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Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 1
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian Banner
System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of International
Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
Chang Tengchi│Assistant
Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University
Abstract
The Mongolian banner system is not something originally created by the Mongolians.
It is not similar in nature to the county system practiced by ancient agricultural
empires. The relationship between the Mongolian banners and Qing Dynasty
emperors was different from the one between inland local officials and Qing Dynasty
emperors in that the former had a higher level of flexibility as well as uncertainty, as
shown in the irregularity in the conditions of tribute sent by the Mongolian banners to
Qing Dynasty emperors. To stabilize the situation in Mongolia, the Qing Dynasty
imperial court introduced transformed versions of its Eight Banners system in
Southern Mongolia (also known as Inner Mongolia), Northern Mongolia (Outer
Mongolia), and Western Mongolia (Oirat Mongolia) and relied on the "Yellow Hat"
Gelugpa Sect of Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism, headed by the Dalai Lama) followed
by the Mongolians to settle conflicts. The Qing Dynasty imperial court also set up
several “Lama Banners” in honor of lamas in Mongolia to keep the Mongolian
banners in check. The system proved quite successful, ensuring peace and high-level
autonomy among Mongolian banners while also keeping them under the rule of Qing
Dynasty imperial court. The Mongolian banners made alliance with each other to
form a unified nomad regime against the Central Plain regime of China, just like the
situation before the Ming Dynasty.
This paper draws the inference that Mongolia’s banner system is a creative invention
of the Manchu Qing Dynasty rulers, deriving from the Eight Banners system. Since
Mongolia was a vassal state belonging to the Qing Dynasty imperial court back then,
the evolution and diversity of its banner system are a true reflection of the “Tianxia”
(all China) concept under China’s tributary state system, which means Mongolia was
a multi-morphic state that follows a system of multi-morphic units. This innovative
system is a result of historical factors as well as political and economic calculations,
and may inspire future political and international relations studies in a number of
ways as well as facilitating the exchange between Mongolian and Tibetan studies and
other disciplines of social science.
Key Words: banner system, Mongolia, international system, Tianxia, tributary state
system, Eight Banners
Ⅰ. Introduction
2 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
The banner system is not an invention of the Mongols. It derived from Qing
Dynasty Manchu’s “Heshuo system” (meaning “administrative banners”),
which had been derived from pre-Ming Dynasty’s Mongols’ “Otog” and
“Aimag” systems. 1 The “Later Jin” or “Qing” Dynasty was not a regime
dependent on agriculture production. Like the Mongol banners, it designated
households and livestock as administrative units, instead of dividing territories
into administrative units. However, after Qing Dynasty seized China, the
Manchu rulers imitated the previous agricultural empire and introduced clear
administrative divisions to Mongolian banners, in order to “divide and rule”
Mongolia and ensure accountability in the event of riot.
Yet the banner system was not exactly the same as the “system of prefecture
and county” of agricultural empires. It was not uncommon for nomadic Mongol
banners to fight over resources. The relationship between Mongol banners and
the Qing Emperor was more changing and uncertain between the relationship
between other counties and prefectures of China and the Qing Emperor, as
demonstrated by irregularities in the amount of Mongol tributes presented to
Qing Dynasty. To stabilize the situation in Mongolia, the Qing rulers
introduced their invention of the “eight banners” system to Southern Mongolia
(also known as Inner Mongolia), Northern Mongolia (Outer Mongolia), and
Western Mongolia (Oirat Mongolia), and relied on the Mongols’ belief in the
"Yellow Hat" Gelugpa Sect of Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism, the leader being
the Dalai Lama) to settle disputes. The Manchu rulers also established certain
“lama banners” in Mongolia as a gesture of goodwill to the lamas of Mongolia
and also to keep the Mongol banners in check.
The introduction of “eight banners” system proved rather effective: the
Mongol banners were able to coexist peacefully and at the same time
maintained a high degree of autonomy under the rule of Qing Dynasty. The
system also ensured that the pre-Ming Dynasty history of Mongol banners
ganging up as a nomadic regime against China would not repeat. The system
was so effective that the Republic of China government also adopted it,
establishing first the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Yuan and later the
This paper was submitted for review on July 27, 2010. It was approved for publication on October 26,
2010.
* Some parts of this paper are taken from the author’s research project “Development and
Applications of the ‘Chinese School’ of International Relations Theories: Taking the ‘Tianxia’ Order and
Tribute system as an Example.” The author of this paper would like to extend gratitude to Taiwan’s
National Science Council for funding this research project, and also thank the anonymous reviewers
for their comments and suggestions.
1
Dali Zhabu (ed.), A Brief History of Mongolia (Beijing: Central University of Nationalities Press, 2006),
pp.255-256.
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 3
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission to carry on the operations of Qing
Dynasty’s Lifan Yuan and deal with political affairs in Mongol, Hui, and
Tibetan regions. In the 1940s, the Republic of China government made a foiled
attempt to weaken autonomy of Mongolia by introducing a “provincial
government” there. In 1949, the People’s Republic of China government
abolished all the Inner Mongolia provinces established by the previous
Republic of China government. The People’s Republic of China government
wasted no time in opening a communist party headquarter in Inner Mongolia,
and incorporated the banners of the Three Northeast Provinces into Inner
Mongolia in order to dilute the Mongolian majority. The Chinese government
also actively pushed for “ethnic identification” measures, to the point of
creating the “Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.” These measures allowed
Inner Mongolia to maintain a certain degree of autonomy under the banner
system, and also allowed China to tighten its control over Inner Mongolia. 2
Qing Dynasty’s administrative banner division and religious Jimi measures
in Mongolia led to a prolonged period of regional stability prior to the fall of
Qing Dynasty. Compared to modern countries in the West, Qing Dynasty
China was unique in that under the administrative banner system, the Emperor
maintained a unique and flexible political-religious relationship with the
Mongol banners. In recent years, the concepts of a “Chinese Empire,”
“Tianxia,” and “reconstruction of Asia” have become popular among the
circles of international relations and history in China and Taiwan, 3 and the
Mongol banner system seems to be an example of successful realization of
these concepts.
Regarding the current international situation, “the rise of China” has become
an objective reality in post-Cold War international politics. Such a reality left
those dedicated to the study of international relations wondering just what kind
2
Wu Zhe, “Ethnic Autonomy versus Centralization--How Beijing Integrated “Regional National
Autonomy” into the State in the 1950s,” Journal of Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica, No.
65 (2009), pp. 81-129.
3
For the former, see Chang Chi-Hsiung, “The Origin of Chinese World Order,” in Wu Zhipan et al. (ed.),
The Value of East Asia (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2010), pp. 105-146; Huang Chih-Lien, A Study
on Tribute system of Qing Dynasty China (Beijing: China Remmin University Press, 1992); He
Fangchuan, “The Chinese Order Versus the Western Order,” Journal of Beijing University, No. 190
(1998), pp. 30-44. For the latter, see Zhao Tingyang, A World without Worldview: Anthology of Works
on Political Philosophy and Cultural Philosophy, (Beijing: China Renmin University, 2005); Chang
Tengchi, “Paradigm Shift in China’s Diplomacy: From Great Power Diplomacy to World Harmony,”
presented in the annual conference of Chinese Association of Political Science, September 28, 2008
(Chiayi: National Chung Cheng University Department of Political Science); Chen Weichih and Shih
Chih-yu, “An Asian Perspective on China: Hamashita Takeshi's Study on the Tribute System and Its
Implications,” Taiwanese Journal of Political Science, No. 39 (2009), pp. 59-84. Shih Chih-yu and Chang
Tengchi, “The Epistemology of China's Rise and Its Narrative Derivatives,” World Economics and
Politics, No, 353 (2010), pp. 37-51.
4 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
of impact it would have on existing mainstream international relation theories
as well as international political and economic order initiated by the West.
They also wondered whether the old tribute system would stage a comeback in
a new appearance in East Asia. 4 The recent hot issues of “Beijing Consensus”
(or “China Model”) versus “Washington Consensus, 5” the idea of “Chimerica”
raised by American experts, as well as post US hegemony, non-polar world,
and the future of the West, 6 are just a few examples of the many much-debated
issues. The question that is increasingly obvious is whether/how China will
introduce a new world order.
Although I (the author of this paper) am more knowledgeable in
international relation theories than Mongolian or Tibetan studies, it is still my
deepest belief that contemporary Mongolian and Tibetan studies could offer
clues into how a new world order would be constructed. As such, I conducted
an interdisciplinary study on “banner system” based on existing data, in order
to demonstrate the system’s difference from the nation state system of the West,
and apply Mongolian studies to the study of politics and international relations.
Ⅱ. “International System” of the West and “Tianxia System” of the East
Many in the West have long paid close attention to the old international
system of China, 7 but few think such a system would stand any chance of
revival given the dominance of the modern western system. One example of
prominent scholars in the West paying attention to a Chinese version of a new
world order that was gradually taking shape happened in April 2008, when
Peter J. Katzenstein, President of the American Political Science Association,
made a tour speech in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China. He and his team had
already been watching closely the issues of China’s rise, transitions in
4
On the subject of whether the People’s Republic of China had “tributary relationships” with
neighboring countries at that time, see Chang Tengchi and Chen Ying-His, “Revival of the Tribute
system? Take Sino-Burma and Sino-Vietnam Relationships since the 1990s for Example,” a paper
presented in Symposium Celebrating 80th Anniversary of National Chengchi University’s Department
of Diplomacy, Taipei, October 22, 2010.
5
For Chinese translation of the cited texts, see Huang Ping, Cui Zhiyuan (ed.), China and Globalization:
Washington Consensus or Beijing Consensus? (Beijing: Social Sciences Academy Press, 2005). For
details about “Beijing Consensus, see Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The
Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).
6
See G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.87-1
(2008), pp. 23-37. The concept of “non-polar” world was first raised by the renowned international
relations expert Richard Haass. See Richard Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What will Follow US
Dominance?” Foreign Affairs, Vol.87-5 （2008）, pp.44-56; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World,
Mandarin translation by Zhao Guangcheng and Lin Minwang (Beijing: Citic Publishing House, 2009).
7
For example, the American John K. Fairbank was one of the first in the West to explore the tribute
system of East Asia. See John K. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order：Traditional China's Foreign
Relations (M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1969).
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 5
regionalism of Asia, and the new direction of world politics. Continuing a
discussion he initiated in Beijing University’s Journal of International Politics
in 2007, he went further to explore China’s role as a civilizational polity and
the country’s constructive power in reshaping world order. He believes that
concepts like these resemble the old tribute system of ancient East Asia, which
is a manifestation of Confucius philosophy. The difference between a
Confucius tribute system and modern European system is that the former is
essentially a combination of formal hierarchy and informal reciprocal equality,
while the latter is a combination of formal equality and informal hierarchy. 8
The modern European system can also be understood as Stephen D. Krasner’s
concept of sovereignty as an organized hypocrisy. 9 Another reason why the old
tribute system of East Asia is worth observing is that, throughput the history of
China, with the exception of the period from the founding of the People’s
Republic of China to Cultural Revolution, the country has always been an
“open empire” with a lot of heterogeneous elements. 10 Krasner believes this is
where China is similar with the US but different from Empire of Japan and
German Empire, also the fundamental reason why China might further
complicate the new world order.
1. Introduction to “International System” of the West
“International system” is a term drawn from international relations theories
of the West, in particular structural realism. It is used to evaluate political units
in history, for example China and Mongolia, by viewing these countries as
constituent units of a “system” bound by the law of balance of power. 11 Under
such thinking, a unit that is relatively weak in power should seek military
reinforcement or alliances to defend itself against the invasion of great powers.
And a unit that is relatively powerful can seek to consolidate its edge by
8
Peter J. Katzenstein, “Asia under US Dominance,” International Politics Quarterly, No.2, 2006, pp.
10-20. Passages related to Katzenstein’s speech delivered in the International Conference Hall of
National Taiwan University’s College of Social Sciences in April 2008, as well as his seminar speech in
the First Conference Room, are cited from the author of this paper’s notes. Katzenstein has yet to
publish these speeches in writing. In addition, Chen Kuan-Hsing raised a similar point of view in a
seminar in 2005. See Bai Yong-Rui, Chen Kuan-Hsing, and Sun Ge, “On the Possibility of an East Asian
Perspective,” ibid., p. 35.
9
Stephen D. Krasner, “Problematic Sovereignty”, in Stephen D. Krasner ed., Problematic Sovereignty:
Contested Rules and Political Possibilities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 1-23.
10
“Open” in this context refers to the frequency and scale of movement of productive and
ideological elements into and out of a territory. It has little to do with liberalist concerns in political
philosophy. For further analysis, see Valerie Hansen, The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2000).
11
For case analysis, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MS:
Addison-Wesley Press, 1979); Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structuralism Realism after the Cold War."
International Security, Vol. 25-1, pp. 5-41.
6 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
throwing its weight around or seeking to expand its territory. According to
systemic theory of international politics, the only distinction the units is the
size of their power. The characteristic of international system is determined by
the distribution of power among its constituent nations. Therefore, the units
would always have the same characteristics, which would not differ over the
ideologies, race, or social class of a nation’s ruling class. The units are
mutually exclusive: one cannot expand in power without causing threats to
others. If a unit is dependent on another unit in some respect (for example
judiciary, military, or finance), then it has lost its status as a sovereign unit, and
therefore has lost its place in the system. In short, the units within a system are
essentially mutually exclusive atomic entities that can only annex each other or
keep each other in check. Cooperative coexistence is short-lived, while
competition is permanent.
2. Introduction to Tribute System
He Fangchuan defines the old tribute system of East Asia as the most
ancient and most well-defined international system in history. Chang
Chi-Hsiung believes that tribute system gave rise of the so-called “Chinese
empire” concept. 12 Strictly speaking, the tribute system was first seen in around
200 B.C. (in Han Dynasty), however, it was not until 600 A.D. (Tang Dynasty)
that the system was in full swing, with tributes coming in China through land
and sea routes.
“Tribute” is essentially a manifestation of a Confucius ideal of formal
acknowledgement of submission. As a public show of submission, delivery of
tribute focuses a lot on “formalities.” Shin’ichirō Watanabe points out three
types of order manifested in the imperial court of China in his famous work
“Throne in the Sky”: the order between the Emperor and central government
bureaucracy, the order between the Emperor and local counties and prefectures,
and the “Tianxia order” between the Emperor and Siyi (Four Barbarians). The
last one is also known as “tributary relations. 13” The idea of tributary relation
originated from a set of etiquettes and policy principles deriving from a
concentric framework centering on the concept of “filial piety” as appeared in
12
See Chang Chi-Hsiung, “East‐West Conflicts on Principles of International Order: The Case of the
Recognition Negotiations between China and Siam, 1853-1928,” Journal of Historical Research, July
2007, pp.88-114.
13
Shin’ichirō Watanabe made extensive research on this subject. See Shin’ichirō Watanabe, The
Throne in the Sky: Court Administration and Etiquette of Imperial China (Tokyo: Kashiwashobo
Publishing, 2000); for a Mandarin language introduction of the book, see National Taiwan University
Professor Wang Te-chuan, “Beyond Tokyo and Kyoto: A Study of Chinese Ancient History by Watanabe
Shinichirō,” New History, Vol.17 No.1 (2006), pp. 143-202.
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 7
Discourses of the States. Chen Xiangyang illustrates the idea in the following
table:
Table One: Tributary Relations and Etiquettes
Distance from
Dianfu (five
Houfu (a
Binfu (a
Barbarian
Barbarian
the Emperor
hundred li)
thousand li)
thousand and
Yaofu (two
Huangfu
five hundred
thousand li)
(remote wild
domain)
li)
Etiquette of
Ceremony
Sacrifice
Offering
Tribute
Free to
submission to
declare
the Emperor
themselves as
king
Emperor’s
Legal
Military
means of
penalties
attack
Invasion
Warning
Urging in
writing
punishing
breach of
etiquette
Source: Cited and summarized from Chen Xiangyang, China’s
Good-Neighborly Diplomacy: Thinking, Implementation, and Prospects,
(Beijing: Shi Shi Publishing House, 2004), p.29.
For tributary nations in remote domains, a tributary relationship is
maintained through the following three ways: marriage of state, cefeng, and
chaogong. 14 In a practical sense, “chaogong” can also be seen as a policy tool
in jimi system (self-rule administrative and political organization system),
which is used to both explore the true intentions of the tributary nation and also
to persuade the tributary nation into compromise through the offer of marriage
and trade. John K. Fairbank calls this an act of “defensive diplomacy. 15”
However, sometimes it is not possible to keep a powerful tributary state in
check through chaogong. As a result, tributary relationships often became a
ritualistic formality in which the tributary state receives far more benefits than
the more powerful state, and the relationship itself was a proof of legitimacy of
the more powerful regime. Sometimes the more powerful state even found it
too much of a burden to deal with tributary states, with the emperor
14
See Chen Xiangyang, China’s Good-Neighborly Diplomacy: Thinking, Implementation, and Prospects,
(Beijing: Shi Shi Publishing House, 2004), p.135.
15
Cited from Chen Tingxiang and Zhou Ding, Tianxia, World, and the Country: A History of
Transformation in Contemporary China’s Foreign Relations Principles (Shanghai: Joint Publishing,
2008), p.4.
8 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
complaining about dealings with tributary states “too costly and too much
trouble” and asking tributary states that sought chaogong benefits “not to send
delegations until you have a new leader. 16”
From the political-economic perspective, the “emperor-tianxia order” in the
tribute system did not emerge out of the blue from Confucius classics. It comes
with certain material conditions, and has basic ideas that are derived from these
conditions. For example, He Fangchuan believes that such an order reflects the
conservative ideal of self-sufficiency, a characteristic of an agricultural empire
which stands in contrast to the aggressive spirit of nomadic or island nations.
China’s geographical location and technological limitations posed a physical
obstacle to the expansion of agricultural empire. Imperial China’s relationships
with tributary states were essentially a kind of “domestic affairs within the
empire.” In other words, China as a “central empire” with relatively greater
economic autonomy and relatively stronger military power, forged ties with
remote tributary states through ritualistic etiquettes. 17
Being an agricultural empire with material advantages, imperial China at the
height of its power often liked to launch military campaigns against weaker
states. However, imperial China also lacked the ability to appreciate the
material and cultural advantages of tributary states, and as a result overlooked
the possibility of ruling or colonizing the tributary states. 18 Ancient maps of
imperial China betray reality by presenting China as having a much larger
territory than neighboring countries. This is another example of imperial
China’s self-centeredness. 19
There were two types of situations in which imperial China might not extend
a seemingly “non-interference” attitude toward tributary states. Firstly,
tributary states that refused to observe the proper etiquette as expected of them
might provoke imperial China into wielding its self-assumed military
superiority to launch face-saving military campaigns. On the other hand,
tributary states that spared no efforts in pleasing imperial China were
16
Vol. 324 of Ming Dynasty History, “Foreign Country V,” cited from He Fangchuan, “The Chinese
Order Versus the Western Order,” Journal of Beijing University, No. 190 (1998), p. 39. In fact, there
were states that actively performed tributary duties by paying regular visits to the more powerful
states. Famous examples include Uruma and Great Joseon in Ming Dynasty era.
17
The term “domestic affairs within an empire” was coined by Shin’ichirō Watanabe. Cited from
Wang Te-chuan, ibid., p.190.
18
For more information regarding China’s preference to launch military campaign against weaker
states, see Iain Alastair Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
19
See Ge Zhao-guang, “Ancient Maps as Records of History of Ideas,” in Gan Huaizhen (ed.), Concepts
of Tianxia and China in History of East Asia (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2007), pp.
217-254.
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 9
guaranteed to receive protection from China against invasion of other countries,
even though it might be a costly and difficult campaign for imperial China to
launch. This is how a tributary relationship fulfills a utopian ideal—the more
powerful state enables the survival a weaker tributary state. An example of this
would be the case of Kingdom of Great Joseon turning to the deteriorating
imperial Ming China for assistance against Japanese invasion led by Toyotomi
Hideyoshi. Eventually Ming China and Great Joseon won the war, though not
without paying a hefty price. Ming Dynasty came to an end soon after. Many
years after the fall of Ming Dynasty, Great Joseon still refused to recognize
legitimacy of imperial Qing Dynasty of China, and still held private rituals in
commemoration of Zhu Youjian, thee last emperor of Ming Dynasty. It was an
extreme case of tributary relationship. 20
3. “Tianxia Order” as a New Question Awareness
Zhao Tingyang raised the very abstract concept of “Tianxia order” based on
the abstract elements of “tributary relationship.” He acknowledges that as a
worldview, “Tianxia order” resembles Plato’s idealism. Plato defines “Tianxia”
as a philosophically perfect form which is not necessarily practicable in the
current world. Besides, the tribute system of imperial China only contains a
very small fraction of idealism and lots of flaws and hypocrisy. The current
world lacks the many conditions required for immediate realization of
“Tianxia” worldview. Yet this does not stop people from thinking about the
possibility of improving existing world order. 21
Zhao Tingyang first questions the presumed anarchism of mainstream
western international relations. He believes that the Westphalia/Hobbes order
under presumed anarchism is essentially a “non-worldly disorder.” Hobbes’
“disorder” cannot provide mankind with a complete worldview framework
both in theory and in practice, since it is essentially “anti-world” and
“anti-social.” Zhao then used a method similar to John Rawls’ “veil of
ignorance” to search for a conceptual possibility that transforms from being
specific to being abstract, that exists in time and space of mankind, in the
highest political system. It is the largest context in which mankind exists. It is
20
See Chen Xiangyang, China’s Good-Neighborly Diplomacy: Thinking, Implementation, and Prospects,
ibid., pp. 156-160.
21
Plato’s “Republic” is based on the same idea. For more information on Plato’s idealist philosophy
and a brief discussion on “form,” see Bertrand Russell, translated by He Bao-zhong and Chen
Chun-Huei, Wisdoms of the West (I), (Taipei: Yeqiang Publishing House, 1986), pp. 80-82, 88. Also see
Zhao Tingyang, A World without Worldview: Anthology of Works on Political Philosophy and Cultural
Philosophy, ibid., pp. 9, 52; Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia System: A Philosophical Guide to World Systems
(Nanking: Jiangsu Education Publishing House, 2005), pp. 40-48.
10 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
an existence “larger than the sum of nation,” one that cannot be reduced and
returned to the unit of nation. 22 Such a situation can never be one that involves
mutually exclusive “nation states” that are confined within a presumed
Westphalia system in a territory.
According to Zhao, “tianxia” worldview is better than Hobbes order and the
Westphalia system because as a “perfect form,” “tianxia” worldview is based
on the idea of “everything under heaven as one nation.” This concept originates
from Gongyang Zhuan on Spring and Autumn Annals, meaning that for an
emperor or a king, all that is under heaven is under his rule. This idea stands in
contrast to territorial sovereignty. This concept has double meanings. Firstly,
the emperor is supposed to be an abstract core of order, then under “tianxia”
concept, everyone under heaven is his subject, despite differences in the depth
of relationship, and not a single one of them should be deemed “alien.” In other
words, the Chinese/barbarian distinction is a cultural one, and has nothing to do
with nationalism. 23 The “core regions” have a sense of cultural superiority over
remote domains, and are focused on “diversity and coexistence” rather than
interference and “conversion.” Secondly, the role of “son of heaven” (i.e.,
emperor) at the heart of the system is supposed to be taken up by any member
of the system who commands “popular support.” In imperial East Asia where
Confucius values prevailed, the “son of heaven” usually refers to a legitimate
ruler who had control over the territory, and who more or less practiced
Confucius principles and fulfilled his ceremonial role. This is why the Northern
Dynasties in around 400 A.D. and the Qing Dynasty in around 1,600 A.D. are
still deemed “legitimate regimes” by ethnic majority. 24
Naturally, the “tianxia” concept faced a lot of challenges soon after its
creation. Imperial Chinese rulers often lacked the ability to carry out the
“tianxia” worldview. As a result, many of them exercised an administration
style that was “Confucius at the surface, but legalist at heart. 25” Since these
practical issues could not be solved anytime soon, it is no wonder that the
Chinese government does not talk much about the “tianxia” concept that is
22
Statements regarding “larger than the sum of nation” and “reduction” are the author of this
paper’s interpretations of the theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Kenneth N. Waltz, both of whom
are believers in holism.
23
Also see Shin’ichirō Watanabe, translated by Shu Chong, Royal Power and Tianxia Order in Imperial
China (Beijing: Chung Hwa Book Co., 2008), p.12.
24
Zhao Tingyang, A World without Worldview: Anthology of Works on Political Philosophy and
Cultural Philosophy, ibid, pp.16-18; Chen Xiangyang, China’s Good-Neighborly Diplomacy: Thinking,
Implementation, and Prospects, p.31, 151-152.
25
For an example, see Violetta Ravagnoli, “China’s View of World Order: the Tianxia Concept and
Western Concept of Order,” translated by Wang Juxin, in Chen Shangsheng (ed.), Confucian Civilization
and the Chinese History of Foreign Relations (Jinan: Shandong University Press, 2008), pp.225-236.
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 11
popular among academic circles around the world. However, “tianxia” theory
did give rise to multidisciplinary approaches to the study of international
politics, in particular in the fields of history, philosophy, and social sciences.
Many were indeed driven to rethink the meaning of concepts like “East Asia,”
“new regionalism,” and “the world. 26” “Tianxia” theory’s extreme emphasis on
the influence of “relationships” and “roles” on international politics apparently
has much to do with the international relations’ current structuralist focus on
exploring the issue of “identity.” Such a focus is giving rise to a certain
“Chinese school” of international relation theories. 27
Ⅲ. Origin and Organizational Structure of Mongolian Banner System in Qing
Dynasty
1. The Origin of Mongolian Banner System
The Mongolian banner system that appeared after Qing Dynasty is not only
practiced by the Mongols. In Liao Dynasty and Jin Dynasty era, some regions
of today’s Mongolia once practiced the prefecture and county system (some
even had higher authorities to supervise administration). After the Mongols
crushed Liao and Jin and created Yuan Dynasty, the old system of bestowing
meadowland to Mongol nobles was restored. The Mongols also adopted the Jin
practice of setting up provinces in certain regions. While Ming Dynasty
emperors opted to divide and defeat “remote regimes” such as Mongolia, they
for the most part adopted a conservative attitude toward the Mongols, refusing
to interfere with local affairs. Examples of this conservative attitude include the
creation of “weiso administrative system” and construction of the Great Wall. 28
The Later Jin Dynasty rulers adopted their own traditional political and military
system, also known as the eight banner system, to manage the basic social units
(“otog”) of Mongolia. The Chahar and Khorchin Mongols (which lived near
Liao River in the western part of Northeast China) were among the first
Mongols to show submission to Later Jin, and therefore were expanded from
two banners to eight Mongol banners. Thus the “Eight-Banner Chahar” was
born. 29 To the Manchu people, belonging to a “banner” does not entitle a
person to a piece of land. However, the Manchu rulers did bestow the newly
26
Wang Zhengyi, ibid, p.20. For the viewpoints of Bai Yong-Rui, see Bai Yong-Rui, Chen Kuan-Hsing,
and Sun Ge, “On the Possibility of an East Asian Perspective,” ibid., p. 36.
27
For an example, see Qin Yaqing, “On the Possibility and Inevitability of the Birth of “Chinese School”
of International Relations Theories,” World Economics and Politics (2006, No.3), pp. 14-21.
28
See Cao Yongnian (ed.), History of Inner Mongolia (Volume II) (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia University
Press, 2007), pp. 13-30, 104-110, 289-295, 393-400.
29
Dali Zhabu (ed.), A Brief History of Mongolia (Beijing: Central University of Nationalities Press, 2006),
pp.191-199.
12 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
submitted Mongols clearly allocated “pastoral areas” and prohibit the Mongols
and Manchus from crossing the border to fight against or collaborate with each
other. 30 In fact, even before creating the Mongol banners, Later Jin had created
the Mongol Office alongside the six ministries of imperial administration. The
Mongol Office was changed to Lifan Yuan in 1637, and was charged with
Mongolian, Xinjiang, and Tibetan affairs until the end of Qing Dynasty. Lifan
Yuan was later transformed into Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Yuan and
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in Republic of China era.
2. Organizational Structure of Mongolian Banners
Since the Mongolian banner system is derived from the Manchu “eight
banner system,” it is important to explain first the Manchu banner system. As
both an administrative and a military unit, the banner consists of productive
and military units known as “nirus.” Each “niru” has ten men, and one of these
ten men serves as “ezhen,” or unit chief. As the local population grew, a “niru
ezhen” was designated for every three hundred men, and every five nirus
constitute a “jiala” (a unit of around 1,500 men). A jiala has a “jiala ezhen.”
Every five jialas constitute a “banner” (a unit of around 7,500 men). Each
banner is headed by a Manchu royalty known as “beile,” and under the beile is
the ezhen who serves as the commander. 31
The head of a Mongol banner (known as a jasagh) is usually the most
powerful noble in the banner. A jasagh is often bestowed hereditary honorary
titles such as prince in recognition of his contribution to the realm. A jasagh
has his own office/residence, which is also known as “banner office.” One of
his sons is given the honorary title of “Duke Who Stabilizes the State,” and
another is created “Duke Who Assists the Nation.” Under the jasagh is the
tayiji, or assistant manager who is also a Mongol noble of the banner. 32 A tayiji
is a fourth level official (there are cases of second level tayijis near the end of
Qing Dynasty) who supervises banner administration. Under the tayiji are a
banner janggin and a deputy banner janggin. Under the two janggins are two
“meilun janggins” and two deputy “meilun janggins.” The most basic unit is
called “sumu” (military unit) or “bage” (nomadic unit), which is roughly
equivalent to township. Each sumu is led by a fifth to seventh level “sumu
30
Liu Xueyao, “Mongol League and Banner System,” in Liu Xueyao and Chen Yuhsin, “A Brief
Discussion on Mongol League and Banner System and Tibetan Theocratic System (Taipei: Mongolian
and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 1996), pp. 3-4.
31
For more information, see Du Jiaji, “A Study on the Relationship between Qing Royalties and State
Administration (Taipei: Wunan Book, 1998).
32
“Tayiji” means literally “prince.”
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 13
janggin,” and each banner contains about thirty sumus. As such, the banner’s
status as an administrative unit is roughly equivalent to that of “county” in
China. However, banner officials have much higher positions and much greater
privileges than county officials. 33 A “league” is an administrative unit
consisting of several banners. It is equivalent to Tumen (unit of ten thousand)
of Yuan Dynasty. The term “league” initially refers to an assembly of banners
for the purpose of parade. Later it became an administrative unit headed by a
“league chief,” a non-hereditary position which is filled by Mongol nobles who
supervise military and civil affairs. 34 The following table presents a comparison
of the Manchu eight banners system and the Mongol league and banner system:
Table Two: Comparison of Manchu Eight Banner System and Mongol League
and Banner System
Head of
Head of
Son of
Chief
Assista
Head of
Head of
League
Banner
Head
Execut
nt
Five Basic
Basic
of
ive
Execut
Administra
Administra
Banner
Officer
ive
tive Units
tive Unit
of
Officer
Banner
of
Banner
Banner
Beile,
Commander-in-c
Regimenta
Company
Eight Banner
Chief (a
beise
hief (gvsai
l
commande
System
royal
janggin)
commande
r (niru
r (jiala
ezhen),
janggin)
each unit
(5)
consisting
Manchu
None
prince)
of dozens
to 300 men
None
Sumu
Vassal
Head of
Jasagh (a
Duke
Assista
Banner
Mongol
league (1)
Mongol
Who
nt
Janggi
Janggin
Banners,
Deputy head
noble and
Stabili
Tayiji
n and
(head of
including
of league (1)
also a
zes the
and
Deputy
sumu),
prince)
State
Deputy
Banner
manages
(1),
Assista
Janggi
several
Southern
Mongolia,
33
See Liu Xueyao, “Mongol League and Banner System,”ibid; Liang Lixia, A Study on Alxa Mongol
(Beijing: Ethnic Press of China, 2006), pp.115-117; Cheng Hou, Ye Dakuang et al., Survey Report on Ten
Banners in Jirem League (I) (Hohhot: Yuanfang Publishing House, 2007), pp. 118-119.
34
Dali Zhabu (ed.), A Brief History of Mongolia, ibid., p.255; Liu Xueyao, “Mongol League and Banner
System,” ibid., p.8.
14 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
Northern
Duke
nt
n,
Mongolia,
Who
Tayiji
Meilun
and Western
Assists
(Mong
Janggi
Mongolia
the
ol
n and
Nation
nobles)
Deputy
(1),
Meilun
second
Janggi
level
n
damules
tayiji
(or
lower)
General
Commander-in-C
Regimenta
Company
olled
Manager,
hief, Deputy
l
commande
Mongol
General
Commander-in-C
commande
r
Banners
(non-heredi
hief
r
Direct-Contr
None
tary,
appointed
by the
Emperor)
Equivalent
Governor-Ge
County
Township*
administrativ
neral of
Executive,
(or
e unit in
Province,
Prefecture
military
China
Grand
Executive
company)
Coordinator
and
Provincial
Governor
Source: Compiled by the author of this paper based on Cheng Hou, Ye
Dakuang et al., Survey Report on Ten Banners in Jirem League (I) (Hohhot:
Yuanfang Publishing House, 2007); Dali Zhabu (ed.), A Brief History of
Mongolia, ibid. (Beijing: Central University of Nationalities Press, 2006); Liu
Xueyao, “Mongol League and Banner System,” in Liu Xueyao and Chen
Yuhsin, “A Brief Discussion on Mongol League and Banner System and
Tibetan Theocratic System (Taipei: Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs
Commission, 1996).
*After the People’s Republic of China government abolished the People’s
Commune and introduced the reform and opening-up policies, each banner
contains administrative units known as townships as well as “sumu.” Like
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 15
townships, “sumu” is also a “basic administrative unit.” See Compilation
Group, Introduction to Evenk Autonomous Banner (Beijing: Ethnic Press of
China, 2008), pp.14-15.
However, the league and banner system is not necessarily applicable to all
Mongol banners. In dealing with vassal states and foreign countries, imperial
China had all kinds of varied and flexible relationships with neighboring
communities and units. There is also a lot of flexibility and variety in Mongol
league and banner system. Qing rulers had vastly different standards when it
comes to establishment of banners and appointment of banner executives,
taking into account a variety of factors such as the banners’ relation with Qing
royalties, loyalty to the Qing Emperor, geographical location, and strategic
values. 35 Some Mongol tribes were made “a banner without a league,” or
directly under the jurisdiction of Qing Emperor. Some banner executives were
not Mongol nobles at all, but military officers such as General or
Commander-in-Chief appointed by the Qing Emperor. Mongol banners had
pretty much the same administrative organizational structure as prefectures and
counties in China, with the only difference being the status of chief executive.
Despite the varieties, Mongol leagues and banners can still be classified into
the following types based on geographical position and status of chief
executive:
The first type, “Direct-Controlled Mongolia,” included once rebellious tribes
such as Chahar Banner, which was founded by Mongols in Chakhar (which
included Ligdan Khan, a descendant of Northern Yuan Dynasty). (Chahar
Banner was previously known as Chahar League in 1934, and later become
known as Chahar Province.) Other banners of Direct-Controlled Mongolia
included Guihua City (Kweisui of Suiyuan), where Qing Dynasty stationed
their troops in the war against Dzungar Khanate, the Xining General’s
Jurisdiction which was created following the revolt of Lobsang Tendzin of
Qinghai, the remote northeastern region of Hulunbuir, Altai Uriankhai (two
banners) in northern frontier, Tannu Uriankhai (five banners), and Uliastai
General’s Jurisdiction (two banners). The Qing Emperor directly appointed
“Generals” or “Commander-in-Chiefs” to manage these banners, and these
banners had “General Managers” or “Commanders,” but no jasaghs. Qing
imperial residents in Tibet commanded a troop consisting of members of eight
Mongol banners led by eight commanders. Although these Mongol banners
were not necessarily in geographical proximity to imperial Qing rulers, their
35
Liu Xueyao, ibid., p.7.
16 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
chief executives were not hereditary positions, as they were directly under the
jurisdiction of the Qing emperor. Therefore, the chief executives of these
banners “did not hold hereditary positions, and had to seek the emperor’s
approval in banner administration.” These banners were known as
“Direct-Controlled Mongolia. 36”
The second type is “Vassal Mongolia,” where the position of banner jasagh
was hereditary. It was divided into two parts: “Outer Jasagh Mongolia” and
“Inner Jasagh Mongolia.”
“Outer Jasagh Mongolia” included Khalkha Mongolia (also known as
“Mongolia located in the north,” or today’s Mongolia, and contains four
“league” level administrative units: Tüshiyetü Khanates, Sechen Khanate,
Jasaghtu Khanates, and Sayin-Noyan Khanates, which together included 86
banners), Oirat Mongolia (also known as Western Mongolia, it was the
territory of Wala in Ming Dynasty, and included the following administrative
units: two leagues and 19 banners in Kobdo, four leagues and 13 banners in Ili
General’s Jurisdiction, Qinghai Mongolia (two leagues and 29 banners, under
the jurisdiction of Xining General), and three special non-league banners of
Alxa Heshuote Banner (today’s Alxa League), Etsina Torghuud Banner, and
Kobdo Heshuote Banner, which together had 150 banners. The head of a
banner in “Outer Jasagh Mongolia” is called a jasagh, who had to seek the
league executive’s or general’s approval in military affairs and foreign relations,
but had a certain degree of autonomy in matters relating to the banner’s civil
administration, judiciary, and finance. The jasaghs of the three special banners
had their own troops, and answered directly to the Qing emperor. In the
Republic of China era, the banners became under direct jurisdiction of the
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, and ceased to answer to “league”
authorities, since there were no league executives. 37
“Inner Jasagh Mongolia,” also known as Southern Mongolia, had a total of
49 banners, including most of the territory of today’s Inner Mongolia. It has six
leagues: (from east to west) Jirem League (10 banners), Zhāowūdá League (11
banners), Josutu League (8 banners), Xilingol League (10 banners), Ulaanqab
League (6 banners), and Yīkèzhāo League (7 banners). The 49 banners
eventually increased to 52 banners. The jasagh or head of a banner is
concurrently the banner’s military commander-in-chief, as well as the highest
authority in civil administration, judiciary, and finance of the banner. 38 Prince
Demchugdongrub, the famous leader of a Mongol independent movement in
36
37
38
Dali Zhabu, A Brief History of Mongolia, ibid., pp.190, 259-260.
Liang Lixia, A Study on Alxa Mongol, ibid., pp.103-105.
Liu Xueyao, ibid., pp.11-12; Dali Zhabu, A Brief History of Mongolia, ibid., pp.253-254.
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 17
Inner Mongolia in the Republic of China era, is a jasagh (lord) of the Sonid
Right Banner of Xilin Gol League. He later became the head of the league. He
is an example of how influential banner nobles could be in the region back
then. 39
3. Relationship between Banner/League and Qing Emperor/Imperial Court
Compared to general administrative units in the rest of China, Mongol
banners maintained a different relationship with the imperial Chinese court
(central government of China). The differences are found in the following
respects:
Firstly, in Mongol banners (vassal Mongol banners), positions such as the
lord of banner, “Duke Who Assists the Nation,” “Duke Who Stabilizes the
State,” and all the tayijis were hereditary. The executives of prefectures and
counties in the rest of China, however, had to pass a qualifying examination to
secure their positions, which were not hereditary. The hereditary Mongol
nobles were required to pay annual tributes, but not taxes, to the Qing Emperor.
And they would receive an annual provision of “money, silk, and satin.” In fact,
the Mongol nobles were given a more generous amount of money, silk, and
satin than the officials in the rest of China. For example, the three princes of
Khalkha Mongolia in the north each received an annual allowance of 2,500
Taels of silver. The annual allowance for each jasagh prince was 2,000 Taels of
silver, 1,500 Taels of silver for each prince, 500-800 Taels of silver for each
beile and beise, 200-300 Taels of silver for “Duke Who Assists the Nation” and
“Duke Who Stabilizes the State,” and 100 Taels of silver for other tayijis. 40
Secondly, there were many cases of marriage for alliance between Mongol
banners and Qing royalties. Some Mongol banners even practiced marriage
alliances for hundreds of years. The offspring of this type of marriage would
often be given hereditary titles and other rewards. For example, the ruling
house of Alxa Heshuote Banner, which was directly under the jurisdiction of
Qing emperor, had 29 marriages with the ruling house of Qing from 1702 to
1894. 41 Selected offspring of these marriages were given the privilege of living
among and going to school with Qing royalties, which further deepened the
relationship. The emperor and league/banner leaders thus became more than
39
See Meng Fanli, “An Analysis of Prince Demchugdongrub’s Independence Movement in Mongolia in
the Late Stages of Chinese Civil War,” Journal of China Border Area Studies, No.168 (1996), pp. 43-53;
Wu Zhe, “Ethnic Autonomy and Centralization: Beijing’s Efforts to Centralize Ethnic Autonomous
Regions through the Means of Administrative Division in the 1950s,” ibid.
40
Dali Zhabu, A Brief History of Mongolia, ibid., pp.268-269.
41
Liang Lixia, A Study on Alxa Mongol, ibid., pp.123-137.
18 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
just monarch and his subjects, but also members of one family. Such a kind of
kinship is different from the Han Dynasty policy of peace marriage, but similar
in nature to the political marriages between ruling houses of Europe. According
to Du Jiaji’s study on early Qing Dynasty archives, since the beginning of
Manchu rule in China, there had been as many as 336 Mongol nobles marrying
Qing princesses, and 85 Mongol noble ladies marrying Qing nobles. 42
Thirdly, Mongol banners, like other vassal states of China, were required to
pay annual tribute to the Qing emperor and participate in the hunting parties
alongside the emperor. Depending on the distance to the emperor, the Mongol
banners made one tributary visit to the emperor every three years or every five
to six years. 43 In dealing with the Mongol banners, the emperor followed the
traditional practice of “receiving little gifts but giving generously in return.”
Each Inner Jasagh Mongolian banner presented the emperor with a goat and a
bottle of goat milk wine every year. Each prince of Khalkha Mongolia in the
north presented the emperor with “nine whites” (eight white horses and one
white camel) every year. Each lama banner presented the emperor with khata
and horses every year. These tributes had relatively little economic values, and
highlighted the fact that the emperor was “kind and generous” to the vassal
states, and did not seek to make profits (through colonization) out of tributary
relationships. Like “eight banner nobles,” the head of a Mongol banner was
entitled to annual allowances, and were allowed to build residence in Beijing. 44
Ⅳ. Strategic, Political, and Economic Values of the Mongol League/Banner
System
The Mongol league/banner system has the advantages of preserving unique
qualities of various banners/leagues and maintaining peace among
leagues/banners. For the ruling Manchus who were an ethnic minority in China,
the system was useful as a tool to keep the Han Chinese people in check and to
prevent the Mongols from collaborating against the imperial court.
Introduction of Manchu “eight banner system” to Mongolia has the
following strategic effects: Firstly, the Mongol Otog system was meant for
pastoral areas, and the Manchu sumu or banner systems were designed as
fishing and hunting or combatant units. In other words, these systems were not
designed as administrative divisions. However, the system introduced by Qing
rulers gave Mongolia clearly defined pastoral regions, and all local leagues and
42
Ibid., p.136.
See Qi Meiqin and Lee Wenqi, “A Study on Qing Dynasty Vassal Mongol Princes’ Reasons for Visiting
Beijing,” Journal of China Border Area Studies, No.175 (2008), pp.33-52.
44
Dali Zhabu, A Brief History of Mongolia, ibid., p.272.
43
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 19
banners were prohibited from violating the borders. Therefore, the
league/banner system can be used to “define borders.” Secondly, there was a
steep increase in the number of Mongol nobles following the introduction of
eight banner system, since Qing emperors conferred many titles to the Mongols,
and sometimes a Mongol banner was divided into left, middle, and right
banners, and leaders of the newly created banners were created nobles.
Sometimes the head of a banner was rewarded simply because of an increase in
the number of men in the banner, and the banner was made a new banner. As a
result, Mongol tribes diminished in size. This strategy is known as
“enfeoffment.” Thirdly, Mongol banners were divided into “vassal banners”
and “direct-controlled banners.” Vassal banners had league executives or
generals to supervise military and foreign affairs, while direct-controlled
banners had emperor-appointed officials (generals or commander-in-chiefs) to
carry out the will of the emperor. This strategy is known as “military
control. 45”
The Qing rulers took the following measures to make sure Mongol banners
would not be strong enough politically and economically to challenge the Qing
regime. The first measure is called “separating Mongols from Han Chinese.”
The Qing rulers brought the league/banner system and hereditary titles to
Mongolia, and encouraged alliance marriages between noble houses in
Mongolia and Qing China. However, the Qing rulers prohibited unapproved
marriages between nobles of southern and northern Mongolia, and ban the
Mongols on learning Mandarin language or taking imperial examinations. The
only way for a Mongol person to secure public office is by the decree of
emperor or by battle achievements. And Han Chinese civilians were strictly
prohibited from doing business in Mongol banners (this rule gradually died out
toward the end of Qing Dynasty because of difficulty in enforcement, and also
because of Qing rulers’ wish to strengthen border defense against foreign
invasion), and also prohibited from marrying Mongol women. Although these
rules might be effective in preventing Han Chinese-Mongol clashes and
protecting the resources of Mongolia, they also forged a barrier between
Mongols and Han Chinese. Towards the end of Qing Dynasty, the
league/banner system was on the decline, and the bans against mixing of Han
Chinese and Mongol civilians were reduced to nothing but formalities. The
Qing rulers were unable to enforce the rules, and even the Mongol princes were
actively recruiting Han Chinese farmers in order to earn farmland rent. In Inner
Jasagh Mongolia, it was increasingly common for Han Chinese and Mongols to
45
Liu Xueyao, ibid., pp.4-5; Liang Lixia, A Study on Alxa Mongol, ibid., p.105.
20 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
mix and marry, and an increasing number of Mongols were learning Mandarin
language. However, conflicts were inevitable after Mongolia bowed to reality
and opened doors to Han Chinese. 46
The second most important political and economic measure taken by Qing
rulers is to promote Tibetan Buddhism and keep the Mongol banners in check.
As many Mongols were firm believers in Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism,
and there was the history of Güshi Khan and Lhasa Khan entering Tibet
directly interfering with military affairs of Tibet, the Qing rulers were deeply
aware of the importance of making friends with theocratic rulers of Tibet as a
means to cement spiritual and political legitimacy of Qing rulers. For this
purpose, the Qing rulers took the following measures: Firstly, Gelug followers
in Mongolia were entitled to certain financial or even civil privileges. Gelug
monasteries in Mongolia did not have to follow the orders of Mongol nobles,
did not have to pay taxes to banner lord, and monks were exempted from
military service. As the monasteries were gaining in residents, some of the
larger-scale monasteries went on to form “lama banners” ruled by “Living
Buddha” on behalf of the Qing emperor. Secondly, the Qing rulers changed the
rules so that reincarnations of “Living Buddha” (also known as Khutukhtu) of
major monasteries in Mongol could proceed without the approval of banner
lords. However, reincarnations did need the approval of Lifan Yuan. Some of
the more prestigious Khutukhtu even had to go through the Golden Urn method
in Beijing (Changkya Khutukhtu, the spiritual head of southern Mongolia, even
took up permanent residence in Beijing). 47 Thirdly, Qing Dynasty Mongols
were encouraged to make donations to the Gelug. It is said that the Qing rulers
wanted to make a show of devoutness and also weaken the financial clout of
Mongol lords by encouraging the Mongols to make donations to the Gelug. To
lead by example, the emperor himself made regular donations to monasteries in
Mongolia out of his own pocket (instead of taking money from the imperial
Treasury). Qianlong Emperor alone donated over 6 million Taels of silver to
Mongol monasteries during his reign. 48
These political and economic measures gradually died out towards the end of
Qing Dynasty, partly because a weakened Qing regime was unable to enforce
the rules, and partly because it was a common belief among Qing officials in
46
This is also known as “blocking policy”; Dali Zhabu, A Brief History of Mongolia, ibid., pp. 263-264;
for case analysis, see Cheng Hou, Ye Dakuang et al., Survey Report on Ten Banners in Jirem League (I),
pp. 71-83, 124-139.
47
In addition of the Lord of Alxa Heshuote Banner, the three Gelug monasteries each also had its own
Khutukhtu reincarnations. See Liang Lixia, ibid., pp. 108-109.
48
Lai Huimin, The Qing Government's Expenditures on Tibetan Buddhist Temples in Beijing and Their
Significance, Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica, No.58 (2007), pp. 1-5.
Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4 21
Beijing and Mongolia that Japan and Russia had infiltrated deeply into
Manchuria and Mongolia. The sparsely populated Manchuria and Mongolia did
not have enough population to strengthen border defense and economic
development. Therefore, Qing Chinese regime could not consolidate border
control without relaxing the Han Chinese/Mongol segregation policy. The
Mongols were not as heavily Sinicized as the Manchus who had ruled China
for two hundred years. This is the reason why so many Mongol leagues and
banners (especially the Outer Jasagh Mongols) launched independence
movement at the encouragement of Russia (later the Soviet Union)
immediately following the founding of Republic of China after Xinhai
Revolution.
Ⅴ. Conclusions: A Multi-Morphic Tianxia Model
The author of this paper makes a preliminary conclusion that the Qing rulers
were rather creative in inventing the Mongol league/banner system based on
the eight banner system. The Mongol league/banner system was an historical
coincidence and also a strategic design for political and economic purposes. It
is also an inspiring innovation in the field of politics and international relations,
and an important creation that could enhance exchanges between the field of
Mongolian and Tibetan studies and other fields of social sciences.
First of all, the traditional Chinese concept of a “state” has been structurally
different from modern western countries. Asking China to adopt the modern
western paradigm would be setting the country up for theoretical fallacies and
obstacles in practice. 49 As noted above, the western paradigm of “nation state”
is constructive or even hypocritical in nature. 50 The modern “international
system” that derived from the concept of “nation state” is by no means
mankind’s ultimate solution towards world peace. As a vassal state of imperial
Qing Dynasty China, Mongolia has an administrative system that manifests the
characteristics of the Chinese “tianxia” tributary system. The Mongolian
system is a system of multi-morphic units, and Mongolia is a multi-morphic
state. The author of this paper believes that this description might even be more
accurate than Fei Xiaotong’s view of Chinese nation as a unity of pluralistic
society. Fei’s theory defines “Chinese nation” as a high-level entity consisting
of many basic-level, multi-morphic ethnic entities. The problem with this
49
For an example, see Chang Tengchi, “Essence and Evolution of the ‘China’ Concept,” in Chang
Tengchi, Constructing China: Status and Foreign Relations of a Great Power in an Uncertain World
(Taipei: Yang-Chih Book, 2003), pp.308-313.
50
For more information, see Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1995), pp. 12-52.
22 Banner System in Qing Dynasty: An Innovation of
The Significance behind the Creation of Mongolian
International Political System under the “Tianxia” Concept
theory is the overemphasis on “homogeneity” and consolidation of Communist
China’s sovereignty. 51 The “multi-morphic state” theory adopted in this paper
is in fact of one and the same idea as the “Chinese school” of international
relations, which emerged recently as a result of Chinese experts’ investigation
of imperial China’s international relations. This paper takes the view that the
Mongol league/banner system is one of the major models of the “multi-phoric
system” or “tianxia system” that China brought to East Asia.
Qin Yaqing of China Foreign Affairs University, one of the most
well-known authorities on “Chinese school” of international relations studies,
points out that based on a quantitative analysis of the papers on international
relations published by Chinese authors in the past thirty years, “the Chinese
school” of international relations has yet to take shape. The period from
2001-2007 was a “progressive phase of international relations theoretical
research.” Qin also notes a sudden emergence of a school of thought on
Confucian ideologies and ancient political order of East Asia, which he dubbed
the “traditional school.” Philosophers were the first ones to raise the idea of
“traditional school,” and the tianxia theory is one example of this school of
thought. 52 Qin’s observations strike a good point, and also agree with the
arguments in this paper, which is that the Mongol league/banner system is an
important subject in the field of international relations studies, and also an issue
that concerns East Asia. Apparently, creating a new theory involves more than
“detailed literature review” and “complicated methods,” but also
problem-solving. 53 This paper was written in haste and therefore must leave
much to be desired. It is the sincere wish of the author of this paper that fellow
researchers of social science could explore interesting and meaningful topics
out of Mongolian and Tibetan studies to extend the scope of social science
studies.
51
See Fei Xiaotong (ed.), Chinese Nation: A Unity of Pluralistic Society (Beijing: Central University for
Nationalities Press, 2003).
52
Qin Yaqing, “Theories of Chinese International Relations,” in Wang Yizhou (ed.), Transformation of
Foreign Affairs and International Relations in China, 1978-2008 (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press,
2009), pp.306-343.
53
Qin Yaqing, “Research Design and Academic Innovations,” World Economics and Politics, No.8, 2008,
pp.75-80.