Download long term strategy for facilitating a regime change in iran

LONG TERM STRATEGY FOR
FACILITATING A REGIME CHANGE
IN IRAN
TWS Policy Paper
Albert Beardow
December 2009
INTRODUCTION
This is a series of proposals that are intended to act as a long-term strategy in dealing with the
problems in Iran, particularly the human rights abuses and the oppressive nature of the Government,
with the eventual aim of allowing a regime change in the Islamic Republic. Although it should be
recognises that Iran is developing nuclear weapons in – and dealing with the threat of a nuclear Iran is
the most immediate priority – these proposals could work either alongside other proposals for directly
tackling the nuclear issue, and would be continued in the vent that Iran did acquire nuclear
capabilities. Iran’s motives in developing nuclear weapons appear to be:

To secure regional dominance over the Middle-East – to gain economic advantages over
the Arab states as well as to create supremacy of Iranian Shia Islam over the Arab Sunnis

To present a serious threat to the security of Israel

To achieve global power that will make it more difficult for the US to operate in the MiddleEast, as well as to empower a front opposed to Western aims and principles made up of Iran
and its allies such as Venezuela and North Korea

To use this gained level of power nationally as well, to increase repression of Reformist
movements and to further allow those at the head of the regime to fulfil their vision of an
Islamic Socialist Republic based on anti-Western principles.
Fundamentally, it appears that the aims of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamene’I, and the President,
Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad are also to cement their power at the top of Iranian politics, and they likely
believe that success in developing nuclear weapons would allow them substantial power to fulfil their
goals. Ahmadinezhad’s opposition to Zionism, whilst perhaps originating from anti-Semitism, is
primarily used to gain the support of those who sympathise with the Palestinian cause. It is thus
necessary to make progress in further reducing Ahmadinezhad’s support, particularly amongst the
ruling clerics, to deny a major rise in their powers. It is unlikely that Ahmadinezhad will relinquish
the construction of nuclear weapons unless he sees either a major threat to his power or a large
enough incentive to stop doing so (which would probably mean an increase in his power, and the
ability of the Iranian regime to oppress more of their people). In the absence of these, the most likely
method of removing a nuclear threat would be a regime change – allowing this would take a few years
at least, so to prevent a nuclear Iran this would require proposals designed to delay Iran’s nuclear
programme (such as the enrichment of Uranium in France and Russia). If a nuclear Iran did emerge,
then the regime should still be tackled firstly to prevent the suppression of the people, and also to
create a more stable regime under figures who are more likely to find at least a modus vivendi with
the West, or potentially those who would dismantle the nuclear programme.
If a regime change is facilitated, it should be:

A change in the figures at the head of the regime rather than a change of the system of
government itself. There a numerous reformist figures in the government who have the
knowledge and expertise to run the country, most of whom are religious and do not wish to
see the Islamic Republic fall. Additionally, a large proportion of the Shia Muslim populace
support the state being non-secular, so tackling its non-secularity would likely cause further
potential problems

A change through political means rather than popular uprising. Due to the support the
state has from large sections in society, and the divisions within Iranian society between the
rural populace and those of traditional Islamic beliefs, and the westernised Middle-Class, a
popular uprising would only be supported by certain groups in society, and others would
oppose their aims, perhaps resulting in the civil war since the fundamentalist side would have
the support of an ousted government. Additionally, those reformists who are in the
government already hold significant political power – key figures such as Karroubi and
Mousavi have been able to defy Khamene’i’s orders without themselves being arrested or
experiencing many repercussions.

Before the end of Ahmadinezhad’s presidential term. It is perhaps optimistic to see
Ahmadinezhad leaving within four years, however is he loses enough of the support of the
clerics and parliament, particularly among conservatives who believe his economic and
foreign policy are threatening Iran and destroying the economy, he might be forced to leave
office. This would also deal a severe blow to Khamene’I, who has been a strong supporter of
Ahmadinezhad.

After the end of Ahmadinezhad’s presidential term. Constitutionally, Ahmadinezhad is
ineligible to stand for the Presidency for another four years – any attempt to change the
constitution could cause discontent among the large number who believe Khomeini’s rules
should be followed and not changed for personal power, so this could cause problems. The
majority of conservatives who might stand for election in place of Ahmadinezhad are not as
controversial as him, and would be more likely to avoid conflict with the West and revive
Iran’s economy. However, Khamene’i would still have key power as Supreme Leader

The Supreme Leader. Although it is constitutionally possible for the Guardian Council to
remove the Supreme Leader from power, and its head, Hashemi Rafsanjani, has been a critic
of the regime’s recent policies following the fraudulent elections, it is again optimistic to
imagine the Guardian Council re-electing a Supreme Leader. However, if the clerics deem his
policies to be dangerous or anti-Islamic, they good assert their influence to decrease his
powers, and it is possible that if enough of the population oppose him, he could be dismissed
and replaced with a reformist leader such as Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.
Here follows a list of some ideas that could be applied to reduce the support of those at the head of the
regime, both from the populace as a whole and particularly from within the government – reformists
already oppose Ahmadinezhad, and there are several areas of conflict which could be exploited to
increase the rift between him and more conservative figures. Many of these ideas simply remove
some of the regime’s internal justification for conflict with the West. Some additional proposals are
also discussed in more detail.
PROPOSALS

Britain and the USA should officially apologise for their role in the overthrow of Mohammad
Mosaddegh – this will reduce Iran’s justification for a continuation of perceived British and
US imperialism, whilst having no major negative effects on Britain or the USA.

Recognise the right of Iran to exist as a non-secular Islamic Republic, and not to challenge the
Islamic principles of the regime. Perhaps also to emphasise Khomeini’s legacy in Iran, as his
laws and principles will be much respected by the majority of clerics, but are being
challenged and disobeyed by the elite currently in power.

Engage with more moderate key figures in Iranian politics, particularly the clerics who hold
much influence in the political system, such as former presidents Ayatollah Rafsanjani and
Mohammad Khatami.

Encourage nations perceived by Iran not to be hostile, such as Oman, Kuwait and other
Islamic nations, to also engage in multi-lateral talks with the opposition and to challenge the
actions of the Iranian government, particularly within a religious framework.

Solving the Israel-Palestine problem would deny Ahmadinezhad one of his major reasons for
support, and would reduce any internal justification for Iran’s support of Hamas and
Hezbollah – therefore it is important to deal with this issue in parallel also.

Provide further methods for and encourage debate particularly on religious and economic
issues within Iran e.g. through extension of the BBC’s Persian service.
WORKING WITH IRAN TO TACKLE TERRORISM AND OTHER COMMON PROBLEMS
The Iranian government has accused Britain and other Western nations of doing nothing to stop Iran’s
domestic terrorists, many of whom they claim to be living unhindered in the UK and the USA. This is
especially damaging given the West’s claims for moving into Afghanistan and Iraq being that of a
“War on Terror”. Although there are some disputes as to which individuals can be considered
terrorists, those that have been involved in such acts, even if their groups are not considered terrorist
groups, should be arrested – if there are suspicions they have been involved in terrorist activity in Iran
then they should be treated as other terrorist suspects are in the UK. This would improve relations
with the Iranian government and provide further evidence to dispute Khamene’i’s and
Ahmadinezhad’s criticism of Britain as the “Little Satan”. Potential problems are that groups such as
the PMOI, which was recently removed from the list of terrorists by the UK and EU but are still on
the US and Canadian list of terrorists, are diverse and large sectors do not engage in these activities.
Additionally, the PMOI have been useful in providing some information about Iran’s nuclear
programme. Nevertheless, Iranian terrorists that are arrested but not deported will show the Iranian
regime that the West is against all terrorism, but will not tolerate human rights abuses as committed in
Iran. The West should also work with Iran to confront other common problems, such as the drugs
trade.
SMART SANCTIONS
Most figures in the reformist movement agree that smart sanctions used to suffocate the income of the
regime will cause considerable damage in the long run that will further cause many in the Iranian
government to see restoring the economy as a key reason to replace Ahmadinezhad. Targeting
industries that benefit groups such as the Revolutionary Guards Corps, in particular the oil and gas
industries, is particularly necessary – the National Iranian Oil Company has close links with the
Revolutionary Guard. These sanctions should also be targeted at individuals particularly – those key
figures at the head of the Government who support Khamene’i and Ahmadinezhad, as well as those in
businesses and other institutions related to these rulers. Bank accounts of such individuals and
organisations could be frozen, as well as the blocking any interaction with foreign financial systems.
Sanctions that are more focused in this way would allow other sanctions to be lifted, such as those that
restrict the communication and technology of the Iranian people (for example Microsoft still bans
Windows Instant Messenger in Iran). A big problem is gaining the consent of Russia and China –
Russia’s large pro-Israel faction could make persuading Russia to agree to such sanctions easier (and
Medvedev has agreed that sanctions might be inevitable), but China has key economic ties with Iran
that will be difficult to break – perhaps an economic incentive to China in response to complying with
sanctions would be necessary.
A PERMANENT US REPRESENTATIVE IN IRAN
Although the Iranian regime might reject any such figure, a permanent representative of the US in
Iran would be useful for more direct diplomacy with all parts of the Iranian government. Preferably
such a representative would be a Shia Muslim, who would be more acceptable to the Iranian
government and who would also be able to engage with the mullahs on a religious level. This would
be a practical measure that is not as far as a full Embassy which would imply further legitimacy to
Ahmadinezhad’s government. Such a representative should be discussed with the Iranian government
even if they decide not to accept it.