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ANIMALS AND SOCIETY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO
HUMAN-ANIMAL STUDIES
Chapter 18: The Moral Status of Animals
C o py r i g h t M a r g o D e M e l l o a n d C o l um b i a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 2 01 2
WHO CAN HAVE RIGHTS?
Do animals have rights?
How we answer this question will affect
our views on controversial moral
questions:
Should we rear and kill animals for food?
Should animals be used for laboratory
experiments?
Should hunting be banned?
WHAT DO WE DO TO ANIMALS THAT
WE DON’T DO TO HUMANS?
WE DON’T DO THOSE
THINGS TO HUMANS.
WHY?
BECAUSE WE THINK IT’S IMMORAL.
 If it is immoral to treat humans in these ways, but
perfectly permissible to treat animals in these
ways, then there must be some morally relevant
difference between humans and animals that
accounts for this striking dif ference in permissible
treatment.
THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS
 Since the time of the Greeks, philosophers have been
asking about the nature and extent of moral
considerability in general and the moral status of
animals in particular:
1. Which entities deserve moral consideration and
how much consideration are these entities owed?
2. Do animals deserve moral consideration, have
moral rights, or in some other sense possess moral
standing?
 How do we answer these questions?
ETHICAL HUMANISM
 The view that only human beings deserve moral consideration and
all human beings deserve equal moral consideration. A direct
consequence is that all non-human animals lack moral standing,
and hence, there is nothing that we could do to animals that
would wrong them.
 Two strategies for defending the claim that all and only human
beings deserve moral consideration:
1.
2.
Unqualified speciesism: species membership alone grants
moral consideration; everyone/thing who is not of the
human species gets no consideration
Qualified speciesism: some morally relevant property of the
species grants such consideration
 What are the problems with #1?
 What is the morally relevant property for #2?
ETHICAL HUMANISM
 What is the morally relevant property for qualified speciesism?
 Aristotle: rationality; those without rationality are forced to serve
those with it
 The book of Genesis and Divine Hierarchy: a soul
 Aquinas : rationality and “intrinsic value” vs. Irrationality and
“instrumental value”
 Descartes: the Mind; animals only have a body; automata devoid
of thought or reason
 Kant: reciprocal obligations; only those with obligations have
rights
 Agency approach: animals don’t possess the desires that
correspond to rights
ASSESSING THE CASE FOR ETHICAL
HUMANISM
The major problems:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The factual accuracy of the qualified speciesists’ claims. Do
animals really lack rationality? Does lacking language
indicate lack of thought?
Do they really lack the desire to not be harmed or to live a
happy life?
A morally relevant difference that justifies one kind of
difference in treatment need not justify another. Men and
women are different in some ways, but what kind of
different treatment does that justify?
The properties identified as morally relevant are not
possessed by all humans. Do all humans possess
rationality? What should we do to those who don’t?
Either the relevant feature is not possessed by all humans,
or, if it is possessed by all humans, it is possessed by at
least some animals as well.
CHALLENGES TO ETHICAL HUMANISM
PETER SINGER: UTILITARIANISM
Jeremy Bentham, the father of Utilitarianism: “The question is not, Can they
reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suf fer?”
Peter Singer: utilitarianism requires:
 that we give equal consideration to the interests of all beings and
 that we act in ways that maximize the satisfaction of interests of all
those af fected by our conduct.
 The basic principle of equality is not based on who humans are; it is a
moral claim that all human beings deser ve to have their interests
considered equally with the like interests of other s.
 Ever y being with interests deser ves moral consideration and deser ves to
have its interests considered equally with the like interests of other s.
 Which beings have interest? Sentient beings.
 Without the capacity to feel pain or pleasure, a being cannot have a well being that can be promoted or harmed
 At a minimum, all sentient beings have an interest in avoiding pain.
PETER SINGER: UTILITARIANISM
 Giving animals equal consideration does not imply that we must
treat all animals alike or accord them exactly the same rights as
humans, but it does require that we give their pleasures and pains
equal weight with human pleasures and pains when carrying out
utilitarian calculations.
 An action is right for a person if and only if, out of all the actions
available to that person, that action maximizes the satisfaction of
interests of all those affected by the action.
 In order that the practice of killing animals be justified, the
animal’s pain must not only be outweighed by the human’s
pleasure, but there can be no alternative act that would foreseeably
result in a better balance of pleasure over pain.
 Question: Do infants, comatose patients, or the senile require moral
judgement under this position?
“The capacity for suffering and enjoying
things is a pre-requisite for having interests
at all, a condition that must be satisfied
before we can speak of interests in any
meaningful way. It would be nonsense to
say that it was not in the interests of a
stone to be kicked along the road by a
schoolboy. A stone does not have interests
because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we
can do to it could possibly make any
difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the
other hand, does have an interest in not
being tormented, because it will suffer if it
is.”
--Peter Singer
TOM REGAN: ANIMAL RIGHTS
What are rights?
 Moral vs. legal rights
 Negative rights vs. positive rights
 Animals have negative moral rights to non -inter ference
 Regan rejects utility -maximization principle of utilitarianism (sacrificing
individuals for the greater good), and the equal consideration of
interests
 Human beings have inherent value and the moral standing that goes
along with it in vir tue of the fact that they are subjects of a life
 All who have inherent value have it equally, regardless of their sex, race,
religion, species, intellectual capacity, sexual preference, etc., since this
is the only way to preclude such injustices as slaver y, sexual
discrimination, religious per secution, and so on.
CAN WE KILL AUNT BEA?
COMPARISON BET WEEN SINGER AND REGAN
 S i n ger: P h i losophy ba s e d o n ut i l it a ria nism
 We m us t g i ve e q ua l co n side rat ion to i n te rest s o f a l l be i n gs
 We m us t a c t i n way s t h a t m a x i miz e t h e s a t i sfac t ion o f i n te rest s o f ALL o r M OST
a f fe c te d by o ur c o n duc t
 Th e pri n c i ple o f e q ua lit y i s n ot ba s e d o n h ow we ARE ( s inc e we a re di f fe re n t ),
but o n t h e fa c t t h a t we a l l s h a re i n te rest s
 Al l i n te rest s h a ring c re a t ure s , t h e n , de s e r ve to h ave t h e i r i n te re st s g i ven e q ua l
c o n s ideration
 Se n t i e nt c re a t ure s ( t h o se w h o fe e l pl e a sure o r pa i n ) h ave i n te rest s ( a c o m a tose
pa t i e n t do e s n ot )
 We m us t we i g h o ur ow n a c t i o ns ba s e d o n w h et h e r t h ey w i l l m a x i miz e t h e
s a t i sfac tio n fo r a l l o r m o s t pa r t i e s
 K i l lin g a n i mals fo r fo o d c a n n ot be j us t ified s i n c e 1 ) t h e i r pa i n do e s n’ t o ut we i g h
o ur pl e a sure a n d 2 ) t h e re a re a l te rn at ives to k i lling a n i mals fo r fo o d. On t h e
ot h e r h a n d, s a c ri ficin g i n di viduals fo r t h e g re a te r g o o d i s fi n e w h e n i t re s ul t s i n
m a x imum s a t i sfac t ion to a l l , o r w h e n t h e a n i mal do e s n ot fo re s ee i t s ow n de a t h
 Re j e c t s t h e c o n c e pt o f ri g h t s i n favo r o f i n te re st s ba s e d o n s e n t ienc e, w h i c h
exc l ude s “ m a rg inal” h um a n s
 C o u l d p o s s i b l y a c c e pt a n imal we l fa re a s l o n g a s t h e g re a te st g o o d wa s m et
( be n e fit s o ut we i g h h a rm )
COMPARISON BET WEEN SINGER AND REGAN
•Regan: Philosophy based on moral rights
• We must give equal consideration to interests of all beings
•Animals & humans share moral rights, and in particular, negative rights to noninterference (right to not be killed, tortured, etc.)
•It is wrong to sacrifice even one individual to benefit even a great many
•This is because every creature has an inherent value and thus a moral right to be
treated well
•All creatures are subjects of a life which grants them moral rights, regardless of their
utility (comatose patients still have moral rights and inherent value)
•We cannot justify harming even a single human or animal, even if lots of humans or
animals will benefit
•Killing animals for food cannot be justified because ALL animals are subjects of a
life who thus deserve moral rights
•Rejects the concept of interests in favor of rights based on subjectivity, which
includes all humans (even “marginal” ones) and animals
•Rejects animal welfare because it’s inconsistent with a rights position
RIGHTS VS. UTILITARIANISM
We think it wrong to sacrifice the lives of innocent
human beings for the greater good. Regan’s theory of
rights seems to capture this idea.
We might think it acceptable to sacrifice the lives of
some animals for the greater good – e.g. deer-culling.
Singer’s utilitarian theory seems to fit this idea.
RIGHTS, UTILITARIANISM AND
ANIMALS
Questions to consider:
If animals have a right to life, what are the
practical implications for
 our use of animals for food, and
 our use of animals for laboratory experiments?
What are the practical implications of
utilitarianism for
 our use of animals for food, and
 our use of animals for laboratory experiments?
OTHER CHALLENGES TO ETHICAL HUMANISM
CONSISTENCY: MYLAN ENGEL
 This argument is predicated on commonsense beliefs that most of
us hold, and ensuring that those beliefs are consistent. Beliefs
such as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Other things being equal, a world with less pain and suffering
is better than a world with more pain and suffering.
Cruelty is wrong and should not be supported or encouraged.
Many animals (including cows, pigs, and chickens) are capable
of feeling pain.
It is morally wrong to cause an animal unnecessar y pain or
suffering.
It is wrong to harm animals for no good reason.
 Can you hold the above statements as true and still support, for
example, factory farming?
PERSONHOOD: STEVEN WISE
 Wise's position is that some animals, particularly primates,
because of their inherent qualities, meet the criteria of legal
personhood, and should therefore be awarded certain rights
and protections.
 His criteria for personhood are that the animal must be able to
desire things, to act in an intentional manner to acquire those
things, and must have a sense of self i.e. the animals must
know that s/he exists.
CAPABILITIES: MARTHA NUSSBAUM
 Animals, like humans, deserve to live a “dignified existence.”
That we deny such an existence to most animals is, to her, is a
social justice issue.
 Nussbaum’s theory of justice is based on a capabilities
approach: what are people actually able to do and to be?
 She argues that each individual creature, of each species,
should be allowed to flourish in its own way, and to fulfill all of
its capabilities.
 Because all animals have dif ferent “natural” capabilities, what
is necessary for one to have a dignified life will dif fer from that
of another.
 The goal is for all humans and animals, regardless of species
or disability, to be able to flourish in their own communities.
VIRTUE ETHICS: DIAMOND
 A virtue ethics position is based on the actions that
a “virtuous person” might engage in. A virtuous
person would not, for example, kick a dog to death,
because that would demonstrate that that person’s
character is not virtuous at all. If the attitudes that
underlie such behaviors are not compassionate or
kind or virtuous, then we are not those things. In
this approach, humans and animals share with
each other membership in a moral community, and
members of a moral community do not kick each
other to death.
FEMINIST ETHICS: ADAMS, DONOVAN
 Ecofeminism is both a philosophy and a social
movement which focuses on the links between
the oppression of women and the destruction of
nature. Ecofeminists examine the relationship
between industrial capitalism and patriarchy as
well as a host of other systems of inequality,
including animal exploitation. Ecofeminist
positions are structural—focusing on the power
structures of society and the different forms of
institutional inequality—rather than
individualistic, and argue not for individual
change (becoming a vegetarian, for example) but
for largescale social change.
FEMINIST ETHICS: ADAMS, DONOVAN
 The feminist ethic of care, on the other hand, is an
individualistic approach and focuses on the
relationship between humans and non-humans.
Because animals have feelings like humans do,
humans have a moral obligation to them, that is not
based on abstract qualities like rights or justice, but on
the idea of relationships. Proponents of this theory
argue that other ethical approaches are too heavily
based on rationality and downplay qualities associated
with women like empathy, caring and love. These
theorists argue that we need to re-insert emotion back
into discussions of animal welfare, because without an
emotional response to animal suffering, it’s easy to see
why abuse continues.