican, Liviu Tîrãu, and
and Misconceptions in the Study of


Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and
(Cambridge

Vol. 22, March 2014

Stancu, Eugen (2012) Lucian Boia
Societies, Vol. 17
and
Manea, Mihai, Teodorescu, (1994)
Romanian
Istoria Românilor de la 1821 pânã în
Intellectual
1989:Manual pentru clasa a XII-a
Critics, published in Yearbook of the
(Romanian
till
'Gheorghe Sincai' Institute for Social
1989:Twelfth grade textbook); (Editura
Sciences & the Humanities of the
Didacticã si Pedagogicã: Bucharest)
Romanian Academy, Vol. 15
history
from
1821
the
Demythologization
Historical
Origins,
of
the
Discourse.
Arguments
and
54
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal

Vol. 22, March 2014
Balasz TRENCSENYI, Dragos
History Textbooks: The Mitu
PETRESCU,
Cristina
Controversy
PETRESCU,
Constantin
o Dragos
Petrescu,
Can
IORDACHI, Zoltan KANTOR
Democracy work in Southeastern
(2001), Nation-Building and Contested
Europe? Ethnic nationalism vs.
Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case
Democratic consolidation in post-
Studies, (Regio Books, Budapest,
communist Romania

2001)
Verdery,
Katherine,
(1993)
o Razvan Paraianu, National
Nationalism and National Sentiment in
Prejudices, Mass Media and
Post-socialist Romania, published in
Slavic Review, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1993
55
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 22, March 2014
Beyond Compatibility : Replicating High-Performing Asian
Economies
Meicen SUN20, University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
T
here is much contention on the applicability of the high-performing sian economic (HPAE) model,
often on the basis that the Asian countries’ unique historical, political, economic and cultural
conditions are really what make the model work. I argue in this paper, however, that the replication
of this model may be desirable for certain economies. This is of course not without conditions. First, the country
should have a significantly Pareto-suboptimal starting level of resource mobilization. The HPAE model is most
effective in pushing a country’s economic development toward the Pareto frontier through mobilization of
underutilized resources. Second, given this, the success of an HPAE model hinges on the state’s intervention in not
only the procedural but also the substantive aspect of economic policymaking. Since there are presumably high
stakes involved in having the state playing the “coach” (and not just the “referee”), having a reliable decisionmaking body is indispensable to implementing the HPAE model. Third, for the HPAE model to achieve its
maximum effect, the demographic makeup of the target country should meet a few requirements, such as a relatively
low dependency ratio. On the other hand, I contend that the country’s sociocultural compatibility with the HPAE
model is of limited importance because the HPAE is powerful in transforming such contexts to its advantage.
Lastly, I address what I call a “latent political cost” in adopting the HPAE model as a policy caveat looking
forward.
20
Meicen Sun is a Ph.D student of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of
Pennsylvania
56
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
I
Vol. Nr.20, June 2013
DEFINING HPAE – ESSENTIALS AND NON-ESSENTIALS
first set straight what defines an
efficiency-based economies,24 or in some
HPAE model. The World Bank
cases
“agriculture-oriented,”
or
“labor-
characterizes the HPAEs as implementing
intensive,” I consider these as different
neoclassical economic fundamentals such as
manifestations of the aforementioned two
high levels of capital and macroeconomic
policy dimensions. They are the economic
stability on the one hand, and enforcing
dependent variables resulted from the
robust government intervention to entrench
political explanatory variables – orientation
these fundamentals on the other.21 Thus the
and degree of state intervention. Similarly,
orientation of the HPAE model distinguishes
specific tactics used by different HPAEs in
it from the plan ideological model in the
realizing their economic objectives, such as
sense that the model ultimately relies on the
the different forms of centralized economic
regulatory power of the market rather than
planning across various HPAEs, should not
that of the government to achieve economic
be confused with the commonality in their
growth, and the degree of state intervention
political
distinguishes it from the market rational
economic growth through goal-oriented
model because the government plays a much
state intervention. Only the latter is relevant
more central role in manipulating the
to my argument henceforth.
market’s regulatory power in the HPAEs
economic
I. STATE
REALIZING
Partly as a result, a strong, insulated elite
RESOURCES
as primarily responsible for the making and
implementation of key economic policies.23
While scholars have attached various
other qualifiers to the basic HPAE model,
such
as
“input-based”
vis-à-vis
the
which
INTERVENTION
than in a typical laissez-faire economy.22
bureaucracy is often observed in the HPAEs
strategy,
is
IN
UNDERUTILIZED
Paul Krugman correctly identifies
that a key to the HPAEs’ success is their
massive mobilization of resources to feed
productivity growth by increasing input.
Without achieving a level of technological
progress comparable to that in the U.S.,
even highly efficient HPAEs like Singapore
“Strategies for Rapid Accumulation,” World
Bank, 1993, 192.
22 These terms are borrowed from Chalmers
Johnson. See Chalmers Johnson, “”Market
Rationality vs. Plan Rationality,” 216.
23 Gregory Noble, “The Japanese Industrial Policy
Debate,” 59.
21
are merely a “one-time” occurrence and little
more than the result of deferred gratification
Paul Krugman, “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle,”
64.
24
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– namely the people’s “willingness to
was, for example, essential to overcoming
sacrifice current satisfaction for future gain”
market failure associated with privatized
by complying with government policies
education while creating the necessary
aimed at producing future economic growth
positive externalities conducive to economic
through sacrifices made in the present.
growth.
Similarly, the miracle of China’s rapid
horizontally
growth
an
comparable development levels such as
exceptionally low baseline and the open-up
Pakistan and Peru, the success of the
policy that served as a “one-time recovery”
HPAEs’ human capital accumulation can
from its near total stagnation.25
almost solely be accounted for by their
is
simply
attributable
to
Krugman’s critique is valid insofar as
More
importantly,
compared
to
states
when
of
public education policies.26 The productivity
an input-driven development model is hard
growth
derived
from
improved
basic
to sustain absent of a matching level of
education in the HPAEs was less the result
technological innovation. But to the extent
of their cultural legacy than of this specific
that suboptimal growth is attributable, at
policy directive.
least partly, to the underutilization of
The accumulation of physical capital
resources and a weak capital stock, the
is a more complex issue. Some ascribe the
HPAE model is still effective in quickly
boom of HPAEs like Japan, South Korea
bridging the capital gap. This is especially
and Taiwan to the initial funding from the
true for the so-called late developers in
U.S.27 This fails to explain the success of
Alexander
stage
other HPAEs that did not have such foreign
theory, such as the vast majority of sub-
aid, e.g. China. To be sure, foreign direct
Saharan and a number of Latin American
investment (FDI) was the most prevalent
countries today, which typically have both
means of acquiring physical capital from
low
an
abroad for all HPAEs. Salient in this
undereducated population, and low levels of
approach was the joint promotion of
physical capital. The World Bank’s analysis
domestic savings on the one hand and
shows the HPAEs’ advantage in providing
investment, especially FDI, on the other.28
the
levels
initial
Gerschenkron’s
of
human
momentum
linear
capital
through
–
rapid
accumulation of capital on both fronts. The
HPAEs’ prioritization of basic education
through substantial government subsidies
25
Krugman, 70-78.
“Strategies for Rapid Accumulation,” 199-200.
Tun-jen Cheng, “Political Regimes and
Development Strategies: South Korea and
Taiwan.” 147-150.
28 See the discussion on such measures as
favorable tax policies and price manipulation to
attract (foreign) investors in “Strategies for
Rapid Accumulation,” 228-235.
26
27
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Together, these two levers created a steady
economic behaviors of the HPAE model
and systematic bias toward investors at the
also suggests that if there were a history of
expense of domestic savers. The importance
adversity that the government could tap
of FDI and trade for a developing economy
into, as is the case for a large number of sub-
speaks for itself: Whereas Mexico had a
Saharan African countries and certain Latin
similar level of per capita GDP to that of
American countries that have undergone
Japan, it plummeted immediately after the
prolonged civil wars such as El Salvador, it
government restricted foreign trade, and has
might be especially easy for the government
since fallen progressively further behind that
to promote domestic savings by appealing to
of Japan’s.29 Not only did capital flow faster
people’s sense of insecurity.
into the HPAEs, but it was usually better
II. MAINTAINING
A
utilized as well. A horizontal comparison of
BUREAUCRACY
the HPAEs with Latin America, again,
MERITOCRACY
shows that much of the former’s superiority
in growth was accounted for by the
governments’ direct channeling FDI into the
most efficient industries, in this case
manufacturing.30
In most cases, household savings in
particular provided the first “pool of funds”
which was then efficiently invested to spur
productivity and growth.31 Though frugal
Confucious ideology and the history of
suffering both played a part in people’s
desire to save, the HPAEs’ domestic savings
policies that actively rewarded such behavior
was what ultimately sustained the capital
flow.32
This ability to select certain
Henry Rowen, “The Political and Social
Foundations of the Rise of East Asia: An
Overview,” 18.
30 Anthony Elson, “What Happened?”
31 Edward Lincoln, “The Showa Economic
Experience,” in Daedalus Summer 1990, 196197.
32 This point will be elaborated in Section III
below.
29
COMPETENT
THROUGH
Given the HPAE model’s efficacy in
mobilizing underutilized resources on a
massive scale, we should then ask how such
can be best achieved. Chalmers Johnson
contrasts the “plan rationality” of the
Japanese
economy
to
the
“market
rationality” of that of the U.S., primarily by
the state’s substantial undertaking not only
in the regulatory but also substantive
economic matters in the former, to the
extent that it essentially dictates “which
industries
ought
to
exist
and
which
industries are no longer needed.”33 At
different times and to different degrees, the
MITI in Japan, the EPB in South Korea and
the CUSA in Taiwan all assumed such a role
in prioritizing economic goals by directly or
indirectly dictating what was to be produced.
This clearly demands tremendous foresight
33
Johnson, 216.
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on part of the leadership, and it was not
that was critical to the consolidation of state-
accidental that all three states had a well-
business relations.36
established institution that steadily supplied
qualified civil servants into the system.
Although both the examination
system and the incentive structure for
The legacy of the civil examination
maintaining a qualified bureaucracy have
system in Confucious Asia did provide a
their cultural roots in the HPAEs, these
foundation for such rigorous screening
states
processes. For instance, in South Korea
entrenching these mechanisms in their
under Rhee and Park, hundreds of exam-
development model, hence making such a
takers typically vied for one vacancy in civil
bureaucracy endogenous to their political
service, much like civil exams at ancient
economy, hence replicable beyond the Asian
times.34 But more important than the
context.
screening process is a robust incentive
structure
that
in
Because of the highly paternalistic
bureaucracy. All HPAEs employed various
leadership to the successful implementation
schemes of reward-punishment to ensure
of the HPAE model is evident. The strength
that qualified bureaucrats not only enter, but
of state intervention amplifies both the
stay in the system. Such incentives boil
successes
down to compensation and security. In
economic policies. China, a latecomer in
postwar Taiwan, for example, technocrats in
Gerschenkron’s theory, offers one example
the
were
in each direction: With the two disastrous
consistently better paid than those in the
policy programs of the Great Leap Forward
other ministries. The status of the EPB in
and the Cultural Revolution, Mao practically
South Korea, similarly, was elevated not only
stripped China of its economic productivity
by way of financial compensation, but also
and trade capacity within three decades.37
by its minister being given the same title of
Yet under the equally decisive leadership of
deputy prime minister.35 Long-term job
Deng, and the continuation of his open-up
security for civil servants in Japan likewise
policy under Jiang and Hu, China caught up
create
planning
not
only
in
engaged
role of the state, the importance of
helped
talents
aggressively
the
economic
retains
also
agencies
a
failures
of
the
state’s
competent
bureaucracy, but also corporate coherence
Tun-jen Cheng et al., Institutions and Growth in
Korea and Taiwan: The Bureaucracy, 99.
35 Cheng et al., 102-105.
34
and
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: the State
and Industrial Transformation, 12.
37
See, for example, Kenneth Lieberthal’s account
of the Maoist Era in Chapter 4 of Governing China:
From Revolution Through Reform, and his
attribution of the “greatest weakness of the Maoist
system” to the fact that the Chairman “loomed so
large in it,” 122.
36
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to be one of the largest and fastest growing
dependency ratio, for example, meant that
economies second only to the U.S., also
any increase in physical capital and education
within about three decades. China’s case is
resources already predicted by the policy
illustrative in showing not only the miracle
would be further amplified by the decline in
that a market-conforming, “plan rational”
population.40 Because of this, skeptics like
dictatorship can achieve, but also the havoc
Krugman dismiss such growth as a one-time
that
occurrence
a
market-nonconforming,
38
ideological”
“plan
since
drastic
demographic
dictatorship can wreck, ceteris
transitions resulting in a sudden, drastic drop
paribus. This dichotomy, as well as the
in dependency ratio rarely happen. However,
dichotomy of the two Koreas, demonstrate
this does not mean that these policies are
that the HPAE model goes far beyond the
ineffective, just that they may not have as
cultural constraint, and that the quality of
dramatic an effect as they did in the HPAEs
the decision-making elites is a far better
if the dependency ratio happens to be high.
predictor of economic growth than either
Furthermore, since most of the developing
culture or history. A competent bureaucracy
countries today are characterized by a high
therefore serves to guard against the HPAE
and rising population density, such as most
model’s one inherent weakness – that of
sub-Saharan African countries and Asian
sporadically
“worst
countries like India, the HPAE model may
outcome”39, of which market rational liberal
be particularly suitable for creating and
democracies usually manage to steer clear.
furthering comparative advantage in labor-
giving
rise
to
a
intensive industries.
IV. IV.
III. MAXIMIZING
THE
HPAE
EFFECT
WHY
SOCIOCULTURAL
COMPATIBILITY IS OVERRATED
–
– DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP
THE
TRANSFORMATIVE
POWER OF THE HPAE MODEL
I outlined in Section I the policy
undertaking by certain HPAE governments
Finally, I evaluate from a historical
to secure rapid capital accumulation. Some
constructivist
of these policies’ efficacy was derived from
sociocultural compatibility theory holds
the country’s demography at the time of
poorly for the HPAE model. Proponents of
implementation.
the “culture” theory argue that it is not the
A
dramatic
fall
in
point
of
view
why
economic policies of the HPAEs per se, but
Again, we are borrowing Johnson’s term used
for the USSR. See Johnson, 216.
39 Yuhua Wang, lecture, October 14, 2013.
38
40
“Strategies for Rapid Accumulation,” 194-195.
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rather such sociocultural norms as “group-
model’s innate compatibility with Asian
oriented” ideology41 that make these policies
cultures, we ought to recognize the HPAE
work only in these Asian countries. It
model’s
implies therefore that only countries with
sociocultural norms to its advantage. It does
such deep-rooted ideologies can readily
so by selectively rewarding the desirable
absorb
aspects of the culture, such as the desire for
the
government
redistribution
shock
policies
and
from
such
top-down
aggressive
as
powerful
ability
in
shaping
radical
secure savings in the case of the postal
economic
savings scheme in Japan,44 while punishing
planning.
undesirable ones, such as the feudalistic
line
daimyo-samurai relations and landlordism.45
overlook the fact that more often than not,
The prevalent land reform in virtually all
state intervention had to work against the
postwar East Asian economies, often in
East Asian culture in which it was
extremely violent forms which essentially
embedded. The effective implementation of
“separate[ed]…the landlord from the land,”
economic policies in the HPAEs owes more
was perhaps the most radical move to
to the state’s active “persuasion and
mobilize social resources by completely
incentives to steer the private sector in
severing old socioeconomic ties. This was
desired directions,”42 rather than a natural
often the result of “blatant manipulat[ion]”
inclination of the private interests to
by the military or civilian bureaucracy,46
succumb to those of the state. Almost all
which
HPAEs took coercive measures to weaken
bureaucracy argument than to the culture
entrenched
argument.
Interpretations
traditional
along
and
this
indigenous
lends
To
more
be
support
sure,
the
to
my
gradual
interests at some point43 for the purpose of
elimination of these “counterproductive”
economic development. More than the
sociocultural aspects have helped sustain,
For an example, see Kozo Yamamura’s
discussion on Japan’s postwar industrialization
in “Bridled Capitalism and Economic
Development in Japan, 1880-1980”, 67-68. A
similar argument has been used for China and
East Asian countries in general, where the
ideological essence (Ti) of the country does not
change with the practical means of production
(Yong) borrowed from the West. See Jonathan
Spence, The Search for Modern China, 225-226.
42 Daniel Okimoto, “Japan, the Societal State”,
214.
43 See for instance, the KMT’s strategy aimed at
weakening and transforming the indigenous
interest structure in Taiwan post 1949, in Cheng,
146-151.
41
over time, an illusion that HPAE has
worked because of the Asian cultures in
which it finds itself.
“Strategies for Rapid Accumulation,” 220.
For a detailed discussion of the tremendous
risks involved in the abolition of the samurai
class and the agricultural tax reform during the
Meiji restoration, see Ann Waswo, Modern
Japanese Society, 1868-1994, 43-45.
46 John Dower, “The Useful war,” in Daedalus
Summer 1990, 60-61.
44
45
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In reality, what is left of the apparent
highly centralized and insulated bureaucracy.
“Asian culture” today is in itself the product
This is perhaps one of the strongest critiques
of aggressive selection by the HPAE model
for the HPAE model – that it tends to
over
The
prioritize economic growth over other
“embeddedness” or “networked-ness” is,
development objectives such as human
rather than a predetermined outcome of
rights,
cultural compatibility, the very process by
democratization, at the sole discretion of the
which
ruling elites.
at
the
least
HPAE
six
decades.
model
works
to
manipulate the malleable private interests
environmental
In
fact,
sustainability
HPAE
works
and
well
through lowering transaction cost on the
economically precisely by creating political,
one hand and closing the bureaucracy-
social and environmental externalities.49
market information gap on the other.
Such often goes unnoticed at first because
the political cost of corruption and rent-
POLITICAL
SUSTAINABILITY
–
AFTER
seeking typically lags behind economic
growth. This latent political cost may
PROSPERITY
Having evaluated the feasibility of
therefore only be activated at a later time,
the HPAE model, I now turn to its
when marginal return from the input-driven
sustainability. As Krugman points out, the
growth starts to diminish and be outweighed
HPAEs’ success hinges not upon “growth in
by the sociopolitical price. The existence of
output per unit of input,” or efficiency-
this “tipping point” finds evidence in the
driven growth, but merely upon a sheer
similar paths taken by HPAEs including
“expansion of inputs.”47 Additionally, the
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In all three
HPAE model may be unsustainable for a
states, the formerly centralized decision-
deeper, political reason – the HPAE model
making body gave way to market and
tends to be politically self-undermining in
political liberalization after prosperity was
the longer run.48 Once a certain level of
achieved: In Japan, the dissolution and
economic growth has been reached and all
replacement of MITI ran concurrent to the
previously
resources
country’s economic development, and were
mobilized, the HPAE model may undercut
carried out as a relatively smooth phase-out
its own achievement by degenerating into a
process. South Korea and Taiwan, by
underutilized
system of diminishing productivity growth
resulted from unchecked power of the
47
48
Krugman, 63-64.
Cheng et al., 100-101.
For example, this can be political externalities
such as corruption and rent-seeking, or
environmental externalities such as pollution.
For such cases see Cheng et al.’s discussion on
the political implication in South Korea and
Taiwan.
49
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
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contrast, paid a much higher political price
established ex ante to put a limit on the
for a similar transition in their political
bureaucracy’s power, the HPAE model can
economy.50 On the other hand, Singapore is
be implemented with considerable success at
a case where the technocracy has carried
a minimal cost.
through despite sustained high growth rate,
and is sometimes considered to be an
References
anomaly of high growth rate and rule of law
Edward Lincoln (1990) “The Showa
Economic Experience,” in Daedalus, June
1990
51
without democracy.
While there is no sure way to predict,
a priori, which of these will occur once a
country implements the HPAE model, the
multiplicity of paths serves as a caveat that a
sound exit option or phase-out strategy, ex
ante, should be in the policymakers’ calculus
before implementing the model. Moreover,
externalities
like
corruption
are
path
Evans, Peter (1995) Embedded Autonomy: the
State and Industrial Transformation, (Princeton
University Press)
Johnson, Chalmers (1998) “Market
Rationality vs. Plan Rationality” in Inside the
Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary Society
and Political Economy (Stanford University
Press)
dependent. Japan avoided this cost by
strictly enforcing intra-system personnel
rotation
early
on
in
its
economic
Krugman, Paul (1994) “The myth of Asia’s
Miracle”, in Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 1994; 73;
6
development, which helped ensure that the
eventual
phase-out
of
the
centralized
bureaucracy was prompt and smooth. China
and Indonesia, on the other hand, missed
the window of opportunity in their earliest
stage of development, resulting in an ever
increasing gap of corruption over time. But
as Haggard suggests, it is entirely possible
for
countries
to
develop
institutions
conducive to both political liberty and
economic growth.52 If a phase-out strategy is
Noble, Gregory W (1989) “The Japanese
industrial policy debate”
Rowen, Henry (1997) “The Political and
Social Foundations of the Rise of East Asia:
An Overview” in Henry S. Rowen, eds.
Behind East Asian Growth (Routledge)
Tun-jen, Cheng (1990) "Political Regimes
and Development Strategies: South Korea
and Taiwan” in Gary Gereffi and Donald L.
Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles : Paths of
Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia
(Princeton University Press).
Cheng et al., 89-90, and Wang, lecture,
September 30, 2013.
51 Wang, lecture, October 14, 2013.
52 Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the
Periphery, 256.
50
64
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 What data show in detail, general tendencies and interesting particularities.
 (Model construction) and Conclusions
Causal models may be formulated and general conclusions reached. Conclusions may or may not
specifically challenge or support findings in existing literature.
 Future research
Possibilities of future research for the researcher or other scholars, promising directions,
requirements for future research.
 List of References (Bibliography)
POLITIKON uses APSA-Style for making references to sources used (see below).
 Appendixes
Every data used shown so as to facilitate potential replications. If possible, data shared publicly
and/or presented together with the manuscript.
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. Nr.20, June 2013
Format of the paper:
Contents: Title, author, abstract, paper, bibliography; short presentation of the author
Font: Times New Roman 12, spacing 1.5; Abstract: Times New Roman 12, spacing 1.15, italic;
Main Title (Heading): Times New Roman 14, bold; Subtitles (Section Headings): Times New Roman
12, bold; Presentation: Times New Roman 12, spacing 1.15, italic.
Borders: top and bottom 2,5 cm, left and right 3,00cm (default)
A good academic paper features:
 Academic style of writing and structure (see section “Recommended Academic Paper
Structure”);
 Grammatically correct English;
 Between 2000 and 5000 words;
 APSA-Style in-text references;
 APSA-Style Bibliography (references at the end) (E.g.. Hertsgaard, Mark. 1988. On Bended
Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency. New York: Schocken Books; see, e.g.,
http://www.csuchico.edu/lref/pols/APSA.pdf)
Presentation of the author
Please, include a short presentation of yourself (approx. 100 words) in the following style (3rd
person singular): Name, age, (hometown), university, degree, focus of your studies/Master or
Bachelor Thesis, current employment or study interests, e.g.:
"Françoise Deutsch, 32, is a graduate who received his Bachelor in "European Studies" at the University of Shire
in 2008. In 2009, he obtained an LL.M/M.Sc./MA in International Relations at the University of Stadt. He
has written his Master Thesis on ???, and currently interns/works/studies at the WWW. His interests include
security studies, human rights, democratic transition, development studies, political philosophy, conflict resolution
etc."
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