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CLIMATE & ENERGY PAPER SERIES 2010 MAPPING CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY IN NORTH AFRICA JOSHUA BUSBY, KAIBA WHITE, AND TODD G. SMITH © 2010 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to: The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1744 R Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E [email protected] This publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm. Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected]. GMF Paper Series The GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staff, fellows, and partners of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by e-mail to [email protected]. About GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has six offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm. Transatlantic Climate Bridge Initiative This paper would not have been possible without funding from the Transatlantic Climate Bridge, an initiative of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs to connect and support those working to address the challenges of climate change, energy security, and economic growth at the local, the state, and the federal level in the United States and Germany. Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa Climate & Energy Policy Paper Series October 2010 Joshua W. Busby1 University of Texas at Austin Kaiba White1 University of Texas at Austin Todd G. Smith1 University of Texas at Austin Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Potential Climate Change-Related Security Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Where Are the Vulnerable Areas in North Africa? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Narratives of Climate Vulnerability in North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 Conclusion and Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 Joshua W. Busby is an assistant professor in the LBJ School of Public Affairs and a Crook distinguished scholar in the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin. Kaiba White is a GIS research associate at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin. Todd G. Smith is a Ph.D. Student in the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. 1 The authors thank the German Marshall Fund for commissioning this report. This material is based upon work supported by, or in part by, the U. S. Army Research Laboratory and the U. S. Army Research Office under contract/grant number W911NF-09-1-0077. The research is part of a larger project on Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS), http://ccaps.robertstrausscenter.org/ The views of the authors do not necessarily reflect those of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Executive Summary Climate change is increasingly recognized to have implications that extend beyond impacts on people’s quality of life and into the security sphere. Scholars and analysts have invoked a host of purported problems that climate change could contribute to, from armed conflict to migration flows to complex emergencies that require humanitarian intervention. A number of these concerns apply directly to North Africa, which, for the purposes of this study, is the region including the countries along the Mediterranean, south to the Sahelian countries of Mali and Niger, and extending across to Sudan and the Horn of Africa. North Africa is a strategically important region for Europe largely because of its proximity, with the broader transatlantic policy community exercising particular concern where Africa’s problems spill over to Europe. North or northern Africa is an arid and semi-arid region that includes vast expanses of sparsely populated or not populated at all territory. It is a region where the amount of water available per person is already, in many cases, less than 1,000 cubic meters per year and where climate change is expected to make the region much hotter. The brittleness and weakness of regimes in the region and the wider continent, coupled with the low level of human and economic development, enhance Africa’s vulnerability to a variety of ills, including climate change, terrorism, armed conflict, and piracy. The purpose of this study is to reach a better understanding of how climate change and physical sources of vulnerability to natural hazards might intersect with the region’s various demographic, social, and political sources of weakness. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS), we map the confluence of those sources of vulnerability, extracting maps of regional vulnerability from a broader research effort on the entire continent of Africa. We couple those maps with illustrative narratives from two sites of high vulnerability — Niger and Sudan — and seek to explain their significance for the transatlantic policy community, drawing on broader scholarly and policy literature. The maps reveal vulnerability across the region to climate change and other risks. The Mediterranean coastline looks particularly exposed to climate-related hazards, but other areas appear more vulnerable when we add in other dimensions like community and household resilience and governance and political violence. Putting the four sources of vulnerability together — climate-related hazard exposure, population density, household and community resilience, and governance and political violence — we find that western Ethiopia stands out as the most vulnerable part of the region, with pockets of high vulnerability throughout south-central Sudan, southern Chad, Niger, and Somalia. Small pockets of medium vulnerability exist along the Mediterranean coastline in Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt. Beyond these maps of vulnerability, we explore four potential mechanisms where climate and security concerns are potentially connected in North Africa: conflict, migration, terrorism, and humanitarian disasters. With respect to conflict, the academic literature on climate-related violence is, thus far, inconclusive. Where conflict is associated with climate change, it tends not to be from scarcity of resources per se but from volatility and shocks that make it hard for people to plan their economic activities one year to the next, forcing them into desperate action. Studies are increasingly focusing on lower-level conflicts like strikes and riots to examine their connections with climate change. In North Africa, however, using a new dataset from the Social Conflict in Africa Database, we find that lowerlevel social conflict events are concentrated in the areas least vulnerable to climate-related hazards. Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa iii As for migration, rough calculations suggest that additional climate-related migrants from Africa to Europe between today and 2050 (as a result of changing agricultural yields) are likely to be relatively few compared to the number of migrants likely to migrate in any case because of rising population growth. Moreover, if past trends continue, a much higher proportion of migrants will remain in Africa or go to regions other than Europe. Climate change may contribute to migration through other channels such as water scarcity and extreme weather events, but we should be cautious about overstating the challenge of climate-led African migration to Europe. There is no compelling argument that identifies climate change as a cause of terrorism. However, we do see terrorism and climate change potentially being twin challenges that weak governments in the region, such as Niger, might have to face simultaneously, requiring difficult choices in terms of allocation of scarce resources. Algeria has been the largest regional site for terrorist attacks, most of them directed against the national government with limited implications for European or Western security. to high physical vulnerability to climate change is likely to be worse because of weak governance and low household and community resilience to climate change. These areas include western Ethiopia and pockets in southern Sudan, Chad, and Niger. While targeted assistance to governments and NGOs for disaster prevention and risk are essential, equally important may be support for basic government capacity and conflict resolution in those countries, as they may generate positive spillovers for their ability to address climate-related challenges. Our findings also lead us to conclude that North African countries along the Mediterranean like Morocco and Tunisia may be more physically vulnerable to climate change than others but possess more capacity at the household and governance levels to cope with these problems. Support for these countries should include more information-sharing to help them address their physical vulnerabilities largely through mobilization of their own internal resources. Finally, with respect to natural disasters, we find that floods and droughts are the main climaterelated disaster types in the region, with floods being far more frequent and deadly but droughts affecting larger numbers of people over greater areas. Countries in the region with poorer governance such as Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Sudan, and Somalia had far larger numbers of people affected by disasters than other countries. As our case studies of Niger and Sudan demonstrate, many areas severely affected by droughts and floods are also facing political volatility. In terms of policy, these conclusions lead us to recommend that resources and attention be directed to the areas and countries where modest iv The German Marshall Fund of the United States Introduction Climate change is increasingly recognized to have implications that extend beyond impacts on people’s quality of life and into the security sphere. Since 2007, policy practitioners and academics have issued scores of reports identifying the security risks associated with climate change. Scholars and analysts have invoked a host of purported problems that climate change could contribute to, from armed conflict to migration flows to complex emergencies that require humanitarian intervention. Even as academics continue to debate the specific relationship between climate change and security outcomes, the topic has garnered the attention of the UN Security Council, the European Commission, and numerous individual governments.1 A number of these concerns apply directly to North Africa, a region for the purposes of this study we take to include the countries along the Mediterranean, south to the Sahelian countries of Mali and Niger, and extending across to Sudan and the Horn of Africa. North Africa is a strategically important region for Europe largely because of proximity, with the broader transatlantic policy community exercising particular concern where Africa’s problems spillover to Europe. North or northern Africa is an arid and semi-arid region that includes vast expanses of sparsely populated or not populated at all territory. It is a region where the amount of water available per person is already, in many cases, less than 1,000 cubic meters The topic has become virtually a cottage industry, with the number of papers and speeches too numerous to name. The UN hosted a special meeting of the Security Council on the topic in 2007. In the United States, the National Intelligence Council conducted a National Intelligence Assessment in 2008. The British government has been among the main champions of the links between climate and security. Javier Solana, the former EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, was another champion (Hague 2010; Fingar 2008; Solana 2008; Beckett 2007; UN Security Council 2007). 1 per year.2 Climate change is expected to make the region much hotter, suffering temperature increases higher than the expected average increases worldwide.3 It is also a region that has a variety of governance challenges, with a number of regimes that have largely resisted democratization and economic modernization. Many of them have long-time rulers or family dynasties (Libya, Morocco, Egypt), and others are characterized by great political instability (Somalia). A number of these countries have quite fragile regimes, with recent experience of coups (Niger) and extensive acts of terrorism (Algeria). Others have experienced spates of violence and conflict, including Sudan and Ethiopia. The brittleness and weakness of regimes in the region and the wider continent, coupled with the low level of human and economic development, enhance Africa’s vulnerability to a variety of ills, including climate change but also terrorism, armed conflict, and piracy. For Europe and the United States, two problems — migration and terrorism — are particularly salient and potentially combustible, given the intersection with broader cultural and political currents in Europe about immigrants and Islam and concerns about ungoverned spaces and the rise of terrorism. Countries in North Africa also have more strategic significance as providers of important natural Levy et al. note that populations are vulnerable to water stress between 500 and 1,700 cubic meters per person. The 1,000 cubic meter per year threshold is often used to capture chronic water scarcity. In 2005, about 35 percent of the world population faced chronic scarcity. In countries like Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, about 100 percent of the population already experiences this problem (Levy et al. 2008). 2 Model projections suggest that North Africa’s average temperature will increase by 2.16°C (almost 4°F) by mid-century, compared to the period 1980-2000. The IPCC Fourth Assessment reports that the global average projected temperature change for midcentury is an increase of 1.8°C (for the same time period and under the A1B scenario) (IPCC 2007). North Africa model projections come from collaborative work we have carried out with scientists at the University of Texas’ Jackson School of Geosciences. See footnote 43 for more details. 3 Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 1 resources. Libya and Algeria are among the leading exporters of petroleum, while Niger is one of the world’s top exporters of uranium. In addition to these natural resources, the region’s sea lanes — from Egypt and the Suez Canal down to Somalia and the Gulf of Aden — are important for global commerce. The purpose of this study is to reach a better understanding of how climate change and physical sources of vulnerability to natural hazards might intersect with the region’s various demographic, social, and political sources of weakness. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS), we map the confluence of those sources of vulnerability, extracting maps of local vulnerability from a broader research effort on the entire continent of Africa. We couple those maps with illustrative narratives from two sites of high vulnerability — Niger and Sudan — and seek to explain their significance for the transatlantic policy community, drawing on the broader scholarly and policy literature. with physical exposure and incrementally adding population density, household and community resilience, and governance and political violence. Together, these baskets are combined in an overall map of composite vulnerability in the region that should help policymakers focus their resources and attention. From these areas of higher vulnerability, we selected two sites — Niger and southern Sudan — for extended vignettes in Section 3 to explain how the confluence of climate change and other dimensions of social and political vulnerability may conjoin to create security consequences of concern for the broader international community. This is not a work of country experts but a measured attempt to take stock of regional vulnerabilities and potential spillovers from climate change.4 As such, we seek to avoid overstating the severity of problems. We also identify regions about which policymakers have expressed concern but do not appear particularly vulnerable to climate change, based on our model. In Section 1 we review the mechanisms by which climate change could have security implications in North Africa, by looking at conflict, migration, terrorism, and extreme weather events. In Section 2 we create a series of sub-national maps of vulnerability to climate change in North Africa, beginning For more area studies-informed scholarship on climate and security in the region, see White forthcoming; Al-Marashi forthcoming; CENTRA Technology and Seitor Corporation 2009; National Intelligence Council 2009. 4 2 The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1 Potential Climate Change-Related Security Consequences Since about 2007, academics and practitioners have vigorously investigated the security consequences of climate change, in part driven by an effort to generate more broad-based and high-level political interest in addressing climate change.5 As the security consequences of climate change have become more accepted, the debate has matured. What is now needed is a pragmatic assessment of the nature of the threats, what we know and can know, and how best to think about preparing for the future. Most of the work to date has focused on whether climate change will contribute to violent conflict, but a host of other issues with some potential links to climate change — migration, terrorism, and climate change related disasters — may have security consequences worthy of concern. Here, we take a relatively narrow view of security threats, focusing on problems of such grave concern that they threaten a country’s existence or way of life or pose deep challenges to the country’s main instruments of self-defense (namely military assets).6 To better understand these potential consequences, we explore the connections between climate change and four issues — conflict, migration, terrorism, and disasters — with special reference to examples from northern Africa. Conflict Much has been made of the potential security consequences of climate change. The emphasis among scholars and practitioners has been on the potential for climate change to contribute to conflict, with words like “threat multiplier” and “stressor” frequently invoked to acknowledge that climate change on its own is unlikely to lead to conflict. The examples have become almost too numerous to mention, but important examples include reports from the CNA Corporation, CNAS/CSIS, and the Council on Foreign Relations (CNA Corporation 2007; Campbell et al. 2007; Busby 2007). 5 6 For a more detailed academic discussion, see Busby 2008. While most scholarship has focused on subnational conflict, advocates have also invoked the specter of “water wars” between states over scarce water supplies. One of the frequently cited cases of concern is disputes over the waters of the Nile that link Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, and Uganda. While dams built for irrigation, flood control, or hydroelectric power potentially will lead to disputes over water along the length of the Nile, historically there have been few or no cases of “water wars.” On the contrary, the common necessity of water often serves to force even hostile countries to cooperate.7 Climate shocks, such as large declines in precipitation from one year to the next, rather than absolute scarcity of resources like water and land, are thought to be the most likely way climate change might contribute to conflict. In this way, desperate people, unable to plan their agricultural harvests or water their animals, could be driven to steal or take up arms, potentially leading to violent encounters with others.8 In the northern African context, the conflict in Darfur, Sudan, has controversially been linked to climate change. Droughts initially brought nomadic herders into conflict with farmers over grazing rights, which was then exacerbated by poor government policy. 9 In spite of this, most academic studies that have used quantitative statistical approaches to test for a link between climate-related indicators (such as drought) and conflict have not found a connection.10 That said, because these studies look at historical data, they may ultimately tell us little about future climate change and conflict. 7 Klare 2007; Victor 2007; Nordås and Gleditsch 2009. 8 Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Levy et al. 2005. For a discussion, see de Waal 2007; Homer-Dixon 2007; Busby 2009. 9 For summary reviews of the literature, see Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug 2010; Buhaug 2010; Busby 2009; Buhaug, Gleditsch, and Theisen 2008. 10 Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 3 FIGURE 1 Scholars are starting to look at lower levels of conflict like riots and strikes, with some suggestions that both high and low rainfall might give rise to more of these low-level conflicts.11 Another productive area for future scholarship is to examine the indirect effects of climate change on conflict by way of economic growth.12 If climate change leads to low economic growth, which is highly correlated with the increased incidence of conflict, then climate change could have an important indirect effect on conflict.13 A preliminary examination of a recently released database, the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), reveals that riots, strikes, demonstrations, and lower-level social conflicts in North Africa in 11 Hendrix and Salehyan 2010. 12 Levy 2010. 13 Collier 2007. 4 the period 1995-2009 are concentrated in small areas that correspond to major cities throughout the region (see Figure 1). We find that social conflicts are clustered in areas least vulnerable to climate-related physical hazards. Figure 2 shows the number of social conflict events by area for each of the five quintiles of underlying exposure to climate-related physical hazards like drought and floods. We observe that the first quintile (the 20 percent of the region with the least physical exposure to climate hazards) has the most social conflict events in the period 1995-2009 (see Figure 2). This does not necessarily mean that climate change has no connection with social conflicts like strikes and riots, as people may take their grievances from their home regions to national and provincial capitals and major cities. But, echoing other work that has examined the The German Marshall Fund of the United States undermine agricultural productivity, prompting people to move in search of better land or offfarm opportunities.15 FIGURE 2 For Europe, emigration from North Africa, particularly given some of the emergent cultural and political fault-lines, is a specific concern.16 At the same time, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have also used North Africa as a trans-migratory route into Europe, which has led to unprecedented interdiction efforts through Frontex, a new European border control initiative established in 2005.17 Given the comparatively lower levels Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Social Conflict in Africa Database and of economic development in UNEP/GRIO-Europe sub-Saharan Africa, the prospects connections between climate change and violence, of larger numbers of migrants our findings suggest a measure of caution.14 passing through North Africa in a bid to resettle in Europe has generated significant concern (though Migration the Sahara Desert may be a fairly effective barrier for most migrants). Climate change has also been put forward as one of the many reasons people migrate from their homes, from rural to urban areas, within continents and between them in the search of better opportunities. A number of different climate-related mechanisms have been identified as potential triggers for migration, including so-called “distress migration” caused by swift-onset disasters that make areas temporarily or permanently uninhabitable. Increased water scarcity for human or animal consumption might also make migration more attractive. Similarly, changing temperatures and precipitation might The data are divided into five categories or quintiles of roughly equal size, from the least vulnerable to climate-related hazards (category 1) to the most (category 5). The Social Conflict in Africa Database was developed by our colleagues at the University of North Texas, Idean Salehyan and Cullen Hendrix. 14 In this context, advocates have warned of large numbers of “climate refugees,” or people who are forced to move because their livelihoods are no longer possible due to prolonged droughts, floods, storms, and other extreme weather events.18 These advocates have also warned of conflict emerging from migration, as newcomers compete with local populations for resources or work. While migration Martin 2010a; Martin 2010b; Collinson 2010. For a set of additional GMF-sponsored papers on climate change and migration, see http://www.gmfus.org/cs/publications/publication_view?publication.id=650 15 16 National Intelligence Council 2010. 17 See http://www.frontex.europa.eu/ 18 Myers 2005; Werz and Manilove 2009. Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 5 FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4 Source: Global Migrant Origin Database 2007 is frequently thought of as a problem, mobility has also historically been quite an important adaptive tool for people whose life possibilities were foreclosed in their home countries. Migrants often enrich the communities of the host countries where they ultimately resettle.19 One concern is that while “climate refugees” may be a rhetorical talking point, it will be difficult in practice to clearly identify them and distinguish their reasons for migrating from other motives. While scholars have found cross-border migration to be associated with an increased risk of conflict,20 a number of scholars believe that if there were such a thing as environmental migration, dislocated populations, overwhelmingly dependent upon neighboring countries’ goodwill and relief 19 World Bank 2010. 20 Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006. 6 for survival, may be less likely to engage in conflict simply because their own situation in host countries is so tenuous.21 That said, they may be vulnerable to violent reprisals by locals, as Zimbabweans have been in South Africa. In the European context, whether or not migration will lead to violent conflict in the short run may be less important than the political ramifications of migrants coming from particular parts of the world. Not only are anti-immigrant parties gaining more of a political footing in Europe, the potential radicalization of diaspora populations from North Africa and other parts of the world has troubled European policymakers in countries where immi- Gleditsch, Nordås, and Salehyan 2007; Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008. 21 The German Marshall Fund of the United States grant populations have been implicated in terrorist activity.22 Despite rhetoric from the aforementioned political parties and certain media stories, the available data on migration seems to lead to two somewhat surprising conclusions. First, on the whole, Africans make up a small proportion of total immigrants into Europe. Second, Europe is not the main destination for most African migrants. The Global Migrant Origin Database publishes a matrix of migrants from nearly every country in the world to every other country in the world.23 Strictly speaking, the reported data are stocks of migrants — that is, people living in one country that are from another — rather than flows of people in any given year. Furthermore, the data for some countries are extrapolated from other countries with more reliable census information. Despite these limitations, it is possible to get a general picture of emigration out of Africa and immigration into Europe. The majority of the roughly 16 million Africans living outside of their home countries have migrated to other African countries. Côte d’Ivoire (14.6 percent), Burkina Faso (7.0 percent), South Africa (6.4 percent), and Tanzania (5.6 percent) are the most popular destinations. The 14 countries of North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn had a combined population of 335.5 million people in 2007, of which approximately 12 million were resident outside of their home countries. Figures 3 and 4 show how these migrants were distributed by region. The largest portion of these, 33 percent, migrated to other African countries. For example, of the 1.6 million Malians who emigrated, 487,000 went to Côte d’Ivoire and 438,000 went to Burkina Faso. The second largest High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council 2008; Srichandan 2009. 22 See http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/ global_migrant_origin_database.html 23 group is Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians, who have migrated to their previous colonial power, France. This accounts for 2.46 million people, or 20 percent of the total out of northern Africa. Of the remaining migrants, another 2.46 million migrate to the Middle East. 1.49 million of these are Egyptians, 282,000 are Sudanese, and 101,000 are Ethiopians. Saudi Arabia is the most popular destination for Egyptians (slightly over 1 million) and Sudanese (206,000), while Ethiopians settle in Israel (59,000) and Saudi Arabia (22,000) (see Figure 5, next page). Of the remaining 26 percent of North African migrants, 2.13 million, or 18 percent, are distributed throughout the rest of Europe (excluding France) (see Figure 4). Figure 6 (next page) shows that Africans account for 19 percent of migrants in Europe, with 13 percent — approximately 4.68 million people — from the 14 countries of interest here. Fifty-two percent of these are the aforementioned 2.46 million Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians living in France. This accounts for 39 percent of France’s total immigrant population of 6.3 million but only 4 percent of its total population of over 62 million. Still, this represents a potentially destabilizing portion of French society, as evidenced by rioting in Paris in 2005 and to lesser extents since then. Another cultural clash has centered on the wearing of the face veil by Muslim women, which the French Senate banned in September 2010. Although the face veil is generally a practice of Middle Eastern Muslims the recent legislation may be perceived by the broader Muslim community as an attack on the religion as a whole. Other immigrant controversies in France have had little to do with populations from Africa. A squatter camp near Calais that was dismantled in 2009 was populated mainly by migrants from Iraq and other Near East countries. Most recently France has generated a political storm by expelling Roma from Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding these destabi- Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 7 in emigration. Extrapolating these results into the future, the authors estimated that if climate change contributes to a 10-50 percent decrease in crop yields in Mexico (as was the range of estimates under a variety of climate models), Mexican emigration to the United States would increase by between 1.4 and 6.7 million people by 2080, controlling for other factors.24 FIGURE 5 Although lack of data makes it difficult to estimate the elasticity of migration from North Africa to Europe in response to changing crop yields, we can make some crude calculations. If we assume that Africa’s elasticity of migration in response to agriSource: Global Migrant Origin Database 2007 lizing factors, the drivers of migration from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia likely have little to do with climate change or other environmental factors and more to do with France’s long-standing influence in the region dating back to its original colonization of Algeria in the mid-19th century. 24 Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer 2010. FIGURE 6 In the context of climate change in North Africa, one of the great unknowns is whether the changes will make parts of the region unlivable or uneconomic (or perceived to be), such that large numbers of people begin moving. That prospect would have to be in the next 20 to 30 years, a time horizon close enough and swift enough to be policy-relevant. A 2010 study estimated the elasticity of Mexican migration to changes in crop yields over the period 1995-2005, suggesting that every 10 percent decline in crop yields would lead to a 2 percent increase 8 Source: Global Migrant Origin Database 2007 The German Marshall Fund of the United States cultural yields is similar to Mexico’s, the numbers of migrants out of Africa in response to climate change could potentially be quite large. FIGURE 7 However, the Mexico study largely made use of 2001 data.25 Newer data from 2009 by the same authors cited in the Mexico study suggest that climate change will have a lesser impact on crop yields than first thought.26 Using the 2009 data, we find that the numbers of additional migrants associated with declining agricultural yields is likely to be modest, especially when compared to migration associated with population growth.27 If we assume similar migration rates as today, projected population growth alone will lead to an increase from 4.7 million North African migrants in Europe in 2007 to 5.6 million in 2020 and 7.0 million in 2050 (see Figure 7). Looking at all of Africa, the number of African migrants to Europe — with population growth and current rates of migration — is projected to increase from 6.9 million in 2007 to 8.5 million in 2020 and 9 million in 2050. Thus, of the increment of additional migrants to Europe, North Africans (broadly defined) would constitute 55 percent of them between 2007 and 2020 and 48 percent of them between 2007 and 2050. Of those, Algerians and Moroccans would constitute more than 60 percent of the total new North Africans in Europe in both 2020 and 2050 (see Appendix A). The number of additional North Africans who migrate to Europe in response to declining agricultural yields, given our assumptions, will only bring the total moderately higher, an additional 30,000 Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Global Migrant Origin Database 2010 in 2020 and 340,000 in 2050. Including all African countries, the number of agricultural yield-related migrants to Europe would be 485,000 in 2020 and 1.92 million in 2050 (see Table 1).28 Still, the percentage of migrants across Africa that are projected to move due to changing agricultural yields constitutes less than 18 percent of the total in 2020 and 2050. Of the North Africa component to Europe, the estimate suggests these would overwhelmingly come from Ethiopia in 2020, with some migration from other countries in the region (Algeria, Egypt, and Somalia) by 2050. Continentwide, agricultural-led migrants are estimated to come disproportionately from Nigeria in 2020 and Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda in 2050 (given our assumptions and data on the numbers of migrants 2001 data is available here http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/ giss_crop_study/CCMquerytools.html 25 2009 data is available here http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/ mva/cropclimate/ 26 This assumes no interactive effects between declining agricultural yields and population growth. 27 This estimate assumes that the elasticity of migration in response to changing crop yields is similar to Mexico’s. The estimate of crop yields uses one of the various scenarios of future agricultural yields, the A1FI scenario, which assumes continued globalization and fossil fuel intensive economic growth. 28 Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 9 TABLE 1 Estimates of Future Migration Due to Crop Yields 2020 Percent change in ag. yield (scenario A1FI) 2020 Algeria Chad Djibouti 2050 Emigration due to change in agricultural yield Total Percent change in ag. yield (scenario A1FI) To Europe 2050 Emigration due to change in agricultural yield Total To Europe 0.45 -36 -30 -0.53 52 42 -0.93 28 1 -1.96 108 3 0.30 -1 0 -0.76 2 1 Egypt -0.37 73 7 -1.63 422 39 Eritrea -0.43 6 0 -1.56 34 2 Ethiopia -0.83 180 38 -2.31 801 167 Libya -0.41 6 2 -1.59 31 8 Mali -0.89 31 1 -1.81 113 5 Mauritania -0.76 6 1 -1.43 17 3 Morocco -0.02 1 1 -0.05 4 3 Niger -0.71 33 1 -1.34 155 4 Somalia -1.37 34 9 -3.31 155 42 Sudan -0.09 9 0 -0.91 138 7 Tunisia 0.05 -0.66 -1 -1 369 30 2,573 485 14 country North Africa total Africa-wide average -0.84 -2.14 17 14 2,051 340 9,266 1,920 * in thousands of people Source: Authors’ calculations based on crop-yield projections from Rosenzweig and Iglesias 2009, population projections from UN Population Fund and elasticity from Feng et al. 2010 and their historically preferred choices for where to migrate). Of course, this is a highly contingent estimation, based on an untested assumption that the elasticity of migration from North Africa is at all similar to Mexico and that the Mexico model itself accurately reflects the underlying reality. The migration data we used may also have significant problems, given 10 the difficulty of estimating what are often informal, illicit population movements. More onerous, uneven enforcement of borders may ultimately change the pattern of where future migrants choose as destinations. Moreover, declines in agricultural yield only reflect one dimension of climate change that may contribute to migration. More abrupt weather shocks from floods and storms or declining The German Marshall Fund of the United States water availability may also contribute to additional migration. Nonetheless, this exercise leads to some preliminary conclusions. Climate change, as reflected by changing agricultural yields, is likely to contribute a small proportion of future migrants to Europe compared to population growth. Of those, countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria may be a larger source of migrants to Europe. Based on population growth, North African countries like Algeria and Morocco are estimated to send larger migrant populations to Europe, particularly to France, independent of climate change. Moreover, only about a quarter of Africa’s migrants are estimated to end up in Europe, so the issue of how to deal with migration within Africa and between Africa and other countries will likely be a salient concern for a number of other countries. In terms of the security implications, the policy community has to be careful about drawing alarming conclusions regarding the number of climate-induced migrants to Europe from Africa, which could feed into larger xenophobic currents. That said, if people move at historical rates and the African population grows as expected, there will be a significant movement of Africans to Europe with or without climate change. A modest additional number will likely move with climate change from changing agriculture yields, and an untold number of others may move as a result of other climaterelated forces such as displacement after swift-onset disasters. The number of migrants may matter less than the emerging perception among advanced industrialized countries that some immigrants from developing countries cannot be successfully integrated into the wider society of their new homes. The choices for policymakers will be bound up with larger questions about how to treat migrants, whether they are climate-related or not, including robust interdiction efforts (which could be problematic from a human-rights perspective) and merely displace the challenges of integrating migrants to other countries within Africa and elsewhere. Mobility within and between countries has historically been one of the most important coping mechanisms people have taken advantage of in the face of environmental challenges. Remittances have become as, if not more, significant than foreign assistance; and the skills migrants learn can be important when and if the immigrant diaspora returns home. In the absence of better economic opportunities and alternative livelihoods, more vigorous efforts to restrict immigration into Europe and other regions will do little to diminish the demand by people to leave. While a number of scholars have suggested that migrants prompted to move because of climate change may need explicit legal protections, our analysis suggests that it may be premature to commit to those policies until more is known about the potential magnitude of and destination for these migrants. In the meantime, the fate of climaterelated migrants, however slim their number in the short run, will properly be bound up in wider discussions of the integration of immigrants into advanced industrialized countries. Terrorism Parts of North Africa, particularly Algeria, have endured the most acts of terrorism on the continent. According to the Global Terrorism database, of the 3,676 terrorist attacks in Africa between 1995 and 2008, nearly a third (1,195 events) took place in Algeria and more than 10 percent (414 events) took place in Somalia. Together, the 14 countries in North Africa accounted for more than 55 percent of all the terrorist attacks (2,088 events).29 Most 29 See http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 11 of these, though, were directed against their own governments and do not pose an obvious risk to Western governments. However, persistent state weakness in a number of countries in the SahelMaghreb has allowed groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after being pushed out of Algeria, to organize in countries like Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. Western tourists and businessmen have increasingly become targets for hostagetaking. For scholars interested in climate change and security in North Africa, the links between climate change and terrorism is an obvious area for inquiry. Unfortunately, little scholarship exists on the links between climate change and terrorism. It is unclear how changes in rainfall, extreme weather events, or rising temperatures would lead people to take up arms and attack civilians. The influence of climate change could go through rising immiseration and poverty, but most studies on the causes of terrorism suggest that poverty is poorly correlated with the incidence and onset of conflict.30 Western counterterrorism programs in the region have been premised on the notion that ungoverned spaces could provide organizing territory from which later attacks on the West could be planned. Given the paucity of roads, airports, communication networks, and infrastructure, it is unclear that the Sahel-Maghreb is the ideal place for terrorist groups to organize.31 A group with more local grievances may have been inadvertently elevated to a larger regional or global threat on the basis of its unfortunate choice of name as an Al Qaeda franchise.32 States in the region have been able to take advantage of Western interests (and U.S. interest in Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Laitin and Krueger 2008. That said, poor economic conditions might make it easier to recruit from the middle classes and contribute to conflict. 30 31 RAND 2007. Kennedy-Boudali 2009. For another assessment of regional rivalries within AQIM, see Filiu 2010. 32 12 particular) in counterterrorism to secure resources and support to address their own security concerns, some of which may be more related to separatist movements and criminal elements rather than terrorism.33 Nonetheless, as our narrative on Niger suggests, the confluence of vulnerabilities to Tuareg separatists, AQIM, and climate change, coupled with Niger’s uranium supplies, may make parts of the region more strategically important to the West. A more productive way to think about these issues is to examine whether or not areas that were historically most vulnerable to terrorist activity are also among those most vulnerable to climate change. To the extent that these vulnerabilities overlap, governments faced with both of these problems and other governance challenges will face capacity constraints in dealing with them simultaneously. In the next section, we classify all areas within Africa into five quintiles, or roughly equal-sized classes, based on their physical exposure to climaterelated hazards. Using geo-coded data of the Global Terrorism Database for the period from 1995 to 2008,34 we find that in North Africa the sites of the most number of terrorist attacks per ten thousand square kilometers are concentrated in the areas both least and most vulnerable to climate change. This suggests that the places physically vulnerable to climate change may also face concomitant challenges of dealing with terrorism (see Figure 8).35 It would be premature to suggest that climate change had any hand in causing these terrorist 33 CENTRA Technology and Seitor Corporation 2009, 35. The data was geo-coded by Shawn Strange. Additional work geo-coding this data was also done by University of Texas graduate students Christian Glakas, Marc Olivier, and Sanjeet Deka. 34 Algeria dominates the terrorism statistics, and these patterns hold at the country level as well. Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed July 2, 2010. 35 The German Marshall Fund of the United States attacks. Though Osama Bin Laden has made the occasional reference to climate change as a source of grievance, we have yet to see a plausible explanation that connects terrorism to climate change. Our data do not address that question, which would require additional statistical tests to see if climate change and terrorism are correlated, controlling for other factors. Extreme Weather Events and Complex Emergencies FIGURE 8 Sources: Calculations by the authors based on data from the Global Terrorism Data- Climate change is expected to base and UNEP/GRIO-Europe increase the severity and possibly the frequency of extreme weather the early 1990s created a humanitarian emergency events, contributing to more serious floods, that prompted the United States to send in more droughts, and soaring temperatures. With people than 20,000 troops as part of Operation Restore increasingly living in places of high physical expoHope. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Western sure, along coasts and in flood plains, the number militaries became increasingly familiar with such of people affected and the amount of damage from missions in places like Central America (after climate-related weather phenomenon has been Hurricane Mitch in 1998) and Haiti (after the 2004 steadily rising. mudslides). Disaster-related emergencies frequently exceed the capacity of local fire, water, and rescue services, requiring the mobilization of military assets for humanitarian relief. Rich, western countries have not been immune from these incidents. The U.S. military was mobilized in the wake of 2005’s Hurricane Katrina. Greece’s military was required to stamp out a series of debilitating fires in 2007, as was Australia’s in 2009. The effects of climate-related hazards are even more devastating on developing countries with poor governance and limited capacity, which frequently require assistance from the international community. For example, because of government incompetence, a not-too-severe drought in Somalia during The 2010 floods in Pakistan affected more than 20 million people and destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure, including some of the resupply routes the U.S. military was using to get goods to its troops in Afghanistan. While scientists do not attribute specific weather events to climate change, the floods are consistent with the kinds of weather-related anomalies expected to increase as a result of climate change. Even as Western donors, including militaries, mobilized to help the millions of Pakistanis left homeless and in need in the wake of the floods, Niger was experiencing its own flood emergency halfway across the world. A country that has to divert its military to deal with weather-related emergencies at home or Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 13 abroad will face the opportunity costs of not having them available to guard against other external or internal challenges. For example, in the wake of the 2010 floods, the U.S. sent dozens of helicopters to Pakistan from its increasingly difficult war effort in Afghanistan.36 Where governments fail to respond to humanitarian needs, the effects of disasters can potentially create security problems of their own. While in the short run, the devastation following swift-onset disasters may make it difficult for people to organize insurgent activity, desperate people may riot or loot in the search for food and water, particularly if there are known depots in the area. Over time, insurgents groups may be emboldened to rebel and be better able to recruit from populations disaffected from governments that failed to help them in their time of need, particularly if insurgent or terrorist groups were more capable of providing emergency social services than the government.37 We can observe the role of poor governance by examining the disaster mortality and damage statistics using the EM-DAT International Disaster database compiled by the Université Catholique de Louvain in Belgium.38 In the next section, we present maps of climate hazards based on physical thresholds (wind speed, amount of precipitation, etc.). The EM-DAT database only counts an event as a disaster if the consequences meet one of the following conditions: ten or more people killed; 100 or more people reported affected; a declaration For a more extended discussion of the security implications of disasters, see Busby 2008; Busby 2009. 36 Some studies have found connections between certain kinds of natural disasters and the increased likelihood of conflict, those concerns may be confined to earthquakes and may not be applicable to climate-related extreme weather events. See Brancati 2007; Nel and Righarts 2008. 37 38 See http://www.emdat.be/database 14 of a state of emergency; or a call for international assistance.39 In the EM-DAT database, floods and droughts are the main climate-related disaster types with floods far more frequent and deadly but droughts affecting larger numbers of people. When floods occur they tend to destroy homes. As the next section on vulnerability details, countries in the region with poorer governance, such as Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Sudan, and Somalia, had far larger numbers of people affected by disasters than other countries. Though some of these are highly populous countries (Ethiopia, Sudan), a number of these countries had small populations (see Table 2). While some of the countries that have experienced devastating disasters in North Africa might not be as strategically important to the United States and Europe, large-scale disasters can generate intense media attention and demands for humanitarian intervention and relief operations. For Western militaries, this can translate into rapid redeployment away from fighting wars and other traditional security responsibilities to assist in disaster relief, an important opportunity cost if those scarce resources are already stretched thin. In Africa, the continued after-effects of the international intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s, coupled with strategic priorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, may make Western intervention in the short-run unlikely. However, in the event of natural disasters in the region, African Union troops might need logistical support from the West to support humanitarian relief. Over time, the legacy of Somalia may fade, engendering greater will to support deployment for humanitarian purposes, particularly if the magnitude of droughts, floods, or storms creates massive need. This dataset is in part a reflection of reporting so the patterns may not fully reflect all the disasters or may be biased to countries that have more media attention. Moreover, the data on fatalities, people affected, and homelessness may be inaccurate. 39 The German Marshall Fund of the United States TABLE 2 1995-2008 Climate-Related Disasters in North Africa Country Number of Number of Number of Number of Disasters Floods Droughts Storms Max. Killed Max. Total Affected Max. Homeless Algeria 32 25 1 3 921 (f) 45,423 (f) 3,000 (f) Chad 12 9 2 1 100 (f) 800,000 (d) 45,000 (f) Djibouti 7 5 1 1 51 (f) 340,000 (d) 1,500 (d) Egypt 10 5 0 2 32 (hw) 3,000 (f) 3,000 (f) Eritrea 4 2 2 0 0 2.3 million (d) 0 Ethiopia 42 34 6 0 498 (f) 12.6 million (d) 79,000 (floods) Libya 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Mali 16 13 3 0 15 (f) 1 million (d) 41,586 (f) Mauritania 14 11 2 1 25 (f) 1 million (d) 20,000 (f) Morocco 19 15 1 2 730 (f) 275,000 (d) 0 Niger 13 9 3 1 7 (floods) 3.58 million (d) 46,472 (f) Somalia 26 4 22 0 2,311 (f) 3.3 million (d) 230,000 (f) Sudan 25 2 21 1 150 (f) 2 million (d) 200,000 (f) Tunisia 4 0 4 0 16 (f) 27,000 (f) 0 f=flood, d=drought, hw=heat wave Source: OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 15 2 Where Are the Vulnerable Areas in North Africa? Areas that have a number of problems simultaneously are more likely to be vulnerable to large-scale emergencies that 1) necessitate outside humanitarian relief, 2) compete for attention with other problems countries face like terrorism, 3) force people to move temporarily or permanently from their homes, and 4) contribute to tensions that may escalate to violence and conflict. Our aim is to go beyond saying a particular country is vulnerable to climate change to identify which parts of that country are vulnerable, and why. entrepreneurial skills to avoid those hazards or minimize their effects. •Governance and Political Violence. Weather emergencies frequently exceed the capacities of local communities’ emergency services, requiring national-level mobilization to save people from rising waters or from being trapped under rubble and to provide food, water, and shelter for people left homeless or otherwise affected by extreme weather events. As the world witnessed in Pakistan in July 2010, countries with poor or unstable governance are less able or even willing to provide such services. Autarkic countries like Myanmar cannot or will not count on external aid to help them in such circumstances. Venal and incompetent governments can transform even small physical effects, like the modest drought in Somalia in the early 1990s, into major humanitarian disasters. Places with a history of violence may be more difficult to deliver services to and may have additional localized governance challenges. The consequences of climate change are likely to emerge based on the confluence of vulnerabilities.40 We consider four broad processes important in an area’s overall total vulnerability to the securityrelated consequences of climate change including: •Climate-Related Hazard Exposure. At a minimum, places have to be physically exposed to climate-related hazards. •Population Density. Policymakers generally care about places where people live. All else being equal, more densely populated areas that are highly exposed to climate-related hazards will command more attention from decisionmakers. •Household and Community Resilience. The first line of defense for many people will be what resources they have at the household and community level to protect themselves from physical hazards and respond in the event of climate-related emergencies like floods, droughts, or storms. Communities where many people are sick and have inadequate access to health care and basic amenities are likely to be less resilient than those that are healthier and have greater access to services. Where people are poorly educated, they may have fewer This section builds on our previous research in Busby et al. 2010. 40 16 Our operating assumption is that the most vulnerable places are likely to be those where high physical exposure to climate-related hazards conjoins with high population density, low levels of household and community health and education, and poor governance and widespread political violence. Each of these four baskets — physical exposure, population density, household and community resilience, and governance and political violence — is represented by indicators. In all but the population basket, multiple indicators have been selected to represent the basket. We selected these particular indicators based on review of the existing literature and with some statistical tests to eliminate indicators that were highly correlated. We also selected these indicators with an eye towards identifying The German Marshall Fund of the United States FIGURE 9 Composite Vulnerability Baskets and Indicators sub-national data sources for a continent where data availability is problematic. Within each basket, indicators are assigned weights and aggregated. We then classify the vulnerability categories into quintiles with the least vulnerable 20 percent represented by yellow colors and the most vulnerable 20 percent represented by red. These quintile classifications are relative to the rest of Africa, not the rest of the world. So, while all of Africa might be vulnerable to climate change, some areas are more vulnerable than others (see Figure 9 for a representation). From the four baskets, we developed a composite map combining all four baskets of vulnerability. In Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 17 TABLE 3 Climate-Related Hazard Exposure Data Variable (weight) Unit Source Years Cyclone surge frequency (.167) Events per 1,000 years UNEP/GRID-Europe 1975 - 2007 Cyclone wind frequency (.167) Events per 1,000 years UNEP/GRID-Europe 1975 - 2007 Flood frequency (.167) Events per 100 years UNEP/GRID-Europe Drought events (.167) Number of events UNEP/GRID-Europe 1980 - 2001 Wildfire density (.167) Per year per 11.1 sq km pixel UNEP/GRID-Europe 1997 - 2008 Low elevation coastal zone (.167) Coastal areas below 10 m elevation USGS EROS this composite map, each of the baskets is weighted equally. We started the process by mapping physical exposure to climate-related hazards on its own and then created an additional map of population density, then another of community/household resilience, and then finally, a fourth map of governance and political violence. At each stage, we also created a map adding each new dimension to the previous one (such as climate exposure + population density). We then mapped the difference between the simpler map and then more complex one, which allows us to identify the places that show up as more or less vulnerable with the addition of each basket. As our composite model of vulnerability demonstrates, places that are physically exposed to climate hazards and are densely populated may be resilient to climate change because individuals and communities are better prepared to protect themselves and their governments are willing and able to help them when in need. In many countries in North Africa this is not true. The incremental addition of our 18 population, household/community, and governance/violence baskets shows the value of a more holistic approach to vulnerability. We use historic exposure to climate-related disasters to represent physical exposure. Models of future climate vulnerability for Africa notoriously show widespread disagreement among scientists about what is likely to happen. For that reason, we begin with past exposure to climate-related physical hazards (see Table 3 for a list of data sources). We include some early findings from our collaborative work with climate modelers that aims to do a better job mirroring past weather patterns in Africa and that produces data on timescales and indicators that are more useful for policy audiences. Findings Our map of climate hazard exposure shows the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia to be especially vulnerable as well as pockets of coastal Egypt, large swathes of western Ethiopia, and portions of southern Sudan (see Figure 10). The German Marshall Fund of the United States FIGURE 10 However, whether or not physical exposure to climate hazards actually translates into large-scale potential loss of life, damages, or security consequences like those explored in this paper ultimately depends on other factors. Obviously, there will be more potential loss of life if large numbers of people live in an area that is physically vulnerable. Because this work focuses on the direct impact to human populations, we exclude unpopulated areas from our analysis. Our maps of population density show the population of North Africa concentrated along the Mediterranean coastline and along the Nile in Egypt, with dense concentrations of people in western Ethiopia, a large concentration radiating around Khartoum, Sudan, and some moderate population density in the southern portion of Sahelian countries like Niger and Chad. The central part of the region is sparsely populated throughout the extent of the Sahara desert (see Figure 11). When we add the population basket to create a composite vulnerability index of physical exposure and population density (not shown), we find that coastal Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are more vulnerable while the interior, just south of the coast, of all three countries is less vulnerable. Egypt along the Nile appears much more vulnerable when we add in population, as do densely populated areas around Khartoum, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and Maradi (Niger). Portions of southern Sudan are less vulnerable given low population density. We next created a map of household and community resilience and added it to climate-related hazard exposure and population density (see Table 4 for data sources). The northern part of Sahelian countries of Niger, Chad, and Mali appears the most vulnerable alongside Ethiopia and Somalia. Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 19 FIGURE 11 TABLE 4 Africa-Wide Household and Community Resilience Data Variable (weight) Education (.25) Health (.25) Daily Necessities (.25) Access to Healthcare (.25) 20 Indicator (weight) Source Years of Data Availability Literacy rate, adult total (percent of people ages 15 and above) (.125) WDI 2000 - 2007; no data for The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, or Somalia School enrollment, primary (percent gross) (.125) WDI 2004 - 2008; 1998 for Angola; 1999 for Somalia; 2001 for Guinea-Bissau Infant mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) CIESIN 1991-2003 Life expectancy at birth (years) both sexes (.125) WHO 2006 Percent of children under age of 5 underweight (.125) CIESIN 1991-2003 Percent of population with sustainable access to improved drinking water sources (.125) WHO 2006; 2000 for Cape Verde and Seychelles Per capita total expenditure on health (PPP int. $) (.125) WHO 2006; 2001 for Somalia Nursing and midwifery personnel density (per 10,000 population) (.125) WHO 2002 - 2006; no data for Somalia The German Marshall Fund of the United States FIGURE 12 Adding this dimension to our overall composite subnational political violence, these form the core index brings down Morocco and Tunisia’s vulneraelements of our basket for governance and political bility while significantly increasing the vulnerability violence (see Table 5 for data sources). (by two quintiles) of southern Niger and Chad, as well as eastern Ethiopia and much of Somalia FIGURE 13 (see Figure 12). Finally, when we look at governance and political violence, we find that the Mediterranean countries have substantially better governance than a number of countries in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, elevating the vulnerability of the latter and lowering the vulnerability of the former. Figure 13, a chart of North African governance ratings, draws on national-level data of indicators of voice and accountability and government effectiveness, an index of global integration, and measures of political instability (see Figure 13). Along with the Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 21 TABLE 5 Governance and Political Violence Data Variable Indicator (weight) Source Year(s) Government Responsiveness Voice & Accountability (.2) World Governance Indicators 2008 Government Response Capacity Government Effectiveness (.2) World Governance Indicators 2008 Openness to External Assistance Globalization Index (.2) KOF Index of Globalization 2009 Government Stability Polity Variance (.1) Polity IV Project 2000 - 2009 Number of Stable Years (.1) Polity IV Project 1855 - 2009 Politically Motivated Atrocities Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) 1995 - 2008 Presence of Violence When we incorporate subnational data on atrocities, parts of Sudan and Somalia stand out, while the relatively good governance in Morocco, Tunisia, and Mali drives down their overall vulnerability (see Figure 14). Putting these four baskets together, we find that western Ethiopia stands out as the most vulnerable part of the region, with pockets of high vulnerability throughout south-central Sudan, southern Chad, Niger, and Somalia. Small pockets of medium vulnerability exist along the Mediterranean coastline in Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt (see Figure 15). When we look at the difference between the map that includes only physical exposure to climaterelated hazards and population density (human exposure to climate-related hazards) and the final composite map, we find that a number of areas appear to have relatively low human exposure to climate-related hazards but are far more vulnerable when we add in other dimensions (see Figure 16). These include southern Niger and Chad as well as Somalia. Western Ethiopia appears to be 22 highly vulnerable across all maps, whereas coastal Morocco and Tunisia are highly physically vulnerable to climate hazards but have lower overall composite vulnerability because of higher local resilience at the household and community level as well as better governance. Some questions emerge from these maps of vulnerability. What do they have to tell us about future vulnerability to climate change? Do we have confidence that the attributes of historic vulnerability will be similar in the future? Trying to project the physical dimensions of future climate change is difficult enough, so we limit our efforts there. While provisional, our preliminary findings from collaboration with climate modelers at the University of Texas suggest some continuity with historic patterns.41 For example, when we look at projected changes between the 1980-2000 period and the 2040-2060 period, we find that eastern and western Our collaborators are Kerry Cook and Ned Vizy from the Jackson School of Geosciences. The model uses the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) model from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The model is based on the A1B emissions scenario. 41 The German Marshall Fund of the United States FIGURE 14 Ethiopia, as well as parts of central Sudan, Chad, and Morocco will likely experience sharp increases in the number of heat wave days, though Algeria may experience fewer days of such hot weather (see Figure 17).42 When we look at the change in the number of drought days, we find that some of the Mediterranean coastline, particularly in Tunisia and Libya will experience an increased number of drought days, while Algeria may experience a decrease.43 Southern Mali, central Sudan, and the north coast of Somalia will also experience more drought, while southern Ethiopia and central Somalia may experience fewer dry days (see Figure 18). Heat waves are defined as three or more days with maximum daily temperatures of at least 105 degrees Fahrenheit. 42 Droughts here are defined as 21 consecutive days with less than 1mm of rainfall in any given day. 43 Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 23 FIGURE 15 FIGURE 16 24 The German Marshall Fund of the United States FIGURE 17 FIGURE 18 Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 25 3 Narratives of Climate Vulnerability in North Africa By way of several illustrative vignettes, we can understand how governance problems and political instability can transform exposure to climaterelated hazards into disasters and create negative spillover effects for the international community. Niger In fall 2010, Niger experienced the worst floods in 80 years along the Niger River, near the capital of Niamey. Nearly 8 million people in Niger alone were thought to be facing severe food shortages and 200,000 people had been displaced. Parts of Chad and northern Mali were also affected by unusual rainfall patterns across the region. The effects of the floods were thought to be more severe than previous ones because they occurred in the wake of crippling droughts.44 Niger was also beset by a number of other problems. In February 2010, the military seized power in a coup, displacing the country’s leader who had been in power for more than a decade and had sought to amend the constitution in order to retain power.45 The military government promised a swift restoration of democracy and was relatively responsive to the country’s flooding and droughts. Nonetheless, Niger’s governance problems limit the country’s capacity to respond to other problems (Niger ranked 35th out of 53 African countries in our governance index, and in the 2009 UNDP Human Development Index, Niger ranked last in the world).46 Niger’s strategic importance has been elevated due to its reserves of uranium. Niger provides about 8 percent of the global market for uranium (with the French particularly reliant on it) at the mines in Arlit and Akouta in northern Niger along the Johnson 2010; Thomson 2010; Norweigan Council for Africa 2010. border between the Sahara Desert and the eastern part of the Aïr mountains. In this area, the French firm Areva is constructing a major uranium mine. The Imouraren mine is planned to come online in 2013 or 2014 and produce 5,000 tons of uranium a year, making Niger the second largest producer in the world. However, political instability in Niger from multiple fronts may make that difficult.47 Even as Niger’s interim military government was grappling with the floods, seven foreigners, including five French nationals, were kidnapped in the uranium-mining region in September 2010 by groups affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), leading the French government to encourage the 1,700 nationals in the country to leave the mining region.48 With the status of the kidnapped staff unknown at the time of writing, it is unclear what effect this episode will have on Niger’s long-term ability to export uranium. Aside from the recent challenge posed by AQIM, Niger and other Sahelian countries also have periodic challenges from Tuareg nomads who live in the uranium-mining region and in neighboring countries. The Tuareg, who have long been marginalized from the seats of government in the region, began a rebellion in 2007 that continued through 2009, motivated in part by a desire for a greater share of mineral wealth. Calm only returned after a 2009 ceasefire, which was one of many that have occurred in the last couple of decades. While Tuareg mobilization dates back to the early 20th century, there have been more recent cycles of rebellion from the 1990s on, punctuated by periodic ceasefires in 1995, 1998, and 2006.49 The Tuareg have a sometimes contentious relationship with AQIM. For example, the Tuareg were thought 44 47 Lewis and Massalatchi 2010. Reuters 2010b, 2010a. Hershkowitz 2005; AlertNet 2007; UPI 2009. 45 Smith 2010. 48 46 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 49 26 The German Marshall Fund of the United States FIGURE 19 to have provided intelligence to French authorities, which prompted a summer 2010 raid that killed senior AQIM leaders. In response, AQIM kidnapped a Tuareg customs officer in Mali.50 AQIM’s ability to operate in regions populated by the Tuareg may have depended upon complicity by the Tuareg, but the increasingly violent activity by AQIM, which brought in unprecedented international scrutiny, may have alienated the Tuareg and lead to a rupture between them.51 The AQIM threat, though perhaps inflated by international 50 Intelligence Quarterly 2010; Daily Middle East Reporter 2010. 51 Kennedy-Boudali 2009. observers, nonetheless has taken on new significance with the potential effect on the uraniummining sector. The latest attacks prompted a renewed effort at regional security. It is unclear what these problems collectively mean for Niger’s future security. The floods occurred in the south of the country near Niamey, along the length of the Niger River. The Tuareg and the uranium mines are located further north in areas where the government’s reach is weaker. In the thinly populated regions, AQIM has found sanctuary. The uranium is typically transported in liquidated form by truck along a road (the so-called Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 27 “Uranium Highway”) from Arlit to Tahoua to Birnin Konni to Dosso and out of Niger at Gaya/ Malanville to the coast at Cotonou, Benin (see Figure 19). While the uranium highway crosses the Niger River at Gaya, satellite photos of the floods did not include the bridge at Gaya.52 Other reports suggested that large numbers of animals died from hypothermia and flooding in the area east of Tahoua and south of Agadez (see Figure 19 for a map of the Niger River Basin and its composite climate vulnerability).53 The confluence of problems in Niger — political instability, disasters, al Qaeda activity, and insurgencies — may not have long-run implications for the country’s security, regional stability, terrorism, or global uranium supplies. Then again, the situation is in flux. The narrative here is meant to suggest that weak governments in the region, beset by other problems, will have trouble dealing with climate emergencies and that extreme weather events will, in turn, make it difficult for capacityconstrained and unstable regimes to be able to address other challenges. Sudan The Darfur region of western Sudan has already been identified by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as the world’s first climate war, harkening back to the droughts and the land and grazing disputes between nomads and farmers that predated the Sudanese government’s support for the Janjaweed militias in the early 2000s. Whether or not droughts or variable rains had an important role in the on-going conflict in western Sudan remains hotly contested. Debating the relative role played by environmental causes in Darfur compared to other political factors may ultimately be unproductive. Would the farmers and herders have had reason to fight over resources in a world of more reliable rain? Possibly, but the particular story would have been different. Looking ahead, the political story in Sudan appears to dominate. The south is scheduled to have a vote for secession in January 2011. With the country’s oil reserves located in the south, the expected vote in favor of southern secession may lead to renewed violence throughout Sudan. For a country that lost 2 million people to 20 years of civil war in the 1980s and 1990s, the prospect of another civil war is a great and grave possibility. In 2009, political violence claimed more than 2,000 lives in the area near the North-South border and displaced more than 300,000 people.54 As the south votes on secession, the contested area of Abyei is set to have its own referendum on whether to join the South or remain with the North. Other areas, the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, also may be sites of future contestation; though technically part of the north, large numbers of people from these regions fought with the south during Sudan’s previous civil war.55 In this context, the role of environmental factors might seem overshadowed by politics, but like Niger, policymakers should consider the role that extreme and variable weather could play in different parts of the country, particularly when coupled with Sudan’s history of political violence and instability. As our maps of Sudan’s vulnerability suggest, the country has pockets of relatively high physical exposure particularly in the south, near the city of Juba, the expected southern capital. In the event of a weather emergency, southern Sudan might not have the capacity to address the needs of its populace. Moreover, should fighting re-emerge in Sudan, a conflict-riddled southern Sudan might find it difficult to get relief supplies into the 52 DLR 2010. 54 Gettelman 2009. 53 FEWSNET 2010. 55 Schwartz 2009; International Crisis Group 2010. 28 The German Marshall Fund of the United States FIGURE 20 Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 29 country, particularly in the event of a weatherrelated emergency. The roads around the southern capital suffered intense damage during the civil war and were heavily land-mined. Only in late 2010 was a route to Uganda taking shape to ease travel, though it passes through Gulu, an area with a history of instability from Uganda’s own insurgent group, the Lord’s Resistance Army.56 In January 2009, nearly 40,000 people were displaced when unusual rains affected the southeastern state of Jonglei and heavy rains caused the Nile to overflow its banks.57 In January 2010, the World Food Programme estimated that drought and conflict together meant that the number of people who needed food assistance increased from 1 million in January 2009 to 4.3 million a year later. In August 2010, floods displaced more than 50,000 around the southern town of Aweil, just two years after its previous flooding.58 While relief supplies could be brought in by air, southern Sudan is an immense region, so the absence of good infrastructure to distribute aid could pose a serious problem. A Sudan embroiled in a North-South civil war might also be inattentive to droughts or food insecurity in other parts of the country like Darfur, which is also both riven by conflict and historically prone to drought. Perhaps Sudan is not seen as a strategically important country to the West, but renewed civil war, coupled with perennial floods and droughts made worse by climate change, could put large numbers of people at risk of mass death, rivaling or exceeding the atrocities observed in Darfur in recent years (see Figure 20 for a map of composite climate vulnerability in Sudan). 56 Thome 2010. 57 Bianchi 2009; AFP 2010. 58 World Food Programme 2010; IRIN 2010. 30 The German Marshall Fund of the United States 4 Conclusion and Policy Implications As our discussion of the potential security consequences of climate change noted, advocates for more aggressive action on climate change have seized on the security connection to draw attention to their cause. In an effort to demonstrate the importance of their concerns, there is a risk of speaking beyond the available evidence to sell the threat, what Dean Acheson described in the Cold War as being “clearer than truth.” The policy world has run ahead of the scholarly community in terms of taking the security consequences of climate change like conflict and migration at face value. As we have found, there is some potential to overstate the severity of these threats or a risk of mischaracterizing their nature. By labeling climate change as a security threat, resources are directed towards some dimensions of the problem and potentially not others. At the same time, security problems potentially elicit the interest of the military. Their influence and expertise are valuable, but preventing the worst security consequences of climate change is largely going to be the responsibility of civilian agencies and foreign assistance programs. Even if climate change is understood to be a security problem, it would be unfortunate if the security dimension primarily came to be seen as the military’s problem. In advancing policies to address the problem, we are better served by evidence-driven assessments. This study of the North African region has investigated a range of security consequences — conflict, migration, terrorism, and disaster relief — to determine what role climate change might play in relation to them. For most of the concerns, our main conclusion is that the available evidence is inconclusive, that the threats specified by many advocates in the climate security debate are not yet supported by academic work on conflict, migration, and terrorism. Our preliminary efforts to describe their meaning in North Africa suggest that the concerns are real, but much more work needs to be done before the grandiose claims of climate security enthusiasts are substantiated. As for large-scale humanitarian disasters, events in Africa and worldwide suggest that people are vulnerable to extreme weather events and that militaries are increasingly finding humanitarian rescue and relief to be part of their normal operations. While crisis early-warning systems for both conflict and famine are important ways the policy community has sought to prevent the worst consequences from coming to pass, building government capacity to make countries and communities more resilient to climate shocks remain important priorities. At the same time, the policy community needs to continually engage academics on the state of their findings and commit to policies that will be beneficial to countries, even if the worst security consequences of climate change do not come to pass. These include early warning systems, disaster preparedness, weather station monitoring, reforestation, better building codes, and drought-resistant agriculture. As our maps of composite vulnerability suggest, the places ultimately most vulnerable to the security concerns we discussed may not be those countries most physically exposed to climate-related hazards. Though western Ethiopia appears across all baskets as especially vulnerable, we observe that North African countries along the Mediterranean tend to be physically exposed to climate hazards but that this vulnerability is offset by better education and health indicators and superior governance at the national level (as compared to the rest of the continent). By contrast, countries across the Sahel and Horn, save for Mali, tend to exhibit extremely poor governance and possess low indicators for health and education, making them much more vulnerable to weather hazards than they would otherwise be, potentially transforming moderate droughts and floods into major humanitarian emergencies. Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 31 On one hand, this suggests that foreign assistance resources be directed to areas that need it the most: southern Chad, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, and persistently vulnerable western Ethiopia. On the other hand, these are precisely the governments least likely to spend the money well. So, while the need is great, building state capacity for any purpose, let alone to protect the country from climate change, will be a great challenge. With these observations in mind, we recommend the following policy approaches: 1. Focus resources and attention on the areas and countries most vulnerable to climate change from a holistic perspective including western Ethiopia and pockets in southern Sudan, Chad, and Niger. •Build basic government capacity in those areas as more capacity to deliver services could spill over to climate-related areas. Countries like Morocco and Tunisia, despite facing higher physical exposure to climate change, are likely to be better equipped to handle the problem. This observation leads to a conundrum for donors. The countries with the most capacity to protect themselves from the effects of climate change may be best able to spend donor money appropriately.59 Trying to equip Somalia with the resources to handle extreme weather events in the absence of a functioning government would be a challenge, if not an impossibility. •Support NGO and local government efforts to protect people through targeted investments in early warning systems, disaster preparedness, drought-resistant agriculture, and weather monitoring. 2. Build cooperative relationships with North African governments on the Mediterranean that are physically vulnerable to climate change but have more capacity to address the problem. One approach would be to focus on the specific areas where physical exposure is most severe at the sub-national level and try to support community and household resilience through targeted investments in NGOs and possibly local governments in western Ethiopia. However, given that state capacity is the main limiting factor, continual investments in NGOs are not an attractive long-run solution. Even amidst broader government disarray, it may be possible to focus on small areas of technocratic competence such as military-to-military training exercises on disaster preparedness or better weather monitoring. At the same time, support for conflict resolution and basic state-building activities in countries may spillover to other domains, allowing people to address other concerns like climate change. This mirrors similar findings from the foreign assistance community on aid effectiveness (Kaufmann 2009, 2010a, 2010b). 59 32 •Focus on information-sharing and mobilization of the government’s own resources to protect against climate-related hazards. •Develop better information resources on migration and agriculture to assess the responsiveness of North Africans to changing agricultural yields. While the precise connections and security consequences remain uncertain, our vulnerability assessments can help policymakers to prioritize resources. Preventive action and measures to address the most vulnerable areas and countries should be more cost-effective than responding to weather emergencies after the fact. At the same time, such investments should mostly involve development assistance rather than hard power, though some investments in training local mili- The German Marshall Fund of the United States taries in disaster response will be a priority. 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