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Evan Asher Dr. Mark Almond, Oxford University Modern European History 14 March 2016 Why Did the Allies Win the Second World War? World War II, the deadliest conflict in human history, was a titanic struggle like never seen before. The Allies, led by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, waged a total war against against the Axis Powers, led by Germany, Japan, and Italy, which decided the very future of humanity. Nations across the globe would either retain the basic human rights and freedoms they’d earned over centuries of conflict, or they would be brutally repressed and violated as SS death squads roamed freely throughout conquered lands. Luckily, the world avoided such a dreadful fate since the Allies were victorious after six years of fighting. But, what propelled them unto victory? How did they manage to subdue the legendary Wehrmacht and sink Japan’s fearsome Navy? These forces presented a historically difficult challenge for the Allies. Faced with the daunting prospect of defeating two of the most evil, proud, militarized societies ever, the Allies were forced to test their physical, industrial, and, most importantly, moral boundaries. Consequently, there’s no single reason the Allies were victorious in the war. Although, there were several turning points which were central to ensuring Allied success and thus an eventual Axis defeat. First of all, the Allies were only able to remain on-par with, or sometimes above, German technological standards thanks to Hitler’s absurd racial policies.1 He once famously 1 Lewin, Ronald. Hitler's Mistakes. New York: William Morrow, 1984. 36. 1 stated: “Our national politics will not be revoked or modified, even for scientists. If the dismissal of Jewish scientists means the annihilation of German science, then we shall have to do without science for a few years.”2 His unwavering commitment to ensuring Germany’s racial purity ensured that he would lose access to dozens of brilliant Jewish scientists just years before he planned to start a major war. As early as 19 May 1933, the Manchester Guardian, a British newspaper, devoted an entire front page to listing the names of 196 professors and other academics who were dismissed from German university posts within a period of just three weeks.3 Furthermore, discarded Jewish scientists weren’t content with living as second-class citizens locked out of academia. The majority of them did what any sensible Jew did during Hitler’s reign and emigrated to the United States or the United Kingdom.4 Therefore, instead of supporting the Nazi’s nuclear weapons program, men like Albert Einstein were supporting the United States’ Manhattan Project. The remaining German scientists failed miserable in their attempts to build an atomic bomb. They didn’t even arrive at the correct formula by the time World War II had ended.5 In the end, the calibre of Nazi Germany’s scientific and technological loss was staggering: five scientists who left for the United States had already won a Nobel Prize; six would earn one in the future.6 Next, before the United States had even entered the war in support of the Allies, the Soviet Union was sacrificing astonishing amounts of troops to halt Germany from advancing further into Russia’s heartland. Nowhere was the Red Army’s courageous 2 Ibid., 47. Ibid., 45. 4 Ibid., 43. 5 Ibid., 47. 6 Ibid., 48. 3 2 sacrifice more apparent than at Stalingrad. From August 1942 to February 1943 Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were locked in an epic struggle for this city bearing Stalin’s name. Soviet soldiers holding the narrow strip of land along the Volga River’s western bank were told to fight as if they had no place to retreat across on the eastern shore.7 Order No. 227, Stalin’s “Not a step back!” proclamation, was on full display as men clung to the bridgehead by contesting every room of every building with bullets, bayonets and even their bare hands.89 Soon, Hitler’s foolhardy insistence on capturing Stalingrad in the face of such stoic Soviet opposition would lead to what many historians point to as the turning point of the war. Operation Uranus, the encirclement of enemy forces on the “Stalingrad Axis”, was only the first phase in the Soviets’ plan to take the initiative, but it was undoubtedly the most effective.10 In less than a week, from 19 to 23 November 1942, the impossible happened at Stalingrad. The entire German 6th Army, some 240,000 men, with over 100 tanks, 1,800 guns and 10,000 assorted vehicles, was surrounded by Soviet forces.11 Thanks to the next maneuver launched in December, Operation Little Saturn, the distance between the inner and outer encirclement of German forces grew to over 65 miles; the Nazis were doomed.12 After months of holding out, desperately hoping for relief forces to break through, on 2 February 1943 German troops were finally forced to admit defeat.13 Soviet commanders Merridale, Catherine. Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006. 151. 8 Ibid., 136. 9 Ibid., 151. 10 Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. London: Phoenix Giants, 1996. 5. 11 Ibid., 1-2. 12 Ibid., 27. 13 Ibid., 38. 7 3 estimated German losses at 22 divisions, plus 160 support and reinforcement units.14 Moreover, Soviet records show that 5,762 guns, 1,312 mortars, 156,6987 rifles, 10,722 automatic weapons, 10,678 motorcycles, 240 tractors, 3,569 bicycles, 933 telephone sets, and 397 km. of signal cable were captured.15 The victory at Stalingrad, won at a cost of just under 500,000 Soviet soldiers’ and airmens’ lives, wounded the Axis severely.1617 After Stalingrad, and later Kursk, Germany could never regain the initiative on the Eastern front. Earlier in England, British airmen contributed greatly to the Allied victory with a defense that demonstrated similar desperation to Stalingrad. Their ability to retain air superiority in the skies over the English channel was vital. Because they won “The Battle of Britain,” the Royal Air Force forced Hitler to indefinitely postpone Operation Sea Lion, Germany’s land invasion of Britain. The RAF’s 52 fighter squadrons (approximately 960 aircraft), 7 antiaircraft artillery divisions, and 40 radar stations fended off Gӧring’s Luftwaffe for roughly 4 months.18 Thanks to radar stations, as well as reports from Ultra, the top secret British intelligence program that intercepted and cracked Enigma messages, British commanders often knew when, where, and at what strength the Luftwaffe would attack.19 In a period of intense combat from 13 and 31 August 1940 alone, the Luftwaffe lost 252 fighter planes and 215 bombers while the RAF lost 359 aircraft.20 The battle climaxed on 15 September 1940, now called “The Battle of Britain Day” by the British, when two 14 Ibid. Ibid. 16 Merridale, Ivan’s War, 176. 17 Ibid., 164. 18 Overy, R. J. The Air War, 1939-1945. New York: Stein and Day, 1980. 102. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid., 105. 15 4 massive German assaults forced the RAF to scramble its entire force at the same time. Almost 25% of the attacking German raiders — 56 aircraft — were lost, while a mere 26 British fighter planes were destroyed.21 Thanks to the incredible bravery demonstrated by RAF pilots, which included foreign fighters and volunteers from Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States, the Luftwaffe was proven mortal and the British mainland was saved in yet another turning point of World War II.22 When the security of Britain was finally ensured, Churchill and the RAF set their sights on continental Europe. Their new tactic, “strategic bombing,” sought to win the entire war from the air.23 Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, often referred to as the “Father of the Royal Air Force,” outlined their strategy perfectly before the war in 1928: To attack the armed forces is… to attack the enemy at its strongest point. On the other hand, by attacking the sources from which these armed forces are maintained, infinitely more effect is obtained. In the course of a day’s attack upon the aerodromes of the enemy perhaps 50 airplanes could be destroyed; whereas a modern industrial state will produce 100 in a day — and production will far more than replace any destruction we can hope to do in the forward zone. On the other hand, by attacking the enemy’s factories, then output is reduced by a much greater proportion.24 The RAF ruthlessly executed their strategic bombing initiative. By the autumn of 1942 they had dropped a total of 60,000 tons of explosives over Europe.25 When the war finally ended, that number had grown to over 657,000 tons of explosives.26 Funding air 21 Ibid., 107. Ibid., 96. 23 Friedrich, Jörg. The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 51. 24 Ibid., 54. 25 Ibid., 75. 26 Ibid. 22 5 campaign after air campaign was by no means cheap: British Bomber Command devoured 33% of all British war expenditures as it decimated Europe from above.27 Moreover, the strategic bombing offensive against the “Arsenal of the Reich,” involving the bombing of 21 major cities between March and July 1943, clearly demonstrated its effectiveness. In one particular example of that campaign’s ruthless efficiency, a damage report composed by analyzing photographs of the aftermath of the raid on Krefeld, Germany on the night of 21 June, estimated: 25,000 residences destroyed; 87,000 people homeless; and 1,450 people killed, 850 by high-explosive bombs and 600 by incendiaries.28 The same procedure, employed by both the United Kingdom and the United States, would be used to annihilate more than 25% of Germany’s most industrialized areas by 1944.29 Relentless strategic bombing of German industry was undoubtedly key to the Allied victory in World II. Finally, victory was nearly ensured for the Allies when the United States entered the war on their side. Although the Lend-Lease Act was central to the Allied attempt to halt Germany’s early advances, it pales in comparison to the massive contribution made by the United States when it actually declared war.30 The Japanese Empire, by their rash decision to surprise attack Pearl Harbor, gifted a strategic present to the United States; they united an otherwise isolationist country.31 Immediately after news of the attack broke, the 27 Ibid. Ibid., 81. 29 Ibid. 30 Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History. New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1986. 69. 31 Ibid., 541. 28 6 American war machine came roaring to life with indignation.32 Between 1940 and 1945, the US Army grew from 243,000 officers and men into a force numbering over 8 million. With 89 divisions, comprised of men who had shortly before been civilians in one of the world’s less militarized nations; and backed by a gigantic, untouchable industrial base, the US Army fanned out across the globe to free the world from tyranny.33 The Founding Fathers would’ve been astonished to learn that their nation would, less than 200 years later, be so instrumental in ensuring liberty’s continued spread across the international community. All in all, there were numerous reasons the Allies triumphed against the Axis Powers in World War II. Brilliant Jewish scientists, overwhelming Soviet manpower, brave British and American airmen, and the sheer might of American industry are just a few of the more vital reasons the Allies were victorious. Without even one of those many factors, the war may have ended in a noticeably different fashion. Perhaps, if Hitler didn’t invade the Soviet Union, the Axis Powers would’ve won. Perhaps, if the United States never entered the war, the Soviet Union would be the world’s sole superpower. We’ll never know exactly what other scenarios could have came to fruition. In the end, the world probably received its best-case scenario. Samuel Eliot Morison, a former Rear Admiral in the United States Naval Reserve, eloquently summarized the actual, ironic, residual effects from the Allied victory in 1945: History is studded with ironies, but never were there greater ironies than these: The fundamental reason for America’s going to war with Japan was our insistence on the integrity of China; yet all our efforts and sacrifices, instead of strengthening friendly relations with China, have resulted in making her our greatest potential enemy. America in 1939-1941 wanted neither world power nor world responsibility, only to Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. 70. 33 Creveld, Martin Van. Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982. 166. 32 7 be let alone; but world power and responsibility were forced upon her by the two nations, German and Japan, that badly wanted both… nations now numbered among America’s firmest allies.34 34 The Two-Ocean War, 45. 8 Works Cited Creveld, Martin Van. Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982. Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. London: Phoenix Giants, 1996. Friedrich, Jörg. The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Lewin, Ronald. Hitler's Mistakes. New York: William Morrow, 1984. Merridale, Catherine. Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006. Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. Overy, R. J. The Air War, 1939-1945. New York: Stein and Day, 1980. Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History. New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1986. 9