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The Effects of Unrecorded Assets and Information Disclosure on Future Earnings Response Coefficients Shaw-Ping Chen, Associate professor, Department of Accounting, Providence University, Taiwan Yu-Chih Lin, Associate Professor, Department and Graduate Institute of Accounting, National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, Taiwan Chung-Jen Fu, Professor, Department and Graduate Institute of Accounting, National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, Taiwan ABSTRACT The purposes of this paper are to investigate the relationship between unrecorded assets, information disclosure, and future earnings response coefficients (FERC)and to compare the disclosure effects on the return-earnings relation for enterprises with different unrecorded assets. R&D intensity and Capital expenditures are used as proxies of unrecorded assets. The results show that the relationship between unrecorded assets and information transparency is significantly positive. Firms with higher unrecorded assets have higher FERC. In addition, compared to firms with less unrecorded assets, the firms with higher unrecorded assets how more sensitive moderating effects for earnings response coefficient (ERC) and future earnings response coefficient (FERC).The management implication of this paper suggests that firms with high R&D intensity or high capital expenditures could increase their information transparency to decrease the information asymmetry problems, and hence increase their enterprise value. INTRODUCTION Based on the generally-accepted accounting principles, the accountants treat research and development (R&D) expenditures as current expense which reduce current earnings immediately. Future cash flow that is expected to be generated by research and development (R&D) expenditure is only partially reflected or responded to in current earnings (Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan, 1994). A lack of timeliness in the disclosure of accounting information results a weak relationship between current returns and current earnings. When economic events occur, a well-informed capital market can determine the overall or total effects. Rational investors from the capital market tend to adjust the perceived or expected future earnings, which alters corporate stock prices and returns on investment. This result has led to studies examining the relationship between current earnings and the future earnings response coefficient (FERC). Lundholm and Myers (2002) investigated how companies’ disclosure activities affected the relationship between current returns, current earnings, and future earnings, and found that companies that disclosed relatively more information also disclosed more forward-looking information. Consequently, their current returns reflected significantly higher FERC. Collins et al. (1994) indicated that a lack of timeliness and random interferences or disturbances (noises) resulted in inferior current earnings informativeness. One of the main contributors to the lack of timeliness for accounting information is the recognition or determination of intangible assets. Underestimation of intangible assets is mainly caused by issues related to R&D expenditure and The Journal of Global Business Management Volume 11* Number 1 * April 2015 Issue 27 underestimation of future earnings from newly acquired fixed assets. The R&D expenditures recognized as expenses when they occurred. If the R&D is successful, the company would obtain significant development opportunities, indicating that the company possessed unrecorded intangible assets. However, if the R&D was not successful, the company would be equivalent to companies that have no intangible assets (Chin, Lin, and Qiu, 2005). Signaling theory holds that when companies have good news or when they are undervalued, management tends to release more information; therefore, the higher the company’s R&D expenditure, the greater the underestimation of intangible assets. There exist the motivations for management to disclose more information. The first objective of this study tries to find out the relationship between unrecorded assets and information transparency. Lundholm and Myers (2002) believed that increased disclosures of future earnings information would reduce the effects that current earnings have on current returns. That is, the influences of current earnings and future earnings information on current returns could be substituted. However, these findings have not yet to be verified. In this study, we contend that Lundholm and Myers did not consider the influences of various characteristics for each company. Hence, thesecond objective of this study was to add a specific company characteristic (degree of unrecorded assets) when investigating whether the influences of current earnings and future earnings information on current returns could be substituted. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES To date, only a few studies have investigated the relationships between current returns, current earnings, and future earnings. When investigating the effects that various levels of information disclosure had on the relationships between current returns, current earnings, and future earnings, Lundholm and Myers (2002) found that companies with higher information transparency disclosed more forward-looking information. The transparency of information has a positive moderating relationship for the correlation between current returns and future earnings information. Tucker and Zarowin (2006) found that compared to changes in share prices for non-income smoothing companies, changes in current share prices for income smoothing companies contained more future earnings information. Therefore, the smoothness of earnings increased their inform ativeness. Orpurt and Zang (2009) used the FERC to provide evidence and explain how investors employing information from cash flow statements prepared using the direct method could contribute to the projections of company future operating performance. In a knowledge-based economy, innovation has become the key to the success or failure of all companies. The innovations and technologies created from research expenditure, as well as the subsequent capital expenditure, all contribute to companies gaining a competitive edge (Chin, Lin, and Qiu, 2005). Previous studies have shown that a positive correlation exists between R&D and company value (Sougiannis, 1994; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). Because of the high risks associated with the future operations of companies, generally-accepted accounting principles consider R&D expenditure as current expenditures. For managers, to prevent the underestimation of share prices, they tend to disclose more information. Highertransparent a company’s information is, higher investors’ confidence in the expectation of company’s future earnings will be. While the R&D expenditures lead to potentially valuable patents, direct disclosure should be a good signal, and such information is considered usefulness to investors (Hughes, 1986). Thus, we proposed the following hypothesis: H1: The relationship between unrecorded assets and information transparency is positive. 28 The Journal of Global Business Management Volume 11 * Number 1 * April 2015 Issue Examining how increases in the level of disclosures affected market expectations, Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) found that the regression formula for current earnings and returns indicated that the higher the disclosure level, the greater the current earnings coefficient. Lundholm and Myers (2002) believed that increases in the current earnings coefficient, as mentioned previously, were caused by changes in the expected future earnings not being applied to the regression formula. If increasing the level of disclosures could enhance the relationship between current returns and future earnings, the current returns of companies with poorer transparency would be decided more by current earnings, because these companies demonstrate relative insufficiency regarding future earnings information. This is because current earnings are a proxy variable for changes in future earnings. With increases in the level of disclosure and more future earnings information made public, the influence that current earnings have on current returns declines. This means that the influence of current and future earnings information on current returns can be substituted based on the level of disclosure. However, study results did not support the argument that current and future earnings information has a substitution effect for current returns (Lund holm and Myers, 2002). In this study, we contend that when considering companies with varying characteristics, because the level of changes in expected future earnings differs, the level of disclosure required by investors also differs. Therefore, the effects that the level of disclosure has on the correlations between current returns and current and future earnings would differ. For investors, the higher the companies’ R&D expenditure, the higher the values of intangible innovation; thus, investors would desire more future earnings information. Additionally, the greater the information transparency, the more information asymmetry would be reduced, and the stronger confidence in adjustments of future earnings would be, thereby increasing the market FERC values. Simultaneously, the effects that current earnings have on current returns would decline. However, for companies with less R&D expenditure,because of the lower inform ativeness of their future earnings, the effect that information transparency had on current earnings and current returns would be unclear. Thus, we proposed the following hypotheses: H2: Because unrecorded assets differ between companies, the effects that information transparency has on the correlations between current returns and current earnings also differs. H2a: For companies with high unrecorded assets, the correlation between current returns and current earnings declines as the level of disclosures increases. H2b: For companies with low unrecorded assets, the relationship between the level of disclosures and the correlation between current returns and current earnings is unclear. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN Empirical Models for Hypothesis 1 The following model was used to test hypotheses 1. Based on signaling theory, we contend that the firms with higher unrecorded assets disclosures more information.We organized the sample companies from highest to lowest according to their unrecorded assets, where the top 50% of the sample were considered companies with high unrecorded assets, and the other half were considered companies with low unrecorded assets. R&D intensity index and capital expenditure index are the proxies of unrecorded assets. Both are indicator variables, 1 for high unrecorded assets and 0 otherwise. Company size, and industry are included as control variables (Huang, Huang, Chang, and Fu, 2011).For this study, we used results obtained from the Information Disclosure and Evaluation System developed by the Taiwan Securities & Futures Institute (SFI) as proxy variables for information transparency and information The Journal of Global Business Management Volume 11* Number 1 * April 2015 Issue 29 quality. The SFI divided the overall evaluation results into five categories or rankings: A+, A, B, C, and C-, where C- denoted the lowest level of information transparency. , for this ranking was 0 and represented the base group for this study. Values of 1, 2, 3, and 4 for , represented the information evaluation result of C, B, A, and A+, respectively. A of 4 denoted the optimum , level of information transparency. ∝ ∝ & ∝ ∝ , , , , , , (1) Where, for firm i the variables are defined as follows: = Information transparency index , = R&D intensity index(1 if high R&D intensity firms, 0 otherwise) & , =Capital expenditure Index(1 if high R&D intensity firms, 0 otherwise) = nature log of total assets , = indicator variable (1 if electronic industry firms, 0 otherwise) , = the residuals , For Hypothesis 2, the focus of the regression formula was on the coefficient∝ . A positive ∝ indicated that unrecorded assetswas positively correlated with information transparency. Empirical Models for Hypothesis2 For hypotheses 2. We contend that for different level of unrecorded assets, information transparency has different moderating effect on the correlation between returns, ERC and FERC.We adapt the model (Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006)to test hypothesis 2.We use the method, as stated previously, to separate the sample companies into two subgroups: high unrecorded assets firms and unrecorded assets firms, and then use the following model to test and compare the moderating effect of information transparency: , , , , , ∗ , , ∗ , , ∗ , , ∗ , , ∗ , ∗ , (2) Where, for firm i the variables are defined as follows: = current returns, which is the rate of return for common shares in the Ri,t tthyear(from May 1 in the tth year to April 30 in the t+1th year) =previous earnings, which is the EPS in the t-1th year Xi,t-1 =current earnings, which is the EPS in the tth year Xi,t =sum of future earnings, which is the sum of EPS for Years t+1, t+2, and t+3 Xi,t+3 = future returns, which is the rate of return for common shares from Years Ri,t*3 t+1 to t+3 calculated based on compound interest = Information transparency index , = cross multiplication of transparency index and previous earnings , ∗ , = cross multiplication of transparency index and current earnings , ∗ , = cross multiplication of transparency index and sum of future earnings ∗ , , = cross multiplication of transparency index and future return ∗ , , ∗ = the residuals , The coefficients 1, 2, 3, and 4 measured the relationships between current returns and previous period earnings, current earnings, future earnings, and future returns for companies that received an evaluation rating of C-. measured the relationships between previous earnings and current returns, and possessed a negative expected sign. was the response coefficient for current earnings (the greater the current earnings, the greater the returns), and possessed a positive expected sign. measured the effects that changes in expected future earnings had on current returns, and possessed a positive expected sign. measured the relationship between returns and measure errors (the greater the measure errors, the lower 30 The Journal of Global Business Management Volume 11 * Number 1 * April 2015 Issue the returns), and possessed a negative expected sign. 6, 7, 8, and 9 measured the differences in the slopes of each independent variable for companies from different evaluation rating groups, when compared to the lowest evaluation rating companies. For Hypothesis 2, the focus of the regression formula was on the coefficient 8. A positive 8 indicated that information transparency was positively correlated with the relationship between earnings and returns from previous and future periods. The focus of the regression formula was coefficients 8 and 7. When the coefficient 8 was significantly positive, information transparency was positively correlated with the relationship between earnings and returns from the previous and future periods. When coefficient 7 was significantly negative, information transparency was negatively correlated with the relationship between current returns and current earnings. When 8 was positive and 7 was negative, a substitution effect existed between the two factors. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES Sample Selection This study used listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies in Taiwan between 2005 and 2007 as samples. Because we used these companies’ actual earnings and returns for the next three years as proxy variables for future earnings information and error measurement, information regarding 2006 sample companies was collected until April 30, 2011. The data evaluation results were obtained from the Taiwan Stock Exchange Market Observation Post System, and the financial reports, stock prices, and returns of the sample companies were acquired from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) databases. The following companies were excluded from this study: financial and insurance companies, chiefly because of their varying evaluation methods and regulations; companies with an accounting period that was not based on a calendar year system because the periods in which the returns were calculated differed; and companies that had incomplete information regarding the variables. Consequently, we obtained a total of 2,884 annual company sample data. Table 1 shows the annual distribution of the sample companies. In 2005, 2006, and 2007, totals of 914, 970, and 1,000 companies were obtained, respectively. The number of companies increased every year. There were 1,574 and 1,311 companies from the information and electronic (I&E) and non-information and electronic industries, respectively. Year 94 95 96 Total Table 1: The annual distributions of the sample companies I&E Industries Non-I&E industries 488 426 533 437 553 447 1,574 1,311 Total 914 970 1,000 2,884 Table 2 presents the regression results of the relationship between unrecorded intangible assets and disclosure. We focused on the coefficient ∝ of R&D intensity index ( & , ) and ∝ of capital expenditure index ( , ). From table 2, a value of 0.1223 was obtained for this coefficient∝ , which suggests that higher the R&D intensity, greater the firms’ information transparency (t = 4.3578, p< .01). A value of 0.0141 was obtained for this coefficient∝ , which is positive, but not significant (t=0.5998, p>0.10). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. Further, this results might show that the undervalued assets of R&D is stronger than those of capital expenditure and that results in revealing more information. The Journal of Global Business Management Volume 11* Number 1 * April 2015 Issue 31 Table 2: The regression results of the relation between unrecorded intangible assets and disclosure ∝ ∝ & ∝ ∝ , , , , Dependent variable: Expected sign coefficient , Intercept -0.6061*** ? & 0.1223*** + , 0.0141 + , 0.1548 ? , 0.1804*** + , Adjusted R2 0.0950 F-statistics 76.6211*** Sample size 2884 , , t value -3.6535 4.3578 0.5248 14.2772 6.3335 Note 1: 1. variables are defined as follows: & , =R&D intensity index; , =Capital expenditure index; , =Company size; , =number of employers; , =industry index. 2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (when expected signs were present, we used a one-tailed test; when expected signs were not present, we used a two-tailed test) 3. The t-value was obtained by heteroskedasticity processing (White, 1980) Table 3 the moderating effect of information transparency under different R & D intensity firms. The samples are divided into two groups: high R&D intensity firms and low R&D intensity firms. We use the evaluation results obtained through the Information Disclosure and Transparency Evaluation System as the proxy variables for information disclosure. Based on the overall evaluation results, the Grade Ccompanies were used as the base group and , , , measured the relationship between the current returns ( , ),previous earnings, current earnings, future earnings, and measurement errors of the lower quality information transparency companies. The previous earnings ( , ) coefficient ( was -213.8960 and -60.6086, demonstrating a significant negative correlation with current returns ( , ) (t=-3.23;p<0.01; t=-2.61, p<0.01). The results showed that the previous earnings ( , ) of Grade Ccompanies increased by NTD$0.1, and that, as the unexpected earnings decreased, the current period returns decreased by 21.39% and 6.06%, which corresponded to the expected signs. The current earnings ( , ) coefficient ( was 228.7792 and 99.3699, demonstrating a significant positive correlation with current returns ( , ) (t = 3.31, p< .01; t= 4.11, p<0.01). This result suggests that current earnings and return increased by NTD$0.1 and 22.88% and 9.94%, respectively which corresponded to the expected signs. The sum of future earnings ( , ) coefficient (FERC, was 22.0161 and 16.5181. Although it possessed a positive correlation with current returns ( , ), the result was not significant (t = 0.97,p>0.1; t=1.27, p> 0.1), further indicating that investors do not trust information regarding future earnings from lower quality information transparency companies. The coefficient ( of future return ( , ∗ ) was -8.3816 for high R&D intensity firms, 32 The Journal of Global Business Management Volume 11 * Number 1 * April 2015 Issue Table 3: The moderating effect of information transparency under different R & D intensity firms , , , , , ∗ , , ∗ , (3) , ∗ , , ∗ , , ∗ , ∗ , High R&D intensity firms Low R&D intensity firms Dependent variable: , Expected sign Coefficient t value Coefficient t value ? Intercept 23.3041*** 4.26 29.9141*** 6.99 *** *** Xi,t-1 -213.8960 -3.23 -60.6086 -2.61 + 228.7792*** 3.31 99.3699*** 4.11 Xi,t + 22.0161 0.97 16.5181 1.27 Xi,t+3 -8.3816 -1.24 -27.4531*** -3.97 Ri,t*3 * * -1.76 -4.633 -1.83 ? -4.7941 , ** *X -2.08 ? 37.6462 1.26 -29.8689 i,t-1 , ** *X -1.96 6.5647 0.44 -64.1582 i,t , *** ** *X 2.39 12.4996 1.82 + 26.4365 i,t+3 , -1.45 3.7737 1.21 ? -4.8379* , *Ri,t*3 Adjusted R2 0.332 0.232 F-statistics 80.6664*** (<0.01) 49.2780*** (<0.01) Sample size 1,442 1,442 Note 1: 1. , =current rdturn; Xi,t-1= previous earnings; Xi,t= current earnings; Xi,t+3 = sum of future earnings; Ri,t*3 = future return; = cross multiplication of transparency index and previous , = transparency index; , ∗ , earnings; = cross , ∗ , = cross multiplication of transparency index and current earnings; , ∗ , multiplication of transparency index and sum of future earnings; , ∗ , ∗ = cross multiplication of transparency index and future returns 2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (when expected signs were present, we used a one-tailed test; when expected signs were not present, we used a two-tailed test) 3. The t-value was obtained by heteroskedasticity processing (White, 1980) indicating a negative, but not significant (t=-1.24, p>0.1). The coefficient ( of future return was -27.4531, indicating a significant negative correlation with current returns ( , ) (t = -3.97, p< .01), which corresponded to he expected signs. From table 3, the cross multiplication coefficient 8 of the transparency index and the sum of the future earnings ( ), in which the FERC of the high and low R&D intensity companies , ∗ , were 26.4365 and 12.4996, respectively, suggesting that the FERC of the high and low R&D intensity companies were positive and significant (t = 2.39, p< .01; t = 1.82, p< .05). The results further suggest that information transparency has a positive effect on the correlation between current returns and future earnings. The cross multiplication coefficient of the transparency index and current earnings ( ∗ ) measured the influence that information transparency had on the correlation between , , current returns and earnings. The results showed that the current earning response coefficient (ERC) of high R&D intensity companies was -64.1582, which suggests that information transparency has a significant negative effect on the correlation between current returns and earnings (t = -1.96, p< .05). Furthermore, the information transparency of high R&D intensity companies has a positive and negative correlation with the relationships between returns-future earnings and returns-current earnings, respectively. Therefore, a substitution effect existed between the two factors and we retained Hypothesis 2. From table 4, the coefficients 1, 2, 3, and 4 measured the relationships between current returns and previous earnings, current earnings, sum of future earnings, and future returns for companies that received an evaluation rating of C-.Additionally, the expected signs for these relationships were the same as those mentioned previously.the cross multiplication coefficient 8 of the transparency index and the sum of the future earnings ( ), in which the FERC of the high and low capital , ∗ , expenditure companies were 31.7175 and 17.5018, respectively, suggesting that the FERC of the high and The Journal of Global Business Management Volume 11* Number 1 * April 2015 Issue 33 low capital expenditure companies were positive and significant (t = 2.16, p< .05; t = 1.93, p< .05). The results further suggest that information transparency has a positive effect on the correlation between current returns and future earnings. The cross multiplication coefficient of the transparency index and current earnings ( , ∗ , ) measured the influence that information transparency had on the correlation between current returns and earnings. The results showed that the current earning response coefficient (ERC) of high capital expenditure companies was-65.9474, which suggests that information transparency has a significant negative effect on the correlation between current returns and earnings (t = -1.89, p< .05). Furthermore, the information transparency of high capital expenditure companies has a positive and negative correlation with the relationships between returns-future earnings and returns-current earnings, respectively. Therefore, a substitution effect existed between these two factors and we retained Hypothesis 2. Table4: The moderating effect of information transparency under different capital expenditure firms , , , , , ∗ , , ∗ , ∗ ∗ ∗ , , , , , , ∗ , Dependent High capital expenditure firms Low capital expenditure firms Expect-e variable: , d sign Coefficient t value Coefficient t value ? Intercept 9.1442 1.57 33.0934*** 7.57 -98.8469*** -2.45 -113.0085*** -3.36 Xi,t-1 + 256.5460*** 3.38 105.3954*** 3.10 Xi,t + 11.9615 0.38 17.8702 1.08 Xi,t+3 -8.1593 -0.86 -21.6000*** -3.40 Ri,t*3 -2.89 ? 1.2390 0.69 -6.3380*** , ? -20.2824 -0.91 2.09268 0.13 , *Xi,t-1 -65.9474** -1.89 -4.3194 -0.25 , *Xi,t 2.16 17.5018** 1.93 + 31.7175** , *Xi,t+3 *R ? -6.9595 -1.51 1.4968 0.48 i,t*3 , 0.3286 0.2234 Adjusted R2 F-statistics 61.6023*** (<0.01) 57.7400*** (<0.01) Sample size 1,442 1,442 Note 1: 1. , =current rdturn; Xi,t-1= previous earnings; Xi,t= current earnings; Xi,t+3 = sum of future earnings; Ri,t*3 = future return; = cross multiplication of , = transparency index; , ∗ , transparency index and previous earnings; , ∗ , = cross multiplication of transparency = cross multiplication of transparency index and sum of index and current earnings; , ∗ , future earnings; ∗ = cross multiplication of transparency index and future returns , , ∗ 2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (when expected signs were present, we used a one-tailed test; when expected signs were not present, we used a two-tailed test) 3. The t-value was obtained by heteroskedasticity processing (White, 1980) Previous studies regarding transparency and earning information obtained differing results because they did not consider the significance of using future earnings information or inform at iveness. This study showed that higher quality information transparency companies are more informative regarding future earnings information. Furthermore, the reason for the weak correlation between returns and earnings may be the underestimation of future profitability based on unrecognized assets. We categorized sample companies into groups of high and low R&D expenditure and investigated the relationships 34 The Journal of Global Business Management Volume 11 * Number 1 * April 2015 Issue between information transparency and non-current returns and earnings. The results showed that high R&D intensity companies have better the information transparency of a company, the more informative the future earnings that are reflected by current returns, and, conversely, the less informative the current earnings. Therefore, future and current earnings demonstrate a substitution effect. We get the same results for high and low capital expenditure firms. The management implication of this paper suggests that firms with high unrecorded assets could increase their information transparency to decrease the information asymmetry problems, and hence increase their enterprise value. REFERENCES Collins, D. W., S. P. Kothari, J. Shanken, and R. Sloan. (1994). Lack of timeliness and noise as explanations for the low contemporaneous return-earnings association. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18(3): 289-324. Healy, P. M., A P. Hutton, and K. G. Palepu. (1999). Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding Sustained increases in disclosure. 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