Download Mrs. Lee Honors Cuban Missile Crisis Source I Did the Kennedy

Mrs. Lee
Honors
Cuban Missile Crisis Source I
Did the Kennedy Administration handle the Cuban Missile Crisis effectively?
The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) was the most serious Cold War crisis, the closest the
United States and the Soviet Union came to a nuclear war with each other. Following a July 1962
visit by Cuban foreign minister Raul Castro Ruz and finance minister Ernesto "Che" Guevara de
la Serna to Moscow, the Soviet Union decided to place ballistic missiles in Cuba. American U-2
reconnaissance planes detected an increased number of ships sailing from the Soviet Union to
Cuba, and flights over Cuba between 29 August and 6 September revealed that the Soviets were
building a defensive missile system on the island. President John F. Kennedy informed Soviet
premier Nikita S. Khrushchev that the American government would not tolerate turning Cuba
into a base for offensive military capabilities aimed at the United States. Khrushchev assured
Kennedy that the Soviet Union had placed only defensive, short-range, surface-to-air missiles in
Cuba to augment Cuban air defenses. In fact, in addition to twenty-four surface-to-air missiles,
Khrushchev had sent forty-two offensive, nuclear-armed, medium-range missiles and ordered the
shipment of twenty-four additional long-range missiles (they never arrived). He also sent fortyfive thousand Soviet troops and technicians to the island.
The hurricane season delayed further intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba until after 11
October. Flights conducted between 11 and 14 October revealed that the Soviet Union was
busily building launching pads for offensive ballistic missiles at San Cristobal. Intelligence
reports also said that Soviet ships carrying ballistic missiles had left their Black Sea ports and
were heading toward Cuba, where they were due in about ten days. U.S. intelligence assessed
that, by December 1962, the Soviet Union would have fifty operational strategic nuclear missiles
In Cuba. On 23 October four of the medium-range missies were already operational.
Kennedy convened a group of advisers, known as the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council (ExComm), to assess U.S. options. The choices they discussed ranged from
invading Cuba with troops or attacking the missile bases with surgical aerial strikes, on one
extreme, to accepting the Soviet offensive presence, on the other. Eventually the ExComm
agreed on an air and maritime blockade of the island, which would prevent the Soviets from
delivering additional missiles to Cuba. Blockade supporters pointed to several advantages of
their proposal over other options. An invasion might be costly in American lives, while an aerial
strike might not destroy all the launch pads and would leave intact Soviet nuclear-armed
bombers on the runways. An invasion or air strike might also cause Soviet casualties, and with or
without such loses, it was imagine that the Soviet Union would passively watch a U.S. attack on
a Soviet ally. It was more reasonable to assume that they might retaliate either by attacking the
United States directly or, more likely, by capturing West Berlin or some other Western asset of
high value.
A blockade appeared to be the less provocative, but equally firm option. It would prevent the
Soviets from moving more missiles onto the Island, but allow them several days (the time it
would take the Soviet cargo ships to reach the blockade line) to consider their own options and
negotiate with the United States. On 24 October, two days after Kennedy announced the
blockade, Pentagon officials reported that twelve of the twenty-five Soviet ships sailing toward
Cuba had changed course to avoid the blockade. When one of the cargo ships reached the
blockade line and was discovered to carry missiles, it was turned away. Another ship, the tanker
Bucharest, was stopped by U.S. Navy vessels and allowed to continue to Havana when it was
ascertained that it was carrying only oil. The next day, all remaining ships turned back. "We
were eyeball to eyeball," Secretary of State Dean Rusk was reported to have said, "and the other
fellow just blinked." Behind-the-scenes negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev
produced a compromise on 28 October; the Soviet Union would withdraw its missiles from Cuba
in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and a tacit understanding that the United States
would withdraw the aging U.S. medium-range Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
Viewpoint: Yes. The Cuban Missile Crisis was handled effectively because the Kennedy
administration avoided all-out nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union through quiet negotiations
combined with a strong, public stand.
The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) began when U.S. military reconnaissance flights
provided proof that the Soviets were placing medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, ninety
miles from Florida. This move was a destabilizing one as it reduced dramatically the flight time
of, and hence the reaction time to, nuclear missiles that might be used to attack the United States.
The United States was not friendly with Cuba, and the possibility of a communist regime in the
Western Hemisphere possessing nuclear weapons was unacceptable. President John F. Kennedy
decided to assert U.S. rights under the Monroe Doctrine (1823) to prevent this circumstance from
happening.
The situation in Cuba was tense because, having just finished its revolution, it was not exactly
stable. Still, the communists in Cuba continued to ride a wave of popularity and Cuban armed
forces were enthusiastic, if not well-trained. Fidel Castro was no friend of the United States; after
all, the Kennedy administration had tried to overthrow him in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion
(April 1961), and it was fairly obvious to all that he was a true communist. The United States
decided to undertake action to prevent the further placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba by
military force if necessary.
What the Americans did not know was that the Soviets already had nuclear weapons in Cuba,
which they planned to use to repel a possible invasion—this fact only became known in the West
after the Cold War ended. Soviet doctrine allowed for the use of, and a willingness to use,
tactical nuclear weapons in these circumstances. Of course, their use would have caused a
general, almost undoubtedly nuclear war. At the same time, the U.S. Army was preparing an
invasion from Florida—moving tens of thousands of men and tons of materiel to the state—and
was ready to attack if called upon. Both sides were ready for a confrontation.
Hawks on both sides pushed for war, even the possible use of nuclear weapons. Many people
within the defense establishment believed that the best way to deal with the Soviet Union was to
launch an all-out attack, including nuclear weapons, in a first strike. This assault would decide
the Cold War all at once, in their opinion, and the victorious West could move on.
U. S. Air Force General Curtis E. LeMay, the architect of the most devastating air attacks in
history—the fire bombing of Tokyo (9-10 March 1945)—and the nuclear attacks in Japan
(August 1945), had no qualms about nuclear war. He believed not only that it was possible to
win a nuclear exchange, but that the resulting millions of friendly casualties from such a
confrontation would be acceptable. On the Soviet side, there also were many hawks who wanted
war, especially since they believed that the United States would invade Cuba. While Nikita S.
Khrushchev did not agree, he was willing to fight if necessary. Clearly both sides were "eyeball
to eyeball."
The situation escalated, however, when the Cubans shot down a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft on a
spy mission in their airspace. Cuba was perfectly within its rights to do this as the overflight was
a violation of its national sovereignty. The fact that the United States did not know that Cuban air
defenses were capable of this action and the pilot was killed only added ammunition to the
hawks in Washington.
There was only one method short of war, however, to prevent the placement of nuclear missiles
in Cuba-a blockade, which is in fact an act of war. On the other hand, a “quarantine” (a blockade
by another name) is not. By "quarantining" Cuba, the United States could achieve its goal, using
an extreme measure without the negative consequences attached to it. Still, the strategy was
dangerous, for both sides clearly had no real idea of the motives or resolve of their opponents.
The Kennedy administration announced that U.S. naval forces would stop, board, and search
ships approaching Cuba in international waters and turn back those carrying offensive weapons.
While this was a more "peaceful" solution, Kennedy made it clear that he would attack Cuba is
the missiles already on the island were not removed.
Nevertheless, during the crisis the leadership in the United States and the Soviet Union realized
that they were on the brink of a nuclear exchange and that, if they wanted to avoid it, they would
have to negotiate. The problem was that they were so used to being enemies, after the end of
World War II, that they did not really know how to talk to each other, especially since this
situation had already proved how incorrect their concepts of each other were. Despite these
difficulties, however, they negotiated.
The Soviet position, that they had a right to place missiles in Cuba, was not unreasonable as the
United States had medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe pointed directly at the Soviet Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). The reality was that the Soviets were simply doing
what the Americans had already done and they misjudged U.S. intelligence capabilities, never
expecting to get caught. Furthermore, Khrushchev was honestly surprised by the U.S. reaction,
for he had miscalculated U.S. resolve in this matter. Again, this blunder only demonstrates how
little the two sides understood the motives and goals of the other.
Both sides worked together, for the first time since World War II, for a common goal and a
common good, and reached equitable terms. The soviets agreed to publicly pull out their nuclear
weapons from Cuba, while the Untied States said it would secretly remove its medium-range
missiles from Turkey. This agreement was a victory for both sides. The United States was able
to save face with the secrecy clause, while the U.S.S.R. got the Americans to remove their
weapons from the Soviet border.
In all, the crisis was successful in that both sides walked way from it with concession at the cost
of few lives. There was no world war, and the crisis set the stage for future relations. The
United States and the U.S.S.R. came to the realization that having these weapons on the border
of their enemy was a dangerous and destabilizing strategy. They also discovered that they
needed greater communication with each other to prevent these misunderstandings and avoid a
nuclear conflict. Finally, they recognized that perhaps they should consider working together to
reduce their vast nuclear stockpiles.
Yet the United States and Soviet Union did not become friends after this incident. Both sides
intensified their efforts to nullify the actions of the other, but with less directly confrontational
means. The Soviets gave greater support to countries fighting U.S. interests, while the Americans
reciprocated, giving rise to fighting each other by proxy.
The Soviets also made some crucial military decisions as a result of this confrontation. Most,
notably, they recognized that the U.S. quarantine was effective because the Soviet navy was
unable to compete with its U.S. counterpart. This realization led to an intense period of naval
construction in the Soviet Union to create a truly blue-water navy that could deal with this newly
discerned threat. The Cold War was not over after the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the crisis was
the last time that both sides stood on their highest nuclear alert status.
WILLIAM H. KAUTT, SAN ANTONIO,TEXAS
References
Michael R. Bechloss. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York:
Edward Burlingame, 1991).
James Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Re-examine the Cuban
Missile Crisis (New York: Hill & Wang, 1989).
Dino Brugioni. Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis, edited by
Robert F. McCort (New York: Random House, 1991).
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and
Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: Norron, 1997).
Raymond L. Garthoff. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D C; Brookings
Institution, 1989).