Download Why Did the Allies Win the Second World War?

Evan Asher
Dr. Mark Almond, Oxford University
Modern European History
14 March 2016
Why Did the Allies Win the Second World War?
World War II, the deadliest conflict in human history, was a titanic struggle like
never seen before. The Allies, led by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States,
waged a total war against against the Axis Powers, led by Germany, Japan, and Italy, which
decided the very future of humanity. Nations across the globe would either retain the basic
human rights and freedoms they’d earned over centuries of conflict, or they would be
brutally repressed and violated as SS death squads roamed freely throughout conquered
lands. Luckily, the world avoided such a dreadful fate since the Allies were victorious after
six years of fighting. But, what propelled them unto victory? How did they manage to
subdue the legendary Wehrmacht and sink Japan’s fearsome Navy? These forces presented
a historically difficult challenge for the Allies. Faced with the daunting prospect of defeating
two of the most evil, proud, militarized societies ever, the Allies were forced to test their
physical, industrial, and, most importantly, moral boundaries. Consequently, there’s no
single reason the Allies were victorious in the war. Although, there were several turning
points which were central to ensuring Allied success and thus an eventual Axis defeat.
First of all, the Allies were only able to remain on-par with, or sometimes above,
German technological standards thanks to Hitler’s absurd racial policies.1 He once famously
1
Lewin, Ronald. ​Hitler's Mistakes​. New York: William Morrow, 1984. 36.
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stated: “Our national politics will not be revoked or modified, even for scientists. If the
dismissal of Jewish scientists means the annihilation of German science, then we shall have
to do without science for a few years.”2 His unwavering commitment to ensuring Germany’s
racial purity ensured that he would lose access to dozens of brilliant Jewish scientists just
years before he planned to start a major war. As early as 19 May 1933, the ​Manchester
Guardian​, a British newspaper, devoted an entire front page to listing the names of 196
professors and other academics who were dismissed from German university posts within a
period of just three weeks.3 Furthermore, discarded Jewish scientists weren’t content with
living as second-class citizens locked out of academia. The majority of them did what any
sensible Jew did during Hitler’s reign and emigrated to the United States or the United
Kingdom.4 Therefore, instead of supporting the Nazi’s nuclear weapons program, men like
Albert Einstein were supporting the United States’ Manhattan Project. The remaining
German scientists failed miserable in their attempts to build an atomic bomb. They didn’t
even arrive at the correct formula by the time World War II had ended.5 In the end, the
calibre of Nazi Germany’s scientific and technological loss was staggering: five scientists
who left for the United States had already won a Nobel Prize; six would earn one in the
future.6
Next, before the United States had even entered the war in support of the Allies, the
Soviet Union was sacrificing astonishing amounts of troops to halt Germany from
advancing further into Russia’s heartland. Nowhere was the Red Army’s courageous
2
Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 45.
4
Ibid., 43.
5
Ibid., 47.
6
Ibid., 48.
3
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sacrifice more apparent than at Stalingrad. From August 1942 to February 1943 Nazi
Germany and Soviet Russia were locked in an epic struggle for this city bearing Stalin’s
name. Soviet soldiers holding the narrow strip of land along the Volga River’s western bank
were told to fight as if they had no place to retreat across on the eastern shore.7 Order No.
227, Stalin’s “Not a step back!” proclamation, was on full display as men clung to the
bridgehead by contesting every room of every building with bullets, bayonets and even their
bare hands.89
Soon, Hitler’s foolhardy insistence on capturing Stalingrad in the face of such stoic
Soviet opposition would lead to what many historians point to as the turning point of the
war. Operation Uranus, the encirclement of enemy forces on the “Stalingrad Axis”, was only
the first phase in the Soviets’ plan to take the initiative, but it was undoubtedly the most
effective.10 In less than a week, from 19 to 23 November 1942, the impossible happened at
Stalingrad. The entire German 6th Army, some 240,000 men, with over 100 tanks, 1,800
guns and 10,000 assorted vehicles, was surrounded by Soviet forces.11 Thanks to the next
maneuver launched in December, Operation Little Saturn, the distance between the inner
and outer encirclement of German forces grew to over 65 miles; the Nazis were doomed.12
After months of holding out, desperately hoping for relief forces to break through,
on 2 February 1943 German troops were finally forced to admit defeat.13 Soviet commanders
Merridale, Catherine. ​Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945​. New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2006. 151.
8
Ibid., 136.
9
Ibid., 151.
10
Erickson, John. ​The Road to Berlin​. London: Phoenix Giants, 1996. 5.
11
Ibid., 1-2.
12
Ibid., 27.
13
Ibid., 38.
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estimated German losses at 22 divisions, plus 160 support and reinforcement units.14
Moreover, Soviet records show that 5,762 guns, 1,312 mortars, 156,6987 rifles, 10,722
automatic weapons, 10,678 motorcycles, 240 tractors, 3,569 bicycles, 933 telephone sets, and
397 km. of signal cable were captured.15 The victory at Stalingrad, won at a cost of just
under 500,000 Soviet soldiers’ and airmens’ lives, wounded the Axis severely.1617 After
Stalingrad, and later Kursk, Germany could never regain the initiative on the Eastern front.
Earlier in England, British airmen contributed greatly to the Allied victory with a
defense that demonstrated similar desperation to Stalingrad. Their ability to retain air
superiority in the skies over the English channel was vital. Because they won “The Battle of
Britain,” the Royal Air Force forced Hitler to indefinitely postpone Operation Sea Lion,
Germany’s land invasion of Britain. The RAF’s 52 fighter squadrons (approximately 960
aircraft), 7 antiaircraft artillery divisions, and 40 radar stations fended off Gӧring’s
Luftwaffe for roughly 4 months.18 Thanks to radar stations, as well as reports from Ultra, the
top secret British intelligence program that intercepted and cracked Enigma messages,
British commanders often knew when, where, and at what strength the Luftwaffe would
attack.19
In a period of intense combat from 13 and 31 August 1940 alone, the Luftwaffe lost
252 fighter planes and 215 bombers while the RAF lost 359 aircraft.20 The battle climaxed
on 15 September 1940, now called “The Battle of Britain Day” by the British, when two
14
Ibid.
Ibid.
16
Merridale, ​Ivan’s War,​ 176.
17
Ibid., 164.
18
Overy, R. J. ​The Air War, 1939-1945​. New York: Stein and Day, 1980. 102.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid., 105.
15
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massive German assaults forced the RAF to scramble its entire force at the same time.
Almost 25% of the attacking German raiders — 56 aircraft — were lost, while a mere 26
British fighter planes were destroyed.21 Thanks to the incredible bravery demonstrated by
RAF pilots, which included foreign fighters and volunteers from Poland, France,
Czechoslovakia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States, the Luftwaffe was proven
mortal and the British mainland was saved in yet another turning point of World War II.22
When the security of Britain was finally ensured, Churchill and the RAF set their
sights on continental Europe. Their new tactic, “strategic bombing,” sought to win the entire
war from the air.23 Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, often referred to as the “Father of the
Royal Air Force,” outlined their strategy perfectly before the war in 1928:
To attack the armed forces is… to attack the enemy at its strongest point. On the
other hand, by attacking the sources from which these armed forces are maintained,
infinitely more effect is obtained. In the course of a day’s attack upon the
aerodromes of the enemy perhaps 50 airplanes could be destroyed; whereas a
modern industrial state will produce 100 in a day — and production will far more
than replace any destruction we can hope to do in the forward zone. On the other
hand, by attacking the enemy’s factories, then output is reduced by a much greater
proportion.24
The RAF ruthlessly executed their strategic bombing initiative. By the autumn of
1942 they had dropped a total of 60,000 tons of explosives over Europe.25 When the war
finally ended, that number had grown to over 657,000 tons of explosives.26 Funding air
21
Ibid., 107.
Ibid., 96.
23
Friedrich, Jörg. ​The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945​. New York: Columbia University Press,
2006. 51.
24
Ibid., 54.
25
Ibid., 75.
26
Ibid.
22
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campaign after air campaign was by no means cheap: British Bomber Command devoured
33% of all British war expenditures as it decimated Europe from above.27
Moreover, the strategic bombing offensive against the “Arsenal of the Reich,”
involving the bombing of 21 major cities between March and July 1943, clearly
demonstrated its effectiveness. In one particular example of that campaign’s ruthless
efficiency, a damage report composed by analyzing photographs of the aftermath of the raid
on Krefeld, Germany on the night of 21 June, estimated: 25,000 residences destroyed; 87,000
people homeless; and 1,450 people killed, 850 by high-explosive bombs and 600 by
incendiaries.28 The same procedure, employed by both the United Kingdom and the United
States, would be used to annihilate more than 25% of Germany’s most industrialized areas
by 1944.29 Relentless strategic bombing of German industry was undoubtedly key to the
Allied victory in World II.
Finally, victory was nearly ensured for the Allies when the United States entered the
war on their side. Although the Lend-Lease Act was central to the Allied attempt to halt
Germany’s early advances, it pales in comparison to the massive contribution made by the
United States when it actually declared war.30 The Japanese Empire, by their rash decision
to surprise attack Pearl Harbor, gifted a strategic present to the United States; they united
an otherwise isolationist country.31 Immediately after news of the attack broke, the
27
Ibid.
Ibid., 81.
29
Ibid.
30
Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. ​Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History​.
New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1986. 69.
31
Ibid., 541.
28
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American war machine came roaring to life with indignation.32 Between 1940 and 1945, the
US Army grew from 243,000 officers and men into a force numbering over 8 million. With
89 divisions, comprised of men who had shortly before been civilians in one of the world’s
less militarized nations; and backed by a gigantic, untouchable industrial base, the US Army
fanned out across the globe to free the world from tyranny.33 The Founding Fathers
would’ve been astonished to learn that their nation would, less than 200 years later, be so
instrumental in ensuring liberty’s continued spread across the international community.
All in all, there were numerous reasons the Allies triumphed against the Axis Powers
in World War II. Brilliant Jewish scientists, overwhelming Soviet manpower, brave British
and American airmen, and the sheer might of American industry are just a few of the more
vital reasons the Allies were victorious. Without even one of those many factors, the war
may have ended in a noticeably different fashion. Perhaps, if Hitler didn’t invade the Soviet
Union, the Axis Powers would’ve won. Perhaps, if the United States never entered the war,
the Soviet Union would be the world’s sole superpower. We’ll never know exactly what
other scenarios could have came to fruition. In the end, the world probably received its
best-case scenario. Samuel Eliot Morison, a former Rear Admiral in the United States Naval
Reserve, eloquently summarized the actual, ironic, residual effects from the Allied victory in
1945:
History is studded with ironies, but never were there greater ironies than these: The
fundamental reason for America’s going to war with Japan was our insistence on the
integrity of China; yet all our efforts and sacrifices, instead of strengthening friendly
relations with China, have resulted in making her our greatest potential enemy.
America in 1939-1941 wanted neither world power nor world responsibility, only to
Morison, Samuel Eliot. ​The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second
World War​. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. 70.
33
Creveld, Martin Van. ​Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945​. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1982. 166.
32
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be let alone; but world power and responsibility were forced upon her by the two
nations, German and Japan, that badly wanted both… nations now numbered among
America’s firmest allies.34
34
The Two-Ocean War, 45.
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Works Cited
Creveld, Martin Van. ​Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance,
1939-1945​. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982.
Erickson, John. ​The Road to Berlin​. London: Phoenix Giants, 1996.
Friedrich, Jörg. ​The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945​. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2006.
Lewin, Ronald. ​Hitler's Mistakes​. New York: William Morrow, 1984.
Merridale, Catherine. ​Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945​. New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. ​The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States
Navy in the Second World War​. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963.
Overy, R. J. ​The Air War, 1939-1945​. New York: Stein and Day, 1980.
Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. ​Pearl Harbor:
The Verdict of History​. New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1986.
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