Download India`s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) The Hindu Nationalist Party

India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
The Hindu Nationalist Party Between
Moderation and Radicalization
AUTHOR
Mario Lootz
February 2014
In a few month in spring 2014, the Indian population is electing their central government. Next to
the long-standing major party of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the upcoming Aam Aadmi
Party (AAP), which emerged from the anti-corruption movement in 2011, there is the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), that is seen ahead in opinion polls and has delightful prospects to win the Lok
Sabha's elections. Because the BJP's return to government is highly possible, this article tries to
explain the attractiveness of the party and sheds light on its history and orientation.
The rise of the BJP
The rise of the BJP starting in the 1980s is seen as one of the most incisive factor in Indian politics.
It can be be explained by various aspects. Among others there is the collapse of the hegemony of the
Nehruvian Consensus taking place. Because Nehru's middle way between capitalism and socialism
had not lead to a broader development in India, there was a deep disappointment in the population
about the failed promises of modernization and an ideological disarray attending on this failure. The
BJP could benefit from this political and ideological vacuum and place itself as serious alternative
to Congress. This was supported by the historic decline of the Congress, which was constantly
confronted with accusations of corruption. In times of socio-economic change and uncertainty, the
concept of Hindu unity functioned as social stabilization. (Ibid., p. 307) Or as it Aijaz Ahmad in his
work “On Communalism and Globalization” formulates in a more polemic way: “an aggressive
kind of rightist nationalism [...] takes advantage from the misery of the masses.” (Ahmad 2002, p.
23) But especially the middle classes, that witnessed the economic success of other Asian countries,
felt left behind and switched support from Congress to the BJP.
Furthermore, there were other decisive developments, that encouraged the “Saffron Wave” (Hansen
1999). In the 1980s the government implemented land reforms, that allowed previous bounded
peasant to own land and rise economically. Besides, the Mandal Comission was established, which
guaranteed reservations for Other Backward Castes (OBC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) in
governments and public institutions. These developments lead to a feeling of menace to their social
status in the predominantly Hindu urban middle classes. As a consequence, Hindu nationalist
thinking around themes of the endangered nation became attractive. Stories about competition over
jobs and education because of Muslim immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh fell on fertile
ground. However, in the beginning of the 1980s, the BJP tried to keep track of the integration into
the center of society by refusing a radical Hindu nationalist program. To reach broader segments of
society, the BJP accepted first dissociations between the party and the RSS. Yet, at the same time
Congress politicians used a language adopted from the Sangh Parivar and therefore contributed to a
“communalization” of Indian politics. (cf. Hansen 1999, p. 140ff.)
For the BJP, the ,moderate' did not prove successful on the ballot box. In the 1984 Lok Sabha
elections the Congress won a great majority and the BJP received only 8% of the votes. This poll
debacle caused a radical rearrangement of the party towards more rigorous communal politics.
L.K. Advani was elected as party president in the aftermath of the elections and the RSS took over
more control again. Consequently a more “purist” stance as defender of the “Hindu society”, in
addition with more populist and anti-Muslim politics, was taken up. A central element in the
reorientated program of the BJP was the Ayodhya campaign. The insistence on building the temple
of Ram on his assumed birthplace became part of the official ideological inventory of the BJP from
1989. The Babri mosque in Ayodyha was claimed as a religious Hindu place already since
independence. In the course of the ,radicalization' of the party, the issue was pushed forward. In
1990, BJP's president Advani started the ,rath yatra', a rally through the whole country to agitate for
support for the Ayodhya campaign and to call anti-Muslim sentiments in the society. The BJP
election manifesto from 1991 comprised the lines: “It [the BJP] seeks the restoration of Ram
Janmabhoomi in Ayodhya only by way of a symbolic righting of historic wrongs.” (cf. Schwecke
2011, p. 81) The Ayodhya campaign can not only be seen as “the most radical phase in the party's
evolution in terms of ideological stridency, but also its most militant phase.” (Ibid., p. 81) Dr.
Sebastian Schwecke, a scholar on Indian history states in his work “New cultural identitarian
political movements in developing societies: the Bharatiya Janata Party” from 2011, that the
campaign helped the BJP to overcome the dilemma, which it faced due to the Mandal report.
Traditionally a party with an upper-class Brahmin constituency, the upsurge of OBC's and Dalits as
a political voice, constituted a challenge for the BJP. Since no political party in India could refuse
Mandalism without disadvantages, the Ayodhya campaign and anti-Muslim agitation also served as
a policy of distraction. The history of Hindus as victims of injustice in their country was told.
Muslims were blamed for destabilization, job snatching and exploitation of “goodhearted Hindus”.
(cf. Schwecke 2011, p. 81 and Hansen 1999, p. 159) To make a bogeyman out of the Muslim
community supposed to facilitate receiving votes from all classes and castes including the lower
ones. Hence, the BJP by the end of the 1980s links Mandalism and Ayodhya, but also the rise of the
middle class, rent scarcity and liberalization within the bounds of a radical Hindu nationalist
ideology. This radicalization of the BJP is accompanied by large-scale communal violence
throughout most of India culminating in the demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992. The mosque
was eventually entirely destroyed by large mob of around 150,000 people without protection from
the BJP state government. Anti-Muslim violence associated with the campaign furthermore
climaxed in the Bombay riots in 1993, where around 900 people died in communal clashes. (Cf.
Schwecke 2011, p. 81)
The impact of the Ayodhya campaign and the Babri mosque demolition can be evaluated in
different ways. On the one hand, the campaign proved successful in electoral terms. The BJP could
gain the support of millions of Hindus and win the elections of the 1993's Delhi Assembly and the
1995's Gujarat and Maharashtra state elections. The incident had created a feeling of strength and
self-confidence amongst broad sections of the Hindus and “these fragments of Hindu nationalist
discourse gained enormous popularity and ubiquity”. (Hansen 1999, p. 184) On the other hand,
parts of the party members and of the constituency were shocked by the magnitude of the violence.
And while the VHP was pushing forward the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya, a
discussion about the violent actions emerged within the BJP. In contrast to the hardliners in the RSS
and the VHP, BJP leaders compromised on a rather ,moderate' way. They agreed on a strategic
reorientation which included a new line of diversification of issues, e.g. to promote OBC's, Dalits
and Tribals concerns. Therewith, the BJP scaled down its dependence on religious symbolism and a
“normalization” of the party took place after 1993. (cf. Schwecke 2011, p. 82f. and Hansen 1999, p.
198) The reorganization of the party towards a moderate orientation proved successful on in
electoral terms. In the 1996 elections the BJP became the party with the most seats in the Lok
Sabha. Yet, other parties did not want to form a coalition with the Hindu party. But in 1998, the BJP
could overcome its isolation in the political constellation and joined the government of the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA). The Hindu nationalists party also won the 1999 elections and stayed in
government within the NDA until 2004. The consolidation of the BJP in the political mainstream
was possible through the assertion of the liberal wing within the party around prime minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee vis-à-vis the traditional wing around L.K. Advani. The BJP-liberals encouraged an
liberalization of the economy, reconciliation of the religious communities and positive relation with
the South Asian neighbor states. (cf. Skoda 2005, p. 182) Hence, the 1999 election and following
years in government can be seen as consolidation of the Hindu right and a ,normalization' of the
BJP. “The ,party with a difference' was increasingly perceived to be less different from other
political parties, especially the INC.” (Schwecke 2011, p. 88)
However, the turn towards moderation was never uncontested in the Sangh Parivar and the BJP
leaders always oscillated between centrist politics and commitment to Hindu nationalist ideology.
The Gujarat pogrom in 2002 can be seen against this background. The inter-communal riots took
place in the federal state Gujarat until May 2002 and led to more than 1,000 deaths. The BJP is
claimed to not interfere sufficiently to prevent an escalation of the violence. Furthermore, the party
did not show any adequate efforts to pursue the perpetrators and resisted demands for the
resignation of Narendra Modi and his federal government. Although the Gujarat violence showed,
that the radical wing in the BJP and the Sangh Parivar has not vanished over time and is able to
exert certain pressure on the moderate elements of the party, it can be constituted, that it was
incapable of comprehensively challenging the moderates dominance in the party. After 2002, the
party advanced the conflicting agendas by concentrating on development issues, which were
predominant in the 2004 election race. (cf. Schwecke 2011, p. 95f.) In this 2004 Lok Sabha
elections, the BJP experienced a surprising defeat. In the election campaign, the BJP prided itself on
its achievements in development policy. It celebrated the rates of economic growth achieved in the
last incumbency with a campaign called “Shining India”. This slogan was supposed to address the
“new middle class”. But rural India with its 750 Million people and the lower castes, living in
poverty, could absolutely not identify with this campaign. Because also the religious minorities
were worried after the Gujarat pogroms, these factors lead to a decisive loss of votes. In 2009,
Congress repeated it success in the general elections and obtained the mandate to govern again.
The rise of the BJP began at the end of the 1980s. It developed from an ideological-fundamentalist
Hindutva faction, to a major party with integrative character and elements of Hinduism. The lapse
of the Ayodhya campaign led to a reorganization of the party including the assertion of the moderate
wing with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as central figure. The BJP integrated into the political mainstream.
Its ,normalization' made it possible to form coalitions and facilitated the BJP's rise as governing
party from 1998 to 2004. The 2004 defeat came surprising for the BJP leaders. However it was no
fundamental weakening of the Hindu nationalists. The BJP has developed to a nationwide operating
major party and the most serious opponent to Indian National Congress. In the next part of the paper
I am going to discuss the BJP's role today.
The BJP today
For the 2014 general election, the BJP nominated Narendra Modi as their candidate for the prime
minister position. Being in power during the 2002 Gujarat riots, he is a controversial figure in
Indian politics. Since he is considered as a ,hardliner' within the party, it is a crucial question to ask,
in which direction the BJP is heading with his nomination. According to Achin Vanaik remains
behind the mask of moderate politics the “ruthlessness” and the “steel-hard determination” of the
RSS. (cf. Vanaik 1997) Arundhati Roy takes the same line, asserting in her work “Listening to
Grasshoppers– Genocide, Denial And Celebration”, that „preparations to recreate the 'Gujarat
blueprint' are currently in different stages in the BJP-ruled states […]“ (Roy, 2009) By contrast,
Schwecke states, that a comprehensive discontinuation of the moderate way, except from local
violent setbacks „by now does not anymore constitute a probable threat.“ (Schwecke, 2011)
Schwecke claims, that the BJP is moving away from its former role as political arm of the Sangh
Parivar, which can be seen in the growing number of cases, in which the BJP takes position against
the RSS-ideology. For Schwecke, the cultural identitarian agenda nowadays is less important in
mobilizing popular support than the economic agenda. The majority of the modern middle class
demands the development of the country, combined with elements of a Hindu nationalism.
However, the nationalism of the “new middle classes” is rather interested in projecting Indian
nationality in the world than exclude social groups within India. (cf. Schwecke 2011, p. 176ff.)
Hence, Hindu nationalist thoughts are adapted “in order to enable the party to operate in the context
of modern Indian politics.” (Ibid., p. 128) Schwecke identifies three dynamics that will influence
the prospects of the BJP emerging as a moderate, centre-right political party. First, the dynamic of
political pragmatism, “which reinforces the tendency to adapt to the institutional compulsion of
Indian politics”. Second, the discursive dynamics inherent in the Hindu nationalist concept of a
cultural identity. With its relative vagueness regarding the notion of a national identity, it can either
facilitate the turn towards moderation or turn out to be a major obstacle in this process. And third,
the trajectory of socio-economic changes and the resulting dynamics of political economy, which
have a crucial potential of stabilizing the moderate way. (cf. Ibid., p. 181)
Dr. Hans Georg Wieck, the former German ambassador in India writes, that the moderate way of the
BJP is depending on the ability of the BJP leaders to keep the RSS-basis under political control and
to expand moderate views within the RSS ideology. He states, that the BJP was able to integrate
huge differences in all questions of the complex structure of the Indian state. The party could
enforce efficient and pragmatical policies and enable the possibility of forming coalitions. After the
catastrophe of Ayodhya, a renunciation of a radical Hindu nationalism emerged and allowed the
development to a big-tent party. Vajpayee sets up the development of the party, that did not deny its
ideological origins, but arranged itself with the requirements of modern Indian society. Apart from
temporary setbacks of the Hindu nationalist violence, Wieck considers the moderate way as the
BJP's future, as long as the party stays in charge of the interdependence with the RSS. (cf. Skoda
2005, p. 235-251)
In his essay “The BJP: A Conservative Party of the Middle Class.”, Dr. Fabian Becher confirms the
narrative of the BJP as a moderate conservative party. He claims that the BJP by coming into power
in 1998 dismissed many radical elements in their program. A decisive factor in this course
correction was the force to build coalitions. With a demand for radical Hindu nationalist politics, the
BJP wouldn't be able to find coalition partners and therewith fulfill the condition to form the
government. This can be demonstrated using the example of Ayodhya. After coming into power, the
BJP's insistence on building the Ram-temple in Ayodhya faded from the spotlight. What Becher also
noticed, is the alienation between the BJP and the RSS due to the party's moderation. According to
Becher, the rise of the BJP as a modern alternative to the Congress in terms of economic policies
and as a conservative party in terms of social and cultural issues happened in the aftermath of the
1991 economic reforms, that reshaped the Indian society. The BJP became attractive to
predominantly Hindu middle classes as a guarantor of the the economic liberalization and as keeper
of the social order and middle class status. As written by Becher, its way to a moderate conservative
party proceeded in 1998. The secularization of its internal structure due to an accrue of members
without an RSS background will support this development. When the party is able to distance itself
from the RSS in the long term, Becher predicts the consolidation of the BJP as a moderate party in
the future. (cf. Skoda 2005, p. 251-271)
However, there are also critical voices next to Arundhati Roy and Achin Vanaik. An article in the
magazine “The Economist” (author unstated) returns to mind the dubious role of top candidate
Narendra Modi in the Gujarat pogrom. He turned a “blind eye on the massacres and has since then
happy to portrayed as a Hindu nationalist.” (The Economist, 12/2012) The author is also concerned,
because Modi since then refuses to atone for the victims and do not even mention the violent
communal riots. Although Modi softens his rhetoric he “has hardly been a model of reconciliation”
(The Economist, 12/2013) They recall the fact, that the BJP can win an election without any support
from India's 180 million Muslims, so there is no electoral imperative to speak in their concerns.
Even if Modi stresses his focus on economic matters, the Economist's author believe that if the
economy tumbles, he could enforce a rather nationalist communal language. (cf. Ibid.)
Even if it is not possible to predict the way the BJP will take in the future, there are some factors,
that let a moderate orientation of the party seem to be rather likely. First, there is an ongoing
alienation between the RSS and the BJP. If the emancipation continues and a rather cautious stance
can be established in the Sangh family, communalism will decrease. Second, there is the party's
leader orientation towards economic issues instead of cultural identitarian programs. If the market
reacts positive to Modi's new program and the economy grows, religiously and culturally balanced
politics will be highly probable. However, if the economy struggles, communal setbacks and
cultural clashes are getting conceivable. What is reassuring, is a look into the BJP's record in
government. During its first period of government, the BJP developed to a party with a program
guided by the needs of the modern Indian society. And “after two successive electoral defeats,
pragmatists within the BJP […] begun to realize that too much Hindutva […] is hurting the BJP.”
(Subramanian 2009) Yet surveys predict good opportunities for the BJP to win the elections.
Nevertheless, there are some reasons to expect moderate and balanced politics, when the Hindu
nationalists party will seize power.
Literature
Ahmad, Aijaz: On Communalism and Globalization. Offensives of the Far Right. New Delhi, 2002.
Author unstated: India's BJP. On a roll. The Economist, 20/12/2012,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/12/indias-bjp, last access: 04/02/2014.
see:
Author unstated: Narendra Modi. A man of some of the people. The Economist, 14/12/2013, see:
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21591599-populist-nasty-past-and-decent-economicrecord-wants-run-india-man-some, last access: 04/02/2014.
Copland, Ian/ Mc Guire, John: Hindu Nationalism and Governance. New Delhi, 2007.
Hansen, Thomas Blom: The Saffron Wave. Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India.
Princeton, 1999.
Jaffrelot, Christophe: Religion, Caste and Politics in India. London 2011.
Arundhati Roy: “Listening to Grasshoppers – Genocide, Denial And Celebration”. Hamish
Hamilton, 2009.
Schwecke, Sebastian: New cultural identitarian political movements in developing societies: the
Bharatiya Janata Party. London, 2011.
Skoda, Uwe/ Voll, Klaus (Hg.): Der Hindu-Nationalismus in Indien. Aufstieg – Konsolidierung –
Niedergang? (Hindu-nationalism in India. Rise – consolidation – decline?) Berlin, 2005.
Subramanian, Samanth: Letter from New Delhi. India's Myopic Opposition. The Battle for the Soul
of the BJP. Foreign Affairs, 10/2009.
Vanaik, Achin: Communalism Contested: Religion, Modernity and Secularization. New Delhi,
1997.
Wolf, Siegfried O.: Die Konstruktion einer kollektiven Hindu Identität in Indien: Vinayak Damodar
Savarkar und sein Hindutva-Konzept. (The construction of a collective Hindu identity in India:
Savarkar and his concept of Hindutva) Heidelberg 2008/09.