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Joint Research Centre the European Commission's in-house science service * Jonathan Pycroft Salvador Barrios JRC-B2 Co-authors: 04 July 2016 María Teresa Álvarez-Martínez, Salvador Barrios, Maria Gesualdo, Dimitrios Pontikakis Disclaimer: The views expressed are purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of any affiliated institution. * Introduction to CORTAX: Corporate tax CGE * Simulations *Harmonising EU CIT rates *Single country lowering CIT rates Motivation tax competition & tax avoidance (EU Action Plan on Corporate Taxation) large vs small economies * CORTAX: Originally by CPB Netherlands (Bettendorf and van der Horst 2006) * Applied general equilibrium model: households, firms, government * Multi-country: EU28 + JPN + USA (+ tax haven) * Comparative static (steady state equilibria) * Calibrated on 2012 data (Eurostat, OECD, ORBIS, UN) * Overlapping generations (old, young); inter-temporal optimization * Labour/leisure optimization; workers immobile across countries * 2 types of firm: DOMESTIC, MULTINATIONALS (HQ + SUBSIDIARIES) * Debt and equity financing; capital fully mobile across countries * Production of a single tradable final good * Multinationals perform transfer pricing between EU members and profit shifting to the tax haven * Governments tax corporate, labour, financial incomes. Revenues are transferred to the old generation * FIRMS • Domestic • Multinational headquarters Transfer Profit shifting Tax haven pricing • Multinational subsidiary Debt, equity Asset, bond W, Rk, Rf Household OLG ( young, old ) G L, K, F Tax revenue Transfer * Tax revenue Government Budget balanced COORDINATED • Harmonisation of CIT rates in the EU + UNCOORDINATED • • Unilateral reduction: CIT rate in Ireland Unilateral reduction: CIT rate in Germany Free vs fixed capital across the EU28 * * France Spain Malta Belgium Italy Germany Portugal Luxembourg Sweden Austria Netherlands Denmark Finland United Kingdom Estonia Hungary Croatia Greece Slovakia Poland Czech Republic Slovenia Romania Lithuania Latvia Ireland Cyprus Bulgaria 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 27.7% 35% 40% * France Spain Malta Belgium Italy Germany Portugal Luxembourg Sweden Austria Netherlands Denmark Finland United Kingdom Estonia Hungary Croatia Greece Slovakia Poland Czech Republic Slovenia Romania Lithuania Latvia Ireland Cyprus Bulgaria 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 27.7% 35.0% 40.0% * France Spain Malta Belgium Italy Germany Portugal Luxembourg Sweden Austria Netherlands Denmark Finland United Kingdom Estonia Hungary Croatia Greece Slovakia Poland Czech Republic Slovenia Romania Lithuania Latvia Ireland Cyprus Bulgaria 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 27.7% 35.0% 40.0% * France Spain Malta Belgium Italy Germany Portugal Luxembourg Sweden Austria Netherlands Denmark Finland United Kingdom Estonia Hungary Croatia Greece Slovakia Poland Czech Republic Slovenia Romania Lithuania Latvia Ireland Cyprus Bulgaria 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 27.7% 35.0% 40.0% Profit shifting from headquarters to subsidiaries Harmonised baseline IN CIT reform OUT IN OUT Euro millions Euro millions Euro millions Percentage Euro millions Percentage Ireland 0 0 1185 8.98% 0 - Rest of EU 0 0 0 - -1185 -0.17% Germany 0 0 6055 4.65% 0 - Rest of EU 0 0 0 - -6055 -1.03% * Ireland CIT rate CoC K L GDP CIT revenue Welfare pp pp % % % % of GDP % of GDP -10.0 -0.24 3.30 -0.19 1.64 -1.15 0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.24 3.05 -0.34 0.88 -1.15 0.2 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 Rest of EU Germany Rest of EU -10.0 * CIT rate CoC K L GDP CIT revenue Welfare pp pp % % % % of GDP % of GDP -10.0 -0.25 3.26 -0.19 1.63 0.17 0.5 Rest of EU - 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 Germany -10.0 -0.19 2.42 -0.37 0.69 -1.15 0.08 Rest of EU - 0.05 -0.62 -0.04 -0.25 0.01 -0.09 Ireland * *Tax competition impacts other countries *Profit shifting *Capital iff competition for capital within EU *Country size matters *Larger gains for small countries *And smaller losses for others [email protected] *