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Concept Note:
DELINEATING POSTMODERNISM THROUGH INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
At various stages of history, schools of Indian philosophy have attempted to reach some consensus (in their quest for truth) through
elaborate and intensive debates (śāstrārtha) among themselves. This reminds us of the elaborate contests and disputes between
Buddhism and Vedānta and the debates among various Upaniśadic schools themselves. These debates were mostly of traditional
and textual nature.
It was only after the advent of Britishers in India that Indian philosophy got exposure to the European form of ‘critical reflection’.
This gave an extended dimension to the already existing śāstrārthas among Indian philosophical schools. However, some
commentators are not much convinced about openness of discussions and debates in modern Indian philosophy. Indian
philosophers, may be due to their cautious approach towards the colonial and neocolonial situations, or due to the modern
mobilizations of religious identities, have seemed to developed a cocoon (some sort of resistance to critical reflection) around
themselves. We cannot say for sure that there are enough discussions occurring at the interest of ‘search for truth’ in modern Indian
philosophy. On the other hand, our thinkers are often directed by vested interests of defending their own school of thought by nonphilosophical means. Despite the above said background of Indian philosophy, there are certain compelling trends, conditioned by
the development of socio-cultural movements, in favor of culturing critical studies of Indian philosophy too.
The Marxist exposition of Indian philosophy is one such trend in the reading of Indian philosophy from a critical perspective. Some
prominent names in this direction are Rahul Sankrityayan, D.P. Chattopadhyaya and K.Damodharan. The Periyarian and Dravidian
analysis of Indian philosophy (often in the form of critically looking into Hinduism) is also popular in certain regions of the country.
Similar regional versions of reading Indian philosophy are available in other parts of the country as well. In recent times, the Dalit
perspective of analyzing Indian philosophy is also gaining new grounds (although such a trend was started way back by Mahatma
Phule and Ambedkar). A feminist reading of Indian philosophy may also be referred to in this context.
Postmodernism is one of the recent trends in Western philosophy that has drawn our attention to certain critical tools in the study of
philosophy, which became popular in Western thought in the 80s. As the term indicates, postmodernism has certain continuities
with (as well as discontinuities) from Modernism that is associated with such thinkers as T.S.Eliot, D.H.Lawrence, Mathew Arnold,
Frank Kafka and Albert Camus.
To a philosopher, Modernism is a phenomenon that reflects several philosophical issues associated with Phenomenological and
Existentialist movements in philosophy. In a nutshell, Phenomenological and Existential thinkers registered the deep crisis of
Western society in the 20th century, more particularly the social and cultural crisis related with the two world wars in Europe. They
addressed the human situation in this technocratic society and tried to induce the authentic human existence to speak for itself.
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Postmodernism inherits this crisis-situation of Modernism but at the same time it is critical to the theme of subjectivity made so
central by Phenomenology and Existentialism. It does not restrict itself by defining its attitude only to the Modernist movement, but
goes further. It moves to criticize the values and slogans of the entire Modernity in Europe that was led by the Enlightenment
movement and science-oriented philosophies. It affirms that the Modern European society has constructed certain Grand-narratives
such as humanity, progress, reason and social liberation, and calls to problematize them. Some instances are:
The Heideggerian theme of onto-theological bias of Western metaphysics has been reframed by the Postmodernists with fresh verve
and renewed thoroughness.
Derrida takes up this problem to the ancient Greek philosophy which offered the first formulation of logocentrism in Philosophy.
Now, let us pass over to Indian philosophy. In Indian context, any postmodern exercise cannot restrict itself with mere repetitions of
the postmodernist criticisms of scientistism and rationalist discourses of Modernity only. The traditional philosophical and religious
discourses are very much alive here and a postmodern discussion cannot avoid problematizing the pre-modern themes. As a result,
postmodernism encounters in India not modernity or modernism as its objects of criticism, but more it has to look into the premodern philosophical and cultural themes. This implies that we have to decipher the way grand-narratives were constructed in
ancient Indian culture and philosophy, and the way how they were utilized in the consequent history of society.
Let us start this discussion from clarifying the idea of grand-narrative and the way postmodernism expounds this concept. For
postmodernism, grand-narratives are the most abstract concepts that deliberately avoid the actual complexities of reality. A grandnarrative considers itself clear from differences, multiplicity, identities, contradictions and changes identifiable and occurring in
(so-called) phenomenal world. Construction of such grand-narrative incorporates certain evaluative scales into the discussion and in
the final analysis, attributes certain ideological stigmas upon the excluded moments of reality. Thus, an asymmetrical binary is
constructed where one side of the binary is always considered superior to the other side. According to postmodernism, such a
hierarchical construction is an ideological act. Construction of a grand-narrative in this manner has a persuasive power which is
exercised almost with the consent of the items involved.
In the present context of our discussion, the concept of Brahman in the Upaniśads may serve as the best example of a grandnarrative. It is quite interesting that, along with the increasing analytical exercise of the Upaniśadic thinkers, the attempt to abstract
Brahman from the analytical moments increases as well. The analytical activity delineated more-and-more newer sides of the
reality, making it more-and-more complex. All these complexities are deciphered from the reality with the help of observation and
analysis. However, unique trend in the Upaniśads is the ‘abstraction’ of the concept of Brahman from the complexities identified.
Brahman is abstracted away from everything gross, physical and compared more-and-more to subtle things like prāna or ākash
(sometimes even water or clay). A methodology of ‘reduction’ is performed to strengthen the ‘abstraction’ of Brahman.
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This is the way of constructing a grand-narrative, where all differentiations and complexities are shed down. A grand-narrative
always refuses to hold in itself the concreteness of reality. It reminds us of:
Parmenides preference to move away from opinions to abstract truths,
Aristotle avoidance of contradictions in correct thinking,
Descartes attempt to reach beyond doubt self-clear ideas, and
Hegelian discussion of abstraction and concreteness.
The Upaniśadic philosophy too tries to reach Brahman beyond multiplicity, divisibility, physical and contradictory. Evaluative
appellations are also added to the concept of Brahman. Brahman is ancient, the first, the sacred and the eternal. Brahman is also the
one. And what about the other side that stands against the Brahman? It is the phenomenal world, its multiplicity, divisibility and
physical nature. It is transient, temporal and undergoes change.
We may also name it Prakṛti. Although Prakṛti as nature is one, its oneness evolves and gives birth to so many things. Once Prakṛti
evolves, the attribute of eternality cannot be ascribed to it. In Sānkhya philosophy, the original or natural state of Prakriti is said to
be pralaya. We find here enough space for feminist reading as well. Prakriti as earth as well as woman gives birth to, divide into,
evolve into multiple. Thus the Prakriti is transient, in that sense that it is not eternal. Consequently, Prakriti is not eternal truth.
Prakriti is the opposite of Brahman. The Upaniśadic philosophy completes itself though the construction of these binaries that is
hierarchical, asymmetrical. Along with the analytical categories of one/multiple, one/divisible, eternal/transient etc, so many
evaluative or ideological categories too mix up into the analysis namely the multiple as chaotic, superficial, impure, phenomenal,
mayic etc. The apex of Upaniśadic wisdom is said to be the definition of Brahman as ‘Neti-Neti’ (Brahman as Nirprapanća,
Nirvaćanya, Nirguna and Nirākāra). Everything earthly, temporal and attributive has been thoroughly eliminated from the concept
of Brahman. In such a state, Brahman is an absolute grand-narrative.
As much as the binary of Brahman and Prakriti is ideological, its status remains unchangeable. As much as the binary of Brahman
and Prakriti is religious, its absolute nature becomes unchangeable. Brahman and Prakriti do not interact, do not relate, do not
penetrate each-other, do not touch each-other. This mutual exclusion becomes a law, an ideological law, an eternal law, a sanātana
law. The construction of Brahman as a grand-narrative brackets temporality. Allowing temporality or change may mean Brahman
inviting its own end. It is against the rules of the game of constructing a grand-narrative. Brahman suppressing thoroughly
temporality is like conceiving pure spatiality. Not only the Time has been suppressed, but along with that a galaxy of items, namely
differences, identities, multiplicity, their autonomy, the feminine, the physical etc are suppressed out from the grand-narrative of
Brahman. In the construction of the grand-narrative of Brahman, even discursive thought (as reflection too) is avoided The
knowledge (or Jnāna) acquired at the stage of realizing the Brahman is not equivalent to the discursive or logical thought- It is
beyond it. The rituals (or karmas) that were celebrated otherwise in the early Vedic literature too are suppressed now in favor of
constructing the concept of Brahman. Along with the suppression of temporality, the philosophy of Brahman also suppresses any
possibility of subjectivity.
Here appears the concept of Atman as the transcendental subjectivity. The philosophy of Brahman ultimately asserts the supremacy
of the Atman over the temporal ego (or self). At times, the Upaniśads declare that only the Atman is real while the temporal ego is
transient. What is the meaning of this binary and the elevation of one-over-the-other? It can be understood as the affirmation of
religious power over the temporal power. Spiritual legitimacy and supremacy have been earned to the concept of Atman discarding
the temporal power as the lower. In the ancient Indian social context, the binary of Atman and temporal self can also be read as the
contest of Brahman power over the kshatriya power.
There are at least two significant ancient Indian philosophical concepts that fervidly challenge the overwhelming dominance of
Brahman and its grand-narrative status. They are the Jaina concept of Anekānta and the Vaiśesika concept of Viśesa. Anekāntavāda
of Jainism seems to be the direct opposition to the Ekāntavāda of Brahman. If Ekāntavāda can be translated as the philosophy of
aloneness asserting the self-assumed supremacy of the concept of Nirguna Brahman against the multi-gunic reality, then
Anekāntavāda can be translated as the ‘philosophy of multiplicity’ or differences (affirming the authenticity and autonomy of the
atomic reality and individualized standpoints about that reality). “Each living and non-living being or atom, and the infinite number
of living beings is a cluster of infinite qualities and their modifications. So even if all these i.e. the whole truth were comprehended
by the Omniscients, it was ineffable. And hence, the whole truth has to be seen at, and stated in infinite ways of expression”.
Anekāntavāda as the philosophy of multiplicity is in so many aspects nearer to the postulates of postmodernism. It shall be noted
here that postmodern philosophy is often identified as a standpoint of ‘pluralistic nominalism’. Anekāntavāda as an epistemological
conception justifies differing perceptions about the nature of reality, every one perceiving the world from his own existential
situation. “All absolutist (ekāntika) attitudes (nayas) are false; and therefore their collection is also false. Non-absolutist
(Anekāntika) attitudes are correct. Therefore, all of them being meaningful (in the expression and representation of some aspect of
truth); their collection is not false” (Aptamimāmsa, V .108). Anekānta vada also suggests a non-violent relationship among the
differing and varying points of view. It is the ethics of Ahimsa proposed by Jainism. Ahimsa appears as the ethics of a ‘pluralistic
federative democracy’, as voluntary commitment of people of one sort to respect the point of view of the people of another sort. No
concept has the authority to dominate the other in the name of more essentiality ascribed to that concept.
Postmodernism maintains that all types of essentialism and attempts of transcending the so-called phenomenal are in the path of
constructing grand-narratives for dominance. Another equally interesting concept in Indian philosophy that speaks for difference
and multiplicity is the concept of Viśesa. Etymologically speaking, Viśesa is specificity, particularity and individuality. It can imply
multiplicity and differences. Logically speaking, Viśesa is that which gives definition to a thing or event against the background of
the relation of generality the thing or event may have with other things and events. Viśesa as the distinctive feature of the thing
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always resists reducing the thing into something else whatever you call it as essence, cause or general. Viśesa demands autonomy to
existence of that particular phenomenon and insists upon the svabhāva of that phenomenon. Viśesa differs categorically from the
regressive methodology of reduction followed for the making of the concept of Brahman. It is progressively for the new that is
emerging and for its specificity and assertion. Absolutizing the concept of Viśesa, one can call it as the philosophy of ‘pluralistic
nominalism’. It is a philosophical debate, may be also a social debate, between Ekāntavada and Anekāntavada, a debate between the
supremacy of Brāhman and the autonomy of multiplicity. In Postmodern terminology, this may be the problem of disciplining the
multiplicity, bringing the many under order and grading the many under the leadership of the Brahman, the one supreme.
Possibly, two more powerful arguments deny the absoluteness of Brāhman, namely the Sāmkya and the Buddhist. Both the
arguments try to mediate between the extremes of one and many already articulated and suggest their own ways out. Sāmkhya
proposes an evolutionary paradigm where Prakriti, the one dynamic beginning gives birth to so many evolutes, thus trying to
embrace the many in the form of a concrete-abstraction. The second important argument that enters midway into the debate between
Ekāntavāda and Anekāntavāda is the concept of Buddhism. Buddhism declares that it is a Madhya-mārga, a middle path. The idea
of middle path itself is interesting in the sense that in the realm of the middle nothing is fixed and frozen. It is a realm of flux where
nothing is permanent. It is a realm of criticism and re-criticism. Buddhism deconstructs subjectivity but deconstructs it thoroughly.
It does not deconstruct subjectivity at the temporal level and keeps it untouched for the Pārmārthika level. The deconstruction is
total here. Even the question of identity is challenged here. Buddhism contributes to the theme of multiple identities or shifting of
identities. In Buddhism one cannot go for constructing asymmetrical binaries of soul and body, sacred and profane, Brahman and
Maya. Buddhism is a strong statement against the totalitarian and idealistic Ekantavada and it is also more realistic than the
philosophical nominalism of Anekāntavāda.. A few more concepts such as Sunyatā, Kshanikavāda, Sahaja etc. to indicate
Buddhism’s further potentials.
So the obvious question here seems to be: what is the way out? May be, Postmodernism suggests to counter the totalizing grandnarrative of Brahman? Rather than totalitarian and grand-narratives, postmodernism proposes multiple, localized, autonomized and
non-centralized kinds of theoretical production and “its validity is not dependent on the approval of the established regimes of
thought”. Foucault calls this “the return of knowledge” or better “the insurrection of subjugated knowledge” (By subjugated
knowledge, Foucault refers to “a whole set of knowledge that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently
elaborated”). He affirms that the historical contents of these knowledge contain in themselves “the ruptural effects of conflict and
struggle” that were masked by the tyranny of globalizing discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges of theorization. In
other words, Foucault suggests rediscovering the historical knowledge of struggles, the memory of hostile encounters which even up
to this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge. Foucault calls this the alternative genealogy, rather a multiplicity of
genealogical researches which are aimed at a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with rude memory of their conflicts. The
Anekānta of Jainism, Viśesa of Vaiśesika and the anitya of Buddhism need to be insurrected for the above purpose.
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