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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes-Picot Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul,
1915-1918
Author(s): Edward Peter Fitzgerald
Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 697-725
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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France's Middle EasternAmbitions, the Sykes-Picot
Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul,
1915-1918*
Edward Peter Fitzgerald
Carleton University
One of the puzzles of the territorialsettlement in the Middle East after the
First World War is France's surrenderof its diplomatic claim to the Mosul
region of Iraq. A remote province on the eastern marches of the Ottoman
Empire, Mosul (al-Mawsil) was considered a promising area for oil exploration.' France's feeble petroleum industrypossessed no overseas production
facilities, and a gasoline crisis duringthe winter of 1917-18 had heightened
awareness of the military significance of dependence on foreign-controlled
sources of supply. Meanwhile, the Sykes-Picot negotiations on the postwar
partitionof Ottomanterritoryhad apparentlygained Mosul for futureFrench
control, and this accord was formally ratifiedby Paris and London in May
1916. Thus Francepossessed both a need for Mosul's anticipatedoil reserves
plus an incontrovertiblediplomaticclaim to the area.Yet threeweeks afterthe
war ended, Prime MinisterGeorges ClemenceauabandonedFrance'srightsto
Mosul and ceded control of all northernMesopotamiato Britain.
The "Mosul cession" was agreed during a private conversationbetween
Clemenceau and David Lloyd George at the French embassy in London on
Sunday,December 1, 1918. No aide-memoirecommittedthis bargainto paper,
nor was it mentionedin the official recordof the Allied talks that took place
at Downing Street during the following two days.2 However, enough
* I would like to thank Professor John ApSimon, dean of graduate studies and
research of Carleton University, as well as Professor Michel Fleury of the Institut
Francophonede Paris for material supportthat made possible the researchon which
this article is based. Thanks are also due to the archival staff of the French Foreign
Ministry for their assistance, and to the Journal's two anonymous readers for their
helpful suggestions.
1 Arabic and Turkish place names mentioned in the text are spelled in their
contemporaryforms (though without diacritical marks), except where a locality is
likely to be more familiarin an earlierEuropeanizedversion-e.g., "Aleppo" instead
of "Halab," "Zor" instead of "Dayr az-Zawr."
2 Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (hereafter MAE), Paris, Papiers d'AgentsArchives Privees, Papiers Pichon, file 6, "Conclusions arretes a la suite d'une
conversationinteralliee tenue 'aDowning Street le lundi 2 decembre a 11 heures du
[The Journal of Modern History 66 (December 1994): 697-7251
X) 1994 by The University of Chicago. 0022-2801/94/6604-0002$01.00
All rights reserved.
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698
Fitzgerald
contemporaryevidence exists to make it indubitable that Clemenceau did
indeed abandonFrance's diplomatictitle to Mosul, along with a rathermore
precariousclaim to Palestine, duringthat Sunday conversation.3In short, the
Mosul cession actually happened.But how can it be explained?
Historians have developed three lines of reasoning to account for Clemenceau's action. First, there is the assumption that all of Clemenceau's
decisions were governed by an overriding determinationto assure France's
securityin Europe.On this readingthe Frenchprime ministerceded Mosul as
well as the French claim to Palestine in order to remove a likely source of
friction with the ally whose good will was critical to securing France's aims
on the Rhine frontier.4To this Eurocentricreasoning is added a second and
more specificallyMiddle Easternpurpose:thatof forestallingBritishdemands
for wholesale revision of the Sykes-Picot agreementon the partitionof the
Ottoman Empire. By giving away some elements of the 1916 deal, Clematin"; telegramto PresidentWilson, December 2, 1918; "Conclusions auxquelles a
abouti une reunion ... le 3 decembre 1918, a 11 heures 15"; "Conclusionsarret6esa
la suite de conversations interalliees ... le mardi 3 decembre 1918 'a 4 heures de
l'apres-midi."As Italian representativestook part in these meetings, and as Colonel
EdwardM. House had originallybeen expected to attend,it is hardlysurprisingthat a
purely Anglo-Frenchbargainwas kept secret.
3 David Lloyd George's lapidarydescriptionof this meeting in The Truthabout the
Peace Treaties(London, 1938), 2:1038, was writtenseveral years after the event and
cannot be consideredcontemporarytestimony.However, when Lloyd George retumed
to Number 10 that Sunday evening, he told Sir MauriceHankey,secretaryof the War
Cabinet,about his talk with Clemenceau.Three days later Hankey entereda comment
in his privatediary,and that entry confirmsthe essentials of Lloyd George's version of
what had happened. On December 11, 1920, Hankey also recorded a more detailed
version of what the prime ministerhad told him. See StephenRoskill, Hankey,Man of
Secrets, vol. 2, 1919-1931 (London, 1972), pp. 28-29. The published record of the
peace conferencealso includes statementsconceming Clemenceau'sarrangementabout
Mosul andPalestine.Forone example, see Lloyd Georgeto Clemenceau,May 21, 1919,
in Documentson British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, ed. E. L. Woodwardand Rohan
Butler, first ser. (London, 1952), 4:1092, document 684, n. 2. Finally, unpublished
documents in the French diplomatic archives authenticateClemenceau's cession of
Palestine and Mosul to Britain:e.g., "Note au sujet d'une entente franco-anglaisesur
la question de Syrie," February11, 1919, in MAE, ser.A-Paix 1918-25, file 175. (The
date on this document, which summarizesthe Quai d'Orsay's version of what had
transpiredin London, is close to illegible and might possibly be the 14th.)
4 JukkaNevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920 (London,
1969), pp. 89-92; Michael L. Dockrill and J. Douglas Goold, Peace withoutPromise:
Britain and the Peace Conferences,1919-23 (London, 1981), p. 145; ChristopherM.
Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner,France Overseas: The Great Warand the Climax
of French Imperial Expansion (London, 1981), p. 174; Howard M. Sachar, The
Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1924 (London, 1970), pp. 253-54; D. Stevenson, French WarAims against Germany,1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982), p. 145.
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 699
menceau is said to have preserved and strengthenedFrench claims to what
really mattered:control over Syria and Lebanon.s A third reason, usually
introducedas a corollaryto the second, is the presumptionthat Lloyd George
promisedClemenceaua significantshare-perhaps as much as 50 percent-of
whatever oil might be found in a British-controlledMosul. There is an
intrinsic logic to this argument,and it accords well with the considerable
attention the French gave to petroleum during postwar negotiations on the
Near East. Perhaps for that reason this view has found almost universal
acceptancein the scholarly literature.6It is, nevertheless, mistaken.7
This article does not seek to deny that broad strategicconsiderationsmay
have influencedClemenceau'sdecision to abandonFrance'sclaims to Mosul
(and Palestine) on that Sunday afternoon. Instead it concentrates on the
element that gave Mosul its momentarydiplomatic importance-crude oil.
Recent research by British and German scholars, together with Captain
Roskill's presentationof Sir Maurice Hankey's diaries, have shown how the
5 See Nevakivi, p. 93; Dockrill and Goold, pp. 145 and 150; Andrews and
Kanya-Forstner,p. 174. A variantof this interpretationhas Lloyd George promising
Clemenceauthat Frenchcontrol could be "upgraded"to a protectorateover the whole
of Syria, as opposed to directcontrolover Lebanonalone andjust a sphereof influence
au Proche-Orient(Paris, 1970), p. 54;
in Syria. See Andre Nouschi, Luttespe'trolie'res
Georges-HenriSoutou,L'or et le sang: Les buts de guerre economiquesde la Premiere
Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1989), p. 784; and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Clemenceau
(Paris, 1988), p. 829 and esp. p. 854 (where the author mistakenly dates the Mosul
cession in December 1919). In 1928 Clemenceau complained to his secretary that
many critics had attackedhim for abandoningMosul. "But they forget to say that I
used it as bait to get Cilicia, which a certain numberof our good allies would very
much have liked us not to have.... I therefore said to the English, 'Which do you
prefer?Mosul? Or Cilicia?' They answered 'Mosul'. I said 'I'll give it to you, and I'll
take Cilicia.'" See Jean Martet, Le silence de M. Clemenceau (Paris, 1929),
pp. 303-4. This account is framed in defensive and anachronisticlanguage (there is
talk about a pipeline to Alexandretta),and it is obvious that the retiredstatesmanwas
intent on justifying "his" peace settlementagainst its detractors.Thus it is probably
betterto view this as the rationalizationof an old man in his eighty-seventhyear and
not as an accurateaccount of his motives in 1918.
6 For instance, see Duroselle, p. 829, following Sartou, p. 784; Nouschi, p. 54;
Nevakivi, p. 92; Andrewand Kanya-Forstner,pp. 174-75; Dockrill and Goold, p. 145;
Sachar,p. 254.
7 I base this conclusion largely though not exclusively on the discovery of a private
letter written in March 1920 by Philippe Berthelot, head of the Political and
CommercialAffairsdivision of the ForeignMinistry.Berthelotwas the most important
French participantin the postwar negotiations that culminated in the San Remo
agreementon MiddleEasternoil. His position in this letteris unequivocal:Clemenceau
abandoned France's claims to Mosul and Palestine without obtaining anything in
return.(I discuss this matterin detail in a forthcomingarticle.)
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700
Fitzgerald
"oil factor"influencedBritain'sMiddle Easternpolicy, particularlyduringthe
final months of the war.8In contrast,little is known aboutthe influence of oil
on France'swartimediplomacy.This articleaims to redressthe historiographical balance by examining the role played by oil in the elaborationof French
objectives duringthatcountry'sprincipalwartimenegotiationswith Britainon
the partitionof the OttomanEmpire.
FRENCHKNOWLEDGE
OF MOSUL'SOIL POTENTALBEFORE1914
Petroleumseepages and tar sandsin northernMesopotamiahad been observed
and put to local use long before the Christianera.9 During the nineteenth
century diplomaticrepresentativeshad noted such sites in their dispatches,10
and Westernexperts had been reportingon the potential of the region for oil
explorationsince the 1870s.11The Ottomangovernment,which administered
the area as the vilayet (province) of Mosul, also commissioned European
geologists to investigate the petroleumdeposits found in the area.
The French Foreign Ministry obtained copies of at least three of these
commissioned reports. The first was that of Emile Jacquerez, a French
engineer whom Paris had put at the disposal of the Porte and who traveled
throughMosul Province from Januaryto April in 1895. Thirteenyears later,
the French vice-consul in Mosul persuadedprovincial authoritiesto let him
see Jacquerez'sreport. They left it in his possession for two days, during
which he copied it out by hand and sent his version to the Quai d'Orsay.12 A
8
MarianKent, Oil and Empire:British Policy and MesopotamianOil, 1900-1920
(London, 1976), pp. 124-26; Geoffrey Jones, The State and the Emergence of the
British Oil Industry (London, 1981), pp. 197-200; V. Rothwell, "Mesopotamiain
British WarAims, 1914- 1918," Historical Journal 13, no. 2 (1970): 73-94; Helmut
Mejcher,"Oil and BritishPolicy towardsMesopotamia,1914-1918," MiddleEastern
Studies 8, no. 3 (October 1972): 377-91, and his Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq,
1910-1928 (London, 1976), chap. 2. The significance of the "oil factor" relative to
other considerationsmotivating British policymakersis judiciously assessed by John
Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: ImperialPolicy in the Aftermathof War,
1918-22 (London, 1981), pp. 258-65.
9 R. J. Forbes, Vijftigeeuwen olie: De geschiedenis van de aardolie (Zeist, 1963),
pp. 11-13.
1o For example, see a French consular report of August 30, 1871, signaling the
working of oil pools at Mandali, Kifri, and Tuz Khurmatu,as reproducedin Charles
Issawi, ed., The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914: A Documentary Economic History
(New York, 1988), pp. 402-3.
" See StephenH. Longrigg, Oil in the MiddleEast, Its Discovery and Development
(London, 1954), pp. 13-14; and Kent, Oil and Empire,p. 15.
12 Georges-Louis-AlexandreDugrand to MAE, March 2, 1908, with enclosed
89-page manuscriptreport, in MAE, Nouvelle Serie-Correspondance Politique et
Commerciale(hereafterNS-CPC), Turquie,box 452, file "Petroles."
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France's Middle EasternAmbitions 701
year later anotherFrench engineer, ToussaintRouzaud, wrote an optimistic
report for the Ottoman Imperial Crown Lands Departmenton the potential
expansion of primitive local oil operations around Mosul.13 The French
commercial attachein Istanbulobtained a copy of this reportand forwarded
an even more optimistic precis of it to Paris. In November 1909 the Foreign
Ministry sent a copy of this re'sumeto the Finance Ministry,suggesting that
they inform "financialgroups likely to be interestedin these matters."There
is no indicationthatthe FinanceMinistrydid anythingof the kind. In any case,
Rouzaud had put the cost of developing full-scale production and refining
facilities plus a distributionnetworkat almost 55 million francs.14 That was a
very substantialsum to ask Frenchfinanciersto put at risk, particularlyfor an
investmentcommunitywhose preferencefor governmentpaperand other safe
investments is well known.
What appearsto have been the most detailed of the prewarassessments of
Mesopotamia'spetroleumpotentialwas the work of ProfessorL.-C. Tassartof
the prestigious Ecole des Mines. At the request of the Ottomangovernor of
Mosul, Tassarttraveledthroughthe Tigris valley, the Mosul region, and what
he generally called "Turkish Kurdistan" from August to October 1908.
Tassartthen wrote several reportson the economic potentialof the region. His
main reportdealt in some detail with various oil sites, concentratingon the
areas near Qayyarah, Zakhu, and Kirkuk. After enumerating the main
locations where he had actually investigatedoil seepages plus other locations
he had not visited but that were already well known, Tassartreached this
conclusion aboutthese "affieurements
petrolifieres":"[They] certainlyappear
to be signs indicating a vast oil-bearing region, the biggest part of which is
admittedlylocated in Persian territory,but with a sufficiently large zone left
in Turkish Kurdistan [i.e., the Mosul region] to permit the hope that
particularlyrich oilfields will be discovered there" (pp. 65-66).15 Tassart's
confidentialreportswere submittedto the ImperialCrownLands Department,
but the well-connectedBanqueImperialeOttomanesuppliedthe Quai d'Orsay
with revised copies.16
13 ToussaintRouzaud, "Note sur les gltes petroliferesde la Mesopotamie,"October
20, 1909, in MAE, NS-CPC, Turquie,box 452, file "Petroles."
14 "Gisements petrolif'eresen Mesopotamie," November 12, 1909, with enclosed
resume;in Ministeredes Finances, Service des Archives Economiqueset Financieres,
box B 31287, file "Turquie-Societes."
15 Tassarttempered his optimism with a realistic understandingthat the region's
remotenessmeantdevelopmentcosts would be considerableif an oil field was actually
discovered and that successful commercial exploitation would depend on prior
constructionof an adequatetransportationcorridor.
16 They are found in MAE, NS-CPC, Turquie,box 452, file "La region de Mossoul
au point de vue economique."I say "revised" because the phrasing("our interests,"
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702
Fitzgerald
Thus, before 1914 the French Foreign Ministry possessed at least three
reportsfrom professionallyqualifiedobserverson the oil potentialof Mosul;
quite possibly there were more.'7 This information indicated that many
surfacepetroleumdeposits were presentin one form or anotherin the province
of Mosul and that the region possessed much the same geological layout as
southwestern Iran, where the nascent Anglo-Persian Oil Company had
discovered a substantial field in 1908. However, there is no evidence to
suggest that these reports,or briefingpapersbased on their conclusions, were
circulatedto Frenchnegotiatorseither before or during wartimetalks on the
partitionof Ottomanterritory.We can be absolutely certainof only two facts
relatedto the oil issue: first,a copy of the petroleumsection of Tassart'sreport
was sent to one of the French oil negotiators in London early in 1920.18
Second, Tassarthimself was dispatched to London as a technical expert to
assist the French delegation in working out the postwar Anglo-French
agreementthatcame to be known as the San Remo accord.19While both facts
tell us somethingaboutthe value the Frenchattachedto the oil factorafter the
war-and after Clemenceau's cession of Mosul-they unfortunatelyreveal
nothing about the perceived importance of Mesopotamian oil before and
duringthe key wartimenegotiations.20
"ourindustry")shows that these could not have been exact copies of the reportsgiven
to the Turkishauthorities.EitherTassartsubmitteddifferentversions to the bank,or the
bank's staff revised their wording.The formermay be more likely because the Banque
Imperiale Ottomanewas involved in the financing of Tassart'smission. It certainly
advanced Tassart's travel funds, and it is possible that the bank, not the Ottoman
government, may actually have picked up the entire bill for his trip through
Mesopotamia. See "J. G." [Jean Gout], handwritteninstructions, "E[crire] a M.
Berenger,"January8, 1919, MAE, series E-Levant, 1918-40, Irak, vol. 32.
17 Material in MAE, NS-CPC, Turquie,box 452, file "Petroles," shows that the
FrenchPonts et ChausseesDepartmentwas awareof the local oil works at ash-Sharqat
near Mosul since at least 1895. See also Jacques Thobie, Inte'retset impe'rialisme
franCais dans l'Empireottoman (1895-1914) (Paris, 1977), p. 418, n. 71.
18 Jean Gout, head of the Foreign Ministry's Asia and Oceania division, had the
sections of Tassart'sreportdealing with oil typed out and sent as a twenty-two-page
brief to SenatorHenryBerenger,the Frenchhigh commissionerfor fuel. The phrasing
of his draft covering note implies that Gout did not believe Berenger knew about
Tassart'smission. "J. G.," note, "E[crire] a M. Berenger,"January8, 1919, MAE,
E-Levant, 1918-40, Irak, vol. 32.
19 Berthelotto "Cherami," March 11, 1920, MAE, series E3-Relations Commerciales, 1919-40, B-Petroles, file 49. Berthelot found Tassartto be useless during the
oil negotiations. In a characteristictone of detached amusementhe describedTassart
as a vain and incompetentfool, incapableof doing anythinghelpful on the technical
questions his expertise was needed for.
20 As for the actual situation on the ground before 1914, although French capital
accountedfor the lion's share of Westerninvestmentin the OttomanEmpire, French
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France's Middle EasternAmbitions 703
FRANCE'S
INITIAL
APPROACH
TOPARTITION
On March 20, 1915, Foreign MinisterTheophile Delcasse sent a summaryof
his views on the partitionof the OttomanEmpireto the French embassies in
London and Rome. The diplomatic context for Delcasse's demarche was
dominatedby two factors. First, as the memorandumacknowledged,discussions were then going on between Foreign SecretarySir EdwardGrey and the
Italianambassadorin LondonconcerningItaly's entryinto the war.Second, as
evidenced by a Russian diplomatic note of March 4, Petrograd had put
forwarda claim to Istanbuland the Straits.Both initiativesraised the issue of
carving up Ottoman territory after an Entente victory; and the French
particularlywanted to link their assent to Russian claims with reciprocal
acknowledgmentof France's ambitions in the Levant.21
Delcasse's memorandumshows that the officials in Paris were working
from the assumptionthatthe route of the Baghdadrailway would serve as the
reference point for the division of the spoils. They were certain that Russia
would demand more of the area closest to Istanbul and that Britain would
doubtless want "the Tigris and Euphratesregion right up to the northern
frontiers of Mesopotamia." Therefore France would seek to acquire the
central sections along the Baghdad line running from Konya through the
Anatolian plateau "up to the north of Mesopotamia, [thereby] obtaining
possession of the regions which constitute the economic hinterlandof the
segment of the Baghdad railway that will be awarded to France." On the
ground this meant the Ottoman provinces of Adana, Aleppo, Ma'muret
ul-'Aziz, and Diyarbakir.It is noteworthy that, although the Quai d'Orsay
envisioned thatthe futureFrenchand Britishsphereswould meet "in the north
of Mesopotamia,"acquisition of the province of Mosul was not listed as a
French goal. Nor was there any mention of oil.22
Paul Cambon, the veteran French ambassadorin London, reacted to the
memorandumby cautioning Delcasse against initiating discussions about a
enterprisewas absent from the field of petroleumexploration.With the exception of a
short-livedattemptby a Dutch promoterto draw the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas
into a scheme to obtain an oil concession in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad,
Frenchprewarinterest in Middle Easternoil was notable by its absence. See Thobie,
pp. 418-20.
21 For this last point see Nevakivi (n. 4 above), pp. 14-15.
22
Delcasse to London and Rome embassies, March 20, 1915, MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 177. In anotherpart of this communicationthe Quai d'Orsay speaks of
instructingthe Frenchambassadorin Petrogradto insist that, in returnfor assentingto
Russian occupation of Constantinople,"France intends above all to obtain all [sic]
Syria includingthe region aroundthe Gulf of Alexandrettaand Cilicia up to the Taurus
range." This, too, would exclude Mosul.
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704
Fitzgerald
territorialcarve-up. This subject, he argued, was bound to stir up rivalries
among the Entente powers.23Cambon specifically warned against extending
French claims eastwardto remote places like the province of Diyarbakir(as
Delcasse had recommended),which he regardedas an economically worthless
wildernessinhabitedby "a bunch of wild, thieving bandits."Cambonamused
himself by wonderingaloud at Delcasse's expense abouthow the Chamberof
Deputies might greet a futurerequest for loan guaranteesfor such outlandish
outposts of French rule.24
However, four days before he sent this splash of cold water to Paris,
Cambonput his misgivings aside and informedGrey that Delcasse wanted to
arrangean unofficial exchange of views about each country's aims in Asiatic
Turkey.Grey agreed,albeit with the reservationthat the Cabinet "hadnot yet
had time to consider our desiderata" in the region. After expressing his
personal belief that after the breakupof Turkey "there must, in the interests
of Islam, be an independentMoslem political unit somewhere else," Grey
specifically referredto the future of Mesopotamia.He told Cambon that the
governmenthad not yet decided whether Mesopotamia should form part of
this independentMuslim state "or whetherwe should put forwarda claim for
ourselves in that region.",25
23
Comparethe similaropinion of Sir ArthurNicolson, permanentundersecretaryat
the Foreign Office, who held that talk of partitionwould quickly engender quarrels
about who was to get Jerusalem.See Elie Kedourie,In the Anglo-ArabLabyrinth:The
McMahon-HusaynCorrespondence and Its Interpretations, 1914-39 (Cambridge,
1976), p. 53.
24 Cambon to Delcasse, March 27, 1915, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 177.
Interestingly,Cambon believed that the British had little in the way of territorial
designs on the region. In words that anticipate Robinson and Gallagher's views on
London's predilectionfor "informalempire," Cambon wrote that "England is only
interested in assuring her supremacy in the Persian Gulf and in preventing another
power from challengingher there. It is truethat Sir E. Grey did referto 'Mesopotamia'
when he spoke with me, but what he would like to see there is British paramountcy,
not physical possession. It is importantto keep in mind the fact that nowadaysEngland
is no longerkeen on acquiringmore territory.While intendingto maintainaccess to her
existing possessions and to create new markets, she does not seem to be seeking
additionaloverseas possessions, for she reckons that she already has as much as she
can handle in every part of the globe" (same dispatch).
25 Grey to Sir Francis Bertie, March 23, 1915, reproducedin Viscount Grey of
Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (New York, 1925), 2:236. Grey misled
Cambona bit if he did indeed say that the Cabinet "had not yet had time to consider"
Britain's aims in the region, for the War Committee had just finished discussing war
aims in the Middle East on March 19. At that meeting Grey had presentedarguments
as to why Britain should support the creation of an independent Muslim polity to
replace Turkey.But the confused characterof the discussion at this meeting shows
there was no consensus about even the main lines of a futurepartition,and certainly
no agreedposition on Mesopotamia.The minutesof this meeting are in C. J. Lowe and
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 705
THE OIL FACTORIN BRITAIN'SVIEWOF MOSUL26
Although it does not appear that Paris subsequently pressed for these
negotiations,27Cambon'sdemarchedid contributeto London's decision to set
up a special interdepartmentalcommittee chaired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen
to sort out Britain'sposition on the futureof the OttomanNear East, including
Mesopotamia.28At that point in the war the Indian interest regarded
Mesopotamiaas its special patch, for an Indianarmy was at thattime fighting
its way toward Baghdad, and officials were keen on annexing at least lower
Mesopotamia (i.e., the vilayet of Basra) after the war. But their ambitions
arose from the traditionalpreoccupationwith strategiccontrol of the Persian
Gulf, not from a plan to gain access to potential petroleumreserves. Oil had
yet to be put officially on the table, and it was the de Bunsen committee that
now did this. It became the first official body to incorporate access to
Mesopotamianoil into the bundle of British war aims.
M. L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy, 1902-22 (London,
1972), 3:524-27; see also Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorised
Biographyof T.E. Lawrence(London, 1989), pp. 179-80; plus Nevakivi, pp. 16-17.
26 The works cited in n. 8 above constitutethe main sources for the influence of oil
on British wartimediplomacy.For the evolution of Britain'sMiddle Easternpolicy in
general, there is a very substantialliteraturefor the wartime period. In addition to
Nevakivi's Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, see Elie Kedourie,Englandand
the Middle East: The Vital Years, 1914-21 (London, 1956); Zeine N. Zeine, The
Strugglefor Arab Independence:WesternDiplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's
Kingdom in Syria (Beirut, 1960); Elizabeth Monroe, Britain'sMoment in the Middle
East, 1914-1971, rev. ed. (London, 1981), chaps. 1-2; the essay by Marian Kent,
"GreatBritainand the End of the OttomanEmpire,"in her edited volume, The Great
Powers and the End of the OttomanEmpire (London, 1984); and David Fromkin's
extensive narrativeA Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East,
1914-22 (New York, 1989). Kedourie's Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, Jeremy Wilson's
weighty biography,Lawrence of Arabia, and Briton Cooper Busch's detailed study,
Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921 (Berkeley, 1971), also supply considerable
insight into the making of Britain's Near Easternpolicies. Finally, much information
about Anglo-Frenchdiplomacy in general can be found in monographsdealing with
the future disposition of Palestine: Isaiah Friedman, The Question of Palestine,
1914-1918: British-Jewish-ArabRelations (London, 1973); Leonard Stein, The
BalfourDeclaration (London, 1961); and A. L. Tibawi,Anglo-ArabRelations and the
Question of Palestine, 1914-21 (London, 1977).
27 In August 1915, a colonialist deputy, Georges Leygues, used his position in the
Chamber of Deputies' foreign affairs commission to criticize both Delcasse and
Cambonfor not pressingLondonfor a formalagreementon partition.See Andrewsand
Kanya-Forstner(n. 4 above), p. 76.
28 De Bunsen was a career diplomat who had been British ambassadorin Lisbon,
Madrid, and Vienna in the decade before the war. His committee comprised
representativesfrom the Foreign and India offices, the service ministries, and the
Board of Trade.
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Fitzgerald
The committeemet thirteentimes betweenApril and Junebefore submitting
its report, "British Desiderata in Turkey and Asia," on June 30, 1915.29
Although most recommendationsdealt with traditional security concerns,
"security for the development of undertakingsin which we are interested,
such as oil production,river navigation,and constructionof irrigationworks"
also appearedon the list of desired outcomes. The problem was that it was
easy to list goals but "very difficult to lay down how to shape the opportunity
now at hand for attainingthem." In any case, the Admiraltyhad pressed the
committee to consider acquisition of Mosul, specifically because of its oil
potential,30and the WarOffice representativeson the committee, GeneralSir
CharlesCallwell and Lieutenant-ColonelSir Mark Sykes, had recommended
for militaryreasonsthat British control in Mesopotamiabe extended not only
from Basra up to Baghdad but even further to encompass the province of
Mosul and its northernapproaches.31 The committee accepted their view, and
the petroleumpotentialof the area was cited in supportof this recommenda32
tion.
Thus, five months before Anglo-Frenchtalks on the partitionof Ottoman
territorybegan, an official Cabinet committee had explicitly asserted the
desirabilityof obtaining control of Mosul after the war. The oil factor had
figured in this decision, albeit as a supplementaryrather than a primary
motive. However, not too much should be made of this. Mesopotamian
oil was only one among a long list of desiderata,and not a central focus of
the report. Nor does it appear that this particular aim was taken very
seriously.33As we shall see, by the time the Foreign Office got round to
29
The proceedings and recommendationsof the de Bunsen committee are nicely
summarizedin Kedourie,Anglo-ArabLabyrinth,pp. 58-62. Its reportis conveniently
reproducedin J. C. Hurewitz,ed., TheMiddle East and NorthAfrica in WorldPolitics:
A DocumentaryRecord, vol. 2, British-FrenchSupremacy,1914-1945, 2d ed. (New
Haven, Conn., 1979), pp. 26-46.
30
Rothwell (n. 8 above), p. 287.
31 Dockrill and Goold (n. 4 above), pp. 133-34; Aaron S. Klieman, "Britain'sWar
Aims in the Middle East in 1915," Journal of ContemporaryHistory 3, no. 3 (July
1968): 242-45.
32 See pars. 21 and 22 of the report in Hurewitz, ed. A twofold "oil justification"
figures in par. 26: Baghdad is cited as a protective glacis for the existing interests of
Anglo-PersianOil Companyacross the frontier,"andoil again makes it commercially
desirablefor us to carryour control on to Mosul, in the vicinity of which place there
are valuable wells possession of which by anotherPower would be prejudicialto our
interests"(Hurewitz,ed., 2:30-32). See also Mejcher,"Oil and BritishPolicy towards
Mesopotamia" (n. 8 above), p. 378; and Kent, Oil and Empire (n. 8 above),
pp. 121-22.
33 Kedourieassertsthat the entire de Bunsen report "was never seriously examined
by the government"and that Grey ignored it. See his Anglo-Arab Labyrinth(n. 23
above), p. 104.
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 707
emphasizing the importanceof Mesopotamianoil as a British war aim (in
March 1916), the idea of awarding part of Mosul, the most promising
location of potential oil fields in Mesopotamia,to future French control had
alreadybeen accepted in Whitehall!This startlingdevelopmentsuggests that
in 1915-16 oil was hardly a determiningfactor when Whitehall envisioned
the shape of things to come in the Middle East.34
SOUGHT
BILATERALTALKSON PARTITION
WHYLONDON
Given that the de Bunsen report signaled the desirability of controlling
Mesopotamianoil, we have to ask why the British governmentsubsequently
agreed to assign part of the most likely oil-bearing area of Mesopotamiato
France. The answer is directly linked to the well-known negotiations then
under way between the British authorities in Egypt and Sharif Husayn of
Mecca, which the British had undertakenwith a view to inducing the Arab
leader to rise against the Turks.It was this initiative that caused London to
approachParisto requestofficial talks on the partitionof the OttomanEmpire.
Grey realized that the Frenchwere bound to hear rumorsof the negotiations
with Husayn and that they would likely conclude that ever-perfidiousAlbion
was scheming to supplantFrance'slong-standinginterestin Syria by creating
an Arab puppet regime. The foreign secretary (quite unlike Kitchener)had
always emphasizedthe political importanceof respectingFrance'straditional
ambitionsin the Levant.3sNow he wanted to head off a possible contretemps
throughtimely consultation.
On October21, 1915-the day after he had authorizedan official promise
of British supportfor a futureArabstate-Grey told CambonthatLondonwas
very worried about the situation in Persia and Afghanistan, where German
officers were stirringup Islamic feeling against the Entente. Faced with the
threat of impending insurgency, he explained, London had been trying to
foment some subversionof its own by encouragingthe Arabs to rise against
the Turks.Grey told Cambonin a general way about the correspondenceSir
Henry McMahonhad been conductingwith Husayn.Then he got to the point:
Husayn's ambitionsnecessitateda reconciliationof his territorialclaims to a
future "Arabia" with France's aspirations in Syria. Therefore Grey asked
Cambonto have Parissend over "a representativequalifiedto settle the extent
of Syria's borderswith Lord Kitchener."36
34
35
See Jones (n. 8 above), p. 194.
For Grey's caution about interfering with France's aspirations see Kedourie,
Anglo-ArabLabyrinth,p. 55; and Friedman(n. 26 above), pp. 100-102.
36 Cambonto MAE, two telegrams,both dated October21, 1915, in MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 177. Grey apparentlywent so far as to express the fear thatPersiamight
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708
Fitzgerald
THEINmALFRENCH
POSMTON
The Quai d'Orsaywas suspicious of London'smotives and saw complications
both in the idea of the revolt itself and in the political reward of an "Arab
kingdom"that Britainproposedto bestow on Husayn.37But these drawbacks
were offset by the tremendous advantage Grey's demarche offered: in
Cambon'swords, "It constitutesformal and official recognitionof our rights
to Syria." So two days after the foreign secretarymade his approach,Paris
accepted the British invitation to undertake talks on the partition of the
OttomanEmpire.38To conductthe negotiationsCambonrecommendedone of
his assistants,FranqoisGeorges-Picot,"who knows the Syrianquestionbetter
than anyone."39This was certainly an exaggeration, for Georges-Picot had
spent relatively little time in Middle Eastern postings. But he had the
advantageof already being on site (he was currentlya first secretaryat the
London embassy), and he enjoyed the confidence of his ambassador.He also
possessed a reputationas a forceful advocateof France'scolonial ambitionsin
enterthe war.It is temptingto conclude that all this talk aboutan Islamic rising against
the Allies was just a stratagemgot up for the occasion to induce the Frenchto consent
to an Arabstate.However,both Cambonand Georges-Picotformedthe impressionthat
the British genuinely believed this danger was imminent. Cambon believed that
General Sir John Maxwell (commander-in-chief,Egypt) and Sir Henry MacMahon'neither of them especially cool heads"-were the cause of the anxiety in London.See
Cambon to Briand, November 26, 1915, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178.
37 Some French officials worried that a reinforcement of Husayn's spiritual
authority might affect Muslim opinion in French North Africa: e.g., Jules-Albert
Defrance (chargein Cairo) to Delcasse, January3, 1915, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file
177. This dispatch also shows that French diplomats regardedBritain's strategy of
backing Husayn as a way of establishing a veiled British protectorateover the Hijaz
and Yemen. The Colonial Ministry was also suspicious of London's intentions and
wanted prior consultationto work out a common Entente policy on the Hijaz before
anythingfurtherwas done. Doumergueto Delcasse, January19, 1915, MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 177. These reservations must seem ironic in light of the fact that in
November 1914 French military headquartershad already put forwardthe idea of a
general rebellion among the subject peoples of the OttomanEmpire,and Husayn was
the leaderwhom the soldiersidentifiedas the best candidateto lead the Arabrising. See
Dan Eldar,"FrenchPolicy towardsHusayn, Sharifof Mecca," Middle EasternStudies
26, no. 3 (July 1990): 329-31.
38 "Arabie," an undatednote in MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 177, which summarizes the Anglo-Frenchpositions.
39 Cambon to Rene Viviani, second telegram, October 21, 1915, MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 177. Cambon was so confident of his choice that he had already
instructedGeorges-Picot to go to Paris to discuss this question with Prime Minister
Viviani, who had temporarily taken on the foreign affairs portfolio following
Delcasse's resignation.
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 709
the Middle East, so he was persona grata to the vocal colonialist lobby in
Paris.40
The Foreign Ministry's formal instructions to its special envoy (which
Georges-Picot actually drafted himself) called for him to argue that France
needed to be compensatedfor the disappearanceof its privileged position in
the OttomanEmpire. (This was a circular argumentof breathtakingproportions, for it was the Entente'spartitionof the OttomanEmpirethat was going
to bring about thatdisappearance!)Compensationwas to come in the form of
la Syrie int6grale,"GreaterSyria,"with dimensionssuitableto its name-and
to the requirementsof colonial parsimony:"This FrenchSyria must not be a
dwarf state [un pays etriquel set amidst much bigger foreign possessions,
eking out a precariousexistence within constrictedfrontiersand remainingan
onerouschargeon the metropolitanbudget. OurSyria needs extensive borders
that will make it capable of earning its own way." In practicethis meant the
inclusion of Palestineto the south and Cilicia to the north-a "greaterSyria,"
indeed.As for the easternfrontier,this was to run along the Taurusmountains
in the vilayets or mutasserifliksof Ma'muretul-'Aziz, Diyarbakir,and Van,
"thence to the south following the mountainswhich define the Tigris basin,
cutting across this river below [the town of] Mosul, ... and reaching the
Euphratesat the borderof the province of Zor, which will also remainin our
zone." This demarcationline, the instructionsnoted, would put copper, lead,
and other mineral deposits found in the area within the borders of a future
French Syria. Then, almost as an afterthought,the following sentence was
added: "It would also be desirableto have the mining regions aroundKirkuk
included in our zone, but it is to be feared that the English will refuse to go
along with us on this point." This oblique reference was the only partof the
French negotiatinginstructionsthat touched in any way on oil.41
40
Franqois-Marie-DenisGeorges-Picot, then forty-four years old, had served in
Copenhagen, Beijing, and in the Political and Commercial Affairs Division of the
Foreign Ministry.Put in chargeof the consulate-generalin Beirut at the end of January
1914, he was assigned to Cairo in November and then posted to London in August
1915. See Annuairediplomatiqueet consulaire de la RepubliqueFran9aisepour 1921
(Paris, 1921), pp. 222-23. For Georges-Picot'sposition as a strongbackerof la Syrie
integrale and his high standing among the imperial enthusiasts, see Andrew and
Kanya-Forstner(n. 4 above), pp. 74-75. Paris may have thoughtCambon'scandidate
was the right man for the job, but the choice of Georges-Picot was denounced by
Britain's Arab experts in Egypt. McMahon, who had met Georges-Picot during the
latter'sbrief stint in Cairo, cabled Grey that the French special representativewas "a
notorious fanatic on the Syrian question" (Wilson [n. 25 above], p. 233).
41 Briand to Georges-Picot, November 2, 1915, "Pourparlersavec les Anglais
concemant les limites de la Syrie," MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 177 (my emphasis).
Andrew and Kanya-Forstnercite Georges-Picot's handwrittendraft of these instruc-
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710
Fitzgerald
How FRANCEDECIDEDTO PRESSFORMOSUL
Grey suggested that the Anglo-Frenchtalks begin on Friday,November 19,
but the first meeting actually took place at the Foreign Office the following
Tuesday.42There Georges-Picot found himself faced by a seven-man interdepartmentalcommittee, with representativesfrom the Foreign, War, and
India offices, chaired by the Foreign Office's permanentundersecretary,Sir
ArthurNicolson. The French special representativepresented the territorial
demandshis instructionscalled for, including a claim to most of the territory
of the province of Mosul.43Nicolson expressed "some surprise"at the extent
of France's territorialappetite, and he pointedly questioned whether direct
controlwas necessaryin any case. He suggested thatthe Frenchmight well be
satisfiedwith a sphereof influencecarryingexclusive economic rights and the
real advantagesof indirect rule. In any case, Georges-Picotquickly realized
that the British were not interested in delimiting France's ambitions on the
ground.Rather,what Nicolson wanted was French supportfor a futureArab
state so that Britaincould hold out a concrete goal to Husayn.This point was
driven home as Nicolson pressed Georges-Picot to make clear to Paris "the
gravity of the danger" the Allies faced in the Muslim world, as well as to
tions (which they say is identical with the formal typescriptversion) to supporttheir
argumentthatthe Frenchenvoy had authorizedhimself to negotiatefor Mosul-a goal
that (they emphasize)he was confidentthe Britishwould not oppose. Theirimplication
is that Georges-Picot was referring to all of Mosul province (pp. 89 and 269, nn.
14-16). I have read those same instructionsin the different file cited above, and I
believe they show quite the opposite: namely, that Georges-Picot did not believe he
could obtain all of Mosul. Rather, what he hoped to get, as the quotations here
illustrate,was the town itself and the region to its north, not the entire province.
42 Grey to Cambon, November 17, 1915, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 177. The
Britishnegotiatingteam had alreadyconvened on November 13 to work out a strategy
for persuadingthe Frenchto accept the creationof an Arab state in Syria. See Wilson,
p. 231.
43 The French-language minutes have Georges-Picot drawing the southeastern
boundaryof the Frenchzone "following the mountainswhich delimit the Tigris basin,
cutting across this river at Kirkuk,and reachingthe Euphratesat the provincialborder
of Deir el Zor" (in MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178). The English language minutes
speak of a line runningeastwardfrom Zor, passing "to the south of Kirkuk,"and then
tuming north "to include the whole of the Mosul district" (as quoted in Wilson,
p. 1018, n. 32). This request for all of Mosul province does not contradict the
interpretationadvancedin n. 41 above. Like many negotiators,Georges-Picotfavored
a strategy of advancing maximum demands in order to have plenty of room for
subsequenthorse-trading:"Our task is to make our demands and [then] to abandon
ground only foot by foot if compelled to do so; that way we shall always have some
ground left" (as quoted in Andrew and Kanya-Forstner,p. 89).
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 711
explain to his superiorswhy a futureArab polity would serve the interestsof
both Britain and France in the Middle East.44
A week after this first meeting, Georges-Picot sent his impressions of the
situationin London, and of the possibilities it presented,to PierreJacquinde
Margerie,Nicolson's opposite number at the French Foreign Ministry.45He
began by emphasizingthe false pretensesunderlyingthe discussions:London
was not really concernedwith definingfutureterritorialboundariesin the Near
East; instead, the British wanted to persuade Paris to give up its aim of
colonial rule in Syria so that they could proffer statehoodto the Arabs "and
dazzle them with a dream."This said, the news was not all bad. The British
design did hold out potentialfor compensation:"If we accept the sacrificewe
are being asked to make, the English would be disposed to be rather
accommodatingas to our sphere of influence and the rights we could obtain
there."The Frenchspecial representativeemphasizedthe fact that the British
appearedto be in a panic (affoles) on account of the reportscoming in from
Egypt and Mesopotamia.46Because of this the Foreign Office wanted to
pursue the Arab negotiations quickly; his obvious advice was that "we need
to take advantageof this situation."Georges-Picotemphasizedthat a French
response must not be delayed-a point on which Cambonconcurred-and he
suggested a tactical line for the next round of negotiations. First, express
shock and indignation about London's "Arab kingdom" as a challenge to
France's well-established claims to all of Syria. Then, "after putting up just
enough resistanceto convince them of the need to alter their original plan, it
44 French-languageminutes of the meeting of November 23, 1915, MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 178. Historianswho have readthe English-languageminutespresentthis
meeting as a hostile confrontation, with an "adamant" Georges-Picot pressing
"staggering" demands leading to an "impasse" followed by the French envoy's
departurefor consultations with his government. (See Wilson, p. 231; Friedman,
p. 103; and Andrew and Kanya-Forstner,p. 92.) I have not seen the English version,
but the French-languageminutes convey only an atmosphereof forthrightdiscussion,
spiritedbut not hostile. To some extent these differentimpressionsmay be a matterof
tone, but it is simply not correctto maintainthat Georges-Picotquit London as a result
of this initial "confrontation."The fact of the matter is that Nicolson insisted that
Georges-Picot go back to Paris in order to convince the French authorities of the
seriousness of the political-militarysituationin the Middle East.
45 Margeriewas the Quai's directorof Political and CommercialAffairs and, until
Briand's restructuringof the top bureaucraticposts, the foreign minister's chef de
cabinet.
46 It is importantto recall that, in addition to their general perception of Islamic
unrest, the British at this time were also facing the anticipatedeffects on Muslim
opinion of two specific military reversals:the lengthening impasse at Gallipoli, and
General Charles Townshend'sretreatback to Kut after his expeditionaryforce was
batteredby the Turksat Ctesiphon.
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712
Fitzgerald
should be possible to get the English to designate the regions where they will
allow us to have exclusive economic and political privileges." In this way the
Frenchcould try "to keep the maximumamountof territoryoutside the Arab
kingdom and obtain the maximumnumberof privileges within the sphere of
influence that will be assigned to us." Georges-Picot ended by requesting
Margerieto pass his letter along to his deputy,Philippe Berthelot.If they both
agreedwith his approach,they were to send him official instructionsalong the
lines he had spelled out.47
While Georges-Picotwas writing to Margerie,Jean-EtienneGout, head of
the Asia and Oceania division at the Quai d'Orsay, was drawingup his own
appreciationof the situation. He expressed annoyance at the concept of an
Arab kingdom ("this strange proposal") and at the fact that the British,
"following their natural bent," wanted the French to "make the biggest
sacrifices."Gout neverthelesssaw thatpolitical and militarybenefits could be
gained from anArabrising, benefitsthatmightjustify Frenchacceptanceof an
Arab state. In his view the easternconfines of a French "greaterSyria" could
safely be placed, together with the British-zone provinces of Basra and
Baghdad,inside an Arabkingdom-provided thatthis futurestate was a weak
federation. In that case Husayn would be the mere nominal overlord of a
clutch of local emirs "advised" by French residents, who would be the real
powers behind the scene.48
Both Georges-Picot'snegotiating strategy and Gout's scheme for a "federal"Arab kingdom, including indirectFrenchrule in the province of Mosul,
were incorporatedinto the new instructions drafted for the French special
envoy. These instructionswere sent underBriand'sname but were obviously
47 Georges-Picotto Margerie,handwrittenletter,December 2, 1915, MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 178. Berthelot was one of the most influentialofficials in the Foreign
Ministry. He was Margerie's assistant, head of the European division, and the
minister's chef de cabinet. For his rise to prominence, see M. B. Hayne, The French
Foreign Office and the Origins of the First WorldWar,1898-1914 (Oxford, 1993),
pp. 124-26 and 259-60. A week afterhe wrote this letter,Georges-Picotcrossed over
to Paris to present Cambon's views on the talks and seek instructions.
48 "In this way we could set up, under a French protectorate,emirs of Damascus,
Aleppo, and Mosul, who would divide among themselves the present vilayets of
Damascus and Aleppo, plus the southern parts of Ma'muret ul-'Aziz, Diyarbakir,
Mosul, and Zor." Handwrittennote by "J. G.," December 2, 1915, MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 178. Ten days later Gout wrote anothermemo naming Husayn as the
nominal ruler and his sons as the local princes. Gout's plan was to ensure French
dominanceby playing the sons off against the father.See Eldar(n. 37 above), p. 334.
Jean-EtienneGout was a careerdiplomat,graduateof the Ecole des LanguesOrientales
vivantes, and head of the Foreign Ministry'sAsia and Oceania division since March
1914. (It is really "Gout,"by the way, not "Gout."This diplomatchose to go without
a circumflex;Andrew and Kanya-Forstnerare in errorwhen they supply him with one
in France Overseas.)
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 713
drawnup on the basis of Gout's analysis, probablyby Berthelot.49The French
negotiatingposition was to be as follows: althoughthe Arabkingdom concept
prescribed a sort of double sovereignty that was utopian and chimerical,
nevertheless "we must avoid annoying the English by stubbornlyadheringto
logical principles."Indeed, "it can actually be an advantageto have French
control set up on the fringes of our zone in the form of a protectoraterelying
on indirectrule throughlocal leaders."As in Gout's draftbriefingpaper,these
local princelings, including an "emir of Mosul," were to be managed by
French advisers.50 Then, in returnfor accepting the extravagantnotion of an
Arab federation under French protection on the borderlands of Syria,
Georges-Picotwas to lay out an argumentfor "compensation"-the elements
of which he had already developed in his December letter to Margerie:"A
lessening of our sovereigntyover inland Syria [i.e., giving up colonial control
for indirectrule] should be compensatedby an extension of our protectorate
over the Arab lands on its easternborders(Zor and Mosul), with the award of
the Kirkukoilfields also representingan element of this compensation."51 In
short, French acquiescence to the centerpiece of London's new Middle East
policy-a futureArab state for Husayn-was to be purchasedby extending
the zone of French control to include Mosul and, specifically, its oil-rich
southernportion.
Summarizingto this point, it is evident that France'sclaim to the province
of Mosul did not originate from a carefully laid plan to gain control of the
petroleumresourcesof upperMesopotamia.To the contrary,this claim was an
outcome of circumstanceratherthan design. The initial French demand for
part of Mosul province arose only afterAnglo-Frenchnegotiationshad been
proposedby London.That demandwas at first hardlyassociated with oil; nor
was it considered fully attainable. It was only when Paris grasped that
Britain'surgentdesire to sponsoran Arabrising had createdan opportunityto
put forward furtherterritorialdemands that the French advanced a serious
claim to all of Mosul province, including the promisingoil sites near Kirkuk.
49Cambon gave his view of Briand's work habits in a letter to his son on January
20, 1916: "Briand talks a lot and is a charming man, but he doesn't actually do
anything except cover himself against attacks from his cabinet colleagues and
parliament.He reads neither the dispatches that are sent to him nor those which
Berthelotsends out in his name." Paul Cambon,Correspondance,1870-1924 (Paris,
1946), 3:98.
50 It was admittedthat the emirs in Baghdad and Basra would have to have British
advisers.
51 Briand to Cambon, "Question de Syrie," December 14, 1915, MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 178 (my emphasis). Many passages from Gout's handwrittendraft
reappearalmost verbatimin this memorandum,which was typed on the notepaperof
his Asia and Oceania division. Passages from Georges-Picot's December 2 letter to
Margerieare also evident.
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Fitzgerald
TO FRANCE'SDEMANDFORMOSUL
LONDON'SREACTION
Fortified with his new instructions, Georges-Picot returnedto London on
December 15. His second meeting with the British negotiating team took
place six days later, this time with Sir Mark Sykes attending as a representative of the WarOffice.52Faithfulto his tacticalline, Georges-Picotpresented
France's acceptance of Arab sovereignty over some part of Syria as a
tremendoussacrificethatcried out for compensation.However,as most of this
second discussion dealt with Lebanon,the question of the inclusion of Mosul
and Kirkukin the French zone was set aside for future sessions.53
It was after this meeting that Sykes approached Georges-Picot with a
friendlyproposal.If he could obtainthe requisiteauthorization,Sykes said he
would like to hold private talks with the Frenchenvoy in orderto arriveat a
set of territorial compromises that could then be put before the whole
interdepartmentalcommittee. Nicolson gave Georges-Picothis assent to this
arrangement,and after that one-on-one meetings took place at almost daily
intervals in the French embassy.54 Unlike Cambon, Georges-Picot found
52
Sykes was a young Tory M.P. who had been honorary consul at the British
embassy in Istanbulin 1905-7 and had publishedthree travelbooks on the Near East
before the war.Throughconnectionshe got into the WarOffice as a lieutenantcolonel
detachedfor political work, and his ascent to policy-advising circles came as a result
of his appointmentto the de Bunsen committee, where he representedKitchener's
views and played an importantrole in shapingthe final recommendations.A witty and
charming man, outgoing and enthusiastic, Sykes was an engaging sort of person to
whom people took an immediate liking. His superficialityand penchant for grand,
improbableschemes became apparentonly afterlonger acquaintance.The professional
Arabistsin Cairo had a poor opinion of his abilities, and they especially resented his
pretensions to expertise on Middle Eastern affairs. See Bruce Westrate, The Arab
Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920 (University Park, Pa., 1992),
pp. 26-29 and 153; and Kedourie's impressionistic portrayalof Sykes's outlook in
Englandand the MiddleEast (n. 26 above), chap. 3. At the time of Georges-Picot'sfirst
meeting with Nicolson's committee,Sykes had been in Cairopromotinghis idea for an
"IslamicBureau"to coordinateMiddleEasternpolicy andpropaganda.He hadalso met
with Muhammadal-Farukito see if Arab nationalistswould be willing to make some
kind of compromiseto accommodateFrenchambitionsin Syria. See Kedourie,AngloArab Labyrinth(n. 23 above), p. 58; and Wilson (n. 25 above), pp. 227-30.
53 French-languageminutes of the meeting of December 21, 1915, MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 178. A British summaryof what was decided (reproducedin Tibawi [n.
26 above], pp. 112-13) also notes that "the allocation of the Mosul vilayet" was one
of the two points that the negotiatorsspecifically reserved for future discussion. The
descriptionof this meeting in Friedman(n. 26 above), pp. 105-6, becomes unintentionally funny once the readeris aware of the negotiating strategemsthe French had
decided on.
5 Georges-Picot to Cambon, January3, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178.
Accordingto the preface to the memorandumof understandingsigned by the two men
on January4, 1916, the initiative for private discussions came from Nicolson, an
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 715
Sykes understandingand easy to deal with, and the two men soon made considerableprogress.55But on the outstandingquestionof the dispositionof Mosul
province, Georges-Picotreportedthat he could not obtain full satisfaction:
[Uptill now]thequestionof exactlywhatzoneto assignto Franceeastof Zorhadbeen
didnot concealthathe was personallydisposed
kepton the shelf.Yetmy interlocutor
to approachthis issuein a conciliatoryspirit;andhe proposedto leaveus [northern]
Mosulby situatingthe frontieron the Big Zab river.But as for the regionaround
Kirkuk,Sykesprotestedthatany concessiontherewas out of the question.... This
fortheEnglishandtheywouldnot give it up.However,
regionwas ... indispensable
aftera long discussionhe agreedthatthe limitsof our zone couldbe fixed [farther
south]at theLittleZabriver.Inthatwaytheoil depositsat Sharqatwouldfall intoour
area as compensationfor droppingour demand [for Kirkuk].56
Sykes's first biographer, Shane Leslie, asserted that "giving Mosul to
France"was Sykes's own idea.57This interpretationcalls for two comments.
First, quite apartfrom the question of where the idea came from, it is critical
to understandthat Sykes's liberalityover Mosul was only partial:Kirkukand
the southernhalf of Mosul province were to stay in British hands. Second,
"giving Mosul to France" was part of a broader strategy whose premises
Sykes may have shared but whose conception was hardly unique to him.
Britain abandoned the de Bunsen committee's recommendationto claim
Mosul because of a fundamental fact of the "Great Game" in Asia. In
1915-16, as the Frenchdocumentsshow, it was anticipatedthat any partition
of the OttomanEmpire would award easternAnatolia to Russia. Given that
outcome, the extension of future French control eastwardthroughMosul to
the Persianfrontiermade sense to London because the French sphere would
constitute a buffer between the future British and Russian zones in the Near
East.58This is exactly what Sykes insisted that Georges-Picotaccept: "They
interpretationsupportedby Tibawi, p. 113. The account by David French, British
Strategy and WarAims, 1914-1916 (London, 1986), p. 147, misleadingly has Sykes
being broughtin to "replace"Nicolson.
s Cambon had initially regardedSykes as a spokesmanof the colonial hardliners
and believed that his presence would complicateratherthan expedite the negotiations.
Cambon to Briand, December 22, 1915, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178.
56 Georges-Picotto Cambon,January3, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178. At
no point in this discussion did Sykes mention oil as a reason for his resolve to keep
Kirkukin British hands.
S7 Shane Leslie, Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters (London, 1923), pp. 249.
According to Marian Kent, Sykes believed the French demand for Mosul stemmed
from the lobbying of a Frenchfinancialsyndicatethatwantedto build a railway across
Syria to Persia (Oil and Empire [n. 8 above], p. 122). See also Nevakivi (n. 4 above),
pp. 22 and 34; and Andrew and Kanya-Forstner(n. 4 above), pp. 94-95.
58 Kitchenerwas committedto getting a territorialarrangementthat would prevent
Anglo-Russian collisions, but Kent believes that it was General G. M. Macdonogh,
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Fitzgerald
[the British] considered that our presence there was necessary to provide a
guaranteeagainst the Russian threat and consequently was the precondition
for their abandonmentof Mosul. If we were to renounceit [northernMosul],
they would be forced to push on to where they could find a naturalfrontier
readily defensible against an invasion from the northand thus incorporatethe
territorythatthey had assigned to our zone. This was an absolutecondition of
their present offer."59Significantly,this was precisely the reason Berthelot
cited to explain why northernMosul was assigned to France: "As for Mosul,
it was the Britishin 1916 who pushedus with all theirmight to take it into our
zone. At that moment Imperial Russia still existed and they [the British],
following a buffer-statepolicy, wantedto position us between themselves and
the Russians in order to avoid any friction."60
SECURINGTHE AGREEMENT
With the Mosul hurdle overcome, both Georges-Picot and Cambon became
convinced that the Frenchhad gotten as good a deal as they were likely to get.
Their dispatcheseven show a certainmeasureof surpriseover how much the
British had conceded, especially along the Mediterraneancoast. Both saw no
reason to put off formal assent; indeed, they saw dangerin delay because the
Admiralty and the War Office, furious at Sykes's surrenderof the strategic
port of Alexandretta,wanted the agreementrevised.61 Georges-Picothad also
directorof militaryintelligence, who decisively pushed this position (Oil and Empire,
p. 122). In any case, Sykes could not but have been following WarOffice instructions
when he insisted that France take northem Mosul all the way to the Persian frontier.
5 Georges-Picotto Cambon,January3, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178 (my
emphasis). Sykes did requirea guaranteethat upstreamwater usage on the Tigris and
Euphrateswould not compromise the needs of the regions downstream.The India
Office viewed the abandonmentof northemMosul as an importanteconomic sacrifice;
nevertheless,it acceptedthis as a way of forestallingunspecifiedFrenchdemandsthat
it judged even more excessive. See Marian Kent, "Asiatic Turkey, 1914-1916," in
British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge,1977),
p. 449; also her Oil and Empire,p. 123.
60 Berthelot to "Cher ami," March 11, 1920, MAE, ser. E3, Relations commerciales, 1919-1940, B-Petroles, file 49. See also Briandto Cambon,February8, 1916,
A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178: "Moreoverit is possible that Russia will be happy to have
us as neighbors in this part of Eastem Asia [sic] so as to avoid direct contact with
England." It is interesting to recall that Georges-Picot had originally believed that
Britaincould be persuadedto give northemMosul to Franceprecisely for this reason.
See Andrew and Kanya-Forstner,p. 89, but also n. 41 above.
61 Cambonto MAE, telegram, January5, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178;
see also an unsigned memorandum, "Syrie," January 2, 1916. As Georges-Picot
pointedout, therewas anotherreasonto act quickly: "The English now seem in a hurry
to finish so that they can pursuetheir negotiationswith the Arabs, and nobody knows
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France's Middle EasternAmbitions 717
informed Cambonthat Whitehall was intent on obtaininga protectorateover
Palestine, including the port of Haifa. This was a serious storm cloud, but the
Quai d'Orsay chose to emphasize its silver lining: "In exchange England
would accept full French sovereignty over the vilayet of Beirut and the
inclusion of the Mosul region down to the Little Zab river in the French
protectoratezone." Moreover,as this memorandumwent on to point out, "it
is worthwhileto note that in the latterregion there are importantoil wells."62
By this time the permanentofficials at the Quai d'Orsaywere readyto agree
thatit was time to accept what theirnegotiatorsin Londonhad alreadygained.
For our purposes it is their view of what France was going to obtain in the
eastern reaches of Syria that matters. From Georges-Picot's remarks about
"the oil deposits at Sharqat"(see p. 715 above) and the "importantoil wells"
mentioned in the memorandumjust quoted, one could readily draw the
conclusion that the Quai d'Orsay believed France had won control of the
oil-bearing sites of upper Mesopotamia. But this was not the case, and
subsequentdocuments make it clear that both the officials in Paris and their
representativesin Londonunderstoodthat this was not the case. For example,
in a recapitulationof the territorialdispositions acceptedthus far, the Foreign
Ministryacknowledgedthat, in the area to be underthe nominal suzeraintyof
Husayn,the French sphere of influence would include "partof Mesopotamia
including Mosul, but boundedby the Little Zab river and thereforeexcluding
the oil-bearing region of Kirkuk."63And althoughCambongave weight to the
fact thatthe Britishhad compromisedon the Mosul region, he pointed out that
they had done so only "in reserving for themselves the area richest in oil
wells, i.e. Kirkuk;our zone stops at the Little Zab, a small streamwhich flows
into the left bank of the Euphrates."64
what surprisestomorrow'sevents might bring."Georges-Picotto Cambon,January3,
1916 (same file).
62 Unsigned memorandum,"Syrie," January2, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file
178. In The High Wallsof Jerusalem:A History of the Balfour Declaration and the
Birth of the British Mandatefor Palestine (New York, 1983), Ronald Sanders states
(pp. 307-8) thatSykes "surely"conceded Mosul to Georges-Picotin returnfor French
agreement to the "internationalization"of Palestine. Sanders does not supply any
proof of his assertion,but documentsin file 178 make clear thatthe Britishdid link the
assignmentof Mosul to the Frenchzone with an easing of France'sstandon Palestine.
the solution finally adopted,was a discreet way of saying that
("Internationalization,"
neitherpower could get the other to relinquishits claim to Palestine.)
63 Briand to Cambon, January 5, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178 (my
emphasis).
64 "Negociationsfranco-anglaises(Syrie et empire arabe),"undatedbriefingpaper,
MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178. Although the cover sheet is dated December 21,
1915, the contents show that this paper could not have been written before January
1916.
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Thus there can be no doubt that in January 1916 French diplomats
understoodthe exact territoriallimits of the British concession on Mosul and,
specifically, the implication of those limits for any future oil development:
namely, that a largerportionof promisingoil territorylay south of the French
zone. Furthermore,the Quai d'Orsay had no trouble accepting this outcome.
Although the Foreign Ministry did ask Cambon and Georges-Picot to try to
obtain some last-minutefrontieradjustments,it is highly significantthat none
of these desired revisions involved extending the bordersof the French zone
to include Kirkuk and its oil sites.65 Surely this is what the Quai d'Orsay
would have tried to do if oil had truly been a major French objective.
Sykes and Georges-Picotwere now allowed to draw up a draft memorandum of agreement,along with a map illustratingthe borderdelimitations.This
they signed on January4, 1916. Georges-Picot then crossed the Channel to
discuss the agreement with Prime Minister Briand and President Poincare.
Even afterthis Pariswanted some small frontieradjustments,and some bright
light there even came up with a brandnew requirement-the compensatory
cession of Cyprusto France!66Once this bizarrenotion was disposed of, the
Foreign Office circulatedthe Januarymemorandumof agreementto various
sister departmentsfor comment. These comments grew into a list of desired
65 Briand to Cambon, January 5, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178. The
French were much more interestedin a last-ditcheffort to have Palestine divided into
threezones. How little Mosul was valued by supposedlyinformedopinion is illustrated
by a resolution adoptedat a meeting of the Societe de Geographieon June 30, 1916.
This body had gotten word of the territorialdispositions of the Sykes-Picot accord
(doubtless through an intentional leak), and it protested against the separation of
Palestine from the future French Syria. It encouraged the government to continue
negotiations in order to get Palestine placed in the French zone. What is revealing is
the GeographicalSociety's advice on what to tradefor Frenchacquisitionof Palestine:
"partof our projectedexpansion into the distant and inaccessible region of Mosul."
Societe de Geographie, meeting of June 30, 1916, "Voeu edmis,"in MAE, A-Paix,
1918-25, file 174.
66 Cambon to Briand, January 18, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178. The
Frenchdocumentsgive no indicationof who was responsiblefor this harebrainedidea,
but it seems that someone in the governmenthad floated it when Georges-Picotwas in
Paris to brief the political authoritieson the accord. When he got back to London the
French envoy was left in -no doubt that the "Cyprus exchange" was a nonstarter.
Significantly,Sykes warned him that various departmentsin Whitehall were growing
daily more opposed to the terms of their agreementand that a wrangle about Cyprus
would sink the whole deal. Cambon reportedthat his confidential sources confirmed
this warning and noted that the opposition included the India Office, "which was
puttingforwardIndia's need for Mosul as a strategicfrontier."Cambonrecommended
thatthe Cyprusissue be dropped,and he convinced Paris to be satisfiedwith London's
promise that France could have a right of first refusal if ever the British decided to
leave that island. See Cambon to Briand, January20, 1916, same file.
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 719
revisions, and this delayed a final accord. More informaltalks were required,
including a visit by Georges-Picotto the WarOffice to deal with Kitchener's
objectionto the placementof the frontierbetween Syria and Palestine andhow
it might hinder constructionof a futurerailway between Haifa and Baghdad.
The Nicolson committee finally accepted the terms of the memorandumof
agreementon February4, albeit with the proviso "that everything remained
conditional on effective help from the Arabs and agreement from the
Russians."67 But once Petrograd assented, London, at least, would be
preparedto sign the accord.68As for the French, Georges-Picot returnedto
Paris on February 8 to defend the deal, but the government apparently
approvedthe agreementeven before he arrived.69
How FRANCE'SCLAIMTO MosuL WAS FURTHERQUALIFIED
Georges-Picot and Sykes now proceeded to Petrograd,where on March 10
they submittedan aide-memoireexplaining the agreementthey had reached.
The Russian government insisted on some modifications of the proposed
frontier(the mountainpasses aroundBitlis and Urmia Lake were to be under
Russian control),but otherwise acceptedthe accord as it stood.70This cleared
the way for final ratification.After Georges-Picot returnedfrom Petrograd,
Cambon wrote to the Foreign Office to request that an exchange of formal
letters of ratification not be put off. A string of procrastinatingresponses
convinced him that oppositionto the agreementremainedstrongin Whitehall,
67
Cambonto Briand,February5, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178. After this
final meeting Nicolson made a point of reiteratingto Georges-Picothow surprisedthe
British had been by the extent of the French demands:only London's desire to reach
a compromisehad led them to accept the memorandumof agreementas it stood.
68 Cambon to Briand, February 5, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178.
Interestingly,the territorialboundariesof the five zones called for in the accord were
delimitedon the accompanyingmap and not spelled out in the memorandumitself. The
only specific mention of Mosul came in Article 6(A), which stated that the Baghdad
railway would not be extended to the south beyond Mosul without the agreementof
both govemments. "Memorandumapprouvepar le Cabinetanglais" (undated),sent to
Briandwith Cambon'sdispatchof February5, 1916 (same file). In the discussion that
subsequently took place in Petrograd,it was emphasized that this article had been
included "from a desire to prevent the completion of Germany'sBaghdad railway."
"Aide-memoire,"Petrograd,March 10, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 179.
69
MAE to Cambon,February8, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 178.
70 With the proviso, of course, that Russia would obtain control of Istanbuland the
Straits.See "Aide-memoire,"Petrograd,March4/17, 1916; Count Sergei Sazanov to
MauricePaleologue,April 13/26, 1916, where the easternareasof the Frenchzone are
called "Arabie"; Paleologue to Sazanov, April 13/26, 1916; Paleologue to Briand,
April 26, 1916; all in MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 179.
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Fitzgerald
where "a tendentious campaign was being carried out by those who keep
saying that this accord will never become a reality and who openly wish for
its failure."7' For that reason Cambon decided to force the issue by tackling
the remainingBritish concerns head on. On May 9 he sent Grey a complete
restatement of the terms of the memorandum signed on January 4 and
subsequentlyapprovedin Petrograd,along with a covering letterproposingto
supply assurancesabout the British schools, hospitals, and business concessions thatfell into the Frenchzone.72Grey's reply asked for an explict French
pledge that "any existing British concessions, rights of navigation or
development, . . . will be maintained"in those areas.73Cambonimmediately
responded "that the French Governmentis ready to approve various British
concessions definitelyconcludedbefore the outbreakof the war in the regions
assigned to France or to French administration."74Satisfied with this
guarantee,Grey forwardedofficial Britishapprovalon following day, May 16,
along with a restatementof the entire accord.Acceptance was conditional on
these French assurances,as well as on "the cooperationof the Arabs."75
71
"The objections put forwardby various departmentsand the delays with which
they greeted my repeatedefforts demonstratedthat the enemies of the accord had not
given up.... On the one hand they cited the need to reach a prior agreementon the
futureof Britishmissions, schools, and hospitalslocated in the regions we will receive.
Then they expressed concern over the concessions awardedto British subjects there,
and about how parliamentwould make a fuss about the uncertaintyof their future
status." Cambon to Briand, May 17, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 174.
72 Cambon to Grey, May 9, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 174.
73 Grey to Cambon,May 15, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 174. Grey was of
course ready to extend a reciprocalguaranteeof existing Frenchinterestsin the future
British zone. According to Clemenceau'sclose collaborator,Andre Tardieu,the three
British firms which held 75 percent of the share capital of Turkish Petroleum
Company-National Bank of Turkey,Anglo-PersianOil Company,and Anglo-Saxon
Oil Company(a subsidiaryof Royal Dutch/Shell)-had vigorously lobbied the Foreign
Office for a guaranteeof existing concessions. See his article, "Mossoul et le pdtrole,"
in L'Illustration(June 19, 1920), p. 380. Kent, whose Oil and Empire (n. 8 above) is
generally well informed about such corporate pressures, does not inquire into the
origins of Grey's request for the guarantee(see p. 124).
74 Grey to Cambon, May 15, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 174 (also in file
179). Someone at the Foreign Ministry criticized Cambon's formula on the grounds
that he should have specified whether the phrase "ayant date certaine anterieurea la
guerre"meant before August 4, the beginning of the general war in Europe,or before
November 1914, the time of Turkey'sentry into the war. Unsigned handwrittennote,
May 25, 1916, in file 174.
75 Grey to Cambon, May 16, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 174 (copy in file
179): His Majesty's Government"[is] ready to accept the arrangementnow arrivedat,
provided that the cooperation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfill the
condition and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus and Aleppo."
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 721
The Foreign Office regardedthe Sykes-Picot accord without enthusiasm.76
Grey's eventual recognition of the bilateral agreementbegan by noting that
"the acceptance of the whole project, as it now stands, will involve the
abdicationof considerableBritish interests,"77and Cambon felt he had had
quite a difficulttime bringingthe Britishto the point where they would accept
the accord at all. But accept it they did, no doubt because they expected it
would be without consequences. Indeed, it is paradoxicalthat Grey, who had
originallypressed for a bilateralagreementon partition,now believed thatthe
whole business of "Arab cooperation"(and the futureArab state that would
emerge from it) was "a castle in the air which would never materialize."78As
for Britain's "loss" of Mosul, the foreign secretaryand his officials found that
particularpill easier to swallow because they were convinced nothing would
ever come of these hypothetical territorialarrangements.How wrong they
were!79
CONCLUSION
The argumentsand evidence put forwardin this article point toward a set of
conclusions that can be grouped under three headings.
76
Nevakivi (n. 4 above) believes that the Foreign Office viewed the accord as the
unfortunateprice London had to pay in orderto get Frenchconsent for furtherBritish
militaryoperationsin the Levant after the Gallipoli debacle (p. 38). Ratificationof the
Sykes-Picot accord did not silence the opposition in Whitehall. A campaign for
revision gathered strength as British forces reversed the military situation on the
ground in Palestine and Mesopotamia,and Lord Curzon's strong voice called for the
reopening of "that wretched Agreement." By the fall of 1918 many signals had
indicatedto ParisthatLondonregardedthe accordas a dead letter.See Nevakivi, chap.
3; Darwin (n. 8 above), pp. 153-54; and Erik Goldstein, "BritishPeace Aims and the
Eastem Question:The Political Intelligence Departmentand the Eastem Committee,
1918," Middle Eastern Studies 23, no. 4 (October 1987): 421-24.
77 Grey to Cambon,May 16, 1916, MAE, A-Paix, 1918-25, file 174.
78 Grey's words to Austen Chamberlain,then secretaryof state for India, as cited in
Dockrill and Goold (n. 4 above), p. 136.
79 See Kent, "Asiatic Turkey" (n. 59 above), p. 450. British military forces
occupied the town of Mosul and its northem approachesin the final days of the war,
therebygiving Britainpossession on the groundduringthe peace conference.Although
all of Mosul province was includedin the League of Nations' mandateof Iraq,the new
Turkish Republic vigorously advanced an irredentistclaim to the area, so London
became embroiledin a diplomaticwranglewith Ankara.In December 1925 the League
Council approvedan arbitrationawardthat confirmedIraq'spossession of Mosul. See
Peter J. Beck, " 'A Tedious and Perilous Controversy':Britain and the Settlementof
the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926," Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 2 (April 1981):
256-76.
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Fitzgerald
The Quai d'Orsay's initial
The origins of the French claim to Mosul.
approachto the partitionof the OttomanEmpiredid not call for Frenchcontrol
of Mosul, thoughit did envision thatthe borderbetween the futureFrenchand
British zones in Asiatic Turkeywould lie somewhere in northernMesopotamia. It was London's invitation to undertakeformal talks on partition that
caused Paris to redefine its territorialaims and advance a claim for the
province of Mosul. The Foreign Office had sought these talks because it
wantedFrenchassent to a futureArab state for Husayn.The French,although
hardly keen on Grey's "Arab kingdom," grasped that acquiescence would
provide an opening to extend their territorialdemands as "compensation."
This realizationwas the true origin of France's demand for Mosul.
After the war the
The importance of the oil factor for the French.
French governmentdevoted considerable attentionto the question of Mesopotamianoil, a fact that leads us to expect that the oil reserves of Mosul had
been an importantobject of wartime diplomacy.Yet the evidence shows that
on the eve of the Sykes-Picot talks Paris gave no special attentionto the oil
potential of the Mosul region, which was alluded to only in a general phrase
about "the Kirkukmining basin" (which, in any event, the French did not
expect they could obtain). This was so despite the fact that the Quai d'Orsay
possessed at least three detailed reports contending that the Mosul region
might be of considerablefuture worth as oil-bearing territory.
The "oil factor" came to play a minor role only after Paris understoodthat
London's perceived need for Arab supportallowed the French to up the ante
in the partition stakes. The new instructions given to Georges-Picot in
mid-December1915 reflectedthis, with theircall for an eastwardextension of
the areato be placed undera Frenchprotectorateas compensationfor agreeing
to nominal Arab sovereignty over inland Syria. French possession of the
Kirkuk oil sites was to be part of this compensation. But the Foreign
Ministry'sfiles show that even at this stage the petroleumpotentialof Mosul
figuredmore as an illustrationof the area's interest than as a cardinalobject
of policy.
In short,duringthe war Frenchdiplomacy was not strainingevery nerve to
obtain Mosul on account of its oil. Indeed, throughoutthe Sykes-Picot talks
there is no evidence that the Quai d'Orsay made any use at all of the detailed
information we know it possessed on the area's petroleum potential. This
negligence is not easy to understand.It is truethatthe oil riches of Mosul were
anticipated,not proven;it is also true that the strategicsignificanceof oil was
more apparentat the close of the war than it was in 1915-16. Yet even when
these qualifications are borne in mind, this relative disregard for the "oil
factor" remains an awkward testimonial to the limitations of the Foreign
Ministry's outlook.
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 723
Three reasons were
London'sacceptance of France's claim to Mosul.
involved here. First, Sykes was ready to agree because a "French Mosul"
dovetailed nicely with the traditionalaim of maintaininga buffer separating
areas of British and Russian influence in Asia. Second, contrary to what
almost all historiansof wartime diplomacy have written, the French did not
really "get Mosul" in the Sykes-Picot agreement.The province was in fact
partitionedat the Little Zab river;this meantthatthe known oil-bearingregion
to the south (the "Kirkukoilfields" referredto in Georges-Picot'sinstructions)
was excluded from the Frenchzone-an exclusion thatthe Frenchnegotiators
clearly understood.Third, London insisted that the agreementinclude reciprocal guarantees of existing business interests in the territorybeing partitioned. This meant that the Turkish Petroleum Company-the Britishcontrolledfirmthatclaimed to hold a monopoly concession from the Ottoman
governmentfor Mosul and Baghdad provinces-now enjoyed French diplomatic recognition of its legal rights even in the part of Mosul allocated to
futureFrench administration.80
In summary,it is inaccurateto say that the Sykes-Picot accord gave France
possession of a hard-woneconomic asset, "les petroles de Mossoul," which
Clemenceau nonchalantlygave away in 1918. Although Sykes-Picot had secureda Frenchdiplomaticclaim to Mosul, the areaBritainconcededcomprised
only the northernportionof the province,not the whole vilayet. Thatnorthern
portion included some of the areas where the presence of surface deposits
indicatedpotentialundergroundreserves, notablyAl-Qayyarah,Ash-Sharqat,
and Hammamal-'Alil.81 But the portionof Mosul province slated for British
control contained even more sites of this kind-for example, Tikrit, Tuz
Furthermore,the accord's
Khurmatu,Kifri, Sulaymaniyah,andJabalGurgur.82
provision for reciprocal guaranteesof existing concessions meant that Paris
would find it almost impossible to challenge Turkish Petroleum's right to
develop oil reserves everywherein Mosul province.
In short, whatever the two prime ministers actually said to each other in
London on that December afternoon,what Clemenceau gave up was a great
80
For the complex question of Turkish Petroleum's prewar concession and its
slender legal basis, see Kent, Oil and Empire,pp. 103-12.
81 Ash-Sharqatwas the only place the French seem to have specifically mentioned
during the negotiations.
82 All of these were among the places mentioned by Tassartin 1908. Although it
does not bearon the questionof Frenchperceptionsin 1915-16, geological luck would
have favored the British even if the Sykes-Picot partitionof Mosul province had been
maintainedafter 1918. The main postwar discovery came in the Jabal Gurgurfield to
the south of Kirkuk,and the only field of significancein the erstwhile "Frenchzone"
turnedout to be near Qayyarah.
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724
Fitzgerald
deal less than French ownershipof Mosul's oil fields. It was, at best, a claim
to about half of a promisingregion whose oil reserves, if actually discovered
and successfully developed, were going to be worked by a British firm even
if the producing fields fell within the French zone. Thus France's future
political and economic rights in northern Mesopotamia were really quite
circumscribed.This fundamentalfact cannotbe emphasizedtoo stronglyif we
wish to understandthe logic of the "Mosul cession."
It is not, however, the whole story.The limited natureof France'sclaim in
Mosul needs to be linked to the broaderpolicy context then being created in
France by the "cooperationist"views of Clemenceau's influentialtrade and
industryminister,EtienneClementel.Since 1916 Clementelhad been pressing
for the extension into the postwar period of inter-Allied controls over raw
materials.83Strong American opposition to any scheme involving administered marketsmeant that his ideas would not prevail at the peace conference.
But for our purposes we need to rememberthe authorityClementel's views
enjoyed in Paris during the last months of 1918. Indeed, by the end of
SeptemberClemenceauhad endorsedClementel's plan for creating a permanent inter-Allied economic bloc built around preferential tariffs and joint
controlover raw materials.This scheme was intendedto be the cornerstoneof
France's foreign economic policy after the war.84
Both the limited natureof France'sclaim to Mosul and the endorsementof
Clementel's cooperationistpolicies worked to convince Clemenceau's petroleum adviser,SenatorHenry Berenger,thatthe realistic route to a nationaloil
policy had to pass throughLondon and The Hague: London, where Berenger
hoped that the government could be persuaded to set up an Anglo-French
petroleum partnershipin Rumania, Persia, and the Middle East; and The
Hague, where Berenger knew that the ambitious Henri Deterding was more
than ready to have Royal Dutch/Shell provide France with the production
expertise its small domestic companies so conspicuously lacked. These two
postulates shaped Berenger's public statementsin London after an important
83
For Clementel's approachto postwar economic planning and the central place
that administered markets for raw materials occupied in his scheme, see Marc
Trachtenberg," 'A New Economic Order':Etienne Ciementel and French Economic
Diplomacy during the First World War," French Historical Studies 10, no. 2 (Fall
1977): 315-41, esp. 319-20, as well as his Reparationin WorldPolitics: France and
European Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923 (New York, 1980), pp. 1-10. See also
Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modem France (Cambridge, 1981),
pp. 43-47; and Dan P. Silverman, Reconstructing Europe after the Great War
(Cambridge,Mass., 1982), p. 17.
84
Trachtenberg,"Clementel and French Economic Diplomacy," pp. 329-31.
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France's Middle Eastern Ambitions 725
roundof inter-Alliedoil negotiationsduringNovember.85Assuredly they also
figuredin the private conversationsBerengerhad with Clemenceauwhen he
got back to Paris. Two weeks later the Frenchprime ministermet with Lloyd
George and "gave away" Mosul. Truthto tell, there was less for him to give
away than historians have traditionallythought. French oil firms possessed
neither the technical capacity nor the marketingchannels needed to exploit
Mosul's oil fields on their own, and in any case the terms of the Sykes-Picot
accord had foreclosed on their legal right to do so.
As things turned out, Berenger's vision of an Anglo-French petroleum
partnershipwas realized only in Iraq, where France became Britain'sjunior
associate in the developmentof the Kirkukfield. Although that denouement
lay several years in the future,the point to underlinehere is that Berenger's
oil strategy had already ceased to be based on the principle of territorial
possession by the end of 1918. That fact also forms part of the historical
context within which the puzzle of the "Mosul cession" finds a logical
explanation.
85
Henry Berenger was in Britain from November 16 to 23 for the Inter-Allied
PetroleumConferencethatwas convened a fortnightbefore Clemenceau'sofficial visit
to London. He held several talks, particularly with Walter Long, dealing with
"questionsrelatingto our oil policy and to such agreementsas it might be possible to
make, notably with the British Government,concerningjoint exploitationof various
oilfields." Berenger to Pichon, "Note no. 2 sur la politique franqaisedu petrole et la
paix," MAE, E-Levant, 1918-40, Irak, vol. 32 (my emphasis). Berenger's florid
speech at the closing banquetpraisedAllied economic collaborationand called for its
extension into the postwarperiodin the form of cooperativecontrolover raw materials.
He linked this goal to the League of Nations ideal-an astute maneuverto drape a
Wilsoniancloth over Clementel'spolicy. See his book, Le petrole et la France (Paris,
1920), p. 179.
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