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Fiscal Policy and Public Expenditure
Santiago Herrera
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS AND
MANAGEMENT COURSE
March 2005
Outline
I. The Government’s budget identity
II. Expenditure: composition, efficiency and growth
impact
III. Taxes and growth-optimal size of the expenditure
IV. Financing the budget-debt sustainability analysis
in practice
V. Policy coordination: fiscal, monetary, exchange
rate and public debt policies
I. The Government’s Budget Identity
Uses = Sources
Gt  it Bt 1  Et i Ft 1
*
Uses :
Sources:
Tt  Bt  Bt 1   E t Ft  Ft 1   M t  M t 1 
Government’s Inter-temporal Budget
Constraint
Today’s debt stock = NPV of (primary surplus + seigniorage revenue)

Dt   ( St i  M t i ) /
i 1
where
St i  Tt i  Gt i
Dt  Bt  Et Ft
i 1
Rt
II. Public spending:composition,
efficiency, and growth impact
Objectives of public expenditure:
Efficiency in resource utilization
Economic growth
Equity of income distribution and social stability
A. Cost-Benefit analysis
B. Measuring effciency
C. Growth impact
A. Costs Benefits Analysis
• Rationale for public intervention
– Redistribute income
– Correct market failure/positive externality
– Greater supply of goods than private-sector provision
• Objectives and Targets
• Valuing costs
– Additional fiscal burden
• Source of funds to cover costs – borrowing vs. taxation
• Marginal cost of public funds
– Sustainability – Macroeconomic Stability
• Valuing benefits
– Comparing with a counterfactual
Net present value of geothermal project in the
Philippines with different marginal cost of funds
NPV
40
US m
29.7
20
0
1.0
-20
1.20
1.40
1.60
-11.3
-40
-60
-52.3
-80
-100
Source: Devarajan, et.al. (1997)
-93.3
BOX 2: ROAMEF CYCLE
Source: The Green Book, HM Treasury
B. Measuring Efficiency of Public
Spending
• Nonparametric Approaches: (Deterministic or
Stochastic)
– FDH (Free Disposable Hull)
– DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis)
• Parametric Approaches: (Deterministic or
Stochastic)
– Corrected OLS
– Stochastic Frontier
Parametric Approach: Stochastic Frontier
- An Illustration
140
Primary Enrollment vs Education Expenditure
BRA
CPVGAB
GNQ
PER
120
MWI
60
80
100
UGAT GO
CHN
BLZ
KNA
ARG ZAF
FJ
I
NAM
NPL
T UN
LAO
DOM
PHL
RWA
LSO
LCA
RUS
MEX
COL
T
ON
PRY
GUY
BOL
IDN
URY
LKA
KHM
VNM
PAN
DZA
SWZ
HND
BLR
VUT
MUS
LBN
CRI
SLV
SYR
ZWE
T J KKGZNIC
ROM
HUNBWACZE
CHL
SVK BHR
T
T
O
VCT
BGRWSM
LT U
MKD
MAC
EST
DMA
POL
IND
J AM
LVA
MYS
MDG SLB
AZE
KOR
KAZ
MNG
BGD
GT
M
BHS
MAR
J
OR
GRD
IRN
GEO
CMR
ARMUZB
T HA HRV
ARE
BENKEN
MDA
MOZ MRT
OMN
COM
UKR
ZMBGMB
COG
GHA
PNG
YEM
CIV
SEN
PAK
GNB
T CD
SLE
TCAF
ZA AGO
GIN
BDI
ERI
SDN
ET H
MLI
BRB
KWT
SAU
40
BFA
DJ I
NER
0
200
400
600
Public Expenditure on Education
Inefficiency
Data Source: World Bank WDI
800
Efficiency Frontier
1000
Methodology: Concept of Efficiency
X2/Y
Y
T
R
P
S
Y’
O
• Technical Efficiency: TE = OR/OP
• Allocative Efficiency: AE = OS/OP
X1/Y
Methodology: FDH
D
Output
E
C
A
YA
YB
B
O
XA
XB
Input
 Input Efficiency for country B: XA/XB
 Output Efficiency for country B: YB/YA
Non-parametric Approach: FDH – An Illustration
140
Primary Enrollment vs Education Expenditure
BRA
CPVGAB
MWI
120
GNQ
60
80
100
PER
UGAT GO
CHN
BLZ
KNA
ARG ZAF
FJI
NAM
NPL
T UN
LAO
DOM
PHL PRY
RWA
LSO
RUS
COL T ONMEXLCA
IDN
LKA BOL GUY URY PAN
KHM
VNM
DZA
SWZ
HND
BLR
VUT
MUS
LBN
CRI
SLV
SYR
ZWE
T JKKGZNIC
ROM
HUNBWACZE
CHL
SVK BHR
T
T
O
VCT
BGR MKD
LT U
MAC
EST
WSM
DMA
POL
IND
JAM
LVA
MYS
MDG
SLB
AZE
KOR
KAZ
MNG
GT M
BGD
BHS
MAR JORIRN
GRDT HA HRV
GEO
CMR
ARM
UZB
ARE
BENKEN
MDA
MOZ MRT
OMN
UKR
ZMB COM
COG
GMB
GHA
PNG
YEM
CIV
SEN
PAK
GNB
T CD
SLE
TCAF
ZA AGO
GIN
BDI
ERI
SDN
ET H
MLI
BRB
KWT
SAU
40
BFA
DJI
NER
0
200
400
600
Public Expenditure on Education
Data Source: World Bank WDI
800
1000
Methodology: DEA
CRS
F
D
Output
N
Y
VRS
V
C
A
B
VRS
O
X
Input
Country C: Efficient by FDH, but inefficient by DEA
Peers of country C: A and D
Country D: inefficient by CRS DEA, but efficient by VRS DEA
DEA Efficient Frontier: Primary Enrollment
140
Primary Enrollment vs Education Expenditure
BRA
CPVGAB
MWI
120
GNQ
60
80
100
PER
UGAT GO
CHN
BLZ
KNA
ARG ZAF
FJI
NAM
NPL
T UN
LAO
DOM
PHL
RWA
LSO
LCA
RUS
MEX
PRY COL T ON
IDN
LKA BOL GUY URY PAN
KHM
VNM
DZA
SWZ
HND
BLR
VUT
MUS
LBN
CRI
SLV
SYR
ZWE
T JKKGZNIC
ROM
HUNBWACZE
CHL
SVK BHR
T
T
O
VCT
BGR MKD
LT U
MAC
EST
WSM
DMA
POL
JAM
LVA
MYS
MDG IND
SLB
AZE
KOR
KAZ
MNG
GT M
BGD
BHS
MAR JORIRN
GRDT HA HRV
GEO
CMR
ARM
UZB
ARE
BENKEN
MDA
MOZ MRT
OMN
UKR
ZMB COM
COG
GMB
GHA
PNG
YEM
CIV
SEN
PAK
GNB
T CD
SLE
TCAF
ZA AGO
GIN
BDI
ERI
SDN
ET H
MLI
BRB
KWT
SAU
40
BFA
DJI
NER
0
200
400
600
Public Expenditure on Education
Data Source: World Bank WDI
800
1000
An important factor of production (public spending) is
used more intensively in the relatively richer countries
8
Edcation Spending vs GDP per capita
2
4
6
KWT
SAU BRB
MAC
EST
CZE
ZAF HUN
BWA
KOR
ARG
POL
NAM LVA MYS
KNA
BHS
SVK
OMN BHR
T
UN
LCA
ARE
LT
U
CRI
HRV
VCT
MUS
MEX
DMA
T
ON
TGRD
HA
O AT G
ZWE
BLZ
PAN
BRAT TCHL
FJI
IRN
VUT JOR
COL
SWZ
MKD
DZA
BLR
RUS
URY
LSO
JAM PRY
GAB
WSM ROM
CPV
GUY
BGR
MARUKR
KAZ
PER
PHL
GNQ
BOL
SYR LBN
SLV DOM
HND
UZB
SDN
MDA
MNG
NIC
AZE
IND
LKACHN
GHA
SLBARM
CIV
T GO
DJI
COM
MRT
YEM KEN
GT M
SENGMB
KGZ CMR
PNG
AGO
VNM
IDN
GEO
PAK
NPL
BGD GIN
LAO
KHM
ERI
UGA
ET H
BENRWA
MWI
BDI
CAF
MOZ
MLI
MDG
T CD
NER
TZMB
JK
GNB BFA
T ZA
SLE
0
COG
6
7
8
lgdp
ledu
9
10
Linear prediction
Public Expenditure on Education and GDP per capita (both in logs)
600
Correlation: Learning Scores and Average Years of School
SGP
T WN
500
SVN
MYS
CUB
400
KEN
T ZA
MOZ
300
Learning Scores
T HA
ARG
CHL
PER
PRY
KWT
PHL
MUS
ZWE
CMR
UGA
ROM
MEX T T O
JOR
T UN
IRN
BRAT UR
IDN
BOL
COL
DOM
HND
KOR
HKG
HUN
SVK
CZE
BGR
POL
SWZ
BWA
ZAF
MLI
LSO
200
SEN
ZMB
MWI
NER
0
2
4
6
Average Years of School
8
10
600
Data Source: World Bank WDI & Crouch and Fasih (2004)
Correlation: Learning Scores and Net Secondary Enrollment
KOR
CUB
ROM
MDA
T T O MKD
J OR
T UN
IRN
BRAALB ARG
400
MEX
DOM
IDN
PRY
T UR
BOL CHL
COL
PER
KW T
VUT
SYC
KEN
300
T ZA
MAR
SW Z
MOZ
MDG
PHL
ZW E
BLZ
MUS
BW A
BFA
ZAF
LSO
NAM
200
Learning Scores
500
SVK
MYS
HUN
CZESVN
BGR
LVA POL
LT U
NER
0
20
40
60
Net Secondary Enrollment
Data Source: World Bank WDI & Crouch and Fasih (2004)
80
100
600
Learning Scores vs Education Expenditure
HUN
SVK
RUS CZE
500
BGR
POL LVAMYS
LT U
ROM
TT O
400
IDN
CHL
MDA
J OR
IRN
T UR ARG
BRA
PER
T HA
MEX
MKD
PRY
COL HND
T UN
BOL
KWT
VUT
300
MUS
KEN
BLZ
SWZ
PHL
T ZAMAR
CMR MOZ
MDG
UGA
BFA
BWA
CIV
MLI
ZMB
SEN
MWI
200
ZWE
ZAF
LSO
NAM
NER
0
100
200
300
Orthogonalized Public Expditure on Education
Data Source: World Bank WDI & Crouch and Fasih (2004)
400
600
500
NLD
HUN
SVK
AUS
CZE
RUS
GBR
DEU BGRUSA
ESP
400
GRC
300
CAN
CHE
MYS
POLLVA
AUT
FRA
SWE
FIN
ISL NZL
NOR
IT A
LT U
T HA
PRT
ROM
MDACYP
T T OMEX
MKD
J OR
T UN
ARG
TBRA
UR IRN
IDN
CHL
COLPRYBOL
KWT
DOM
PER HND
VUT
MUS
KEN
BLZ
MAR
T
ZA
CMR
MOZ
MDGSWZ
UGA
ISR
PHL
BFA
CIV
MLI
ZMB
SEN
MWI
200
Learning Scores
Learning Scores vs Education Expenditure
ZWE
BWA
ZAF
LSO NAM
NER
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Orthogonalized Public Expditure on Education
Data Source: World Bank WDI & Crouch and Fasih (2004)
1600
DNK
C. Public Expenditure Composition and
Growth
Question – What’s impact of public spending
composition on growth?
• Re-allocation decisions among Infrastructure,
Education, Health, and Transfers
• Financing decisions for expenditure change – debt
or tax, or or different types of tax instruments
• Permanent vs. transitory expenditure changes
Modeling approach
• Question: Effect of public expenditure on growth
• Building blocks of the model economy based on
some principles that allow replication of key
features (growth, transfers, debt accumulation)
• Experiments
a. Allocation decisions: Change compositions and
compare with SS
b. Financing decisions: debt vs. taxes; or different
types of tax instruments
c. Permanent vs. transitory expenditure changes
Building blocks
• Preferences (types of agents, consumption,
unproductive government expenditure)
• Technology- Explicit relationship between
inputs and output; productive government
expenditure)
• Resource constraints (public and private
sectors)
Building blocks (Glomm-Rioja)–Preferences
Individual s live 2 periods :
Work in period 1. Retired in period 2.
• Consumer’s utility maximization problem
max
s.t.
ln( 1  nt )  ln ct ,t   ln ct ,t 1
ct , t  st  (1   L, t ) wt ht
ct , t 1  (1  (1   K , t )rt 1 ) st  Tt 1
Solution leads to optimal savings and labor supply
decisions.
Building blocks -Technology
Production Function :
Yt 


1
AGt K t H t
Y : Output
A : Productivity parameter
G : Public capital
K : Private physical capital
H : human capital
Building blocks-productive government
expenditure
• Human capital production function



ht  Bnt Et 1ht 1
Laws of motion:



H t  Bnt Et 1H t 1
Gt 1   G ,tYt
Building blocks-Fiscal policy
Dt 1   L, t wt H t   K , t rt K t  ( G, t   E , t  T , t   P, t )Yt  (1  rt (1   K , t )) Dt
where public expenditure (as % of GDP)
-
on infrastructure
on education
on transfers
on other non-utility enhancing public service
Tax rate
- on labor income
- on capital (interest) income
rt  rt 
Dt
R( Y
t
)
G ,t
 E ,t
 T ,t
 P,t
 L ,t
 K ,t
Building blocks- The steady state
•
Competitive equilibrium conditions
–
–
–
–
–
The household utility maximization problem is solved.
The representative firm’s profits maximization problem is
solved.
The government budget constraint is satisfied.
The goods market clears
The competitive input markets clear
– Permanent increase in expenditure financed by debt
Increase in expenditure (Perm anent 1% of GDP, financed by debt)
GDP growth rate (%)
3.50
3.25
3.00
2.75
2.50
2.25
2.00
1.75
0
1
2
3
Period
Benchmark
Transfer
Education
Infrastructure
–Temporary increase in expenditure financed by debt
Increase in expenditure (Tem porary 1% of GDP, financed by debt)
GDP growth rate (%)
3.50
3.25
3.00
2.75
2.50
2.25
2.00
1.75
0
1
2
3
Period
Benchmark
Transfer
Education
Infrastructure
– Permanent increase in expenditure financed by tax
Increase in expenditure (Perm anent 1% of GDP, Financed by tax)
GDP growth rate (%)
3.50
3.25
3.00
2.75
2.50
2.25
2.00
1.75
0
1
2
3
Period
Benchmark
Transfer
Education
Infrastructure
Income per capita
- Permanent Expenditure Reallocation (1% of GDP)
Reallocation in expenditure (Permanent 1% of GDP)
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
0
1
2
3
Period
Benchmark
From Transfers to Education
From Transfers to Infrastructure
From Education to Infrastructure
Income in base year: $4500 for Brazil, constant 1995
III. How much government expenditure? a
simple model and international comparison
• The model (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995)
• Production function of the economy :
Yt= AtF(K, N, G) or Y=AL1-KG1-
• Government Budget constraint : G=Y
• Representative individual maximizes a utility
function subject to a budget restriction
Public expenditure has two opposite effects
on growth rate of consumption of
• One positive effect derived from larger
government services
• One negative effect due to the after-tax
marginal product of capital
The simple estimate of the optimal size
of government expenditure
g

From this simple model we obtain:
• The maximum growth rate is achieved for
= G/Y=1-
• Indicators of productiveness or unproductiveness
of government services
( dy/dg>0 ?)
• The degree of over-provisioning or underprovisioning of public capital
Atf1< r+d+n
Implications of Maintenance in Public Capital
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Aggregate Production Y=AL1-KG1-
Kt  I t  (1   k ) Kt 1
Private capital
M
Gt  I Gt  [1   G ( )]Gt 1
Public capital
Y
Maintenance expenditure
M  Y
I g  (1   )Y
New public investment
Government Budget constraint M  I g  Y
 Optimal tax rate that maximizes growth
1
 
1   *
*
Does government expenditure (as a ratio to
revenue) conform to international experience?
The same holds when private investment is
used as a metric
Ratio of Public to Private Investment
Ratio of Public to Private Investment
1 .20
1.04
Ratio of Public to Private Investment
1 .00
0 .8 1
0 .80
0 .6 7
0 .5 9
0 .60
0.45
0.40
0.3 9
0 .40
0 .36
0 .2 9
0 .22
0.2 1
0 .2 1
0.20
0.17
0 .20
0.2 4
0 .2 1
0.20
0.14
0 .10
0.09
0 .00
ARG
BRA
CHL
COL
CRI
EST
HRV
IND
LVA
MDA
PER
PHL
POL
RUS
SVN
THA
TUR
URY
VEN
ZAF
The ratio between capital and current expenditures.
Expenditure composition is a matter of concern
Ratio of Government Capital to Current Expenditure
ARG
Ratio of Capital to Currrent Expenditure (%)
BHR
BRA
80 .0
CAN
CHL
COL
CRI
70 .0
67.1
CZE
EST
HRV
60 .0
HUN
IND
KAZ
LTU
50 .0
46 .1
LVA
MDA
NZL
40 .0
PER
PHL
POL
29.7
30 .0
ROM
25 .5
RUS
22. 3
18 .9
20 .0
13. 0
11. 6
11.0
10.2
9. 9
9 .9 9.9
8.1
7 .2 7.7
7.2
SVK
SVN
13 .2
THA
10 .7
1 0.1
TUR
8.7
7 .8
7 .3
URY
5 .0 4.7
4.7
2.7
2.5 1.7
5.1
USA
VEN
ZAF
VNM
VEN
USA
URY
TUR
THA
SVN
SVK
SGP
RUS
ROM
POL
PHL
PER
MDA
LVA
LTU
KAZ
IND
HUN
HRV
EST
CZE
CRI
COL
CHL
CAN
BRA
VNM
BHR
0 .0
SGP
17 .5
NZL
10 .0
ARG
capcur (%)
44.5
ZAF
IV. Debt sustainability and productivity of
capital expenditures
• The traditional debt dynamics equation
 e     1  e i 
rg

bt 1  
f t 1  st

1  g 1   
 1  g 1    
*
T
b
t
1. Debt targeting- S instrument of fiscal policy
2. “Fiscal space”-productivity of public capital
Revised debt dynamics equation, with current
and capital expenditures disaggregated
T
b
t
 e     1  e i * 
 (r  d )   
rg
c
 k t 1

bt 1  
f t 1  st  

1  g 1   
 1  g 1    
 1 g 
r+d= rental price of public capital
p = marginal productivity of public capital
Policy coordination: fiscal, monetary,
exchange rate and public debt management“fiscal space” considerations
under liquidity constraints-Brazil 2002
•
1.
2.
3.
Features of Brazilian public debt
Mostly domestic
Short maturity and duration
Indexed to the exchange rate or to short
term interest rates (Selic)
4. Concentrated holders (mutual funds, few
banks)
Public debt jumps in 2001 as currency
depreciates (Argentina crisis unfolding)
4.0
68
3.6
64
3.2
60
2.8
56
2.4
Public Debt (right scale)
52
2.0
48
1.6
44
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
% of GDP
Reais/dollar
Exchange Rate
The primary surplus falls. The presidential
campaign is no fertile ground for fiscal adjustments.
Primary Fiscal Balance of the Public Sector 2000-2003
(as a percentage of GDP)
4.8
4.4
4.0
3.6
3.2
2000
2001
2002
2003
Brazilian Spreads and Exchange Rate
Jan 2000 – April 2003
Capital Flows to Brazil
(ratio to international reserves)
B r a z i la i n S p r e a d s a n d E x c h a n g e R a t
4.0
.3
2800
$ R /U S
E x c h a n g e r a te
(left scale)
3.6
b ps
.2
2400
.1
3.2
2000
.0
2.8
1600
-.1
2.4
1200
-.2
2.0
800
-.3
S o v e r e in g s p r e a d
1.6
2000
400
2001
2002
2003
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
Public debt sustainability concerns causes a run on
mutual fund “deposits”
Net Resource Flow to Mutual Funds
(as a fraction of net worth)
.06
.04
.02
.00
-.02
-.04
-.06
-.08
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
The central bank was forced to print money to
redeem public debt
Money Base as a Share of
GDP
(seasonally adjusted data
Monetary Impact of
Treasury’s
Operations 1999- 2003
(ratio to the monetary base
.4
5.0
.3
4.5
.2
4.0
.1
3.5
.0
3.0
-.1
2.5
-.2
2.0
-.3
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Monthly Inflation Rate in Brazil 20002003
6
Seignorage from Money Creation
2000-2003
(% of GDP)
2.5
5
2.0
4
1.5
3
1.0
2
0.5
1
0.0
0
-0.5
-1
2000
2001
2002
2003
2001
2002
2003
Exchange rate and interest rates adjust after
the fiscal commitment is certain.
4.4
Reais/dollar
4.0
28
%
26
Exchange rate
3.6
24
3.2
22
2.8
20
2.4
Selic
(right scale)
2.0
1.6
18
16
14
2000
2001
2002
2003
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