Download 2017/18 and 2018/19 National Tariff Payment

2017/18 and 2018/19 National
Tariff Payment System:
A consultation notice
Published by NHS England and
NHS Improvement
November 2016
Contents
Please note:
Part A of this document is the statutory consultation notice. It starts on page 4.
Part B of this document is the proposed 2017/19 National Tariff Payment System.
This is shown as it would appear in final form. It starts on page 80.
Part C of this document is the glossary. It starts on page 198.
1. About this document ......................................................................................................... 4
2. Context ............................................................................................................................. 6
3. Responding to this consultation......................................................................................... 8
3.1. Statutory consultation on the national tariff and the objection process .................................... 8
3.2. Consequences of objections .................................................................................................... 9
3.3. Other responses to the consultation ........................................................................................ 9
4. How we worked with the sector to develop our proposals ............................................... 11
4.1. New developments for 2017/19 NTPS ................................................................................... 11
4.2. This year’s engagement ......................................................................................................... 11
4.3. Expert review of draft price relativities ................................................................................... 11
4.4. Enhanced impact assessment ............................................................................................... 12
4.5. Mental health .......................................................................................................................... 12
4.6. Engagement on specialised services ..................................................................................... 12
4.7. Policy publications and engagement ...................................................................................... 12
4.8. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 13
5. Setting a tariff for 2017/19 ............................................................................................... 14
5.1. Proposal to set a two-year tariff.............................................................................................. 14
6. Currency design .............................................................................................................. 17
6.1. Introducing HRG4+ currency design ...................................................................................... 17
6.2. Changing the scope of currencies .......................................................................................... 19
6.3. Changes to the high cost drugs and devices list .................................................................... 20
6.4. Changes to the maternity pathway ......................................................................................... 23
6.5. Creating incentives in outpatient follow ups ........................................................................... 26
6.6. Best practice tariffs ................................................................................................................. 30
6.7. Amending the acute stroke care BPT .................................................................................... 39
6.8. Introducing a tariff to promote the adoption of innovation and technology ............................ 40
7. Proposed method for determining national prices ........................................................... 46
7.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 46
7.2. Modelling national prices for 2017/18 .................................................................................... 48
7.3. Managing model inputs for 2017/18 ....................................................................................... 50
7.4. Setting prices for best practice tariffs for 2017/18 .................................................................. 52
7.5. Setting national prices for 2018/19 ......................................................................................... 53
7.6. Making manual adjustments to prices .................................................................................... 55
7.7. Setting the efficiency factor .................................................................................................... 56
7.8. Cost uplifts .............................................................................................................................. 58
2
7.9. Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts .................................................................................. 62
7.10. Managing volatility ................................................................................................................ 65
7.11
Setting the cost base ....................................................................................... 66
8
National variations ........................................................................................................ 69
8.11
9
Updating top-up payment for specialised services ......................................... 70
Locally determined prices ............................................................................................. 73
9.11
9.12
9.13
Mental health payment proposals for adults and older people ....................... 74
Mental health payment proposals IAPT .......................................................... 76
Proposed changes to rules for locally determined prices and payment ......... 77
3
1. About this document
1.
This is the statutory consultation notice for the 2017/18 and 2018/19 National
Tariff Payment System (2017/19 NTPS).
2.
Since 1 April 2016, Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority have
been operating as a single integrated organisation known as NHS Improvement.
This notice is however issued in exercise of functions conferred on Monitor by
Section 118 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. In this notice, therefore,
‘NHS Improvement’ means Monitor, unless the context otherwise requires.
References to ‘we’ refer usually to NHS Improvement and NHS England, who
have agreed the proposals in this notice.
3.
The document is in three parts:
a. Part A contains:
 an introduction that sets the context for the 2017/19 NTPS and explains
how you can respond to this consultation notice
 a summary of how we have engaged with the sector
 what we propose to change from the 2016/17 NTPS and what we
propose to retain.
b. Part B contains a draft of the proposed 2017/19 NTPS. This is shown as it
would appear in final form and includes sections on:
 the scope of the tariff
 the currencies that are the building block for national prices and some
local prices
 the method for determining national prices
 national variations to national prices
 locally determined prices
 payment rules.
c. Part C contains the glossary.
4.
This document should be read in conjunction with the annexes and the
supporting documents. The annexes to part B form part of the proposed
national tariff.
4
Table 1: Annexes
Part
Title
A
Annex A1: A detailed summary of engagement and sector feedback
A
Annex A2: A detailed explanation of how to respond to this consultation and
the statutory objection process
B
Annex B1: The national prices and national tariff workbook.
B
Annex B2: The models used to set national prices
B
Annex B3: Technical guidance for mental health clusters
B
Annex B4: Guidance on currencies with a national price
B
Annex B5: Guidance on currencies without national prices
B
Annex B6: Guidance on best practice tariffs
Table 2: Supporting documents
Title
2017 to 2019 National Tariff Payment System proposals: Impact assessment
A guide to the market forces factor
Guidance for commissioners on the marginal rate emergency rule and the 30 day
readmission rule
Non-mandatory prices
Innovation and technology tariff
5
2. Context
5.
For the 2016/17 NTPS we prioritised sector stability over payment system
progress. We did this by rolling over the prices from the 2015/16 Enhanced
Tariff Option (ETO), adjusting them for efficiency, inflation and the Clinical
Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST).
6.
This created a firebreak for the sector to help with achieving financial stability
but it meant we did not make significant progress on the objectives for the
payment system set out in Reforming the payment for NHS services: Supporting
the five year forward view.1 It also meant the costs used to set prices were from
2011/12 and increasingly do not reflect current clinical practice.
7.
Given the ongoing financial challenges facing the sector, the next NTPS must
continue to offer stability while creating the conditions necessary for the sector
to move towards the goals set out in the Five Year Forward View. We propose
to address this in four ways:
a. set a two-year tariff
b. make corrections and updates to currency design, top ups for specialised
services and the data used to set prices
c. address the data concerns by using the latest available cost data
d. phasing in the transition to these new policies across a series of national
tariffs.
8.
As previously announced, we are proposing significant policy changes for this
year including a move to the HRG4+ phase 3 currency design for national
prices and alignment of top-up payments for specialised services with the list of
prescribed specialised services. We are also proposing to introduce a small
number of new best practice tariffs (BPTs) and make other minor changes to
currency design. These changes would allow the use of more up-to-date cost
and activity data from 2014/15 that better reflect changes in clinical practice and
improvements.
9.
As these new policies would involve significant changes, with a sizeable impact
on many providers, particularly specialist orthopaedics and paediatrics, we
propose to phase them in over more than one tariff period to reduce price
volatility. Reducing price volatility will reduce the volatility of provider income
and commissioner spend. This is key in ensuring continued service provision
1
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/381637/
ReformingPaymentSystem_NHSEMonitor.pdf
6
10. We believe that setting a two-year tariff for 2017/18 and 2018/19 will give the
sector greater certainty against which to plan and make the investment
decisions necessary to deliver transformation to the service. Further, introducing
a two-year tariff will reduce the burden on commissioners and providers that
comes from annual contract rounds and allow the sector to focus on necessary
improvements. While we accept that there are risks with this, particularly given
the current economic uncertainty, we believe that offering certainty based on
our current assumptions is of more value to the sector than the flexibility of
changing the tariff each year.
11. We recognise that providers and commissioners in local areas may be able to
work together to develop payment models that better meet the needs of their
patients than the payment models set out in the tariff, and we have simplified
the rules and guidance on local pricing to make it simpler to adopt these new
approaches.
12. This tariff has been developed as part of the system wide response to the
challenges facing the NHS. It sits alongside the development of the two year
NHS planning framework, the changes to the NHS Standard Contract and the
changes to the support offer for NHS Providers from NHS Improvement. Our
proposals for the 2017/19 NTPS should be considered in the context of this
package of initiatives.
7
3. Responding to this consultation
3.1. Statutory consultation on the national tariff and the objection process
14. The proposals for the 2017/19 NTPS are subject to a statutory consultation
process as required by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (the 2012 Act).
This offers stakeholders the chance to tell NHS Improvement and NHS England
what they think about the proposals. It also allows clinical commissioning
groups (CCGs) and ‘relevant providers’ to object to the method we have
proposed for determining national prices. The consultation period begins on
8 November and ends on 6 December 2016. On 8 November we will publish
the full suite of annexes and supporting documents. This will signal the
beginning of the consultation.
15. We propose to introduce the 2017/19 NTPS from 1 April 2017.
16. You can find further information on the statutory consultation, objection process
and relevant legislation in Annex A2.
3.1.1. Whose objections are relevant for the statutory objection process?
17. The 2012 Act provides a statutory process for challenging the proposed method
for determining national prices. If the objection threshold is exceeded for either
(i) CCGs or (ii) relevant providers then s.120 of the 2012 Act provides that
Monitor cannot publish the national tariff without reference to the Competition
and Markets Authority (or further statutory consultation).There are two
categories of relevant provider:
a. Licence holders. This refers to providers holding an NHS Improvement
licence, including NHS foundation trusts and independent providers.
b. Other relevant providers as defined in the National Health Service (Licensing
and Pricing) Regulations 2013.
18. The definition of relevant provider includes all NHS trusts that provide nationally
priced services, as well as all NHS foundation trusts.
19. Commissioners whose objections to the method are relevant for the statutory
objections process are CCGs. NHS England, in its role as a commissioner of
specialised services, is not included.
3.1.2. Objections to the method
20. Although we welcome comments on all our proposals, the 2012 Act makes it
clear that the statutory objection process applies only to objections to the
8
“method or methods Monitor proposes to use for determining the national
prices” of NHS healthcare services.2
21. The method includes the data, method and calculations used to arrive at the
proposed set of national prices, but not the prices themselves.
22. It does not include:
a. the proposed national currencies
b. the proposed national variations, such as the market forces factor, top-ups
for specialised services and the marginal rate for emergency admissions
c. the rules for agreement of local variations
d. the methods for approving or granting local modifications
e. the rules for determining local prices.
3.2. Consequences of objections
23. The objection thresholds are:
a. 66% or more of commissioners (measured by number)
b. 66% or more of relevant providers (measured by number).
24. If either objection threshold is met NHS Improvement cannot publish the
2017/19 NTPS unless it undertakes a further statutory consultation or makes a
reference to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).
25. If NHS Improvement reconsults, it will publish another consultation notice and
the process will begin again. If NHS Improvement decides to refer to the CMA,
objecting parties will have the opportunity to set out details of their objection.
26. In either case, the 2017/19 NTPS would be delayed. If the 2017/2019 NTPS is
delayed beyond 1 April 2017, the 2016/17 NTPS would remain in effect until a
new tariff is published. If this happens, NHS Improvement and NHS England
would issue further guidance on interim arrangements.
3.3. Other responses to the consultation
27. As well as consulting on the method for setting national prices, NHS
Improvement and NHS England are consulting on the entire package of
proposals in the consultation notice. We welcome feedback on any of these
proposals and will consider your responses before making a final decision on
the policies for the 2017/19 NTPS.
2
Health and Social Care Act 2012, Sections 118(3)(b) and 120(1)
9
28. Please submit your feedback through the online survey3 or via email to
[email protected]
29. The deadline for submitting responses is 6 December 2016.
3
www.surveymonkey.co.uk/r/2017-2019TariffConsultation
10
4. How we worked with the sector to develop our proposals
30. During the development of our proposals for the 2017/19 NTPS we engaged
extensively with the sector. Further details can be found in Annex A1, which
contains a list of events and the feedback we received on policy proposals .
4.1. New developments for 2017/19 NTPS
31. This year we have set up a national tariff webpage4 that allows stakeholders to
see where we are in the development of the national tariff. Users can register
for updates and stay informed of key developments in the national tariff
development process.
32. In previous years some feedback suggested there had been a lack of
transparency in how we develop national prices so we launched the metrics
engine. This tool lists every step of the price modelling process to show how
admitted patient care prices are developed. Users can view data at HRG,
subchapter, chapter and total tariff level. We also examined the steps that
regularly have a large effect on prices in a price modelling narrative. Both the
tool and the narrative can be accessed here.5
4.2. This year’s engagement
33. To date, we have run or attended over 100 events to explain tariff proposals to
stakeholders and gain feedback. The web pages containing our policy
proposals were viewed around 6,500 times. Approximately 250 people attended
the workshops to discuss proposals, which generated over 450 responses to
our online consultation. The discussions and feedback have informed the
policies on which we are now consulting.
4.3. Expert review of draft price relativities
34. For the 2017/19 NTPS, we used the clinical expertise of the National Casemix
Office’s Expert Working Groups (EWGs). The EWGs are responsible for
advising on the design of the casemix classifications known as healthcare
resource groups (HRGs). They consist of clinicians nominated by their
professional bodies and royal colleges. We discussed currency design and
development, and then price relativities separately.
35. More details on this process, the outputs and how we incorporate this into
prices can be found in Section 7.6 Making manual adjustments to prices. The
manual adjustments we made to the tariff can be seen in Annex B2.
4
5
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/developing-201718-national-tariff/
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/metrics-engine/
11
4.4. Enhanced impact assessment
36. In developing the 2016/17 NTPS we ran our first Enhanced Impact Assessment
process (EIA). This involved sharing draft prices with a group of providers and
commissioners and asking them to model the impact using their data. This year
we ran the process again while looking to improve it and made two changes.
37. The first change is the involvement of commissioners in the process: we
involved three commissioners so we could get their perspective on impact
assessment. The second change was a pre impact assessment discussion on
price relativities (called the provider price check). This took place at the same
time as the engagement with the EWGs and got us some feedback on price
relativities that are not correct.
38. The process helped us to understand the differences between NHS
Improvement’s impact assessment and those of individual providers, and to
identify how we can resolve these differences to make future impact
assessments more robust.
4.5. Mental health
39. We have continued to engage with the sector to develop the payment system
for mental healthcare with workshops on proposals to move away from the
current payment methods. Stakeholders told us that they would like more
detailed guidance on implementing a new payment approach, so we have
developed more information on this. For more details see Section 9 Locally
determined prices.
4.6. Engagement on specialised services
40. For the 2016/17 NTPS we established the Specialised and Complex Care
Advisory Group to provide advice on the review of specialised top-ups and
followed this up by convening two groups to input on the development of
specialist service reimbursement for 2017 to 2019. These were the specialised
and complex care policy and technical groups, which consisted of
representatives of large and small specialist providers, NHS England specialist
commissioners and national representative bodies.
41. Further details on the input of these groups can be found in Section 8.1
Updating top-up payments for specialised services.
4.7. Policy publications and engagement
42. Once we had developed our initial policy proposals and price relativities, we
published our engagement document to seek feedback from stakeholders. This
was accompanied by documents on currency, best practice tariffs and the
development of a two-year tariff. We followed this with workshops which were
12
attended by around 350 stakeholders. We published the feedback we got from
the workshops and a web-based survey. All the feedback can be found in
Annex A1.
4.8. Conclusion
43. We would like to thank everyone who has given their time to work with us. Our
engagement activities yielded a large amount of information and helped to
improve the proposals contained in this statutory consultation.
13
5. Setting a tariff for 2017/19
5.1. Proposal to set a two-year tariff
5.1.1. What we previously proposed6
44. During consultations on the previous national tariff, and at engagement events
on the payment system, providers and commissioners have consistently told us
that they would like more predictability to aid long-term planning and
investment.
45. The proposals we published in August7 identified our preferred option as setting
a national tariff for two years (2017/18 and 2018/19). This would provide stability
and certainty to support long-term planning and investment. It would also
remove the need for a separate consultation for the second year.
46. The two-year tariff would include two price lists, one for 2017/18 and another for
2018/19, and a set of currencies, national variations and rules which in most
cases would apply to both years.
47. To determine national prices we propose to model the prices for 2017/18 and
then roll them over to 2018/19 adjusting for cost uplifts, efficiency and the
Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST). We were considering the
implications of staged introductions of top-ups for specialised services and the
new currency design.
48. The other rules and policies would remain the same for both years but we
considered introducing a rule mandating a payment approach for IAPT from
April 2018.
5.1.2. What you told us
Table 3: Breakdown of responses to the proposal to set a two-year tariff8
Strongly
support
Number
%
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
56
166
75
54
68
13%
40%
18%
13%
16%
Source: Survey responses to National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
6
In 2017 to 2019 National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
7
As note 6.
8
We have published a summary of the response from the sector. For more detail about how the
responses were broken down please see Annex A1.
14
39
49. The principal concerns were:
a. This may not be the best time to introduce a two-year tariff when so many
other changes, particularly the move to HRG4+, are happening.
b. Any errors in the reference cost data underpinning national prices will be
carried over for two years. Also, the data will be out of date for the 2018/19
tariff year; more recent data should be used rather than rolling over data
used for 2017/18 prices.
c. There is a risk of material changes outside the control of providers and
commissioners during the two-year period such as:

the impact of Brexit

future NICE recommendations on drugs and devices

unforeseen consequences of the 2017/19 tariff rules, prices or
currencies

inflation being materially different to current projections.
d. There are issues over how transitional arrangements for top-ups would be
managed. It was felt that deferring these may be undesirable as it would
delay necessary change.
e. There would need to be consistency across the system, eg the contracting
framework should also be based on a two year framework, and pay awards
and CNST premiums should be agreed for two years.
f. Impact of embedding any overfunding or underfunding for an extra year.
50. Some respondents suggested that for the second year (2018/19) the tariff
should include a formula for determining the prices for 2018/19, into which data
for 2018/19 inflation could be input at a later date, rather than the prices
themselves. The legislation, however, requires that the national tariff includes
national prices themselves and not just a formula or method for their calculation.
51. Among the main reasons for supporting a two-year tariff were that:
a. It should give commissioners and providers scope to put in place
agreements for a longer period. There may be some changes to contracts
during the period that could be agreed up front.
b. It should give providers and commissioners more capacity to agree service
change.
c. It should reduce the administrative burden that comes from annual
contracting.
15
5.1.3. How this has influenced our proposals
52. We have based our assumptions on the best available evidence. There will
always be challenges in setting forward-looking prices but these challenges are
faced by other regulated industries and we feel that the advantages of greater
planning certainty outweigh the risks.
53. Given the relative certainty of NHS funding at the current time, the fact that
there is no planned revision of CCG allocations until 2019 and the wider
planning being undertaken to support the sustainability and transformation plans
we believe now is an opportune time to introduce a two-year tariff.
54. The proposed move to a two-year tariff is in conjunction with a number of other
elements of the NHS financial framework including the development of a two
year NHS Standard Contract and a two year planning round.
55. In relation to calculating the prices for the second year, we think the most
practical, and simplest, approach would be to roll over the data used to set the
2017/18 tariff with appropriate uplifts for inflation, CNST and efficiency. This is
because we would not have more recent cost and activity data with which to
model the 2018/19 prices.
56. We have considered the implications of significant changes in our assumptions
and we will continue to review any issues raised. While we could propose and
consult on a new national tariff, our strong preference would be to retain the
proposed national tariff for two years.
57. We see this as a chance to set a longer term tariff to facilitate longer term
planning and learn from the process when we consider the best approach to the
2019/20 NTPS and beyond.
5.1.4. Final proposal
58. We propose to set a national tariff for two years: 2017/18 and 2018/19.
59. We propose that the 2018/19 price list takes effect from 1 April 2018.
16
6. Currency design
60. To pay for healthcare, we need to group activity in a clinically meaningful way.
These groupings, or currencies, are used to set prices for healthcare services.
61. There are different currencies for different types of healthcare activity. In this
section we explain our proposals on the currencies to be included in the
2017/19 NTPS.
6.1. Introducing HRG4+ currency design
6.1.1. What we previously proposed9
62. In our earlier engagement, we proposed to adopt a new design, HRG4+. It
allows payment to better reflect the cost incurred in treating patients of differing
levels of complexity. As HRG4+ was introduced in reference costs in three
phases, we proposed to use the third phase as the basis of the reference cost
collection in 2014/15. Further information on the proposed change from HRG4
to HRG4+ can be found here10
63. As well as the improvements in design, we think it is appropriate to move to
HRG4+ because national prices set for HRG4 use cost and activity data from
2010/11. This means that prices set using HRG4 do not reflect recent changes
in clinical practice.
6.1.2. What you told us
Table 4: Breakdown of responses for the introduction of HRG 4+
Strongly
support
Number
%
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
60
122
39
17
22
23%
47%
15%
7%
8%
Don’t
know
21
Source: Survey responses to ‘National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
64. Support for this policy was very high. It is seen as a substantial and necessary
step forwards, particularly given the increasingly historical costs used to inform
HRG4 price design.
9
In ‘2017 to 2019 National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
10
www.hscic.gov.uk/media/11601/Summary-of-Changes/pdf/HRG4__RC1213_Summary_of_Changes_v1.0.pdf
17
65. Feedback included the following concerns:
a. While HRG 4+ better reflects complexity, it still does not fully explain it. The
currency design and cost collections still do not adequately capture the cost
of some services, for example orthopaedics.
b. The introduction of HRG4+ is likely to introduce volatility to provider and
commissioner income and expenditure that needs to be managed.
c. Some commissioners believe it provides opportunities for up-coding of
activity to higher complexity levels to increase provider income.
d. Moving to a two-year tariff with an untested currency design may lock in any
design issues or instability that arises from the shifts in payments across
service lines.
e. Some specific issues were identified around the design of some individual
prices. These have been reviewed separately.
6.1.3. How this has influenced our proposals
66. Based on the positive feedback from the sector we still believe it is appropriate
to introduce this policy. To address concerns about price volatility we propose to
introduce measures to reduce this (see Section 7.10).
67. We currently do not have evidence that providers are systematically up-coding
activity. If we are presented with this evidence we will investigate and may
change our policies accordingly.
68. We have considered the implications of moving to a two-year tariff. More detail
on this can be found in Section 5 Setting a tariff for 2017/19.
69. We have reviewed the comments on currency design: many of them reflect
suggestions for manual adjustments. Where we feel it appropriate, we have
made changes. More details on the manual adjustment processes can be found
in Section 7.6 .
6.1.4. Final proposal
70. We propose to introduce HRG4+ phase 3.
18
6.2. Changing the scope of currencies
6.2.1. What we previously proposed11
71. In our summer engagement we proposed to introduce four new national prices
in the next tariff:
a. cochlear implants (CA41Z, CA42Z)
b. complex computerised tomography scans (RD28Z)
c. complex therapeutic endoscopic, upper or lower gastrointestinal procedures
(FZ89Z)
d. photodynamic therapy (JC41Z, JC42A and JC42B).
72. We also explained that if we were to adopt a two-year tariff, we would not
review the scope of prices for 2018/19. This means there would be no national
prices added or removed in that year.
73. We had proposed prices for cochlear implants, complex computerised
tomography scans and complex therapeutic endoscopy in early engagement on
the 2016/17 NTPS to a broadly positive response. These were not introduced in
2016/17 because our final tariff proposals were based on the existing price list
used by most of the sector to offer stability from one year to the next.
6.2.2. What you told us
Table 5: Breakdown of responses to the proposal to expand the scope of
national prices
Strongly
support
Number
%
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
24
107
72
35
0
10%
45%
30%
15%
0%
36
Source: Survey responses to ‘National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
74. We had general support from the sector to these proposals from both providers
and commissioners but some concerns were noted including:
a. Prices for some procedures were too low, particularly cochlear implants but
also complex computerised tomography and photodynamic therapy.
b. One provider felt that the price for photodynamic therapy should be
introduced as a non-mandatory price in the first instance.
11
In ‘2017 to 2019 National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
19
c. Introducing these at the same time as a two-year tariff could generate
unintended consequences.
6.2.3. How this has influenced our proposals
75. We have referred issues relating to price levels to the manual adjustment
process for review. Adjustments have been made to the price relativities to
reflect the sector feedback. More detail on this process can be found in Section
7.6 and the actual adjustments made in Annex B2.
76. The feedback from the sector was generally supportive. Taking this into
account, we believe it is appropriate to introduce these prices at this time.
6.2.4. Final proposal
77. We propose to introduce the following national prices:
a. cochlear implants (CA41Z, CA42Z)
b. complex computerised tomography scans (RD28Z)
c. complex therapeutic endoscopic, upper or lower gastrointestinal procedures
(FZ89Z)
d. photodynamic therapy (JC41Z, JC42A and JC42B).
6.3. Changes to the high cost drugs and devices list
6.3.1. What we previously proposed12
78. In our summer engagement document, we proposed to update the list of high
cost drugs and devices reimbursed outside national prices, as shown in Annex
A: 2016/17 National Prices and National Tariff Workbook of the 2016/17 NTPS.
79. For the high cost device list we proposed to:
a. remove 10 out of 28 categories of devices
b. remove all devices from the stents category, except for bifurcated stents
c. remove devices for percutaneous ablation procedure from the
‘radiofrequency, cryotherapy and microwave ablation probes and catheters’
category
d. clarify that the category for lengthening nails includes nails for limb
reconstruction.
12
This was proposed in our summer engagement document National tariff proposals for 2017/18 and
2018/19 at https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
20
80. For the high cost drug list we proposed to:
a. add two drugs to existing categories on the list
b. add nine new categories of drugs to the list: there are 10 drugs distributed
across these categories
c. remove fibrin sealants from the blood products category.
81. We made these proposals to reflect changes in clinical practice, HRG design
and the availability of drugs and devices. Our proposals were based on the
recommendations of the high cost steering groups.
6.3.2. What you told us
Table 6: Breakdown of responses to changes to the high cost list
Question
HC devices
HC drugs
Strongly
support
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
34
Number
10
52
81
47
34
%
4%
23%
36%
21%
15%
Number
11
63
105
23
14
%
5%
29%
49%
11%
6%
41
Source: Survey responses to ‘National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
82. In general, respondents agreed with the proposal to incorporate the cost of
extra drugs and devices into the tariff, but only if the relevant price covered the
cost of the drug or device as well as any other intervention covered by the HRG.
On the particular proposals:
a. There was a high volume of responses to the proposal to remove cochlear
implants from the high cost device list with broad consensus that the price
for cochlear implants did not cover the cost of the device and the service
would not be viable.
b. Further concerns were raised regarding the other devices to be removed
from the list.
c. There were some challenges to the proposal to remove fibrin sealants from
the high cost drug list.
83. Some respondents raised concerns that if devices were removed from the list,
they would no longer be considered for the central procurement programme.
This would reduce the scope for savings as providers would need to procure
them through local arrangements that would not realise economies of scale.
84. Particular concerns related to the proposal to fix the tariff for two years. Some
respondents felt that fixing the high cost drugs list would mean that new drugs
21
licensed for 2018/19 would not be included on the list. If the commissioner were
unwilling to fund the costs of these drugs any clinical decision to use them
would mean the provider would need to pay for them from national prices.
6.3.3. How this has influenced our proposals
85. Given concerns regarding the removal of devices from the list we are now only
proposing to remove two devices from the list: cochlear implants and robotic
consumables. The other devices would remain on the list for 2017/19 although
we would reconsider these when developing policy for future tariffs.
86. We recognise the issues with prices for cochlear implants and robotic
consumables and have made manual adjustments to the proposed prices to
cover the costs of the devices. More details can be found in Section 7.6 and
Annex B2.
87. We have reviewed the final prices and we consider that these address the
feedback around fibrin sealants and propose no further adjustments.
88. In developing the proposal to move to a two-year tariff we considered the
implications for several policy areas. Setting a tariff for two years means that all
elements are fixed and we cannot make exceptions for any policy. We believe
that the wider benefits to the sector of a two-year tariff outweigh the
disadvantages in relation to any individual policy, but we will keep this under
review as we go through the year.
6.3.4. Final proposal
89. We propose to update the high cost device list, removing two device categories
and clarifying an existing category.
90. We propose to update the high cost drugs list by adding 12 drugs and removing
fibrin sealants.
91. Annex B1 shows the high cost drugs and devices list with our proposed
changes.
22
6.4. Changes to the maternity pathway
6.4.1. What we previously proposed13
92. In our summer engagement document, we proposed to update the casemix
assumptions for the antenatal stage of the maternity pathway to increase the
activity allocated to intermediate and intensive levels. The allocation at standard
level would be reduced.
93. This would change the relative weightings between the standard, intermediate
and intensive prices. The policy would not increase or decrease the total
amount of money allocated to the antenatal stage.
6.4.2. What you told us
Table 7: Breakdown of responses to changes to the maternity pathway
Number
%
Strongly
support
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
19
82
71
14
13
62
10%
41%
36%
7%
7%
Source: Survey responses to ‘National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
94. In general, respondents supported the proposed change but they did raise
some concerns. In particular
a. It wasn’t clear how this fitted with the outputs of the National Maternity
Review.14
b. Fixing the tariff for two years would not allow further development of the
maternity pathway.
c. It appeared that less than 50% of costs were attributed to standard
deliveries. There was a concern that this could lead to up-coding.
d. More information was needed at this stage: in particular the expected uplift
for CNST.
95. We received feedback that the HRGs for caesarean sections and postpartum
interventions had been incorrectly mapped to the lower payment level so were
not being appropriately funded.
13
This was proposed in National tariff proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19 at
https://improvement.nhs.uk/uploads/documents/TED_final_1.pdf
14
www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/national-maternity-review-report.pdf
23
6.4.3. How this has influenced our proposals
96. We reviewed the outputs of the maternity review but did not feel we had a
strong enough evidence base on which to propose new payment approaches
between the completion of that review and the publication of this consultation.
We are continuing to work with maternity experts to develop appropriate
payment approaches for the 2019/20 national tariff.
97. We have reviewed the mapping of HRGs to the payment levels for delivery and
we believe that we should change it so that more deliveries are mapped to the
higher level. This would however mean that less cost is attributed to standard
deliveries.
98. The prices we published in our earlier engagement were relative, and meant to
show the distributional effect of new policies. At that stage it would not have
been appropriate to include CNST, nor would it have been possible, as we did
not have the correct data (see Section 7.9 for more information on CNST).
6.4.4. Final proposal
99. We propose to update the casemix assumptions
100. We propose to update the mapping of HRGs to the delivery pathway as set out
in the table below.
Table 8: Mapping HRGs to the delivery pathway
HRG
Description
Current mapping
Revised mapping
NZ30A
Normal Delivery with CC Score 2+
with CC
with CC
NZ30B
Normal Delivery with CC Score 1
with CC
with CC
NZ30C
Normal Delivery with CC Score 0
without CC
without CC
NZ31A
Normal Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, with CC Score 2+
Normal Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, with CC Score 1
Normal Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, with CC Score 0
Normal Delivery, with Epidural and
Induction, or with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 2+
Normal Delivery, with Epidural and
Induction, or with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 1
Normal Delivery, with Epidural and
Induction, or with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 0
Normal Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, and with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 2+
Normal Delivery, with Epidural or
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
without CC
without CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
without CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
NZ31B
NZ31C
NZ32A
NZ32B
NZ32C
NZ33A
NZ33B
24
NZ40A
Induction, and with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 1
Normal Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, and with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 0
Normal Delivery, with Epidural, Induction
and Post-Partum Surgical Intervention,
with CC Score 2+
Normal Delivery, with Epidural, Induction
and Post-Partum Surgical Intervention,
with CC Score 1
Normal Delivery, with Epidural, Induction
and Post-Partum Surgical Intervention,
with CC Score 0
Assisted Delivery with CC Score 2+
with CC
with CC
NZ40B
Assisted Delivery with CC Score 1
with CC
with CC
NZ40C
Assisted Delivery with CC Score 0
without CC
without CC
NZ41A
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, with CC Score 2+
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, with CC Score 1
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, with CC Score 0
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural and
Induction, or with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 2+
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural and
Induction, or with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 1
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural and
Induction, or with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 0
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, and with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 2+
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, and with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 1
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural or
Induction, and with Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 0
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural,
Induction and Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 2+
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural,
Induction and Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 1
Assisted Delivery, with Epidural,
Induction and Post-Partum Surgical
Intervention, with CC Score 0
Planned Caesarean Section with CC
Score 4+
Planned Caesarean Section with CC
Score 2-3
Planned Caesarean Section with CC
Score 0-1
Emergency Caesarean Section with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
without CC
without CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
without CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
without CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
without CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
without CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
NZ33C
NZ34A
NZ34B
NZ34C
NZ41B
NZ41C
NZ42A
NZ42B
NZ42C
NZ43A
NZ43B
NZ43C
NZ44A
NZ44B
NZ44C
NZ50A
NZ50B
NZ50C
NZ51A
25
without CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
with CC
without CC
with CC
Score 4+
NZ51B
NZ51C
Emergency Caesarean Section with CC
Score 2-3
Emergency Caesarean Section with CC
Score 0-1
with CC
with CC
without CC
With CC
6.5. Creating incentives in outpatient follow ups
6.5.1. What we previously proposed
101. In our engagement document we proposed a change to the way that consultantled follow ups were to be reimbursed. Our proposal was to remove all national
prices for outpatient follow ups and replace them with non-mandatory prices.
We would then introduce a local pricing rule under which providers and
commissioners would agree a single annual payment (a ‘block’) for all outpatient
follow ups; this would include consultant-led, non-consultant led and non-faceto-face follow-up activity with some small exclusions such as BPT and
outpatient procedures.
102. In doing this our primary objective was to free up consultant capacity in
outpatient services to increase the number of first attendances and so improve
current referral to treatment times.
103. Providers are currently reimbursed for each consultant-led face-to-face first and
follow-up outpatient attendance. There is no incentive to move to new ways of
providing outpatient care, such as by telephone, using technology or using
workforce in a different way or to reduce inappropriate attendances, as this
would directly affect a provider’s income.
104. We also considered how payment mechanisms could support the increased use
of the NHS e-Referral Service (ERS) for GP referrals.
6.5.2. What you told us
Table 9: Breakdown of sector responses to the proposed outpatient policy
Number
%
Strongly
support
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
19
32
49
46
86
31
8%
14%
21%
20%
37%
Source: Survey responses to ‘National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
105. Overall, there was strong opposition from the sector through the engagement
workshops and the online survey. The main points of concerns were:
26
a. This would make it more difficult for commissioners and providers to agree
contracts. Given the national level intention to agree contracts by the end of
December, this was seen as a major obstacle.
b. It would create incentives for increased or inappropriate discharges back to
primary care to generate new first attendances.
c. There wasn’t enough information to make a fully informed assessment of
how it would reduce follow-up attendances.
106. There was some support for the policy intent but a feeling that this might not be
the most appropriate solution, especially given the timescales involved.
Specialist providers also raised concerns because of their unique casemix.
6.5.3. How this has influenced our proposals
107. Reflecting the feedback from the sector, both from providers and
commissioners, we have amended our proposals.
108. We appreciate the pressures and challenges on the sector in relation to the
timely agreement of contracts and have therefore removed the proposal to
create a single annual payment (a ‘block’) for all outpatient follow ups.
109. We still wish to incentivise a change in the delivery of outpatient follow-up
activity with a move to more efficient models and to freeing up consultant
capacity.
6.5.4. Final proposal
110. The current outpatient prices include a fixed 10% transfer of follow-up costs into
first attendances. This was introduced to create a financial incentive to
undertake more first attendances with follow-up attendance prices slightly
under-reimbursed.
111. To strengthen this incentive and to drive a further change we propose to
increase this transfer of cost, at a treatment function code level, up to a
maximum of 30%.
112. We propose an approach that takes into account the differences at specialty
level with three levels:
 30% for adult surgical specialties and some medical specialties
 20% for other medical specialties
 10% (ie no change) for oncology, haematology, paediatric specialties,
nephrology and areas where we have a BPT.
27
113. We estimate the proposal would include 63% of all nationally priced outpatient
follow-up activity in the 30% group. It would also limit the impact on specialist
cancer and children’s providers by excluding these specialties from the extra
transfer of cost.
114. The table below sets out the current and proposed bundling for each treatment
function code:
Table 10: Changes to outpatient first attendance rates
Current
Treatment function code
Proposed
Change
100
General surgery
10%
30%
+20%
101
Urology
10%
30%
+20%
103
Breast surgery
10%
30%
+20%
104
Colorectal surgery
10%
30%
+20%
105
Hepatobiliary and pancreatic surgery
10%
30%
+20%
106
Upper gastrointestinal surgery
10%
30%
+20%
107
Vascular surgery
10%
30%
+20%
108
Spinal surgery service
10%
30%
+20%
110
Trauma and orthopaedics
10%
30%
+20%
120
ENT
10%
30%
+20%
130
Ophthalmology
10%
30%
+20%
140
Oral surgery
10%
30%
+20%
143
Orthodontics
10%
20%
+10%
144
Maxillo-facial surgery
10%
30%
+20%
160
Plastic surgery
10%
30%
+20%
170
Cardiothoracic surgery
10%
30%
+20%
171
Paediatric surgery
10%
10%
0%
172
Cardiac surgery
10%
30%
+20%
173
Thoracic surgery
10%
30%
+20%
190
Anaesthetics
10%
30%
+20%
191
Pain management
10%
30%
+20%
211
Paediatric urology
10%
10%
0%
214
Paediatric trauma and orthopaedics
10%
10%
0%
215
Paediatric ear nose and throat
10%
10%
0%
216
Paediatric ophthalmology
10%
10%
0%
217
Paediatric maxillo-facial surgery
10%
10%
0%
219
Paediatric plastic surgery
10%
10%
0%
223
Paediatric epilepsy
10%
10%
0%
251
Paediatric gastroenterology
10%
10%
0%
252
Paediatric endocrinology
10%
10%
0%
253
Paediatric clinical haematology
10%
10%
0%
28
Current
Treatment function code
Proposed
Change
257
Paediatric dermatology
10%
10%
0%
258
Paediatric respiratory medicine
10%
10%
0%
263
Paediatric diabetic medicine
10%
10%
0%
300
General medicine
10%
20%
+10%
301
Gastroenterology
10%
30%
+20%
302
Endocrinology
10%
20%
+10%
303
Clinical haematology
10%
10%
0%
306
Hepatology
10%
20%
+10%
307
Diabetic medicine
10%
20%
+10%
320
Cardiology
10%
20%
+10%
321
Paediatric cardiology
10%
10%
0%
329
Transient ischaemic attack
10%
10%
0%
330
Dermatology
10%
30%
+20%
340
Respiratory medicine
10%
20%
+10%
341
Respiratory physiology
10%
20%
+10%
350
Infectious diseases
10%
20%
+10%
361
Nephrology
10%
10%
0%
370
Medical oncology
10%
10%
0%
410
Rheumatology
10%
20%
+10%
420
Paediatrics
10%
10%
0%
430
Geriatric medicine
10%
20%
+10%
502
Gynaecology
10%
30%
+20%
503
Gynaecological oncology
10%
10%
0%
800
Clinical oncology (previously
radiotherapy)
10%
10%
0%
812
Diagnostic imaging
10%
30%
+20%
115. In September 2016, we published Proposed national tariff prices: for planning
2017/18 and 2018/1915. In response to the feedback we have revised the
following treatment function codes:
15

cardiology from 30% to 20%

diabetic medicine from 30% to 20%

orthodontics from 30% to 20%

paediatric surgery from 30% to 10%.
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/proposed-national-tariff-prices-1718-1819/
29
116. The published prices above reflect these changes.
Non face-to-face activity
117. To further incentivise the use of new delivery models for follow-up
appointments, increased use of non face-to-face appointments or wider
adoption of technology, we want to encourage providers and commissioners to
agree local prices for non-consultant led and non face-to-face activity.
Reference costs are available as a reference point for local price setting. Any
increase in local prices should deliver a reduction in consultant-led face-to-face
attendances.
118. To incentivise a shift in activity which is targeted and clinically appropriate, we
recommend prices are set at a treatment function code level where there is
clear evidence that care can be delivered in an alternative way and the current
pricing structure is acting as a barrier.
119. We propose to remove the non-mandatory non face-to-face outpatient
attendance price that has been published in previous years as we feel this did
not provide an appropriate incentive to move to alternative care models. Once
we understand any variation in reference cost submissions and the potential
financial impact in greater detail we will consider whether to re-introduce prices
for non face-to-face activity.
6.6. Best practice tariffs
120. We proposed some changes to BPT arrangements in National tariff proposals
for 2017/18 and 2018/19.16
121. These included:
a. four new BPTs
b. revisions to four existing BPTs
c. the removal of one BPT.
122. We received feedback on these proposals and have considered this in the final
development of policy. In the tables below we set out:
a. Table 10: The response from the sector to our proposals
b. Table 11: A breakdown of the final proposals for new, amended and
removed BPTs for 2017/19.
16
https://improvement.nhs.uk/uploads/documents/TED_final_1.pdf
30
123. We also propose further amendments to the acute stroke care BPT, set out in
full below in the following tables.
124. The proposed introduction of HRG4+ will also lead to some changes to the
currency design of applicable BPTs, for example pleural effusion. These will not
affect the policy objectives, or the methods for collecting and validating data.
31
Table 11: Sector feedback on changes to BPTs
Question
Strongly
support
Tend to
support
Neither support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
New BPT for straight-to-test for
patients requiring lower
gastrointestinal investigation
Number
19
72
49
11
4
%
12%
46%
32%
7%
3%
New BPT for chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD)
Number
17
62
60
12
3
%
11%
40%
39%
8%
2%
New BPT for cardiac
rehabilitation for myocardial
infarction (MI)
Number
16
68
52
11
1
%
11%
46%
35%
7%
1%
New BPT for non-ST segment
elevation myocardial infarction
(NSTEMI)
Number
12
64
53
11
4
%
8%
44%
37%
8%
3%
Changes to existing BPTs (day
case procedures, fragility hip
fracture, primary hip and knee,
same day emergency care)
Number
9
78
53
10
4
%
6%
51%
34%
6%
3%
Removing the interventional
radiology BPT
Number
17
50
65
12
4
%
11%
34%
44%
8%
3%
Source: Survey responses to ‘National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
32
35
37
38
42
32
36
Table 12: Changes to BPTs
BPT
Previous proposal
Feedback – key points
Final policy
Introduce a pathway to offer diagnostic
tests to patients without an initial
outpatient appointment using an
appropriate nurse-led triage mechanism.
General support but concerns
including:
 the costs of implementing the
service may not be recovered
by the BPT price
We propose to introduce this as a
non-mandatory BPT for 2017/19.
Any agreement to implement this
must be made in conjunction with
the local pricing rules in Section 6
of the national tariff.
New
Straight-to-test for
patients requiring
lower
gastrointestinal
investigation
Assign the BPT price against colonoscopy
and flexible sigmoidoscopy HRGs.
This was based on examples of peerreviewed best practice from several
providers across the country.
 existing programmes with the
same objectives but different
delivery methods may be
affected
 lack of clarity over the currency
Based on the concerns of the
sector we will further develop this
proposal with stakeholders before
mandating it.
 concerns about the burden of
recording and validation
Chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease
(COPD)
Introduce a BPT that rewards providers
when a percentage of patients with a
primary diagnosis of COPD, admitted for
an exacerbation of COPD, receive
specialist input to their care within 24
hours of admission, and where they
receive a discharge bundle before
discharge
We did not propose a target rate as we
were seeking sector feedback
33
General support but concerns
including:
 patients may be admitted
unnecessarily to get the BPT
 unclear cost impact of the BPT
 the burden of recording and
validation
Several providers were concerned
that setting a target rate above
60% would be unachievable for a
large part of the sector.
We propose to mandate this BPT.
To achieve this BPT, 60% of
patients must receive specialist
input within 24 hours of admission
and a discharge bundle before
discharge
We recognise the potential issues
around recording and validation of
data but as the RCP is producing a
new tool to collect this data we
believe that this will be appropriate.
BPT
Previous proposal
Feedback – key points
Final policy
This may require some service
redesign but some providers have
reported that this BPT is existing
practice in some areas and so the
costs should be minimal.
Cardiac
rehabilitation for
myocardial infarction
(MI)
Introduce a BPT to encourage providers to
refer appropriate post-MI patients to
cardiac rehabilitation within 3 days of an
initiating event, and before discharge.
General support but concerns
including:
 the data is collected annually
which is not timely enough for
commissioner validation
We propose to introduce a nonmandatory BPT for 2017/19. Any
agreement to implement this must
be made in conjunction with the
local pricing rules in Section 6 of
the national tariff.
Calculate the target population would be
locally with referrals measured using the
National Audit of Cardiac Rehabilitation
(NACR). The target achievement rate
would be 45%.
Non-ST segment
elevation myocardial
infarction (NSTEMI)
Introduce a BPT to improve the time from
a patient being admitted to them receiving
coronary angioplasty. Measure
achievement through the MINAP
database.
A target rate of 60% of NSTEMI patients
having coronary angiography within 72
hours of admission.
For patients transferred from one hospital
to another to have coronary angiography,
34
 the NACR dataset is not part of
mandatory collection and may
not be a complete dataset
 where a local cardiac
rehabilitation service is not
available, providers could be
penalised for a commissioning
decision.
General support but concerns
including:
 from commissioners that
achievement was not easy to
validate: not all data collected
through MINAP

the 72-hour limit for transfers
would be affected by the
performance of the other
hospital which is outside their
control
Following feedback from the sector
we do not believe we can mandate
this BPT until we fully address the
data collection and reporting
concerns.
We propose to mandate this BPT.
If accepted it would be introduced
as set out in the original proposal.
We accept there is concern over
the management of transfers but
this is in line with NICE guidelines
and we feel local systems need to
be developed to manage this.
NICOR will publish a guide shortly
to help with validation of this BPT
BPT
Previous proposal
calculate the time for achieving the BPT
from the time of admission to the first
hospital.
Feedback – key points
 the 72-hour limit may require
changes to working patterns to
protect elective lists
Final policy
 more guidance needed on the
management of payments for
transfers
Amended
Day case
Add 19 procedures to the day case BPT
based on the British Association of Day
Surgery directory of procedures that could
be provided as a day case.
Increase target rates for two existing daycase procedures where the sector had
generally achieved the existing targets.
Some positive feedback for this
policy from providers and
commissioners but concerns that:
 dual chamber pacemakers
should be included in the scope
of the BPT not just single
chamber pacemakers
 ability to deliver this procedure
is based on the ability of
providers to schedule activity
early in the day. Where
providers provide evening lists
(eg paediatric tonsillectomy)
releasing patients before
midnight may not be
appropriate
 the casemix of the provider will
determine their ability to meet
the target rates
35
We propose to introduce the
proposals as originally set out with
one change.
We propose to introduce the
proposals as originally set out with
one change to the implantation of
cardiac pacemaker category.
We propose to add EY06E Implantation of Dual Chamber
Pacemaker with CC Score 0-2
and remove EY08D - Implantation
of Single Chamber Pacemaker
with CC Score 3-5
The implantation of cardiac
pacemaker category would consist
of the following HRGs:
EY06E-Implantation of Dual
Chamber Pacemaker with CC
Score 0-2
EY08E-Implantation of Single
BPT
Previous proposal
Feedback – key points
Final policy
Chamber Pacemaker with CC
Score 0-2
Fragility hip fracture
Remove three measures from the existing
BPT and replace them with four new
measures:
 a nutritional assessment during the
admission
Providers and commissioners
raised a number of concerns
regarding this BPT including:
 this will create an additional
burden on providers to collect
the data and commissioners to
validate it for payment
We propose to remove the three
measures and introduce three of
the four new measures originally
described.
 persistence with bone treatment after
discharge
 delirium assessment during the
admission
 assessed by physiotherapist the day
following surgery.
The full BPT price would only be paid if all
criteria were met and a follow-up
appointment takes place 120 (+/-60) days
after discharge.
Primary hip and
knee
Increase the rate at which providers were
required to submit data to the National
Joint Registry (NJR) from 85% to either
90% or 95%.
Change the significance criteria for health
gain by changing the rate below which
providers will not be paid from the lower
99.8% significance to the lower 95%
significance. This would reduce the
number of providers eligible for the BPT.
36
 The 120-day follow-up condition
will create issues with the
standard freeze-and-flex period
after year end for payments.
Because of the feedback regarding
the 120-day follow-up measure we
are not proposing to include this as
a condition for payment. We do
however believe this is still an
important element of best practice.
 Costs associated with delivering
best practice do not disappear
when criteria have been
achieved so changing criteria
may place an extra burden on
providers.
Some concerns were raised
regarding these changes including:
 compliance rate data not always
available to commissioners for
validation
 raising the outlier target
discriminates against trusts with
more complex demographics
 setting it at 95% will increase
We propose to leave the NJR
submission rate at the current level
of 85%.
We propose to change the health
gain criteria BPT so that a provider
will not be eligible if they are
outside the 99.8% confidence
interval in a single year (current
criteria) or outside the 95%
confidence interval over two
BPT
Previous proposal
Feedback – key points
the number of outliers because
of random variation
 ability to deliver the target
where services are subcontracted.
Final policy
previous consecutive years.
We are proposing not to increase
the NJR rate because of concerns
from the sector regarding subcontracted services.
We also recognise that 95% would
increase the probability of being an
outlier by chance and although it is
statistically significant it may not be
meaningful (probability of error is
greater). To mitigate this we have
set the threshold over two
consecutive years.
Same day
emergency care
(SDEC)
Make seven more clinical scenarios
eligible for the same day emergency care
BPT. These are:
 abnormal liver function
 acutely hot painful joint
 chronic indwelling catheter-related
problems
 gastroenteritis
 transient ischaemic attack
 upper gastrointestinal haemorrhage
 urinary tract infections
37
Some concerns were raised
including:
 as some local areas are
developing/have developed
local ambulatory care pathways
this may undermine their
development
 lack of understanding of the link
between this policy and the 30day readmission rule.
We propose to amend the BPT as
originally described.
BPT
Previous proposal
Feedback – key points
Final policy
This was supported but there were
concerns that:
 the removal of BPT for IR
procedures may mean more
expensive, more invasive older
surgical treatments will be used
instead
We propose to remove this BPT.
(This is based on the NHS Institute’s
Directory of Ambulatory Emergency Care
in Adults)
Removed
Interventional
radiology (IR)
We proposed to remove the interventional
radiology BPT.
This was proposed because HRG4+
contains the same currencies.
 areas previously covered by the
BPT are not adequately
reimbursed by the prices with
the new HRGS, for example
angioplasty, stenting for diabetic
foot disease and uterine artery
embolism, and that this runs the
risk of more invasive and costly
procedures being chosen.
38
With the introduction of HRG4+ we
feel that this is necessary. To
retain it could create confusion in
payments by putting parallel
payment approaches in place.
.
6.7. Amending the acute stroke care BPT
6.7.1. Background
125. Stroke is one of the first five conditions to be prioritised by NHS England as part
of their work to improve urgent and emergency care.
126. The acute stroke care BPT is currently in place but does not meet all the criteria
endorsed by NHS England.17
6.7.2. Our proposal
127. To address this we propose to amend the criteria as set out below:
Table 13: Changing the criteria for the stroke BPT
Current criteria
Revised criteria
a Patients are admitted directly to an
acute stroke unit by the ambulance
service, from A&E or via brain
imaging. Patients must not be
admitted directly to a medical
assessment unit. Patients must then
also spend most of their stay in the
acute stroke unit
Patients are admitted directly to an acute
stroke unit by the ambulance service, from
A&E or via brain imaging. Patients must not
be admitted directly to a medical assessment
unit. [Patients must be seen by a
consultant with stroke specialist skills
within 14 hours of admission.] Patients
must then also spend most of their stay in the
acute stroke unit
b Initial brain imaging is delivered within
12 hours of admission. The scan must
not only be done in the stated
timescales but immediately interpreted
and acted on by a suitably
experienced physician or radiologist
Initial brain imaging is delivered within 12
hours of admission. [For the purposes of
the BPT, reporting times are not defined
but access to skilled radiological and
clinical interpretation must be available 24
hours a day, 7 days a week to provide
timely reporting of brain imaging]
c
No change requested
Patients are assessed for
thrombolysis, receiving alteplase if
clinically indicated in accordance with
the NICE technology appraisal TA264
‘Alteplase for treating acute, ischaemic
stroke’ guidance on this drug.
6.7.3. Rationale
128. One of the standards NHS England has set for measuring performance is that
all stroke patients should be seen within a maximum of 14 hours of arrival by a
consultant with stroke specialist skills. This is supported by the National Clinical
17
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/qs2
39
.
.
Guidelines for Stroke by the Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party18 and the
NICE Acute Stroke and Transient Ischaemic Attack Guidelines19.
129. The statement “The scan must not only be done in the stated timescales but
immediately interpreted and acted on by a suitably experienced physician or
radiologist” is not something that is ever measured, and would therefore be
impossible to report. We have removed this wording and replaced it with “For
the purposes of the BPT, reporting times are not defined but access to skilled
radiological and clinical interpretation must be available 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week to provide timely reporting of brain imaging.” Changing it to access to
skilled clinical interpretation makes it something commissioners can confirm
compliance against.
130. We do know that all hospitals admitting acute stroke patients should have
access to consultant stroke physicians and consultant radiologists 24 hours a
day.
6.8. Introducing a tariff to promote the adoption of innovation and technology
6.8.1. What we previously proposed20
131. We proposed to introduce new arrangements to encourage the uptake and
spread of technology, applicable to services in the scope of the national tariff.
132. We proposed that once potential innovations were identified, we would consider
whether they are::
a. suitable for the high cost list
b. suitable for a BPT
c. suitable for an adjustment to a national price or group of prices
d. suitable for another tariff incentive
e. not suitable for inclusion in the tariff.
18
www.rcplondon.ac.uk/guidelines-policy/stroke-guidelines
www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg68?unlid=90678893420161141231
20
In 2017 to 2019 National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19 available at:
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
19
40
.
.
6.8.2. What you told us
Table 14: Breakdown of responses to the proposal to introduce an innovation
and technology tariff
Strongly
support
Number
%
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
22
74
37
14
2
15%
50%
25%
9%
1%
33
Source: Survey responses to National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
133. Feedback to this policy was very positive but there were concerns that:
a. the policy was not clear enough to make an informed judgement
b. it was not clear how payments would be made
c. introduction of innovation would be better done through other mechanisms,
such as Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) payments,
rather than national prices
d. there should be a formal link between NICE medical technology reviews and
this policy.
134. Some providers were also concerned about how this policy would work in the
context of a fixed two-year tariff.
6.8.3. How this has influenced our proposals
135. We have further developed the policy by reference to the innovations available
through the Innovation Accelerator programme and created a list of innovation
types we believe should be addressed in the 2017/19 NTPS.
136. We considered paying for these innovations through an adjustment to all prices
(a top slice) but recognising the concerns expressed by the sector it is now
proposed that NHS England will provide additional funding to CCGs. We will
continue to review the adoption of these innovation types over the course of the
two-year tariff to further support development of the policy.
137. We propose to ensure that all innovation types recommended for inclusion in
the tariff are reviewed, but recognising that innovation is not just the use of new
devices, at this stage we are not willing to link it to medical technology reviews.
6.8.4. Final proposal
138. We propose to support six specific innovation types. For five of the six
innovation categories, providers would be reimbursed a fixed price through local
pricing. NHS England is proposing to agree these fixed prices with
manufacturers of these products. We would expect that these prices would form
41
.
.
the basis for local agreement between providers and commissioners so there
should be no need for further local negotiation of the price. This approach is
similar to that currently adopted for high cost drugs and devices which are also
subject to the local pricing rules. NHS England would reimburse commissioners
for the full cost in addition to its commissioner allocations.
139. The sixth category, treatment of lower urinary tract symptoms of benign
prostatic hyperplasia as a day case, is already included in national prices.
140. For the 2017/19 NTPS we propose to include the following innovation types:
a. Guided mediolateral episiotomy to minimise the risk of obstetric anal
sphincter injury
i. Approximately 15% of births in England require an episiotomy. Of these,
around 25% experience obstetric anal sphincter injuries (OASIS). The
angle of the cut is important and NICE Guidance recommends that cuts
need to be between 45 and 60 degrees to reduce the incidence of poor
patient outcomes, reconstructive surgery and litigation costs.
ii. The use of angled scissors in episiotomies therefore should improve
patient experience and outcomes and reduce OASIS repair and litigation.
b. Arterial connecting systems to reduce bacterial contamination and the
accidental administration of medication
i. Arterial line placement is a common procedure in various critical care
settings. Intra-arterial blood pressure (BP) measurement is more accurate
than measurement of BP by non-invasive means, especially in the
critically ill. Although rare, when wrong route drug administration occurs,
it has the potential to cause serious damage to the vessel and
surrounding tissue. Arterial cannulation is associated with complications
including bacterial contamination, accidental intra-arterial injection and
blood spillage.
ii. Needle-free connectors prevent blood spillage and through a one-way
valve allow aspiration only thus preventing accidental administration of
medication to the arterial line.
c. Pneumonia prevention systems which are designed to stop ventilatorassociated pneumonia
i. Ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP) is defined as pneumonia that
occurs 48-72 hours or thereafter following endotracheal intubation,
characterised by the presence of a new or progressive infiltrate, signs of
systemic infection (fever, altered white blood cell count), changes in
sputum characteristics, and detection of a causative agent.
42
.
.
Approximately 100,000 patients are admitted for ventilation in critical care
units in the UK each year. The risk for patients is highest during early
ICU stay when it is estimated to be 3% per day during days 1–5 of
ventilation, 2% per day during days 5–10 of ventilation and 1% per day
thereafter (Masterton, 2008).
ii. On average 10 - 20% (10,000- 20,000) patients will be diagnosed with
Ventilator Associated-Pneumonia (VAP) resulting in an attributable
mortality rate of about 30% or between 3,000 and 6,000 deaths. Each
episode of VAP has an estimated cost to the NHS of between £10,000
and £20,000.
iii. Improved airway management in critically ill patients who are having
mechanical ventilation can prevent ventilator-associated pneumonia by
minimising the risk of pulmonary aspiration and micro-aspiration in
patients having ventilation for 24 hours or more. This could see a
reduction in the length of time spent on ventilation and length of stay in
ICU.
iv. There are available Pneumonia prevention systems which are designed
to stop ventilator-associated pneumonia through the use of a cuffed
ventilation tube and an electronic cuff monitoring and inflating device
which prevents leakage of bacterial laden oral and stomach contents to
the lung – a problem associated with standard tubes.
d. Web-based applications for the self-management of chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease
i. Managing Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) costs the
NHS more than £1bn each year. However, treatment is complex, with
different inhalers needing to be used in different ways. Compliance with
treatment is often extremely low, leading to poor outcomes and wasted
prescribing. For this reason, improving self-management for patients with
COPD is a key priority for the NHS.
ii. There is no cure for COPD and good symptom management is essential
to stabilise disease and prevent recurrent flare-ups or exacerbations.
Exacerbations often require intensive treatment and can be severe
enough to require hospital admission.
iii. There is evidence from recent studies that disease-specific selfmanagement improves health status and reduces hospital admissions in
COPD patients. It is critical to implement health education programs in
the continuum of care aimed at behaviour modification. Studies in COPD
have shown that self-management increases knowledge and skills the
patients require to treat their own illness.
43
.
.
iv. A number of a web based and iOS applications that help patients manage
their condition more effectively are available. These platforms can
interface with clinical dashboards to monitor and manage their patients
remotely at an individual and population level.
v. These platforms can also be used by local health care providers and
CCGs to monitor exacerbation burdens in real-time and review potential
inequalities in health care to plan support services effectively.
e. Frozen faecal microbiota transplantation for recurrent Clostridium difficile
infection rates
i. Clostridium difficile infection rates are climbing in frequency and severity,
and the spectrum of susceptible patients is expanding beyond the
traditional scope of hospitalized patients receiving antibiotics. There are
over 3,000 new cases of chronic CDI across England per annum. Faecal
microbiota transplantation is becoming increasingly accepted as an
effective and safe intervention in patients with recurrent disease, likely
due to the restoration of a disrupted microbiome. Cure rates of > 90% are
being consistently reported from multiple centres. Faecal Microbiota
Transplantation (FMT) is the provision of a screened specially prepared
stool administers via a nasal tube into the intestine to restore the balance
of bacteria in the gut. FMT is a NICE recommended treatment for
Chronic CDI.
ii. To date nine trusts have performed FMTs on their own site via the frozen
service.
f. Prostatic urethral lift systems to treat lower urinary tract symptoms of benign
prostatic hyperplasia as a day case:
i. Benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH) is a common and chronic condition
where the enlarged prostate can make it difficult for a man to pass urine,
leading to urinary tract infections, urinary retention, and in some cases
renal failure. Existing treatments TURP (transurethral resection of the
prostate) involve cutting away or removing existing tissue, require an
average hospital stay of 3 days and often catheterisation for many days
post-surgery.
ii. In people with benign prostatic hyperplasia, the prostate becomes
enlarged. A prostatic urethral lift system uses adjustable, permanent
implants to hold the enlarged prostate away from the urethra so that it
isn’t blocked. In this way, the device can relieve lower urinary tract
symptoms (such as pain or difficulty when urinating).
44
.
.
iii. Healthcare teams may want to use a prostatic urethral lift system as an
alternative to transurethral resection of the prostate (TURP) and holmium
laser enucleation of the prostate (HoLEP).
141. More details of these innovations can be found on the NHS Innovation
Accelerator website21 and part B of this statutory consultation.
21
www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/innovation/nia/
45
.
7. Proposed method for determining national prices
7.1. Introduction
142. This section is about how we propose to determine national prices for 2017/18
and 2018/19. We set out our proposals for setting price relativities for both years
in National Tariff: Policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19.22
7.1.1. Our principles
143. Our principles for setting national prices are that:
a. Prices should reflect efficient costs. This means that the prices set should:
i. reflect the costs a reasonably efficient provider ought to incur in supplying
services at the quality expected by commissioners
ii. not provide full reimbursement for inefficient providers.
b. Prices should provide appropriate signals by:
i. giving commissioners the information needed to make the best use of
their budgets and enabling them to make decisions about the mix of
services that offer most value to their populations
ii. incentivising providers to reduce their unit costs by finding ways of
working more efficiently
iii. encouraging providers to change from one delivery model to another
where commissioners want this and where it is more efficient and
effective.
7.1.2. Overview of the modelling approach
144. There are three stages to the proposed method for determining 2017/18 and
2018/19 prices.
a. Setting relative prices for 2017/18: For example, how the price of one
procedure within a specialty differs from another, taking into account the
level of resources required to perform each one.
b. Setting the level of prices for 2017/18: Setting the level of prices by
reference to the costs of providing services incurred by reasonably efficient
providers, and taking into account other relevant factors.
c. Setting the prices for 2018/19: both for relative and absolute levels.
22
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
46
145. The figure below shows the price setting process in summary form.
Figure 1: Stages in our method for setting national prices for 2017/19
2014/15 Reference
costs
Determine price
relativities
(relationship
between average
unit costs)
Set prices to 2016/17 levels (current year)
Adjust to 2016/17
base using 15/16
and 16/17
efficiency, cost
uplifts and CNST
Adjust
relativities
using expert
advice
Adjust subchapters to
manage
volatility
Apply cost
base
adjustment
2017/18 Price levels
2018/19 price levels
Adjust for forward
looking 2017/18
efficiency, cost
uplifts and CNST
Adjust for forward
looking 2018/19
efficiency, cost
uplifts and CNST
146. NHS Improvement and NHS England consulted on proposals for setting relative
prices over the summer. We did not consult on setting price levels. The main
policy areas we have not previously engaged on are our proposals for setting
the final cost base, uplifts for changes to provider costs and efficiency.
147. In the 2016/17 NTPS, we rolled over prices from the ETO with adjustments for
inflation and efficiency. For 2017/18, we propose instead to model prices by
taking a similar approach to that used by the Department of Health in modelling
prices for 2013/14 Payment by Results (PbR).23
148. We propose to refresh the input data to use the latest information and we also
propose to make a series of changes to the DH PbR method itself, including:
a. simplifying the approach to setting prices for BPTs
b. updating activity and cost inputs and adopting a method for cleaning costs to
reduce some of the known issues with reference cost data
c. updating cost uplifts based on latest information
d. introducing a method to reduce the immediate impact of distributional
changes from the new currency design
e. reviewing assumptions used to calculate the efficiency factor
f.
explicitly setting a cost base
g. ensuring that manual adjustments are cost neutral
h. other more minor changes that are required because of the passage of time,
lack of data sources or because they improve the transparency, efficiency
and simplicity of the tariff model.
23
More detail on the 2013/14 PBR method can be found here:
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214905/Step-by-stepguide-to-calculating-the-2013-14-national-tariff.pdf
47
7.2. Modelling national prices for 2017/18
7.2.1. What we previously proposed24
149. In National tariff: Policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19 we proposed to set
prices for the 2017/18 tariff year by modelling prices using the approach taken
by DH for the 2013/14 PbR, with changes including ensuring that manual
adjustments are cost neutral, allowing for up-to-date inputs and new calculation
models and managing provider revenue volatility.
150. We proposed to set national prices for 2017/18 by using the currencies
proposed in the currency section of this document and modelling national prices
using the process set out in the figure above.
151. This was a change to the approach used for the 2016/17 NTPS, but reflected
the approach we originally proposed in earlier consultations for the 2016/17
NTPS.25
152. We considered it would be more appropriate to model prices than to continue to
roll prices forward. This would allow us to use up-to-date cost data that reflect
changes in clinical practice, and to set prices for the proposed new currency
design, HRG4+.
7.2.2. What you told us
Table 15: Breakdown of responses to the proposal to model prices
Strongly
support
Number
%
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
12
95
30
24
20
7%
52%
17%
13%
11%
Don’t
know
12
Source: Survey responses to ‘National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
153. Responses to our proposals on the method for modelling prices focused mainly
on the following areas.
a. data quality issues in the reference cost and Hospital Episode Statistics
(HES) datasets
b. inappropriate proposed prices in specific areas: in particular orthopaedic and
renal prices, and specialist services provider prices that are too low
24
National Tariff: Policy proposals for 2017 to 2019 https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/nationaltariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
25
This was proposed in our summer engagement document 2016/17 national tariff proposal:
Currency design and relative prices at www.gov.uk/government/publications/201617-national-tariffproposals-currency-design-and-relative-prices
48
c. specific issues with the modelling approach: we should use spell-based
reference costs rather than convert finished consultant episodes to spells in
calculating prices.
7.2.3. How this has influenced our proposals
154. A clear majority (59%) of respondents supported our proposals.
155. Reference costs and HES for 2014/15 are the most comprehensive datasets
available to us. There are no realistic alternatives to them for setting the
2017/18 tariff.
156. Issues with reference costs are well known and we propose to mitigate these
shortcomings, for example through our proposed data cleaning and manual
adjustment processes.
157. We propose to mitigate the impact on orthopaedic, renal and specialist
providers through our approach to managing volatility (Section 7.10) and
through specialist top-up payments.
158. We do not propose to use spell-based reference costs because the very tight
timelines due to the later than- expected publication of the 2016/17 NTPS did
not allow us to explore this option further.
7.2.4. Final proposal
159. We propose to adopt the approach to modelling 2017/18 national prices set out
in National tariff: Policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19. This means we
propose to set 2017/18 prices using the modelling approach previously used by
DH for the 2013/14 DH PbR tariff, with some method changes and adjustments
to allow us to use up-to-date inputs and new calculation models, and to simplify
other models.
49
7.3. Managing model inputs for 2017/18
7.3.1. What we previously proposed26
160. In our summer engagement document, we proposed to model prices using
2014/15 reference costs and 2014/15 HES activity data. This is because the
2014/15 reference costs are designed to support the HRG4+ currency
proposals for 2017/18, and the 2014/15 HES activity data is the activity dataset
that is most compatible with the 2014/15 reference costs. When we started our
modelling, these datasets were also the most recent available.
161. We also proposed to apply some data cleaning rules to clean reference cost
data. We believe this would improve the quality of the reference cost dataset.
7.3.2. What you told us
Table 16: Breakdown of responses to our proposals for managing model
inputs
Strongly
support
Number
%
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
10
88
42
22
13
6%
50%
24%
13%
7%
Don’t
know
16
Source: Survey responses to ‘National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
162. A clear majority (56%) of respondents supported our proposals.
163. Respondents raised a few concerns, particularly that our data-cleaning
approach could remove genuine outliers.
164. Some respondents also suggested alternatives to our proposed data-cleaning
rules.
7.3.3. How this has influenced our proposals
165. We stated in our summer engagement that we would only apply data-cleaning
rules to reference costs for admitted patient care. This would result in a small
percentage of reference cost data records submitted by a small number of
providers being removed to improve the quality of the dataset.
166. Our analysis shows that the data-cleaning rules do have a significant effect on a
relatively small number of HRGs. However, we think we have put done enough
to minimise the risk of a negative effect from an unintentional removal of
genuine outliers, in particular:
26
National Tariff: Policy proposals for 2017 to 2019 https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/nationaltariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
50
a. our clinical review process for our modelled prices with the option for clinical
experts to propose manual adjustments to prices that appear to be
implausible
b. the ability for stakeholders to propose similar adjustments in response to our
consultation in July.27 To aid this we published with our July consultation a
readout tool that shows the impact of data cleaning on each HRG. An
updated version can be found on the NHS Improvement 2017/19 national
tariff page.28
167. We have not changed the way we propose to clean reference costs in response
to the suggested alternative data-cleaning methods. This is because we still
believe this method is appropriate and to do otherwise would require significant
development work to assess the suitability of these alternative approaches
relative to the effect of data cleaning on most HRGs.
7.3.4. Final proposal
Reference costs
168. We propose to adopt the approach to managing model inputs for 2017/18 prices
as set out in our summer engagement paper. This means we propose to clean
reference cost data by removing:
a. outliers from the raw reference cost dataset using a statistical outlier test
known as the Grubbs test
b. providers submitting reference costs more than 50% below the national
average for more than 25% of HRGs, who also submit reference costs more
than 50% higher than the national average for more than 25% of HRGs
c. providers submitting reference costs containing more than 75% duplicate
costs across HRGs and departments.
169. For the 2017/18 tariff we propose to clean only reference cost data for the
admitted patient care model.
HES data
We intend to use 2014/15 HES data grouped by Monitor.
27
National Tariff: Policy proposals for 2017 to 2019 https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/nationaltariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
28
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-1719-consultation
51
7.4. Setting prices for best practice tariffs for 2017/18
7.4.1. What we previously proposed29
170. In National Tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19 we proposed to,
where possible, simplify and standardise the method for setting prices for
existing and new BPTs by:
a. using the modelled price without adjustments as the starting point
b. setting a fixed differential between the BPT and non-BPT price (either a
percentage or absolute value)
c. setting an expected compliance rate that would be used to determine final
prices
d. then calculating the BPT and non-BPT price so that the BPT would not add
to or reduce the total amount paid to providers at an aggregate level.
171. These proposals would reduce the risk of BPTs creating an extra efficiency
requirement, would be easier to understand and simpler to calculate.
7.4.2. What you told us
Table 17: Breakdown of responses to our proposals for managing model
inputs
Strongly
support
Number
%
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
10
79
59
12
4
6%
48%
36%
7%
2%
23
Source: Survey responses to National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
172. 54% of respondents supported the proposed modelling approach and only 9%
did not.
173. Responses to our proposals focused mainly on the following areas.
a. the need to expressly take into account the cost of complying when setting a
BPT
b. lack of clarity on BPT criteria and payment rules and the associated
processes causing an administrative burden on the sector.
29
ational tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
52
7.4.3. How this has influenced our proposals
174. The pricing method for BPTs makes the assumption that the existing cost base
already includes the cost of compliance with BPTs. We think this is a
reasonable assumption for BPTs that have been in place for some time and
have received no evidence that newer BPTs cause significant extra costs to
providers.
175. We do consider the administrative burden on providers when proposing the
introduction of new BPTs but this needs to be weighed against the patient
benefit. Where we have significant feedback on undue administrative burdens
we have amended our BPT proposals to minimise the burden. We also have not
received any specific evidence that the administrative burden for existing BPTs
is disproportionately large.
176. As a result we do not currently have enough evidence to justify a change to our
proposals for the BPT pricing method to account for the cost of compliance or
the cost of administrative burden.
7.4.4. Final proposal
177. We are not amending our earlier proposals and so propose, where possible, to
simplify and standardise the method for setting prices for existing and new
BPTs by:
a. using the modelled price without adjustments as the starting point
b. setting a fixed differential between the BPT and non-BPT price (either a
percentage or absolute value)
c. setting an expected compliance rate that would be used to determine final
prices
d. calculating the BPT and non-BPT price so that the BPT would not add to or
reduce the total amount paid to providers at an aggregate level.
7.5. Setting national prices for 2018/19
7.5.1. What we previously proposed30
178. In National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19 we proposed to
model national prices for 2018/19 using the 2017/18 price list as a base and
then:
30
National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
53
a. determine final price levels by applying adjustments for expected efficiency,
inflation and CNST
b. adjust the method for setting inflation, efficiency and CNST to base them on
longer term projections rather than the most recent available data.
7.5.2. What you told us
179. A majority of respondents (53%) supported the proposed modelling approach.
180. Responses to our proposals on the modelling approach for 2018/19 prices
focused mainly on the limited flexibility that setting a two-year tariff imposes:
a. very limited flexibility to make changes in year 2 of the tariff poses a risk that
undesirable effects of the tariff are present for an extended period
b. limited opportunity to accommodate innovation
c. limited ability to react to unexpected cost changes.
7.5.3. How this has influenced our proposals
181. We recognise that there are limitations on making price changes when setting a
two-year tariff. We have addressed these concerns in Section 5 Setting a tariff
for 2017/19.
182. We have not been told of any major concerns around our proposal to use a rollover method for setting 2018/19 national prices. We are therefore not proposing
any changes to these proposals in the National tariff: policy proposals for
2017/18 and 2018/19 document.
7.5.4. Final proposal
183. As set out above, we propose to model national prices for 2018/19 using the
2017/18 price list as a base and then:
a. determine final price levels by applying adjustments for expected efficiency,
inflation and CNST
b. adjust the method for setting inflation, efficiency and CNST to base them on
longer term projections rather than the most recent available data.
54
7.6. Making manual adjustments to prices
7.6.1. What we previously proposed31
184. In our summer engagement document we proposed to introduce some manual
adjustments to price relativities based on the expert clinical feedback, for
example, from workshops with clinicians and specialty groups.
185. We presented these adjustments to the wider sector in an annex to the
engagement document32 and asked for further recommendations on these price
relativities.
7.6.2. What you told us
Table 18: Breakdown of responses to the proposal to manually adjust prices
Strongly
support
Number
%
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
8
75
55
13
14
5%
45%
33%
8%
8%
24
Source: Survey responses to National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
186. Although feedback to this proposed approach was broadly positive, some
respondents commented that the process should be more open and that
particular groups, such as bariatric surgeons, had not been adequately engaged
with.
187. There were also specific comments on price levels submitted through the
survey as well as recommendations returned using the template in the manual
adjustment annex.
7.6.3. How this has influenced our proposals
188. We have reviewed all comments on specific prices, accepted some feedback
and made further recommendations. We are now proposing a new set of
manual adjustments to price relativities.
189. These manual adjustments have already been factored into the prices
proposed in Annex B1. We have included all the proposed manual adjustments
in Annex B2.
190. The manual adjustments proposed for the summer engagement were
developed with a relatively narrow series of stakeholder groups but we are now
31
In 2017 to 2019 National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
32
https://improvement.nhs.uk/uploads/documents/Annex_B_
Price_relativities_response_template.xlsx
55
releasing them to all stakeholders to get the widest possible range of views. We
are also looking at ways to make sure the groups represent a wider range of
views at the earliest stage of the manual adjustment process.
7.6.4. Final proposal
191. Following sector engagement we propose to introduce some manual
adjustments to price relativities. Details of these are in Annex B2.
7.7. Setting the efficiency factor
7.7.1. Background
192. The efficiency factor is a mechanism used in sectors where prices are regulated
centrally to incentivise providers to reduce costs. It measures the efficiency
providers are expected to achieve by treating patients at lower cost over time,
for example by introducing innovative healthcare pathways, technological
changes or better use of the labour force.33
193. The objective of the efficiency factor is to set a challenging but achievable target
to encourage trusts to continually improve their use of resources, so that
patients receive as much high quality healthcare as possible.
194. Setting the efficiency factor inappropriately can have substantial and
undesirable impacts on providers, commissioners and patients because:
a. Setting a too high efficiency factor (prices too low) may challenge providers’
financial position and sustainability. Providers may not be adequately
reimbursed for the services they provide, which potentially could affect a
service quality (eg increasing waiting times) and increase the risk of adverse
impact on the quality of care for patients.
b. Setting a very low efficiency factor (prices too high) may reduce both the
volume of services that commissioners can purchase with given budgets and
reduce the incentive for providers to achieve cost savings.
7.7.2. What are we proposing?
195. We propose an efficiency factor of 2% for 2017/18 and 2% for 2018/19.
7.7.3. Rationale
196. We use evidence-based data to set the efficiency factor. The starting point is
the Deloitte analysis produced to inform our decision on the efficiency factor for
the 2015/16 national tariff. This initial analysis was based on an econometric
33
The Carter report has proposed ways providers can achieve efficiencies.
56
model and a supporting case study.34 The model used data from 165 acute
trusts between the 2008/09 and 2012/13 financial years. For the 2016/17 NTPS
we developed the Deloitte econometric approach by changing our measurement
of certain variables and incorporating 2013/14 data into the model.35
197. For the 2017/18 NTPS we considered how we might develop the existing
econometric model, as well as whether any update to the evidence was needed.
We updated the analysis prepared for the 2016/17 NTPS to include 2014/15
data.36 This allows us to account for the most recent changes in efficiency in our
decision on the efficiency factor setting. We have also improved the
measurement of deprivation in the model.37
198. We estimated two measures of efficiency: trend efficiency and variation in
efficiency.
a. Trend efficiency is the average sector-wide efficiency gain we observe over
time. This could arise from new technologies, improved hospital processes
or less efficient trusts catching up with more efficient ones. We estimate
trend efficiency as a percentage reduction in costs over time that does not
vary by trust. Given the importance of achieving value for money in the NHS,
we think it is reasonable to set an efficiency ask at least at the level of
historical trend efficiency.
b. Variation in efficiency is the range of efficiency performance across trusts.
This could arise from differences in use of technologies, or differences in
hospital processes. We estimate variation in efficiency as a percentage
difference in costs from the average trust that does not change over time.
We use this to inform our understanding of what reasonable efficiency ask,
over and above trend efficiency, would enable less efficient trusts to catch up
with more efficient trusts.
199. The table below displays the results of the estimates of our model and suggests
it would be reasonable for the efficiency factor to be at least 1% with catch up
factor to reduce variations in efficiency. Given the financial pressures on the
NHS, we believe that it is appropriate to set a challenging but achievable
efficiency target for 2017/18. We are proposing an efficiency factor of 2%.
34
See Deloitte report for detailed description of the method.
The report of the efficiency factor for the 2016/17 national tariff can be found here: Evidence on the efficiency
factor.
36
Where changes in data collections mean data is not available for variables, for instance certain disease’s
prevalence in the Quality Outcomes Framework, we have extrapolated based on historical data.
37
In 2016/17 the estimate of the level of deprivation a trust faced was calculated using the area-level index of
multiple deprivation, mapped to trusts by the average patient flow. This was time-invariant. This year we have
recalculated patient flow each year. This enables us to capture changes in the deprivation profile a trust may
face due to changes in catchment area served over time.
35
57
Table 19: Efficiency estimates
Estimate
Trend efficiency
1.0%
Variation in efficiency
Median to 60th centile
1.6%
Median to 70th centile
3.0%
Median to 80th centile
5.2%
Median to 90th centile
6.9%
Notes:
The econometric analysis is based on cost data on 170 providers for the period 2008/092014/15.
200. Our modelling suggests that trusts become 1% more efficient each year on
average. Around this trend we estimate that there is substantial variation in
efficiency, which could justify an efficiency factor greater than 1% as poorer
performers can improve more than the average. For instance, if the average
performer catches up to the 60th centile we estimate that this would release
1.6% efficiency in addition to trend efficiency. For the 2018/19 national tariff we
assume trend efficiency will continue and this goes in line with the other
government reviews.38 We therefore consider it appropriate to adopt an
efficiency factor of 2% for 2018/19.
7.8. Cost uplifts
7.8.1. Background
201. To determine national prices for 2017/18 and 2018/19 we need to assess the
cost pressures in those years taking into account the expected changes to the
major components of provider costs.
Table 20: Cost uplift factor components
Category
Description
Source
Frequency of
update
Labour cost
inflation
Expected pay settlement, pay drift,
apprenticeship levy, staff mix and
pension changes
Department of
Health
Annually
Drugs cost
inflation
Cost increase of all drugs
Department of
Health
Monthly
Non-pay,
non-drugs
inflation
General inflation of other operating
expenses using the latest forecast of
the gross domestic product deflator
Office for Budget
Responsibility
End of each
quarter
Changes in
capital costs
Anticipated changes in depreciation
and private finance initiative (PFI)
payments
Department of
Health
Annually
38
A recent Carter review report on operational productivity and performance suggests the NHS is expected to
deliver efficiencies of 2-3% per year, which could represent savings of 10-15% by 2021.
58
Category
Description
Source
Frequency of
update
CNST
Expected increases in CNST
contribution payments
NHS Litigation
Authority
Annually
(October/
November)
Service
development
Expected cost of new requirements
set out in the government’s mandate
to NHS England
NHS England
Annually
(November/
December)
7.8.2. Our proposal
202. We propose to use broadly the same methodology for setting cost uplifts that
we have used in previous years with the notable difference that we must
estimate for two years rather than one.39 We are also making some adjustments
to the DH figures for labour cost and drug cost inflation, as explained below. To
estimate the appropriate cost uplift for 2017/18 and 2018/19, we propose to:
a. forecast the rate of inflation for each of the categories in the table above
b. combine these into a single cost uplift factor by weighting each category by
its average share of providers’ expenditure
c. estimate cost weightings based on the actual weighting in the 2015/16
consolidated accounts and use the same weightings for 2017/18 and
2018/19.
203. Based on the approach we have developed for cost uplift and the latest
available data, we propose to use an inflation cost uplift of 2.1% for 2017/18
and 2.1% for 2018/19. A breakdown of this estimate, calculated using the
approach described above, is shown below.
204. For labour costs we propose to exclude estimates for pay inflation that lead to
increased output on the basis that this activity growth would be paid for by
reimbursement of that extra activity through national prices.
205. For drugs costs we propose to exclude estimates for inflation that relate to
activity growth as this would be paid for by reimbursement of that extra activity
through national prices. We also propose to exclude the estimates of inflation
for high cost drugs.
39
Please see Section 4.2 of the 2016/17 National Tariff Payment System for more details on the
previous methodology for setting cost uplifts
59
Table 21: Summary of cost uplift factor estimates
Category
2017/18
uplift %
2018/19
uplift %
Category
weight
Weighted
estimate
2017/18
Weighted
estimate
2018/19
Labour cost inflation
2.1%
2.0%
63.1%
1.3%
1.3%
Drugs cost inflation
2.8%
2.1%
8.5%
0.2%
0.2%
Non-pay, non-drugs
inflation
1.8%
2.1%
20.9%
0.4%
0.4%
Changes in capital costs
3.0%
2.9%
5.7%
0.2%
0.2%
CNST cost inflation
0.9%
0.9%
1.8%
0.0%
0.0%
Service development and
other costs
0.0%
0.0%
n/a
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
2.1%
2.1%
Overall
Note: calculations were done unrounded; only one decimal place is displayed
7.8.3. Rationale
206. Every year the efficient cost of providing healthcare changes because of
changes in wages, prices and other inputs over which providers have limited
control. We therefore make a forward-looking adjustment to the modelled prices
to reflect expected cost pressures in future years. We refer to this as the cost
uplift.
207. We have considered other methods of setting cost uplifts, including the inflation
estimates from the OBR, but we feel that, because the current methodology
includes estimates of changes to healthcare costs provided by the bodies best
placed to estimate them (eg the Department of Health or the NHS Litigation
Authority), it reflects our best understanding of changes to healthcare costs.
208. Labour cost inflation. We are projecting an increase in the pay bill of 2.1% in
2017/18 and 2.0% in 2018/19. Our estimate for labour cost inflation comprises:

1% pay award, in line with public sector-pay policy as set by HM Treasury

pay drift and group mix effects of 0.7% in 2017/18 and 1.0% in 2018/19. In
arriving at these figures, we have made an adjustment of -0.3% to the DH
projections to reduce or exclude elements of pay inflation that would lead to
additional output and so are remunerated through activity rather than price

the apprenticeship levy, which is estimated to add a net 0.3% to the total
wage bill in 2017/18 (with no further impact in 2018/19). This comprises 0.4%
expected gross costs, offset by our estimate of 0.1% financial benefit, as
employers are able to access funding for the training of apprentices

the immigration skills charge, which the Department of Health estimate will
add 0.1% to the total wage bill in 2017/18 (with no further impact in 2018/19)
60
209. Drug cost inflation. Our estimate for drug cost inflation is 2.8% in 2017/18 and
2.1% in 2018/19. The approach is a development of that used in previous years
to ensure that it better reflects actual price increases.
210. The starting point for our approach is DH estimates of drug expenditure growth.
These are based on long-term trends, DH’s expectation of new drugs coming to
market and other drugs that will cease to be provided solely under patent in the
coming 12 months. The figures are 5.8% in 2017/18 and 5.0% in 2018/19. We
then adjust these to calculate a figure appropriate for use in the tariff, as follows:
a. calculating a revised figure for tariff drugs, by assuming 6.2% cost growth in
the proportion of drugs expenditure accounted for by high cost drugs. As the
cost of high cost drugs is paid outside the tariff, it is not correct to include
expected price growth in our calculation of tariff inflation
b. removing assumed underlying activity growth of 2.5% in both years as this
this activity growth would be paid for by reimbursement of that extra activity
through national prices
c. recognising the uncertainty associated with these adjustments, particularly
for pass-through drugs, and setting the growth figure to be at least the GDP
deflator in each year.
211. Non pay non drugs inflation. For other operating costs, which include general
costs such as medical, surgical and laboratory equipment and fuel, we have
used the forecast of the GDP deflator estimated by the Office of Budget
Responsibility (OBR) as the basis of the expected increase in costs. The latest
available forecast of the GDP deflator is from June 2016.40 This is 1.8% in
2017/18 and 2.1% in 2018/19.
212. Capital costs. Providers’ costs typically include depreciation charges and
private finance initiative (PFI) payments. As with increases in operating costs,
providers should have an opportunity to recover an increase in these capital
costs.
213. In previous years, DH reflected changes in these capital costs when calculating
cost uplifts, and we have adopted the same approach for 2017/18 and 2018/19.
Specifically, we have applied DH’s projection of changes in overall depreciation
charges and PFI payments.
214. In aggregate, DH projects PFI and depreciation to grow by 3.0% in 2017/18 and
2.9% in 2018/19. These both translate to an 0.2% uplift on tariff prices.
40
Published at www.gov.uk/government/statistics/gdp-deflators-at-market-prices-and-money-gdpjune-2016-quarterly-national-accounts
61
215. CNST. As in previous years, most CNST costs are allocated to the relevant
HRGs at a subchapter level. About 2% of CNST costs cannot be allocated to
subchapters. Our proposed approach is that we apply this residual or
unallocated CNST cost change to all HRGs by including an uplift to the cost
uplift factor. We used data provided by the NHS Litigation Authority to calculate
the uplift factor for unallocated CNST, and propose to adopt that approach for
the final prices.
216. Service development and other costs. We also considered whether any extra
allowance should be made for other identified costs, or to allow for expected
service developments including major initiatives in NHS England’s mandate. We
concluded that no further adjustments were necessary, having in particular
considered the following potential areas of extra cost:
a. CQC inspection fees: the impact of announced extra CQC inspection fees
is less than 0.1% and not considered material
b. Seven-day services: this will be considered as part of transformation
funding and it is not therefore necessary to include an uplift in tariff.
7.9. Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts
7.9.1. Background
217. CNST is an indemnity scheme for clinical negligence claims. Providers
contribute to the scheme to cover the legal and compensatory costs of clinical
negligence.41 The NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA) administers the scheme
and sets the contribution each provider must make to ensure the scheme is fully
funded each year.
218. Following the approach used in previous years, we propose to allocate the
increase in CNST costs to core HRG subchapters (for admitted patient care), to
the maternity delivery tariff and to A&E services, in line with the average
increase that will be paid by providers. This approach to the CNST uplift is
different to other cost uplifts. While other cost uplifts are estimated and applied
across all prices, the estimate of the CNST increase can be different for each
subchapter (within admitted patient care), A&E services and for the maternity
delivery tariff.
219. Each relevant HRG has received an uplift based on the change in CNST cost
across specialties mapped to HRG subchapters. This means that our proposed
41
CCGs and NHS England are also members of the CNST scheme.
62
cost uplifts reflect, on average, each provider’s relative exposure to CNST cost
growth, given their individual mix of services and procedures.42
220. As we are proposing to move to a two-year tariff we would set the CNST uplift
for both years.
7.9.2. Proposal
221. We propose to set the same CNST uplifts for both years. These are in the table
on the next page.
7.9.3. Rationale
222. We propose to use the same method we have used in previous years with
minor adjustments to adapt it to HRG4+ and a two-year tariff.
223. As this is a tested model previously accepted by the sector we do not believe a
redesign of the policy is required at this stage.
224. We believe that setting the same levels for two years makes sense given the
information from the NHSLA and the rollover method we propose to adopt for
setting prices in 2018/19.
225. The NHS Litigation Authority (NHS LA) provides NHS Improvement with a
breakdown by treatment and staff specialty of the total amount to be collected
from members of the scheme to cover projected litigation claims. For the
2017/19 tariff the NHS LA have provided two years’ worth of projections
covering the 2017/18 and 2018/19 financial years. The increase from the
2016/17 and 2017/18 projections respectively is then allocated to the relevant
areas of tariff using the same method.
42
For example, maternity services have been a major driver of CNST costs in recent years. For this
reason, a provider that delivers maternity services as a large proportion of its overall service mix
would probably find its CNST contributions (set by the NHSLA) have increased more quickly than
the contributions of other providers. However, the cost uplift reflects this, since the CNST uplift is
higher for maternity services. This is consistent with the approach previously taken by DH.
63
Table 22: CNST tariff impact by HRG subchapter
HRG sub
chapter
2017/18 up
lift (%)
2018/19 uplift
(%)
HRG sub
chapter
2017/18 upli
ft (%)
2018/19
uplift (%)
HRG sub
chapter
2017/18 uplif
t (%)
2018/19 uplift
(%)
AA
0.72%
0.89%
JC
0.67%
0.80%
PP
1.25%
1.53%
AB
0.41%
0.54%
JD
0.40%
0.49%
PQ
0.58%
0.71%
BZ
0.54%
0.68%
KA
0.48%
0.63%
PR
1.14%
1.41%
CA
0.34%
0.46%
KB
0.22%
0.25%
PV
1.08%
1.34%
CB
0.36%
0.45%
KC
0.20%
0.22%
PW
1.33%
1.62%
CD
0.16%
0.19%
LA
0.18%
0.20%
PX
1.10%
1.35%
DZ
0.17%
0.20%
LB
0.37%
0.45%
SA
0.30%
0.37%
EB
0.26%
0.31%
MA
0.22%
0.37%
VA
0.83%
1.08%
EC
0.26%
0.33%
MB
0.41%
0.58%
WH
0.49%
0.61%
ED
0.23%
0.32%
PB
1.12%
1.38%
WJ
0.22%
0.26%
EY
0.29%
0.36%
PC
1.18%
1.45%
YA
2.71%
3.55%
FZ
0.56%
0.71%
PD
1.33%
1.63%
YD
0.29%
0.33%
GA
0.56%
0.72%
PE
0.94%
1.15%
YF
0.57%
0.73%
GB
0.27%
0.34%
PF
1.14%
1.40%
YG
0.26%
0.31%
GC
0.52%
0.65%
PG
0.75%
0.92%
YH
0.91%
1.17%
HC
0.84%
1.10%
PH
0.86%
1.07%
YJ
0.72%
0.92%
HD
0.49%
0.60%
PJ
1.24%
1.51%
YL
0.23%
0.28%
HE
1.51%
1.92%
PK
0.74%
0.91%
YQ
0.71%
0.91%
HN
0.83%
1.08%
PL
0.79%
0.97%
YR
0.75%
0.95%
HT
0.92%
1.20%
PM
0.24%
0.30%
VB
1.94%
1.90%
JA
0.84%
1.05%
PN
0.70%
0.85%
Maternity
6.36%
7.54%
Source: The NHS Litigation Authority. Note: * Maternity is delivery element only
64
7.10. Managing volatility
7.10.1. Background
226. In proposing to set national prices based on the HRG4+ currency design
underpinned by cost and activity data from 2014/15, we accept that this would
change the distribution of provider income and commissioner expenditure.
While this is one of the desired consequences of introducing an improved
currency design based on more up-to-date cost data, the change may be
destabilising for individual providers even though in aggregate the effect is
neutral to the provider sector.
227. Delaying the introduction of the new currency design would reduce this volatility
but it would mean that prices become increasingly removed from current costs
and practice. It would also mean that when any new currency design is
implemented the impact would be much greater.
228. This means that the impact from introducing the new currency design needs to
be managed in a way that reduces the total impact on providers and
commissioners to a manageable level in any year.
229. For the prices released with National tariff: Policy proposals for 2017/18 and
2018/19,43 we were concerned that some services had large gains and others
significant losses: in particular orthopaedics (subchapters HC, HD, HE, HN and
HT), neonatal disorders (PB), renal dialysis (LD), chemotherapy (SB) and
radiotherapy (SC).
7.10.2. Proposal
230. We propose to continue to adjust prices in the subchapters mentioned above so
that services recover 75% of the initial estimated loss. Tariff prices outside
these subchapters have been reduced equally by 1.2% to pay for this revenue
adjustment (top sliced). The table below displays the adjustments factors:
Table 23: Adjustments made to individual subchapters
Subchapter
Subchapter description
Uplift adjustment
HC
Spinal Procedures and Disorders
3.9%
HD
Musculoskeletal and rheumatological
Disorders
0.9%
HE
Orthopaedic Disorders
11.1%
HN
Orthopaedic Non-Trauma Procedures
5.3%
HT
Orthopaedic Trauma Procedures
7.9%
LD
Renal Dialysis for Chronic Kidney
10.4%
43
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
65
Subchapter
Subchapter description
Disease
Uplift adjustment
PB
Neonatal disorders
15.0%
SB
Chemotherapy
4.1%
SC
Radiotherapy
6.3%
All remaining chapters
-1.2%
231. We also propose a further change to the management of subchapter HD to
separate it from the rest of chapter H for price calculation.
232. NHS England is making consequential adjustments as between CCG and
specialist commissioners budgets to ensure the changes are purchasingprovider neutral between locally and nationally commissioned prices.
7.10.3. Rationale
233. Under the existing approach all prices in chapter H are calculated together
which means that manual adjustments to prices in another H subchapter have a
significant impact on prices within HD. Separating this sub-chapter means we
can avoid a significant reduction to prices for musculoskeletal and
rheumatological disorders.
234. However, this is not a perfect solution and would still leave 52 NHS providers
facing a reduction of more than 0.5% of operating revenue. We do not collect
data on operating revenue from independent providers and so are not able to
provide this analysis for the independent sector.
235. This approach would allow the introduction of a new currency design while
reducing some of the extreme reductions in payments for some services as a
result of switching to HRG4+. The remaining issues may relate to casemix
complexity that is not captured adequately by the HRG4 or HRG4+ currency
designs and cannot be mitigated through the national tariff.
7.11
Setting the cost base
7.11.1 Background
236. The cost base is the level of cost the tariff will allow providers to recover before
adjustments are made for cost uplifts, CNST and the efficiency factor are
applied. Therefore in setting national prices, after setting price relativities, we
set prices at a level that will allow them to recover the cost base, and then we
adjust those prices to allow for cost uplifts, and the efficiency factor.
66
7.11.2 What are we proposing?
237. For 2017/18, for the total activity with a national price, we are proposing to set
the cost base equal to the revenue that would be received under 2016/17
national tariff.
238. Similarly, for 2018/19, we propose that the cost base should equal the revenue
that would be received under 2017/18 prices (that is the 2016/17 cost base
adjusted for 2017/18 cost uplifts and efficiency factor).
7.11.3 Rationale
239. As with many other parts of tariff setting, we use last year’s tariff as a starting
point for the following tariff. Therefore, last year’s prices and last year’s revenue
are used as a starting point.
240. After setting the starting point, we consider new information, and a number of
factors to form a view whether an adjustment to the cost base is warranted.
241. Information and factors we considered include:
a. historical efficiency and cost uplift assumptions
b. latest cost data
c. additional funding outside the national tariff.
d. any other additional revenue providers use to pay for tariff services 44
e. our pricing principles and the factors which legislation requires us to
consider, including matters such as the importance of setting cost reflective
prices, and the need to take into account the duties of commissioners in the
context of the budget available for the NHS.
242. In using our judgement, we also consider the effect of setting the cost base too
high or too low. This effect is asymmetric:
a. If we set the cost base too low (ie we set too high an expectation that
providers will be able to catch up to past undelivered efficiency), providers
will be in deficit, service quality will decrease (eg waiting times will increase),
and some providers may cease providing certain services.
b. However, if we set the cost base too high, commissioners, who have an
obligation to stay within their budgets, are likely to restrict the volumes of
commissioned services, and could cease commissioning certain services
44
We commissioned a review into the cost base from FTI. This can be found at:
improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-1719-consultation
67
entirely. This would mean some patients may not be provided with the
healthcare service they require.
243. Given the above, it is our judgement to keep the cost base equal to the revenue
that would be received under 2016/17 prices.
68
8
National variations
244. National variations refer to variations to national prices specified in the national
tariff (s116(4)(a) of the 2012 Act). They relate to circumstances where it is
appropriate to make adjustments to national prices (as distinct from local
variations agreed between commissioners and providers). National variations
may reflect features of costs that are not fully captured in national prices or seek
to share risk more appropriately between providers and commissioners. The
national variations in the national tariff aim to do one of the following:
a. improve the extent to which prices reflect location-specific costs (eg the
market forces factor (MFF))
b. improve the extent to which prices reflect patient complexity (eg top-ups for
specialised services)
c. create incentives to share responsibility for preventing avoidable unplanned
hospital stays (eg the marginal rate emergency rule)
d. share financial risk appropriately following (or during) a move to new
payment approaches (eg national variation to support the implementation of
the BPT for hip and knee replacements).
245. For 2017 to 2019 we are only proposing to adjust top-up payments for
specialised services.
246. We propose to retain the current approach to the market forces factor:
a. Where there are mergers during the period in which the tariff has effect, as
now, the existing MFF rate will continue to apply, but providers and
commissioners may agree a local variation to national prices in accordance
with the rules set out in Section 6 of the national tariff.
b. Where MFF rates are recalculated, for example where two trusts have
merged before the end of March 2017, we will publish the rates and they will
apply from April 2017.
247. We propose to retain the marginal rate emergency rule and the 30 day
readmission rule. We believe that these still provide appropriate incentives to
prevent avoidable admissions.
248. We propose to retain the transitional national variation for primary hip and knee
replacements. This was introduced in 2014/15 to recognise that there are
circumstances in which some providers will be unable to demonstrate that they
meet all the best practice criteria, but where it would be inappropriate not to pay
the full BPT price. We will continue to review this policy over the period of the
tariff and may propose changes in 2019/20.
69
8.11
Updating top-up payment for specialised services
8.11.1 What we previously proposed45
249. In our previous engagement, we proposed to:
a. Move to top-ups based on the Prescribed Specialised Services (PSS)
definition of specialised services
b. Move to top-up payments for 2017/18 that adopt the recommendations from
the University of York.46
250. We would mitigate the impact by transitioning to the new rates over four years
for services that would lose income from the new rates. Other rates will be
scaled pro-rata to maintain a total payment amount of around £416 million.
251. This change would use the latest reference costs and HES data, and a
methodology developed by the University of York with input from the service
and the Specialist and Complex Care Advisory Group.
252. Moving straight to the new top-up rates could destabilise providers. We are also
analysing how complexity is captured by the national tariff. As we will not
conclude this analysis in time for proposals to be included for the 2017 to 2019
national tariff, we believe that is appropriate to transition to the new top-up
levels.
8.11.2 What you told us
Table 24: Response from the sector to updating top-up payment for
specialised services
Number
%
Strongly
support
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Don’t
know
17
62
48
14
24
22
10%
38%
29%
8%
15%
Source: Survey responses to National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
253. Support for this policy was generally favourable. The update to the top-ups to
line up with specialised commissioning rules and to reflect HRG4+ phase 3 was
seen as a necessary change.
254. Concerns were raised that the PSS rules were not being evenly applied and the
definitions were not in line with services being commissioned locally.
45
In 2017 to 2019 National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-policy-proposals-1718-and-1819/
46
www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/
CHERP118_costs_prescribed_specialised_services.pdf
70
255. Certain key stakeholders did have concerns about the impact of the policy
particularly orthopaedic and paediatric providers.
256. We also had feedback suggesting that other issues with the payment of
complex care were not fully addressed by this new policy.
8.11.3 How this has influenced our proposals
257. Based on the positive feedback from the sector we still believe that it is
appropriate to introduce this policy. To address concerns regarding price
volatility, the PSS definitions and complexity payments we are proposing to
introduce measures to reduce this:
a. We have updated the top-ups to account for the latest PSS rules
consultation carried out by NHS England specialised commissioning. This
means that top-ups and our impact assessments will reflect an updated set
of PSS rules due to be released in the payment grouper in April 2017.
b. To ensure greater stability for paediatric and orthopaedic providers we are
not going to make further adjustment to rates for top-ups between the
2017/18 and 2018/19 prices. The top-up values will remain the same across
both years.
c. We remain committed to investigating other areas of concern raised by our
key stakeholders and are developing a work plan for the specialist and
complex care group to review for 2017/19.
8.11.4 Final proposal
258. We propose to:
a. Move to top-ups based on the most up to date definitions of PSS available
from NHS England specialised commissioning.
b. Move to top-up payments for 2017/18 that adopt the recommendations from
the University of York.47
c. We would mitigate the impact by transitioning to the new rates over four
national tariff periods. Other rates will be scaled pro-rata to maintain a total
payment amount of around £478 million.
d. This change would use the latest reference costs, currency design and HES
data, and a methodology developed by the University of York with input from
the service and the Specialist and Complex Care Advisory Group.
47
www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/
CHERP118_costs_prescribed_specialised_services.pdf
71
259. The impact of the top-up values by specialty area and the changes between the
values reported in the previous engagement are presented in the table below:
Table 25: Top-up impact by specialist area
Top-up area
Rollover
of
SSNDS
top-ups
TED top-ups
(no update to
PSS rules):
no transition
S118 prices
(with update
to PSS): no
transition
TED top-ups
(no update to
PSS rules):
with
transition
S118 prices
(with update
to PSS): with
transition
All top-up
areas
£322.5M
£416.3M
£478.5M
£416.3M
£478.5M
Spinal
£18.5M
0
0
£13.7M
£13.9M
Neurosciences
£60.8M
£138.9M
£165.6M
£87.7M
£117.7M
£5.3M
£0.8M
£1.0M
£4.2M
£4.2M
£237.9M
£106.3M
£124.8M
£203.2M
£209.6M
Cancer
0
£22.4M
£23.6M
£14.1M
£16.7M
Respiratory
0
£42.6M
£45.5M
£26.9M
£32.3M
Cardiac
0
£93.5M
£103.1M
£59.1M
£73.3M
Other
0
£11.8M
£15.0M
£7.5M
£10.7M
Orthopaedics
Children
72
9
Locally determined prices
260. Over half of the £70 billion of NHS activity covered by the national tariff is
subject to local pricing arrangements.
261. Subject to compliance with local pricing rules and methods, national prices can
be adjusted, particularly if it will allow commissioners to innovate in the design
of services for patients (local variations) or where they do not adequately
reimburse efficient costs because of structural issues (local modifications).
These changes must be published and, in the case of local modifications, NHS
Improvement must agree to the proposals applying its methods.
262. Under the rules, in agreeing a local payment approach, commissioners and
providers must adhere to three principles:
a. the approach must be in the best interests of patients
b. the approach must promote transparency to improve accountability and
encourage the sharing of best practice
c. the provider and commissioner(s) must engage constructively with each
other when trying to agree local payment approaches.
263. We are proposing to make some changes to the structure of the locally
determined prices section of the proposed 2017/19 NTPS to reduce duplication
and simplify the guidance. We have also moved guidance out of the supporting
document48 and into the proposed 2017/19 NTPS. There will be no supporting
document for locally determined prices for the 2017/19 NTPS.
264. Over the past two tariff cycles we have received feedback that the locally
determined prices section and supporting guidance are repetitive and poorly
written. We believe that these changes should make it easier for the sector to
understand the rules and obligations.
265. For mental health we are proposing two changes:
a. the sector to move to episode of care, capitation models for mental health
services or an alternative approach under local pricing Rule 4
b. the sector to adopt the IAPT payment model from 2018/19 or an alternative
approach under local pricing Rule 4.
48
www.gov.uk/government/publications/nhs-national-tariff-payment-system-201617-supportingdocuments
73
9.11
Mental health payment proposals for adults and older people
9.11.1 What we previously proposed
266. We proposed to change the local payment rules to require mental health
providers and commissioners to link prices to locally agreed quality and
outcome measures and the delivery of access and waits standards. This applies
regardless of the payment approach chosen.
267. We also proposed to change the rules to require local use of one of the
following options:
a. episode of treatment or year of care, as appropriate to each mental
healthcare cluster
b. capitation, informed by care cluster data and any other relevant data
c. an alternative payment approach consistent with the rules for local pricing.
268. Our payment proposals describe the use of mental health currencies known as
care clusters to inform payment. Care clusters were developed to be needs
based and to assist providers in the patient’s clinical assessment. Even though
the care clusters cover not all but most mental health services for working-age
adults and older people, they are the existing tool available to support clinical
decision-making.
269. Going forward, NHS England will look to strengthen the clinical relevance of the
care clusters and their relationship with diagnosis-based pathways to draw on
the best evidence available. This work will have a patient-centred focus to
improve quality and outcomes by bringing greater transparency to payment
approaches in clinical decision-making as well as informing commissioners in
improving investment decisions for mental health services.
9.11.2 What you told us
270. We originally consulted on these proposals in October 2015 and received
support. Feedback to the summer engagement contained little negative
comment, and several people felt that moving to a new approach was long
overdue. The table below outlines the breakdown of responses received to the
summer engagement.
Table 26: Response from the sector to mental health payment proposals
Question
Mental
health
Strongly
support
Tend to
support
Neither
support or
oppose
Tend to
oppose
Strongly
oppose
Number
6
36
63
6
6
%
5%
31%
54%
5%
5%
Source: Survey responses to ‘National tariff: policy proposals for 2017/18 and 2018/19’
74
Don’t
know
69
271. Feedback this year found that some commissioners felt that the data submitted
by providers were not sufficiently robust to support payment. They were also
concerned that they did not have sufficient time or resources to fully implement
the proposals because of pressure related to the acute sector.
272. There were also requests for more detailed guidance to support the local
implementation of the payment approaches. This is currently being prepared by
NHS Improvement and NHS England. We are also considering the requests for
more support on national benchmarking of quality and outcome metrics, and
how this can be incorporated into local systems.
9.11.3 How this has influenced our proposals
273. We do not propose making any adjustments to the existing proposals.
274. Based on this and earlier feedback, we intend to publish further guidance to
support local health economies develop and implement local payment
approaches. We will also continue to work with NHS Digital to ensure data
reporting supports this.
9.11.4 Final proposal
275. Our final proposals are to:
a. require mental health providers and commissioners to link prices to locally
agreed quality and outcome measures from 2017/18
b. require local use of one of the three payment options outlined above from
2017/18.
276. These proposals are consistent with the work NHS Improvement and NHS
England have been doing with the sector over the past few years to move to a
more transparent and robust payment approach. Providers and commissioners
must now put in place the building blocks for successful implementation of these
proposals. Guidance and further support material are available via the payment
development webpage.49
49
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/new-payment-approaches/
75
9.12
Mental health payment proposals IAPT
9.12.1 What we previously proposed
277. In our summer engagement on mental health we proposed to mandate the IAPT
payment model,50 as outlined previously in the local payment example, for use
from 2018/19.
278. This model involves using the set of outcomes and process metrics routinely
collected and reported by all IAPT providers as an integral part of payment.
9.12.2 What you told us
279. Overall, most providers and commissioners welcomed our proposal but wanted
more support and guidance. This included:
a. the use of local flexibility and discretion
b. ensuring patient choice continues to be supported
c. appropriateness of the cluster tool for IAPT.
280. There were a number of requests for the evidence base for the payment
approach. The IAPT care programme51 has already conducted reviews of
benefits of the IAPT care programme nationally.52
9.12.3 How this has influenced our proposals
281. We recognise that the nationally developed IAPT payment model may not be
appropriate in all cases and wish to encourage local flexibility and innovation
while retaining a focus on linking payment to outcomes.
282. To this end we are no longer proposing to mandate the IAPT payment model for
use but instead to introduce a rule mandating the use of an outcomes-based
payment model for IAPT that uses the outcome measures that are collected
nationally as part of the IAPT dataset. Local variations still apply.
9.12.4 Final proposal
283. Our final proposal is to introduce a new Rule 8, in Section 6 of the 2017/19
NTPS, which would mandate the use of an outcomes-based payment model for
IAPT from 1 April 2018/19. This model would need to take into account the
severity and complexity of a service user’s presenting problem. The 10 national
outcome measures collected in the IAPT dataset must reflect the outcomes
50
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-payment-example-improving-access-topsychological-therapies
51
https://www.england.nhs.uk/mentalhealth/adults/iapt/
52
http://www.iapt.nhs.uk/silo/files/iapt-3-year-report.pdf
76
element of the payment model for IAPT services. NHS England and NHS
Improvement would publish updated guidance on the use of this payment model
for shadow testing in 2017/18.
284. Commissioners and providers may use a different payment approach under
local pricing Rule 4. We propose that any alternative payment model must link
prices to agreed quality and outcomes measures.
285. Commissioners and providers should consider shadow testing their chosen
payment model in 2017/18 ahead of implementation.
9.13
Proposed changes to rules for locally determined prices and payment
9.13.1 Background
286. Section 6 of the 2016/17 NTPS sets out the current requirements for all locally
determined prices. It contains the principles that apply to the rules for local
variations, the method used by NHS Improvement to assess local modifications
and rules on local prices.
287. Section 7 of the 2016/17 NTPS sets out the current payment rules. In particular
it reflects the requirements for billing and activity reporting contained in the
terms and conditions of the NHS standard contract.
288. In the consultation on the 2016/17 NTPS we received feedback53 that the locally
determined prices section of the national tariff and the supporting guidance are
repetitive and, in places, unclear.
289. Over the course of this year we have reviewed this guidance and we propose to
simplify Sections 6 and 7 to reduce repetition and improve accessibility for the
reader.
290. In doing this, we identified some rules that could be usefully changed.
9.13.2 What are we proposing?
291. We propose to:
a. remove Rule 5
b. amend Rule 3 and remove Rule 6
c. remove local pricing Rules 11a and 11c of the 2016/17 NTPS (rules for
ambulance services)
53
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/512795/1617_tariff_feedba
ck_for_publication.xls
77
d. change the rule relating to high cost drugs, devices and listed procedures so
that prices reflect the actual supply cost, nominated supply cost or any
national reference price, whichever is lower.
292. We also propose drafting changes to:
a. more clearly distinguish mandatory requirements from guidance
b. provide some additional guidance
c. include guidance, which was previously published separately,54 in Section 6
d. remove duplication.
9.13.3 Rationale
Removal of local pricing Rule 5
293. Rule 5 of the 2016/17 NTPS applies to acute services without national
currencies and required prices to be determined in accordance with the terms
and service specifications set out in locally agreed commissioning contracts. We
believe that the rule is unnecessary because we consider that Rules 1 and 2 of
the 2016/17 NTPS (general rules for all services without a national price) are
sufficient to ensure that prices are set in line with our objectives. Commissioning
contracts also contain dispute resolution provisions that may be used. We feel it
is inappropriate for us to become involved in such disputes and the removal of
this rule would provide clarification.
Combining local pricing Rules 3 and 6
294. Local pricing Rule 3 of the 2016/17 NTPS applies to services with a national
currency but no national price generally. Rule 6 applies specifically to acute
services. Both rules require that national currencies are used unless an
alternative payment approach is agreed in accordance with Rule 4. Rule 3(d)
however refers only to the national currencies for mental health and ambulance
services. Changing Rule 3 so that it more clearly applies to all services with a
national price would remove the need for rule 6.
295. In addition, Rule 3(c) requires the completion of a local pricing template when
national currencies are used. This applies to all services, although the lack of a
reference to acute services in Rule 3(d) may have made this unclear.
296. We therefore propose to amend Rule 3(d) so that it refers to acute services and
remove rule 6, which is no longer required.
54
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/509771/Guidance_on_local
ly_determined_prices.pdf
78
Removing local pricing rules 11(a) and 11(c)
297. Local pricing rule 3 of the 2016/17 NTPS applies to all services with a national
currency (but no national price) while rules 11(a) and 11(c) apply specifically to
ambulance services. Both rule 3 and rule 11 require that the national currencies
are used unless an alternative payment approach is agreed in accordance with
rule 4. They also require that local pricing templates are completed when
national currencies are used. Rules 11(a) and 11(c) therefore duplicate rule 3
and are unnecessary. Their removal will simplify the rules.
Changing the rule relating to high cost drugs, devices and listed procedures so that
prices reflect the actual supply cost, nominated supply cost or any national reference
price, whichever is lower
298. Rule 7 of the 2016/17 NTPS concerns high-cost drugs and listed procedures.
Rule 7(c) requires prices to reflect the actual cost to the provider or the
nominated supply cost, whichever is the lower. NHS England intends to publish
reference prices for high cost drugs (and possibly some high cost devices
devices) during 2017/19. These references prices will be calculated using
existing NHS framework prices as a basis. We are therefore proposing to
amend rule 7(c) so that the price agreed should reflect the actual cost to the
provider, the nominated supply cost or the published reference price, whichever
is the lower. NHS England would contact providers in advance of publishing
reference prices to give them sufficient time to prepare. The rationale for this
approach is that it will encourage providers to behave economically when
purchasing high cost drugs and devices.
79
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Proposed 2017/18 and
2018/19 National Tariff
Payment System
Published by NHS England and
NHS Improvement
79
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document.
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Contents
Please note:
Part A of this document is the statutory consultation notice. It starts on page 3.
Part B of this document is the proposed 2017/19 National Tariff Payment System.
This is shown as it would appear in final form. It starts on page 79.
Part C of this document is the glossary. It starts on page 198.
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 81
2. Scope of the 2017/19 NTPS............................................................................................ 83
2.1. Public health services ............................................................................................................. 83
2.2. Primary care services ............................................................................................................. 83
2.3. Personal health budgets ......................................................................................................... 84
2.4. Integrated health and social care ........................................................................................... 85
2.5. Contractual incentives and sanctions ..................................................................................... 85
2.6. Devolved administrations ....................................................................................................... 86
3. Currencies with national prices........................................................................................ 88
3.1. Classification, grouping and currency .................................................................................... 88
3.2. Currencies for which there are national prices ....................................................................... 90
3.3. High cost drugs, devices and listed procedures ................................................................... 115
3.4. The innovation and technology tariff .................................................................................... 116
4. Method for determining national prices.......................................................................... 122
4.1. Overall approach .................................................................................................................. 122
4.2. The method for setting prices ............................................................................................... 123
4.3. Managing model inputs ........................................................................................................ 128
4.4. Manual adjustments ............................................................................................................. 131
4.5. Cost base ............................................................................................................................. 131
4.6. Volatility ................................................................................................................................ 132
4.7. Cost uplifts ............................................................................................................................ 133
4.8. Efficiency .............................................................................................................................. 142
5. National variations to national prices ............................................................................. 143
5.1. Variations to reflect regional cost differences: the market forces factor .............................. 144
5.2. Variations to reflect patient complexity: top-up payments .................................................... 145
5.3. Variations to help prevent avoidable hospital stays ............................................................. 146
5.4. Variations to support transition to new payment approaches .............................................. 154
6. Locally determined prices.............................................................................................. 157
6.1. Principles applying to all local variations, local modifications and local prices .................... 157
6.2. Local variations..................................................................................................................... 164
6.3. Local modifications ............................................................................................................... 168
6.4. Local prices .......................................................................................................................... 188
7. Payment rules ............................................................................................................... 197
7.1. Billing and payment .............................................................................................................. 197
7.2. Activity reporting ................................................................................................................... 197
80
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1. Introduction
1.
This document is the national tariff, specifying the currencies, national prices,
the method for determining those prices, the local pricing and payment rules,
the methods for determining local modifications and related guidance that make
up the national tariff payment system for 2017 to 2019 (the 2017/19 NTPS).
2.
Since 1 April 2016, Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority have
been operating as a single integrated organisation known as NHS Improvement.
This document is however issued in exercise of functions conferred on Monitor
by Section 116 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. In this document, ‘NHS
Improvement’ means Monitor, unless the context otherwise requires.
3.
This 2017/19 NTPS has effect for the period beginning on 1 April 2017 and
ending on 31 March 2019 or the day before the next national tariff published
under section 116 of the 2012 Act has effect, whichever is the later.1
4.
National prices published for the 2017/18 financial year will have effect from 1
April 2017. National prices published for the 2018/19 financial year will have
effect from 1 April 2018.
5.
The document is split into six sections and six annexes. The six sections are:
a. the scope of the tariff
b. the currencies used to set national prices
c. the method for determining national prices
d. national variations to national prices
e. locally determined prices
f. payment rules.
1
If a replacement national tariff was to be introduced before the end of the two year period, this tariff
would cease to have effect when that new tariff takes effect.
81
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Table 1: 2017/19 NTPS annexes
Annex
Description
B1
The national prices and the national tariff workbook.
B2
The model used to set national prices
B3
Technical guidance for mental health clusters
B4
Guidance on currencies with national prices
B5
Guidance on currencies with no national price
B6
Guidance on best practice tariffs
6.
The national tariff is also supported by documents containing guidance and
other information.
Table 2: Supporting guidance to the 2017/19 NTPS
Title
2017/19 National Tariff Impact assessment
A guide to the market forces factor
Guidance for commissioners on the marginal rate emergency rule and the 30 day
readmission rule
Non-mandatory prices
Innovation and Technology Tariff
82
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2. Scope of the 2017/19 NTPS
7.
The scope of services covered by the 2017/19 NTPS is the same as that under
the 2016/17 NTPS.
8.
As set out in the Health and Social Care Act 2012,2 the national tariff covers the
pricing of healthcare services provided for the purposes of the NHS. Subject to
what we explain below, this covers all forms of NHS healthcare provided to
individuals, whether relating to physical or mental health and whether
commissioned by clinical commissioning groups (CCGs), NHS England or local
authorities acting on behalf of NHS commissioners under partnership
arrangements.
9.
Various healthcare services are however outside the scope of the national tariff,
as explained below.
2.1. Public health services
10. The national tariff does not apply to public health services:3
a. provided or commissioned by local authorities or Public Health England
b. commissioned by NHS England under its Section 7A public health
functions agreement with the Secretary of State.4
11. Public health services commissioned by local authorities include local open
access sexual health services and universal health visitor reviews. The services
commissioned by NHS England under section 7A arrangements include public
health screening programmes, sexual assault services and public health
services for people in prisons.
2.2. Primary care services
12. The 2017/19 NTPS does not apply to primary care services (general practice,
community pharmacy, dental practice and community optometry) where
payment is substantively determined by or in accordance with regulations or
directions, and related instruments, made under the provisions of the National
Health Service Act 2006 (‘the 2006 Act’).5
13. Where the payment for NHS services provided in a primary care setting is not
determined by or in accordance with regulations or directions, or related
2
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/7/contents/enacted
See the meaning of ‘healthcare service’ given in Section 64 of the 2012 Act; and the exclusion of
public health services in Section 116(11).
4
For the Section 7A agreement, see: Public Health Commissioning in the NHS 2015 to 2016.
5
See chapters 4 to 7 of the 2006 Act. For example, the Statement of Financial Entitlements for GP
services, and the drug tariff for pharmaceutical services.
3
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instruments, made under the 2006 Act then the 2017/19 NTPS rules on local
price setting apply. For instance, local price setting rules apply to minor surgical
procedures performed by GPs and commissioned by clinical commissioning
groups (CCGs). The rules governing payments for these services are set out in
Section 6 Locally Determined Prices.
2.3. Personal health budgets
14. A personal health budget (PHB) is an amount of money to support the identified
health and wellbeing needs of a particular patient, planned and agreed between
that patient and their local NHS.
15. There are three types of PHB:
a. Notional budget: no money changes hands − the patient and their NHS
commissioner agree how to spend the money. The NHS will then arrange
the agreed care.
b. Real budget held by a third party: an organisation legally independent of the
patient and their NHS commissioner will hold the budget and pay for the care
in the agreed care plan.
c. Direct payment for healthcare: the budget is transferred to the patient to buy
the care that has been agreed between the patient and their NHS
commissioner.
16. Payment to providers of NHS services from a notional budget is in the scope of
the 2017/19 NTPS. It will either be governed by national prices as set out in
Annex B1 (including national variations set out in Section 5) or subject to the
local pricing rules (see Section 6.4).
17. In some cases a notional budget may be used to buy integrated health and
social care services to facilitate more personalised care planning. Where these
services and products are not NHS services, the 2017/19 NTPS does not apply.
18. If a PHB takes the form of a direct payment to the patient or third-party budget,
the payments for health and care services agreed in the care plan and funded
from the direct payment are not in the scope of the 2017/19 NTPS. Direct
payments for healthcare are governed by regulations made under sections
12A(4) and 12B(1) to (4) of the 2006 Act.6
6
See the National Health Service (Direct Payments) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1617, as amended)
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1617/contents/made
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19. The following are not in the scope of the 2017/19 NTPS, as they do not involve
paying for provision of healthcare services:
a. payment for assessing an individual’s needs to determine a PHB
b. payment for advocacy: advice to individuals and their carers about how to
use their PHB
c. payment for the use of a third party to manage an individual’s PHB on their
behalf.
20. More information about implementing PHBs can be found on the NHS Personal
Health Budgets page.7
2.4. Integrated health and social care
21. Section 75 of the 2006 Act provides for the delegation of a local authority’s
health-related functions (statutory powers or duties) to their NHS partner, and
vice versa, to help meet partnership objectives and create joint funding
arrangements.
22. Where NHS healthcare services are commissioned under these arrangements
(‘joint commissioning’), they remain in the scope of the 2017/19 NTPS even if
commissioned by a local authority.
23. Payment to providers of NHS services that are jointly commissioned are
governed either by a national price as set out in Annex B1 (including national
variations set out in Section 5) where applicable, or by a local price (including a
local variation in Section 6.2).
24. Local authority social care or public health services commissioned under joint
commissioning arrangements are outside the scope of the 2017/19 NTPS.
2.5. Contractual incentives and sanctions
25. Commissioners’ application of Commissioning for Quality and Innovation
(CQUIN) payments and contractual sanctions are based on provider
performance, after a provider’s income has been determined in accordance with
the 2017/19 NTPS. If a contractual sanction changes the amount paid for the
provision of an NHS service, this is permitted under the rules relating to the
making of payments to providers under Section 7.
7
http://www.england.nhs.uk/healthbudgets/
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2.6. Devolved administrations
26. The pricing provisions of the 2012 Act cover healthcare services in the NHS in
England only. The devolved administrations (DAs) are responsible for the NHS
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. If a patient from Scotland, Wales or
Northern Ireland is treated in England or vice versa, the 2017/19 NTPS applies
in some but not all circumstances.
27. Table 3 summarises how the 2017/19 NTPS applies to various cross-border
scenarios. ‘DA commissioner’ or ‘DA provider’ refers to a commissioner or
provider in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Table 3: How the 2017/19 NTPS applies to devolved administrations
Scenario
NTPS
applies to
provider
NTPS applies
to
commissioner
Examples
DA patient treated in
England and paid for by
commissioner in England


Scottish patient attends A&E
in England
DA patient treated in
England and paid for by
DA commissioner


A Welsh patient, who is the
responsibility of a local health
board in Wales, has elective
surgery in England which is
commissioned and paid for by
that local health board
English patient treated in
DA and paid for by DA
commissioner


English patient, who is the
responsibility of a CCG,
attends A&E in Scotland
English patient treated in
DA and paid for by
commissioner in England


English patient has surgery in
Scotland which is
commissioned and paid for by
CCG in England
28. In the final scenario above, the commissioner in England has to follow the
prices and rules in the 2017/19 NTPS, but there is no such requirement for the
DA provider. The commissioner in England may wish or need to pay a price set
locally in the country in question, or use a different currency from that mandated
by the national tariff. In such cases, the commissioner must follow the rules for
local pricing (see Section 6). If there is a national price for the service, a local
variation would be required to pay a different price to the DA provider or to
make a change to the currency. If there is no national price, the commissioner
should follow the rules for local price setting.
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29. Providers and commissioners should also be aware of rules for cross-border
payment responsibility set by other national bodies. The England–Wales
Protocol for Cross-Border Healthcare Services8 sets out specific provisions for
allocating payment responsibility for patients who live near the Wales–England
border. NHS England also provides comprehensive guidelines on payment
responsibility in England.9 The scope of the 2017/19 NTPS does not cover
payment responsibility rules as set out in these documents. These rules should
therefore be applied as well as any applicable provisions of the 2017/19 NTPS.
8
9
http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/england-wales-protocol.pdf
This guidance is set out in Who Pays? Determining responsibility for payments to providers,
www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/who-pays.pdf
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3. Currencies with national prices
30. Currencies are one of the ‘building blocks’ that support the NTPS. They include
the clinical grouping classification systems for which there are national prices in
2016/17.
31. Under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (‘the 2012 Act’), the national tariff
must specify certain NHS healthcare services for which a national price is
payable.10 The healthcare services to be specified must be agreed between
NHS England and NHS Improvement.11 The 2012 Act also provides that the
national tariff may include rules for determining which currency applies where
there is more than one currency and price for the same service.
32. We are using healthcare resource group HRG4+ currency design as the basis
for setting national prices for admitted patient care, outpatient procedures and
accident and emergency (A&E) attendances. We are using ‘phase 3’ of the
currency design, which was used for the collection of the 2014/15 reference
costs.12
33. This section should be read with the following information set out in:
a. Annex B1: National tariff workbook. This contains:
i. The list of national prices (and related currencies)
ii. Maternity data requirements and definitions
iii. The lists of high cost drugs and devices
b. Annex B4: Guidance on currencies with national prices
c. Annex B6: Guidance on best practice tariffs.
3.1. Classification, grouping and currency
34. The NHS payment system relies on patient-level data. To operate effectively,
the payment system needs:
a. a way of capturing and classifying clinical activity: this enables information
about patient diagnoses and healthcare interventions to be captured in a
standard format
b. a currency: the large number of codes for admitted patient activity in the
primary classification system makes it impractical as a basis for payment;
10
2012 Act, Section 116(1)(a)
2012 Act, Section 118(7)
12
Details available at http://digital.nhs.uk/article/6226/HRG4-201415-Reference-Cost-Grouper
11
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instead casemix groupings are used as the currency for admitted patients,
outpatient procedures and A&E. For outpatient attendances, the currency
is based on groupings that relate to clinic attendance and categories.
35. Clinical classification systems describe information from patient records with
standardised definitions and nomenclature. The 2017/19 NTPS relies largely on
two standard classifications to record clinical data for admitted patients. These
are:
a. the World Health Organization International Classification of Diseases,
10th revision (ICD-10) for diagnoses13
b. Office of Population Censuses and Surveys 4 (OPCS-4) for operations,
procedures and interventions.14
36. ‘Grouping’ is the process of using clinical information such as diagnosis codes
(in admitted patient care only), procedure codes (in admitted patient care and
outpatient care), treatment codes (A&E only) and investigation codes (A&E
only) to classify patients to casemix groups structured around healthcare
resource groups. HRGs are groupings of clinically similar conditions or
treatments that use similar levels of healthcare resources. The grouping is done
using grouper software produced by NHS Digital.15 NHS Digital16 also publishes
comprehensive documentation giving the logic and process behind the
software’s derivation of HRGs as well as other materials that explain and
support the development of the currencies that underpin the national tariff.17
37. A ‘currency’ is a unit of healthcare for which a payment is made. Under the 2012
Act, a healthcare service for which a national price is payable must be specified
in the national tariff. A currency can take one of several forms. We use spellbased HRGs as the currency for admitted patient care and some outpatient
procedures. The currencies for A&E services are based on A&E attendances.
38. The HRG currency design used for the 2017/19 NTPS is known as HRG4+ and
is arranged into chapters, each covering a body system. Some chapters are
divided into subchapters. The specific design for the 2017/19 NTPS is that used
to collect 2014/15 reference costs.
39. The currency used for outpatient attendances is based on attendance type and
clinic type, defined by treatment function code (TFC). This is explained in more
detail in Section 3.2.4.
13
The 5th edition update of ICD-10 was published in April 2015.
OPCS version 4.8 has been incorporated into the currency design used for national prices.
15
http://digital.nhs.uk/casemix/payment
16
Any enquiries on the ‘Code to grouper’ software, guidance and confirmation of appropriate coding
and the grouping of activities can be sent to [email protected]
17
http://digital.nhs.uk/casemix/payment
14
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3.2. Currencies for which there are national prices
40. Section 3.2.1 describes the currencies for which there are national prices.
41. Details of the methods we use to determine the national prices are provided in
Section 4. The list of national prices and related currencies is Annex B1.
42. In particular circumstances we specify services in different ways, and attach
different prices; for example, setting best practice tariffs (BPTs) to incentivise
improved outcomes for particular cohorts of patients. As well as specifying the
currencies, Section 3 (in combination with Annexes B1, B4 and B6) includes the
rules for determining which currencies and prices apply where a service is
specified in more than one way.
43. The rules for the local pricing of services with mandatory currencies but no
national prices – such as adult mental health and ambulance services – are set
out in Section 6.4.
3.2.1. Admitted patient care
44. Spell-based HRG4+ is the currency design for admitted patient care covering
the period from admission to discharge. If a patient is under the care of one
consultant for their entire spell,18 this would comprise one finished consultant
episode (FCE). Occasionally, a patient will be under the care of more than one
consultant during their spell; this would mean that the spell had multiple FCEs.
45. National prices for admitted patient care cover the care received by a patient
during their spell in hospital, including the costs of services such as diagnostic
imaging. The national price to be applied is determined by date of discharge.
46. The costs of some elements of the care pathway, such as critical care and high
cost drugs, are excluded from national prices. These costs are paid under the
rules applicable to local pricing.
47. To promote movement to day-case settings where appropriate, most elective
prices are for the average of day-case and ordinary elective-case costs,
weighted according to the proportion of activity in each group.
48. For a few HRGs there is a single price across outpatient procedures and day
cases, or a single price across all settings. This approach has been taken where
a price that is independent of setting is clinically appropriate.
18
A spell is a period from admission to discharge or death. A spell starts following the decision to
admit the patient.
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49. When a patient has more than one distinct admission on the same day19 (eg the
patient is admitted in the morning, discharged, then re-admitted in the
afternoon), each admission is counted as the beginning of a separate spell,
although a short stay adjustment may apply to the first admission.
50. Short stay emergency adjustments20 and long stay payments21 apply to
admitted patient care. These are explained in detail below.
Changes to the scope of services with national prices
51. The services for which there are national prices remain the same for 2017/19 as
for 2016/17, except that we are adding the following services :
a. cochlear implants (CA41Z, CA42Z)
b. complex computerised tomography scans (RD28Z)
c. complex therapeutic endoscopic, upper or lower gastrointestinal procedures
(FZ89Z)
d. photodynamic therapy (JC41Z, JC42A and JC42B).
52. While the tariff has been informed by the 2014/15 design of HRG4+ and the
2014/15 reference cost relativities, the scope of the tariff, unless explicitly stated
otherwise, is consistent with 2016/17.
Short stay emergency adjustment
53. The short stay emergency adjustment (SSEM) is a mechanism for ensuring
appropriate payment for lengths of stay shorter than two days, where the
average HRG length of stay (LoS) is longer. It applies whether the patient is
admitted under a medical or a surgical specialty providing all the following
criteria are met:
a. the patient’s adjusted LoS is either zero or one day
b. the patient is not a child, defined as aged under 19 years on the date of
admission
c. the admission method code is 21-25, 2A, 2B, 2C or 2D (or 28 if the
provider has not implemented Commissioning Data Set CDS version 6.2)
19
20
21
Calendar day not 24-hour period.
Short-stay emergency adjustments ensure that emergency stays of less than two days, where the
average length of stay of the HRG is longer, are appropriately paid for.
For patients that remain in hospital beyond an expected length of stay for clinical reasons, there is
an additional reimbursement to the national price called a ‘long stay payment’ (sometimes referred
to as an ‘excess bed day payment’). The long stay payment applies at a daily rate to all HRGs
where the length of stay of the spell exceeds a ‘trim point’ specific to the HRG.
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d. the average length of non-elective stay for the HRG is two or more days
e. the assignment of the HRG can be based on a diagnosis code, rather than
on a procedure code alone, irrespective of whether a diagnosis or
procedure is dominant in the HRG derivation.
54. The adjustment percentages applied are set out in the table below.
Table 4: HRG short stay emergency adjustment percentages
HRG Average length of stay
2017/19 short stay percentages
< 2 days
100.0
2 days
65.0
3 or 4 days
40.0
≥5 days
30.0
55. For BPTs the short stay emergency adjustment is not universally applicable as:
a. SSEM only applies to diagnostic driven HRGs
b. it does not apply, for example, when the purpose of the BPT is to reduce
length of stay.
56. The table before is designed to help clarify when the SSEM is applicable and
how the adjustment is to be applied in each case.
Table 5: Application of SSEM
Best Practice Tariff
SSEM Applicable
SUS Applied
Local
Adjustment
Required
COPD (new)
Yes
To base price
To
conditional
top-up
Non-ST segment elevation
myocardial infarction
No – procedure driven
n/a
n/a
Acute stroke care
No – policy exempt
n/a
n/a
Diabetic ketoacidosis and
hypoglycaemia
Yes
To base price
To
conditional
top-up
Fragility hip fracture
No – policy exempt
n/a
n/a
Heart failure
Yes
To base price
To
conditional
top-up
Same-day emergency care
No – policy exempt
n/a
n/a
Primary hip and knee
replacement outcomes
No – procedure driven
n/a
n/a
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57. Providers and commissioners should take this into account when agreeing local
data flows and reconciliation processes. Where applicable any local adjustment
should be adjusted at the same rate as the core spell (as defined in Annex B1).
58. Any adjustments to the tariff, such as specialised service top-ups,22 are applied
to the reduced tariff. Annex A lists the HRGs to which the reduced short stay
emergency tariff is applicable.
Long stay payment
59. A long stay payment on a daily rate basis applies to all HRGs where the length
of stay of the spell exceeds a specified trim point23 specific to the HRG and
point of delivery.
60. The trim point is defined in the same way as for reference costs, but is spell
based and there are separate elective and non-elective trim points. The trim
point for each HRG is shown alongside national prices in Annex A.
61. For 2017 to 2019, there is a trim point floor of five days.24 There are two long
stay payment rates per chapter – one for child-specific HRGs and one for all
other HRGs.
62. If a patient is medically ready for discharge and delayed discharge payments
have been imposed on local authorities under the provisions of the Community
Care (Delayed Discharges etc) Act 2003, commissioners should not be liable for
any further long stay payment.
63. Long stay payments may only be adjusted when SUS+25 applies an adjustment
for delayed discharge when the Discharge Ready Date field is submitted in the
Commissioning Data Set, by removing the number of days between the ready
date and actual discharge date from any long stay payment. Where the
Discharge Ready Date field is submitted, providers will wish to satisfy
themselves that local authorities are being appropriately charged.
3.2.2. Chemotherapy and radiotherapy
Chemotherapy
64. HRG subchapter SB covers both the procurement and the delivery of
chemotherapy regimens for patients of all ages. The HRGs in this subchapter
22
Specialised top-ups are paid to reimburse providers for the higher costs of treating patients who
require specialised care. Further information is provided in Section 5.
23
The trim point is defined as the upper quartile length of stay for the HRG plus 1.5 times the interquartile range of length of stay.
24
For simplicity, we have shown a trim point floor of at least five days for all HRGs in the tariff
spreadsheet, regardless of whether the HRG includes length of stay logic of less than five days.
25
http://content.digital.nhs.uk/sus/replacement
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are unbundled and include activity undertaken in inpatient, day case and nonadmitted care settings.
65. Chemotherapy payment is split into three parts:
a. a core HRG (covering the primary diagnosis or procedure) – this has a
national price
b. unbundled HRGs for chemotherapy drug procurement – these have local
currencies and prices
c. unbundled HRGs for chemotherapy delivery – these have national prices.
66. The regimen list has changed for 2017 to 2019.26
Radiotherapy
67. HRG subchapter SC covers both the preparation and the delivery of
radiotherapy for patients of all ages. The HRGs in this subchapter are for the
most part unbundled and include activity undertaken in inpatient, day case and
non-admitted care settings.
68. HRG4+ groups for radiotherapy include:
a. radiotherapy planning for pre-treatment (planning) processes
b. radiotherapy treatment (delivery per fraction) for treatment delivered, with a
separate HRG allocated for each fraction delivered.
69. The radiotherapy planning HRGs are intended to cover all attendances needed
to complete the planning process. It is not intended to record individual
attendances for parts of this process separately.
70. The planning HRGs do not include the consultation at which the patient
consents to radiotherapy, nor any medical review required by any change in
status of the patient.
71. The HRGs for radiotherapy treatment cover the following elements of care:
a. external beam radiotherapy preparation: this has a national price
b. external beam radiotherapy delivery: this has a national price
c. brachytherapy and molecular radiotherapy administration: this has local
currencies and prices.
26
http://systems.digital.nhs.uk/data/clinicalcoding/codingstandards/opcs4/chemoregimens
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72. Further information on the structure of the chemotherapy and radiotherapy
HRGs and payment arrangements can be found in Annexes B4 and B6.27
3.2.3. Nuclear medicine
73. To create more appropriate, procedure-specific HRGs to better differentiate the
resource use of high cost, complex scans, as well as nuclear medicine
procedures, Subchapter RA Diagnostic Imaging Procedures has been deleted
and replaced with the following:
a. Subchapter RD Diagnostic Imaging Procedures
b. Subchapter RN Nuclear Medicine Procedures.
74. We note that the scope of activity under HRG4 currencies and HRG4+
currencies do not map exactly.
3.2.4. Post-discharge rehabilitation
75. Post-discharge national currencies cover the entire pathway of treatment post
discharge. They are designed to help reduce avoidable emergency
readmissions and provide a service agreed by clinical experts to facilitate better
post-discharge rehabilitation and reablement for patients.28
76. Post-discharge currencies cover four specific rehabilitation pathways:
a. cardiac rehabilitation
i. The post-discharge price will only apply to the subset of patients identified
as potentially benefitting from cardiac rehabilitation, where the evidence
for the effect of cardiac rehabilitation is strongest; that is, those patients
discharged having had an acute spell of care for:
o
acute myocardial infarction
o
percutaneous coronary intervention or heart failure
o
coronary artery bypass grafting
b. pulmonary rehabilitation29
i. The post-discharge price will apply to patients discharged having had an
acute episode of care for COPD. The national price can be paid only for
27
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-1719-consultation
More information on commissioning rehabilitation services can be found here
https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/rehabilitation-comms-guid-16-17.pdf
29
Based on the care pathway outlined in the Department of Health’s ‘Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (COPD) Commissioning Pack’.
28
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patients discharged from acute care with an HRG for the spell of care of
DZ65A to DZ65K, who subsequently complete a course of pulmonary
rehabilitation
c. hip replacement rehabilitation
i. The national price can only be paid for patients discharged from acute
care with an episode of care with a spell dominant procedure of W371,
W381, W391, W931, W941 or W951
d. knee replacement rehabilitation.
i. The national price can be paid only for patients discharged from acute
care with an episode of care with a spell dominant procedure coding of
W401, W411, W421 or O181.
77. We are continuing with national prices for these four post-discharge currencies
for the care of patients where a single provider provides both acute and
community services. These prices are listed in Annex B1. Where services are
not integrated, the national price does not apply; however, we encourage the
use of these prices in local negotiations on commissioning of post-discharge
care pathways.
78. Degrees of service integration vary. Accordingly commissioners and providers
will need to establish which health communities receive both acute and
community services from a single provider to establish whether the postdischarge national prices should be used.
79. The post-discharge national prices must be paid on completion of a full
rehabilitation pathway.
80. The post-discharge activity and national price will not be identified by the
grouper or by SUS+. Therefore, in deriving a contract for this service,
commissioners and providers need to locally agree the number of patients
expected to complete rehabilitation packages. This forecast should be
reconciled to the actual numbers of packages completed at year end.
81. Further information to support the implementation of all four post-discharge
currencies, their scope and their specific rules can be found in Annex B6
guidance on best practice tariffs.
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3.2.5. Outpatient care
82. National prices for consultant-led outpatient attendances are based on clinic
type categorised according to treatment function code (TFC).30 There are
separate prices for first and follow-up attendances, for each TFC, as well as for
single professional and multi-professional clinics.31
83. To incentivise a change in the delivery of outpatient follow-up activity, to
encourage a move to more efficient models and to free up consultant capacity,
we over-reimburse first attendances and under-reimburse corresponding followup attendances. This transfer in cost is set at a TFC level and ranges from 10%
to 30%. There is a full list in Annex B1.
84. The outpatient attendance national price remains applicable only to pre-booked,
consultant-led attendances and in accordance with the service conditions in the
NHS Standard Contract.
85. When an attendance with a consultant from a different main specialty occurs
during a patient's admission and replaces an attendance that would have taken
place, it should attract a national price provided it is pre-booked and consultant
led.
86. When a patient has multiple distinct pre-booked outpatient attendances on the
same day (eg one attendance in the morning and a second separate
attendance in the afternoon) each attendance is counted separately and will
attract a separate national price unless a local pathway price has been agreed
with commissioners.
87. Outpatient attendances do not have to take place on hospital premises.
Therefore consultant-led outreach clinics held in a GP practice or a children’s
centre should be eligible for the national price. For these clinics, it is important
to make sure the data flows into SUS+ to support payment for this activity.
However, home visits are not eligible for the outpatient care national price and
are instead subject to local price-setting.
88. If, following an outpatient attendance, a patient attends an allied health
professional (eg a physiotherapist), the costs of the latter attendance are not
included in the national price for the original attendance and these attendances
will be subject to local price-setting (in accordance with the rules on local
pricing).
30
TFCs are defined in the NHS Data Model and Dictionary as codes for ‘a division of clinical work
based on main specialty, but incorporating approved sub-specialties and treatment interests used
by lead care professionals including consultants’.
31
Multi-professional attendances are defined as multiple care professionals (including consultants)
seeing a patient together, in the same attendance, at the same time. For more detail see Annex
B4.
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89. Commissioners and providers should use the NHS Data Model and Dictionary
to decide the category of outpatient attendance and day-case activity.32
Furthermore, providers must ensure that the way they charge for activity is
consistent with the way they cost activity in reference costs, and consistent with
any conditions for payment included in contracts.
90. For some procedures undertaken in an outpatient setting, there are national
prices based on HRGs. If more than one of these procedures is undertaken in a
single outpatient attendance, only one price is applicable. The grouper software
will determine the appropriate HRG, and the provider will receive payment at the
relevant price.
91. Where a procedure-driven HRG is generated, SUS+ determines whether the
HRG has a mandatory national price and, if so, applies it. Outpatient procedures
for which there is no mandatory HRG price will be paid according to the relevant
outpatient attendance national price.
92. For TFCs with no national price, the price should be set through local price
setting (in accordance with the rules on local pricing). The national price for any
unbundled diagnostic imaging associated with the attendances must be used in
all cases. National prices for diagnostic imaging in outpatients are mandatory,
regardless of whether or not the core outpatient attendance activity has a
national price.
93. As set out in the 2017-2019 Operational Planning and Contracting guidance,
and linked to the Advice and Guidance CQUIN, local systems are being
encouraged to introduce Advice and Guidance services as part of plans to
manage demand in secondary care acute services. National guidance is being
produced by NHS England but in the meantime, local health systems should
work together to agree a local solution for such services, supported by local
data flows.
3.2.6. Direct access
94. There are national prices for activity accessed directly from primary care, which
are listed in Annex B1. One example is where a GP sends a patient for a scan
and results are sent to the GP for follow up rather than such a service being
requested as part of an outpatient referral.
32
The NHS Data Model and Dictionary Service sets out the definitions to be applied. It provides a
reference point for assured information standards to support health care activities in the NHS in
England.
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95. A field was added to the outpatient Commissioning Data Set version 6.2 which
can be used to identify services that have been accessed directly.33
96. Where direct access activity is processed through the grouper, both a core HRG
and an unbundled HRG will be created. When the activity is direct access, the
core HRG should not attract any payment but the direct access service should
attract a payment.
97. In the case of direct access diagnostic imaging services for which there are
national prices, the costs of reporting are included in prices. These costs are
also shown separately in Annex B1 so that they can be used if a provider
provides a report but does not carry out the scan.
98. There is also a non-mandatory price for direct access plain film x-rays.
3.2.7. Urgent and emergency care
99. There are national prices for A&E services and minor injury units, based on 11
HRGs (subchapter VB – Emergency and Urgent Care). The A&E currency is
based on investigation and treatment.
100. Where a patient is admitted following an A&E attendance, both the relevant
A&E and non-elective prices are payable. Please note that the tariff for patients
who are ‘dead on arrival’ (DOA) should be that applying to VB99Z.
101. Type 1 and Type 2 A&E departments continue to be eligible for the full range of
A&E HRGs and corresponding national prices; Type 3 A&E departments are
eligible for VB11Z only.
102. Services provided by NHS walk-in centres, which are categorised as
Type 4 A&E services by the NHS Data Model and Dictionary, will not attract
national prices. Information on local price-setting can be found in Section 6.
3.2.8. Best practice tariffs
103. A BPT is a national price that is designed to incentivise quality and costeffective care. The first BPTs were introduced in 2010/11 following Lord Darzi’s
2008 review.34
104. The aim is to reduce unexplained variation in clinical quality and spread best
practice. BPTs may introduce an alternative currency to an HRG, including a
description of activities that more closely corresponds to the delivery of
outcomes for a patient. An incentive to move from usual care to best practice is
33
34
SUS R16 release (April 2016) has a requirement to add new functionality to implement the CDS6.2
new data item ‘Direct access indicator’.
‘High Quality Care For All’, presented to Parliament in June 2008.
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created by creating a price differential between agreed best practice and usual
care to create an incentive for providers to shift from usual care to best practice.
More detail on the method for setting BPT prices can be found in Section 4.
105. Where a BPT introduces an alternative currency, that currency should be used
in the cases described here, and set out in Annexes B1, B4 and B6.
106. Each BPT is different, tailored to the clinical characteristics of best practice for a
patient condition and to the availability and quality of data. However, there are
groups of BPTs that share similar objectives, such as:
a. avoiding unnecessary admissions
b. delivering care in appropriate settings
c. promoting provider quality accreditation
d. improving quality of care.
107. The service areas covered by BPTs are all:
a. high impact (that is, high volumes, significant variation in practice, or
significant impact on patient outcomes)
b. supported by a strong evidence base and clinical consensus on what
constitutes best practice.
108. A breakdown of the BPTs and the eligibility criteria are provided in Table 5.
109. For 2017/19, the NTPS includes two new mandatory BPTs for:
a. chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD) care
b. Improving the time from a patient being admitted to receiving coronary
angioplasty for patients with NSTEMI.
110. There are also changes to five BPTs:
a. day case procedures
b. fragility hip fracture
c. primary hip and knee replacements
d. same day emergency care
e. acute stroke care.
111. The 2017/19 NTPS no longer includes the BPT for interventional radiology. This
is because the adoption of HRG4+ makes it unnecessary.
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112. Some BPTs relate to specific HRGs (HRG-level) while others are more detailed
and relate to a subset of activity in an HRG (sub-HRG). The BPTs that are set
at a more detailed level are identified by ‘BPT flags’. For sub-HRG level BPTs
there will be other activity covered by the HRG that does not relate to the BPT
activity, and so a ‘conventional’ price is also published for these HRGs to
reimburse the costs of the activity unrelated to the BPT. For more information
relating to the BPT flags see Annex B1.
113. Top-up payments for specialised services and long stay payments apply to all of
the relevant BPTs. The short stay emergency adjustment (SSEM) is not
universally applicable to BPTs. Details of how the adjustment is to be applied in
each case is set out above in section relating to SSEM (Section 3.2.1).
Table 6: Summary of best practice tariffs
BPT
Eligibility criteria
Acute stroke care
(amended
2017/19)
The BPT is made up of three conditional payment levels:
 Patients admitted directly to an acute stroke unit either by
the ambulance service, from A&E or via brain imaging.
Patients must not be admitted directly to a medical
assessment unit. Patients must be seen by a consultant
with stroke specialist skills in 14 hours of admission.
Patients must then also spend most of their stay in the
acute stroke unit.
 Initial brain imaging is delivered in 12 hours of admission.
 Patients are assessed for thrombolysis, receiving alteplase
if clinically indicated in accordance with the NICE
technology appraisal TA264 ‘Alteplase for treating acute,
ischaemic stroke’.
Adult renal
dialysis
(haemodialysis)
The BPT requires vascular access via a functioning
arteriovenous fistula. Therefore, renal units will need to
collaborate with surgical services to establish processes that
facilitate timely referral for formation of vascular access
Adult renal
dialysis (Home
haemodialysis)
The BPT price for home haemodialysis will reflect a week of
dialysis, irrespective of the number of dialysis sessions
prescribed.
 The BPT price covers the direct costs of dialysis as well as
the associated set up, removal and utility costs incurred by
the provider (eg preparation of patients’ homes, equipment
and training).
Chronic
obstructive
pulmonary
disease (COPD)
(new 2017/19)
Best practice would be considered achieved when:
 60% of patients with a primary diagnosis of COPD, admitted
for an exacerbation of COPD, receive specialist input in to
their care in 24 hours of admission, and
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BPT
Eligibility criteria
 where they receive a discharge bundle before discharge as
measured by the national COPD audit.
Day-case
procedures
(amended
2017/19)
 The BPT is made up of a pair of prices for each of the
procedures listed in Annex B1; one applied to day-case
admissions (higher) and one applied to ordinary elective
admissions (lower). Annex B1 details the prices, whether
they apply at HRG or sub-HRG (with BPT flag) and the
relevant OPCS codes.
Diabetic
ketoacidosis and
hypoglycaemia
The BPT applies only to adults admitted as an emergency with
diabetic ketoacidosis or hypoglycaemia.
The BPT is made up of two components: a base price and a
conditional payment. The base price is payable for all activity
irrespective of whether best practice was met. The conditional
payment is payable if the patient receives all the following
care:
 referred to the diabetes specialist team (DST) on admission,
and seen in 24 hours by a member of the DST
 has an education review by a member of the DST before
discharge
 is seen by a diabetologist or diabetic specialist nurse before
discharge
 discharged with a written care plan (which allows the person
with diabetes to be actively involved in deciding, agreeing
and taking responsibility for how their diabetes is managed)
that is copied to their GP
 offered access to structured education, with the first
appointment scheduled to take place in three months of
discharge.
Early
inflammatory
arthritis
There are three separate BPT payments applicable where
care meets the standards set out below.
 Diagnosis and discharge
For those patients with suspected early inflammatory arthritis
who are:
 seen in three weeks of referral
 diagnosed as not having early inflammatory arthritis and
discharged in six weeks of referral.
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BPT
Eligibility criteria
The BPT includes the costs of plain radiology, ultrasounds, all
blood tests, and clinical consultations with doctors/nurses.
 Disease-modifying antirheumatic drugs (DMARD) Therapy
For those patients with suspected early inflammatory arthritis
who:
 are seen in three weeks of referral
 start DMARD treatment in six weeks of referral
 receive regular follow-up and monitoring over first year of
treatment with evidence of appropriate titration of therapy.
The BPT price includes the annual costs of all blood tests,
non-biological prescriptions, clinical consultations with
doctors/nurses, annual review. The price excludes
physiotherapy, psychology, podiatry, occupational therapy,
telephone emergency advice line, inpatient admissions,
biologics and associated drug costs.
 Biological Therapy
For patients with suspected early inflammatory arthritis who:
 are seen in three weeks of referral
 have DMARD treatment initiated in six weeks of referral
 receive regular follow-up and monitoring over first year of
treatment
 meet NICE eligibility criteria for biological therapy and
biologics are prescribed and initiated in year 1.
The BPT price includes the annual costs of all blood tests,
non-biologic prescriptions, clinical consultations with
doctors/nurses, annual review. The price excludes
physiotherapy, psychology, podiatry, occupational therapy,
telephone emergency advice line, inpatient admissions,
biologics, drug infusion and associated costs.
Endoscopy
procedures
The BPT applies to adults only for elective endoscopic
procedures in all NHS providers (including community
organisations) and independent sector providers.
 providers achieving BPT Level 1 Joint Advisory Group
(JAG) accreditation will be reimbursed at the full BPT price
 providers achieving BPT Level 2 will receive a price 2.5%
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BPT
Eligibility criteria
below the BPT price
 providers at BPT Level 3 will receive a price 5% below the
BPT price.
 each month the JAG will publish a list indicating each
endoscopy unit's BPT level.35
Fragility hip
fracture
(amended
2017/19)
The BPT is made up of two components: a base price and a
conditional payment. The base price is payable to all activity
irrespective of whether the characteristics of best practice are
met. The conditional payment is payable only if all the
following characteristics are achieved:
 time to surgery within 36 hours from arrival in an emergency
department, or time of diagnosis if an admitted patient, to
the start of anaesthesia
 assessed by a geriatrician in the perioperative period (within
72 hours of admission)
 fracture prevention assessments (falls and bone health)
 an abbreviated mental test performed before surgery and
the score recorded in National Hip Fracture Database
(NHFD)
 a nutritional assessment during the admission
 a delirium assessment using the 4AT screening tool during
the admission
 assessed by a physiotherapist the day of or day following
surgery.
Commissioners determine compliance with best practice using
reports compiled from data submitted by providers to the
NHFD.
Heart failure
The BPT is made up of two components: a base price and a
conditional payment. The base price is payable to all activity
irrespective of whether the characteristics of best practice are
met. The conditional payment is payable only if all of the
following characteristics are achieved:
 data submission to the National Heart Failure Audit (NHFA)
with a target rate of 70%: this means that at least 70% of all
eligible records need to be submitted to the NHFA.
 specialist input with a target rate of 60%: this means that at
35
www.thejag.org.uk/Commissioning/BestPracticeTariffStatus.aspx
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BPT
Eligibility criteria
least 60% of all patients recorded in the heart failure audit
have received specialist input as defined by the NHFA.
Major trauma
care
The BPT is made up of two levels of payment differentiated by
the patients’ Injury Severity Score (ISS) and conditional on
achieving the criteria below.
A Level 1 BPT is payable for all patients with an ISS of more
than eight providing that:
 the patient is treated in a major trauma centre
 Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN) data are
completed and submitted within 25 days of discharge
 a rehabilitation prescription is completed for each patient
and recorded on TARN
 any coroners’ cases flagged in TARN as being subject to
delay to allow later payment
 tranexamic acid is administered within three hours of injury
for patients receiving blood products
 if the patient is transferred as a non-emergency they must
be admitted to the major trauma centre within two calendar
days of referral from Trauma Unit (TU).
A Level 2 BPT is payable for all patients with an ISS of 16 or
more providing Level 1 criteria are met and that:
 if the patient is admitted directly to the major trauma centre
or transferred as an emergency, they must be received by a
trauma team led by a consultant in the major trauma centre.
The consultant can be from any specialty, but must be
present within five minutes
 if the patient is transferred as a non-emergency they must
be admitted to the major trauma centre within two calendar
days of referral from the trauma unit
 patients admitted directly to a major trauma centre with a
head injury (AIS 1+) and a Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS)
score of less than 13 (or intubated pre-hospital), and who do
not require emergency surgery or interventional radiology
within one hour of admission, receive a head CT scan within
60 minutes of arrival.
NSTEMI
(new 2017/19)
The BPT is made up of two components: a base price and a
conditional payment. The base price is payable to all activity
irrespective of whether the characteristics of best practice are
met.
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BPT
Eligibility criteria
Best practice will be considered achieved where 60% of
NSTEMI patients, undergoing coronary angiography, do so
within 72 hours of first admission.
Success against the best practice criteria is measured at
provider level and for the provider who undertakes the
procedure.
Outpatient
procedures
The BPTs for all three outpatient procedures apply at the HRG
level. SUS+ will automate payment by applying the relevant
prices to the HRG. Annex B1 details the prices, relevant HRGs
and the relevant OPCS codes.
To qualify for the outpatient BPT, the procedure must occur
and be coded to an outpatient setting as defined by the NHS
Data Model and Dictionary.
Paediatric
diabetes
Where commissioners are satisfied the standards have been
achieved, the BPT must be paid for all the young people
attending the clinic. It is expected that compliance with all
criteria will need to be demonstrated for at least 90% of
patients attending the clinic.
The best practice service specification is:
 On diagnosis, a young person’s diabetes is discussed with a
senior member of paediatric diabetes team within 24 hours
of presentation. A senior member is defined as a doctor or
paediatric specialist nurse with ‘appropriate training’ in
paediatric diabetes. Information as to what constitutes
‘appropriately trained’ is available from the British Society
for Paediatric Endocrinology and Diabetes or the Royal
College of Nursing.
 All new patients must be seen by a member of the specialist
paediatric diabetes team on the next working day.
 Each provider unit can provide evidence that each patient
has received a structured education programme, tailored to
the child or young person’s and their family’s needs, both at
initial diagnosis and at ongoing updates throughout the child
or young person’s attendance at the paediatric diabetes
clinic.
 Each patient is offered a minimum of four clinic
appointments per year with a multidisciplinary team (MDT),
defined as including a paediatric diabetes specialist nurse,
dietitian and doctor. At every visit, the child must be seen by
the doctor, who must be a consultant or associate specialist/
speciality doctor with training in paediatric diabetes or a
specialist registrar training in paediatric diabetes, under the
supervision of an appropriately trained consultant (see
above). The dietitian must be a paediatric dietitian with
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BPT
Eligibility criteria
training in diabetes (or equivalent appropriate experience).
 Each patient is offered additional contact by the diabetes
specialist team for check-ups, telephone contacts, school
visits, troubleshooting, advice, support etc. Eight contacts
per year are recommended as a minimum.
 Each patient is offered at least one extra appointment per
year with a paediatric dietitian with training in diabetes (or
equivalent appropriate experience).
 Each patient is offered a minimum of four haemoglobin
HbA1C measurements per year. All results must be
available and recorded at each MDT clinic appointment.
 All eligible patients must be offered annual screening as
recommended by current NICE guidance. Retinopathy
screening must be performed by regional screening
services in line with the national retinopathy screening
programme, which is not covered by the paediatric diabetes
BPT and is funded separately. Where retinopathy is
identified, timely and appropriate referral to ophthalmology
must be provided by the regional screening programme.
 Each patient must have an annual assessment by their
MDT as to whether they need input to their care by a clinical
psychologist, and access to psychological support, which
should be integral to the team, as appropriate.
 Each provider must take part in the annual Paediatric
National Diabetes Audit.
 Each provider must take part in the local paediatric diabetes
network. A contribution to the funding of the network
administrator will be required. A minimum of 60%
attendance at regional network meetings needs to be
demonstrated. They should also take part in peer review.
 Each provider unit must provide patients and their families
with 24-hour access to advice and support. This should also
include 24-hour expert advice to fellow health professionals
on the management of patients with diabetes admitted
acutely, with a clear escalation policy as to when further
advice on managing diabetes emergencies should be
sought. A provider of expert advice must be fully trained and
experienced in managing paediatric diabetes emergencies.
 Each provider unit must have a clear policy for transition to
adult services.
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BPT
Eligibility criteria
 Each unit will have an operational policy, which must
include
o a structured ‘high HbA1C’ policy
o a clearly defined DNA/was not brought policy taking
into account local safeguarding children board
policies and evidence of patient feedback on the
service.
 If the young person is not registered with a provider, the
admitting provider must invoice the relevant commissioner.
If a patient is referred elsewhere for a second opinion,
shared care or full transfer of care, subsequent division of
funding will need to be agreed between the referring and
receiving centres.
Paediatric
epilepsy
The BPT is a payment for each attendance for follow-up
appointments and covers outpatient care after first acute or
outpatient assessment, for patients with a diagnosis of
probable epilepsy until they transfer to adult services. Activity
meeting the best practice criteria must be coded against the
TFC223 Paediatric Epilepsy.
The BPT is payable to providers of a service that meets the
following criteria:
 Paediatric consultants with expertise in epilepsies lead the
service with epilepsy specialist nurses (ESNs) performing
an integral role.
 Patients have a comprehensive care plan that is agreed
between the patient, family and/or carers and both the
paediatric consultant with expertise in epilepsies and the ESN.
This must cover lifestyle issues as well as medical issues.
 The follow-up appointments provide enough time with both
the paediatric consultant (or associate specialist) with
expertise in epilepsies and the ESN to manage the patient
against the agreed care plan. As a guide, it is expected that
the patient spends at least 20 minutes with each
professional (either at the same time or in successive slots).
All children with epilepsy must be able to be reviewed when
clinically required. Outpatient booking systems must be able
to guarantee these follow up appointments.
 The service has evidence of shared care and referral
pathways to tertiary paediatric neurology services, transition
and referral pathways to adult services, and continuing full
participation in the Epilepsy 12 national audit.
 The BPT is a payment for each attendance for follow-up
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BPT
Eligibility criteria
appointments and covers outpatient care after first acute or
outpatient assessment, for patients with a diagnosis of
probable epilepsy until they transfer to adult services.
Parkinson’s
disease
The BPT applies to adults with a probable diagnosis of
Parkinson’s disease where care during the first year is
delivered in line with the criteria detailed below:
 Referrals from primary care with suspected Parkinson’s
disease must be seen by a movement disorder specialist
(neurology/elderly care) within six weeks. These timescales
are applicable to all patients for the purposes of the BPT,
but the expectation is that new referrals in later stages of
disease with more complex problems will continue to be
seen within two weeks.
 Each patient must receive regular follow-up and diagnostic
review with a specialist nurse at least every six months with
a process in place to identify the appropriate period of
follow-up. Each patient must have a nominated person
identified to continue with follow-up and diagnostic review.
 All patients must be referred to a Parkinson’s disease nurse
specialist (PDNS) (local names may include neurology
nurse specialist or movement disorder specialist) who will
be responsible for co-ordinating care.
 Evidence to demonstrate that the provider is using
recognised tools, for example patient feedback, NMS
screening tool and cognitive assessment tool.
 Patients must be offered therapy assessment within one
year (including physiotherapist, speech and language
therapist and occupational therapist). The costs of the
therapy assessment are not included in the BPT. However,
payment is dependent on therapy assessment being offered
(irrespective of whether patient takes this up).
Pleural effusions
The aim of this BPT is to incentivise a shift in activity away
from non-elective admissions to pleural effusions being
performed on a planned elective basis under ultrasound
control.
This is achieved by setting the price for daycase admissions
relatively higher than the non-elective price, therefore creating
a financial incentive for the managing patients on an elective
basis.
In setting the BPT, we have assumed that 50% of current
emergency admissions to DZ16N are suitable to be managed
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BPT
Eligibility criteria
on a daycase basis (YD04Z or YD05Z).
Primary hip and
knee
replacement
outcomes
(amended
2017/19)
The criteria for payment of the BPT are:
 the provider not having an average health gain significantly
below the national average
 the provider adhering to the following data submission
standards:
o a minimum patient reported outcome measures (PROMs)
participation rate of 50%
o a minimum NJR compliance rate of 85%
o an NJR unknown consent rate below 15%.
Providers will not receive the BPT if they are either:
 below the lower 99.8% control limit based on the most
recently published data or
 below the lower 95% control limit based on the most
recently published previous two years data.
Commissioners will need to monitor PROMs and NJR
publications to determine whether providers are complying
with the payment criteria. Where they are not, commissioners
should make manual adjustments to the base (non-best
practice) price until an improvement is shown in the published
data and the requirements of the BPT are met (unless subject
to the national variation).
Same-day
emergency care
(amended
2017/19)
The BPT for each clinical scenario listed in Annex B1 is made
up of a pair of prices: one applied to emergency admissions
with a zero day length of stay (higher), the other to emergency
admissions with a stay of one or more days (lower).
It is not expected that the rate of emergency admissions will
increase as a result of introducing the BPT for the clinical
scenarios. It would be expected that either the rate remains
constant with the proportion of zero stays increasing, or the
rate reduces as providers implement more same day
emergency care pathways appropriate to a non-admitted
setting.
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3.2.9. Looked after children health assessments
114. Looked after children36 are one of the most vulnerable groups in society.
115. One-third of all looked after children are placed with carers or in settings outside
the originating local authority. These are referred to as ‘out-of-area’ placements.
116. When children are placed in care by local authorities, their responsible health
commissioner has a statutory responsibility to commission an initial health
assessment and conduct six-monthly or yearly reviews. When the child is
placed out of area, the originating commissioner retains this responsibility but
the health assessment should be done by a provider in the local area, to
promote optimal care co-ordination for the child.
117. Usually, there are clear arrangements between commissioners and local
providers for health assessments of looked after children placed ‘in area’.
However, arrangements for children placed out of area are variable, resulting in
concerns over the quality and scope of assessments.
118. To address this variability in the arrangements for children placed out of area
and to enable more timely assessments, a currency was devised and
mandated. A checklist for implementing the currency is included in Annex B4.
119. National prices apply for children placed out of area, these can be found under
‘Other National Prices’ in Annex B1. When a looked after child is placed “out of
area”, the responsible commissioner must commission providers in the
receiving area to undertake the health assessments and pay them using the
national price.
120. There is a non-mandatory currency but no mandatory currencies or national
prices for in-area health assessments for looked after children. In setting prices,
commissioners and providers must adhere to the relevant rules and principles
set out the locally determined prices section of the national tariff. We have made
non-mandatory prices available for children placed in area to support the
development of local prices.
3.2.10. Pathway payments
121. Pathway payments are single payments that cover a bundle of services37 which
may be provided by several providers for an entire episode or whole pathway of
36
The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) website on Children in Care
states: “A child who is being looked after by the local authority is known as a child in care or
"looked after”.
37
2012 Act, Section 117 provides that a bundle of services may be specified as a single service (ie a
currency) to which a national price applies, where those services together constitute a form of
treatment.
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care for a patient. They are designed to encourage better organisation and coordination of care across a pathway and among different healthcare providers.
Improving the co-ordination of care, including across different care settings (eg
primary, secondary, community services and social care), has the potential to
improve patient outcomes by reducing complications and readmissions.
122. There are two pathway-based payment systems. These relate to:
a. maternity healthcare services
b. healthcare for patients with cystic fibrosis.
Maternity pathway payment
123. The maternity pathway payment system splits maternity care into three stages:
antenatal, delivery and postnatal. For each stage, a woman chooses her
pathway provider, identified as the ‘lead provider’. The commissioner makes a
single payment to the lead provider of each stage to cover the cost of care38 the
level of which depends on clinical factors that affect the extent and intensity of
care a woman is expected to need.
124. Women may still receive some of their care from a different provider for clinical
reasons or to support their choice. This care is paid for by the lead provider who
will have received the entire pathway payment from the commissioner.
125. For 2017/19, we have updated the casemix assumptions for the antenatal
pathway to increase the activity allocated to the intermediate and intensive
levels. This means that the allocation at standard level would be reduced and
relative weightings between the standard, intermediate and intensive prices will
change. This policy will help to ensure that providers are more appropriately
reimbursed for the care they provide. More detail on this can be found in
Section 4.3.4.
126. The table below sets out what is included and excluded from all three stages of
the maternity payment system. Besides the exceptions identified, there should
be no further payments for individual elements of activity along the pathway.
38
Antenatal care for uncomplicated pregnancies
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg62/chapter/guidance
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Table 7: Description of the maternity pathway payment system
Area
Included
Excluded
Admitted
patient care
All activity against NZ* HRGs
(regardless of TFC)
This includes all fetal
medicine, including that
provided by tertiary providers39
All activity against non-NZ*
HRGs (regardless of TFC)
Outpatient
care
All activity against NZ* HRGs
(regardless of TFC)
All attendance activity against
TFC 501 (obstetrics) and 560
(midwife episode)
- includes all foetal
medicine, including that
provided by tertiary
providers
- Includes any activity in
emergency gynaecology or
early pregnancy units that
codes to ‘NZ’ HRGs, even
if before the antenatal
assessment visit
All activity against non-NZ*
HRGs (except with a TFC of 501
or 560)
An attendance TFC other than
501 (obstetrics) or 560 (midwife
episode)
Emergency gynaecology and
early pregnancy activity will
normally code to TFC502 or non
NZ* HRGs and will therefore be
excluded
Antenatal
education
Antenatal education activity
Critical care
All critical care activity
Community/
primary care
All maternity community-based
antenatal and postnatal care
All primary care activity
applicable to payment under the
GP contract. A woman may
choose some of her maternity
pathway to be delivered by her
GP or for the practice to be the
lead pathway provider, but any
care delivered by the GP will be
paid under the GP contract
Scans,
screening and
tests
All maternity ultrasound scans,
and all relevant maternal and
newborn screening which is
part of National Screening
Programmes40
The analysis elements of the
screening process undertaken
by specialist diagnostic
laboratories under a separate
commissioner contract
Immunisation
All specified immunisation of
39
It is expected that from 2014/15 fetal medicine has been coded differently, which should facilitate
separate commissioning for this service in the future.
40
Further information can be found in the NHS England publication ‘Who pays for antenatal and newborn screening?’ at https://www.england.nhs.uk/expo/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2015/06/whopays-mpp-upd-06-2015.pdf
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Area
Included
the newborn which should
occur before handover to
primary care
Birth
The birth, irrespective of type
and setting
Post-birth care
Well/healthy babies, both
during the delivery module and
pathway checks/ screening
during the postnatal module
Pre-pregnancy
care
Excluded
Pathways for unwell/unhealthy
babies. Babies requiring
admitted patient care treatment
will have their own admission
record
All pre-pregnancy/preconception care and
reproductive services
Non-maternity
care
Advice on risks in the context
of pregnancy and referral to
other relevant professionals
where necessary for resolution
if possible
All activity that is the named
responsibility of other
professionals or providers who
receive payment to deliver that
care for the population (eg drug
and alcohol services, mental
health services, stopping
smoking services, weight
management services, etc)
Specialised
services
All fetal medicine, including
that provided by tertiary
providers
All activity paid for directly by
NHS England
Ambulance
transfers
All ambulance transfer costs
Accident and
emergency
All unscheduled A&E activity
Clinical
Negligence
Scheme for
Trusts (CNST)
All CNST costs are included
High cost
drugs and
devices
All specified high cost drugs and
devices not covered by national
prices
127. Further information on the pathway payment approach can be found in Annexes
B1 and B4.
Cystic fibrosis pathway payment
128. The cystic fibrosis (CF) pathway currency is a complexity-adjusted yearly
banding system with seven bands of increasing complexity of patient need. The
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tariff relates to a year of care. The pathway does not distinguish between adults
and children.
129. The pathway payments cover all treatment directly related to cystic fibrosis for a
patient during the financial year. This includes:

admitted patient care and outpatient attendances (whether delivered in a
specialist centre or under shared network care arrangements)

home care support, including home intravenous antibiotics supervised by
the CF service, home visits by the multidisciplinary team to monitor a
patient’s condition, eg management of totally implantable venous access
devices (TIVADs), collection of mid-course aminoglycoside blood levels
and general support for patient and carers

intravenous antibiotics provided during in-patient spells

annual review investigations.
130. The cystic fibrosis pathway currency was designed to support specialist cystic
fibrosis multidisciplinary teams (MDTs) to provide care in a seamless, patientcentred manner, removing any incentives to hospitalise patients whose care can
be well managed in the community and in their homes. Furthermore, it allows
early intervention (following international guidelines) to prevent disease
progression, for example, through the use of antipseudomonal
inhaled/nebulised antibiotics and mucolytic therapy.
131. Further information is provided in Annex B1 and supporting guidance.
3.3. High cost drugs, devices and listed procedures
132. Several high cost drugs, devices and listed procedures are not reimbursed
through national prices. Instead they are subject to local pricing in accordance
with the rules set out in Section 6. These can be found on the high cost lists in
Annex B1. If they are not on this list, and are part of a nationally priced
treatment or service, then the cost of the drug, device or listed procedure is
covered by the national price. It should be noted that high cost drugs are
excluded either individually or as a group exclusion, as indicated in Annex B.
133. Where a provider and commissioner believe that the national price does not
cover the cost of the drug or device, in addition to the other costs of treating the
patient, then a local variation can be agreed between provider and
commissioner, in accordance with local pricing rules, to facilitate an additional
payment.
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134. For the 2017/19 NTPS we have updated the list of drugs, devices and
procedures using the same criteria used in previous years.41 Annex B1 sets out
the details.
New listed procedures: molecular and companion diagnostics and personalised
medicine
135. In 2016/17 NHS England provided a list of list of molecular diagnostic tests for
exclusion. This list remains the same for 2017 to 2019. Details of the excluded
tests can be found under the heading of listed procedures on the high cost
drugs, devices and listed procedures list in Annex A.
136. NHS England commissioners will agree local prices and activity volumes with
providers for these tests in accordance with the rules on local pricing.
3.4. The innovation and technology tariff
137. We are introducing a new Innovation and Technology Tariff (ITT) with the aim of
setting incentives to encourage the uptake and spread of innovative medical
technologies that benefit patients.
138. The development of innovations is encouraged through the NHS Innovation
Accelerator (NIA),42 the NHS test beds, and the Commissioning through
Evaluation Programme.
139. Innovations that have been accepted on to the NIA process were subject to an
assessment by NHS England of suitability for inclusion in the ITT.
140. This assessment was made against a range of factors such as whether the
service which would utilise the innovation is currently in the scope of the
national tariff, how widespread the innovation is in the sector and whether the
innovation is suitable for pricing in the national tariff. Working with UCL Partners
and clinicians from the NIA process, and also subject matter experts, NHS
England has identified a range of innovations suitable for inclusion in the ITT.
141. The innovations that are included in the ITT for 2017/19 are listed below.
142. Recognising the concerns of the sector, NHS England is committed to funding
CCGs to implement these innovations. For five of the six innovation categories,
NHS England will reimburse commissioners for this cost in addition to its
commissioner allocations. The sixth category, treatment of lower urinary tract
41
Further information about high cost drugs, devices and procedures may be found online via the
high cost drugs, devices and chemotherapy portals www.england.nhs.uk/resources/paysyst/drugs-and-devices/
42
www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/innovation/nia/
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symptoms of benign prostatic hyperplasia as a day case, is already included in
national prices.
143. NHS England intends to agree fixed prices with manufacturers for five of the six
products covered by the Innovation and Technology Tariff. These prices can be
found in the supporting document for the Innovation and Technology Tariff. We
expect that these prices will be adopted in local agreements between providers
and commissioners so there should be no need for further negotiation of the
price. The five innovations to be locally priced are not included within the
currencies used to set national prices. This approach similar to the approach
adopted for high cost drugs and devices which are also subject to the local
pricing rules
3.4.1. Guided mediolateral episiotomy to minimise the risk of obstetric anal
sphincter injury
Innovation detail
144. Approximately 15% of births in England require an episiotomy. Of these, around
25% experience obstetric anal sphincter injuries (OASIS). The angle of the cut
is important and NICE Guidance recommends that cuts need to be between 45
and 60 degrees to reduce the incidence of poor patient outcomes,
reconstructive surgery and litigation costs. The use of angled scissors in
episiotomies therefore should improve patient experience and outcomes and
reduce OASIS repair and litigation.
Further information
145. Further information is available at:
a. www.nice.org.uk/advice/mib33/chapter/introduction
b. www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg190/chapter/1-Recommendations#third-stageof-labour
3.4.2. Arterial connecting systems to reduce bacterial contamination and the
accidental administration of medication
Innovation detail
146. Arterial line placement is a common procedure in various critical care settings.
Intra-arterial blood pressure (BP) measurement is more accurate than
measurement of BP by non-invasive means, especially in the critically ill.
Although rare, when wrong route drug administration occurs, it has the potential
to cause serious damage to the vessel and surrounding tissue. Arterial
cannulation is associated with complications including bacterial contamination,
accidental intra-arterial injection and blood spillage.
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147. Needle-free connectors prevent blood spillage and through a one-way valve
allow aspiration only thus preventing accidental administration of medication to
the arterial line.
Further information
148. Further information can be found at the Eastern Academic Health Science
Network.43
3.4.3. Prevention of ventilated associated pneumonia in critically ill patients
Innovation detail
149. Ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP) is defined as pneumonia that occurs
48-72 hours or thereafter following endotracheal intubation, characterised by the
presence of a new or progressive infiltrate, signs of systemic infection (fever,
altered white blood cell count), changes in sputum characteristics, and detection
of a causative agent. Approximately 100,000 patients are admitted for
ventilation in critical care units in the UK each year. The risk for patients is
highest during early ICU stay when it is estimated to be 3% per day during days
1–5 of ventilation, 2% per day during days 5–10 of ventilation and 1% per day
thereafter (Masterton, 2008).
150. On average 10-20% (10,000- 20,000) patients will be diagnosed with Ventilator
Associated-Pneumonia (VAP) resulting in an attributable mortality rate of about
30% or between 3,000 and 6,000 deaths. Each episode of VAP has an
estimated cost to the NHS of between £10,000 and £20,000.
151. Improved airway management in critically ill patients who are having mechanical
ventilation can prevent ventilator-associated pneumonia by minimising the risk
of pulmonary aspiration and micro-aspiration in patients having ventilation for 24
hours or more. This could see a reduction in the length of time spent on
ventilation and length of stay in ICU.
152. There are available pneumonia prevention systems which are designed to stop
ventilator-associated pneumonia through the use of a cuffed ventilation tube
and an electronic cuff monitoring and inflating device which prevents leakage of
bacterial laden oral and stomach contents to the lung – a problem associated
with standard tubes.
Further information
153. NICE has produced a Medtech Innovation Briefing44 (MIB) which identified three
studies including 1 RTC and two retrospective cohort studies.
43
www.eahsn.org/our-work/casestudies/non-injectable-arterial-connector/
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3.4.4. Application for the self-management of chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease
Innovation detail
154. Managing chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) costs the NHS more
than £1 billion each year. However, treatment is complex, with different inhalers
needing to be used in different ways. Compliance with treatment is often
extremely low, leading to poor outcomes and wasted prescribing. For this
reason, improving self-management for patients with COPD is a key priority for
the NHS.
155. There is no cure for COPD and good symptom management is essential to
stabilise disease and prevent recurrent flare-ups or exacerbations.
Exacerbations often require intensive treatment and can be severe enough to
require hospital admission.
156. There is evidence from recent studies that disease-specific self-management
improves health status and reduces hospital admissions in COPD patients. It is
critical to implement health education programs in the continuum of care aimed
at behaviour modification. Studies in COPD have shown that self-management
increases knowledge and skills the patients require to treat their own illness.
157. A number of a web based and iOS applications that help patients manage their
condition more effectively are available. These platforms can interface with
clinical dashboards to monitor and manage their patients remotely at an
individual and population level.
158. These platforms can also be used by local health care providers and CCGs to
monitor exacerbation burdens in real-time and review potential inequalities in
health care to plan support services effectively.
Further information
159. NICE have produced guidance on the management of COPD.45
3.4.5. Frozen faecal microbiota transplantation for recurrent Clostridium
difficile infection rates
Innovation detail
160. Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) rates are climbing in frequency and severity,
and the spectrum of susceptible patients is expanding beyond the traditional
scope of hospitalized patients receiving antibiotics. There are over 3,000 new
44
45
www.nice.org.uk/advice/mib45
www.nice.org.uk/guidance/CG101
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cases of chronic CDI across England per annum. Faecal microbiota
transplantation (FMT) is becoming increasingly accepted as an effective and
safe intervention in patients with recurrent disease, likely due to the restoration
of a disrupted microbiome. Cure rates of > 90% are being consistently reported
from multiple centres. FMT is the provision of a screened specially prepared
stool administers via a nasal tube into the intestine to restore the balance of
bacteria in the gut. FMT is a NICE recommended treatment for chronic CDI.
161. To date nine trusts have performed FMTs on their own site via the frozen
service.
Further information
162. NICE has produced interventional procedures guidance for this technology as
part of the pathway for gastrointestinal conditions.46
3.4.6. Treatment of lower urinary tract symptoms of benign prostatic
hyperplasia as a day case
Innovation detail
163. Benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH) is a common and chronic condition where
the enlarged prostate can make it difficult for a man to pass urine, leading to
urinary tract infections, urinary retention, and in some cases renal failure.
Existing treatment TURP (transurethral resection of the prostate) involves
cutting away or removing existing tissue, require an average hospital stay of
three days and often catheterisation for many days post-surgery.
164. In people with benign prostatic hyperplasia, the prostate becomes enlarged. A
prostatic urethral lift system uses adjustable, permanent implants to hold the
enlarged prostate away from the urethra so that it isn’t blocked. In this way, the
device can relieve lower urinary tract symptoms (such as pain or difficulty when
urinating).
165. Healthcare teams may want to use a prostatic urethral lift system as an
alternative to transurethral resection of the prostate and holmium laser
enucleation of the prostate (HoLEP).
Payment/price detail
166. For the purposes of reimbursement this cost is included in tariff and reported via
SUS+ and charged per spell.
167. Providers should use combination code M678 (Other specified other therapeutic
endoscopic operations on prostate) + Y022 (Therapeutic endoscopic
46
www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ipg485
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implantation of prosthesis into prostate) which will group to the LB70 Complex
Endoscopic, Prostate or Bladder Neck Procedures (Male and Female) HRG
Root.
168. Annex B1 details the prices for LB70.
Further information
169. NICE has developed medical technology guidance on prostatic urethral lift
systems (MTG26).47
47
www.nice.org.uk/guidance/mtg26?unlid=
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4. Method for determining national prices
170. Our aim in setting prices is to support the highest quality patient care delivered
in the most efficient way.
171. Our principles for setting national prices are that:
a. Prices should reflect efficient costs. This means that the prices set should:
i. reflect the costs that a reasonably efficient provider ought to incur in
supplying services at the quality expected by commissioners
ii. not provide full reimbursement for inefficient providers.
b. Prices should provide appropriate signals by:
i. giving commissioners the information needed to make the best use of
their budgets and enabling them to make decisions about the mix of
services that offer most value to the populations they serve
ii. incentivising providers to reduce their unit costs by finding ways of
working more efficiently
iii. encouraging providers to change from one delivery model to another
where commissioners want this and where it is more efficient and
effective.
4.1. Overall approach
172. We are setting national prices for 2017/18 and 2018/19.
173. We are setting prices using different methods for 2017/18 and 2018/19.
174. National prices for 2017/18 are modelled from the currency design set out in
Section 3 of this document with 2014/15 costs and activity data. This is different
from how we set the 2016/17 national prices, when we rolled over prices
adopted under the Enhanced Tariff Option (ETO) with adjustments for cost
uplifts, CNST and efficiency.48 The methodology for the tariff model for the
2017/18 prices follows closely the methodology previously used by the DH
Payment by Results (PbR) team. 49
48
49
More detail on the method used to set prices for 2015/16 can be found in section 4 of the 2016/17
National Tariff Payment System
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/509697/201617_National_Tariff_Payment_System.pdf
For a description of the 13/14 PbR method, please see Payments by Results, Step by Step Guide:
Calculating the 2013/14 National Tariff. It was not always possible to exactly replicate the PbR
method. Where we have significantly deviated from the PbR method we set this out in this
document. For example we have simplified some of the calculation processes.
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175. For 2018/19 we are using a rollover model. We use the 2017/18 national prices
and currencies as a starting point and apply adjustments based on our
estimates of inflation, efficiency and, where appropriate, CNST in 2018/19 to the
2017/18 prices in order to derive the 2018/19 prices. This is similar to the
approach taken for the 2016/17 NTPS.
176. The stages in our approach can be seen below:
Figure 1: Stages in our methods for setting national prices for 2017/19
2014/15 Reference
costs
Determine price
relativities
(relationship
between average
unit costs)
Set prices to 2016/17 levels (current year)
Adjust to 2016/17
base using 15/16
and 16/17
efficiency, cost
uplifts and CNST
Adjust
relativities
using expert
advice
Adjust subchapters to
manage
volatility
Apply cost
base
adjustment
2017/18 Price levels
2018/19 price levels
Adjust for forward
looking 2017/18
efficiency, cost
uplifts and CNST
Adjust for forward
looking 2018/19
efficiency, cost
uplifts and CNST
177. This section is supported by Annex B2. This contains the models used to set
prices:
a. the admitted patient care (APC) tariff model
b. the APC handbook
c. the outpatient procedures (OPROC) model
d. the outpatient attendances (OPATT) model
e. the accident and emergency (A&E) model
f. the unbundled services model
g. the maternity pathway model
h. the other national prices model
i. the best practice tariff (BPT) model.
178. The section below sets out a high level explanation of the method for setting
prices and the changes made for this year. For the full detail of how each price
has been set please consult the relevant model.
4.2. The method for setting prices
4.2.1. Modelling prices for 2017/18
179. We note that in adopting the PbR method for the 2017/18 tariff year we have in
some cases deviated from the exact implementation of the method. For
example we used different software packages for some calculations (SQL) than
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those used by the PbR team (Access), but in all cases we aimed to replicate the
PbR methodology, with the main changes we made to the PbR method set out
in this section.
180. The PbR method for setting prices was different for different care settings (or
points of delivery). This was mainly due to differences in the type of input data
used and differences in assumptions and incentives. We have therefore
developed a number of different models for different care settings (or
procedures). This means that the 2017/18 tariff model is in practice a suite of
tariff models (for example, we have separate models to generate APC and
outpatient attendance (OPATT) prices).
181. The steps in our modelling approach for 2017/18 are:
a. Determine price relativities (based on average unit costs). We use cleaned
reference costs and Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data as key inputs to
set average costs per currency (eg HRG). See Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 for
more details.
b. Adjust average unit costs to an appropriate price base. As price relativities
are based on 2014/15 costs we need to adjust them to the current year
(2016/17) before we can make any forward looking adjustments. To do this
we adjust absolute price levels by applying efficiency, inflation and CNST
adjustment factors for the two-year gap using the inflation and efficiency
factors and, where appropriate, CNST from the 2016/17 national tariff. At this
point we also apply an adjustment to the amount of money allocated to
admitted patient care (a top slice) to be reallocated to top up payments for
specialised services (see section 5.2).
c. Apply manual adjustments to modelled prices to reduce the number of
instances where price relativities are implausible, illogical or distorted50 (see
Section 4.4)
d. Apply a cost base adjustment factor to prices to ensure prices reimburse a
total amount of cost equal to the desired cost base, see Section 4.5.
e. Where appropriate, applies a volatility factor to prices (at subchapter level) to
reduce volatility in prices. See Section 4.6.
f. Adjust prices to 2017/18 levels to reflect expected inflation (including service
development), CNST (section 4.7) and also an estimation of the level of
efficiency that we expect that they can achieve in 2017/18. See Section 4.8.
50
An example of an illogical relativity could be where the price for a more complex treatment is lower
than the price for a less complex treatment without good reason.
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182. The changes from the 2013/14 PbR method are to:
a. update models for the HRG4+ currency design
b. apply a small set of data-cleaning rules to the 2013/14 reference cost data to
improve the quality of the cost data in the model
c. include a reconciliation to ensure that we base our price relativities, between
tariff models on the equivalent cost relativities in the reference costs dataset
d. we made the manual adjustment process more transparent and included a
reconciliation at chapter51 level to ensure that the manual adjustments made
to modelled prices do not change the total amount paid for each chapter
e. make minor adjustments to streamline the calculation process and improve
its transparency: for example removing some calculation steps in the
2013/14 PbR model which did not have any clearly identifiable policy
intention (such as adjustments that appeared to be historic manual
adjustments)
f. recreate any models that were not transferred from the DH as closely as
possible
g. updated the calculation method for BPTs (Section 4.2.3)
h. introduced volatility and a cost base adjustment (scaling)
i. removed the affordability adjustment.52
183. For prices for which a 2013/14 PbR method was not available we either:
a. used the rollover approach applied in the 2014/15 national tariff (this
approach calculates 2017/18 prices using the 2016/17 tariff prices as a base
and applies the inflation, efficiency and, where applicable, Clinical
Negligence Scheme for Trusts factors to them to arrive at the 2017/18
prices)53
51
In exceptional cases this was done at a subchapter level
Affordability remains a factor which is being considered - for example, when determining the
appropriate efficiency factor, and when making decisions about cost base adjustments.
53
Section 5.2 of the ‘2014/15 National Tariff Payment System’ states:
‘2014/15 national prices (for currencies that are unchanged) are calculated by using 2013/14
prices as the base and adjusting those prices generally for:
 cost pressures on providers; offset by
 our expectations for improved efficiency on the part of providers.
We refer to the above approach as a ‘rollover’ approach, to reflect the fact that we have adjusted
most prices by a common factor (rather than use updated reference costs at the currency level).’
52
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b. developed new models that were designed to follow, as closely as possible,
the principles of the 2013/14 PbR method: for example the calculation of the
Short Stay Emergency (SSEM)54 tariff. All models can be found in Annex B2.
4.2.2. The rollover approach for 2018/19
184. For 2018/19 we model prices using the 2017/18 price list as a base and then
determine the final price levels by applying adjustments for expected efficiency,
inflation and, where appropriate, CNST for 2018/19.
185. We have used the latest available projections to make these adjustments.
4.2.3. Setting prices for best practice tariffs for 2017/18
Changes to the method for setting best practice tariffs
186. For 2017/18 we have changed the method for setting prices for BPTs.
187. Where possible we have applied a standard method of pricing BPTs which can
be summarised in three steps:
a. using the modelled APC/OPROC or OPATT price (without BPT adjustments)
as the starting point (‘base price’)
b. setting a fixed differential between the BPT and non-BPT price. This
differential can take the form of a percentage of the APC or OPATT base
price or can be an absolute value
c. setting the level of the BPT and non-BPT prices so that the BPTs are cost
neutral at HRG level.
188. We set BPTs with the intention that they are cost neutral at HRG level.
Under the DH PbR method neutrality was achieved by adjusting the overall
uplift factor.
189. To achieve neutrality we need to make an assumption about the expected
actual compliance rate, at an aggregate national level, is for each HRG that is
associated with a BPT in the tariff year (in this case 17/18). If this is set too
high, then it will create an extra efficiency ask on providers, too low and it will
put extra pressure on commissioners. The compliance rates can be found in the
BPT model in Annex B2.
190. We currently do not have sufficient information to update the assumptions for
the expected compliance rate in the 2017/18 tariff year for all BPTs. Where we
do not have this information, we have used our best estimate for the expected
2017/18 compliance rates.
54
See ‘Reduced Short Stay Emergency Tariff’ in the BPT model in Annex B2.
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191. There are some BPTs where we are not fully able to implement the approach
set out above. In those cases we have developed bespoke solutions that either
used the existing approach or streamlined the existing model as far as possible:
a. Use the existing method (see Annex B2 and Annex B6 for more detail). We
generally did this where we were not able to update either the 2013/14 PbR
method and/or inputs to the 2013/14 PbR method. This affects:
i. early inflammatory arthritis
ii. major trauma
iii. paediatric diabetes year of care
iv. Parkinson’s disease.
b. Streamlined the existing model for that BPT, as far as possible, in line with
the approach set out above, with necessary adjustments. In particular:
i. renal dialysis: maintaining the 2013/14 PbR method, except that we
simplified the calculation of the peritoneal dialysis prices by basing them
directly on reference costs
ii. paediatric epilepsy: setting the standard national price as per the 2013/14
PbR method and set the BPT based on the principles set out above
iii. pleural effusion: The currency design changed substantially for this BPT
between 2013/14 and 2017/19 due to the introduction of HRG4+. We
retained the policy intentions of the 2013/14 pleural effusion BPT design
as much as possible, taking into account, where possible, the BPT
simplification principles set out above
iv. transient ischaemic attack. We retained the extra payment as per the
2013/14 PbR method, but otherwise updated this BPT in line with the
approach set out above.
192. All BPT price models can be found in Annex B2.
4.2.4. Changes to the method for calculating outpatient attendance prices
193. To incentivise a change in the delivery of outpatient follow-up activity, to
encourage a move to more efficient models of care (eg non face to
face/telemedicine) and to free up consultant capacity, we over-reimburse first
attendances and under-reimburse corresponding follow-up attendances. After
calculating prices for these services we then make an adjustment to increase
first attendances by a set percentage and reduce the corresponding follow up
price by the amount required to make up that increase. For example, if we
increase the first attendance TFC by 10% and there is an average of two
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follow-up attendances for this TFC, we would reduce the average follow-up
price by 5%.
194. For 2017/19 we have increased this transfer for a number of TFCs from 10% to
either 20% or 30%. There is a full list in Annex B1.
4.3. Managing model inputs
4.3.1. Overall approach
195. The two main data inputs used to generate prices for the 17/18 tariff year are
costs (obtained from the annual reference cost collection) and activity, which is
captured in the HES dataset as well as the annual reference cost collection. We
explain these two datasets in more detail in this section.
196. For the 2018/19 tariff year, we are not using any activity and cost data to
generate prices as the prices are based on the prices for the 2017/18 tariff year
using a ‘rollover’ approach.
197. The reference costs dataset contains cost and activity data for many, but not all,
healthcare services providers. The data are collected from all NHS trusts and
NHS foundation trusts and therefore cover most healthcare costs. We do not
currently collect cost data from the independent sector.
198. The HES activity dataset contains the number of admitted patient care,
outpatients appointments and A&E attendances in England from all providers of
secondary care services to the NHS. It is mainly needed for the APC tariff
calculation because the APC currencies are paid on a spell basis, while the
activity data contained in the reference cost dataset is based on FCEs.
199. We are using 2014/15 reference costs and 2014/15 activity data to model prices
for the 2017/18 tariff year.
4.3.2. Reference cost inputs
Reference cost dataset used
200. We are using 2014/15 reference cost data55 for the prices for the 2017/18 tariff
year. We use this reference cost dataset because it is very closely aligned with
the currency design56 of the 2017/19 tariff.
Reference cost data cleaning
201. One of our main objectives is to create a more stable and reliable tariff and
reduce unexplained tariff price volatility.
55
56
See NHS reference costs 2014 to 2015
We have used the HRG4+ currency system (see Section 4 of this document for further details).
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202. We think using cleaned data (ie raw reference cost data with some implausible
records removed) will, over time, reduce the number of illogical cost inputs (for
example, fewer very-low-cost recordings for a particular service and fewer
illogical relativities).57 This, in turn, should reduce the number of modelled prices
that require manual adjustment and should therefore increase the reliability of
the tariff. We believe this benefit outweighs the disadvantage of losing some
data points as a result of the data cleaning process.
203. We have applied new rules for reference cost data cleaning based on
recommendations provided by Deloitte.58 These exclude:
a. outliers from the raw reference cost dataset detected using a statistical
outlier test known as the Grubbs test (also known as the ‘maximum normed
residual test’)
b. providers that submitted reference costs more than 50% below the national
average for more than 25% of HRGs and at the same time also submitted
reference costs 50% higher than the national average for more than 25% of
HRGs submitted
c. providers who submitted reference costs containing more than 75%
duplicate costs across HRGs and departments.
204. We have not followed the recommendations in full because we encountered
some technical issues in the implementing of some of the rules. For example, it
proved more difficult than anticipated to identify the full set of potential illogical
relativities. In particular we have not followed the recommendation to:
a. exclude providers with at least five unit cost submissions below £5 and at
least 10 unit cost submissions above £50,000, subject to an average unit
cost check
b. exclude providers who submitted reference costs containing more than 15%
of unit costs that exhibited illogical relativities.
205. For the prices in the 2017/18 tariff year we are cleaning only reference cost data
for the model for APC.
206. Applying these rules to the reference costs dataset we use to set national prices
for APC has led to a small percentage of reference cost data records being
removed to improve the quality of the dataset. The most significant effect was to
57
58
An illogical relativity is where the cost of performing a more complex procedure is lower than the
cost of performing a less complex procedure (without good reason).
See the independent research paper on the ‘NHS National Tariff Payment System 2016/17:
engagement documents’ webpage.
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remove all APC reference cost data submitted by six, mainly mental health and
community, providers.
4.3.3. HES data inputs
207. We use 2014/15 HES data grouped by NHS Improvement using the 2014/15
(HRG4+) various groupers and the 2017/18 Engagement grouper in our
modelling of the prices for the 2017/18 tariff year.
208. Using NHS Improvement grouping is a deviation from the 2013/14 PbR method
which used HES data grouped by NHS Digital. However we are making this
change because:
a. It allows us more flexibility in the timing of grouping the data.
b. The NHS Digital use patient identifiable data for grouping, which cannot be
shared with third parties (to protect patient confidentiality). NHS
Improvement’s method does not use patient identifiable data, which makes it
easier for third parties to replicate our method. We believe this change
makes the tariff more transparent and will enable stakeholders to better
review and engage with our proposed tariff calculation method.
209. The NHS Improvement grouping method aims to follow, as closely as possible,
the casemix grouping method and initial analysis indicates that the differences
between the two grouping methods are relatively small.
4.3.4. Updates to the maternity pathway
210. For maternity, price relativities are set using assumptions about the casemix.
We have updated the casemix assumptions for the antenatal phase of the
maternity pathway model. These changes are based on feedback from
clinicians.
211. As a result of this information, we updated our model inputs to assume that
more women will require intermediate and intensive antenatal care. Our revised
assumptions are shown in the table below
Table 8: Assumptions for antenatal care
Pathway
PbR allocations
17/18 allocations
Standard
64.0%
50.0%
Intermediate
28.2%
38.7%
7.8%
11.3%
Intensive
212. Full details of the method for setting prices for maternity are in Annex B2.
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4.4. Manual adjustments
213. The 2013/14 PbR method involved making some manual adjustments to the
modelled tariff. This was done to minimise the risk of setting implausible tariffs
(eg tariffs that have illogical relativities) based on reference cost data of variable
quality. We have broadly followed this approach for the 2017 to 2019 national
tariff. We have also introduced a new process of making manual adjustments to
price relativities they are published. This involved not identifying illogical
relativities but identifying implausible prices from a clinical perspective. In doing
so we adopted the following process.
a. We made manual adjustments following feedback on draft tariff prices:
i. We made several manual adjustments following a series of meetings to
review draft price relativities with NHS Digital’s expert working groups of
clinicians before publication of the currency design and relative prices
engagement document released in August 2016.
ii. We made further manual adjustments and revisions following stakeholder
feedback and comments, further engagement with clinical experts and
adjustments on the draft prices published in this summer engagement
document.
214. The manual adjustments made to individual prices can be found in Annex B2.
4.5. Cost base
215. The cost base is the level of cost that the tariff will allow providers to recover,
before adjustments are made for cost uplifts and the efficiency factor is applied.
216. For 2017/18 and 2018/19, for the total activity with a national price, we have set
the cost base equal to the revenue that would be received under 2016/17
national tariff. In other words, we have made no adjustment to the cost base,
except for that which recognises changes in the scope of nationally priced
services.
217. As with many other parts of tariff setting, we use last year’s tariff as a starting
point for the following tariff. Therefore, last year’s prices and last year’s revenue
are used as a starting point.
218. After setting the starting point, we consider new information, and a number of
factors to form a view whether an adjustment to the cost base is warranted.
219. Information and factors we considered include:
a. historical efficiency and cost uplift assumptions
b. latest cost data
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c. additional funding outside the national tariff
d. any other additional revenue providers use to pay for tariff services 59
e. our pricing principles and the factors which legislation requires us to
consider, including matters such as the importance of setting cost reflective
prices, and the need to take into account the duties of commissioners in the
context of the budget available for the NHS.
220. In using our judgement, we also consider the effect of setting the cost base too
high or too low. This effect is asymmetric:
a. If we set the cost base too low (ie we set too high an expectation that
providers will be able to catch up to past undelivered efficiency), providers
will be in deficit, service quality will decrease (eg waiting times will increase),
and some providers may cease providing certain services.
b. However, if we set the cost base too high, commissioners, who have an
obligation to stay within their budgets, are likely to restrict the volumes of
commissioned services, and could cease commissioning certain services
entirely. This would mean some patients may not be provided with the
healthcare service they require.
221. Given the above, it is our judgement to keep the cost base equal to the revenue
that would be received under 2016/17 prices.
4.6. Volatility
222. To reduce the volatility from introducing a new currency design we have
adjusted prices in the some subchapters such that services recover 75% of the
initial estimated loss. Tariff prices outside of these subchapters have been topsliced to pay for this revenue adjustment. The table below displays the
adjustments factors:
Table 9: Subchapters and uplift adjustments
Subchapter
Subchapter description
Uplift adjustment
HC
Spinal Procedures and Disorders
3.9%
HD
Musculoskeletal and Rheumatological
Disorders
0.9%
HE
Orthopaedic Disorders
11.1%
HN
Orthopaedic Non-Trauma Procedures
5.3%
HT
Orthopaedic Trauma Procedures
7.9%
LD
Renal Dialysis for Chronic Kidney
10.4%
59
We commissioned a review into the cost base from FTI. This can be found at:
improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-1719-consultation
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Subchapter
Subchapter description
Disease
Uplift adjustment
PB
Neonatal Disorders
15.0%
SB
Chemotherapy
4.1%
SC
Radiotherapy
6.3%
All remaining chapters
-1.2%
4.7. Cost uplifts
223. Every year, the efficient cost of providing healthcare changes because of
changes in wages, prices and other inputs over which providers have limited
control. We therefore make a forward-looking adjustment to the modelled prices
to reflect expected cost pressures in future years. We refer to this as the cost
uplift.
224. We have retained broadly the same methodology for 2017 and 2018/19 as for
2016/17 with some developments as discussed below. We recognise that
forecasting inflation for two years is subject to increased uncertainty but we
have used the best available information.
225. In determining the cost uplift adjustments we have considered six categories of
cost pressures. These are:
a. pay costs
b. drugs costs
c. other operating costs
d. changes in the cost associated with CNST payments
e. changes in capital costs (ie changes in costs associated with depreciation
and private finance initiative payments)
f. costs arising from new requirements in the Mandate to NHS England. We
call these changes ‘service development’ costs. There are no adjustments
from the Mandate for service development in 2017/18 or 2018/19.
226. The adjustments are included in a total cost uplift factor which is then applied to
the modelled or rolled-over prices, except, as explained below, for most of the
CNST increases. In setting the general cost uplift factor , each cost category is
assigned a weight reflecting the proportion of total expenditure. These weights
are based on aggregate provider expenditure obtained from DH’s published
2015/16 financial accounts. Figure 2 shows the weights applied to each cost
category.
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Figure 2: Breakdown of the tariff cost uplift
227. Below, we set out our method for estimating the level of each cost uplift
component and the CNST adjustments.
Pay
228. As shown in Figure 2, pay costs are a major component of providers’ aggregate
input costs, so it is important that we reflect changes in these costs as
accurately as possible when setting national prices.
229. Pay-related inflation has four elements. These are:
a. pay settlements: the increase in the unit cost of labour reflected in pay
awards for the NHS
b. pay drift: the tendency for staff to move to a higher increment or to be
upgraded and also includes the impact of overtime
c. staff group mix: the movement in the average unit cost of labour due to
changes in the overall staff mix (e.g. the relative proportions of senior and
junior staff, or the relative proportions of specialist and non-specialist staff).
d. extra overhead labour costs: there are two new charges for NHS providers,
the apprenticeship levy and the immigration skills charge, both due to be
implemented from 1 April 2017.
230. We are using DH’s central estimates for these components. DH maintains the
most accurate and detailed records of labour costs in the NHS, and is directly
involved in pay negotiations. We are assuming pay drift and group mix effects of
0.7% in 2017/18 and 1.0% in 2018/19. In arriving at these figures, an
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adjustment of -0.3% has been made to the DH projections for pay drift and staff
mix to reduce or exclude elements of pay inflation that lead to extra output and
thus are remunerated through activity rather than price.
231. The pay award is in line with public sector pay policy of 1% and this is assumed
to be the same for both 2017/18 and 2018/19. The 1% pay award assumption is
a limit to the average pay award set by HM Treasury. A greater increase for
lower paid staff would have to be offset by a lower increase for higher paid staff.
232. The combined impact of pay drift and group mix for tariff purposes is assumed
to be 0.7% in 2017/18 and 1.0% in 2018/19.
233. The apprenticeship levy is estimated to add a net 0.3% to the total wage bill in
2017/18 (with no further impact in 2018/19). This comprises 0.4% expected
gross costs, offset by 0.1% financial benefit, as employers can access funding
for the training of apprentices.
234. The immigration skills charge is estimated to add 0.1% to the total wage bill in
2017/18 (with no further impact in 2018/19).
235. In total, the projection is an increase in the pay bill of 2.1% in 2017/18 and 2.1%
in 2018/19.
Drugs costs
236. The drugs cost uplift is intended to reflect increases in drugs expenditure per
unit of activity. Although drugs costs are a relatively small component of total
provider expenditure (approximately 8%), they have historically grown faster
than other costs. This has made drugs costs one of the larger cost uplift
components in some years.
237. Our approach is a development of that used in previous years which uses a
forecast increase in expenditure and removes the increase in costs resulting
from activity to identify the cost increase due to price increases. This is because
providers will be paid for increased drugs use because of the increase in
volumes and therefore payments. We have also made a new adjustment to
seek to exclude the impact of the more rapid forecast of price growth in high
cost drugs paid for on a pass-through basis outside of tariff. As the cost of these
drugs is remunerated outside the tariff, it is not correct to include it in our
calculation of tariff inflation.
238. To reflect the expected increase in drugs costs, we have used DH’s estimates
as the basis for our calculation. This estimate is based on long-term trends and
DH’s expectation of new drugs coming to market, and other drugs that will
cease to be provided solely under patent in the coming 12 months. DH has
provided us with its best estimate of the increase in drugs total costs for
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providers. The figures are 5.8% in 2017/18 and 5.0% in 2018/19. We then
adjust these by:

calculating a revised figure for tariff drugs, by assuming 6.2% cost growth in
the proportion of drugs expenditure accounted for by pass-through drugs. This
figure is based on NHS England analysis of likely expenditure growth in high
cost drugs (9% average growth) less an assessment of overall efficiencies
required of specialised commissioning (2.6%)60

removing assumed underlying activity growth of 2.5% in both years as
increases in activity are covered by each additional unit paid for not increases
in price per unit

recognising the uncertainty associated with these adjustments, particularly for
pass through drugs, setting the growth figure to be at least the Gross
domestic product (GDP) deflator estimated by the Office of Budget
Responsibility (OBR) each year.
239. This results in assumed drugs cost inflation of 2.8% in 2017/18 and 2.1%
in 2018/19.
Other operating costs
240. Other operating costs include general costs such as medical, surgical and
laboratory equipment and fuel. For this category of cost uplift, we have used the
forecast of the GDP deflator estimated by the OBR as the basis of the expected
increase in costs. The GDP deflator, from June 2016,61 is 1.8% in 2017/18 and
2.1% in 2018/19. In both years this translates to a 0.4% uplift once the
weighting of the increase is taken into consideration.
Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts
241. The Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST) is an indemnity scheme for
clinical negligence claims. Providers make a contribution to the scheme to cover
the legal and compensatory costs of clinical negligence.62 The NHS Litigation
Authority (NHSLA) administers the scheme and sets the contribution that each
provider must make to ensure that the scheme is fully funded each year.
242. Following the previous DH approach, we have allocated the increase in CNST
costs to core HRG subchapters, to the maternity delivery tariff and A&E services
in line with the average cost increases that will be paid by providers. This
approach to the CNST uplift is different to other cost uplifts. While other cost
60
Note that the percentages do not sum due to compounding effects
Published at www.gov.uk/government/statistics/gdp-deflators-at-market-prices-and-money-gdpjune-2016-quarterly-national-accounts
62
CCGs and NHS England are also members of the CNST scheme.
61
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uplifts are estimated and applied across all prices, the estimate of the CNST
cost increase differs according to the mix of services delivered by providers. To
reflect these differences in CNST payments, the cost uplift is differentially
applied across HRG subchapter, A&E services and for the maternity delivery
tariff. Each relevant HRG is uplifted based on the change in CNST cost across
specialties mapped to HRG subchapters. This means that our cost uplifts
reflect, on average, each provider’s relative exposure to CNST cost growth,
given their individual mix of services and procedures.63.
243. The table on the next page lists the percentage uplift that we have applied to
each HRG subchapter to reflect the increase in CNST costs.
244. Most of the increases in CNST costs are allocated at HRG subchapter level,
maternity tariff or A&E, but a small residual amount (about £18 million in
2017/18 and £22.1 million in 2018/19) is unallocated at a specific HRG level.
This unallocated figure is redistributed as a general uplift across all prices. We
have calculated the uplift due to this pressure as 0.02% in both 2017/18 and
2018/19. (though this is given as 0.0% in the table below due to rounding).
63
For example, maternity services have been a major driver of CNST costs in recent years. For this
reason, a provider delivering maternity services as a large proportion of its overall service mix
would probably find that its CNST contributions (set by the NHSLA) have increased more quickly
than the contributions of other providers. However, the cost uplift reflects this, since the CNST
uplift is higher for maternity services. This is consistent with the approach previously taken by DH.
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Table 10: CNST tariff impact by HRG subchapter
HRG sub
chapter
2017/18 up
lift (%)
2018/19 uplift
(%)
HRG sub
chapter
2017/18 upli
ft (%)
2018/19
uplift (%)
HRG sub
chapter
2017/18 uplif
t (%)
2018/19 uplift
(%)
AA
0.72%
0.89%
JC
0.67%
0.80%
PP
1.25%
1.53%
AB
0.41%
0.54%
JD
0.40%
0.49%
PQ
0.58%
0.71%
BZ
0.54%
0.68%
KA
0.48%
0.63%
PR
1.14%
1.41%
CA
0.34%
0.46%
KB
0.22%
0.25%
PV
1.08%
1.34%
CB
0.36%
0.45%
KC
0.20%
0.22%
PW
1.33%
1.62%
CD
0.16%
0.19%
LA
0.18%
0.20%
PX
1.10%
1.35%
DZ
0.17%
0.20%
LB
0.37%
0.45%
SA
0.30%
0.37%
EB
0.26%
0.31%
MA
0.22%
0.37%
VA
0.83%
1.08%
EC
0.26%
0.33%
MB
0.41%
0.58%
WH
0.49%
0.61%
ED
0.23%
0.32%
PB
1.12%
1.38%
WJ
0.22%
0.26%
EY
0.29%
0.36%
PC
1.18%
1.45%
YA
2.71%
3.55%
FZ
0.56%
0.71%
PD
1.33%
1.63%
YD
0.29%
0.33%
GA
0.56%
0.72%
PE
0.94%
1.15%
YF
0.57%
0.73%
GB
0.27%
0.34%
PF
1.14%
1.40%
YG
0.26%
0.31%
GC
0.52%
0.65%
PG
0.75%
0.92%
YH
0.91%
1.17%
HC
0.84%
1.10%
PH
0.86%
1.07%
YJ
0.72%
0.92%
HD
0.49%
0.60%
PJ
1.24%
1.51%
YL
0.23%
0.28%
HE
1.51%
1.92%
PK
0.74%
0.91%
YQ
0.71%
0.91%
HN
0.83%
1.08%
PL
0.79%
0.97%
YR
0.75%
0.95%
HT
0.92%
1.20%
PM
0.24%
0.30%
VB
1.94%
1.90%
JA
0.84%
1.05%
PN
0.70%
0.85%
Maternity
6.36%
7.54%
Source: The NHS Litigation Authority. Note: * Maternity is delivery element only
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Capital costs (changes in depreciation and private finance initiative payments)
245. Providers’ costs typically include depreciation charges and PFI payments. As
with increases in operating costs, providers should have an opportunity to
recover an increase in these capital costs.
246. In previous years, DH reflected changes in these capital costs when calculating
cost uplifts, and we have adopted the same approach for 2017/18 and 2018/19.
Specifically, we have applied DH’s projection of changes in overall depreciation
charges and PFI payments.
247. In aggregate, DH projects PFI and depreciation costs to grow by 3.0% in
2017/18 and 2.9% in 2018/19. These both translate to a 0.2% uplift on tariff
prices.
Service development
248. The service development uplift factor reflects the expected extra unit costs to
providers of major initiatives that are included in the Mandate.64 There are no
major initiatives anticipated in the Mandate to be funded through national prices
in 2017/18 or 2018/19, and no uplift is to be applied for either year.
4.7.2. Summary of data for cost uplifts
249. Given the above, we have calculated the total cost uplift factor for both 2017/18
and 2018/19 national prices as 2.1%, as shown in the table below. This
excludes the targeted CNST adjustments.
Table 11: Cost uplift factors
Uplift factors
Weighted average estimate (uplift x weighting)
2017/18
2018/19
Pay costs
1.3%
1.3%
Drugs costs
0.2%
0.2%
Other operating costs
0.4%
0.4%
Unallocated CNST
0.0%
0.0%
Capital costs
0.2%
0.2%
Total
2.1%
2.1%
Notes:
64
Unallocated CNST refers to CNST cost increases not associated with specific HRG
subchapters. Numbers may not add up exactly due to rounding.
The Mandate to NHS England sets out objectives for the NHS and highlights the areas of health
care where the government expects to see improvements.
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4.8. Efficiency
250. The efficiency factor for 2017/18 is 2%. The efficiency factor for 2018/19 is
also 2%.
251. We use evidence-based data to set the efficiency factor. As a starting point we
use the Deloitte analysis produced to inform us on the efficiency factor for the
2015/16 national tariff. The initial analysis was based on an econometric model
and a supporting case study.65 The model used data from 165 acute trusts for
the period between the 2008/09 and 2012/13 financial years. For the 2016/17
national tariff we developed further the Deloitte’s econometric model by
changing our measurement of some variables and by incorporating 2013/14
data into the model.66
252. For the 2017/18 national tariff we considered more ways in which we might
develop the existing econometric model, as well whether any update to the
evidence was needed. We have decided to update the 2016/17 analysis to
include 2014/15 data67. This allows us to account for the most recent changes in
efficiency in our decision on the efficiency factor setting. We have also improved
the measurement of deprivation in the model.68
253. Our modelling suggests that trusts become 1% more efficient each year on
average. Around this trend we estimate that there is substantial variation in
efficiency, which could justify an efficiency factor greater than 1% as poorer
performers can improve more than the average. For instance, if the average
performer catches up to the 60th centile we estimate that this would release
1.6% efficiency in addition to trend efficiency. Given the financial pressures on
the NHS, we believe that it is appropriate to set a challenging but achievable
efficiency factor for 2017/18. We are proposing an efficiency factor of 2%.
254. For 2018/19 we assume trend efficiency will continue and this goes in line with
the other government reviews.69 Given that the financial pressures on the NHS
are likely to continue, we again consider it appropriate to set a challenging but
achievable efficiency factor. We therefore consider that it appropriate to adopt
an efficiency factor of 2% for 2018/19.
65
See Deloitte report for detailed description of the method.
The report of the efficiency factor for the 2016/17 national tariff can be found here: Evidence on the efficiency
factor.
67
Where changes in data collections mean data is no available for variables, for instance certain disease’s
prevalence in the Quality Outcomes Framework, we have extrapolated based on historical data.
68
In 2016/17 the estimate of the level of deprivation a trust faced was calculated using the area-level index of
multiple deprivation, mapped to trusts by the average patient flow. This was time-invariant. This year we have
recalculated patient flow each year. This enables us to capture changes in the deprivation profile a trust may
face due to changes in catchment area served over time.
69
A recent Carter review report on operational productivity and performance suggests the NHS is expected to
deliver efficiencies of 2-3% per year, which could represent savings of 10-15% by 2021.
66
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5. National variations to national prices
255. In some circumstances, it is appropriate to make national adjustments to
national prices. For example, adjustments may reflect local differences in costs
that the formulation of national prices has not taken into account, or share risk
more appropriately among parties.
256. We refer to these nationally determined adjustments as ‘national variations’ to
national prices. We refer to the price, after application of national variations, as
the ‘nationally determined price’.
257. Specifically, each national variation aims to achieve one of the following:
a. improve the extent to which the actual prices paid reflect location-specific
costs
b. improve the extent to which the actual prices paid reflect the complexity of
patient need
c. provide incentives for sharing the responsibility for preventing avoidable
unplanned hospital stays
d. share the financial risk appropriately following (or during) a move to new
payment approaches.
258. This section sets out the national variations specified in the 2017/19 NTPS.
259. The national variations have changed from those set out in the 2016/17 NTPS
in one area, top-ups for specialised services. All other national variations remain
the same.
260. National variations are an important part of the overarching payment system
framework. They sit alongside local variations and local modifications. Providers
and commissioners should note that:
a. National variations only apply to services with a national price.
b. If a commissioner and a provider choose to bundle services that have a mix
of national prices and locally determined prices, national variations can in
effect be disapplied or modified by local variations agreed in accordance with
the applicable rules (see Section 6.2).
c. In the case of an application or agreement for a local modification (see
Section 6.3), the analysis must reflect all national variations that could alter
the price payable for a service (ie it is the price after any national variations
have been applied that should be compared with a provider’s costs).
d. Where a new service is commissioned that does not have a national price,
rules for local price-setting apply (see Section 6.4).
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261. The rest of this section covers four types of national variation to national prices:
a. variations to reflect regional cost differences
b. variations to reflect patient complexity
c. variations to help prevent avoidable hospital stays
d. variations to support transition to new payment approaches.
5.1. Variations to reflect regional cost differences: the market forces factor
262. National prices are calculated on the basis of average costs and do not take into
account some features of cost that are likely to vary across the country. The
purpose of the market forces factor (MFF) is to compensate providers for the
cost differences of providing healthcare in different parts of the country. Many of
these cost differences are driven by geographical variation in land, labour and
building costs, which cannot be avoided by NHS providers, and therefore a
variation to a single national price is needed.
263. The MFF takes the form of an index. This allows a provider’s location-specific
costs to be compared with every other organisation. The index is constructed to
always have a minimum value of 1.00. The MFF payment index operates as a
multiplier to each unit of activity. The example below explains how this works in
practice.
A patient attends an NHS trust for a first outpatient attendance, which has a
national price of £168.
The NHS trust has an MFF payment index value of 1.0461.
The income that the trust receives from the commissioner for this outpatient
attendance is £176 (£168 x 1.0461).
264. Further information on the calculation and application of the MFF is provided in
the supporting guidance document A guide to the market forces factor.
265. The 2016/17 MFF indices remain unchanged for 2017 to 2019, except in cases
where organisations have merged or are merging or are undergoing some other
organisational restructuring (such as dissolution) before 1 April 2017. The MFF
index values for each NHS provider are in Annex B1.
266. Independent sector providers should adopt the MFF of the NHS trust or NHS
foundation trust nearest to the location where the services are being provided.
267. Organisations merging or undergoing other organisational restructuring after 31
March 2017 will not have a new MFF set during the period covered by the tariff.
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For further guidance in these circumstances see the supporting document A
guide to the market forces factor
268. Where there is a relevant acquisition or merger prior to 31 March 2017 a new
MFF will be calculated and will apply from 1 April 2017. Providers should notify
NHS Improvement by email ([email protected]) of any planned
changes that might affect the MFF index.
5.2. Variations to reflect patient complexity: top-up payments
269. National prices in this national tariff are calculated on the basis of average
costs. They do not therefore take into account cost differences between
providers that arise because some providers serve patients with more complex
needs. The purpose of top-up payments for some specialised services is to
recognise these cost differences and to improve the extent to which prices paid
reflect the actual costs of providing healthcare, when this is not sufficiently
differentiated in the Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) design. Only a few
providers are commissioned to provide such care.
270. In order to set payments we make an adjustment to the (a top-slice) to the total
amount of money allocated to national prices and reallocated this money to
providers of specialised services.
271. Specialised service top-ups have been part of the payment system since
2005/06. The current list of qualifying specialised services, and the design and
calculation of specialised top-ups for these services, is informed by research
undertaken in 2011 by the Centre for Health Economics (CHE) at the University
of York.70
272. These amounts paid and the providers that are eligible are based on the
Prescribed Specialised Services definitions provided by the NHS England
Specialised Commissioning team. The list of eligible providers is contained
within the PSS operational tool.71
273. Top-up payments are only made for inpatient care
Table 12: Top up impact by specialist area 2017/19
Top up area
Top up amounts
All top up areas
£478.5M
Spinal
£13.9M
Neurosciences
£117.7M
Orthopaedics
£4.2M
70
Estimating the costs of specialised care and Estimating the Costs of Specialised Care: Updated
Analysis Using Data for 2009/10.
71
http://content.digital.nhs.uk/casemix/prescribedspecialisedservices
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Top up area
Top up amounts
Children
£209.6M
Cancer
£16.7M
Respiratory
£32.3M
Cardiac
£73.3M
Other
£10.7M
274. We have changed the top-ups payable for 2017 to 2019 based on these
definitions to introduce payments for new areas including cancer, respiratory
and cardiac care.
275. A list of the services eligible for top-ups, the adjustments and their flags can be
found in Annex B1.
5.3. Variations to help prevent avoidable hospital stays
5.3.1. Marginal rate emergency rule
276. The marginal rate emergency rule was introduced in 2010/11 in response to a
growth in emergency admissions in England that could not be explained by
population growth and A&E attendance growth alone.72 It was made up primarily
of emergency spells lasting less than 48 hours.
277. The purpose of the marginal rate emergency rule is twofold. It is intended to
incentivise:
a. lower rates of emergency admissions
b. acute providers to work with other parties in the local health economy to
reduce the demand for emergency care.
278. The marginal rate emergency rule sets a baseline monetary value (specified in
GBP) for emergency admissions at a provider.73 A provider is then paid 70% of
the national price for any increases in the value of emergency admissions
above this baseline. Further guidance for commissioners on investing retained
funds can be found here.74
279. While the original design of the marginal rate emergency rule set a national
baseline expectation, our review of the policy in 2014/15 identified that in some
72
Over 70% of emergency admissions are patients who are admitted following an attendance
at A&E.
73
As defined in the NHS Data Model and Dictionary. These codes are: 21-25, 2A, 2B, 2C or 2D (or
28 if the provider has not implemented CDS 6.2).
74
improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-1719-consultation
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localities, change is needed to ensure the policy works more effectively. For
example, where there have been major changes to the pattern of emergency
care in a local health economy or insufficient progress towards demand
management and discharge management schemes. In 2014/15 we therefore
updated the marginal rate emergency rule to:
a. require baseline adjustment where necessary to account for significant
changes in the pattern of emergency admissions faced by providers in
some localities
b. ensure retained funds from the application of the rule are invested
transparently and effectively in appropriate demand management and
improved discharge schemes.
280. The rule continues to include the changes to local baseline setting and
reinvestment transparency introduced in 2014/15.
Setting and adjusting the baseline
281. A provider’s total baseline value must be assessed as the value of all
emergency admissions at the provider in 2008/09 according to the relevant
year’s NTPS prices (2017/18 or 2018/19).75 A contract baseline value must be
calculated for each contractual relationship.
282. We recognise that changes to HRGs since 2008/09 and the introduction of
BPTs76 cause difficulties in setting baseline values. Therefore, we expect
providers and commissioners to take a pragmatic approach in agreeing a
baseline value: for example, by applying an uplift to a previously agreed
baseline to reflect average changes in price levels.
283. We know that some providers have seen material changes to the volume and
value of emergency admissions. Where changes to admission volumes and
values result from changes in the local health economy, adjustments to the
baseline value continue to be necessary. Examples of relevant changes to
consider include:
a. service reconfiguration at a nearby hospital
b. change in the local population because of a new housing development or
retirement community
75
76
Some emergency activity is excluded from the marginal rate rule and should not be included in the
calculation of baseline values, including: activity that does not have a national price, non-contract
activity, activity covered by BPTs (except for the BPT that promotes same-day emergency care),
A&E attendances, outpatient appointments, and contracts with commissioners falling in
responsibility of DAs.
Activity reimbursed by BPTs is not subject to the marginal rate, with the exception of the BPT for
same-day emergency care.
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c. change in the relative market shares of local acute providers, where an
increase in admissions at one provider is offset by a decrease at another.
284. Making local adjustments may therefore be necessary to ensure a balance
between maintaining positive incentives to manage demand and ensuring
providers receive sufficient income to provide safe and sustainable emergency
care. Baseline values must therefore be set according to 2008/09 activity levels,
but where a provider requests a review of the baseline, a joint review must be
undertaken involving both the provider(s) and the commissioner(s). Following a
review, baseline adjustments must be made where there have been material
changes in the patterns of demand for or supply of emergency care in a local
health economy, or when material changes are planned.
285. Baseline values (specified in £s) should then be updated to account for material
changes that the affected provider cannot directly control. For example, a
change in demand at a provider resulting from the reduction of a nearby
hospital’s A&E department opening hours will be considered a change outside
the control of the provider and so may require an adjustment to the baseline. On
the other hand, changes in the number of admissions that result from a
reduction in consultant presence in the provider’s A&E department will not
necessitate an adjustment to the baseline.
286. When assessing supply and demand for emergency admissions,
commissioners should consider the factors set out in the table below.
Table 13: Examples of where adjustments to baseline values may be required
Driver of change
Reason for change
Adjustment
necessary?
Change in demand
for admissions at a
provider
Movement of demand between acute
providers, resulting in altered market
shares
Yes, if material and
off-setting between
providers
Movement of demand between out-ofhospital care and acute care, or
between secondary and tertiary
providers
Yes, where it reflects
a change in
commissioning
patterns77
Change in total demand in the locality
due to demographics
Yes, if exceptional
and demonstrable
Changes in clinical threshold for
admissions for certain procedures, for
No, unless this
reflects a change in
Changes in the
provision of
77
We expect commissioning patterns to reflect best clinical practice, including where this results in
the decommissioning of out-of-hospital activity (eg closure of a walk-in centre) or a change in the
arrangements of emergency after-care for post-discharge complications by tertiary providers (eg of
cancer patients).
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Driver of change
Reason for change
emergency services
at a provider
example due to increased risk-aversion
in clinical assessment in A&E78
Adjustment
necessary?
commissioning patterns
Changes in the emergency services
commissioned by CCGs (eg
designation as trauma centre
or hyperacute stroke unit)
Yes, if material
Changes in the method for coding or
counting emergency admissions
Yes, recalculate
2008/09 activity
according to new
method
287. When calculating baseline values, both increases and decreases in the value of
activity should be considered equally according to the criteria in Table 11.
288. Where emergency activity moves from one provider to another in a local health
economy (for example, due to service reconfiguration, changing market share or
changes in commissioning patterns), the baseline of each provider should be
adjusted symmetrically so that, as far as possible, the sum of their baseline
values remains constant, all other things being equal.
289. The agreed baseline value (specified in £s) must be explicitly stated in NHS
Standard Contracts and in the plans that set out how retained funds are to be
invested in managing demand for emergency care. A rationale for the baseline
value should also be set out clearly, along with the evidence used to support
agreement, for example the support from their local system resilience group.
290. Acute providers or other parties in the local health economy should raise any
concerns about baseline agreements with NHS England, through its local
offices. Where local consensus cannot be reached, the local NHS England
office will provide mediation, in the context of NHS England’s CCG assurance
role, to ensure CCG plans are consistent with this guidance. Where necessary,
NHS Improvement and NHS England will consider enforcing the rules set out in
this guidance through their enforcement powers. Where the local NHS England
office is the commissioner, the NHS England regional team will provide
mediation. In all cases, NHS Improvement must be notified (via
[email protected]) where concerns have been raised, and whether
(and how) plans were changed as a result.
78
We recognise that establishing a definitive change to clinical practice may be difficult. We suggest
that providers and commissioners examine available data, for example any trends in the casemix
or age-adjusted conversion rate, admissions patterns by time of day, or changes to staffing levels
or patterns (eg use of locums, consultant cover for A&E). Clinical audits and/or insight from the
local system resilience group may also help facilitate agreement.
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Application of the rule
291. The marginal rate rule is applied individually to any contractual relationship. It is
applied to any contract where the value of emergency admissions has
increased above the baseline value for that contract.
292. Some providers may have seen an overall reduction in their emergency
admissions against their baseline value; this reflects a reduction in admissions
in some contracts that is offset by small increases in admissions in other
contracts. Such small increases may be due to annual fluctuations in admission
numbers over which the provider has limited control. Therefore, small
contracts79 are not subject to the marginal rate rule, provided that the overall
value of emergency admissions at the provider has decreased relative to their
overall baseline value across all of their contracts.
293. The marginal rate emergency rule should be applied to the value of a provider’s
emergency admissions after the application of any other national adjustments
for MFF, short-stay emergency spells, long-stay payments, or specialised
service top-ups. Where more than one commissioner is involved in a particular
contractual relationship, arrangements should be agreed locally according to the
payment flows to each commissioner set out in the contract.
294. The marginal rate emergency rule does not apply to:
a. activity which does not have a national price
b. non-contract activity
c. activity covered by BPTs, except for the BPT for same-day emergency
care80
d. A&E attendances
e. outpatient appointments
f. contracts with commissioners falling within the responsibility of devolved
administrations.
5.3.2. Emergency readmissions within 30 days
295. To provide the most suitable care for patients when they leave hospital,
providers need robust discharge planning arrangements. Planning may include
79
80
A small contract is one where the baseline value is less than 5% of the provider’s total baseline
value across all contracts.
The marginal rate policy will apply to activity covered by the BPT for same-day emergency care
only. Although the BPT is designed to encourage providers to care more quickly for patients who
would otherwise have had longer stays in hospital, it may also create an incentive for providers to
admit patients for short stays who would otherwise not have been admitted.
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co-ordinating with the patient’s family and GP regarding medication or arranging
post-discharge equipment, rehabilitation or reablement with a community or
social care provider.
296. The 30-day readmission rule was introduced in 2011/12 in response to a
significant increase in the number of emergency readmissions over the previous
decade. It provides an incentive for hospitals to reduce avoidable unplanned
emergency readmissions within 30 days of discharge. Hospitals may reduce the
number of avoidable emergency readmissions by investing in, for example,
better discharge planning, more collaborative working and better co-ordination
of clinical intervention with community and social care providers.
297. We have retained this national variation. The rest of this section defines an
emergency readmission for the purpose of the readmission rule and sets out
how the rule should be applied. Further guidance for commissioners on
investing retained funds can be found here.81
Definition of an emergency readmission
298. An emergency readmission is any readmission that:82
a. happens up to 30 days from discharge from initial admission
b. has an emergency admission method code83
c. has a national price.
299. There will continue to be exclusions from this policy that apply to emergency
readmissions following both elective and non-elective admissions. These
exclusions were informed by clinical advice on scenarios in which it would not
be fair or appropriate to withhold payment. Commissioners should continue to
pay providers for readmitted patients when any of these exclusions apply. The
excluded readmissions are:
a. any that do not have a national price
b. maternity and childbirth84
c. cancer, chemotherapy and radiotherapy85
81
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/national-tariff-1719-consultation
That is, any readmission irrespective of whether the initial admission has a national price, is to the
same provider or is non-contract activity and irrespective of whether the initial admission or the
readmission occurs in the NHS or independent sector.
83
As defined in the NHS Data Model and Dictionary.
84
Where the initial admission or readmission is in HRG subchapter NZ (obstetric medicine).
82
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d. patients receiving renal dialysis
e. patients readmitted after an organ transplant
f. young children (under four years old at the time of readmission)
g. patients who are readmitted having self-discharged against clinical
advice86
h. emergency transfers of an admitted patient from another provider, where
the admission at the transferring provider was an initial admission87
i. cross-border activity where the initial admission or readmission is in
Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales.
Application of the rule
300. To implement the 30-day emergency readmission rule, providers and
commissioners must:
a. undertake a clinical review of a sample of readmissions. Providers and
commissioners are not required to undertake a clinical review where there
continues to be local agreement on the readmissions threshold
b. set an agreed threshold (informed by the clinical review), above which
readmissions will not be paid
c. determine the amount that will not be paid for each readmission above the
threshold.
Step 1 clinical review
301. Acute providers and commissioners must work together to clinically review a
sample of readmissions to determine the proportion that could have been
avoided. The review team should recognise that some emergency readmissions
are, in effect, planned for and therefore should not be considered avoidable
unplanned readmissions.88
85
86
87
88
Where the initial admission or readmission includes a spell first mentioned or primary diagnosis of
cancer (ICD-10 codes C00-C97 and D37-D48) or an unbundled HRG in subchapter SB
(chemotherapy) or SC (radiotherapy).
Included in discharge method code 2 in the initial admission.
Emergency transfers are coded by admission method code 2B (or 28 for those providers who have
not implemented CDS 6.2). Codes 2B and 28 include other means of emergency admission, so
providers may wish to adopt additional rules to flag emergency transfers.
For example, following an operation, a patient may be discharged from hospital and, with
appropriate care in the community setting and provision of information, this may be the best course
of care for them even if there is a possibility of an emergency readmission occurring within 30 days
of discharge.
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302. The review team must be clinically led and independent, and reviews must be
informed by robust evidence. Relevant clinical staff from the provider trust and
primary care services must be included as well as representatives from the
commissioning body, local primary care providers and social services.
Appropriate consideration should be given to information governance with
regard to protecting the confidentiality of patient medical records.89
303. For each patient in the sample, the review team should decide whether the
readmission could have been avoided through actions the provider, the primary
care team, community health services or social services, or a body contracted
to any of these organisations might have taken.90
304. The aim is not to identify poor quality care in hospitals but to identify actions by
any appropriate agency that could have prevented the readmission. The
analysis should also look at whether there are particular local problems and
promote discussion on how services could be improved, who needs to take
action, and what investment should be made.
Step 2 setting the threshold
305. The clinical review (step 1) will inform local agreement of a readmissions
threshold, above which the provider will not receive any payment. Separate
thresholds can be set for readmissions following elective admissions and
readmissions following non-elective admissions.
Step 3 determining the amount that will not be paid
306. The amount that will not be paid for any given readmission above the agreed
threshold is the total price associated with the continuous inpatient readmission
spell,91 including any associated unbundled costs, such as critical care or high
cost drugs.
307. Where a patient is readmitted to a different provider (from that of initial
admission), the second provider must be paid. However, the commissioner will
deduct an amount from the first provider. 92
89
90
91
92
More information can be found on NHS Digital’s Information Governance website.
systems.digital.nhs.uk/infogov
The King’s Fund paper Avoiding hospital admissions – what does the research evidence say?
illustrates some examples of interventions which are more likely and less likely to succeed in
reducing readmissions.
The spell in this context includes all care between admission and discharge, regardless of any
transfers.
The amount to be deducted from the first provider should be considered as equivalent to what
would have been deducted had the patient been readmitted to the first provider, but with the
second provider’s MFF applied. This also applies where the readmission includes an emergency
transfer.
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308. The three steps for implementing the readmission rule are summarised in
Figure 3. This illustrates how the clinical reviews inform the proportion of
readmissions that could have been avoided; which, in turn, informs an agreed
threshold above which readmissions will not be paid. Total non-payment is
equal to the numbers of readmissions above the threshold multiplied by the
price of each readmission.
Figure 3: Implementing the emergency readmissions rule
Step 1
Number of
readmissions
Undertake
clinical review
to determine
avoidable
readmissions
Step 2
Agree threshold,
above which
readmissions will
not be reimbursed
Step 3
Determine number of
readmissions that will not
be reimbursed and the
amount that will be
withheld for each of these
readmissions
5.4. Variations to support transition to new payment approaches
309. New or changing payment approaches can alter provider income or
commissioner expenditure. For some organisations, the financial impact can be
significant and could be difficult to manage in one step.
5.4.1. Best practice tariff for primary hip and knee replacements
310. Section 4 sets out details of the primary hip and knee replacement BPT
introduced in 2014/15 to promote improved outcomes for patients.
311. We will retain the approach adopted in 2014/15 which recognised that there are
circumstances in which some providers will be unable to demonstrate that they
meet all the best practice criteria, but where it would be inappropriate not to pay
the full BPT price. These circumstances are:
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a. when recent improvements in patient outcomes are not yet reflected in the
nationally available data
b. when providers have identified why they are an outlier on patient reported
outcome measures (PROMs) scores and have a credible improvement
plan in place, the impact of which is not yet known
c. when a provider has a particularly complex casemix that is not yet
appropriately taken into account in the casemix adjustment in PROMs.
312. Under this national variation, commissioners must pay the full BPT if the
provider can show that any of the above circumstances apply. The rationale for
using a variation in these three circumstances is explained below.
Recent improvements
313. Because of the lag between collecting and publishing data, recent
improvements in patient outcomes may not show in the latest available data. In
these circumstances, providers will need to provide other types of evidence to
support a claim that their outcomes have improved since the published data
was collected.
Planned improvements
314. Where providers have identified shortcomings with their service and can show
evidence of a credible improvement plan, commissioners must continue to pay
the full BPT. This is necessary to mitigate the risk of deteriorating outcomes
among providers not meeting the payment criteria.
315. In this situation, the variation would be a time-limited agreement. Published data
would need to show improvements for payment at the BPT level to continue.
316. There are many factors that may affect patient outcomes, and it is for local
providers and commissioners to decide how to achieve improvements but the
following suggestions may be useful:
a. Headline PROMs scores can be broken down into individual domain
scores. If required, providers can also request access to individual patient
scores through NHS Digital. Providers might look at the questions on
which they score badly to see why they are an outlier: for example, those
relating to pain management.
b. Individual patient outcomes might also be compared with patient records to
check for complications in surgery or comorbidities that may not be
accounted for in the formal casemix adjustment. It would also be sensible
to check whether patients attended rehabilitation sessions after being
discharged from hospital.
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c. Reviewing the surgical techniques and prostheses used against clinical
guidelines and National Joint Registry recommendations is another way
providers might try to address poor outcomes. As well as improving the
surgical procedure itself, providers could scrutinise the whole care pathway
to improve patient outcomes by ensuring that weakness in another area is
not affecting patient outcomes after surgery.
d. Providers may also choose to collaborate with others that have outcomes
significantly above average to learn from their service design. Alternatively,
they might do a clinical audit. This is a quality improvement process that
seeks to improve patient care and outcomes through a systemic review of
care against expected criteria.
Casemix
317. Providers that have a particularly complex casemix and cannot show they meet
the best practice criteria may request that the commissioner continues to pay
the full BPT. Although the PROMs results are adjusted for casemix, a small
number of providers may face an exceptionally complex casemix that is not fully
or appropriately accounted for. These providers will therefore be identified as
outliers in the PROMs publications. Commissioners are likely to already be
aware of such cases and must agree to pay the full BPT. We anticipate that any
such agreement will only be valid until the casemix adjustment in PROMs better
reflects the complexity of the provider’s casemix.
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6. Locally determined prices
318. National prices can sometimes be adjusted through local variations or, where
they do not adequately reimburse efficient costs because of certain issues,
through local modifications. Where there are no national prices, local prices
must be agreed between commissioners and providers.
319. This section sets out the principles that apply to all locally determined prices
(Section 6.1). It contains the rules for local variations (Sections 6.2) and the
method used by NHS Improvement to assess local modifications (Sections 6.3).
In addition it contains rules on local prices (Section 6.4). It also has guidance on
the application of the principles, rules and method.93
320. This section is supported by the following information:
a. Annex B5: guidance on currencies with no national price
b. Annex B1 which lists high cost drugs, devices and procedures.
c. Annex B3: Technical guidance for mental health clusters.
d. New payment approaches for mental health services.94
321. It is also supported by the following documents available here:95
a. local variations template (relevant to Section 6.2)
b. local modifications template and worked example (relevant to Section 6.3)
c. local prices template (relevant to Section 6.4).
6.1. Principles applying to all local variations, local modifications and local
prices
322. Commissioners and providers must apply the following three principles when
agreeing a local payment approach:
a. the approach must be in the best interests of patients
b. the approach must promote transparency to improve accountability and
encourage the sharing of best practice, and
c. the provider and commissioner(s) must engage constructively with each
other when trying to agree local payment approaches.
93
Commissioners have a duty to have regard to such guidance – 2012 Act, section 116(7).
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/new-payment-approaches/
95
www.gov.uk/guidance/nhs-providers-and-commissioners-submit-locally-determined-prices-tomonitor
94
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323. These principles are explained in more detail in sections 6.1.1 to 6.1.3 and are
additional to other legal obligations on commissioners and providers. These
include other rules set out in the national tariff, and the requirements of
competition law, procurement law, regulations under Section 75 of the 2012
Act,96 and NHS Improvement’s provider licence.
6.1.1. Best interest of patients
324. Local variations, modifications and prices must be in the best interest of patients
today and in the future. In agreeing a locally determined price commissioners
and providers must therefore consider the following factors:
a. quality: how will the agreement maintain or improve the outcomes, patient
experience and safety of healthcare today and in the future?
b. cost effectiveness: how will the agreement make healthcare more cost
effective, without reducing quality, to enable the most effective use of scarce
resources for patients today and in the future?
c. innovation: how will the agreement support, where appropriate, the
development of new and improved service delivery models which are in the
best interest of patients today and in the future?
d. allocation of risk: how will the agreement allocate the risks associated with
unit costs, patient volumes and quality in a way that protects the best
interests of patients today and in the future?
6.1.2. Transparency
325. Local variations, modifications and prices must be transparent. Increased
transparency will make commissioners and providers more accountable to each
other, patients, the general public and other interested stakeholders.
Transparent agreements also mean that best practice examples and innovation
in service delivery models or payment approaches can be shared more widely.
In agreeing a locally determined price commissioners and providers must
therefore consider the following factors:
a. Accountability: how will relevant information be shared in a way that allows
commissioners and providers to be held to account by one another, patients,
the general public and other stakeholders?
b. sharing best practice: how will innovations in service delivery or payment
approaches be shared in a way that spreads best practice.
96
See the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No.2)
Regulations 2013 (S.I. 2013/500).
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6.1.3. Constructive engagement
326. Providers and commissioners must engage constructively with each other to
decide on the mix of services, delivery model and payment approach that
delivers the best value for patients in their local area. This process should
involve clinicians, patient groups and other relevant stakeholders where
possible. It should also facilitate the development of positive working
relationships between commissioners and new or existing providers over time,
as constructive engagement is intended to support better and more informed
decision-making in both the short and long term.
327. In agreeing a locally determined price commissioners and providers must
therefore consider the following factors:

framework for negotiations: have the parties agreed a framework for
negotiating local variations, modifications and prices that is consistent with the
existing guidelines in the NHS Standard Contract and procurement law (if
applicable)?97

information-sharing: are there agreed polices for sharing relevant and
accurate information in a timely and transparent way to facilitate effective and
efficient decision making?

involvement of relevant clinicians and other stakeholders: are relevant
clinicians and other stakeholders, such as patients or service users, involved
in the decision-making process?

short and long term objectives: are clearly defined short- and long- term
strategic objectives for service improvement and delivery agreed before
starting price negotiations?
6.1.4. Guidance on applying the principles applying to all local variations, local
modifications and local prices
Record-keeping
328. Providers and commissioners should maintain a record of how local payment
approaches comply with the principles. The content and level of detail of this
record will vary depending on the circumstances. For example, more
information is likely to be required for high value contracts than for lower value
contracts. Further (non-exhaustive) examples are provided in the box below.
97
The NHS Standard Contract is used by commissioners of healthcare services (other than those
commissioned under primary care contracts) and is adaptable for use for a broad range of services
and delivery models.
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Examples of what information a record might contain
Providers and commissioners should consider whether to include the following in their
record:
 reasons for choosing to use a local payment approach
 details of any engagement with patients, community groups, carers and other third
parties and how their views have been taken into account before agreeing the
approach
 reasons for specifying the services in a particular way
 rationale for combining payment for several different services as a bundle and the
composition of that bundle, if applicable
 analysis of how the services will be delivered in a way that is co-ordinated from the
perspective of patients alongside other healthcare, health-related and social care
services
 details of the due diligence applied to the information used to inform the local payment
approach
 rationale for key terms of the agreement, for example, prices, quality requirements that
the provider must satisfy, how performance will be assessed during the contract, the
consequences of breaches, and the duration of the contract.
How we will assess whether local payment approaches are in the best interests of
patients
329. When assessing compliance with the requirement to apply the principle that
local payment approaches must be in the best interests of patients, we will
examine whether providers and commissioners have considered all relevant
factors. The extent to which, and way in which, the four factors listed in Section
6.1.1 of the National Tariff need to be considered will differ according to the
characteristics of the services and the circumstances of the agreement.
330. To have considered a relevant factor properly, we would expect providers and
commissioners to have:
a. obtained sufficient information
b. used appropriately qualified/experienced individuals to assess the
information
c. followed an appropriate process to arrive at a conclusion.
331. It is up to providers and commissioners to determine how to consider the factors
set out above based on the matter in hand.
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Evaluation and sharing of best practice
332. We encourage commissioners and providers to use the rules for locally
determined prices as a basis for considering how they can improve the payment
system, especially where care is being delivered in a new way. We are
interested in learning from commissioners and providers that are implementing
new payment approaches to enhance system-wide incentives: for example, to
focus on prevention, integration of care, improved outcomes and improved
patient experiences. Such payment approaches might include pathway,
capitation or outcomes-based payments.
333. To determine whether local payment approaches have achieved their desired
objectives and inform future decision-making, we recommend that
commissioners and providers plan to evaluate the success of new payment
approaches. We encourage commissioners and providers to share the results of
any evaluation processes.
Guidance on a framework for constructive engagement
334. We believe that the principles will be consistent with existing practice for many
providers and commissioners. However, we recognise that this will not always
be the case, particularly where providers and commissioners do not have
existing contractual relationships.
335. Below we set out a framework that could be used as a guide to facilitate
constructive engagement where commissioners and providers do not already
have a framework. It has been designed with local payment approaches agreed
through negotiation rather than competitive procurement in mind. It includes four
stages, which are explained in more detail below. In summary, to implement the
framework in full, providers and commissioners would have to:
a. establish a working group for contract negotiations in relation to locally
determined prices
b. define roles and responsibilities for members of the working group,
including relevant clinicians and other stakeholders, where appropriate
c. agree objectives, timescales and rules for the working group, including
rules on information sharing, deadlines and the responsibilities of each party
when providing or handling information for contract negotiations
d. document progress and outputs for the working group and contract
negotiation, including any planned evaluation, if appropriate.
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Establish a working group
336. Providers and commissioners that use our framework should establish a
working group, or designate an existing group, to take responsibility for local
variations, modifications and prices in contract negotiations. The working group
should:
a. include appropriate representatives from the provider and commissioner,
including senior clinical, financial and operational representatives
b. have the authority to make commitments on behalf of the organisations
represented.
337. Providers and commissioners are responsible for establishing a working group
and should not require NHS Improvement’s involvement.
Define roles and responsibilities
338. For the working group to be effective, it should agree and document the roles
and responsibilities its members and the group as a whole. These may include
the following:
a. selection of a chairperson to lead the working group. The working group
could be jointly chaired or the chair could rotate between represented groups
if appropriate. Alternatively, an independent, jointly chosen and endorsed
chair might be appropriate
b. agreement on the representation required at each meeting of the working
group for it to be quorate
c. agreement on a timetable of meetings for the working group and a process
for recording and approving minutes of the meetings, and other
administrative processes.
339. Relevant clinicians and patient group representatives should be involved in the
negotiation process and be invited to join working group meetings where
appropriate. Involving clinicians and patients with front-line experience is
important when determining how quality and efficiency may best be balanced,
particularly across a range of services.
Agree objectives, timescales and rules
340. Under our proposed framework, the working group should agree clear
objectives, timescales and rules, including policies on information sharing and,
where appropriate, processes to resolve disputes when the working group is not
able to achieve its objectives.10 We explain each of these elements below.
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341. Providers and commissioners should agree short- and long-term objectives as
part of their framework for negotiations. We would generally expect the working
group to:
a. clearly define the issues and the services within the scope of the working
group
b. set specific objectives in relation to each issue or group of services that is in
scope
c.
agree when the objectives must be completed and how they should be
measured
d. agree a process for updating or changing objectives when appropriate
e. agree clear long-term objectives that are consistent with the strategic plans
of the parties in the working group.
342. Under our framework, we would expect the working group to agree a timescale
and a deadline for agreeing local variations, modifications and prices. The
timescale should include specific milestones and named individuals responsible
for delivery.
343. We would encourage the working group to agree rules or guidelines that
facilitate constructive engagement and effective contract negotiation.
344. The working group is most likely to be effective if it has access to relevant and
accurate information provided in a timely manner and agreed by all parties.
Information requests should be proportionate, recognising the cost of preparing
and providing information to the group.
345. On this basis, we would expect the working group to decide what information is
needed to agree local variations, local modifications or local prices. We would
also expect the working group to set rules or guidelines on the way information
is provided and used, including rules or guidelines on maintaining commercial
confidentiality.
346. In negotiations on prices that apply under an existing commissioning contract,
any dispute should be resolved using the procedure for dispute resolution under
that contract. For contracts yet to be entered into (including contracts that will
replace existing contracts), the working group may wish to agree a dispute
resolution process in case it is unable to reach agreement on local variations,
modifications or prices. It may be useful for the working group to:
a. consider assistance that could be available from other organisations, for
example support and advice from commissioning support units (CSUs) and
NHS England’s regional teams
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b. replicate the provisions for dispute resolution in the NHS Standard Contract98
c.
agree when and how the working group should use these dispute resolution
options.
Document progress and outputs
347. The working group should document its progress and outputs. As well as
meeting minutes, we expect it to prepare a constructive engagement report,
covering:
a. the agreed roles and responsibilities of the working group, including a list of
its main representatives and the chair or co-chair
b. the agreed objectives of the working group and the services covered
c. a list of the meetings of the working group
d. a clear statement of the outcome of the process, including points of
agreement and disagreement.
348. This information could be used as evidence of compliance with the
requirements for constructive engagement set out in Section 6 of the 2017/19
NTPS.
349. As well as the constructive engagement report, we encourage working groups
to evaluate the payment approaches they agree, to inform future negotiations.
6.2. Local variations
350. Local variations are adjustments to a national price99 or a currency for a
nationally priced service, agreed by one or more commissioner(s) and one or
more provider(s). They only affect services specified in the agreement and the
parties to that agreement. A local variation can be agreed for more than one
year, although it must not last longer than the relevant contract. Each variation
applies to an individual service with a national price (ie an individual HRG).
However, commissioners and providers can enter into agreements that cover
multiple variations to several related services.
98
These provisions allow for support by third party organisations such as the Centre for
Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) to help resolve disputes
99
Local variations are covered by Sections 116(2), 116(3) and 118(4) of the 2012 Act.
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6.2.1. Rules for local variations
351. For a local variation to be compliant with the national tariff, commissioners and
providers must comply with the following rules.100
Rules for local variations
1. The commissioner and provider must apply the principles set out in Section 6.1
when agreeing a local variation.
2. The local variation must be documented in the commissioning contract between
the commissioner and provider for the service to which the variation relates.101
3. The commissioner must submit a written statement of the local variation to NHS
Improvement using the local variation template. NHS Improvement will publish the
templates it receives on behalf of the commissioner.
4. The deadline for submitting the statement is 30 June 2017. For local variations
agreed after this date, the deadline is 30 days after the agreement.
6.2.2. Guidance on when the use of local variations is likely to be appropriate
352. The local variation rules are intended to give commissioners and providers an
opportunity to innovate in the design and provision of services for patients. For
example, allowing them to:
a. offer innovative clinical treatments, deliver integrated care pathways or
deliver care in new settings
b. bundle or unbundle existing national currencies to design a new service
c. design a new integrated service that combines service elements with
national and local currencies
d. support wide-scale reconfiguration and integration of primary, secondary and
social care services with payment aligned to patient outcomes
e. amend nationally specified currencies or prices to reflect significant
differences in casemix compared with the national average
100
101
The rules in this section are made under the 2012 Act, Section 116(2).
The NHS Standard Contract is used by commissioners of healthcare services (other than those
commissioned under primary care contracts) and is adaptable for use of a broad range of services
and delivery models.
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f. share contracting risks and gains between commissioners and providers to
incentivise better care for patients
g. support changes in the way urgent and emergency care is provided locally.
353. However, it is not appropriate for local variations to be used to introduce price
competition that could create undue risks to the safety or the quality of care for
patients.
Guidance on urgent and emergency care (UEC) local variations
354. To support delivery of local objectives, providers and commissioners delivering
sustainability and transformation plans (STP) may wish to move away from
nationally specified currencies and/or prices for urgent and emergency care
(UEC). Any new payment approach could be a short-term proposal while the
local health economy transforms the way it provides UEC, or a longer-term
move away from paying for UEC on a wholly activity basis. This guidance sets
out how local variations may be developed, tested and adopted locally to
support UEC service transformation.102
355. While it may be appropriate for local areas to move away from the current
payment approach for UEC, the new payment approach should not be a simple
block payment without any link to activity levels, quality of care or consideration
of the balance of risk between provider and commissioner.
356. New models of UEC delivery are likely to take several years to fully establish.
Local variations can support implementation of the care model as it scales up
over time by allowing an alternative payment model to be adopted in the short
term, during any transition, and in the longer term.
Examples of local variations for UEC services covered by the national tariff
357. Local areas should decide on the payment model and scope that will best
deliver their aims locally, ensuring alignment with STP plans and compliance
with the rules in Section 6.2.1 and principles outlined in Section 6.1.
358. Examples of the types of local variation that could be considered include:
a. payment based on an agreed level of activity and associated spend, overlaid
with a gain and loss share
b. payment comprised of a fixed (core) element and an activity-based element
c. whole population budget (WPB), overlaid with a gain and loss share.
102
www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/keogh-review/Pages/published-reports.aspx
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359. All local variations should also ideally be linked to achieving system-wide quality
and outcomes metrics decided locally and aligned with STP objectives.
360. The choice and scope of any local variation will depend on several factors
including:
a. the stage of service transformation a local area is in
b. whether the care model is being delivered by existing provider entities or an
integrated care organisation.
361. Areas seeking to explore a system-wide local variation (eg a WPB) for an
integrated care organisation or alliance of providers may find existing
webinars103 useful and should continue to monitor the NHS Improvement
website for future publications.104
362. Support may be available from NHS Improvement and NHS England: we are
keen to learn from any new payment approaches being developed. Please
contact [email protected].
Commissioners’ responsibility for publishing local variations and submitting
information to NHS Improvement
363. Under the 2012 Act, commissioners must maintain and publish a written
statement of any local variation.105 They should publish each statement by 30
June 2017 or if the variation is agreed after this date, within 30 days of the
variation agreement. These statements (which can be combined for multiple
services) must include details of previously agreed variations for the same
services.106 Commissioners must therefore update the statement if they agree
changes to the variations covered by the statement.
364. The rules on local variations (see Section 6.2.1) require a commissioner to use
NHS Improvement’s template when preparing the written statement and to
submit that statement to NHS Improvement.
365. NHS England requires commissioners to include their written statement of each
local variation in Schedule 3 of their NHS Standard Contracts. Commissioners
should use the template provided by NHS Improvement to prepare the written
statement. (The template and a worked example can be downloaded from NHS
103
Capitation: context and vision; Population, scope and new care models; Gain and loss sharing;
Determining the budget
104
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/?keywords=pricing
105
2012 Act, section 116(3).
106
2012 Act, section 116(3)(b).
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Improvement’s Pricing Portal.107) The completed template should be included in
the commissioning contract (Schedule 3 of the NHS Standard Contract).
366. NHS Improvement will publish these templates on its website so that all agreed
local variations are accessible to the public from a single location. Where NHS
Improvement publishes the template, it will do so on behalf of the commissioner
for the purposes of Section 116(3) of the 2012 Act (the commissioner’s duty to
publish a written statement). Commissioners may, however, take other
additional steps to publish the details of the local variations (eg making the
written statement available on their own website).
6.3. Local modifications
6.3.1. What are local modifications?
367. Local modifications are intended to ensure that healthcare services can be
delivered where they are required by commissioners for patients, even if the
nationally determined price for the services would otherwise be uneconomic.
368. Local modifications can only be used to increase the price for an existing
currency or set of currencies. Each local modification applies to a single service
with a national price (eg an HRG). In practice several services may be
uneconomic as a result of similar cost issues.
369. There are two types of local modification:
a. Agreements: where a provider and one or more commissioners agree a
proposed increase to a nationally determined price for a specific service. For
local modification agreements, NHS Improvement requires commissioners
and providers to prepare joint submissions.
b. Applications: where a provider is unable to agree an increase to a nationally
determined price with one or more commissioners and instead applies to
Monitor to increase that price.
370. Local modifications are subject to approval (in the case of local modification
agreements) or grant (in the case of local modification applications) by NHS
Improvement.108 To be approved or granted, NHS Improvement must be
satisfied that that without the local modification providing a service at the
nationally determined price would be uneconomic.
107
108
https://ldp.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/
The legislation governing local modifications is set out in the 2012 Act, Part 3, Chapter 4. The legal
framework for local modifications is principally described in section 116, 124, 125 and 126.
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6.3.2. Overview of our method for determining local modifications
371. NHS Improvement’s method109 is intended to identify cases where a local
modification is appropriate for a provider with costs of providing a service (or
services) that are higher than the nationally determined price(s) for that service
(or services). Applications and agreements110 must be supported by sufficient
evidence to enable NHS Improvement to determine whether a local modification
is appropriate, based on our method.
372. NHS Improvement’s method requires that commissioners and providers:
a. apply the principles outlined in Section 6.1
b. demonstrate that services are uneconomic in accordance with Section 6.3.3
c. comply with our conditions for local modification agreements and
applications set out in Sections 6.3.4 to 6.3.6.
373. NHS Improvement will determine the circumstances or areas in which the
modified price is to be payable (subject to any restrictions on the circumstances
or areas in which the modification applies).
374. NHS Improvement may take into account previously agreed local modifications
when considering an agreement to extend a local modification, in cases where it
can be demonstrated that the underlying issues have not changed.
6.3.3. Determining whether services are uneconomic
375. NHS Improvement’s method involves determining whether the provision of the
service at the nationally determined price would be uneconomic and applying
additional conditions.111 In relation to determining whether the provision of the
service is uneconomic, local modifications agreements and applications must
demonstrate that:
a. The provider’s average cost of providing each service is higher than the
nationally determined price.
b. The provider’s average costs are higher than the nationally determined
prices as a result of issue(s) that are:
i. specific: the higher costs should only apply to a particular provider or
subset of providers and should not be nationally applicable. For example,
109
Under the 2012 Act, Monitor is required to publish in the national tariff its methods for deciding
whether to approve local modification agreements or grant local modification applications.
110
2012 Act, Section 124(4), requires that an agreement submitted to Monitor must be supported by
such evidence as Monitor may require.
111
Monitor reserves the right to grant an application, in exceptional circumstances, even if the
conditions have not been met.
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we would not normally consider an issue to be specific if a large number
of providers have costs that are similarly higher than the national price
ii. identifiable: the provider must be able to identify how the issue(s) it faces
affect(s) the cost of the services
iii. non-controllable: the higher costs should be beyond the direct control of
the provider, either currently or in the past. Previous investment decisions
that continue to contribute to high costs for particular services may reflect
management choices that could have been avoided (for example private
finance initiatives). Similarly, antiquated estate may reflect a lack of
investment rather than an inherent feature of the local healthcare
economy. In both such cases, we will not normally consider the additional
costs to be non-controllable. This means that higher costs as a result of
previous investment decisions or antiquated estate are unlikely to be
grounds for a local modification. Any differences between a provider’s
costs and a reasonably efficient provider when measured against an
appropriately defined group of comparable providers would also be
considered to be controllable. NHS Improvement also considers CNST
costs to be controllable therefore unlikely to be the grounds for a local
modification
iv. not reasonably reflected elsewhere: the costs should not be adjusted for
elsewhere in the calculation of national prices, rules or variations, or
reflected in payments made under the Sustainability and Transformation
Fund.112
376. Local modifications agreements and applications must also propose a
modification to the nationally determined prices of the relevant services which
specifies the circumstances, or areas in which the proposed modification is to
apply, and the expected volume of activity for each relevant commissioner for
the relevant period (which must not exceed the period covered by the national
tariff).
6.3.4. Additional condition for local modification agreements
377. The agreement must specify the services that will be affected, the
circumstances or areas in which the modification is to apply, the start date of the
local modification and the expected volume of activity for the period of the
112
NHS Improvement may take into account any payment received by a provider under the
Sustainability and Transformation Fund when determining the amount of the local modification to
be approved.
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proposed local modification (which must not exceed the period covered by the
national tariff).113
6.3.5. Additional conditions for local modification applications
378. For local modification applications, five additional conditions must also be
satisfied. The applicant provider must:
a. demonstrate it has a deficit equal to or greater than 4% of revenues at an
organisation level in 2016/17 for applications in 2017/18 or 2017/18 for
applications in 2018/19. Our guidance on how providers should calculate
deficits for the purpose of this condition is contained in Section 6.3.16
b. demonstrate the services are commissioner-requested services (CRS)114 or,
in the case of NHS trusts or other providers that not licensed, the provider
cannot reasonably cease to provide the services
c. demonstrate it has first engaged constructively with its commissioners115 to
try to agree alternative means of providing the services at the nationally
determined price and, if unsuccessful, has engaged constructively to reach a
local modification agreement before submitting an application to NHS
Improvement
d. specify the services affected by the proposed local modification, the
circumstances or locations in which the proposed modification is to apply,
and the expected volume of activity for each relevant commissioner for the
current financial year
e. submit the application to NHS Improvement by 30 September 2017 for
applications in 2017/18 or 30 September 2018 for applications in 2018/19,
unless there are exceptional circumstances (for example, where there is a
clear and immediate risk to patients).
379. NHS Improvement reserves the right to grant an application, in exceptional
circumstances, even if the conditions set out above have not been met.
6.3.6. Guidance on the application of the method
380. When assessing local modification agreements and applications we will review
the allocation of costs to other services associated with the service(s) for which
a local modification is sought (for example, other services in the same service
113
The start date for a local modification can be earlier than the date of the agreement, but no earlier
than the date the national tariff takes effect (as required by the 2012 Act, section 124(2)).
114
See: Guidance for commissioners on ensuring the continuity of health services; Designating
commissioner requested services and location specific services, 28 March 2013.
115
Constructive engagement is also required by condition P5 of the Provider Licence, in cases where
a provider believes that a local modification is required.
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line). If it appears that costs have not been properly allocated, for example
where there are unexpected variations in the profitability of services, we will
take that into account in deciding whether the provider has higher costs in
relation to the services for which a local modification is sought.
6.3.7. Local modification template
381. NHS England and NHS Improvement have developed a local modifications
template116 for commissioners and providers (providers only in the case of a
local modification application)117 to use when recording and submitting a
proposed local modification to NHS Improvement. The completed template
should be submitted with the supporting evidence described in Section 6.3.3,
and a self-certification letter confirming the accuracy of that information,
including any extra terms of the proposed local modification that are not
included in the template.
382. The local modifications template and a worked example can be downloaded
from www.monitor.gov.uk/locallydeterminedprices. It includes detailed
instructions on how to fill in each field. Answers should be clear, concise and
submitted with evidence where required.
383. The template contains the information that NHS Improvement will publish for all
approved local modifications and therefore should not include any information
identifying individual patients. It also should not include information which is
confidential to third parties, unless consent has been obtained.
6.3.8. Dates
Applications
384. If an application for a local modification is successful, NHS Improvement will
determine the date from which the modification will take effect. In most cases,
applications will be effective from the start of the following financial year, subject
to any changes in national prices, to allow commissioning budget allocations to
take account of decisions.
385. In exceptional cases (particularly where delay would cause unacceptable risk of
harm to patients), NHS Improvement will consider making the modification
effective from an earlier date.
116
www.gov.uk/guidance/nhs-providers-and-commissioners-submit-locally-determined-prices-tomonitor
117
In the explanation of summary templates, we refer to information to be submitted by providers and
commissioners. However, in the case of a local modification application, we would expect
providers at alone to submit all of its information. In the case of an application, relevant
commissioners will be given the opportunity to provide their own submissions.
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Agreements
386. The terms of a local modification agreement should be included in the relevant
commissioning contract (using the NHS Standard Contract where
appropriate)118 once they are agreed between the provider and commissioner. If
the terms of a local modification agreement are included in the commissioning
contract before NHS Improvement approves the local modification, the contract
may provide for payment of the modified price pending a decision by NHS
Improvement. But if NHS Improvement subsequently decides not to approve the
modification, the modification would not have effect and the national price
applies. The provider and commissioner must then agree a variation to the
commissioning contract to stop the modification, and may agree a mechanism
for adjustment and reconciliation in relation to the period before the refusal, or
possibly a local variation to the national price.
387. The start date for a local modification can be earlier than the date of the
agreement, but no earlier than the date the national tariff takes effect (as
required by the 2012 Act, Section 124(2)).
6.3.9. Publication of local modifications
388. As required by the 2012 Act (Sections 124(7) and 125(7)), NHS Improvement is
required to publish information on all local modification agreements and
applications that are approved or granted.
389. NHS Improvement will also publish key information on local modification
agreements and applications that are rejected, unless the circumstances of the
case make it inappropriate.
6.3.10. Notifications of significant risk
390. Under the 2012 Act, if NHS Improvement receives an application from a
provider and is satisfied that the continued provision of CRS (by the applicant or
any other provider) is being put at significant risk by the configuration of local
healthcare services, it is required to notify NHS England and any CCGs it
considers appropriate. These bodies must then have regard to the notice from
NHS Improvement when deciding on the commissioning of NHS healthcare as
required by the 2012 Act, Sections 126(1) to 126(3).
6.3.11. Guidance on preparing evidence for a local modification
391. The supporting information required for a local modification will depend in part
on the specific circumstances faced by the provider. This section provides
118
Providers and commissioners should refer to the latest available guidance on the NHS Standard
Contract. See guidance on the variations process for the NHS Standard Contract for 2013/14.
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guidance on the type of evidence that we would expect providers and
commissioners to submit to demonstrate that (i) the relevant services are
uneconomic, and (ii) the proposed local modification reflects a reasonably
efficient cost of provision, given the cost issues faced by the provider. We set
out the process for local modifications below.
392. To prepare the evidence necessary for a local modification, we would expect a
provider to:
a. demonstrate that its average costs are higher than the nationally determined
price for the services covered by the local modification
b. benchmark its average costs, operating efficiency and outcome measures
against suitable comparators, refining the comparator group as necessary
c. present a detailed analysis of its costs which demonstrates that it faces
higher costs as a result of issues meeting the criteria set out in Section 6.3.4,
and identify potential efficiencies
d. propose a local modification that reflects a reasonably efficient cost of
providing the services, based on the benchmarking analysis and internal
review of costs performed.
393. This process can be broken down further into a number of steps. Figure 4 below
summarises the process and the steps required.
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Figure 4: Process for preparing evidence for a local modification
394. We explain each of these steps in further detail below.
Step 1: Identify services with average costs higher than the nationally determined
price
395. We would expect a provider to establish that its average costs are higher than
the nationally determined price for a service or group of services as part of its
ongoing analysis of operations. Providers should then explain why costs are
higher, with reference to our criteria for demonstrating services are uneconomic
at the national price.
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396. We recognise that costing practices differ between organisations and depend
on the cost allocation principles applied by each organisation. We therefore
expect providers to explain cases where they have deviated from Monitor’s
Approved Costing Guidance.119
397. When submitting a local modification to NHS Improvement for approval,
commissioners and providers should provide a detailed explanation of the
issues they face in their local health economy and the drivers of higher costs.
398. For example, higher costs could be related to:
a. Scale: certain services may require a minimum volume of procedures to be
provided efficiently, as a result of the fixed or semi-fixed costs of providing
them. For example, clinical best practice may require the use of specific
expensive equipment, or clinical guidelines may stipulate the staffing mix
required for a particular service. Given these requirements, providers with
low patient volumes may not be cost-effective compared to the national
average.120
b. Casemix: certain groups of patients have greater health needs than others
and are therefore more costly to treat. For example, elderly patients and
people from economically deprived backgrounds may have, on average,
more complex health needs. Providers in an area with a large proportion of
elderly people or high deprivation might therefore face higher than average
costs for providing the same services. This may not be fully reflected in the
nationally determined prices.
399. A hypothetical example is presented below to illustrate how a rural provider that
faces scale issues might assess whether it meets our criteria for local
modifications.
119
120
www.gov.uk/government/publications/approved-costing-guidance
Commissioners may consider the relationship between scale and clinical quality. For example,
some services may require a certain volume in order to be provided in a clinically safe and
sustainable way.
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Example 1: Criteria for demonstrating services are uneconomic at the
national price
Consider an isolated, rural provider with a low catchment population that could
face higher average costs due to geographic location and insufficient scale. Here
is how they could apply the criteria for identifying cost differences.
Specific: An isolated, rural provider might incur specific extra costs which do not
apply nationally, for example:

need to pay for 24 hour staff cover for a relatively low number of patients

not be able to recover fixed costs on certain equipment due to underutilisation, for example, MRI scanning and CT scanning equipment.
Identifiable: The provider is able to identify and quantify extra costs outlined
above. Step 4 in this section presents guidance on the evidence we would expect
providers and commissioners to submit to show how a particular issue affects their
reported costs.
Non-controllable: In this hypothetical example, the provider may not be able to
control its costs for the following reasons:

A healthcare service is required by the commissioner to meet the needs of the
local population. Obviously, the provider is unable to influence the low
population of the area and thus in turn the relatively low case volumes. As a
result, it may not be able to achieve reasonable economies of scale in certain
services.

Certain clinical standards must be met regardless of the low case volumes. For
example, under the Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology guidelines,
5,000 births a year would typically be required for a provider to have a 24/7
obstetrics led maternity unit. However, an isolated, rural provider may require
this level of specialist input to support a significantly lower level of births to
ensure clinical safety.
Not reasonably reflected elsewhere: Nationally determined prices may not fully
reflect the cost differences faced by the provider. Although the Market Forces
Factor (MFF) is intended to adjust for some of the variation in input costs between
providers, it does not adjust for differences in case volume which are particularly
important to isolated, rural providers.
Summary: In this theoretical example, the isolated, rural provider meets the
criteria for demonstrating services are uneconomic at the national price. However,
this is a simplified, hypothetical example. In reality we would expect the provider to
be able to demonstrate that it is operating reasonably efficiently and it has
considered alternative models of service provision in deciding how to provide
services in the local health economy it serves.
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Step 2: Benchmarking average costs, operational metrics and outcome measures
400. Providers should benchmark themselves against a suitable comparator group to
demonstrate that they are reasonably efficient, given the cost issues they face.
This process should include comparisons of average costs, operating metrics
and outcome measures. The provider will probably need to refine the
comparator group through the process to account for operational efficiency and
clinical outcomes. The process should be used to help estimate a reasonably
efficient cost of providing the services, given the cost issues faced by the
provider. It may also help to identify opportunities for improvements in
efficiency.
401. There are a range of publicly available data sources that commissioners and
providers may use to benchmark performance.
402. The section below sets out the following processes:
a. selecting a suitable comparator group
b. comparing average costs
c. comparing operational and quality metrics
d. refining the comparator group.
6.3.12. Selecting a suitable comparator group
403. Effective benchmarking requires an appropriately defined comparator group.
Providers should explain the basis on which they have selected their
comparator group in their submissions to NHS Improvement. They should
consider the drivers of higher costs when identifying an appropriate comparator
group. For example, if a provider believes that service provision is uneconomic
due to insufficient case volume, then we would expect its comparator group to
include providers with similarly low case volumes.121 CCG groupings (compiled
by NHS Digital) could be used as one way of selecting suitable comparators.
404. It is important to consider both the number and relevance of providers included
in the comparator group and balance both factors. Reducing the size of the
group may focus on the most comparable providers but could also mean that
analysis is sensitive to the cost reporting or specific circumstances of particular
providers.
121
The provider could use Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data to identify providers with low case
volumes. The HES database records the number of finished consultant episodes (FCEs) for each
provider and this could be used as a proxy for scale.
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405. The following factors may be relevant when deciding on an appropriate
comparator group:
a. region type (Office for National Statistics super group)
b. demographics (for example, based on age profile)
c. deprivation (for example, based on Economic Deprivation Index)
d. size of trust or service (by revenue or activity)
e. service type (ie A&E with/without trauma, nurse-led, consultant-led, etc).
6.3.13. Comparing average costs
406. Providers should benchmark their average costs for the services covered by a
local modification at both specialty and HRG level, where it is possible to do
so.122 This analysis should demonstrate:
a. whether the provider has higher average costs than the comparator group
b. whether other providers in the comparator group have average costs above
the nationally determined price for the service(s) in question.
407. Despite data quality issues, which can be challenging when comparing different
providers, this analysis could use reference costs, data from patient-level
information and costing systems (PLICS) or HRG-level data from commercial
benchmarking tools. We encourage the use of PLICS data where possible and
practical.
408. Benchmarking should be carried out using the latest available cost data.
409. A table is presented below for a single HRG, using reference costs as an
illustrative example. The column titled ‘RCI’ shows the reference cost index for
each provider (for one HRG); the RCI shows each provider’s cost relative to the
national average (the national average cost has a value of 100).
Table 14: Example of average cost benchmarking
FCEs123 (2011/12)
RCI
Provider 1 (Applicant)
50,000
135
Provider 2
45,000
122
Provider 3
57,000
153
Provider 4
51,000
142
Provider 5
53,000
128
Provider
122
123
We would generally expect this benchmarking to be carried out at the HRG root level.
Finished consultant episodes.
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410. In this example, Provider 1 is applying for a local modification as a result of its
low scale and has identified a comparator group with similarly low levels of
activity. The table shows that all of the providers face above-average costs for
the selected HRG. It also shows that Provider 2 has lower costs than Provider 1
despite also having lower levels of activity. This may suggest that Provider 2 is
more efficient, and we would therefore expect Provider 1 to provide an
explanation for the difference.
411. If an issue affects multiple HRGs in a particular department, it may be
informative to group HRGs together and look at the weighted average cost for
the department. The table below illustrates how this information could be
presented.
Table 15: Illustrative table for benchmarking average costs
HRG 1
Activity
HRG 2
Unit cost
Activity
Unit cost
Weighted
average
cost across
HRG 1&2
Provider 1
Provider 2
Provider 3
Provider 4
Provider 5
Comparator
average
National
average
6.3.14. Comparing operational and quality metrics
412. As well as comparing their average costs to the comparator group, providers
should compare operational and quality metrics. The results of cost
benchmarking should be considered in the context of operational performance
and clinical outcomes when establishing an efficient cost of providing a service
or services.
413. Providers should compare operational metrics at an organisational and
department level, where data is available. These metrics could be useful
indicators of key cost drivers. It is important to consider both the cost and quality
implications of operational metrics – for example, low staff numbers per bed
may indicate a lower cost, but this staffing level may not be compliant with
clinical guidelines. An illustrative table of operational metrics is presented below.
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Table 16: Illustrative table for benchmarking operational metrics
Provider 1
Provider 2
Provider 3
Staff turnover
Bed occupancy
Average length of stay – elective
Average length of stay – non-elective
Theatre utilisation (%)
Agency costs as a % of total costs
Nurses per bed
Staff costs per bed
Consultants per bed
Drugs and devices cost as % of total
414. Similar analysis should be prepared for quality metrics to understand how
clinical outcomes and quality vary across the comparator group. This analysis
will depend on the services under consideration and could be carried out in
several different ways. We would normally expect quality benchmarking to take
place at the department or specialty level. The Acute Trust Quality Dashboard
gives examples of a variety of metrics that can be applied to non-specialist
acute providers. Providers could also benchmark performance against national
targets and relevant clinical guidelines.
415. A range of methods can be used to compare providers and identify particular
areas of relative under or over-performance. Depending on the size and
characteristics of the comparator group and the type of metric considered, it
may be appropriate for providers to compare themselves to the median or mean
of the group or upper or lower quartiles. The Acute Trust Quality Dashboard
compares providers based on their variation from the mean (measured in
standard deviations).
416. We would expect a provider to explain:
a. how it compares to the comparator group
b. the reasons for any differences identified.
417. Providers should also submit a detailed explanation of potential opportunities to
improve operational efficiency and clinical outcomes.124 This will be important
when determining the value of the local modification, as there may be steps that
the provider could reasonably be expected to take to reduce costs; these
124
We would expect this to include an explanation of trends in operational and quality metrics over
time, where data is available.
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‘avoidable’ costs should not be included in the value of the proposed local
modification.
6.3.15. Refining the comparator group
418. Providers should refine their comparator group following analysis of average
costs, operating efficiency metrics and quality metrics. The comparator group
should be refined to exclude inefficient providers and providers that perform
poorly against quality metrics. We would expect providers to start with a
relatively large comparator group and exclude providers at each stage, ie
following analysis of costs, operating efficiency and quality. Reasons for
including or excluding particular providers in the comparator group should be
clearly explained.
419. This process should make the comparator group more relevant when trying to
estimate a reasonably efficient cost for the services covered by a local
modification. The refined comparator group should reflect, as far as practicable,
a set of providers which face the same issues. Providers should then
benchmark their costs against this refined comparator group.
Step 3: Detailed review of provider’s own costs
420. Providers are expected to review their own costs in detail to demonstrate that
services are uneconomic at the national price. Providers should explain their
costs in relation to the costs of the comparator group and the nationally
determined price. We expect providers to explain cases where they have
deviated from Monitor’s Approved costing guidance.125
421. Providers should identify how and at what level the issues they face affect their
costs. Providers could be uneconomic at the organisational level, or there might
be specific departments, specialties or services which operate uneconomically.
For example, it may be that a sub-scale provider faces higher costs for a
particular department because it has to employ a certain number of staff across
the department to meet clinical guidelines. Other departments may not be
affected in the same way. We expect providers to analyse their costs at the
level at which issues have an impact and then consider whether there is any
reason that specific HRGs would not be affected by the issues faced.126
422. In all cases, providers should submit:
125
These principles are: stakeholder agreement; consistency; data accuracy; materiality; causality
and objectivity; and transparency. See Monitor’s Approved Costing Guidance for further
information.
126
Local modifications apply at the individual service level (i.e. at the HRG level). However, to the
extent that the same issue affects a group of services, we encourage providers to analyse costs at
this level.
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a. a breakdown of cost drivers, by cost pool (for example, direct, indirect and
overhead costs)
b. an explanation of internal variation in costs, for example across wards,
clinicians, year-on-year and seasonal fluctuations
c. an explanation and quantification of the additional costs arising from issues
meeting the criteria for demonstrating that services are uneconomic at the
national price. This could for example include staff costs, where additional
staff are required, or depreciation costs where fixed assets are not fully
utilised
d. an explanation of why the provider’s costs differ from the nationally
determined price and the costs of the comparator group
e. an explanation and quantification of opportunities for improved efficiency.
423. When submitting this information, we would expect providers to show that
existing service delivery models are in line with clinical best practice, for
example, by reference to relevant clinical guidelines (such as National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence and Royal College guidelines).
424. An example of a rural provider that faces scale issues is presented below.
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Example 2: Analysing cost drivers
Consider a rural provider of Type 1, 24/7 A&E services, with low case volumes.
The provider would have to submit a detailed narrative to explain the factors
driving its higher costs. This provider might identify direct costs as the key reason
for its higher average costs and breakdown those costs into specific cost drivers.
An illustrative breakdown of direct costs for A&E services
In this particular example, staff costs are the largest component of direct costs. We
would expect the provider to explain. In our example of a rural provider of Type 1
A&E services, high staff costs could be driven by the mandatory staffing
requirements that are associated with a Type 1 A&E service. This could also affect
other services, for example, maternity services where there are also minimum
staffing requirements.
Providers could also break down total costs into fixed costs, semi-fixed costs and
variable costs to explain how particular issues affect their cost base. For example,
the high fixed costs associated with certain services could affect the viability of
providing these services for a provider with low case volumes. The cost breakdown
should identify the structural issues faced by a provider.
Where possible, providers should submit details of internal variation in costs,
including variation across wards, clinicians and over time.
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Step 4: Determine efficient cost based on benchmark cost and provider’s review of
its own costs
425. A local modification can be used to increase the nationally determined price for
a particular service or group of services. When submitting a local modification to
Monitor, commissioners and providers (or providers in the case of an
application) must propose an increase to the nationally determined price which
reflects the efficient cost of providing the service(s). This may not be the actual
cost the provider incurs in the provision of the service as some of the extra cost
incurred by the provider arises from inefficiency rather than the cost issues
identified. The efficient cost should be based on expected activity levels, given
the issues faced by a provider.
426. Based on the nationally determined price, cost benchmarking and a review of
the provider’s own costs, we expect providers to determine and explain the
reasonably efficient cost of providing the services that would be covered by the
local modification and therefore the value of the proposed local modification.
The reasonably efficient cost may be greater or less than the average cost of
the benchmark group, depending on the cost issues faced by the provider in
question. The figure below summarises the components of an illustrative
provider’s costs and the basis on which the value of a local modification should
be calculated.
Figure 5: Basis for calculating value of proposed local modification
427. As shown above, in determining the value of the local modification, providers
should take account of the potential to improve operational efficiency. Providers
facing higher costs may still reasonably be expected to take steps to improve
efficiency, while maintaining clinical outcomes and quality of care. For example,
providers should engage with commissioners and clinicians to ensure that
services are being delivered in the most appropriate way, in line with clinical
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best practice. Similarly, providers should submit evidence of clinical support for
the current configuration of the affected service.
428. Commissioners and providers should submit a supporting narrative to explain
how the proposed local modification value has been determined.
Step 5: Determine structure of the local modification
429. Once a commissioner and provider (or a provider only, in the case of local
modification applications) have decided the value of the proposed local
modification, they must then determine the structure of the modification.
430. The proposed modification must apply to each of the services specified, and the
level or structure of the modification may be different for each service.
431. As noted above, a local modification can be used to increase the nationally
determined price for a particular service or group of services. In many cases
local modifications may be applied as a uniform uplift to the unit price: for
example, a 25% uplift at all levels of activity. However, it is also possible to
propose a modification that is contingent on the volume of activity. For example,
a provider and commissioner could agree to a higher modification at low
volumes of activity to take into account fixed costs associated with providing
certain services.
432. Consider the example again of a rural provider with low case volumes. For a
particular HRG, this provider provides 4,000 units of activity per year, compared
with the national average of 7,000 units of activity. The nationally determined
price (ie after national variations) for this HRG is £1,000 per unit, which means
the provider would normally be paid £4.0 million for providing the service. After
applying NHS Improvement’s proposed method, the provider and commissioner
agree that the provider is unable to cover the fixed costs of providing the service
due to its low case volumes. The provider faces total costs of £5.0 million for
4,000 units of activity, and its shortfall on fixed costs is estimated to be
£1.0 million in total.
433. In this case, the provider and commissioner could structure the local
modification so that the nationally determined price is increased by £250 to
£1,250 for each unit of activity between 1 and 4,000 (the expected annual level
of activity) and maintained at £1,000 for all units above 4,000. In this simplified
example, the commissioner and provider may wish to agree an exceptional
clause to account for the possibility that the provider’s actual activity levels
significantly exceed projections.
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6.3.16. Guidance on the provider deficit condition for local modification
applications
434. To comply with our method for local modification applications, a provider must
demonstrate that it has a deficit equal to or greater than 4% of revenues at an
organisation level in the previous financial year (ie 2016/17 for an application in
2017/18: 2017/18 for an application in 2018/19). This requirement does not
apply to local modification agreements.
435. In this guidance, we set out how our method requires that providers calculate
their deficit.
436. We use a measure of the deficit before impairments and the gain/loss on
transfers by absorption. This measure of the deficit is intended to reflect the
underlying performance of the organisation by removing transitory shocks to
revenue which are not related to the ongoing delivery of services.
6.3.17. Technical definition of deficit
437. The table below shows the formula to use in order to calculate the ‘adjusted’
provider deficit that Monitor will consider when assessing local modification
applications.
Table 17: Components of ‘adjusted’ deficit calculation
Account Component
Calculation
Surplus/deficit after tax
+
Gain/loss on transfers by absorption
-
Total impairment losses/reversals
-
Adjusted provider deficit
438. The components of the ‘adjusted’ deficit calculation are explained below in the
context of NHS foundation trusts and NHS trusts, given the differences in
reporting systems between the two types of organisation.
439. We would expect providers submitting applications to inform us of any one-off
costs or revenue which would have a material impact on their deficit that are not
included in the ‘adjusted deficit’ calculation above.
NHS foundation trusts
440. Providers should submit audited financial information if it is available at the time
of submitting the local modification application. We would expect NHS
foundation trusts to calculate their deficit using foundation trust consolidation
(FTC) form data.
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441. If audited data are not available at the time of submitting a local modification
application, we would expect providers to calculate their deficit based on annual
plan review (APR) data.
NHS trusts
442. We expect NHS trusts to calculate their deficit using Financial Information
System (FIMS) data.
443. If audited data is not available at the time of submitting a local modification
application, we would expect providers to calculate their ‘adjusted’ deficit based
on unaudited planning data.
444. Providers should express their deficits as a percentage of total revenue.
6.4. Local prices
445. For many NHS services there are no national prices. Some of these services
have nationally specified currencies, but others do not. In both cases,
commissioners and providers must work together to agree prices for these
services. The 2012 Act confers on Monitor the power to set rules for local pricesetting of such services, as agreed with NHS England, including rules specifying
national currencies for such services.127 We have set both general rules and
rules specific to particular services. There are two types of general rule:
a. Rules that apply in all cases when a local price is set for services without a
national price. See Section 6.4.1.
b. Rules that apply only to local price-setting for services with a national
currency (but no national price). See Section 6.4.2.
446. As well as the general rules, there are rules specific to particular services. See
Sections 6.4.3 to 6.4.7.
447. Table 18 below shows which rules apply to which area of activity.
Table 18: Application of pricing rules
Rule
Acute
Mental Health
Community
Ambulance
1




2




3




4




5




6




127
2012 Act, section 116(4)(b) and (12) and section 118(5)(b).
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Rule
Acute
Mental Health
Community
Ambulance
7




8




9




10




6.4.1. General rules for all services without a national price
448. Rules 1 and 2 apply when providers and commissioners agree local prices for
services without national prices. The rules apply irrespective of whether or not
there is a national currency specified for the service.
Local pricing rules: General rules for all services without a national price
Rule 1: Providers and commissioners must apply the principles in Section 6.1
when agreeing prices for services without a national price.
Rule 2: Commissioners and providers should have regard to the efficiency and
cost uplift factors for 2017/18 and 2018/19 (as set out in Sections 4.7 and 4.8 of
this document) when setting local prices for services without a national price for
2017/18 and 2018/19, respectively.128
6.4.2. General rules for services with a national currency but no national price
449. Services that have national currencies but no national price are:
a. working age and older people mental health services
b. ambulance services
c. the following acute services
i. specialist rehabilitation (25 currencies based on patient complexity and
provider/service type)
ii. critical care – adult and neonatal (13 HRG-based currencies)
iii. HIV adult outpatient services (three currencies based on patient type)
iv. renal transplantation (nine HRG-based currencies)
v. dialysis for acute kidney injury
128
. For 2017/18, the efficiency factor is 2% and the cost uplift factor is 2.1%. This gives a net increase
of 0.1%. For 2018/19 the efficiency factor and cost uplift factors are 2% and 2.1% respectively.
This results in a net increase of 0.1%.
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vi. Positron emission tomography and computed tomography (PET/CT)
450. The following rules apply when providers and commissioners are setting local
prices for these services.
Local pricing rules: general rules for services with a national currency but no
national price
Rule 3:
(a) Where a national currency is specified for a service, it must be used as the
basis for local price-setting for the service covered by that national currency,
unless an alternative payment approach is agreed in accordance with Rule 4
below.
(b) Where a national currency is used as the basis for local price-setting, providers
must submit details of the agreed unit prices for those services to NHS
Improvement using the standard templates provided by NHS Improvement.
(c) The completed templates must be submitted to NHS Improvement by 30 June
2017. For local prices agreed after this date, the deadline is 30 days after the
agreement.
(d) The national currencies specified for the purposes of this rule and Rule 4 are
the currencies specified in Annex B5.
Rule 4:
(a) Where there is a national currency specified for a service, but the
commissioner and provider of that service wish to move away from using it, the
commissioner and provider may agree a price without using the national currency.
When doing so, providers and commissioners must adhere to the requirements
(b), (c), (d) and (e) below, which are intended to mirror the requirements for
agreeing a local variation for a service with a national price, set out in Section 6.2.
(b) The agreement must be documented in the NHS Standard Contract between
the commissioner and provider which covers the service in question.
(c) The commissioner must maintain and publish a written statement of the
agreement, using the template provided by NHS Improvement, within 30 days of
the relevant contract being signed or in the case of an agreement during the term
of an existing contract, the date of the agreement.
(d) The commissioner must have regard to the guidance in Section 6.2 when
preparing and updating the written statement.
(e) The commissioner must submit the written statement to NHS Improvement.
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451. The templates referred to in Rule 3 can be found here,129
6.4.3. High-cost drugs, devices and listed procedures
452. A number of high-cost drugs, devices and listed procedures are not reimbursed
through national prices. Instead, they are subject to local pricing in accordance
with the rule below. Annex A sets out the updated list of excluded drugs,
devices and procedures for the 2017 to 19 NTPS that are subject to local prices.
Local pricing rules: rules for high-cost drugs, devices and listed procedures
Rule 5:
(a) As high-cost drugs, devices and listed procedures are not national currencies,
Rules 3 and 4 in Section 6.4.2, including the requirement to disclose unit prices to
NHS Improvement, do not apply.
(b) Local prices for high-cost drugs, devices or listed procedures must be paid as
well as the relevant national price for the currency covering the core activity.
However, the price for the drug, device or procedure must be adjusted to reflect
any part of the cost already captured by the national price.
(c) The price agreed should reflect the actual cost to the provider, or the
nominated supply cost, or any national reference price, whichever is lower.
(d) As the price agreed should reflect either the actual cost, or the nominated
supply cost, or any national reference price, the requirement to have regard to
efficiency and cost uplift factors detailed in Rule 2 does not apply.
(e) The “nominated supply cost” is the cost which would be payable by the provider
if the device or drug was supplied in accordance with a requirement to use a
supplier or intermediary, or via a framework, specified by the commissioner,
pursuant to a notice issued under SC 36.50 of the NHS Standard Contract
(nominated supply arrangements). The national reference prices are nationally set
by NHS England and are based on the current best procured price achieved for a
product or group of products by the NHS.
6.4.4. Guidance on local price rules
453. Where prices are determined locally, it is the responsibility of commissioners to
negotiate and agree prices having regard to relevant factors, including
opportunities for efficiency and the actual costs reported by their providers.
129
www.gov.uk/guidance/nhs-providers-and-commissioners-submit-locally-determined-prices-tomonitor
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Providers and commissioners should also bear in mind the requirements as set
out in the NHS Standard Contract, such as in relation to counting and coding.
NHS England includes an adjustment in commissioner allocations to reflect the
unavoidable pressures of rurality and sparsity. When adjusting prices agreed in
previous years, commissioners and providers may agree to make price
adjustments that differ from the adjustments for national prices where there are
good reasons to do so.
454. Rule 2 requires commissioners and providers to have regard to national price
adjustments. In effect they should be used as a benchmark to inform local
negotiations. However, these are not the only factors that should be considered.
455. Relevant factors may include, but are not restricted to:
a. commissioners agreeing to fund service development improvements
b. additional costs incurred as part of any agreed service transformation
c. taking account of historic efficiencies achieved (eg where there has been a
comprehensive service redesign)
d. comparative information (eg benchmarking) about provider costs and
opportunities for local efficiency gains
e. differences in costs incurred by different types of provider, for example
differences in indemnity arrangements (such as contributions to the Clinical
Negligence Scheme for Trusts); or other provider specific costs (such as the
effects of changes to pensions and changes to the minimum wage).
Guidance on applying local price rules to acute prescribed services not subject to a
national price
456. In negotiating prices for an acute prescribed specialised service not subject to a
national price, NHS England and the provider should:
a. make steps towards convergence to efficient benchmark values (subject to
significant differences in service specifications)
b. be informed by full disclosure by the provider of the actual costs of care,
including at a patient level where these are available, and analysis of the
provider’s relative position on the reference cost index for each service
c. review any existing arrangements for gain sharing for high cost drugs and
devices that are currently paid for on a pass through basis
d. adhere to maximum reference prices when determining high cost drug and
device spending, and
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e. take into account activity plans that support agreed service redesigns, which
may include some services being decommissioned or changes to clinical
thresholds
6.5. Mental health services
457. This section sets out the local pricing rules for mental health services for
working age adults and older people and for IAPT services. In addition to
rules 1 to 4, providers and commissioners must adhere to the requirements of
rules 6 to 9.
Guidance on the application of Rule 7
458. Guidance on capitation, episode of care payment models and on linking
outcomes to payment for mental health can be found here.130 In all cases
(including where an alternative payment approach is agreed under Rule 7(b)iii)
these care models must be based on outcomes.
Guidance on the application of Rule 8
459. Regardless of the payment approach agreed locally, prices must be linked to
outcomes
460. An outcomes-based payment model under Rule 8(a) should include two
components:
a. basic service price - includes an amount for assessment and an amount for
the package of care provided taking into account of the severity and
complexity of a service user; and
b. outcomes payment – the contract allows for use of a suite of metrics that are
collected locally and submitted to NHS Digital. This includes 10 national
outcomes measures (5 access targets and 5 outcome measures):
i. Access:
1.a.i.1.
Waiting times
1.a.i.2.
Black or minority ethnic
1.a.i.3.
Over 65
1.a.i.4.
Specific anxieties
1.a.i.5.
Self referral
ii. Percentage achieving good clinical outcomes
130
improvement.nhs.uk/resources/new-payment-approaches/
193
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iii. Percentage with reduced disability and improved wellbeing
iv. Percentage with good employment outcomes
v. Patient experience
1.a.v.1.
satisfaction
1.a.v.2.
choice of therapy
461. We recognise that the above outcomes are not exhaustive and it is expected
that there will be other outcomes that may be agreed that reflect local needs
and priorities.
462. It is known that complexity of patient need as identified from the Mental Health
Clustering Tool affects the cost of treatment. Prices should reflect service user
severity and complexity.
463. All IAPT providers should submit monthly data to NHS Digital in accordance
with the NHS Standard Contract.
464. We expect providers and commissioners to shadow test their preferred payment
approach in 2017/18. To further support shadow testing and implementation
NHS Digital is developing a tool to support payment for IAPT services.
465. We will provide further guidance to support the implementation of outcomes
based payment approaches for IAPT services.
6.6. Ambulances services
466. This section sets out the rules for local price setting for ambulance services with
and without national currencies.
467. In addition to rules 1 to 4, providers and commissioners must adhere to the
requirements of Rule 10.
Local pricing rules: Rule for ambulance services
Rule 10
Quality and outcome indicators must be agreed locally and included in the
commissioning contracts covering the services in question.
6.7. Primary care services
468. Primary care is a core component of NHS care provision. It enables local
populations to access advice, diagnosis and treatment. Primary care services
cover a range of activities, including:
a. providing co-ordinated care and support for general health problems
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b. helping people maintain good health
c. referring patients on to more specialist services where necessary.
469. Primary care is also a key part of the provision of community-based health
services, interacting with a number of other community-based health teams,
such as community nurses, community mental health teams and local authority
services.
Primary care payments determined by, or in accordance with, the NHS Act 2006
framework
470. The rules on local price-setting (as set out in Section 6.4) do not apply to the
payments for primary care services which are determined by, or in accordance
with, regulations or directions, and related instruments, made under the primary
care provisions of the National Health Act 2006 (chapters 4 to 7). This includes,
for example, core services provided by general practices under General Medical
Services (GMS) contracts. For 20176 to 19/17, the national tariff will not apply to
payments for these services.
Primary care payments that are not determined by, or in accordance with, the NHS
Act 2006 framework
471. The national tariff covers all NHS services provided in a primary care setting
where the price payable for those services is not determined by or in
accordance with the regulations, directions and related instruments made under
the NHS Act 2006. Therefore, where the price for services is determined by
agreement between NHS England, or a CCG, and the primary care provider,
the rules for local payment must be applied. This includes:
a. services previously known as ‘locally enhanced services’ and now
commissioned by CCGs through the NHS Standard Contract (eg where a
GP practice is commissioned to look after patients living in a nursing or
residential care home)
b. other services commissioned by a CCG in a primary or community care
setting using its power to commission services for its local population (eg
walk-in or out-of-hours centre services for non-registered patients). 131
472. The price paid to providers of NHS services in a primary care setting in most of
these instances will be locally agreed, and providers and commissioners of
these services must therefore adhere to the general rules set out in Section
6.4.1.
132
These are arrangements made under the NHS Act 2006, Sections 3 or 3A.
195
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6.8. Community services
473. Community health services cover a range of services that are provided at or
close to a patient’s home. These include community nursing, physiotherapy,
community dentistry, podiatry, children’s wheelchair services and primary care
mental health services. The services provided by community providers are a
vital component in the provision of care to elderly patients and those with longterm conditions.
474. Community providers often work closely with other NHS and social care
providers, such as GPs and local authority services, and are a key contributor to
developing more integrated health and social care and new models of care.
475. Payment for community health services must adhere to the general rules set out
in Section 6.4.1. This allows continued discretion at a local level to determine
payment approaches that deliver quality care for patients on a sustainable
basis.
476. Where providers and commissioners adopt alternative care pathway payment
approaches that result in the bundling of services covered, at least in part, by
national prices, the rules for local variations must be followed (see Section 6.2).
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7. Payment rules
477. The 2012 Act allows for the setting of rules relating to payments to providers
where health services have been provided for the purposes of NHS (in
England).132
7.1. Billing and payment
478. Billing and payment must be accurate and prompt, in line with the terms and
conditions set out in the NHS Standard Contract. Payments to providers may be
reduced or withheld in accordance with provisions for contractual sanctions set
out in the NHS Standard Contract (eg sanctions for breach of the 18-week
referral to treatment standard).
7.2. Activity reporting
479. For NHS activity where there is no national price, providers must adhere to any
reporting requirements set out in the NHS Standard Contract.
480. For services with national prices, providers must submit data as required under
SUS guidance.133
481. The dates for reporting activity and making the reports available will be
published on the NHS Digital website.134 NHS Digital will automatically notify
subscribers to its e-bulletin when these dates are announced.
482. NHS England has approval from the Secretary of State to allow CCGs and
commissioning support units (CSUs) to process a limited set of personal
confidential data when it is absolutely necessary to do so, for invoice validation
purposes. This approval is subject to a set of conditions. NHS England has
published advice online135 about these conditions and sets the actions that
CCGs, CSUs and providers must take to ensure they act lawfully.
132
2012 Act, section 116(4)(c)
http://content.digital.nhs.uk/susguidance
134
www.hscic.gov.uk/sus/pbrguidance
135
See: Who pays? Information Governance Advice for Invoice Validation at www.england.nhs.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/who-pays-advice.pdf
133
197
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2017/19 National Tariff Payment System consultation: glossary
Term
Description
2012 Act
The Health and Social Care Act 2012
Admitted patient care
(APC)
A hospital’s activity (patient treatment) after a patient
has been admitted.
Allied Health Professionals
(AHP)
Registered healthcare practitioners who deliver
diagnostic, therapies and other types of care.
Average length of stay
(av LOS)
The number of days a patient is in hospital, from
admission to discharge. Average length of stay
describes the average stay for a group of patients at
a provider or for all patients within an HRG.
Best practice tariffs (BPTs)
Tariffs designed to encourage providers to deliver
best practice care and reduce variation in the quality.
Different BPTs with different types of incentives
cover a range of treatments and types of care.
British Association of Day
Surgery (BADS)
An organisation that promotes the provision of quality
care in day surgery and encourages providers to
manage most of their elective patients with stays of
under 72 hours.
Capitation
Capitated payment is where a provider or a group of
providers are paid to cover a range of care for a
identified population, made on a per person basis
and adjusted to reflect the different needs
Care clusters
National currencies that group patients of mental
health services according to common characteristics,
such as level of need and resources required.
Casemix
A way of describing and classifying healthcare
activity. Patients are grouped according to their
diagnoses and the interventions carried out.
NHS e-Referral Service
The national electronic referral service which gives
patients a choice of place, date and time for their first
outpatient appointment in a hospital or clinic.
Classification
Clinical classification systems are used to describe
information from patient records using standardised
definitions and naming conventions. This is required
for creating clinical data in a format suitable for
statistical and other analytical purposes such as
epidemiology, benchmarking and costing.
Clinical Negligence
Scheme for Trusts (CNST)
This scheme, administered by the NHS Litigation
Authority, provides an indemnity to members and
their employees for clinical negligence claims. It is
funded by contributions from member trusts. In the
method for calculating national prices, cost increases
associated with CNST payments are targeted at
certain prices to take account of cost pressures
198
.
.
Term
Description
arising from these contributions.
Commissioning dataset
(CDS)
Information on care provided for all NHS patients by
providers, including independent providers.
Commissioning for Quality
and Innovation (CQUIN)
A national framework for locally agreed quality
improvement schemes. It allows commissioners to
reward excellence by linking a proportion of payment
for services provided to the achievement of quality
improvement goals.
Cost uplift factor
An adjustment to prices that reflects expectations of
the cost pressures providers will face, on average, in
a given year.
Currency
A unit of healthcare activity such as spell, episode or
attendance. A currency is the unit of measurement
for which a price is paid.
A package of local variations to national prices
adopted by 88% of commissioners and providers in
2015/16.
An episodic payment approach is the payment of an
agreed price for all the healthcare provided to a
patient during an agreed time period – the episode.
Extra reimbursement for patients who for clinical
reasons remain in hospital beyond an expected
length of stay (also sometimes referred to as a longstay payment).
Enhanced Tariff Option
(ETO)
Episode of care
Excess bed day payment
Finished consultant
episode (FCE)
A completed period of care for a patient requiring a
hospital bed, under the care of one consultant within
one provider. If a patient is transferred from one
consultant to another, even within the same provider,
the episode ends and another begins.
Grouper
Software created by the NHS Digital, which classifies
diagnosis and procedure information from patient
records into clinically meaningful groups. The outputs
from the grouper are used as currencies for costing
and pricing.
Healthcare resource
groups (HRGs)
Groupings of clinically similar treatments that use
similar levels of healthcare resource. HRG4 is the
current version of the system in use for payment.
HRGs are used as the basis for many of the
currencies. HRG4+ is the proposed version for
2017/19
Hospital Episode Statistics
(HES)
A data warehouse containing details of all
admissions, outpatient appointments and A&E
attendances at NHS hospitals in England. This data
is collected during a patient’s treatment at a hospital
to enable hospitals to be paid for the care they
deliver. HES data are designed to enable secondary
199
.
.
Term
Description
use for non-clinical purposes.
Improved Access to
Psychological Therapies
(IAPT)
The IAPT programme supports the frontline NHS in
implementing National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence guidelines for people suffering
from depression and anxiety disorders.
Indexation
In the context of setting national prices using a model
based on reference costs, indexation refers to
adjustments made to modelled prices to reflect
increases or achievable reductions in efficient costs
of providing NHS healthcare services for the years
between when the relevant reference costs were
collected and the tariff year.
Integrated care
Defined by the World Health Organization as
bringing together inputs, delivery, management and
organisation of services related to diagnosis,
treatment, care, rehabilitation and health promotion.
Integration is a means to improve services in relation
to access, quality, user satisfaction and efficiency.
International Classification
of Disease (ICD10)
The ICD is a medical classification list produced by
the World Health Organisation. It codes for diseases,
signs and symptoms and is regularly updated.
Joint Advisory Group (JAG) A clinical organisation whose core objectives are to:
agree and set acceptable standards for competence
in endoscopic procedures; quality assure endoscopy
units; quality assure endoscopy training; and to
quality assure endoscopy services.
Local modifications
A modification to the price for a service determined in
accordance with the national tariff where provision of
the service at the nationally determined price is
uneconomic (as provided for in sections 124 to 126
of the 2012 Act). The modification is intended to
ensure that healthcare services can be delivered
where required by commissioners, even if the cost of
providing them is higher than the nationally
determined prices.
Local prices
For many NHS services, there are no national prices.
Some of these services have currencies specified in
the national tariff, but others do not. In both instances
commissioners and providers must work together to
set prices for these services. The 2012 Act provides
that Monitor may set rules for local price setting.
Local variations
Local variations can be used by commissioners and
providers to agree adjustments to national prices, or
the currencies for determining national prices,
particularly where it is in the best interests of patients
to support a different mix of services or delivery
200
.
.
Term
Description
model. This includes cases where services are
bundled, care is delivered in new settings or there is
use of innovative clinical practices to change the
allocation of financial risk.
Locally determined prices/
local payment
arrangements
Many prices, or variations to prices, for NHS
healthcare services are agreed locally (ie between
commissioner(s) and the provider(s) of a service)
rather than determined nationally by the national
tariff. We refer to arrangements for agreeing prices
and service designs locally as ‘local payment
arrangements’. There are three types of local
payment arrangements: local modifications to a
national price; local variations to a national price or a
currency for a service with a national price; and local
prices (sometimes based on nationally specified
currencies).
Market forces factor (MFF)
An index used in tariff payment and commissioner
allocations to estimate the unavoidable regional cost
differences of providing healthcare.
Mental Health Services
Dataset (MHSDS)
MHSDS Information Standard is the specification of
a patient-level data-extraction (output) standard
intended for mental health service providers in
England. This includes both NHS and independent
providers.
National Heart Failure
Audit
The National Heart Failure Audit was established in
2007 to monitor the care and treatment of patients in
England and Wales with acute heart failure. The
audit reports on all patients discharged from hospital
with a primary diagnosis of heart failure, publishing
analysis on patient outcomes and clinical practice.
National Joint Registry
(NJR)
NJR collects information on all hip, knee, ankle,
elbow and shoulder replacement operations and
monitors the performance of joint replacement
implants.
National tariff (National
Tariff Payment System)
The document published by Monitor under s116 of
the 2012 Act. It specifies national prices for specified
healthcare services, national variations, and rules,
principles and methods for local payment
arrangements. Where it is used in conjunction with a
particular year the acronym NTPS will be used, eg
2014/15 NTPS.
NHS Litigation Authority
The NHSLA manages negligence and other claims
against the NHS in England on behalf of their
member organisations.
NHS Mandate
Sets out the government's objectives
for NHS England, as well as its budget.
201
.
.
Term
NHS standard contract
Description
The contract published by NHS England and
mandated for use when commissioning NHS
healthcare services (other than those commissioned
under primary care contracts). It is adaptable for use
for a broad range of services and delivery models,
and is available in both full-length and shorter-form
versions on the NHS standard contract web
page. Versions of the contract suitable for use when
commissioning new care models will also be
available shortly.
Pathway payments
(eg maternity pathway
payment)
Single payments that cover a bundle of services that
may be provided by a number of providers covering
a whole pathway of care for a patient.
Patient Level Information
and Costing Systems
(PLICS)
Systems that support the collection and recording of
patient level costs.
Patient Reported Outcome
Measures (PROMS)
These allow the NHS to measure and improve the
quality of treatments and care that patients receive.
Patients are asked about their health and quality of
life before they have an operation, and about their
health and effectiveness of the operation afterwards.
Payment by Results (PbR)
An approach to paying providers on the basis of
activity undertaken, in accordance with a national
tariff. The term is often used to refer to the tariff
published by the Department of Health before
2014/15.
Personal health budget
(PHB)
An amount of money to support a person's identified
health and wellbeing needs, planned and agreed
between the person and their local NHS team.
Prescribed Specialised
Services (PSS)
Specialised health services commissioned directly by
NHS England under regulations made under section
3B(1)(d) of the National Health Service Act 2006.
Quality, Innovation,
The QIPP programme is a large scale programme
Productivity and Prevention developed by the Department of Health to drive
(QIPP)
forward quality improvements in NHS care at the
same time as making significant efficiency savings.
Reference costs
The detailed costs to the NHS of providing services
in a given financial year which are collected in
accordance with national guidance. NHS healthcare
providers are required to submit reference costs data
to the Department of Health. The costs are collected
and published on an annual basis.
Reference cost design
The currencies according to which reference costs
are reported.
202
.
.
Term
Description
Secondary Uses Service
(SUS)
A single comprehensive repository for healthcare
data in England which enables a range of reporting
and analyses to support the delivery of NHS
healthcare services.
Short stay emergency tariff
(SSEM)
Mechanism for ensuring appropriate reimbursement
for lengths of stay of less than two days, where the
average HRG length of stay is longer.
Spell
The period from the date that a patient is admitted
into hospital until the date they are discharged, which
may contain one or more episodes of treatment.
Treatment function code
(TFC)
Outpatient attendance national prices are based on
TFCs. Main specialty codes represent the specialty
within which a consultant is recognised or contracted
to the organisation. Outpatient activity is generally
organised around clinics based on TFC specialties
and they are used to report outpatient activity.
Trend efficiency
Trend efficiency is the average sector-wide efficiency
gain we observe over time
Trim point
For each HRG, the trim point is calculated as the
upper quartile length of stay for that HRG plus 1.5
times the inter-quartile range of length of stay. After
the spell of treatment exceeds this number of days, a
provider will receive payment for each additional day
the patient remains in hospital. This is referred to as
an excess bed day payment or a long stay payment.
UK specialist Rehabilitation Set up through a DH National Institute for Health
Outcomes Collaborative
Research Programme Grant to develop a national
(UKROC) database
database for collating case episodes for inpatient
rehabilitation.
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.
Contact us
NHS Improvement
Wellington House
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London
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T: 0300 123 2257
E: [email protected]
W: improvement.nhs.uk
NHS Improvement is the operational name for the organisation that brings together Monitor, NHS
Trust Development Authority, Patient Safety, the National Reporting and Learning System, the
Advancing Change team and the Intensive Support Teams.
This publication can be made available in a number of other formats on request.
NHS Improvement Publication code: C 08/16 1
NHS England Publications Gateway Reference: 05995
NHS England Document Classification: Official