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Naomi Fischer
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Senior Thesis
Pride Goes Before A Fall: Foreign Policy and American Hubris
In the spring of 1975 the last American evacuee of the Vietnam War was airlifted
off of the American embassy roof in Saigon. A conflict of fourteen years had finally
come to a close, leaving 58,202 Americans killed in action and 303,644 wounded.1 Public
sentiment had turned against the war: inductees burned their draft cards, young people
took to the streets to demonstrate and to vilify public officials. Years before the Vietnam
War had ended the lessons of the war were already being discussed. Many American
scholars identified what they saw as the country’s essential flaw: a sense of global
entitlement that extended back to a nineteenth century belief in Manifest Destiny,2 the
conviction of American settlers that Western expansion was their inherent right. The
mass destruction of Vietnam should have been the end of America’s global interventions.
However, since then America has engaged in eleven wars and conflicts off of its soils.
Twenty-six years later, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq has cost the U.S thousands in
dead and wounded. From espousing a policy of isolationism America has developed into
one of the most aggressive foreign players. How did we get here?
As World War I raged across the European peninsula, Americans maintained a
policy of neutrality. President Woodrow Wilson asserted in a speech in 1915, “There is
1
Records of U.S. Military Casualties, Missing in Action, and Prisoners of War from the Era of the Vietnam War."
National Archives. United States Government, n.d. Web. 332
2
Axelrod, Alan. The Real History of the Vietnam War: A New Look At The Past. New York:
Sterling, 2013. Print.
Fischer 2 such a thing as a nation being too proud to fight.”3 However, it soon became clear that
America was no such nation. In 1917 Germany announced that it would sink any
submarines bringing supplies to their enemies. Wilson responded, “I cannot consent to
any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect…”4 a claim that Richard
Hofstadter, author of The American Political Tradition called a “rationalization of the
flimsiest sort.”5 While this may seem like a departure from official isolationist ideology,
American methods employed in the search for security have always alternated between
isolationism and interventionism. The overarching principle for maintaining the security
of the country at home and abroad has remained the same over time: to be secure,
America worked to ensure that foreign powers allowed American institutions to flourish.
Therefore, the country was committed to opposing totalitarian threats to a European
balance of power.6 Wilson’s response in World War I became relevant again when
America faced the challenges of World War II. With the fall of France to Germany in
1940, America had to worry again about the balance of the world’s power. Continuing
policies of isolationism remained strongly supported in Congress. However, like Wilson
in the First World War, Franklin Roosevelt understood that a totalitarian government like
Hitler’s was a particularly ominous threat.7 On December 7, 1941 the Japanese attacked
Pearl Harbor— to which America responded by declaring war. Four years later, America
3 Zinn, Howard. A People's History of The United States. New York: HarperCollins Publishers,
1999. Print. 361 4
Zinn 361
As cited by Fromkin, David. In the Time of The American:FDR, Truman, Eisenhower,
Marshall, MacArthur-The Generation That Changed America 's Role in the World. New York:
First Vintage Books, 1995. Print. 104
6
Gaddis, John Lewis. “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point” Council on foreign
Relations:386. JSTOR
5
Fischer 3 dropped the atomic bomb on Japan, and in mid- August Japan surrendered.8 In terms of
armaments, the United States had finally become a massive power. America had tasted
victory, and aided by its economic stability in a time of deep uncertainty, and its sole
ownership of the atomic bomb, the country was ready to take the global reins. The
coming years would witness overt proclamations of previously understated beliefs and
ideologies that would forever change the United States.
Sixty-seven years have passed since Harry S. Truman declared on March 12, 1947
that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjection by armed minorities or outside pressures.”9 Truman’s proclamation
established the moment when Americans officially abandoned isolationist policies,
accepted responsibility as a world power, and began the process by which America
became the world’s policeman. Although considered revolutionary, the policies of the
Truman Doctrine were already in place in America’s ideology, existing as far back as the
Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The significant difference between previous ideologies and
that of Truman’s reflects America’s changing views of the once dominant European
powers. For the United States in the 20th Century a stable international environment could
only be guaranteed if there was a balance of power, without domination by a single
hostile state.10 Following World War II America no longer trusted anyone but itself to
assure and sustain stability. The novelty of the Truman Doctrine is not that it marked a
fundamental ideological shift, but rather, that it indicated a new self-confidence in
America’s right to foreign policy domination, and that it identified an enemy in current
affairs that must be combated at all costs.
8
Fromkin 594
As cited by Gaddis 386
10
Gaddis 387
9
Fischer 4 A belief in America’s ability to lead quickly became unassailable dogma, as
America intervened in situations it did not fully understand in order to preserve its
position of power. Since the acceptance of the Truman doctrine America has all too often
committed manpower and resources to fight a perceived monolith, consistently with
futility—a policy that has extended to current times. Perceived victories have given
American leaders impetus to continue failed policies, establishing a pattern of historical
blindness that has led America to the brink of disaster. From Vietnam to Iraq, America
has ignored the teachings of the past in order to chase an impossible goal. After years of
following unfruitful policy, will America ever learn its lesson?
The Truman Doctrine was issued as a direct response to the conflict in Greece and
Turkey in 1947. An overextended British Government sought the intervention of the
United States in the Greek Civil War. Seizing on an opportunity to put credibility behind
their claim for dominance, the Truman Administration answered the British appeal,
causing a state department official to comment, “Great Britain had within the hour
handed the job of world leadership…to the United States.”11 Although Stalin had not
instigated the civil war in Greece, and had hardly provided even moral support to the
indigenous Greek insurgency, the American government considered the Soviet power
their adversary.12 Truman compared the crisis in Greece to the crisis preceding World
War II and responded accordingly, providing American armaments and military aid. His
actions angered many, including George Keenan, the notorious writer of the “Long
Telegram” that launched America into it’s Cold War mindset. While Keenan supported
11
Ambrose, Stephen E., and Douglas G. Brinkley. Rise To Globalism: American Foreign Policy
Since 1938. London: Penguin Books, 1997. Print. 79
12
Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.
640
Fischer 5 helping the Greek government, he thought there was no need to wage warfare, believing
instead that the issue should be handled through economic and political aid.13 Keenan
seemed to recognize the detrimental nature of the over ambitious policy from the start.
Truman was preparing to make a speech that Keenan considered “grandiose and
sweeping.”14 What Keenan missed was Truman’s need to sway public sentiment that was
dependent on the idea of classic American heroism: that America was competing in a
battle of Good vs. Evil. Preoccupied with domestic issues, uninformed about the situation
in Greece and wary of global intervention, the American public needed a moral
imperative in order to support action.15 Republican Senate leader Arthur Vandenberg of
Michigan advised the President to “scare the hell out of the country.”16 In a very
publicized speech in front of a joint session of Congress in 1947, Truman heeded his
advice. The statement itself was all encompassing. Echoing warnings of a world “divided
between freedom and totalitarianism”17, Truman launched the country into a new global
age.
In a single sentence, the President had distilled and defined American foreign
policy for the future. No matter where in the world, if an anti-communist country was
threatened by an indigenous communist revolt or foreign invasion, the United States felt
justified to supply political, economic and military aid.18 Therefore a government would
be supported even if it was authoritarian and totalitarian, as Richard Barnett, author of
Intervention and Revolution made clear of the Greek Government when he described it
13
Ambrose and Brinkley. 81
as cited by Ambrose and Brinkley 81
15
Herring 639
16
As cited by Ambrose and Brinkley 83
17
Merrill, Dennis. The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity. N.P.: Wiley,
2006. JSTOR.
18
Ambrose and Brinkley 82
14
Fischer 6 as, “particularly brutal and backward.”19 Americans were swayed in the same way they
were in 1941 at the beginning of World War II. Truman had struck a chord with the
majority of his countrymen. The fight against communism portrayed as a cause that
transcended national and economic affairs appealed wildly to a country that expected
their wars to be grand heroic crusades against darkness. With an unprecedented $400
million dollar aid program dedicated to the fight, the rebellion in Greece was defeated in
1949.20 With their fresh victory, Americans ignored the atrocities perpetuated by the
Greek repressive monarchy, misconstruing the struggle as a fight against Communism
alone, ignoring the essentially domestic nature of the insurgency. Victory came at a steep
cost for the Greek people, with 100,000 killed, 5,000 executed and 800,000 refuges.21
“This is only the beginning,”22 declared Truman during a discussion with his cabinet, but
if the warnings of Greece had been heeded, it could have been the end. America had
failed to understand the moral gravity of fighting the wrong enemy, a mistake that would
haunt them in the battlefields of Korea, and again in Vietnam.
While the Civil War in Greece prompted its creation, the real first test of the
Truman Doctrine came in the 1950’s with the Korean War. Arguments over the
unification of the Russian and American supported country resulted in a divided Korea.
The United States backed the conservative Southern Government, while the communist
North Koreans were loosely supported by the Soviet Union. Guerrilla fighting raged
across the peninsula between 1940 and 1950.23 America did not support the South
Korean leader’s desire to wage a total war against North Korea in order to unify the
19
As cited by Herring 639
20 Herring 639 21
Herring 617
As cited by Herring 617
23
Herring 639
22
Fischer 7 country, worried that the leader’s ambitions might entangle the U.S in a war it could not
afford in an area of marginal significance,24 a rare act of caution by the United States.
North Korean leader Kim-Il Sung sought the same support from Stalin for his quest for
unification. Perhaps persuaded by Truman’s withdrawal from South Korea, and a speech
by Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of State, leaving the province out of
America’s “defensive perimeter”,25 Stalin gave Kim the go ahead. In response, America
returned passionately and with little debate to the cause. Having recently suffered the fall
of China to communism, the administration perceived that for reasons of domestic
politics it could not afford the loss of additional Asian territory.
Two main arguments are repeated when speaking of America’s response in the
Korean War. First, under their new doctrine, America believed that if they did nothing
their European allies would lose faith in their promises. Second, as stated by Brent
Scowcroft, a retired United States Air Force Lieutenant General, America looked at the
situations of “all these little pinpricks, as…‘How can we show the Soviets that they can’t
get away with anything?’”26 Domestic and political pressures had reduced the
Administration’s ability to distinguish between peripheral and vital interests.27 Having
pictured the Soviet Union as seeking world domination, it was difficult to explain why
the United States should not resist communism wherever it appeared. America entered
Korea as a full-scale proxy war against the Soviet Union. Ultimately it was the Korean
War that escalated the policies of the Truman Doctrine.
24
Herring 640
as cited by Herring 640
26 As quoted by Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Brent Scowcroft, comps. America and The
World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy. New York: Basic Books, 2008.
Print.
27
Gaddis 394
25
Fischer 8 In the first six months of the Korean War, UN and United States forces could not
stop the North Korean onslaught.28 A risky maneuver by General MacArthur saw
suddenly victorious US forces drive North Korean troops back over the 38th parallel.29
Perhaps caught up in the momentum of their unexpected victory, perhaps out of hubris,
the United States ignored multiple warnings from the Chinese as they crossed the 38th
parallel,30 encroaching on Chinese borders with the intent to crush the North Korean
army, and liberate the country from communism. Rarely had one nation so completely
misjudged the capabilities of another.
Chinese intervention in Korea in November of 1950 demonstrated the
Administration’s inability to assess the effects of its own actions, and its plain wishful
thinking. In two weeks China cleared much of North Korea, isolated MacArthur’s troops,
and completely reversed the course of the war.31 In 1951 the war settled into a bloody
stalemate, leaving the American generals and troops shocked and reeling. By holding its
own against the United States, Mao’s China gained instant world power status.32 To its
credit the Truman Administration did not seek a war with China, instead reverting back
to its original goal: liberating South Korea. In this respect, America could claim success
in Korea; the North Koreans had gained no ground, and communism had not seeped
across the divide. Ignoring the losses and devastation, the Korean War, formulated as a
victory, could then be used as a blueprint for the future.
28
Herring 641
Herring 641
30
Ambrose and Brinkley 121
31
Ambrose and Brinkley 121
32
Herring 650
29
Fischer 9 Because of the Korean War, the prevailing view of communism in Asia, as in
Europe, was as a monolith33 and as the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1952 put it, “each
Communist gain directly involves a loss to the Western World.”34 The escalation of the
Truman Doctrine in both theory and practice was now complete. After the Korean War,
sites of Communist growth of seemingly marginal significance to the world order, such
as Vietnam, were treated as high priorities. Whether America viewed these conflicts as
legitimate threats, or whether they sought to protect American pride and self-interest is
unclear. However, at the end of the Korean War, America was poised to enter a conflict
that would devolve into one of the greatest periods of American loss in the history of the
nation.
From 1964 to 1972, the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world exerted
maximum military effort against a nationalist revolutionary movement in a tiny country.
The road to Vietnam was a long one: beginning in 1950 with America’s decision to aid
France in suppressing the Vietminh revolution. America’s commitment expanded
incrementally from economic to military aid to the commitment of U.S combat troops in
1965. Anti-communist fervor had grown in strength in America, due in large part to the
widespread “red scare” that permeated every United States household. The United States
viewed the conflict in Vietnam largely in terms of the struggle with the Soviet Union in
the Cold War.35 From the outset, American officials considered the Vietnamese
33
Gaddis 397
As cited in JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on “United Sates Objectives and
Courses of Action with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia,” March 3, 1952
United States—Vietnam Relations, VIII, p. 488
35
Herring, George. The New American Realism. N.p.: Council on Foreign Relations, n.d. Print
pg. 106
34
Fischer 10 revolutionary leaders pawns of the Soviet drive for world domination.36 The reality was
far more complex. The leaders of the Vietnamese Revolution, Ho Chi Minh and his
associates, were indeed communists. However, Minh initiated the revolution with little
outside support from Moscow.37 It prospered because the revolution identified with
Vietnamese nationalism, and had a base of indigenous support not connected to
international Communism. After the quasi-victory of Korea, no communist threat was too
small for the United States. By the 1950s there was talk in the White House of what was
to become known as the “domino theory”38: if one country fell to Communism, the next
one would do the same and so on. Therefore it was imperative to stop the first country
from falling. However, like America’s misjudgment of the power of the Chinese in the
Korean War, American policymakers again underestimated the abilities of a group of
individuals fighting for their homeland. The Vietnam War was, as Howard Zinn, author
of A People’s History of the United States put it, a battle of “organized modern
technology versus organized human beings, and the human beings won.”39
By the end of the Vietnam War America had dropped 7 million tons of bombs on
the country, more than twice the total bombs dropped on Europe and Asia in World War
II.40 Additionally, poisonous sprays coated the countryside and Vietnamese mothers were
reporting birth defects in their children. Guerilla warfare had subjected American soldiers
to intense psychological trauma, fueling horrific violence against the citizens of South
Vietnam. “Operation Phoenix” facilitated by the CIA in Vietnam, secretly executed,
36
Herring The New American Realism 107
Herring 107
38
Zinn 471
39
Zinn 472
40
Zinn 478
37
Fischer 11 without trial, twenty thousand civilians under the suspicion of communist practices.41 In
March of 1968 a company of American soldiers massacred the inhabitants of My Lai
without provocation. When Army investigators finally searched the barren area early in
1969 they discovered the mass graves of over 500 people—mostly women, children and
elderly.42 The “Madness”43 as Martin Luther King Jr. called it when he spoke in 1967 in
New York, had gone on too long. Young men refused to register for the draft. By mid1968 3,305 prosecutions were begun against men refusing to be inducted. Public
sentiment had turned against not only the Vietnam War but also all wars. The cruelty of
Vietnam had touched the American conscience as the chant “LBJ, LBJ, how many kids
did you kill today?”44 was heard in protests across the country. The resounding defeat in
Vietnam had quenched the American public’s desire for foreign policy domination. Their
sons, brothers and husbands had been killed for a cause far from their shore, one that no
longer seemed as pressing and relevant as it had years before.
From the point of view of many, Vietnam had been a failure. The American
government had underestimated the power of the Vietnamese, and Americans had died
trying to achieve an impossible goal. As a result, the country’s pride had been dealt a
massive blow. Alan Axelrod, author of The Real History of Vietnam argued that “the
sense that America was destined to dominate global affairs led the United States to make
reckless alliances with inept and brutal partners…”45 The pattern, from Greece, to Korea
to Vietnam was becoming clear. America’s involvement in the Vietnam War was a
product of a political-cultural mindset that could not see past Cold War motives of
41
Zinn 480
Zinn 480
43
As Cited by Zinn 485
44
as cited by Zinn 497
45 Axelrod 332 42
Fischer 12 containing communism. There remained, however, a spectrum of opinions. Those on the
left blamed American hubris, while those on the right placed the fault with American
political leaders, who they saw as not having done enough, not having been aggressive
enough, to win.46 Policy makers should have again learned an invaluable lesson: America
could not win a sustained victory in places that did not desire American intervention. In
Vietnam, America was portrayed as an imperialist force and the Northern Vietnamese
championed the anti-colonial struggle for national independence—and won. The Vietnam
War, with its causalities, shame and exposure of government lies and atrocities had
turned the national mood hostile. Out of the myriad of points of view one sentiment was
often repeated: let there be no more Vietnams.
This idea became a mantra of American politics and foreign policy. Nevertheless,
shockingly, it failed to stay the all too eager hands of twenty-first century ideologues and
demagogues from pushing to engage America militarily in equally incomprehensible
conflicts. America’s pride and determination to maintain its global position did not lessen
after the Vietnam War, and there remained a fear in the country that vulnerability
anywhere might become general vulnerability everywhere. After the Cold War had
finished, Americans were left uneasy—the monolith, as Truman had identified it, had
fallen, and America was unclear of its next move. Over the next decades America’s
global challenges moved away from a battle against a greater communist threat, to a
general sense of global turbulence. The direct attack on American soil in September of
2001 gave impetus to a return to an ideology of containing a single monolith—this time
terrorism.
46
Axelrod 343
Fischer 13 Again America had an enemy to fight. This enemy was everywhere, and quickly
embroiled America in conflicts that escalated out of its control. The legacy of the Truman
Doctrine lived on in the Neo-Conservative movement and the Liberal Hawks, who
believed that American influence was necessary to promote democratic institutions in the
global community. Much like Vietnam, America was again fighting a great power that it
did not fully understand, but this time, America lacked the resources to maintain its
military industrial complex. After 9/11 President Bush declared, “We shall make no
distinction between terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists.”47 The Bush
Administration began bombing Afghanistan after the Taliban refused to extradite Osama
bin Laden, the man responsible for ordering the attack on American soil. Bush ignored
the teachings of history: British retaliation against the Irish Republican Army, Israel’s
response to terrorism from Palestinians and Clinton’s response to the attack of U.S
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, all examples that distinctly showed that
terrorism could not be defeated by force alone. Like Vietnam, the months of bombing had
been devastating to a country that had gone through decades of war and destruction.
However, in his State of the Union address Bush declared, “we are winning the war on
terror.”48 While America could justify its actions in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq was a
blatant disregard of historical precedent.
Once the war in Afghanistan was reported as a victory, the country pivoted focus
to Iraq, as the Bush administration sought to wipe the regime of dictator Saddam Hussein
off the face of the earth. For the neo-conservatives the war in Iraq satisfied a deep
philosophical conviction in America’s right and moral duty to oppose tyranny and spread
47
48
as cited by Zinn 678
as cited by Zinn 678
Fischer 14 democracy. Again a “domino effect” was mentioned—the neo-cons believing fervently
that democracy in Iraq would set off democracy throughout the Middle East. In an
obvious fashion, Iraq followed the rules of Vietnam. The conflict quickly devolved into
guerrilla warfare. By June of 2002 attacks on U.S troops increased sharply, and by 2003
they faced a full-fledged and increasingly lethal opposition, while Jihadists from all over
the Middle East entered the country in order to fight.49 Just like the War in Vietnam,
supporters believed that U.S forces would be welcomed as liberators. Optimistic
assumptions caused a gross miscalculation of what would be required to maintain
peace.50 What had once appeared to be an easy victory revealed itself to be a new
collective nightmare, one that could have been prevented if politicians had paid attention
to the teachings of the past.
The cost of the wars for the United States was substantial. Four thousand
Americans had been killed in Iraq by early 2008.51 A decline in enlistments, even with
lowered standards and higher incentives, threatened the volunteer army concept, a key
policy of post Vietnam War national security. Economic costs of the war were
staggering, estimated at $800 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan, with long-term costs
estimated to be as high as $3 trillion.52 The U.S invasion of Iraq produced fury in the
Muslim world, engendering widespread anti-Americanism, causing more and more
individuals to join the fight against the U.S. Despite their best efforts, America had not
yet achieved its goals in the Global War on Terror, and the country was tired.
49
Herring 953
Herring 953
51
Herring 958
52
Herring 958
50
Fischer 15 The United States’ power was declining. This change was a result of an inevitable
worldwide backlash against U.S hegemony. The 2011 “Arab Spring” roused hope in warweary Americans who wished to see an independent arrival of democracy in Muslim
states. However, when these conflicts turned violent, as tyrannical dictators fought back
against revolutionaries, and those wishing for supreme power subverted “democratic”
elections—it became clear that U.S action would again be called upon. Many individuals
have argued for American involvement, particularly in the conflict in Syria and the
Ukraine. Many on the Right have criticized President Obama’s caution towards military
intervention. Senator John McCain exclaimed that Obama’s policies are “feckless” so
that “nobody believes in America’s strength anymore.”53 The Washington Post warned
that President Obama’s foreign policy “is based on fantasy.”54 However, in contrast,
President Obama’s policies seem to demonstrate, for the first time in American history, a
general attentiveness to the mistakes of the past.
The Wars in Greece, Korea, Vietnam and Iraq were all wars of choice, motivated
by an American desire to see a kind of global democratic paradise under American
supervision. The Truman doctrine had successfully painted an exaggerated picture of the
power of American enemies abroad, calling to mind an old Austrian saying, “out of fear
of dying, we committed suicide.”55 It took Vietnam to instill in the American psyche the
devastation of a battle lost, and it took the War in Iraq to degrade America’s public image
both domestically and internationally. America faces the same risks today as it did on the
eve of the Vietnam War. The established rules of the War on Terror: an implacable
53
as cited by Kristof, Nicholas. "Who's the Villain Here?" New York Times [New York]: n.
page. Print
54
As cited by Kristof
55
As cited by Lievan and Hulsman 67
Fischer 16 sentiment of hostility towards Terrorist States, as it was with the Communist States, is
dangerous. The concept of war in Syria or the Ukraine, viewed in the light of its
predecessors, appears potentially tragic.
Instead, Obama has adopted a policy of restraint that reflects a broader position,
informed, perhaps, by the mistakes of President Bush’s crusade for democracy. Benjamin
J. Rhodes, a deputy national security advisor argues that, “These democratic movements
will be more sustainable if they are seen as not an extension of America or any other
country, but coming from within these societies.”56 The world is beginning to learn that
the bar for U.S intervention is set much higher than it was previously, due in large part to
the fall of the Soviet threat, and the experience of investing too many lives and trillions of
dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan to little lasting impact.57 In the Cold War, policymaking
was straightforward; containment told us what to do and when. The gravest mistake that
America could make today is carrying over the policies of the past into the future, while
leaving the lessons they should have taught us behind. Today, Obama’s critics urge that
action must be taken in Syria and the Ukraine, but we must listen to the teachings of
history and learn our lessons. First, how little we understand the complexities of the
social and political environments of the countries we are attempting to change, and
second that we cannot independently cause good things to happen, and that when we try,
we run the risk of misdirecting a responsibility that truly belongs to the country itself.
The American people should feel skepticism whenever policymakers invoke an
idea of “national interest” or “national security” to justify action. Such justifications led
56
As cited by Baker, Peter. "Wary Stance From Obama: Departure from Bush in Ukraine
Response." New York Times [New York]: n. pag. Print
57
Friedman, Thomas L. "Don't Just Do Something. Sit There." New York Times [Ne York]: n.
pag. Print.
Fischer 17 to the deaths of millions in Korea and Vietnam, the bombings of Afghanistan and the
invasion of Iraq. It is still uncertain whether this same justification will lead America into
another war today. Cultural influences and the accessibility of the media establish a moral
necessity for action, which may lead us down that road again. If there was a way for
America to fix these conflicts in a self-sustaining manner at a cost the country can afford,
the United States should intervene. However, history has shown that this is not possible.
America cannot define evil for the rest of the world; it cannot impose its ways on other
peoples by military force. For the future, America must learn to function in a world
where it no longer calls the shots. As political analyst Fareed Zakaria concluded, “For
America to continue to lead the world, we will have to join it.”58
58
As cited by Herring, 598
Fischer 18 Works Cited
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