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ESTOLA: GOODS’ MARKETS 7 Perfect competition Monopolistic Oligopoly Monopoly competition Number of sellers many many a few one Barriers of entry no no some much Differences in goods no some little only one good some much banks railway Increasing returns no no to scale An example raw materials cars 1.2 1.2.1 Perfect Competition in an Industry Firm in a Perfectly Competed Industry A firm in a perfectly competed industry — like all other firms — aims to operate as profitably as possible. A special feature in perfect competition is that firms cannot affect the price of their product that adjusts in the market according the demand of all consumers consuming, and the supply of all producers producing the good. Price adjusts with time according to the deviation between the aggregate production and consumption at the level the production of the industry gets sold. This occurs because in the long-run firms do not produce more than they can sell. If the weekly production of a firm is greater than its weekly sales, it is rational for the firm to decrease the price of its product in the case price exceeds the firm’s marginal costs. If price is less than marginal costs, it is rational for the firm to decrease its flow of production. In a perfectly competed industry, firms’ products are almost perfect substitutes. Thus if one firm sells at a lower price than others, customers buy from this firm. To keep their customers, other firms must decrease their price accordingly. If the aggregate weekly production of an industry is smaller than gets sold at current price, those firms facing excess demand can raise their product prices. In an excess demand situation, consumers must compete about who can buy the scarce goods, and then some are ready to pay more. For this reason, every firm can increase its product price because consumers buy from the firms having goods left. Thus in a perfectly competed industry, firms cannot decide the price of their product independently, but it is determined 8 ESTOLA: PRINCIPLES OF QUANTITATIVE MICROECONOMICS on the basis of the demand of all consumers consuming, and the supply of all producers producing the good. In the following we study this process. Next we derive the supply relation for a firm in perfect competition. The weekly profit of a firm producing homogeneous good k in a perfectly competed industry is Πk (t) = Rk qk (t) − Ck qk (t) = pk (t)qk (t) − Ck qk (t) , where the flow of production of the firm is denoted by qk (kg/week) and the price of good k by pk ( /kg); the profit Πk , revenues Rk and costs Ck all have unit /week. The dependence of the flow of production and price on time t is assumed because later we analyze their adjustment with time. The time derivative of Πk (Appendix A, Section 7.2) is 0 ∂Πk 0 ∂Πk 0 0 0 0 p (t) + q (t) = qk (t)pk (t) + pk (t) − Ck qk (t) qk (t), Πk (t) = ∂pk k ∂qk k where marginal revenues equal pk and Ck0 qk (t) are marginal costs. Because a firm in a perfectly competed industry cannot affect the price of its product, the only variable by which the firm can affect its profit is qk . A profit-seeking 0 firm adjusts its flow of production as: qk0 (t) > 0 when p (t) − C q (t) > 0, k k k 0 0 0 and vice versa, and qk (t) = 0 when pk (t) = Ck qk (t) where qk (t) (kg/week 2 ) is the acceleration of production of the firm. These adjustment rules can be explained as follows. Earlier on we explained that the price of good k adjusts with time at the level the production of the industry gets sold (including the production of this firm). If price is greater than the marginal costs of this firm, this firm can increase its profit by increasing its flow of production. The firm knows, however, that if it increases its flow of production, the aggregate flow of production of the industry increases that has a decreasing effect on price pk . Thus the firm has to take account that if it increases its flow of production, this may require it to decrease the price of its product to get its production sold. In spite of 0 this remark, we identify the quantity pk (t) − Ck qk (t) as the force acting upon the flow of production of good k of the firm. The defined force measures the firm’s marginal profitability at current price and the prevailing flow of production. The argument for the force interpretation is as before; the more profitable producing one kilogram is, the more eager a profit-seeking firm is to increase its flow of production. The force consists of the benefits and costs in the firm’s decision-making, and the profit maximizing situation corresponds to zero-force: ∂Πk =0 ∂qk ⇔ pk (t) = Ck0 qk (t) . (1.1) ESTOLA: GOODS’ MARKETS 9 The relationship between the flow of production and price defined in (1.1) expresses those flows of production at different prices that correspond to the equilibrium states of the firm. A profit-seeking firm changes its flow of production with time so that eventually Eq. (1.1) holds. If the form of the cost function Ck is known, the optimal flow of production of the firm at moment t can be solved from Eq. (1.1) as −1 pk (t) , (1.2) qk∗ (t) = Ck0 where Ck0 −1 is the inverse function of Ck0 . To be able to find this solution, function Ck0 must be at least partially monotonous (Appendix A, Section 5.3) so that it has a unique inverse at every flow of production. In a perfectly competed industry, every firm decides its flow of production with the aim to sell this production at the price determined in the market. Firms know the price when they make their production decision, but they do not know the flows of production of other firms. If then the aggregate flow of production is greater than that which was previously sold, consumers may not buy the increased production at current price. Some firms have then unsold goods and they can decrease their production to diminish the aggregate flow of production at the level that gets sold at current price. On the other hand, if price is greater than the marginal costs of these firms, the firms can decrease their product price to get their production sold. Now, a price decrease by one firm forces other firms to follow this because otherwise their products would not get sold. In this way the price determination in perfect competition leads to the marginal cost pricing with time. At a higher price than that — assuming that firms’ marginal costs are higher than their unit costs — firms can increase their profit by decreasing their price and producing and selling more; this increases the aggregate flow of production in the industry. If one firm decreases the price of its product under that of other firms, the firm knows that other firms will follow this. This decreases firms’ interest to lower their product price in order to increase their profit and market share. However, a higher price than the marginal costs of firms may attract new firms in the industry. Thus in a perfectly competed industry, the aggregate flow of production will increases with time when price is higher than firms’ marginal costs. An increase in supply decreases price, and thus price adjusts with time at the level of marginal costs of firms. In many textbooks of economics it is also claimed that competition between firms forces the equilibrium price in perfect competition at the level where the marginal costs of firms equal their unit costs. This occurs because those firms, for which this condition does not hold, can adjust their production so that they can decrease their product price at that level. This 10 ESTOLA: PRINCIPLES OF QUANTITATIVE MICROECONOMICS way they gain customers from other firms that forces other firms to follow the price decrease and to produce at the flow of production that creates the minimum possible unit costs. If a firm produces at its minimum unit costs, the firm can sell its products at the lowest possible price, see Figure 6.1. Figure 6.1. The supply relation of a firm in perfect competition The supply relation of a firm in a perfectly competed industry can be derived as is shown in Figure 6.1. The unit and marginal costs of the firm are described as in Chapter 5. Suppose that the price is pk0 in Figure 6.1. Then every produced kilogram till the flow of production qk0 increases the weekly profit of the firm, and the firm is motivated to increase its flow of production till qk0 . However, the firm knows that its production affects the aggregate supply in the industry and this way the market price of good k. For this reason, the production decisions of firms cannot be analyzed separately from the price adjustment mechanism, and the market mechanism must be analyzed as a complete system. This is done in Sections 6.3.1-2. Figure 6.1 shows that the force by which the firm affects the aggregate production of the industry is positive at price pk0 if qk < qk0 , and negative if qk > qk0 . An increase in the flow of production from qk0 creates more costs than revenues at price pk0 which decreases the profit of the firm. At price pk0 , the weekly profit of the firm gets its maximum at the flow of production qk0 ; this corresponds to the zero force situation. If price increases from pk0 to pk1 in Figure 6.1, every sold kilogram till the flow of production qk1 increases the profit of the firm. If the whole production of the firm gets sold, the optimal flow of production at price pk1 is qk1 . We can thus think that the optimal flow of production of the firm is derived by its marginal costs. By the uniqueness of the marginal cost function above the unit cost function, the marginal cost function defines the unique flow of production at every price the firm is willing to produce in the case its production gets sold. Thus it is profitable for the firm to adjusts its flow of production with time at the level its marginal costs equal the price. The supply relation of a firm shows the flows of production at different prices that correspond to the optimal states of the firm. If price decreases, the optimal flow of production of a firm decreases according to its marginal cost function. However, if price pk decreases below unit costs of a firm, this firm makes losses. In this situation, the firm can stop its operation either permanently or temporarily, or continue by making losses. The last option is rational if the firm can cover its variable costs, and the firms’ managers believe that the firm can reduce its costs, or that the price will increase, in the future. On this basis, we can define the marginal cost function as the supply relation of a firm. Marginal costs show the optimal flow of ESTOLA: GOODS’ MARKETS 11 production at every price greater than the unit costs of the firm. Example. Let the cost function of a firm in perfect competition be Ck (qk ) = C0 + g(qk )qk , where the flow of production qk has unit kg/week, g(qk ) = c1 + c2 qk with unit /kg is the variable unit cost function and C0 , c1 , c2 are positive constants with units /week, /kg and ( ×week)/kg 2 , respectively. The weekly profit of the firm is then Πk = pk qk − Ck (qk ) = pk qk − C0 − c1 qk − c2 qk2 , (1.3) and the supply relation of the firm can be defined as dΠk =0 dqk ⇔ ⇔ pk = c1 + 2c2 qk qk∗ = p k − c1 . 2c2 (1.4) The marginal revenues of the firm equal with price pk , and marginal costs c1 + 2c2 qk linearly increase with the flow of production. The supply relation of the firm is the last form of Eq. (1.4). The optimal flow of production increases with price and decreases when constants c1 , c2 increase. If pk < c1 , the firm makes losses and it is optimal to stop the production. 1.2.2 Aggregate Production of an Industry In the previous section we showed that a firm in a perfectly competed industry reacts to a price change by changing its flow of production. Because every firm in the industry faces the same price change, firms change their production flows according to the difference between the price and their marginal costs. As an example of this, we study a situation where the profit of firm i is of the form (1.3) and its flow of production is denoted by qki . Thus 2 Πki = pk qki − Cki (qki ) = pk qki − C0i − c1i qki − c2i qki , and the supply relation of the firm is dΠki =0 dqki ⇔ ⇔ pk = c1i + 2c2i qki ∗ qki = pk − c1i . 2c2i (1.5) Next we assume n firms in the industry and derive the optimal aggregate flow of production of these firms. For simplicity, the cost functions are assumed of identical form for every firm, but the constants in them may vary. The optimal aggregate flow of production is then qkA = ∗ qk1 + ∗ qk2 + ··· + ∗ qkn = n X i=1 = pk ∗ qki = n X pk − c1i i=1 n n X X 1 c1i − = pk A − B, 2c 2c 2i 2i i=1 i=1 2c2i (1.6) 12 ESTOLA: PRINCIPLES OF QUANTITATIVE MICROECONOMICS P P where A = ni=1 2c12i , B = ni=1 2cc1i2i are positive constants. The aggregate supply function thus positively depends on price pk , qkA = Apk − B, (1.7) and qkA ≥ 0 if pk ≥ B/A, where B/A defines the minimum price at which production occurs. The assumption that firms cost functions are of identical form was made to simplify the aggregation. In the real world, varying cost functions of firms make the aggregation more complicated. In the next section we show that in the case of varying cost functions, we can approximate the supply relations of firms by linear ones in the neighborhood of the equilibrium states and in this way solve the aggregation problem. To describe the behavior of a perfectly competed industry, we need to model the aggregate production of the firms in the industry. It is possible that this can be done by using a relatively simple average cost function for the firms. Above we proposed one such candidate, but much work is needed before this question is solved in an empirically satisfactory way. 1.2.3 Equilibrium in Perfect Competition In this section we omit subindex k referring to the good to simplify the notation, and we separate supply and demand by subscripts s, d. Thus pk = p, qksi = qsi , qkdj = qdj , Cki = Ci and hkj = hj . According to Sections 4.10 and 6.1.3 when every firm and consumer have adjusted optimally, we have: p = Ci0 (qsi ), i = 1, . . . n and p = hj qdj , Tj , p, pG , j = 1, . . . , m. (1.8) Adding the n and m equations in (1.8), separately, and dividing the results by n and m, respectively, we get n p= m 1 X 1X 0 Ci (qsi ) = hj qdj , Tj , p, pG ; n i=1 m j=1 (1.9) the middle term is the P average of firms’ marginal P costs at the aggregate flow of production qs = ni=1 qsi , and term (1/m) m j=1 hj is the consumers’ average willingness-to-pay for one kilogram of good k at the aggregate flow P of consumption qd = m q j=1 dj . In the equilibrium, price equals the average of firms’ marginal costs and consumers’ willingness-to-pay, and no agent likes to change his behavior. This corresponds to the neoclassical equilibrium. In the appendix of this section we show that we can approximate the average of firms’ marginal costs as n a0 a1 1X Ci0 qsi ≈ + 2 qs , C 0 qs ≡ n i=1 n n qs = n X i=1 qsi , (1.10) ESTOLA: GOODS’ MARKETS 13 where constants a0 > 0, a1 have units /kg, ( × week)/kg 2 , respectively; a1 < 0 implies increasing returns to scale in the industry and vice versa. In the appendix of this section we show that we can approximate the average willingness-to-pay for one kilogram of good k of the m consumers as m b0 b1 b3 1 X b2 b4 hj ≈ + 2 qd + p + 2 T + pG , h(qd , p, T, pG ) ≡ m j=1 m m m m m where P the aggregate flow of consumption of the m consumers Pm is denoted by m qd = j=1 qdj , the aggregate budgeted funds by T = j=1 Tj , and constants b0 ≥ 0, b1 < 0, b3 have units /kg, ( × week)/kg 2 and week/kg, respectively; b2 < 0, b4 are dimensionless. In the following in this section we assume that pG = pG0 , Tj = Tj0 ; this way we can omit these quantities from the analysis; see the appendix of this section. An approximate average of the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for one kilogram of good k is then m h(qd , p) ≡ b1 b2 b0 1 X + 2 qd + p. hj (qdj , p) ≈ m j=1 m m m (1.11) The equilibrium state in the industry can then be approximated as a0 a1 + 2 qs , n n b1 b2 b0 + 2 qd + 2 p. Aggregate demand relation: p = m m m Aggregate supply relation: p = (1.12) (1.13) The aggregate supply and demand relations can also be presented as na0 n2 + p, a1 a1 2 mb0 m − b2 = − + p, b1 b1 qs = − (1.14) qd (1.15) where a0 , a1 , b0 , n, m > 0 and b1 , b2 < 0. Remark! The aggregate demand relation (1.15) equals with that derived in Section 4.12 with a = mb0 /(m2 − b2 ) > 0, b = b1 /(b2 − m2 ) > 0. Setting qd = qs in system (1.14) — (1.15) we can solve the equilibrium price p∗ . The equilibrium flows of production and consumption can then be solved by substituting p∗ in (1.14) and (1.15). These give p∗ = a0 b 1 n − a1 b 0 m > 0, b1 n2 + a1 (b2 − m2 ) qd∗ = qs∗ = n[a0 (m2 − b2 ) − b0 mn] . a1 (b2 − m2 ) + b1 n2 (1.16) 14 ESTOLA: PRINCIPLES OF QUANTITATIVE MICROECONOMICS The reader can check with the measurement units of the constants that the solutions are dimensionally well-defined. The condition for qd∗ = qs∗ > 0 is that p1 = a0 /n < b0 m/(m2 − b2 ) = p2 , where p1 is the price at which the aggregate supply, and p2 the price at which the aggregate demand is zero. The equilibrium state is displayed in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.2. The equilibrium state in a perfectly competed industry Remark! In Figure 6.2 on the horizontal axis are the aggregate flows of production and consumption of good k both measured in units kg/week, and on the vertical axis is the price of good k, the average marginal costs of firms, and the average willingness-to-pay of consumers for one kilogram; these all measured in units /kg. 1.2.4 Mathematical Appendix The first order Taylor series approximations of firms’ marginal cost functions in the neighborhood of the equilibrium flows of production qi0 are: Ci0 qsi = Ci0 qsi0 + Ci00 (qsi0 ) qsi − qsi0 + i , i = 1, . . . , n, (1.17) where i is the residual term. Assuming i = 0 and summing over i, we get1 : n n X X 0 0 Ci qsi ≈ Ci (qsi0 ) − Ci00 qsi0 qsi0 + Ci00 qsi0 qsi i=1 i=1 a1 qs , n P where qs = ni=1 qsi and constants ≈ a0 + a0 = n X Ci0 (qsi0 ) − Ci00 (qsi0 ) qsi0 , i=1 a1 = n X Ci00 (qsi0 ) , i=1 2 have units /kg and ( × week)/kg , respectively. Because marginal costs are positive at every qsi , then a0 > 0 (let qsi → qsi0 and i → 0 in (1.17) ∀i). Increasing (decreasing) returns to scale in the industry correspond to a1 < 0 (a1 > 0). We approximate the willingness-to-pay function of consumer j in the neighborhood of his equilibrium point zj0 = (qdj0 , p0 , Tj0 , pG0 ) as hj (qdj , p, pG , Tj ) = hj (zj0 ) + + ∂hj ∂hj (zj0 )(qdj − qdj0 ) + (zj0 )(p − p0 ) ∂qdj ∂p ∂hj ∂hj (zj0 )(Tj − Tj0 ) + (zj0 )(pG − pG0 ) + j , j = 1, . . . , m. (1.18) ∂Tj ∂pG Pn Pn Pn Pn Because i=1 ci qi = c i=1 qsi + i=1 (ci − c)qsi where c = (1/n) i=1 ci , the approximation is the more accurate the less ci = Ci00 (qsi ) or qsi vary, i = 1, . . . , n. 1 ESTOLA: GOODS’ MARKETS 15 Assuming j = 0 ∀j and summing over j, we get2 : m m X X ∂hj ∂hj hj (qdj , p, pG , Tj ) = hj (zj0 ) − (zj0 )qdj0 − (zj0 )p0 ∂q ∂p dj j=1 j=1 X m m X ∂hj ∂hj ∂hj ∂hj − (zj0 )Tj0 − (zj0 )pG0 + (zj0 )qdj + (zj0 )p ∂Tj ∂pG ∂q ∂p dj j=1 j=1 + m X ∂hj j=1 m X ∂hj (zj0 )Tj + (zj0 )pG ∂Tj ∂p G j=1 b1 b3 q d + b 2 p + T + b4 p G , m m wherePthe aggregate flow of consumption of the m consumers is denoted by Pm qd = m q , their aggregate budgeted funds by T = T j=1 dj j=1 j , and ≈ b0 + b0 = m h X hj (zj0 ) − j=1 ∂hj ∂hj ∂hj (zj0 )qdj0 − (zj0 )p0 − (zj0 )Tj0 ∂qdj ∂p ∂Tj m m i X ∂hj X ∂hj ∂hj − (zj0 )pG0 , b1 = (zj0 ), b2 = (zj0 ), ∂pG ∂qdj ∂p j=1 j=1 b3 = m X ∂hj j=1 m X ∂hj (zj0 ), b4 = (zj0 ). ∂Tj ∂pG j=1 The units of the constants are: b0 : /kg, b1 : ( × week)/kg 2 , b3 : week/kg, and b2 , b4 are dimensionless. Because the willingness-to-pay of every consumer is non-negative at every qdj , Tj , p, pG , we can conclude that b0 ≥ 0 (let qdj → qdj0 , Tj → Tj0 , p → p0 , pG → pG0 and j → 0 ∀j in (1.18)). In the following we assume that pG = pG0 and Tj = Tj0 ∀j. An approximate average of the consumers’ willingness-to-pay is then: m h(qd , p) ≡ 1 X b0 b1 b2 hj (qdj , p) ≈ + 2 qd + p, m j=1 m m m (1.19) where b0 = b2 = m X j=1 m X j=1 2 m X ∂hj ∂hj ∂hj hj (zj0 ) − (zj0 )qdj0 − (zj0 )p0 , b1 = (zj0 ), ∂qdj ∂p ∂qdj j=1 ∂hj (zj0 ). ∂p See the previous footnote. 16 ESTOLA: PRINCIPLES OF QUANTITATIVE MICROECONOMICS An approximate average of the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for one kilogram of the good thus linearly depends on the aggregate flow of consumption of the good and its price. 1.2.5 Adjustment by Price Mechanism Traditionally, the dynamics in a perfectly competed industry has been assumed to take place by price adjustment via excess demand as: p0k (t) = fp (Fp ), fp0 (Fp ) > 0, fp (0) = 0, Fp = qkd − qks , (1.20) where qkd − qks is the excess demand (supply) when it is positive (negative). This mechanism was suggested by Paul Samuelson (1941,1942). Assuming the demand and supply relations as in the previous section, and denoting 2 0 0 the constants in them as A0 = na > 0, A1 = na1 > 0, B0 = − mb > 0, a1 b1 2 m −b2 B1 = − b1 > 0, the excess demand becomes the following: qkd − qks = B0 − B1 pk (t) + A0 − A1 pk (t) = B0 + A0 − (B1 + A1 )pk (t). Taking the Taylor series approximation of function fp in (1.20) in the neighborhood of point Fp = 0 and assuming the error term zero, we get fp ≈ fp0 (0) × Fp and we can approximate (1.20) as p0k (t) = fp0 (0) × [A0 + B0 − (A1 + B1 )pk (t)], (1.21) where fp0 (0) is a positive constant with unit /kg 2 . From (1.21) we see that A0 +B0 the quantity in brackets is positive if pk < A = p∗k , and vice versa. 1 +B1 Thus price increases (p0k (t) > 0) when it is below, and decreases when it is above its equilibrium value. The equilibrium is thus stable and price adjusts with time toward its equilibrium. According to (1.14) and (1.15), a price raise increases supply and decreases demand and vice versa. Thus firms and consumers react to price changes, and the demand and supply relations show how both parties adjust their flows of production and consumption. Equation (1.21) can be explained as follows. If the whole production of the industry gets sold, and even more could have been sold at current price, the lack of goods forces consumers to compete about who can buy the scarce goods. This allows some firms to raise their product price, and other firms can follow this because also their productions get sold. In the opposite case, any firm can assure that its production gets sold by decreasing its product price, even though the whole production of the industry does not get sold. The price reduction of one firm forces other firms to follow this if they like to sell their whole production. The difference qkd (t) − qks (t) can thus be ESTOLA: GOODS’ MARKETS 17 interpreted as the force acting upon price pk , and every consumer and producer affect this force by their decisions. We could have added also static friction in the price to explain that in the real world, a certain non-zero excess demand may be required before price starts to react. For example, the existing goods in firms’ inventories prohibit a price raise before these goods are sold. However, we assume, for simplicity, that prices do not have static friction. A positive force thus acts upon the price of good k when the aggregate flow of consumption exceeds that of aggregate production at the prevailing price, and vice versa. Remark! In Eq. (1.21) we gave up the Newtonian principle ‘force causes acceleration’, because in Eq. (1.21), the force causes the velocity and not the acceleration of the price. The reason for this is that when we model changes in consumption and production, the adjusting variables are flow variables while price is a ‘stock’ variable. However, Eq. (1.21) corresponds to the principle of modelling in economics because in an excess demand situation, it is rational for profit-seeking firms to charge a higher price and for utilityseeking consumers to pay more. 1.2.6 Time Path of Price* The price adjustment mechanism described in the previous section yielded differential equation (1.21) the solution of which is pk (t) = A0 + B0 0 + C0 e−fp (0)(A1 +B1 )t , A1 + B1 where C0 ( /kg) is the constant of integration. Because A1 + B1 > 0, with t → ∞, pk (t) adjusts toward the equilibrium price in the industry A0 +B0 1 n−a1 b0 m p∗k = A = b1an02b+a 2 , see Section 6.3.2. The process is thus stable. 1 +B1 1 (b2 −m )