Download Measuring Decency: The evaluation of the political organization of

Measuring Decency: The evaluation of the political
organization of cultural difference
CONFERENCE ON PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
HELSINKI 18-21.5.2005
Pasi Saukkonen
University Lecturer, PhD, doc.
Department of Political Science
University of Helsinki
+358 - 9 – 191 24814
[email protected]
Draft, not to be quoted
Introduction
The main point of departure for this paper is not theoretical but practical. I have,
together with a Dutch philosopher, Sjaak Koenis, been constructing a theoreticalconceptual framework which we call “the political organization of cultural difference”
with the aim to analyse the national political traditions in coping with ethnic and
cultural diversity in Finland, Belgium and the Netherlands. The framework (presented
below) has received a form which makes descriptive empirical research possible.
However, we have the intention that research should also draw some normative
conclusions between national models and different practices. For that purpose, there is
a need for concepts and instruments which would make general evaluation and more
detailed pinpointing of good and poor practices and of advantages and disadvantages
possible. This paper consists mainly of deliberation upon that challenge.
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The political organization of difference1
The starting point in our approach is the understanding of societies as inherently
heterogeneous social systems. In contrast to “communities” that, following Rawls
(1993) can be defined as groups characterized by ”comprehensive views”, mutually
shared conceptions of the ”good life”, societies always contain ethnic and cultural
differences within its boundaries. Therefore, the management of that diversity has
also always been one of the basic tasks of the political system of the society. We can
even argue that instead of the management of common affairs, politics is elementarily
organisation of difference. It is invention and elaboration of ideas, the making of
arrangements and the creation of institutions to provide for all those situations in
which shared norm and values do not exist, in which people have fundamentally
different and (sometimes) conflicting conceptions of the good life, but have to live
together nevertheless (Koenis 1997).
The diversity within societies includes, of course, not only ethnic and cultural
differences, but also political differences in terms of power and influence and
economic differences in terms of wealth and control over the means of production.
Here we shall, however, concentrate on the cultural diversity. According to Phikhu
Parekh (2000, 2-4), the cultural diversity can be divided into three categories. Firstly,
there is subcultural diversity that is based on different beliefs and practices
concerning particular areas, or display relatively distinct ways of life (Parekh
mentions here e.g. unconventional sexual identities, miners, jet-set, artists). The
second form, perspectival diversity, is based on criticism of some of the central
principles or values of the prevailing culture and plans to reconstitute it (feminism,
religious anti-modernism, environmentalism etc.).
It is always good to bear in mind the existence of these two modes of cultural
heterogeneity to see that societies would lack perfect cultural unity even without the
third form of cultural difference. This form which Parekh calls communal diversity is,
1
The theoretical-conceptual framework will here be presented in very general terms. For a more
detailed description, Koenis & Saukkonen 2003, Saukkonen 2003.
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however, also the mode which is politically most relevant. Communal diversity is
founded on “self-conscious and more or less well-organized communities entertaining
and living by their own different systems of beliefs and practices”. The differences
within a society can thus be assumed to become politically more important as social
and collective identities are constituted on ethnic or cultural differences. This social
organization of cultural difference (c.f. Barth 1969) takes place when relatively stable
and permanent social groups and categories are being formed on the basis of ethnic or
cultural differences that unite the members of the group or category and distinguish
them from others.
Even though those social systems that we can call societies have always lacked full
ethnic and cultural unity, it is clear that the development in the last decades in Europe
has made the issue of diversity much more salient and politically significant. There
has been impressive sub-cultural and perspectival diversification and increased selfconsciousness of many traditional ethnic or cultural minorities but probably the most
noteworthy change has been the emergence of new ethnic and cultural groups,
communities and identities as a result of immigration.
Therefore, we have sound reasons to argue that the management of cultural diversity
has become a great challenge for contemporary Western societies, for the theory as
well as for the practice. Social and political theory will have to take distance from the
assumption of a society as a culturally united community. More practice-oriented
social sciences need to develop new solutions for new social problems. National and
supra-national politics must learn how to cope with the lack of cultural unity.
As a matter of fact, all societies already have their own, historically developed, ways
of managing diversity (cf. Geddes 2004). Contemporary answers to new challenges
are also strongly influenced by these national traditions, and the possible European
immigration policies and immigrant policies will have to take these national traditions
into account. Neither theoretical nor empirical research has been able to convincingly
present a single model which would be problem-free. However, we can learn from the
experiences in other societies and from their efforts to manage plurality and diversity.
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The theoretical-conceptual framework of the political organisation of cultural
difference has been constructed to facilitate the analysis of national traditions and
solutions. The framework considers diversity as a normal condition and suggests an
approach which conceives politics as action in a structural-institutional context.
Futhermore, it employs a multi-level approach where attention is being paid not only
to institutional politics (systemic level) but also to the civil society (collective level)
and to the individual level. We also want to emphasize the symbolic construction of a
society as a politically relevant dimension because the way the societies are
understood also as cultural systems based on this or that cultural “component” (e.g.
language, religion, shared values or memories, ethnic roots) affects the inclusion and
exclusion mechanisms and the constitution of social hierarchies based on cultural
belonging. The whole field of the political organisation of cultural difference can be
systematically presented as in the table 1 below.
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Table 1. The political organisation of cultural difference: dimensions, levels and
fields.
Traditional dimension
Symbolic dimension
Systemic level
Field 1. State institutions
– create, maintain and change the
social structures of difference and
their reciprocal relations through
legislation, targeted policies and
the distribution of economic
resources.
Field 4. Identity of the state
– reflects the structures of
difference and the values, attitudes
and ideals concerning those
structures in representations of the
state, nation and society produced,
subsidized or authorized by the
state.
Collective level
Field 2. Political forces of the
civil society
– reflect the structures of
difference and try to affect those
structures
– both react to the political
organization of difference by the
state institutions and respond to
the hopes, expectations and claims
from the grassroots level.
Field 5. Identity of the nation
– contains conceptions and
descriptions of the national (or
ethnic) community and its relation
to the state produced directly or
indirectly by the collective actors
in the civil society: e.g. political
parties, voluntary associations,
cultural communities.
Individual level
Field 3. Political culture
Field 6. Individual’s national
identification
- contains cognitive, affective and
evaluative relations between the
individual and the national
community (nation) and the
political unit (state)
– contains orientations towards
and predispositions to the
structures of difference and the
political organization of difference
by state authorities and civic
society actors
From case description to normative judgment
The starting point for the analysis can be dubbed as a Montesquieuan approach.
Phikhu Parekh has mentioned that: ”For Montesquieu, cultural diversity raised two
questions, explanatory and normative: the former concerned with the reasons why
different societies threw up different customs and practices, the latter with how to
judge these. To explain a practice was to show that it was not accidental or absurd but
rational, necessary, natural or intelligible (. . .) Since moral judgment distorted
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explanation, one must approach one’s subject matter without moral preconceptions
and prejudices. This did not mean that one should not judge it, but rather that this was
a different kind of activity and had a different focus and logic.” (Parekh 2000, 56)
It is this different focus and different logic that we shall search for also here to discern
that different kind of activity which would make the evaluation of political
organisations of cultural diversity possible. What follows is an effort to find a way to
construct a well-defined but flexible conceptual basis for the normative part of the
research. Lucid definitions are required to guarantee the validity of empirical analysis
whereas flexibility is needed to remain sensitive to different forms of advantages,
good practices, as well as to the possible tensions, problems and pain spots, and to the
context-specific significance of individual practices and experiences.
Several authors have pointed out that there is a need for theories and perspectives
which would combine different scientific and philosophical traditions and so enable
analytical susceptibility for theory as well as for practice, and for the political as well
as for the cultural dimension in the politics of multiculturalism. In their quest for an
integrated theory, Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, for example, make the
distinction between ethnic conflict studies and political philosophy and argue that ”In
the context of ethnic-conflict studies, the focus is on explaining how state
governments can control ethnocultural conflicts and maintain political stability. The
aim is to avoid violence and instability. Political philosophers, by contrast, are likely
to care not only about the absence of violence, but also about the extent to which
society meets norms of justice, individual freedom, and deliberative democracy.”
(Kymlicka & Norman 2000, 15)
This dichotomy is a slight simplification of reality. The focus on stability is actually
predominant not only in ethnic conflict studies but in the mainstream political science.
In turn, within political philosophy there are also less “idealistic” approaches, those
inspired by Carl Schmitt, for example. The main point is, however, probably
unquestionable: some scholars like Arend Lijphart have so far concentrated upon how
to guarantee social and political stability in imperfect (here: culturally diverse)
situations whereas others like Will Kymlicka himself have tried to construct
theoretical models for ideal societies.
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The author of this paper agrees with those who believe that the gap between the two
extremes should be theoretically bridged and that the “realist” and “idealist” traditions
should be brought closer together. Politics should be understood as the proverbial
sailing between Scylla and Charybdis where a one-sided concentration on problems
endangers democratic and liberal principles and a limited focus on idealist solutions
fails to take possible negative outcomes in practice into account. Put very simply, the
questions posed for contemporary societies are, then, how to combine both democracy
and stability, both participation and functionality, both competitive and just society
and both cultural liberty and a sense of unity in diverse societies?
If we understand the challenge this way, we also realise that the one extreme of the
above mentioned formulations belongs to the systemic level in the framework of the
political organisation of difference (table 1) (stability, functionality, competitiveness,
sense of unity) whereas the other extreme falls into the collective and individual
levels (democracy, participation, justice, cultural liberty). In other words, the first
question in the evaluation of the political organization of difference would be that we
should assess the balance between the system and the civil society.
Minorities at risk
Decent society
A political philosopher, Avishai Margalit (1998, 4) provides us with a starting point
by stating that “(. . .) there is a weighty asymmetry between eradicating evil and
promoting good. It is much more urgent to remove painful evils than to create
enjoyable benefits.” Margalit defines his ideal, the decent society, also in negative
terms by paying attention to what does not take place in a decent society. For him, a
decent society is one whose institutions do not humiliate people. Humiliation is here
generally understood as the rejection of a person from the human commonwealth and
as the loss of basic control and more specifically, as the rejection of specific forms of
life in which people express their humanity. (Ibid., 1-6, 135-149.)
A decent society is thus based on the principle that it may include encompassing
groups which have competing and not merely incompatible forms of life. (ibid., 180.).
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This coheres well with the definition of society in the political organisation of
difference as a unit necessarily including cultural diversity with which the society and
the political system somehow must learn to cope with. Margalit also makes some
other distinctions that are in harmony with our purposes. For example, he emphasizes
the actual behaviour of social institutions as the crucial test for a society being decent
or not, as a distinction from approaches which delimit their focus on the formal rules
and principles. Furthermore, he makes a difference between a decent society and a
civilized society where the members of the society do not humiliate each other.
Finally, he shows sensitivity to the often subtle but nevertheless efficient forms of
symbolic exclusion which is related to the symbolic dimension in our framework as
well. “I claim that a society is decent only if its hegemonic culture does not contain
humiliating collective representations that are actively and systematically used by the
society’s institutions.” (Ibid., 169.)
Forms of exclusion
Margalit also gives examples how “social institutions could be put to the Test”
deliberating upon possible signs of lack of decency in a snobbish society, in
bureaucracy, in the welfare society, and in relation to privacy, unemployment and
punishment (ibid., 189-270). However, for systematic and comparative empirical
research between different national traditions and practices, the conceptual tools of
Margalit require further elaboration. In the following, we shall examine whether the
two aspects of cultural exclusion mentioned in the 2004 UNDP report Cultural
Liberty in Today’s Diverse World could be of help.
The report, obviously leaning on the background work by Will Kymlicka, makes a
distinction between living mode exclusion and participation exclusion. Living mode
exclusion occurs when “the state or social custom denigrates or suppresses a group’s
culture, including its language, religion or traditional customs or lifestyles”, whereas
participation exclusion refers to discrimination or disadvantage based on cultural
identity and leads to social, economic and political exclusion along ethnic, linguistic
or religious lines. (Human Development Report 2004, 27).
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In the first case, a distinct culture as a whole or certain cultural factors or features are
not accepted by the political system or the majority population, irrespective of the
possibly favourable social status, political rights or economic position of that cultural
group. The political authorities can use several methods for this exclusion, such as
genocide, forced mass-population transfers, assimilation or hegemonic control. The
most brutish forms of living mode exclusion are relatively easily observable. When it
comes to more subtle methods, the symbolic exclusion from the community of the
“true nationals” despite of formal citizenship for example, the evidence is often more
difficult to gather.
It is clear that living mode exclusion comes close to Margalit’s concept of humiliation
but how to measure it? The authors of the report make the following comments upon
the measurement of living mode exclusion: “Language, religion, history, clothing,
customs, ceremonies, cuisine and values, among others, interact to define cultural
identity. All of these ways to understand culture provide ways to exclude cultural
identities such as language policies, treatment of different religions, school curricula
and attitudes within society. Information can be collected on these issues, but rarely
is. Beyond the simple data availability problems are the analytical challenges of
converting information into statistically useful numbers. One possible approach is
qualitative assessments – expert assessments of the severity of the situation – on
issues that are important to many cultural identities, such as language and religion.”
(Human Development Report 2004, 31)
The report uses information from the Minorities at Risk data set which “does not
capture the whole detail or scope of cultural exclusions but can provide useful
evidence for understanding the problem” (idem.). That data set focuses – according to
the MAR web page2 – “specifically on ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal
groups that have "political significance" in the contemporary world because of their
status and political actions. Political significance is, in turn, determined by the
following two criteria: 1) the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic
discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society; 2) the group is the basis
2
Minorities at Risk Database http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/about.asp.
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for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its selfdefined interests.
Conceptually, the MAR approach seems to fit well into the “decency-framework”.
For the practical purposes of the research on the political organisation of difference in
Finland, Belgium and the Netherlands, however, it is not too helpful. The criteria for
discrimination, repression, protest and rebellion seem to be so strict that the three
countries emerge as “riskless”. The fact that Western societies are apparently
underrepresented in the risk list is probably partly a consequence of international
treaties concerning minority rights and partly of the well-established national
solutions to deal with cultural diversity. Therefore, it is plausible to think that it is
exactly the symbolic living mode exclusion which is at work in regions like the
Scandinavian countries and the Low Countries, and the MAR database is not able to
include that into their analysis.
In the case of participation exclusion, different cultures and ethnicities, forms of selfexpression, ways of life, conceptions of the good life etc., are formally and possibly
also symbolically accepted and recognized, but cultural belonging nevertheless
produces disadvantaged positions in the social and economic systems and in the
political life. The practical possibilities in studying participation exclusion empirically
are here more advanced than in analysing living mode exclusion even though
differences in the definitions of central concepts make cross-national comparisons
quite complicated.3
As the UNDP report argues, a serious problem is the lack of breakdown by culturally
identified groups. Indeed, there are even sound reasons to assume that one aspect of
3
From previous studies we can draw examples of measuring participation exclusion. Kenneth D.
McRae, for instance, has in his books on conflict and compromise in multilingual societies (e.g. 1999)
analysed the social position of the members of linguistic minorities using vis-á-vis several indicators.
In his study on Finland, for example, he has analysed the social inclusion and exclusion and the
constitution of systematic social contacts by focussing on the memberships in clubs or associations and
in social networks. Regarding economic status and position on the labour market, he has used the data
available on employment and unemployment, on income, on the living standard and on other indicators
of wellbeing. Concerning the relation between politics and cultural minority he has used the data about
party formation, the number of candidates and representatives with a minority background, voter
turnout among different parts of the population and the institutional consultation mechanisms between
the state and the minorities.
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humiliation in contemporary European societies is the tendency to deal in a crude
manner with the category of “foreigners” or “immigrants” irrespective of internal
differences within that category. The report suggests allowing people to register
multiple identities (idem), but it is easy to foresee the troubles this would incur to the
collecting of data and to the statistical analysis. (Human Development Report 2004,
31.)
Whereas living-mode exclusion mainly takes place as interaction between social
institutions and cultural collectives, participation exclusion is – in the rule – activity
which is directed against an individual because of his or her ethnic and cultural
background. Also, the social institutions that excludes are in most cases not
“systemic” organisations, practices or traditions but rather actors belonging to the
civil society broadly defined: employers, parties, interest organisations, voluntary
associations, media etc. For the analysts of the political organisation of difference
there is then a question of demarcation: which forms of participation exclusion are
signs of “uncivilized” society and which, in turn, of “non-decent” society.
Another problem related with participation exclusion is that we should be able to
separate signs of injustice from signs of humiliation and lack of respect.
Unsatisfactory position on the labour market among ethnic and cultural communities,
for example, is not necessarily always a result of direct discrimination but can be a
consequence of shortcomings in the central assets of career development: good
education, linguistic skills, social networks etc. As Margalit points out, it is important
to understand the difference between the two concepts: a just society in the
“Rawlsian” sense does not necessarily be also a decent society in practice (even
though it should be in theory), and a decent society does not necessarily fulfil all
criteria for social justice (even though there are good reasons to hope for that as well)
(Margalit 1998, 271-292). So, how to tell non-decency from injustice?
My suggestion here is that a study on decent society should concentrate on the
political exclusion along ethnic or cultural lines as this is more likely a result of
institutional practices directly related to the different background of some groups or
individuals in the society and also more often a question between the “systemic”
institutions and the civil society. In a democratic society, it could be considered as a
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symptom of humiliation and lack of respect if ethnic and cultural communities would
not be sufficiently represented in the political process to influence at least that part of
decision making which affects their daily life.
As the UNDP report also reminds, political exclusion is unfortunately often more
difficult to capture than social and economic exclusion. Some hard data, such as
representation in parliament and voter participation is, however, relatively well
available and studies on other relevant issues, such as on the freedom of expression,
on the formation of parties, associations and interest organizations and on institutional
consultation mechanisms between the state authorities and minority communities
have already been made.
System in danger
Despite of many conceptual and other problems, the notions of symbolic living mode
exclusion and political participation exclusion can be considered as useful points of
departure for measuring decency. However, as stated earlier, we find it reasonable to
look at the empirical cases also from the more “realistic” perspective. This means
paying attention especially to the possible difficulties in maintaining social and
political stability and the societal sense of unity in the conditions of plurality and
diversity. If the minorities can be at risk of being discriminated or worse from the
point of view of collective cultural rights and liberties, then the system may be in
danger from the macro perspective. The rest of this paper will be devoted upon the
possibilities to study those perils.
Stability in diverse societies
Some conceptual elaboration is again necessary. Above we mentioned, in passing,
that the conceptual counterpoints of democracy, participation and liberty could be
stability, functionality and sense of unity. However, in the contemporary
circumstances of globalized economy, of trans- and supranational integration and of
the “informationalization” of societies, stability should not be understood in a strict
sense, as a “frozen” model of politics and society. Indeed, nowadays societies are
supposed to be dynamic and creative in order to thrive in international competition.
Even in the traditionally more conservative political sphere, the “super-ideology” of
12
economic growth seems to require institutional renewal and administrative
innovations.
Nevertheless, the most elementary social and political principles concerning the
existence and the nature of the state should also be recognized and respected. In
Western democracies, these principles include, for example, the integrity of the state
territory, the rule of law, the relation between church and state, and the central rights
and obligations of the citizens. Following this line of reasoning, we could thus say
that the crucial test for the social and political stability would be the possible
existence of groups and organizations which actively challenge the existence and
basic institutions, procedures and substantial dispositions of the state and the political
system.
In the context of the political organization of difference, this would mean focussing
on political radicalism based on ethnic or cultural identity. This radicalism can take
different forms. There can be, for example, well-organized political activity which
openly participates in the public sphere or there can be informal networks of
clandestine groups which try to reach their objectives through violent methods. It is
also important to pay attention not only to the minority groups and organizations, but
also to the extremist activities among the ethnic or cultural majority population, in the
form of e.g. intolerant nationalism, extreme rightist parties and racist groups and
associations.
Political functionality
The explicitly expressed challenges for the society and for the political system can be
relatively easily traced and there is also some information available of the more
clandestine threats to established social and political order. Possible problems
concerning the optimal functioning of the system are more difficult to analyse. In
recent political analysis, it has often been implied that instead of fluent practice one or
a more forms of malfunctioning is an inherent feature in contemporary political
systems (e.g. Huyse 2002). Therefore, possible problems in the decision making
process that derive from the ethnic and cultural diversity should not be analysed
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against an idealistic image of well-functioning democracy but rather against the
contemporary political realities.
One concept which might be useful is government gridlock. One could focus on the
tendency of the political systems to arrive at a decision-making gridlock, which
Andrew Heywood has defined as ”a paralysis resulting from institutional rivalry
within government or the attempt to respond to conflicting public demands”
(Heywood 1997, 24). In this context, it could be more narrowly understood as
congestions resulting from conflicting public demands which have their origin in
ethnic and cultural diversity. These are most likely to take place in societies and
political systems where a clear cultural majority does not exist but where the system is
based on parallel communities and their organisations and institutions.
Inclusion deficit type II
Behind the problems concerning both political stability and functionality lies then the
structural presupposition about the society “falling apart” into different communities
and interest groups. This brings us to the last point which might be useful in
measuring decency. The symbolic living mode exclusion discussed above is actually
only one of two possible types. In this case, it is the nation state as a whole which is
too exclusive, too homogeneous, either because of a language of ethnicity-based
“strong” or “thick” conception of the nation (at the systemic level), a civil society
which is occupied by collective actors like political parties, trade unions etc. which
excludes (groups of) citizens (the collective level), or a political culture which
contains orientations and predispositions conducive to the exclusion of (groups of)
citizens (the individual level). This sort of inclusion deficit easily produces a restricted
symbolic community which more or less coincides with the political system and
which is very difficult for the members of the minority cultures for the newcomers to
enter. In terms of Margalit, people from encompassing minority groups would fall
short of symbolic citizenship, the sharing of society’s symbolic wealth (Margalit
1998, 158).
The second type, living mode exclusion type II, is then to be expected in a society with
a “weak” or “thin” conception of the nation, in a civil society which is
14
“compartimentalized” in the sense that community ties hamper contact among
communities and parties, and, finally, in a political culture which strengthens
exclusive group orientations and predispositions. This inclusion deficit is a result of
the development of ethnic or cultural communities within the society which turn their
back to each other, which cultivate negative stereotypes, mutual distrust etc., and
which lack loyalty or solidarity to the state and the society (table 2).
Table 2. Living mode exclusions type I and type II
Living mode exclusion type 1
Living mode exclusion type 2
Systemic level
Strong nation-state identity
Weak nation-state identity
Collective level
Civil society united but
Civil society
exclusive
“compartmentalized”
Political culture:
Political culture: “we” the
“we” the nation; “they” the
group/community; “they” the
outsiders
outsiders
Individual level
This latter form of living mode exclusion has three forms of possibly problematic
consequences. Firstly, it can cause difficulties for the political system, on the one
hand, because fractions within the communities can develop radical ideas in that are at
variance with the basic principles of the society or, on the other hand, the conflicting
interests may be harmful to the functioning of the political system. Secondly, living
mode exclusion type II may hamper the integration of the members of the separate
communities into the society as a whole which, in turn, may produce disadvantages in
the labour market and in political representation.
The third possibility, however, is highly relevant in discussing decent society. As
Margalit (1998, 279) has put it, “a decent society is judged not only on the basis of
whether its institutions treat encompassing groups in a humiliating way but also on
15
the basis of how the institutions of the encompassing groups treat their own
members”.4 Strong ethnic and cultural communities can themselves develop
discriminating practices, strict mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, intolerant
notions of the proper behaviour and rigid hierarchical systems between, for example,
men and women, young and old, and between members of this or that “clan”. In a
society divided by the living mode exclusion II, those individuals or groups which are
not accepted by the encompassing group, easily fall between all positive identification
categories because the public authorities can still consider him or her primarily as a
member of a community where s/he does not belong.
To recapitulate, a decent society should not accept living mode exclusion type II more
than it does living mode exclusion type I. Systematic measuring inclusion deficits is
not easy, but it is possible. Qualitative research of the identity of the state and of the
ethnic or cultural collective units within the state can, however, reveal symbolic
structures which affect the society and the social interaction among the populace.
Studies based on interviews of persons who have important positions within
communities can also increase our knowledge of the inclusion and exclusion practices
and principles. Finally, opinion surveys can offer valuable information about the basic
ideas concerning the nature of separate communities and their relation to the society
as a whole.
Conclusion
This paper suggests that decency, understood as the political organization of cultural
difference within a society in a non-humiliating manner, could be analysed with the
use of the following concepts: symbolic living mode exclusion type I and type II,
political participation exclusion, political radicalism based on ethnic or cultural
identity and culture-based government gridlock. On the basis of academic and other
knowledge at hand, we can also find examples these problems from Finland, Belgium
and the Netherlands. The symbolic living mode exclusion type I would be especially a
Finnish problem whereas the Netherlands historically and Belgium in the
4
As an example, Margalit argues that those encompassing groups where the forms of life is based
essentially on humiliating others (e.g. skinheads, Ku Klux Klan) should not be tolerated in a decent
society. (Margalit 1998, 174).
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contemporary era would display living-mode exclusion type II. In Belgium, the
Flemish ultra-nationalism, Vlaams Belang, is a manifestation of political radicalism
based on cultural majority identity (within Flanders) whereas in the Netherlands
Islamic radicalism has recently grown in importance. Government gridlocks are a
typically Belgian phenomenon between the two largest linguistic communities, the
Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking. Political participation exclusion would
require more analysis. It is probably also better not to make here the ultimate
judgment, which of those three countries is the most decent.
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