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“A Cold Day for Britain” by Milton Friedman Newsweek, 27 November 1972, p. 87 ©The Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC The wage and price freeze just imposed in Britain is almost a duplicate of the freeze that President Nixon imposed in the U.S. on August 15, 1971. But the circumstances under which prices were frozen are very different. As a result, the two actions will have very different results. When President Nixon froze prices and wages, inflation was already receding in the U.S. The rate of rise of consumer prices had come down from nearly 7 percent in early 1970 to less than 4 percent in mid-1971. Inflation has continued to recede since, but the further improvement has been less than in the year and a half preceding the freeze. The reduction in the pace of inflation was produced by the monetary and fiscal policies followed in 1969 and 1970—slower monetary growth reinforced by slower growth in government spending. These policies held down the increase in total spending which, in turn, put a damper on inflation, but also produced as an undesirable by-product the recession of 1970. There was no other effective way to stop the accelerating inflation that President Nixon had inherited. The price freeze and the subsequent wage and price controls seemed to me, at the time, a mistake, and I am of the same opinion still. Yet, in their defense, it can be said that they worked with, not against, the trend of the basic economic forces. Indeed, one of my major objections to them—and one that has loomed ever larger since—is that they would be given credit for results that were attributable to other forces, and that, in consequence, the public would be misled into believing that they really are an effective way to halt inflation. The U.S. episode was highly unusual. Price and wage controls have almost never been introduced when inflation and the excess demand producing it were tapering off. They have almost always been introduced under precisely the opposite conditions, to try to offset inflationary monetary and fiscal policies when the political will was lacking to change the monetary and fiscal policies themselves. That is the current British situation. After tapering off from mid-1971 to mid-1972, inflation then started to accelerate rapidly—to a current rate of about 8 percent. The quantity of money has been on an explosive course. The narrowly defined money supply (currency and demand deposits), which was almost constant in 1969, has been rising at a 16 percent rate in the past six months; the broadly defined money supply (including time and savings deposits), which rose at a rate of 3 percent in 1969, has been rising at a 24 percent rate in the past six months. Government spending and deficits have similarly been growing rapidly. It is one thing to freeze prices and wages when inflation is proceeding at a 3 to 4 percent rate and is already coming down. It is a very different thing to freeze them when inflation is proceeding at an 8 percent rate and heading still higher. Even if the freeze were accompanied by a drastic reduction in the rate of monetary growth and in government spending and deficits, it would be 1 working against the underlying forces, since it takes many months before a change in monetary and fiscal policy can check an accelerating inflation. Yet in that case, there would at least be some restraining forces in the background. So far, however, there is little sign—outside of brave talk—that the Conservative government is prepared to reinforce the freeze with effective monetary and fiscal restraint. Britain has been through all this before—during and after World War Two, when price and wage controls were used in an attempt to suppress the inflation arising from wartime spending, financed largely by increasing the money supply. That attempt to bottle up excess demand produced shortages, queues, and rationing. Indeed, they were so prominent that the riddle went around: “Other nations have their national flags, national mottoes, national flowers; Britain is the only Western nation that has a national letter. What is it?” Answer: “Q.” Britain is on its way to repeating that experience —unless the freeze and controls collapse entirely in the next few months, as they well may. It is hard to find the silver lining in this dark cloud. But perhaps the British experience will shock the public out of the view—which the U.S. freeze has done so much to spread—that controls are an effective—or at least harmless—way to curtail inflation. ____________________________________________________________________________ Compiled by Robert Leeson and Charles Palm as part of their “Collected Works of Milton Friedman” project. Reformatted for the Web. 10/25/12 2