Download Measuring Partisanship as a Social Identity, Predicting Political

Measuring Partisanship as a Social Identity,
Predicting Political Activism
Leonie Huddy & Lilliana Mason
Stony Brook University
Lene Aaroe
Arhus University
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
A paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology,
San Francisco, CA, July 7-10, 2010
Abstract
We argue that the current polarized nature of American politics requires a new, more fine-grained
measure of partisanship than the existing 7-point scale. Building on work by Steven Greene (1999,
2002), we turn to social identity theory to develop a measure of partisan identity which is assessed
with 4 items. Data from two surveys of blog readers (combined N=3,849) and a student sample
(N=315) reveal the power of the new partisan identity scale to predict political activism. We test
various predictions and competing explanations for the effectiveness of the new identity scale and
find that it outperforms the standard measure of partisan strength, ideological self-placement, and a
multi-item issue ideology scale in accounting for political activism. Moreover, a social identity
approach leads to the creation of a measure of independent political identity which also predicts
political involvement among independents to some degree. The greater effectiveness of the partisan
identity than ideology scales in predicting political activism suggests that the scale does more than
provide a fine-grained measure of ideological leaning and thus lends real and novel insight into the
dynamics of political activism. Finally, the partisan identity scale far outperformed partisan strength
and ideology as a predictorof strong emotional reactions to a threatened electoral loss. This reveals the
micro process of emotional intensification by which identity drives political behavior. We discuss the
broader implications of our findings for the conception and measurement of political partisanship.
American politics has been become more partisan, strident, vitriolic, and polarized in recent
years. A brief perusal of radio talk show content, television news programs, and blog commentaries,
and the presence of protesters on local street corners, provides ample support for this conclusion. The
case for an increasingly polarized American electorate goes well beyond the anecdotal, however, to
rest on firm research evidence. Gary Jacobson (2007) has fulsomely and graphically charted the
growing political schism between Republicans and Democrats before and during the Bush
administration. His findings reinforce impressionistic accounts of a highly partisan electorate in which
Democrats and Republicans disagree on a slew of political figures and issues. Jacobson (2007) finds
that partisan differences in presidential approval have grown since the 1970s, with an average partisan
gap in approval of former George W. Bush peaking at 59 points, “the highest of any president despite
the extraordinarily high level of approval he received from Democrats in the year following 9/11.”
(p.9). Partisans were divided before the election of George W. Bush, but the divergence between
Republicans and Democrats has increased since then on a broad range of issues (Evans 2003;
Jacobson 2007; Bartels 2008; Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon 2006).
An increasingly polarized American electorate raises numerous questions for political
researchers. We tackle the following very basic question linked to evidence of growing partisan
polarization: To what extent does the current measure of partisanship, which results at best in a threelevel measure of partisan intensity (strong, not so strong, leaning), capture the full range of partisan
feeling and intensity elicited by contemporary American politics? Arguably a 7-point scale may be an
appropriate way to assess a truncated range of views on policy issues such as the Health Reform Act
which vary from very supportive to very opposed. But does a 7-point scale fully capture the range of
political activities in which Americans are currently engaged, with some people being quite passive
and others very intensely involved in sending emails to members of Congress, calling radio talk
programs, and posting regularly to political blogs?
Social Identity Theory
To address this question, we examine partisan identification through the prism of social
identity, a position recently adopted by several researchers (Green et al 2002; Greene 1999, 2002,
2004). Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) suggest that partisan attachment is a social identity,
much like religion or ethnicity. As for other social identities, they argue, partisan affiliation inspires
enduring allegiance, unaffected (on the aggregate level) by changing political opinions or party
blunders. According to Green and colleagues (2002), members of a political party are generally
faithful to that party, even in the face of conflicting beliefs. This sense of identity is (for the most
part) strong enough to survive a partisan’s disapproval of party practices or performance. Even when
a partisan votes for a cross-party candidate, the person continues to identify with their original party.
As Green and colleagues explain, “party identification predicts the vote because partisans pull for
their team and the social groups that it symbolizes while at the same time rooting against the other
party and its allied social groups” (220).
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Identity Measurement
We see three clear empirical and theoretical advantages to regarding partisanship as a social
identity. First, it opens a new approach to measuring partisanship as an identity that ranges in strength
(Huddy 2003). Consistent with Tajfel (1981), we define partisan identity as a social identity that
involves a psychological sense of group attachment and measure it with standard multi-item scales
used to assess social identities more generally (Huddy 2001; Huddy 2003; Huddy and Khatib
2007).Steven Greene has developed this approach and tested a social identity measure of partisanship
(Greene 2002). He develops a ten-item scale of partisanship among a sample of students and a localarea population (Greene 1999; 2004). His scale has good measurement properties and explains, over
and above standard partisan measures, differentiated feelings towards presidential candidates and the
two parties, sustained party support, and levels of party involvement (Greene 1999; 2002; 2004). This
is a promising beginning. More is needed, however, to substantiate that the multi-tem scale developed
by Greene does not simply provide a more differentiated measure of party identification or ideological
leanings than the standard 7-point scale. For instance, other research has demonstrated that a 3-item
scale of partisanship which is not explicitly linked to social identity theory performs better than the
standard single measure (Green and Scheckler 1993).
Identity Distinct from Political Ideology
We go beyond Greene’s research to test two additional implications of a social identity
approach to partisanship, leading to a second key advantage of the approach in which social identity
theory predicts a disjuncture between partisan identity and political ideology. Well over 90% of
Democrats and Republicans voted for their party’s candidate in recent presidential elections
despite Americans’ generally moderate and centrist views on policy issues (Erikson and
Tedin 2007; Jacobson 2007). From this vantage point, the political effects of a strong partisan
identity are distinct from support for a specific ideology or set of issue positions because a partisan
identity depends on the degree to which one’s sense of self is intertwined with the partisan group. Of
course, this notion was implicit in Campbell and colleagues’ (1960) early formulation of partisan
identification as not only a set of beliefs but also feelings which culminated in a sense of
“psychological attachment” to a political group. From the perspective developed in The American
Voter, a combination of political interests shared with members of one’s ethnic, religious, or
occupational group and the approval of these group members of one’s political views acted together to
instill a sense of partisan loyalty.
But the explanation of partisanship provided in The American Voter is more sociological than
psychological resting on a foundation of shared interests among members of various demographic
groups. The declining political cohesion and influence of traditional ethnic, religious, and
occupational groups poses a challenge to this account, leaving unexplained the contemporary origins
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of partisanship. Social identity theory provides a more plausible and purely psychological alternative
in which partisan identity rests on perceived similarity to typical partisans in terms of their beliefs,
lifestyle, occupation, personality traits, and style of dress. From this vantage point, shared beliefs,
ideology, or the common material interests that underlie such views, form only one and a potentially
weak basis of political identity. Social commonalities, such as a similar lifestyle, non-political values,
and personality traits take on a greater role in driving partisanship within a social identity account.
Moreover, we expect partisan identities to provide a stronger basis for political action and activism
than ideology because of their ability to generate strong emotions, an argument that we develop more
fully in the next section of this paper. The greater political power of partisan identities can thus be
tested against the effects of various measures of political belief and ideology because they diverge to
within a social identity account of partisanship. In that sense we test a social identity approach to
partisanship against the explanation offered originally by the authors of the American Voter in which
group interests and associated issue positions feed into partisanship.
The Emotional Basis of Partisan Activism
A third advantage of the social identity approach is its ability to account for the dynamic
foundations of partisan activism, which we argue involve strong emotional reactions to intergroup
competition and threat. These emotional reactions influence, in turn, political involvement and action.
Researchers have amassed impressively consistent evidence that emotions drive political
action, affect candidate decision making, and alter the dynamics of public opinion (Brader
2006; Brader et al 2008; Huddy et al 2005; Huddy et al 2007; Hutchings et al 2006; Gross
2008; Sullivan and Masters 1988; Conover and Feldman 1986; Valentino et al 2008; Smith et
al 2008). There is also growing awareness that threats and reassurances play a pivotal role in
generating strong emotional reactions. An external threat typically enhances in-group solidarity,
tightens in-group boundaries, and inflames out-group hostilities in relation to the degree of threat
(Coser 1956; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Brown and Grant ;Rothberger 1997; Jetten et al 2001).
Threat is also associated with the emotional reactions of anxiety which incline partisans towards
heightened political interest and attentiveness, and anger which promotes action (Lerner and Keltner
2000; 2001; Huddy et al 2007; Marcus et al 2000).
The discussion of emotion is integral to our current discussion of partisan polarization
because emotional reactions to threat are most pronounced among the strongest group identifiers
(Cadinu and Cerchoni 2001; Mackie et al 2000). This finding emerges from research on intergroup
emotions theory, an extension of social identity theory, championed by Diane Mackie and Elliot
Smith (2000; Smith et al 2007). According to social identity theory, group members are
motivated to maintain positive feelings for their ingroup (Tajfel, 1981). Turner and
colleagues (1987; p. 42) have described this motive as a need among group members “to
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differentiate their own groups positively from others to achieve a positive social identity.”
When group status is low or threatened (by an electoral loss, for example), members have
several choices: they can exit the group (social mobility), redefine its status more positively
(social creativity), or challenge their low status directly (social change) (Tajfel and Turner
1979). Strong group identifiers are most affected by their group’s standing and least likely to
abandon their membership in the face of intergroup threat (Ethier and Deaux 1994; Huddy
2001). They are thus more motivated than weak identifiers to view their group positively, and
see it as stronger than an opposing group.
From this vantage point, strongly identified group members are more inclined to feel angry
when threatened by an outgroup because they believe they can prevail in an intergroup competition.
This means, for example, that strong partisans should react with greatest anger to a threatened
electoral loss. By comparison, a more traditional approach to partisanship predicated on shared
interests or common ideology would suggest that strong ideologues react in defense of their beliefs
and that the strongest ideologues should react most angrily to partisan threats. In essence, we see
threat as intensifying identity which leads to increased emotional arousal that stimulates action in turn.
From our perspective, the cycle of threat, emotional intensification, and action which is most
pronounced among strongly identified partisans forms the basis for contemporary partisan
polarization. We do not believe partisan polarization stems primarily from a spirited defense of
ideological principles, but rather derives from threatened group status and interparty competition.
In essence, we regard a partisan identity as a subjective affinity with a group of similar others
which transcends agreement with a specific ideology or set of policy beliefs. This helps to explain
why someone can identify as a Democrat without necessarily endorsing a consistent slate of
Democratic issues. From this social identity perspective, social and intergroup dynamics outweigh
intellectual concerns in accounting for the origins of partisan identity. Moreover, emotional reactions
to threat and the political action they motivate are likely to be most pronounced among strongly
identified group members who feel the threat to their group’s standing most acutely. In contrast,
ideologues might react intellectually to a threat to their beliefs but will be much less inclined to react
emotionally or spring into action as a result of partisan threat. Partisan polarization is thus more likely
a product of political identities than a defense of ideology or issue positions.
An Independent Political Identity
Finally, a social identity approach to partisanship allows for the assessment of novel and
multiple political identities. In the American context, a social identity approach allows for three
distinct identities—Democrat, Republican and political independent. To date, researchers have not
seriously examined an independent political identity with the exception of Greene (1999) who
assessed it among both partisan and independent students in his research. A growing number of
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political independents within the American electorate and increasing support for independent political
candidates hints at the need to measure such an identity, however. Obviously, once we move away
from the U.S. context to a multi-party system, the advantages of a social identity approach to the
conceptualization and measurement of partisanship becomes even clearer. Rather than forcing citizens
onto a single uni-dimensional scale, a social identity approach can be used to measure the intensity of
numerous political identities. In other countries, survey respondents are asked about multiple parties
and then asked their strength of affiliation (Blais et al 2001). But this follow-up question rarely
exceeds more than three intensity points. Researchers have quibbled over minor aspects of the
wording of the partisan affiliation question (Bartle 2001; 2003). But our approach presents a more
radical alternative that better gauges the strength of an underlying political identity than existing
measures. Moreover, the approach we follow is not predicated on the existence of a single political
identification. In principle, multiple political identities can be assessed for the same individual (e.g.,
Republican and Democrat, or Democrat and independent).
Research Hypotheses
We conduct three studies in which we contrast the effects of political identity and traditional
partisan strength on political activism and emotional arousal in response to threat. The first two
studies focus on the reactions of a group of citizens heavily involved in the 2008 presidential
campaign. They are designed to gain insight into the effects of political identities among strong
partisans. These two studies are based on visitors to a number of political blogs. The third study is
based on students at Stony Brook University interviewed in 2010 about the upcoming Congressional
elections. The third study thus assesses whether findings from blog respondents hold among students,
who are less actively engaged in politics. In all three studies, respondents answer a series of questions
about their political identity, partisanship, and their past and current activism. This leads to our first
three hypotheses: (1) Partisan identity and the standard measure of partisanship will be related to each
other, with strong partisans scoring more highly on the partisan identity scale, (2) a strong partisan
identity will better predict past, current and future activism than the standard measure of partisanship,
and (3) a strong partisan identity will better predict activism than standard measures of political
beliefs such as ideological self-placement or ideology as gauged by one’s position on a series of
salient policy issues.
In addition, respondents in all three studies read a fictitious blog entry about either the 2008
Presidential (blog studies) or 2010 Congressional election (students) to gauge their emotional
reactions to a threatened electoral loss. The next hypotheses concern emotional reactions to this threat:
(4) those with a strong partisan identity will react to partisan threat with higher levels of anger and
anxiety and lower levels of positive emotions than those with a weak partisan identity, (5) the
traditional measure of partisanship will fail to detect heightened emotional reactions to threat, and (6)
strong ideologues will react less emotionally to partisan threat than those with a strong partisan
identity.
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Respondents in all three studies rated Democrats and Republicans on a series of positive and
negative personality traits to assess the degree to which they practice ingroup bias (more positive
assessment of their own than the other party). These data are used to test out next hypothesis: (7) a
strong partisan identity will lead to greater ingroup bias than traditional measures of partisanship.
Finally we re-examine several of the above hypotheses among political independents to
determine whether it is possible to measure a political identity as an independent (as opposed to the
typical approach of assessing independence as the absence of a Democratic or Republican identity).
Specifically, we ask whether an independent identity can account for activism among political
independents in all three studies (revisiting hypotheses 2 and 3).
Methods
Sample
In Blog Study 1, 630 individuals were recruited from a number of partisan weblogs (blogs).
The authors of approximately 100 political blogs were asked to post a link to the survey and a short
description of the study on their website. Four blogs agreed to do this (one liberal and three
conservative).The liberal blog was directed at an audience of highly educated women. The majority of
conservative respondents were drawn from one blog which was written by a woman in a southern
state. The other two conservative blogs were written by men, one from a Midwestern state and one
from a New England state. The subject matter of all four blogs was reliably partisan and focused on
discussions of politics. Respondents were led to believe that the survey assessed the general political
views of people who read and post to blogs. The study was conducted between May 16 and June 4,
2007.
In Blog Study 2, 178 blogs were contacted (evenly distributed between liberal and
conservative blogs, with a smaller selection of bipartisan blogs), and 12 agreed to participate. We
recruited 3,219 individuals from 6 liberal blogs, 4 conservative blogs, and two blogs that claim to be
bipartisan. One of the liberal blogs is particularly high-volume, providing an extremely large number
of Democratic respondents. This resulted in a disproportionate number of Democrats (2,653) relative
to Republicans (181). Survey responses were collected between March 17 and May 2, 2008. Most of
the blogs were national in scope. 1
In Student Study 3, 315 undergraduate students at Stony Brook University enrolled in a
political science class participated in the study for course credit in the spring of 2010.
1
Overwhelmingly, Democrats linked to the survey from liberal blogs, Republicans via conservative blogs, and
almost all independents came from a liberal blog. The vast majority of respondents in Study 2 linked to the
survey from a left-leaning blog that is rated by presidentialwatch08.com to be an "infopit" or a "conversation
starter" with power to set a political agenda (http://presidentialwatch08.com/index.php/map-keys/). 2,246
respondents were able to name the blog from which they entered the survey in Study 2 and 2,070 (92%) linked
to the survey from this blog. Of these 1,057 (51%) were strong Democrats, 220 (11%) were weak Democrats,
633 (31%) leaned Democratic, 133 (6%) were pure Independents, and 27 (1%) were Republicans ( 9 leaned, 13
weak, and 5 strong).
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The characteristics of respondents in all three studies appear in Table 1. Blogs 1 and 2 are
combined to increase the number of Republicans (209 in Study 1 and 142 in Study 2 for a combined
total of 351). In addition, a total of 1,221 Independents are included in the combined blog studies. We
also present distinct sample information for Blog Study 2 because issue questions were not asked in
Study 1 and thus some analyses are confined to the second blog study.
**INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE **
It is clear from Table 1 that the two blog samples were especially partisan and very politically
involved. Roughly 8 in 10 Democrats (83%) and Republicans (79%) described themselves as strong
partisans in both studies. Republicans and Democrats differed sharply in their approval of President
George W. Bush, with over 75% of Republicans and almost no Democrats approving of the
president’s job performance. Blog respondents were deeply ideological with over 90% of
Republicans calling themselves conservative and 97% of Democrats calling themselves liberal. They
were also highly active politically. Over two-thirds of Democrats and Republicans had written a letter
to Congress and contributed money to campaigns. Almost 60% of all Democrats had participated in a
protest or demonstration. Roughly a quarter post comments on blogs weekly or more often. And on a
standard 5-item knowledge quiz that includes questions about the positions held by Dick Cheney,
John Roberts, Nancy Pelosi, and Harry Reid, and the name of the majority party in the House of
Representatives, over 85% were correct on all 5 items.
The blog sample thus represents a strongly partisan, knowledgeable, highly engaged, and
deeply polarized segment of the electorate. The choice of such individuals provides a tough test for
our hypotheses because strong partisans are also likely to be deeply ideological, making it difficult to
distinguish the effects of identity and ideology.
The background of blog respondents contrasts sharply with that of the student sample who is
less staunchly partisan or political—under half of all student Democrats and Republicans refer to
themselves as strong partisans and barely a quarter have worked on a political campaign, or written a
letter to Congress. Students are also far less knowledgeable and less ideological than blog
respondents. They thus serve as a less partisan, politically engaged, and less polarized group than blog
respondents. If political identities are equally potent among more and less politically engaged and
committed individuals we have greater confidence in the robustness of our findings.
Measures
Partisan Affiliation
In all three studies, partisan affiliation was measured in two ways: Partisanship was
assessed with the following question: “Generally speaking do you think if yourself as a Democrat, a
Republican, or an Independent?” In subsequent analyses, Democrats, Republicans and Independents
are defined on the basis of responses to this single question. The distribution of partisans and
Independents in each of the three studies is presented in Table 1. We have already noted the
disproportionate number of Democrats in the blog studies. Partisan strength was assessed by the
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follow-up question “would you call yourself a strong or not very strong Republican/Democrat?” To
gauge the strength of independence, independents were asked “Do you think of yourself as closer to
the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?”
In the second measure of partisan affiliation, a set of four existing questions were modified to
measure Democrat, Republican, and Independent identity (Huddy and Khatib 2007). These questions
were keyed off responses to the general partisanship question. For example, someone who thought of
themselves as a Republican received the four Republican identity questions. The four questions assess
the degree to which the respondent finds an identity important, appropriate, and inclusive. These four
questions are most comparable to the importance of identity subscale in Luhtanen and Crocker’s
(1992; Crocker et al., 1994) collective self-esteem (CSE) scale (see also Huddy 2003). All
four questions are listed in Table 2 along with the percentage of Democrats, Republicans and
Independents who endorsed each response.
**INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE **
In general, political identities were somewhat weaker among students than blog respondents.
Consider the question asking how well the term Democrat/Republican/Independent describes the
respondent. Among Democrats almost a quarter of blog respondents said it described them “extremely
well” compared to only 5% of Democrat students; overall, almost 80% of blog Democrats and 64% of
student Democrats said the term described them very or extremely well. Among Republicans, 18% of
those in the blog sample said it described them extremely well compared to 12% of students; and 76%
of Republican blog respondents versus 56% of student Republicans said Republican described them
very or extremely well. In addition, student Republicans had stronger partisan identities than did
student Democrats.
The four identity items were combined to form a reliable scale in Blog Study 1 (α=.80 among
Democrats, α=.85 among Republicans, and α=.73 among Independents), Blog Study 2 (α=.83 among
Democrats, α=.85 among Republicans, and α=.71 among Independents), and Student Study 3 (α=.80
among Democrats, α=.83 among Republicans, and α=.77 among Independents). Scale values ranged
from 0 (weakest) to 1 (strongest) and mean scores were highest among blog Democrats (.69) and
Republicans (.70) and lowest among student Democrats (.53) and student Independents (.56).
Political Activism
Future Electoral Activism in either 2008 (Both Blog studies) or 2010 (students) was assessed
with four questions asking respondents whether they planned to contribute money to (1) candidates or
(2) political organizations, or planned to (3) volunteer for candidates, or (4)political organizations.
These four questions formed reliable scales in Blog Study 1 (α=.75), Blog Study 2 (α=.74), and
Student Study 3 (α=.74). Past Activism was assessed with the four questions asking if the respondent
had ever “worked for a political candidate, political party or organization that supports candidates,”
“participated in a political protest, march or demonstration,” “written a letter to your Congressman or
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Congresswoman,” or “contributed money to a political party or candidates.” The past activism scales
were not very reliable with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .46 to .57. The weakness of these scales
should be kept in mind when interpreting results.
Political Ideology
Ideology was assessed in two ways. Ideological self-identification was assessed in all three
studies with the following question: “In your political views, do you consider yourself to be very
conservative, moderately conservative, moderate, moderately liberal, very liberal, or would you rather
not place yourself on this scale?” This measure is coded 0 to 1, with 1 representing a “very liberal”
response.
Respondents in Blog Study 2 and Student Study 3 were additionally asked to provide their
views on several issues to form an issue ideology scale. In Study 2, a random half of all respondents
were asked to indicate their position on a 6-point scale that ranged from strongly support to strongly
oppose the legalization of abortion, a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, and Christian
prayer in schools. The other half were asked to indicate how much government spending they wanted
on public health and public education on a 6-point scale ranging from spend “a lot more” to spend “a
lot less”. They were also asked how much the wealthy should pay in taxes on a 6-point scale ranging
from “a lot more” to“a lot less”. Any given respondent thus only received either the first three or the
last three items. Due to the small Republican sample size, we decided to create a single issue
ideology scale which was either comprised of three social issues or 3 economic issues. (first three
items α=.71; second three items α=.86).2
In Student Study 3, students were asked three questions on health insurance, gay marriage,
and the provision of government services drawn from the ANES to tap ideology: “There is much
concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some people feel there should be a
government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone.
Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that all medical expenses should
be paid by individuals through private insurance plans like Blue Cross or other company paid plans.
Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions
somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or
haven't you thought much about this? The wording of the second question is as follows: “Some people
oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry legally. Suppose these people are at one end of a
scale, at point 1. Others favor allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry legally. Suppose these
people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in
between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you
thought much about this?” The wording of the third item is as follows: “Some people think the
2
All results were rerun with separate social and economic issue ideology scales. In almost all cases, the social
and economic issue ideology scales had the same coefficient sizes in analyses as those presented below. The two
exceptions are noted subsequently.
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government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to
reduce spending. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Other people feel it is
important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending.
Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions
somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or
haven't you thought much about this?” The three items formed a moderately reliable scale (α=.59).
Inparty Bias
To tap ingroup bias, respondents in all three studies were asked to rate how well most
Republicans and Democrats were described by a series of positive and negative traits. In the blog
studies, the positive traits were creative, honest, moderate, and compassionate, while the negative
traits were closed-minded, corrupt, extremist, and aggressive. In the student study, the traits closedminded, creative and moderate were omitted. The negative items were reversed and a scale created of
positive traits for each group of partisans. The Republican and Democratic traits formed reliable
scales in all three studies (alphas ranging from .61 and .67 in the student study, and .74 to .90 in the
two blog studies). The overall score for the other party was subtracted from the score for one’s own
party to create a measure of inparty bias, or tendency to rate the personality traits of fellow partisans
more positively than those of out-partisans.
Threat Experiment
All three studies contained an experimentally altered blog entry (blended from actual political
blogs) designed to present a message from the inparty or the outparty, that threatened electoral defeat
or suggested electoral victory.3 We included 3 of these conditions in Study 1 (ingroup threat,
outgroup threat, ingroup reassurance, control) and all four in Study 2 and Study 3 (ingroup threat,
outgroup threat, ingroup reassurance, outgroup reassurance, control).4All three studies also included a
control condition that lacked any experimental blog entry. The sample size is thus reduced by a 25%
in Study 1 and 20% in Studies 2 and 3 for analyses that focus on emotional reactions to threat. We
focus here on the threat conditions regardless of the source of threat.
In order to imitate actual blog comments as closely as possible, the experimental statements
were derived from actual blog entries written in the aftermath of the 2006 election. Comments were
adapted to ensure comparable terminology and message tone for Democrats and Republicans. We
used more colloquial and inflammatory language in Study 1 than Study 2 and Study 3, especially in
the threat conditions. Results were comparable across studies, suggesting that language tone did not
unduly influence our findings. See the appendix for wording of the all conditions in each study.
3
Pure independents were randomly assigned to be treated as either Democrats or Republicans. We omit all
independents from subsequent threat analyses.
4
In Study 3, the design included an additional fully crossed factor which varied whether the threat posed a lost
to partisans or their associated liberal or conservative ideas. That factor made no difference to the findings
reported in this paper and is dropped from the analyses.
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The blog comments were followed by questions about the respondent’s feelings while reading
the comment. Respondents were asked the extent to which they felt various emotions on a 4-point
scale that ranged from a great deal to not at all. Feelings of anger were tapped by asking respondents
to rate the degree to which they felt angry, hostile and disgust while reading the blog comments (on a
4-point scale from a great deal to not at all).Anxiety was assessed with feeling nervous, anxious and
afraid. Positive emotions were assessed as hopeful, proud, and enthusiastic. Reliable scales were
created for all three types of emotion in each of the three studies (with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from
.88 to .93). The mean value of anger across all respondents and conditions (on a scale of 0 to 1) was
.36 in Study 1 and.41 in Study 2. In Study 1, the mean anxiety score was .20 and the mean positive
emotion score was .26. In Study 2, the mean anxiety score was .20 and the mean for positive
emotions was .35. Thus overall, anger was a more common emotion than either anxiety or positive
feelings. In Study 3, the three emotions were more equally felt. The mean anger score in the student
sample was .34, the mean anxiety score was .32 and the mean for positive emotions was .32.
In addition, all three surveys included standard demographic questions, political knowledge
questions, and presidential approval (as seen in Table 1).
Analytic Strategy
To examine the validity and political merits of the political identity scale, it is regressed on
measures of current and past activism separately for Democrats and Republicans, and its effects
contrasted with the standard assessment of partisan strength (strong, not very strong), ideological selfplacement or issue ideology, and a series of demographic factors known to influence levels of
political activity (education, gender, age, racial/ethnic background). This analysis is repeated for
Democrat and Republican emotional reactions to experimentally varied threat. The relative impact of
partisan identity and partisan strength on ingroup bias is analyzed with regression analysis. Finally,
several parallel analyses are conducted among independents to assess the political effects of
independent political identity.
Results
Partisan Identity and Political Activism
To validate the new partisan identity scale, we first checked its link to the traditional partisan
strength measure. In support of the first hypothesis, there is a strong connection between the two
measures. In the combined blog study, strong Democrats scored .73 on the Democratic identity scale
(which ranged from 0 to 1) whereas weak Democrats scored .48, a gap of .25 points (on a 0-1 scale).
A comparable gap in identity strength existed between strong and weak Republicans (.71 vs. .45 in the
combined blog study. Similar gaps in identity strength were also observed between strong and not
strong Democrats (.63 vs. .46) and strong and not strong Republicans in Student Study 3 (.75 vs. .48).
Overall, strong partisans, as assessed by the partisan strength scale, score more highly on the political
identity scale than less strong partisans. So far so good.
12
Our second and third hypotheses concern the greater impact of partisan identity than partisan
strength and ideology on political activism. Analyses testing this hypothesis among Democrats are
presented in Table 3 and among Republicans in Table 4. In Tables 3 and 4, partisan identity, partisan
strength, ideology, issue ideology and various controls are regressed onto current and past activism.
Partisan identity predicted current electoral activism in 2008 (for the blog studies) and 2010 (for the
student study) and past activism among Democrats. These analyses included controls for Democratic
strength, liberal-conservative ideology, and issue ideology, as can be seen in analyses presented in
Table 3.
**INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE **
The other measures of partisanship and ideology had limited additional effect on activism
among Democrats and none eliminated the effect of partisan identity. Democratic strength, based on
the standard measure of partisan strength, had no effect on current activism. It was associated with
increased levels of past activism in the combined blog and student study. A liberal ideology (based on
self-placement) was associated with greater past activism among Democrats in the combined blog
studies. The issue ideology scale, which provides a more fine-grained measure of ideology than
ideological self-placement, had even more limited effects on activism. It was linked to higher levels of
past activism but had no effect on current activism in Blog Study 2, and did not influence either
current or past activism among students (except for a negative effect on current activism).5 On
balance, political activism was best accounted for among both students and highly involved blog
respondents by the new partisan identity scale.6
A similar pattern emerges in analyses conducted among Republicans and presented in Table
4, although results are slightly weaker than among Democrats (caused partially by smaller samples).
Republican identity significantly predicted current and past levels of activism in the combined blog
study, and current activism among students. Once again, the effects of partisan identity are far
stronger than those of partisan strength or ideology. Republican strength predicts current activism in
Blog Study 2 but not in the combined blog data set or the student study; it predicts past activism
among students but not among Republican blog respondents. Ideological self-placement has no
impact on past activism among blog respondents. And while issue ideology increases current activism
5
When analyses were rerun separately for social and economic ideology issue scales, social issue ideology
predicted current activism among democrats. This is one of only two instances in which the political effects of
the social and economic issue ideology scales diverged.
6
We examined alternate models (in the blog samples only) in which we removed partisan identity entirely to
gauge the effectiveness of other variables in its absence. Without partisan identity, partisan strength predicts
past and current activism, but with coefficients a half to a fourth of the size of the effects of partisan
identity. Issue ideology also has much weaker or nonexistent effects than political identity on past and current
activism in all cases except for past activism among Democrats which it predicts slightly better. We also reexamined all the models with independent leaners included in the partisan strength measure for Democrats and
Republicans. This 3-point partisan strength scale behaved in exactly the same way as the 2-point measure and
does not change the models at all for the combined blog study.. When controlling for issue ideology in Blog
Study 2, the 3-point scale increases the coefficient for partisan strength on current and past activism, but this has
no effect on the size of the partisan identity coefficients.
13
among Republicans in Blog Study 2 it does so in the wrong direction—with less conservative and
more moderate Republicans expressing greater involvement than strong conservatives in the 2008
presidential election.
A glance at Tables 3 and 4 confirms the consistent and large effects of Democratic and
Republican identity on political activism in all of the analyses Hypotheses 2 and 3. Even when the
effects of the multi-item partisan identity scale are pitted against a multi-item issue ideology scale,
partisan identity wins hands down. Going beyond Greene’s (1999, 2002, 2004) earlier findings, we
uncover definitive evidence that greater political activism among those with a strong partisan identity
is not simply caused by well measured ideological extremity. Even among very involved individuals
who actively follow politics on political blogs, partisan identity provides keen insight into their degree
of political activism.
In summing up across Tables 3 and 4, the coefficient for partisan identity (Democrat and
Republican) is significant in 14 out of 16 analytic tests predicting past and current activism. In
contrast, ideological self-placement predicts activism in 1 of 4 tests, and issue ideology predicts
activism in 3 out of 8 tests, and two are in the wrong direction (student liberal Democrats indicated
they would be less involved politically in 2010, and less conservative Republican blog respondents
said they would be more involved in the 2008 election). Overall, partisan identity proves to be a
strong and consistent predictor of political activism across the political spectrum.
Several other factors account for political activism in the models presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Better educated, female, and older Democratic blog respondents were more involved in the 2008
election and had been more active in the past. Older Republican blog respondents reported higher
levels of past and current activism; better educated Republicans reported higher levels of past but not
current activism. Gender effects were largely absent among the Republican blog respondents. Among
students, white and black Democrats reported lower expected levels of involvement in the 2010
election when compared to Asian and those who designated their race/ethnicity as Hispanic or other.
Race and ethnicity had no significant effect on activism among student Republicans (although there
were too few black Republicans to examine in Study 3).
Emotional Reactions to Threat
We turn next to consider the degree to which partisan identity accounts for the dynamics of
emotional reactions to threat that may ultimately contribute to political activism. There is clear
evidence in Tables 5 and 6 that partisan threat arouses greatest anger, anxiety and the least positive
feelings among those with a strong partisan identity. These findings lend support to Hypothesis 4
which predicts a heightened emotional arousal to threat among those with a strong partisan identity.
Consider findings for Democrats presented in Table 5.There is a large and significant interaction
between Democratic identity and threat in the combined blog studies and the student study for all
three emotional reactions but no interaction between the standard measure of partisan strength and
threat. The heightened reaction to threat among those with a strong partisan identity holds with the
14
added inclusion of issue ideology and its interaction with threat in Blog Study 2. Those strongly
ideological on issues do not feel any greater sense of anger, anxiety or lessened positive feelings when
threatened than the less ideological.7 The one exception is a barely significant interaction between
issue ideology and threat in the equation predicting anxiety among Democrat students. But this does
not diminish the existing interaction between Democratic identity and threat, as can be seen in the
middle panel of Table 5. These findings provide support to Hypothesis 5 which predicts a stronger
effect of identity than partisanship on emotional arousal, and Hypothesis 6 which predicts that the
effects of identity on emotional arousal will prevail when compared to a multi-item measure of issue
ideology.
**INSERT TABLE 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE **
Comparable findings are observed among Republicans in analyses presented in Table 6. Once
again, there is a large and significant interaction between Republican identity and threat that leads to
higher levels of anger and anxiety, and fewer positive emotions in the blog studies. These results are
not replicated, however, among student Republicans in Study 3, although the interaction between
identity and threat is almost significant for anxiety. In contrast, partisan strength and issue ideology do
not heighten Republican emotional reactions to threat in any of the three studies.
Overall, in predicting emotional reactions to threat, the interaction between identity and threat
among Democrats is significant in 8 out of 9 tests presented in Table 5, and 5 out of 9 tests in Table 6
for Republicans. In contrast, the interaction between Democratic strength and threat is never
significant, nor is the interaction between Republican strength and threat. Furthermore, only one of
the 12 interactions between issue ideology and threat is significant for Democrats, and none of these
interactions are significant among Republicans. The findings presented in Tables 5 and 6 make clear
that individuals with a strong partisan identity react with greatest emotion (heightened negative and
dampened positive) to a partisan threat. 8 This finding is difficult to reconcile with the view that
partisanship is based on support for a specific set of policy issues or ideology more generally. If
partisanship rested on such concerns, there is every reason to think that a threatened electoral loss
would arouse strong negative emotions among the most ideological. But we do not find this.
7
We examined the effect of social and economic issue ideology scales separately among Democrats (the
Republican sample size was too small to do so), and found no major differences except that Democrats who
were strongly liberal on social issues evinced fewer positive emotions in the presence of threat; this effect very
slightly decreased the size of the interaction between political identity and threat presented in Table 5.
8
Once again, we ran comparable models to those presented in Tables 5 and 6 excluding political identity. With
partisan identity removed, partisan strength had much weaker effects than political identity on emotional
reactions to threat. Partisan strength does not increase anxiety and only marginally increases anger among
Democrats and Republicans. It does decrease positive emotions in response to threat. Issue ideology also had
weaker effects than political identity on emotional reactions to threat. Issue ideology did not predict anger or
anxiety in response to threat among Democrats, and had a significant but smaller effect than partisan identity
among Republicans. Issue ideology decreased Democrats’ positive emotions in response to threat to roughly the
same degree as partisan identity, but did not depress positive emotions as much as political identity among
Republicans. We also ran models with the 3-point partisan strength scale and found that it behaves no
differently than the 2-point scale in predicting emotions in the blog studies.
15
Partisan Identity &Ingroup Bias
Our final hypothesis concerns the existence of ingroup bias among strong partisans. From a
social identity perspective, ingroup bias is one of the most robust effects of any strongly held social
identity. If partisan identity functions as any other identity it should predict a preference for fellow
partisans over partisans of the other major party. To test this, we examined the determinants of the
inparty bias scale (based on rating the personality traits of Democrats and Republicans) in Table 7. As
seen in that table, partisan identity predicts more positive ratings of one’s own party among
Democrats in all studies (blog respondents and students) whereas a strong Republican identity
predicts inparty bias among blog respondents but not among students (very few of whom are
Republicans). In this instance, partisan strength also accounts for ingroup bias among Republicans
and student Democrats. The inclusion of the issue ideology scale (in analyses not shown here) does
nothing to alter the effect of partisan identity on ingroup bias among Democrats but accounts for the
effects of both partisan strength and identity among Republicans in the combined blog studies. Thus
the link between partisan identity and ingroup bias is robust among Democrats, but less certain among
Republicans where more positive ratings of Republicans than Democrats is linked to a conservative
set of issue positions.
**INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE **
Independent Identity
Finally, we consider the possibility of the existence of an independent political identity that can be
measured separately from Democratic or Republican partisan identification. Typically, independents
are regarded as something of a residual category within American politics, and are thought to be less
actively engaged in politics on average. The direct measurement of an independent political identity
allows us to test more fully the degree to which it propels political involvement. We examine the
determinants of past activism and attention to politics among independents (including leaners) in
Table 8. Identity has no effect on current activism which is excluded from this table. However, Table
8 holds several intriguing findings. First, in all instances the effects of independent strength (pure
independent vs. leaner) is negative, indicating that pure independence significantly dampens the
likelihood of closely following the 2008 election among blog respondents and the 2010 Congressional
elections among students. It also has a negative but non-significant effect on past activism in both the
blog and student studies. Second, a strong independent identity (as measured by the 4-item scale)
significantly boosts the tendency to follow closely the current election among respondents in the
combined blog studies and the student study. These effects hold up with the inclusion of the issue
ideology scale and so are not just due to ideological extremity.
We have to admit that the effects of an independent identity scale are inconsistent.
Independent identity does not predict current activism in any of the studies, and fails to account for
past activism among blog respondents. Nonetheless, the fact that its effects on involvement are
positive in at least some instances whereas the traditional measure of pure independence is linked to
16
lower levels of political engagement suggests considerable heterogeneity among independents that is
worth investigating in future research. Based on our findings, there is clearly more that could be done
to understand political independence and its heterogeneous consequences for political engagement.
Conclusion
In sum, we find considerable support for the new measure of partisan identity developed in
this research and the application of social identity theory to the study of partisanship. Past research on
partisan identification has centered on a single seven-point measure which we argued is inadequate to
capture the full intensity of activism involved in contemporary partisan politics. The introduction of
social identity theory adds a strong theoretical focus to this research and generates the concept of
partisan identity, an effective measure of partisanship that far outperformed the typical distinction
between strong and not so strong partisans in the three studies presented in this manuscript.
Our results are difficult to reconcile with more rational, interest or belief-based accounts of
partisanship. If partisan strength reflects the degree to which one’s issue positions and beliefs line up
with that of a political party, it is difficult to explain why identity and not ideology accounted for
heightened political activism and stronger emotional reactions to partisan threat. If strong partisans
are concerned about the defense of their beliefs and interests we should have detected that by
contrasting the effects of identity against issue ideology (an equally well measured multi-item scale).
But we did not. In that sense, partisans may have more in common with sports fans than rational
interlocutors. The social nature of partisanship revealed in our research provides a tantalizing glimpse
of the insights to be gained by regarding partisanship and partisan emotions as a product of intergroup
relations and conflict. We look forward to a growing body of research in this vein.
In the end, a partisan identity scale may prove to be an important addition to research on the
study of partisanship and political activism very generally. Overall, a social identity approach to
partisanship enhances the measurement and conception of partisan affiliations at a time when
American politics is increasingly intense and polarized along partisan lines.
17
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20
Appendix: Experimental Blog Comments
Study 1
All comments were preceded by the following statement: We are interested in your reactions to
statements about the outcome of the recent Congressional elections and the upcoming 2008
Presidential election that have been circulating on the web. The following statement is taken from one
of the following web sites: Redstate.com, Dailykos.com, Townhall.com/blog, Firedoglake.com,
Freerepublic.com, Mydd.com, Anklebitingpundits.com, Huffingtonpost.com. Please read through the
statement carefully. You will be asked some questions about it after reading it.
Republican Outgroup Threat:
"I love how Republicans think the outcome of the 2006 election is just a two year aberration... keep
thinking that way, fellas... this is no aberration. It is a big shift, towards responsible, reasonable,
government. Your dirty tricks aren't going to work anymore. People are fed up. But, I don't care.. go
right... capture your looney base... while we hold on to middle America... the middle class we won
over last November. As long as we provide for middle America, it will be a long wait for
Republicans. See, you guys conned the middle class into believing you were for them. They bought
your con for awhile, but now they know what a scam it really was! But, keep thinking it's only two
years. I'll enjoy watching your head explode when you lose the presidency in 2008. Republicans
suffered a big blow last November. You yahoos lost a lot of credibility over the years, it's going to
take more than a couple of years and more dirty tricks to get it back. But, I'm glad you are in denial. I
hear that because of your wacko religious base you'll be nominating even more corrupt lunatics in
2008... Cool! Works for me! Keep imploding, suckas!!!"
Republican Ingroup Threat:
"Hey Republicans, it sucks but it's time to seriously face facts. The clear message from American
voters in 2006 is that they want more and bigger government and they’re fed up with conservative
Republican ideas. Solid conservative Republicans were defeated across the country. You only need to
look at the ballot initiatives to see Republican policies losing everywhere. Americans supported the
minimum wage increase and upheld abortion in South Dakota! It looks like most voters have never
heard of the founding fathers, much less care what they founded this country to be. It pains me to say
this, but that's the only conclusion you can take from these elections results. We may as well admit
that our ideas are out of favor right now and we’re not going to win the presidency in 2008. The
Democrats are going to ruin our country and there’s nothing we can do to stop them. We’d better all
get ready for being the minority in Washington for the foreseeable future and hope that Americans
finally come to their senses."
Republican Ingroup Reassurance:
"Hey Republicans, we didn’t lose in 2006. We may have lost control of Congress but we won the
battle of ideas and we'll be back in 2008. America remains a conservative country with a clear
preference for Republican ideals of smaller, less costly government. You can see this in recent polls.
In one poll I saw recently, most Americans wanted smaller government and fewer services over a
larger federal government. A lot of so-called "Republican moderates" lost their seats in the
Congressional election Tuesday, but “true” conservative Republicans got elected. The American
public WANTS politicians who support less spending and smaller government. Republicans who say
we should show "more moderation" and be "less conservative" are headed down the wrong path, the
path that had a lot to do with the "thumpin'" we all got this election. We are going to win by
embracing the true conservatism we share with the rest of the country. Don’t worry. Republicans are
taking back the government in 2008."
Democratic Outgroup Threat:
"I love how Democrats think the outcome of the 2006 election is a signal of “change” in America...
keep thinking that way, fellas... this is no tidal wave. It is an aberration that unfortunately leads us
away from responsible, reasonable, government. Your dirty tricks aren't going to work. People don’t
trust you and they don’t like your politics. But, I don't care.. go left... capture your looney base...
while we hold on to middle America... the middle class we’ve held for decades. As long as middle
21
America agrees with us, it will be a short trip for Democrats. See, you guys are trying to con the
middle class into believing you are for them. They don’t buy your con though. They disagree with
most of your platform. But, keep thinking it's a new Democratic wave. I'll enjoy watching your head
explode when you lose the presidency in 2008. You yahoos lost a lot of credibility over your years of
flip-flopping, it's going to take more than a couple of years and more dirty tricks to get it back. But,
I'm glad you are in denial. I hear that because of your cockiness, you’ll be nominating even more
liberal wackos next election.. Cool! Works for me! Keep imploding, suckas!!!"
Democratic Ingroup Threat:
"Hey Democrats, it's time to seriously face facts. The 2006 election was not a victory for us. It was
more about Bush incompetence and the failure of his Iraq policies than support for our party.
Democrats didn't attract voters so much as the Republicans repelled them. Just take a look at what
happened in Colorado. Republicans did pretty well with their initiatives, and they held off strong
challenges in deep red areas. Remember, the election was really close in a lot of places. A few votes
in the other direction and we would have been telling a very different story. Republicans are well
organized, have a better get-out-the-vote machine than we do, and once Bush is no longer on the
ticket to weigh them down, they’ll all be back in office. Republican ideology is far from dead.
Conservatives outnumber liberals in this country 2 to 1! America remains a conservative country with
a clear preference for Republican ideals of smaller, less effective government. A lot of Republican
moderates lost their seats in the 2006 Congressional election, but “true” conservative Republicans got
elected. The American public WANTS conservative politicians. It pains me to say this, but it looks to
me like Republicans will be back in control in 2008, and we’ll be totally screwed for the foreseeable
future."
Democratic Ingroup Reassurance:
“I gotta say, after the 2006 election I feel pretty great about our chances at the White House. To be
honest, I was actually surprised at the outcome of the November elections. I had hoped the Democrats
would take back Congress, but I didn’t really think it was possible. The Republican party has always
had better political organization, more party unity, and was just better at raising money and selling
ideas. They're crafty. Now all that seems to have changed with this election. We had the public on our
side this time because we just had better policies. Republicans couldn’t get an abortion ban passed in
South Dakota and they couldn’t get a gay marriage ban passed in Arizona. The American public has
finally had it with conservative Republican ideas. And it’s clear to me that Republican ideas will be
out of favor for quite some time. I think they were just in power for too long and lost touch with the
American public. Anyway, Democrats, it’s time to celebrate. The presidency is ours for the taking in
2008.”
22
Study 2:
All comments were preceded by the following statement: We are interested in your reactions to
statements about the outcome of the recent Congressional elections and the upcoming 2008
Presidential election that have been circulating on the web. The following statement is taken from one
of the following web sites: Redstate.com, Dailykos.com, Townhall.com/blog, Firedoglake.com,
Freerepublic.com, Mydd.com, Anklebitingpundits.com, Huffingtonpost.com. Please read through the
statement carefully. You will be asked some questions about it after reading it.
Republican Outgroup Threat/Democratic Ingroup Reassurance:
"I love watching Republicans sweat! This is my favorite election ever! We are raising more money
than them, we are more excited about our candidates than they are, and they are running in circles
desperately trying to convince themselves that America still trusts them! Our current Congress is
no aberration. It is a big shift, towards responsible, reasonable, government. And in 2008 we’re
taking even stronger control of Congress, and we're taking back the White House! People are fed
up with the conservative anti-government attitude toward governing. Republicans lost a lot of
credibility over the years, it's going to take more than fearmongering to get it back. In just one short
year it’ll be our turn, and the American people will see what governing is supposed to be. I am so
glad that little experiment is over and Americans have finally returned to their senses. Republicans
should get used to being the minority for the foreseeable future. I can’t wait for January 2009!"
Republican Ingroup Threat/Democratic Outgroup Reassurance:
"Hey Republicans, it sucks but it's time to seriously face facts. We’re in trouble in 2008. McCain
sucks for so many reasons. Even if you like his policies, there's no way he can win. The Dem
candidates are actually raising more money than we are, which puts us in some kind of bizarroworld where our greatest advantages are now our weaknesses. It feels like it’s just not going to be a
pretty picture for the next 5 years. Our policies are not getting through to people. It looks like most
voters have never heard of the founding fathers, much less care what they founded this country to
be. It pains me to say this, but we may as well admit that our ideas are out of favor right now and
we’re not going to win the presidency in 2008. The Democrats are going to ruin our country and
there’s nothing we can do to stop them. We’d better all get ready for being the minority in
Washington for the foreseeable future and hope that Americans finally come to their senses."
Republican Ingroup Reassurance /Democratic Outgroup Threat:
"I love watching Democrats delude themselves! They’re talking a big game, but look closer and
they know they’re in trouble. In head to head presidential match-ups we are neck and neck with
them, and that’s with Bush’s approval ratings in the toilet. America clearly wants Republican
leadership, and the Democrats are running in circles desperately trying to convince themselves that
anyone in America trusts them! People don’t trust Democrats and they don’t like their politics.
Republicans will hold on to middle America... the middle class we’ve held for decades. As long as
middle America agrees with us, these two years in Congress will be a short trip for Democrats.
Unfortunately for them, the middle class disagrees with most of their platform. They lost a lot of
credibility over their years of flip-flopping, it's going to take more than a couple of years to get it
back. But, I'm glad they are in denial. They shouldn’t get too comfortable in those Congressional
offices.”
Republican Outgroup Reassurance/Democratic Ingroup Threat:
"Ok Democrats, it's time to seriously face facts. Things are not as good as they appear for 2008.
We may very well lose this election. Republicans in 2008 are well-organized, have a strong getout-the-vote machine, already have a nominee, and because Bush is no longer on the ticket to weigh
them down, they may just surprise us all. Republican ideology is far from dead. Conservatives
outnumber liberals in this country and have for a long time! America remains a conservative
country with a clear preference for Republican ideals of smaller, LESS effective government.
Unfortunately, the American public WANTS conservative politicians. It pains me to say this, but it's
a definite possibility that Republicans will be back in control in 2008, and we’ll be totally screwed
for the foreseeable future."
23
Study 3 (Students):
Group-based Republican Outgroup Threat/Democratic Ingroup Support:
The following statement recently appeared on a Democratic blog. Please read it and then tell us how
it made you feel:
“2010 is going to be an important election for Democrats. We are raising more money than
Republicans, our candidates are in safer seats, and Republicans have lost Americans’ trust. Our
current Congress is the beginning of a long-term Democratic majority that will be strengthened by the
2010 midterm election. Finally, we’ll take a super-majority of Congress and won’t have to worry
about the Republican filibuster anymore! I am glad that Americans have finally returned to their
senses. Republicans should get used to being the minority for the foreseeable future. Democrats will
hold our central place in the leadership of the country.”
Issue-based Republican Outgroup Threat/Democratic Ingroup Support:
The following statement recently appeared on an internet blog. Please read it and then tell us how it
made you feel:
“2010 is going to be an important election for political ideas. After this election there will finally be
enough votes available in Congress to fix the economy using actual knowledge instead of blind
ideology. The elections will provide a super-majority in Congress that can provide health care for all
Americans, not just those with jobs and money, and make it easier for all adults to get married if they
want to, no matter who they are. Finally, the day is arriving where these ideas will hold a central
place in the leadership of the country.”
Group-based Republican Ingroup Threat/Democratic Outgroup Support
The following statement recently appeared on a Republican blog. Please read it and then tell us how
it made you feel:
"2010 is going to be a bad election for us Republicans. We have a lot of vulnerable seats opening up
in this election, and Americans still don’t trust us. We’re being blamed for everything that’s wrong
right now. It pains me to admit this, but our party is out of favor and we’re not going to take back
Congress in 2010. The Democrats are going to win a super-majority in Congress and there’s nothing
we can do to stop them. We’d better all get ready for remaining in the minority in Washington for the
foreseeable future."
Issue-based Republican Ingroup Threat/Democratic Outgroup Support
The following statement recently appeared on an internet blog. Please read it and then tell us how it
made you feel:
"2010 is going to be a bad election for sensible political ideas. After this election Congress could be
in a position to completely socialize the economy by nationalizing banks, raising taxes on hard
working Americans, and expanding government bureaucracy. Expect to see socialized medicine,
government meddling in a family’s health decisions, and enforced gay marriage all across the country.
It appears that reasonable ideas are losing their power in this country and will be in the minority in
Washington for the foreseeable future."
Group-based Republican Ingroup Support/Democratic Outgroup Threat
The following statement recently appeared on a Republican blog. Please read it and then tell us how
it made you feel:
“2010 is going to be an important election for Republicans. We are raising more money than
Democrats, our candidates are in safer seats, and Democrats have lost Americans’ trust during the last
few years of a Democratic Congress. Our current Congress is proving to Americans that Democrats
do not deserve to be in the majority, and Americans will make that known in 2010. Finally, we’ll take
Congress back . I am so glad that Americans have finally returned to their senses. Democrats should
not get used to being the majority party. Republicans will take back our central place in the
leadership of the country.”
Issue-based Republican Ingroup Support/Democratic Outgroup Threat
24
The following statement recently appeared on an internet blog. Please read it and then tell us how it
made you feel:
“2010 is going to be an important election for political ideas. This election is shaping up as a
backlash against larger government and massive government spending. Proven free-market strategies
and tax cuts that give Americans the free right to their own money will make a comeback in 2010.
The election will provide enough votes in Congress to stop socialized medicine, health decisions, and
enforced gay marriage all across the country. Finally, the day is arriving where sensible ideas will
hold a central place in the leadership of the country.”
Group-based Republican Outgroup Support/Democratic Ingroup Threat
The following statement recently appeared on a Democratic blog. Please read it and then tell us how
it made you feel:
"2010 is going to be a bad election for us Democrats. We have a lot of vulnerable seats opening up in
this election, and Americans are losing trust in us to get the job done. The economy is not getting any
better and we’re being blamed for everything that’s wrong right now. It pains me to admit this but our
party is in a bad spot and we could lose Congress in 2010. The Republicans are going to take
Congress back and there’s nothing we can do to stop them. We’d better all get ready for being the
minority in Washington for the foreseeable future."
Issue-based Republican Outgroup Support/Democratic Ingroup Threat
The following statement recently appeared on an internet blog. Please read it and then tell us how it
made you feel:
"2010 is going to be a bad election for sensible political ideas. After this election Congress could be
in a position to wreck the economy using blind ideology instead of actual knowledge. We can forget
about improving our health care system, or allowing all adults to get married if they want to, no
matter who they are. It will be back to the same market strategies and tax cuts that failed so badly in
the past. After 2010, reasonable ideas may be out of favor once again in Washington for the
foreseeable future."
Expert Opinion: Republican Support, Democratic Threat
Please read the following passage and then tell us how it made you feel:
Based on analysis of national trends, political experts predict a number of likely policy changes in the
coming year. After the 2010 election, trends hint at a return to market-based economic solutions in
which tax cuts play a more central role than direct government financial intervention in banks or
private companies. Policy experts foresee that health care proposals will only succeed if it rests on
private employer-funded insurance not decisions made by the federal government. Finally, experts
also predict a backlash against recent advances toward gay marriage, with many states banning gay
marriage outright, and reversals of gay marriage in states such as Iowa. These predictions are the
result of extensive statistical analysis of national and electoral trends. "
Expert Opinion: Republican Threat, Democratic Support
Please read the following passage and then tell us how it made you feel:
Based on analysis of national trends, political experts predict a number of likely policy changes in the
coming year. After the 2010 election, trends hint at a strengthening of governmental regulation, with
major corporations being forced to enact more transparent policies and procedures, and the
government playing a stronger role in enforcing higher tax rates for wealthier individuals and large
companies. Policy experts also expect to see a comprehensive health care plan passed by Congress,
one that requires coverage for all Americans and in which the federal government plays a central role.
Finally, we expect to see gay marriage gain acceptance in at least five more states. These predictions
are the result of extensive statistical analysis of national and electoral trends."
25
Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Merged blog study
(Study 1 & 2)
Democrats
Strength of partisanship
Strong (%)
Not very strong (%)
Independent leaner (%)
Pure Independent (%)
Partisan identity (mean)
Ever worked for party, candidate etc
Ever participated in protest
Ever written a letter to Congress
Ever contributed money
Political activity scale (0-1)
100% correct on all political
knowledge questions
Post blog comments weekly or more
often (%)
Presidential approval (% strongly or
somewhat)
Ideology (%)
Conservative ideology (very +moderate)
Liberal ideology (very+ moderate)
Female (%)
Average age
College Grad (%)
n
Republicans
Blog study 2
Independents
Democrats
Republicans
Student study 3
Independents
Democrats
Republicans
Independents
83.3
16.6
.69
38.5
59.4
81.2
72.4
.63
87.4
79.2
20.8
.66
40.7
20.4
72.7
73.7
.52
88.3
80.4
19.6
.66
24.7
50.6
76.9
55.0
.52
85.7
83.3
16.6
.69
38.8
58.1
81.5
74.0
.63
88.7
75.3
24.6
.65
34.5
20.4
68.3
66.0
.47
82.4
79.8
20.2
.67
24.5
51.1
77.2
56.5
.52
88.0
42.3
57.7
.53
29.5
30.5
28.1
10.7
.25
53.6
48.0
52.0
.61
20.0
12.0
28.0
20.0
.2
64.0
76.3
23.7
.56
15.5
25.0
26.8
10.3
.19
55.7
25.26
27.5
26.1
24.1
27.1
24.7
-
-
-
.85
78.4
5.2
.91
71.1
3.2
91.6
16.0
72.2
7.5
78.2
22.4
44.4
68.7
1221
3.64
96.4
26.3
48.2
67.9
1770
84.1
15.2
16.3
47.1
76.1
142
3.0
74.8
53.0
20.3
168
70.0
26.0
52.0
20.0
50
13.4
46.4
37.1
20.7
97
.31
96.5
32.3
46.5
70.3
2010
90.6
2.05
24.9
50.1
78.9
351
5.06
80.8
16.5
45.3
66.7
1065
Note. On the variable “strength of partisanship”, Democrats and Republicans include weak and strong identifiers. Independents include pure Independents
as well as Independents who lean toward the Democratic or Republican party. The merged blog study and blog study 2 included five political knowledge
questions. The student sample answered 4 political knowledge questions. On the variable “presidential approval”, the respondents in the Merged blog study
and Study 2 rated President Bush and the respondents in Student study 3 rated President Obama.
26
Table 2: The Partisan Identity Index by Respondent Partisanship
Merged blog study (Studies 1 & 2)
“How important is being a [Democrat/
Republican/Independent] to you?”
Extremely important
Very important
Not very important
Not important at all
“How well does the term [Democrat/
Republican/Independent] describe you?”
Extremely well
Very well
Not very well
Not at all
“When talking about [Democrats/
Republicans/Independents], how often do you use “we instead
of “they”?”
All of the time
Most of the time
Some of the time
Rarely
Never
“To what extent do you think of yourself as being a
[Democrat/ Republican/Independent]?”
A great deal
Somewhat
Very little
Not at all
n
Independents
Student study 3
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Independents
29.47
41.76
25.54
3.24
24.00
42.57
30.00
3.43
30.84
44.38
21.90
2.87
4.19
44.31
49.10
2.40
16.00
58.00
26.00
.00
19.59
36.08
34.02
10.31
23.25
55.89
20.21
.65
18.10
57.76
23.28
.86
25.60
59.59
14.16
.66
4.79
59.28
34.73
1.20
12.24
44.90
40.82
2.04
17.71
64.58
12.50
5.21
16.92
36.87
28.81
13.33
4.08
13.39
36.75
28.21
17.09
4.56
10.80
26.41
27.24
16.45
19.10
4.76
18.45
38.69
22.62
15.48
12.24
32.65
16.33
26.53
12.24
4.21
16.84
27.37
18.95
32.63
49.88
40.05
9.58
.50
2010
44.16
44.73
10.83
.28
351
45.47
43.00
9.31
2.22
1219
17.37
56.89
23.95
1.80
168
38.00
44.00
16.00
2.00
50
33.33
48.96
10.42
7.29
97
Note. Entries represent the percentage distribution on each item in the index for each partisan group. The exact wording of each item was decided by the
respondent’s partisanship so that Democrats were asked about their identity as Democrats and Republicans about their identity as Republicans.
27
Table 3: Determinants of Political Activism Among Democrats
Activism in 2008/2010
Merged blog
studies (1 & 2)
Democratic strength
Democratic identity
Ideology
Issues
Education
Gender (male)
Age (years)
White
Black
Asian
Constant
Adj. R2
n
.02 (.02)
.43 (.04)
----.03 (.01)
-.03 (.02)
.002 (.0005)
-.08 (.05)
.087
1932
Merged blog
study incl.
ideology
.03 (.03)
.39 (.05)
-.07 (.06)
--.03 (.01)
-.06 (.02)
.001 (.0005)
Blog study
2 incl.
issues
.02 (.02)
.39 (.05)
--.09 (.07)
.03 (.01)
-.05 (.02)
.002 (.001)
.03 (.07)
.086
1612
-.13 (.09)
.087
1697
Past activism
Student
study 3 incl.
issues
.02 (.04)
.46 (.11)
---.22* (.13)
--.01 (.04)
---.08* (.05)
-.15* (.08)
-.02 (.05)
.06 (.11)
.113
162
Merged
blog
studies
.02 (.02)
.13 (.04)
----.04 (.01)
-.05 (.01)
.004 (.0004)
Merged blog
study incl.
ideology
.04* (.02)
.10 (.04)
.16 (.05)
--.04 (.005)
-.08 (.02)
.004 (.0005)
.12 .(04)
.114
1924
.01 (.06)
.13
1604
Blog study 2
incl. issues
.03* (.02)
.09 (.04)
--.16 (.06)
.05 (.01)
-.07 (.02)
.004 (.0004)
.01 (.07)
.122
1687
Student study
3 incl. issues
.04 (.05)
.24* (.13)
--.07 (.14)
--.02 (.04)
---.06 (.05)
.04 (.09)
.03 (.05)
.06 (.12)
.018
164
Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). In the merged blog study and blog study 2 the dependent variable
“Activism” refers to activism in the 2008 presidential election. In the student sample “Activism” refers to the 2010 Congressional Elections. Bold
coefficients are significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test. Bold coefficients with an * are significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test.
28
Table 4: Determinants of Political Activism Among Republicans
Activism in 2008/2010
Republican strength
Republican identity
Ideology
Issues
Education
Gender (male)
Age (years)
White
Asian
Constant
Adj. R2
n
Merged blog
studies (1 &
2)
.04 (.05)
.41 (.10)
----.02 (.01)
-.03 (.04)
.003* (.001)
-----.17 (.12)
.084
335
Merged blog
study incl.
ideology
.03 (.06)
.43 (.11)
.09 (.12)
--.02 (.01)
-.03 (.04)
.002* (.001)
-----.18 (.13)
.072
325
Blog study
2 incl.
issues
.17 (.08)
.29* (.16)
--.21 (.10)
.02 (.02)
-.01 (.08)
.004 (.002)
-----.35* (.18)
.126
137
Past activism
Student
study 3 incl.
issues
.11 (.10)
.55 (.25)
--.08 (.19)
---.04 (.08)
---.03 (.14)
.02 (.16)
-.26 (.21)
.169
48
Merged
blog study
.05 (.04)
.16* (.09)
----.03 (.01)
.01 (.04)
.004 (.001)
-----.01 (.10)
.087
333
Merged blog
study incl.
ideology
.06 (.05)
.18 (.09)
.12 (.10)
--.03 (.01)
.01 (.04)
.004 (.001)
-----.05 (.11)
.080
323
Blog study 2
incl. issues
.08 (.07)
.18 (.14)
--.04 (.09)
-.004 (.02)
.13* (.07)
.01 (.002)
-----.15 (.15)
.178
136
Student study 3
incl. issues
.17* (.09)
.02 (.22)
---.10 (.17)
---.10 (.07)
--.14 (.13)
.15 (.15)
.07 (.19)
.058
50
Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). In the merged blog study and blog study 2 the dependent variable
“Activism” refers to activism in the 2008 presidential election. In the student sample “Activism” refers to the 2010 Congressional Elections. Bold
coefficients are significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test. Bold coefficients with an * are significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test.
29
Table 5. Determinants of Emotional Arousal among Democrats
Anger
Democratic strength
Democratic Identity
Democratic threat
Democratic strength × threat
Democratic identity × threat
Issues (liberal)
Issues × Democratic threat
Gender (male)
Education
White
Black
Asian
Age
Constant
Adj. R2
n
Merged blog
study (1&2)
.004 (.03)
-.03 (.06)
.09 (.05)
-.02 (.04)
.36 (.08)
-----.01 (.02)
-.01 (.01)
------.001 (.0006)
.25 (.06)
.254
1568
Blog study 2
.03 (.04)
-.07 (.07)
.03 (.15)
-.03 (.05)
.43 (.09)
.04 (.12)
.001 (.15)
-.03 (.02)
-.004 (.01)
------.001 (.001)
.26 (.12)
.235
1377
Anxiety
Student
study 3
-.02 (.07)
.04 (.20)
-.79 (.30)
-.06 (.13)
.79 (.31)
-.49 (.20)
.63 (.40)
-.10* (.05)
--.01 (.06)
-.08 (.11)
-.06 (.07)
--.71 (.17)
Merged blog Blog study 2
study (1&2)
-.01 (.03)
.004 (.03)
-.04 (.05)
-.05 (.06)
-.04 (.05)
-.21* (.12)
Student
Merged blog Blog study 2
study 3
study (1&2)
.0002 (.07)
.01 (.03)
.005 (.04)
.04 (.18)
.47 (.06)
.49 (.07)
-.71 (.27)
-.15 (.06)
.07 (.15)
Student
study 3
-.07 (.07)
.47 (.20)
-.05 (.30)
-.03 (.04)
.27 (.07)
-----.03 (.01)
.001 (.005)
---.
-----.0002 (.001)
.20 (.05)
-.05 (.12)
-.05 (.05)
.59 (.29)
-.30 (.09)
-.53 (.19)
--.71* (.37)
---.08 (.05)
.04 (.02)
---.02 (.01)
-.03 (.06)
---.004 (.10)
---.05 (.06)
----.0003 (.0006)
.69 (.16)
.31 (.06)
.01 (.13)
-.18 (.32)
.41 (.20)
-.23 (.40)
-.02 (.05)
---.04 (.06)
-.03 (.11)
-.05 (.07)
---.02 (.17)
.113
143
Positive emotions
.068
1568
-.06 (.04)
.31 (.08)
-.16 (.10)
.18 (.13)
-.02 (.02)
-.0003 (.005)
-------.0001 (.001)
.34 (.11)
.073
1377
.108
143
.329
1568
-.04 (.05)
-.34 (.09)
.19 (.12)
-.21 (.15)
.06 (.02)
-.02 (.01)
------.001 (.001)
.09 (.13)
.322
1377
.197
142
Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in
years. Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test. Bold coefficients with an * are significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test.
30
Table 6 : Determinants of Emotional Arousal among Republicans
Anger
Republican strength
Republican Identity
Republican threat
Republican strength × threat
Republican identity× threat
Issues (liberal)
Issues × republican threat
Gender (male)
Education
White
Asian
Age
Constant
Adj. R2
n
Merged blog Blog study 2
study (1&2)
-.06 (.08)
-.04 (.11)
-.24* (.14)
-.25 (.21)
-.04 (.11)
.04 (.23)
-.03 (.10)
-.11 (.14)
.59 (.19)
.73 (.32)
--.14 (.14)
---.27 (.19)
-.01 (.04)
-.03 (.07)
-.02 (.01)
-.04* (.02)
--------.002 (.01) .001 (.002)
.42 (.12)
.49 (.20)
.307
252
.329
111
Anxiety
Student
study 3
.03 (.17)
-.49 (.43)
-.15 (.45)
-.07 (.29)
.45 (.69)
-.13 (.31)
-.03 (.56)
-.03 (.11)
--.20 (.18)
.07 (.19)
--.66* (.33)
-.143
38
Merged blog Blog study 2
study (1&2)
.001 (.07)
-.03 (.11)
-.14 (.13)
-.15 (.21)
-.08 (.10)
-.21 (.22)
-.11 (.09)
-.02 (.14)
.41 (.17)
.69 (.31)
--.21 (.13)
---.09 (.18)
-.06* (.03)
-.09 (.07)
-.003 (.01)
-.02 (.02)
---------.001 (.001) .001 (.002)
.30 (.11)
.32* (.19)
.067
252
.195
111
Positive emotions
Student
study 3
.24 (.19)
-.78* (.46)
-.27 (.49)
-.33 (.32)
1.24 (.74)
.07 (.32)
-.86 (.60)
-.06 (.12)
--.49 (.19)
.33 (.21)
---
.46 (.35)
.070
39
Merged blog Blog study 2
study (1&2)
.13 (.08)
.05 (.11)
.40 (.15)
.42* (.22)
.17 (.11)
.25 (.24)
-.15 (.10)
-.01 (.15)
-.43 (.20)
-.67 (.34)
---.15 (.15)
--.28 (.20)
-.05 (.04)
.008 (.08)
-.03 (.01)
-.004 (.02)
--------.003 (.001)
--.10 (.12)
-.09 (.20)
.223
252
.119
111
Student
study 3
-.08 (.17)
.52 (.42)
-.24 (.45)
-.05 (.29)
-.03 (.68)
-.01 (.31)
-.24 (.55)
-.04 (.11)
--.16 (.18)
.16 (.19)
--.04 (.33)
.159
38
Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in
years. Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test. Bold coefficients with an * are significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test.
31
Table 7. Determinants of Ingroup Trait Bias (Inparty-Outparty) among Democrats and Republicans
Trait differences
Democrats
Dem/Rep strength
Dem/Rep identity
Education
Male
Age
White
Black
Asian
Constant
Adj. R2
n
Merged blog
study (1&2)
.01 (.01)
.25 (.02)
-.02 (.003)
.07 (.01)
.001 (.0002)
------.32 (.03)
.108
1936
Republicans
Student study 3
.07 (.03)
.20 (.09)
--.01 (.03)
v
-.05 (.04)
-.09 (.06)
-.07* (.04)
.13 (.06)
.079
166
Merged blog
study (1&2)
.13 (.04)
.25 (.08)
.01 (.01)
-.10 (.03)
.002 (.001)
-------.15 (.09)
.158
335
Student study 3
.16* (.09)
-.04 (.22)
--.03 (.07)
--.21 (.13)
--.08 (.14)
-.08 (.16)
.129
50
Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The dependent variable is the average rating of in-party
traits (high is positive) minus the average rating of out-party traits. For partisans, “partisan strength” indicates strong or not so strong
identification. Partisan identity refers to the 4-item identity scale. All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in
years. Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test. Bold coefficients with an * are significant at the .05 level in a onetailed test.
32
Table 8: Determinants of Political Involvement among Independents
Past activism
Independent strength
Independent identity
Ideology
Issues
Education
Gender (male)
Age (years)
White
Black
Asian
Constant
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2
n
Merged blog study
(1&2) incl. ideology
-.01 (.03)
.03 (.06)
.23 (.05)
--.02 (.01)
-.05 (.025)
.01 (.001)
-------.05 (.08)
.108
837
Blog study 2 incl.
issues
-.01 (.02)
-.01 (.05)
--.27 (.06)
.02 (.01)
-.05* (.02)
.01 (.001)
-------.11 (.08)
.109
1014
Follow
Student study 3
incl. issues
-.07 (.07)
.26* (.14)
--.08 (.13)
--.01 (.06)
---.04 (.09)
-.24 (.18)
-.01 (.10)
.04 (.14)
-.021
93
Merged blog study
(1&2) incl. ideology
-.44 (.25)
1.68 (.54)
.91 (.43)
---.05 (.08)
.24 (.24)
-.002 (.008)
--------.023
828
Blog study 2 incl.
issues
-.62 (.20)
1.05 (.46)
--.97 (.49)
-.09 (.07)
.45 (.22)
.003 (.007)
--------.022
1003
Student study 3 incl.
issues
-1.61 (.58)
2.98 (1.11)
--1.13 (.99)
--1.46 (.47)
---.48 (.59)
-.10 (1.41)
.11 (.67)
.124
94
Note. Entries for ”Past activism” are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The wording of the “follow” question was “How
closely do you plan to follow the 2008/2010 Presidential /Congressional elections?” Entries for “Follow” are ordered logit coefficients (standard errors in
parentheses). Ancillary cutpoint parameters have been suppressed. Independent strength refers to the difference between leaning and pure independents
(with the high score indicating pure independent). Independent identity refers to the 4-item identity scale. All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age
which is measured in years. Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test. Bold coefficients with an * are significant at the .05 level in
a one-tailed test.
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