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Chinese Politics DA Answers (NDCA)
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Chinese Politics DA Answers
2AC — All Affirmatives ...................................................................................................................2
2AC — Chinese Politics DA (General) .................................................................................................... 3
2AC — TPP Specific .........................................................................................................................7
2AC — TPP Specific — Instability Turn (General) (Optional) ................................................................ 8
2AC — TPP Specific — Instability Turn (Income Gap) (Optional) ....................................................... 10
2AC — TPP Specific — Instability Turn (Inflation) (Optional) ............................................................. 11
2AC — TPP Specific — Economic Reform Turn (Optional).................................................................. 13
1AR — General ............................................................................................................................. 14
Extend: “Xi Credibility Low Now” ........................................................................................................ 15
Extend: “Dialogue Doesn’t Cause Anti-Americanism” ........................................................................ 17
Extend: “Engagement Helps Xi” .......................................................................................................... 18
Extend: “Capital Doesn’t Generate Reforms” ..................................................................................... 20
Extend: “No CCP Collapse”.................................................................................................................. 21
1AR — TPP Specific....................................................................................................................... 23
Extend: “TPP Instability Turn” ............................................................................................................. 24
Extend: “TPP Economic Reform Turn” ................................................................................................ 26
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Chinese Politics DA Answers (NDCA)
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2AC — All Affirmatives
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Chinese Politics DA Answers (NDCA)
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2AC — Chinese Politics DA (General)
Non-Unique — Xi credibility low now.
The Guardian 16 (“China’s Xi Jinping denies House of Cards power struggle but attacks ‘conspirators’,
May 4th, http://mindanaoexaminer.com/chinas-xi-jinping-denies-house-of-cards-power-struggle-butattacks-conspirators-the-guardian/)
Experts also see Xi’s decision last month to take on the title of commander-in-chief of China’s joint battle command
centre as a potential indicator of trouble at the top. Since coming to power Xi has amassed an unusual plethora
of official titles including general secretary of the Communist party, president of the People’s Republic of China, chairman of the central
military commission, leader of the national security commission and head of the leading group for overall reform. One academic has dubbed
him the “chairman of everything”. Roderick MacFarquhar, a Harvard University expert in elite Communist party politics, said: “Xi Jinping’s
donning of uniform and giving him his new military title is a warning to his colleagues that he has the army behind him. Whether he actually has
or not, one doesn’t know. But that is his bulwark, as it was Mao’s.” However, MacFarquhar said the
new title could be a sign of
weakness rather than strength, noting that not even Mao Zedong had accumulated such a glut of titles. “Chairman Mao
never needed titles. Everyone knew who was in charge,” he said. Xi has made a high-profile anti-corruption campaign
one of his administration’s key missions, disciplining hundreds of thousands of officials, including top party and military figures. But experts say
the war on corruption has generated discontent among officials, caused political paralysis and fueled
suspicions Xi is using the campaign as a pretext to purge his political enemies.
No Link — dialogue doesn’t cause Anti-American backlash.
Gross 7 (Neil, Asst Pf Sociology @ Harvard, 1/14, “The many stripes of anti-Americanism,”
http://archive.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/01/14/the_many_stripes_of_anti_am
ericanism/)
Second, in most countries, anti-Americanism
involves more distrust than outright bias. The distinction is crucial.
Where there is distrust, people may be skeptical of US motives and claims, but are open to considering the
American point of view . Anti-American bias, by contrast, occurs when policies and actions undertaken by the US
government and American corporations are seen as expressions of an unchangeable national identity and character,
such that dialogue over disagreements is deemed to have no value. It is distrust rather than bias that seems
to characterize Chinese anti-Americanism, for example. Political scientists Alastair Johnston and Daniela Stockmann, who
contributed the China chapter, observe that Chinese "amity" toward the United States is in decline as China asserts itself as a budding
superpower. However, Chinese
dislike for US economic and cultural power is "still quite distant from the level of hatred
and bias" the Chinese direct at Japan and the Japanese.
Link Non-Unique — Xi is spending capital on military reforms, not economics.
Wall Street Journal 16 (2016, “President Xi Jinping’s Most Dangerous Venture Yet: Remaking China’s
Military,” April 25th, http://www.wsj.com/articles/president-xi-jinpings-most-dangerous-venture-yetremaking-chinas-military-1461608795)
China’s stock market was swooning. Investors were panicking. Yet when Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke that first Monday in January, he
didn’t address the global angst about the world’s second-largest economy. Clad in an olive-green Mao suit, he was talking instead to
Chinese troops about another challenge that consumes his time and political capital : the biggest restructuring of
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the People’s Liberation Army since the 1950s, a plan that unnerves America and its Asian allies and could upset the global balance of power.
“We must emancipate our minds and change with the times,” he told troops of the 13th Group Army on Jan. 4. They should not, he said, “wear
new shoes to walk the old road.” Four days earlier, Mr. Xi had started to implement a plan to transform the Soviet-modelled
military, long focused on defending China from invasion, into a smaller, modern force capable of projecting power far from its shores. The
plan, to be implemented by 2020, is one of Mr. Xi’s most ambitious and politically risky undertakings yet.
Turn — engagement with the US makes Xi look like a co-equal leader with Obama — it
helps his domestic credibility.
Wang 16 — Wang Xiangwei, Editor-In-Chief of the South China Morning Post, MA in Journalism, 2016
(“Xi Jinping’s Supply-side Plan Now the Genuine Article of Economic Reform for China,” South China
Morning Post, May 16th, Available Online at www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1945530/xi-jinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article, Accessed 08-19-2016)
On the slowdown that has appeared sharper than both global markets and Beijing expected, Mr. Xi urged foreign investors to take the long
view and compared the world’s second-largest economy to a vessel in rough seas. Mr.
Xi, who starts his visit in Seattle on
Tuesday, played down differences that have unsteadied relations with the U.S., including
cybersecurity and China’s island-building in the South China Sea, saying China isn’t militarily
adventurous and wants to work with Washington to address world challenges. Added to the agenda
in recent weeks for Mr. Xi’s summit with President Barack Obama are concerns about China’s wobbly
economy—and whether that’s dented the leadership’s appetite for economic liberalization. So far, with China’s manufacturing-driven
growth model flagging, the shift to consumer spending and services that the government is trying to engineer hasn’t picked up the slack. Mr.
Xi sought to dispel any concern that China is faltering in its transition toward more sustainable
growth: “Like an arrow shot that cannot be brought back, we will forge ahead against all odds to
meet our goals of reform.” On another move that surprised global markets—a nearly 2% devaluation of China’s currency that fueled
concerns about capital flight—Mr. Xi said the reduction in foreign reserves that followed is normal “and there’s no need to overreact to it.”
The lead-up to summits between the U.S. and China have become fraught in recent years, as have
overall relations, as Beijing, particularly under Mr. Xi, has vigorously sought to use the country’s
economic, military and diplomatic clout to further its increasingly global interests. Calls are rising for the
Obama administration to develop better strategies to neutralize a more assertive China. Still, Messrs. Xi and Obama have used
their past summits to project a workmanlike relationship in public, despite friction in their behind-the-scenes
discussions. In the interview, Mr. Xi cited cooperation on pressing global issues, from agreements to reduce emissions linked to climate change
and common efforts in negotiating limits to Iran’s nuclear program; rather
than supplanting the U.S., he said, China wants
to work with Washington on improving global order, he said. “I don’t believe any country is capable of rearranging the
architecture of global governance toward itself,” he said. He later added: “Facts have shown that the interests of China and
the U.S. are increasingly intertwined.” On issues of contention, however, Mr. Xi appeared conciliatory without giving much
ground. He said his government treats all businesses fairly and brushed aside complaints by foreign business organizations that regulations are
being used to hobble foreign firms, particularly U.S. technology companies, and favor Chinese competitors. Mr. Xi said reclamation and other
construction work in the disputed South China Sea that has alarmed neighbors and the U.S. would serve freedom of navigation—a key U.S.
concern—though he didn’t say how. He also signaled that there would be no let-up in restrictions on the Internet that have blocked several
foreign media sites, including the Journal’s English and Chinese editions. He also backed a proposed law that foreign non-profit groups say
would limit their ability to work with social activists. Mr.
Xi
tried to counter allegations about the cybertheft of trade secrets to benefit
Chinese companies—a problem the Obama administration is considering using sanctions to deter—and
welcomed greater
engagement. “The Chinese government does not engage in theft of commercial secrets in any form, nor does it
“We are ready to strengthen
cooperation with the U.S. side on this issue.” Mr. Xi seldom engages with the international media. For the written interview,
encourage or support Chinese companies to engage in such practices in any way,” Mr. Xi said.
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the Journal submitted a dozen questions to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Mr. Xi. While the ministry acknowledged that officials pulled
together facts and research for the answers, it said Mr. Xi revised and reviewed them. The
answers at times glint with the
rhetorical flair that has differentiated President Xi from his immediate predecessors and made him
popular among many Chinese. His policies having met resistance from vested interests, he vows “to
crack hard nuts and ford dangerous rapids” in pursuit of reforms that would rely more on marketbased solutions. Overall, though, he made it clear that the government will maintain firm regulatory hold as it allows markets broader
sway in allocating resources. “That means we need to make good use of both the invisible hand and the visible hand,” he said. His current
trip to America—his first formal visit since taking office nearly three years ago— showcases China’s wider sway in the
world as visits by previous Chinese leaders didn’t. In Seattle, Mr. Xi will see top executives of Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp.,
Boeing Co. and other U.S. business giants on Tuesday and Wednesday. Mr. Xi will address U.N. sessions over the weekend,
presiding at a panel on empowering women. In between are his discussions at the White House and
with members of Congress—the optics of which, Chinese and U.S. officials say, are important for his
image back home.
No Internal Link — capital doesn’t generate reforms.
Pei 16 (Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, “Two ways to break Beijing's
political stalemate,” May 6th, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Twoways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate)
Observers of the Chinese economy can be forgiven for their puzzlement over an apparent paradox. While
China undoubtedly now
has its most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, the country's economic policy appears to be defying the
wishes of the new strongman, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Take, for example, the progress of radical
structural reform, which is part of Xi's blueprint for an ambitious overhaul of the economy. Since its much heralded unveiling in
late 2013, little structural reform has happened . Worse still, in recent months, the Chinese government has
adopted policies obviously aimed at maintaining short-term growth at the expense of long-term structural
reform. For instance, instead of forcing zombie companies into bankruptcy and channeling resources into consumption, Beijing has once
again opened the credit spigot to fund fixed-asset investments -- mainly infrastructure -- and keep moribund companies, most of
them state-owned, on life support. In the first quarter alone, according to the People's Bank of China, Chinese banks increased
their loans by a mammoth 4.67 trillion yuan ($720 billion), a new record. The immediate impact of this monetary stimulus might have propped
up the Chinese economy, as reflected in the recovery of gross domestic product. However, the long-term consequences will be ugly. China's
debt-to-GDP ratio will increase, overcapacity will continue to plague the economy and the eventual cost of
recapitalizing the financial system will explode. Behind this apparent disconnect between Xi's power and
the difficulties he has encountered in executing his reform plan lies a political stalemate which, if prolonged, could
produce even worse economic uncertainties and consequences. One manifestation of this stalemate -bureaucratic paralysis -- is well-known. Xi's anti-corruption drive has frightened and alienated many
Chinese officials. Denied what they consider legitimate rewards for toiling for the party, resentful bureaucrats have been
on a work stoppage in the hope that deteriorating economic performance will force Xi to call off the anti-corruption campaign
and return to business as usual.
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Impact Non-Unique — reforms fail now.
Whitehead 16 (Adam, twenty five years’ experience in capital markets and investment management,
in a career that has involved proprietary trading desks, commodity trading advisors, sovereign wealth
funds and private offices. During this time he has had trading book P&L responsibility, in addition to
setting up and managing offices of regulated global financial entities in the UAE, “The Great Chinese
Political Rift,” May 9th 2016, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3973072-great-chinese-politicalrift?page=2#)
The timing of this
political fight could not be worse for what has become known as the Great Maturity Wall of Chinese debt
up for redemption and/or refinancing this year. The PBoC will be forced to step into the breach and engineer
attractive refinancing terms in the domestic capital markets to ease the passage of this pig through the python. The banking sector is
already trying to convert its bad debt to equity, so any attempt to also convert the Maturity Wall into
equity will face a crowded and difficult market environment. The debate in the analyst community over whether China's
that comes
economy has become like America's pre-Credit Crunch has continued to rage since George Soros made the comparison. The growth of debt and
GDP in tandem is to be expected. The growth of debt in an economic slowdown, as a counter-cyclical stimulus, is also to be expected. The
problem for the China watchers is that the
size of the debt mountain has grown much larger than the GDP that it has
stimulated. The situation therefore appears to be unsustainable.
No Impact — no risk of regime collapse.
Jones 14 (David Martin, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal
of Political Science, February 21, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the
Tiananmen incident ,” Taylor and Francis)
All these
works reveal how pragmatically, proactively and
largely
successfully the CPC has adapted and
reformed itself in the years since Tiananmen . It is increasingly apparent that the Chinese party-state model
has developed the capacity to change
over time
and adjust to new political and economic realities , both
globally and locally. The
party has shown that it can renew itself , alter its leadership and its ideology, and
adapt to external and internal threats to its authority with a shrewd combination of prudence and
ruthlessness . The CPC accords with Gramsci’s prescient view of the role of the modern, mass, socialist party, which is to be ‘the collective
intellectual’ mirroring the political formula of Machiavelli’s Prince and representing the collective will of the state (1973: 186). Whether this
political formula can be indefinitely maintained it is perhaps, as Zhou Enlai responded to Henry Kissinger in a different context, too soon to tell.
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2AC — TPP Specific
These are optional additional arguments to make if you are reading the TPP Affirmative. You should still
make several of the arguments from the “General” frontline, above.
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2AC — TPP Specific — Instability Turn (General) (Optional)
TPP exclusion causes Chinese unrest & regime instability
Wang 16 (Fei-Ling, 2016, Professor of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology,
“China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Significant Challenges and Profound Opportunities,” February
10th http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/01/2016127134617824774.html)
The full impact of China’s staying out of the TPP will take some time to show. It is however clear that China will face
significant challenges. The TPP is poised to alter the “apolitical” international trade game that China has got used to and gamed
lucratively well for many years. It also highlights the differences and deficiencies of the Chinese political
economy that could ignite and energize domestic discontent, resistance, and protests over China’s
lack of IPR and rule of law, environmental protection, and labor rights. “China is an economic giant with heart
diseases,” claimed a Chinese scholar, and the norms and values promoted by the TPP are bound to aggravate China’s problems. (10) China’s
crucial access to the world market in general and the American market in particular could be significantly
reduced and displaced by the similarly endowed TPP member nations. International capital flow and manufacture
chains are likely to move and relocate elsewhere at China’s expenses. Moreover, China’s overall international stature
and power are negatively affected. As the U.S. President Barak Obama gloated in his statement about the TPP, the Chinese are
not in to make the rules for international trade. Indeed, as this author has learned first hand, the vision of this political consequence has helped
to overcome considerable domestic resistances to the TPP deals in places like the U.S. Congress and the Japanese society. In combination, the
forthcoming impact of the TPP
is likely to erode China’s trade position, slow down further its economy which is
already showing signs of weaknesses, undermine Beijing’s diplomatic power, and ultimately affect the CCP one party
rule and the PRC sociopolitical stability. It is therefore perhaps no exaggeration for some Chinese analysts to sound panicky over a
life under new trade rules, the “economic NATO,” made by Beijing’s ideological opponents.
Rule of law solves domestic instability that destabilizes the Chinese government
Velk 15 (Thomas, McGill University, Director of North American Studies, Olivia Gong, & Ariel
Zuckerbrot, “A Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The Antitrust Bulletin 2015, Vol. 60(1) 4-13, DOI:
10.1177/0003603X15573753, proquest)
The potential for instability is heightened further by China’s shaky legal infrastructure. Continual reforms have been
implemented since the late 1970s—from the constitutional down to the local level—with the purported goal of strengthening China’s legal
system. But, in reality, the country is still without rule of law. China does not have an independent judiciary that acts as a check on
executive power. China’s courts are financed by local governments, not by the Supreme Court or the Justice Ministry, and are therefore subject
to government control. Constitutionally prescribed limits on the sovereign power of the Communist Party are mere rhetorical devices. With
virtually unimpeded executive authority, there cannot be true human rights. There are myriad legal sources—fundamental and ordinary laws;
Supreme Court opinions, interpretations, regulations; and other forms of national and local statutes—but no system to determine a consistent
application of the laws and no discernible hierarchy among them.11 The arbitrariness
and uncertainty of a legal system
without rule of law is destabilizing and an impediment to potential growth. President Xi Jinping has discussed two
opposing forms of law: legalism and Confucianism. He believes that China ‘‘must uphold the combination of ruling the nation in accord with the
law and ruling it with virtue. ... ’’12 For him, legalism involves punishment, these days used against corruption. Under Confucianism, bad rulers
may ‘‘legally’’ find themselves under the law, as in the Western tradition in which sovereign law trumps magisterial power. A third type of
Chinese law may be an unplanned but useful consequence of current events. A dimension of the president’s ‘‘big picture’’ reform plan is equity
ownership of foreign assets. Governing such assets by corporate law or business or organizational law, undertaken by Chinese–North American
agents of change who must deal with unions, customers, stockholders, and governments, will introduce some element of Western internal
regulatory law to China. The imported law may allow local peacemaking or at least dispute settlement between foreign and local businesses.
The result could smooth and buffer economic tensions inside an innovating China and as well between a market-wise open China and the rest
of the world. Otherwise, if
the policies of China’s new leaders are seen to be inadequate to the tasks at hand, social
unrest could erupt. The leadership is closely monitoring the number of government-recorded ‘‘mass incidents,’’ defined as a violent
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demonstration involving more than 500 people. This measure of unrest
has doubled, from approximately 90,000 incidents in 2006 to
at least 180,000 in 2010.13 The Human Rights Watch 2014 World Report cites data indicating that there are 300–500 protests
in China each day. Economically, the international outlook is not on China’s side. Social instability threatens to hinder future progress.
We cannot expect, while the global economic climate is still gloomy, for China to grow as fast as it did during the golden days. What
happens next for China largely depends on a successful partnership between East and West.
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2AC — TPP Specific — Instability Turn (Income Gap) (Optional)
Inclusive trade solves income disparities
Velk 15 (Thomas, McGill University, Director of North American Studies, Olivia Gong, & Ariel
Zuckerbrot, “A Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The Antitrust Bulletin 2015, Vol. 60(1) 4-13, DOI:
10.1177/0003603X15573753, proquest)
Now is the time to look beyond an antagonistic East–West relationship and develop a long-term vision for the greater good of the world. Such a
partnership should guide and shape long-term global strategy over the decades to come. An
amicable and mutually respectful
companionship between East and West should be based on nonpolitical, market-based, profit-seeking, and rule of
law–based agreements. In the next half-century agents of change will return to China promoting Western values in their business and
political behavior. Their aggregate actions will build cultural as well as economic bridges between East and West. For China, a
partnership with the West will help manage internal problems of inflation, lack of rule of law, and
increasing social tension between rural and urban citizens. As China decreases its investments in Western debt and
moves toward equity ownership, Western nations, and especially the United States, will be better served
working with China in a free trade setting rather than attempting to combat the economic might of the Chinese superpower.
Income disparities ensure unrest
Velk 15 (Thomas, McGill University, Director of North American Studies, Olivia Gong, & Ariel
Zuckerbrot, “A Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The Antitrust Bulletin 2015, Vol. 60(1) 4-13, DOI:
10.1177/0003603X15573753, proquest)
Past policies
have enriched top-tier cities and the urban population beyond anyone’s prior optimistic predictions: the
dividends have left
many cities and rural areas poor and underdeveloped. Although wages are rising in the underdeveloped parts of China, the average
disposable income for rural citizens, who account for half of China’s population, is 2.2 times less than for urban
households, according to 2010 data.9 Rural China must advance beyond barter and near-autarky if it is to keep pace with urban, financially
advanced regions of the country. But if rising inflation rates and the potential ensuing financial disarray cheat the rural
population and diminish their trust in the money economy, their anger over their economic position, especially in light of
continued urban–countryside income disparities, could be destabilizing.
reawakened nation has the potential to dominate world history for the next hundred years. But past policy
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2AC — TPP Specific — Instability Turn (Inflation) (Optional)
Inclusive trade solves Chinese inflation that causes unrest
Velk 15 (Thomas, McGill University, Director of North American Studies, Olivia Gong, & Ariel
Zuckerbrot, “A Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The Antitrust Bulletin 2015, Vol. 60(1) 4-13, DOI:
10.1177/0003603X15573753, proquest)
Free trade for capital means that China may use its economic might and its accumulated stash of dollars to buy
equity in commodities and other goods. It could then improve its domestic economy, and thus prevent unrest
that could have international implications. The West should not impede this process, because China’s purchase of Western commodity assets,
and the resulting exports of products from those assets, will also stimulate Western domestic economies. The
correct Western
response is a form of partnership whereby the nations grow and thrive together, rather than oppose one another. For example,
elements in the U.S. Congress recently expressed fears that a proposed investment by Huawei Inc. and ZTE Inc. would pose a security risk. It
would be better if instead of China bashing, American politicians urged American technology firms to partner with their Chinese cousins, keep
open mutual books, and thus give these dealings greater transparency. A free
trade policy will create an opportunity for
China to diminish the threat of downstream inflation, ensuring financial soundness and internal
stability in China. Although new money has already built up in the Chinese economy because of past exports, along with the new
money’s inflationary potential, American bonds and U.S. money now in China should be ‘‘recycled’’ back to the West by spending it—investing
it—in overseas real assets, ranging from commodity sources (such as oil fields, forests, and copper mines) to manufacturing firms (such as
makers of airplanes, autos, and consumer goods) to financial firms (such as banks and investment houses). In
a free trade setting,
this strategy would help stimulate recovery in a world that has been so dispirited by the recession and so
overburdened by debt that its players lack the entrepreneurial spirit needed take on new investment risks.
Inflation ensures domestic instability
Velk 15 (Thomas, McGill University, Director of North American Studies, Olivia Gong, & Ariel
Zuckerbrot, “A Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The Antitrust Bulletin 2015, Vol. 60(1) 4-13, DOI:
10.1177/0003603X15573753, proquest)
Currently, China’s sources of inflation threats are diverse. The first and foremost threat is engineered inflation at 2% and
more per annum. Central bankers around the globe produce new money in excess of the stable price level quantity in the belief that easy
money allows economic adjustment to changing demand patterns. They believe few prices or wages fall in weak markets, but as long as prices
and wages may rise in strong markets, rational economic reallocation of investment and economic focus may readily occur. Central bankers
thereby push up inflation expectations and give a green light to rising prices. The second threat is imported inflation from the United States,
through their excessive money and bond creation. The extra Treasury bill money and ordinary money are in excess of U.S. domestic needs. They
spill into the world economy, flowing to exporter countries like China. China currently holds $1.25 trillion of U.S. debt. Those loans—really
‘‘investments’’ of export earning—are part of a process creating new domestic money in China. When a Chinese business exports goods to the
United States, it acquires U.S. dollars. It turns the U.S. dollars over, through the banking system, to the Chinese government’s sovereign wealth
funds, central bank, and other government entities. The Chinese central bank invests the American money by purchasing U.S. government
bonds. U.S. bonds become part of China’s ‘‘base money.’’ Exporting firms get Chinese domestic money in return, which they spend buying local
labor and raw materials. This gives them the power to send off another round of exported goods and acquire another round of ‘‘imported
money.’’ There
has been an increase in Chinese domestic money, but no increase in goods available to
Chinese buyers: The goods are sent away to American buyers. More money without new production spells potential
domestic inflation. As well, the use of export earnings to purchase U.S. bonds (rather than to build up equity investments in China or
elsewhere in the world) does not immediately produce any more consumables or employment inside China. The third inflation threat is internal
economic growth in Asia. Rapid economic growth has twin effects: although it does use up the new money created, economic growth also puts
upward demand pressure on goods, labor costs, and input costs. Finally, the last factor is asset price inflation that results mainly from
uncertainty with respect to the global economic outlook. Increasing
debt levels now burden China’s local and municipal
governments. Funding this domestic debt absorbs local savings, again at the cost of lost private investment
opportunities. General global debt builds fear of repudiation and currency devaluation. This, in turn, encourages economic players to preserve
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capital and purchasing power by moving out of cash and into ‘‘safe haven’’ assets, which raises interest rates and drives up asset prices,
resulting in a family of bubbles. Even during times of asset price inflation, prices of ordinary consumer goods do not rise in tandem. Central
bankers can blithely claim ‘‘There is no inflation’’ even as prices for property, exotic metals, oil, and even collector automobiles climb to record
levels. The unpredictable speculative gains and losses imposed by asset price inflation give rise to unstable investment incentives. Panic
drives safety seekers from one asset class to another. Relative prices of safe assets move in ‘‘black swan’’
patterns. China needs to remain on guard against inflation as unsustainable surges in real estate prices and local debt,
along with growing concerns over the shadow banking system and worrisome declines in both export and
import numbers, signal there is trouble ahead. Chinese anti-inflation policies are essential for internal
stability and lower social tension.
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2AC — TPP Specific — Economic Reform Turn (Optional)
Only an external economic event can prompt frozen reforms now
Pei 16 (Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, “Two ways to break Beijing's
political stalemate,” May 6th, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Twoways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate?page=2)
In the months ahead, as the crucial 19th party congress -- scheduled for the fall of 2017 -- approaches, this inchoate
force can be
expected to mount a series of actions to frustrate Xi's moves to further consolidate his power. Specifically, they
are likely to vigorously oppose any attempts to stack the deck in the Politburo and its powerful standing committee
or to revise the party's rules on age and term limits. Such political subterfuge cannot possibly fool Xi. But he has few options. He could
go all out by putting another mega-tiger -- a very senior incumbent or retired official -- in jail on corruption charges. But this high-risk
move could precipitate a complete breakdown of elite unity and even open political warfare with his
enemies. At the same time, it is inconceivable for him to concede to their unspoken demands of sharing power and restoring collective
leadership. Without
an external shock of some kind, this systemic political stalemate is hard to break. At the
moment, both Xi and his rivals have placed their hopes on what happens to the Chinese economy .
Transparent inclusion signals provide leverage for economic reformers in China
Bush 13 (Richard, Sr. Fellow @ Brookings Inst., 12/3, “Transcript: Cross-Straits Series - Trans-Pacific
Partnership and Asia,” http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcript-cross-straits-seriestrans-pacific-partnership-and-asia)
And I've suggested, China
needs a new round of economic reform. The elements of TPP are – touch on the
kinds of reforms that have to be made. So a new group of Chinese economic reformers could use TPP as their
own leverage. And then there's the Taiwan issue. You know, is China going to put itself in a position where it has to be a political bully to
keep Taiwan out? Now, for that to work, the United States and other major TPP members have to be very firm that they are going to treat
Taiwan's entry into TPP on its economic merits. I hope that's the case. Taiwan, of course, has to make the concessions that allow the United
States and others to do that. But then the ball is in China's court. The good news here is that China
is already moderating its
views of TPP. Originally, it was just another instrument of U.S. containment, and now they want to hear
more, they want transparency.
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1AR — General
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Extend: “Xi Credibility Low Now”
Xi’s credibility is down & reforms are stalled
The Economist 16 (“Beware the cult of Xi,” April 2nd,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21695881-xi-jinping-stronger-his-predecessors-his-powerdamaging-country-beware-cult)
Xi is neither buying himself security nor helping to keep China stable. He is using the
party’s own thuggish investigators to take on graft. But they have a greater interest in settling political scores than in ensuring laws are applied
By cracking down and puffing himself up, Mr
fairly. That gets in the way of good administration, if only because officials are scared of spending money in case it attracts a probe. By cowing the media, Mr Xi created a press reluctant to challenge officials by exposing the dodgy-
scandals eventually come to light, they pose even greater threats to the party’s, and Mr
Xi’s, credibility. Mr Xi has pledged to give market forces a “decisive role,” and put “power in a cage” by establishing the rule of law. But he is providing neither the country with prosperity and freedom, nor reassuring
vaccine trade as soon as it was discovered at least a year ago. By the time such
the rest of the world with stability. Abroad, anxieties about him keep growing: his muscular efforts to assert control in the South China Sea have been driving countries across Asia closer to the American camp. Earlier in Mr Xi’s rule,
hopes are fading that a big reformist push will
ever materialise. Mr Xi appears to have little time for the politically irksome business of making the party follow
the law, closing down loss-making state-owned firms, or bringing about much-needed social changes, such as scrapping restrictions on access by rural
migrants to urban public services. The task of preserving his power is a full-time job.
observers had wondered whether, after establishing himself, he would turn to carrying out the reforms that he says he wants. But
Political instability now
Whitehead 16 (Adam, twenty five years’ experience in capital markets and investment management,
in a career that has involved proprietary trading desks, commodity trading advisors, sovereign wealth
funds and private offices. During this time he has had trading book P&L responsibility, in addition to
setting up and managing offices of regulated global financial entities in the UAE, “The Great Chinese
Political Rift,” May 9th 2016, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3973072-great-chinese-politicalrift?page=2#)
It has become clear that China is entering a period of domestic political friction. A classic proto-Soviet dialectic between the
peasants and the bourgeoisie is being played out at a higher level. Thus far, it has not erupted onto the streets. Both
leaders of each faction are losing focus on the economy as they focus on each other. A leadership vacuum and internal political
struggle will therefore undermine the economy and also perceptions of Chinese risk. China's debt mountain will then
command a higher risk premium in recognition of the deteriorating political landscape. President Xi's enigmatic response to the
palace coup rumors only served to confirm that there is indeed just that happening in real time. In his opinion, there are "cabals
and cliques" inside the party that risk "compromising the political security of the party and the country." In a scene reminiscent
of the Night of the Long Knives, he then went on to say that: "There are careerists and conspirators existing in our party and undermining the
party's governance."
Economic & social tensions strain political credibility now; the trend is down
Keating 15 (Joshua, 8/24, staff @ Slate, “What’s Scarier Than a Strong China? A Weak China,”
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/24/what_s_scarier_than_a_strong_china_a_weak_ch
ina_nbsp.html)
These ongoing tensions are worrying enough in normal times, but are even more dangerous when China’s leaders feel insecure and challenged
by domestic enemies. Which is how they must feel right now. The
economic turmoil of the past few weeks has dealt a blow to
the image of China’s leaders as competent stewards of the country’s economic rise, and President Xi Jinping looks
powerless in the face of economic forces. Reports are already emerging about grumbling within senior
ranks of the Communist Party over whether Xi and his advisers are up to the task of managing China’s next economic transition. If Xi
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feels threatened by a lack of support at home, he could ramp up his purge of potential rivals. The bigger fear if
there’s a long-turn economic downturn is social instability. Under the country’s unspoken post-Tiananmen grand
bargain, China’s population hasn’t significantly challenged the autocratic one-party state, so long as the
party continues to deliver economic progress and increasing prosperity. This is not to say that Chinese society is entirely
harmonious—while the authorities have been adept at managing dissent, the country still sees tens of thousands of “mass incidents” every
year, sparked by causes ranging from labor disputes, to environmental degradation, to land seizures. But thanks
to steady growth,
public anger over economic conditions hasn’t been a major problem over the last 25 years. It could be soon:
Chinese investors, who were strongly encouraged by the state-run media to put money in the market during the country’s boom, are
already venting their anger online.
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Extend: “Dialogue Doesn’t Cause Anti-Americanism”
Chinese anti-Americanism is purely rhetorical – No real political effect or popular
sentiment
Wong 14 (Edward, staff @ New York Times, “In New China, ‘Hostile’ West Is Still Derided,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-turns-up-the-rhetoric-against-thewest.html?_r=0)
Some have questioned the sincerity, or pointed out the hypocrisy, of the party’s tirades against the West,
noting that many party officials have children or other family members living and even applying for citizenship
overseas. Mr. Xi’s daughter, Xi Mingze, attended Harvard University under a pseudonym. “How can Chinese officials really be
anti-American?” asked Zhan Jiang, a media studies professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University. “Anti-foreign sentiments
will always be present in China because of China’s unique history,” he said. “However, the public’s opinion of the West
will not change because of what the party says.”
Anti-Americanism doesn’t spill over to economics.
Berman 6 (Russell, Stanford Pf of Int’l Relations, “Anti-Americanism and the Pursuit of Politics,”
https://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/berman.pdf)
Similarly, the periodic symbolic demonstrations of protest
against the so-called hegemonic policy of the US have not
impacted on the flourishing trade between the two countries. Robust economic activity can coexist with
foreign policy disagreement. This observation could be taken as a cautionary note to those who are concerned that antiAmericanism elsewhere might impact on the viability of US brands. Yet the silver lining of the economic success with China has many gray
clouds, especially the trade
imbalance and the dispute over the Yuan. The imbalance is surely not the result of some
attitudinal anti-Americanism that inhibits Chinese consumers from purchasing US goods. Neither however does
the success of Chinese sales in the US prove that anti-Americanism will always remain irrelevant to economic relations. A revaluation of the
Yuan and increased pressure on China to accept US imports could, in the context of already exacerbated social tensions within China, elicit
popular resentment, that would presumably combine anti-Americanism with an “anti-neo-liberalism” and anti-capitalism. Whether this would
impact on government-to-government interaction would depend on the state of democratization and the liberalization of the public sphere.
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Extend: “Engagement Helps Xi”
China uses US engagement to project parity with the US. The plan allows Xi to gain
political capital when the US gives in.
Li 14 — Cheng Li, director of the John L. Thornton China Center, senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at
Brookings, director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 2014 (“Chinese Enthusiasm and American
nd
Cynicism Over the ‘New Type of Great Power Relations,’” Brookings Institution, December 2 Available Online at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/05-chinese-pessimism-american-cynicism-great-power-lixu)
It has been widely noted that President
Xi Jinping, however, repeatedly promoted the framework first at the U.S.China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July, and then at the summit with Obama in mid-November. After the summit,
China’s official news agency reported that Xi and Obama “pledged to push forward a new type of
major-country relations,” and that “[Obama] is willing to… lift the new type of major-country
relationship between China and the U.S. to a higher level.” Xinhua implied that Obama not only accepts, but
also actively supports, the “New Type” concept. In fact, the Obama administration has been cautiously
staying away from it. Why is China so keen on a “New Type of Great Power Relations” and on creating perceptions of endorsement by
Obama? And why is the U.S. reluctant to adopt it? What are the reasons behind such contrasting views –– Chinese enthusiasm and American
cynicism –– towards this seemingly benign concept? When
Xi Jinping defined the “New Type of Great Power
Relations” in his meeting with Obama at Sunnylands last year, he described it in three points: 1) no conflict or confrontation, through
emphasizing dialogue and treating each other’s strategic intentions objectively; 2) mutual respect,
including for each other’s core interests and major concerns; and 3) mutually beneficial cooperation, by
abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest. Embedded in the “New Type of Great
Power Relations” is a nation’s hope for an international environment more conducive to its
development . From the rise and fall of its many dynasties to its forced opening up to the West in the wake of the Opium Wars, China has
always seen itself as a civilization deeply entangled and affected by history. Recognizing the historically recurring clashes
between an existing great power and an emerging power, China looks to the “New Type” framework
to avoid historical determinism and to seek a less-disruptive rise in an increasingly integrated world. At
the same time, China wants to be viewed as an equal. By using the term “Great Power” to primarily, if not solely, refer to China
and the United States, China aims to elevate itself to a level playing field. Obtaining U.S. support of the concept would imply
Uncle Sam’s recognition of China’s strength and power . This is what China’s official media sought to show
when it suggested Obama’s support of the concept: parity and respect between the two countries .
Furthermore, Chinese leaders believe that the “New Type of Great Power Relations” enables the two
powers to establish a new code of conduct in line with China’s interests. By emphasizing the respect of
“core interests” as an element of the concept, China pushes its territorial claims to the forefront. This is China’s
attempt at more clearly demarking where the United States and other neighboring countries need to
toe the line. American adoption of the term would imply that the United States recognizes China’s “core interests.” This mutual
respect of each other’s national interests is at the core of China’s aspirations. The Chinese media
avidly reporting on Obama and Xi’s joint endorsement of the concept suggests that there are also
domestic reasons driving the “New Type of Great Power Relations.” Although the Chinese concept is
an inherently U.S.-geared proposal, the domestic goals of such a concept should not be overlooked. From a
Chinese perspective, the United States is the only superpower in today’s world that has the capacity to
contain China’s rise. By strengthening China’s view of itself as a recognized and respected power, Xi
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Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership and gain political capital to
consolidate his own power at home.
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Extend: “Capital Doesn’t Generate Reforms”
Excessive capital in China is counterproductive — undermines reforms & generates
backlash
Pei 16 (Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, “Two ways to break Beijing's
political stalemate,” May 6th, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Twoways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate)
The challenge for Xi is that the
campaign against corruption is yielding diminishing returns. To be sure, it has been
effective in limiting theft by greedy officials, but it cannot motivate them to do anything positive. For local
officials, far removed from the center of power, their only weapon is passive resistance. There is now a political
stalemate between the system and its strongman. Another stalemate is less well-known and even harder to analyze
because it is occurring in a much higher and more opaque realm of the Chinese party-state. Xi's remarkable success in achieving
political dominance has demolished the delicate balance of power at the top of the regime. The
consequences of the transformation of what may be called a multipolar political order into a unipolar one in
Beijing have been profound. Decision-making authority has been centralized to an unprecedented degree,
inevitably creating resentment among senior leaders who have seen their influence marginalized.
Capital creates pushback that causes stalemate flipping reform
Pei 16 (Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, “Two ways to break Beijing's
political stalemate,” May 6th, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Twoways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate)
Xi's political foes, meanwhile, are eager to see further erosion of his political capital as the result of continuing economic
weakness. They calculate that if Xi's economic report card to the 19th party congress next year is deemed
unsatisfactory, he will be less able to control the leadership succession process and even be forced to
seek reconciliation with the bureaucracy. Xi, of course, will not allow such an outcome to materialize. While his long-term
objective -- sustaining the CCP's rule with reinvigorated economic reform and tight social control -- may remain unchanged, his immediate
priority is to shore up his political capital. In the current context, this Herculean task requires supporting
economic growth with all the tools at his disposal. For investors and China's trading partners, such a stalemate is bad
news. Not only does it create greater political uncertainty, but also it increases China's overall economic vulnerabilities.
Inaction and passive resistance by Xi's rivals artificially suppress China's economic dynamism, while
doubling down on the obsolete, credit-fueled and investment-driven growth model amplifies the risks of
a destructive debt crisis in the medium term.
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Extend: “No CCP Collapse”
No collapse—legitimacy is durable and their predictions are serially false
Bell 12 (Daniel A., Huffington Post, 'China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing
Society', July 9, Why China Won't Collapse (Soon), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-abell/chinese-government-legitimacy_b_1658006.html, d/a 9-11-12)
Or so we are told. Such predictions
about the collapse of China's political system have been constantly repeated since
But the system didn't collapse then, and it won't collapse now.¶ The key
reason such dire predictions are taken seriously -- especially in the West -- is that non-democratic regimes are
seen to lack legitimacy . A political regime that is morally justified in the eyes of the people must be chosen by the people. In the case
the suppression of the pro-democracy uprisings in 1989.
of China, the political leadership is a self-selected elite. Such mode of rule is fragile, as the Arab Spring has shown.¶ But this view assumes the
people are dissatisfied with the regime. In fact, the
large majority of Chinese people support the single-party state
structure. Since the 1990s, scholars in the West and China have carried out many large scale surveys into the legitimacy of Chinese
political power and by now they have virtually arrived at a consensus : the degree of legitimacy of the Chinese political
system is very high. Surveys have been modified to prevent people from telling lies and the results are always the
same. To the extent there is dissatisfaction, it is largely directed at the lower levels of government. The
central government is viewed as the most legitimate part of the Chinese political apparatus.
No instability-CCP is seen as legitimate and no one wants regime change-all their
evidence is Western misperception
Lundquist 12 (David, Tsinghua University western philosophy lecturer, ‘Why China Won't Collapse,” 6-22,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-isnt-headed-collapse-7046?page=1)
China is said to be headed for collapse for several reasons, any and all of which might combine to overwhelm its increasingly expensive
repressive apparatus. Within this supposed house of horrors is corruption, exorbitant housing prices, costly education, an antsy middle class
and college graduates with dreams deferred—not to mention frustration stemming from China’s shortage of females, dubbed China’s “bachelor
bomb.” But those
reasons take a narrow view of political change, assuming dissatisfaction will morph into
regime change. For a more nuanced perspective, economic analysis has to give way to political analysis. One well-articulated Chinacollapse theory comes from Gordon Chang, who says that the country is enjoying the tail end of a “three-decade upward supercycle” spurred
by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, globalization and demography. Chang’s analysis might be entirely on point, but it doesn’t suggest a dramatic
collapse. For one thing, although China is slowing, a hard landing is looking less likely . But Chang has more than
economic arguments. And that’s where his case weakens severely; he foresees economic weakness aggravating deep-seated tensions in
Chinese leadership and society, tensions which in turn will bring conflict among decision makers and general discontent among the masses. It’s
a plausible picture, but the evidence behind it is lacking. We must ask: How exactly could an economic crisis destabilize China? That is, how do
graphs and pie charts become chaos in the streets? Charting Revolutions The textbook example of a similar change might be Iran’s 1979
revolution, widely thought be propelled by a dramatic fall in global oil prices. But the Chinese economy is no oil-addicted dictatorship, and
China has no Ayatollah Khomeini antagonizing it through sermons on scratchy cassette tapes. Contrary
to the banal collapse
theories, there are reasons to believe that a slowing Chinese economy will bring a chill of calm to the simmering
cauldron of society. China is a modern, complex polity with an adept, agile government. In his landmark work
Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington argued that violence is a mark of modernizing societies. To Huntington, modernity
meant three things: the government gains recognition as the legitimate wielder of force; the division of labor is divided between military,
administrators, scientists and the judiciary; there is mass political participation, by which Huntington meant all forms of participation, be it
democratic or totalitarian (as in the Cultural Revolution). By Huntington’s standards, the PRC is a quite modern polity, one he would deem
“civic” because its institutions are developed beyond its level of political activity. In short, the system can withstand economic pressure. Indeed,
Beijing is well-prepared to confront, divert or grant concessions to popular discontent. With firm
institutions established, a state is less susceptible to economic vagaries, something Chang’s argument doesn’t
consider. By proactively heading off economic distress, the PRC might even stand to gain trust and legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. After all,
as Western governments rushed to ease the liquidity crunch of 2008–2009, baffled and nervous citizens said nary a word of protest as
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unelected bureaucrats worked their money-printing and bailout magic. Only after the crisis, years later, did diverse Occupy Wall Street
movements include this as a minor detail in their failed campaign against capitalist excesses. A
faltering economy does not
necessarily cause disorder, even when effective institutions are absent. A recent New York Times editorial opposing Western
sanctions on Iran broaches this notion, arguing that the Iranian people might stand up to oppression once well-fed and prospering. The same
very well could be true for China. Reform in China There
are hundreds of thousands of conflicts between the Chinese
people and the state every year. But putting aside egregious land-grab cases like the one in the southern Chinese village of Wukan last
year, they
rarely rise to the level of violence—much less regime-change—as many such events are simply labor disputes.
The participants have little notion of a future democratic China, unlike some of their middle-class counterparts, who in
contrast have few material incentives to protest but much to lose. “Chinese people generally do not have revolutionary intentions,” Gordon
Chang recognizes. But reform is another story. No Chinese citizen goes unaffected by the government’s heavy-handedness—the paternalistic,
technocratic, socialist or vulgarly utilitarian blemishes in its laws and administration. That means there’s a lot to fix. Unfortunately, important
domestic-reform initiatives often receive comparatively little attention from Western media, fostering the perception that China is a radically
illegitimate oligarchy powered by the blood of its treasured working class. This is a distorted picture that panders to democratic, wishful
thinking about Chinese society. The truth is that however
slowly and ham-handedly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has
accrued political capital by improving the lives of its people in ways many bygone regimes could not. In late February,
the World Bank issued a report entitled "China 2030.” Its suggestions for China’s economic health include decreasing state ownership of major
industries, establishing protections for society’s most vulnerable citizens, as well as calls for tax reform, reduced carbon emissions and green
energy. Lost in the foofaraw of a lone Chinese man interrupting a bank press conference to defend state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was the fact
that the PRC’s State Council coauthored the report. A Chinese government body signed off on prescriptions counter to the interests of SOE
monopolists—a milestone for the development of civil society there. SOEs have been criticized in China as price manipulators and as magnets
for rent seeking. For example, oil companies like Sinopec have stymied fuel-quality regulations and refused to supply petro to stations, running
them out of business. Often shielded by nationalistic sentiment, SOEs have now come under assault by academics and newspaper editorials
that echo the World Bank report, identifying SOEs as special interests, distinct from public interests. Elsewhere in China, regional governments
are having a crack at mending the controversial hukou system, which threatens to fragment China into two entrenched groups: legally
recognized urbanites and migrant workers, the latter of whom generally enjoy no entitlement to medical care or education in the cities where
they’ve come to toil. In a country of peasants, internal migration is not just a matter of civil rights. It’s a matter of economic transformation, as
those former farmers have settled into cities and long forgotten tilling a field. As China’s population urbanizes, policy makers have proven
adaptive and willing to experiment. The CCP has demonstrated a concern for China’s social fabric. Beijing has decreed that television
programming, including wildly popular dating shows, avoid the depths of crass sexual and material indulgence. Obviously, such policies might
be in the ultimate interest of self-preservation (especially given Hu Jintao’s less than subtle warning about Western culture’s ideological
penetration of China). And it’s debatable whether traditional, native values are what China or any country needs for stability or prosperity.
Granted, on some reform proposals, like liberalization of criminal law, conflict has emerged. But do these disagreements reveal cracks in the
party leadership, as Chang implies? Probably not. First, these are practical differences among technocrats who are after the same thing:
stability via steady growth. Second, policy disputes are also a sign that China’s decision making is more consultative and decentralized than
before. As the hukou example above illustrates, once delegated certain powers, provinces and municipalities can innovate on a smaller scale
than the central government, as in the U.S. federal system. Finally, interest groups and factions are nothing new to Chinese politics. Thus, it’s
unrealistic to think factional tension could paralyze party leadership, military and police at the same time that protesters agitate and show
potential for violence and greater lawlessness. What’s more, scholarly work on factional politics over recent decades, often with a focus on
China, has shown how factions can coexist and even thrive by nearing some sort of competitive equilibrium. This
may explain the relative quietude of Chinese elite politics since 1989. Why China Won’t Fall The political must be analyzed alongside the
economic. China’s institutions are still significantly ahead of the demands of its society. Beijing’s apparent
influence by Huntington’s theories is not surprising, as his works are popular among the PRC-establishment intellectuals, especially those on the
government payroll. Meanwhile, the authoritarian CCP junta keeps the trains running fast and on time. This means a lot to the swaths of
China’s massive, aging population. Hard landing or soft, don’t look for the Beijing to suffer any hits to the head in 2012. Collapse theories are
rooted in idealism, but they’re no more likely to pan out because of it.
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1AR — TPP Specific
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Extend: “TPP Instability Turn”
Chinese involvement improves China’s economy & world trade
Li & Whalley 12 (Chungding, Institute of World Economics and Politics Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, John, Department of Economics Social Science Centre University of Western Ontario, “CHINA
AND THE TPP: A NUMERICAL SIMULATION ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS INVOLVED,”
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18090.pdf)
From these results, it seems clear that China
will benefit from TPP participation (see Figure 11). On production side, China
will increase output separately by 3.816%, 1.967% and 0.59% under the three different trade costs elimination cases. On the
welfare side, China will gain about 1.125% under whole trade costs elimination situation. Trade for China
also will increase significantly under TPP participation. Other TPP member countries, the US and OTPPC will all gain in terms
of total production, welfare, export and import. Countries outside of TPP (ROW) will lose in - production, welfare, export and import. Total
world production, welfare and trade will all rise which suggests that regional trade liberalization will in aggregate benefit global trade and
welfare. Japan is a different case in that although not a member of TPP, still gains in production, welfare and trade. Comparing specific impacts
on TPP member countries, OTPPC will gain the most, China the second, the US the third and Japan the least. TPP effects will increase as trade
costs decrease more. These results thus suggest that China
further
will gain if China joins TPP and China’s engagement will
improve other TPP member countries’ production and welfare.
Inclusion solves Chinese economic dislocations
Aslan 15 (Buhara, Assistant Specialist, International Economic Analysis Division, Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey, Merve Mavus Kutuk, Assistant Specialist, International Economic Analysis Division,
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Arif Oduncu, Director, International Economic Analysis Division,
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and TransPacific Partnership: Policy Options of China,” China & World Economy / 22–43, Vol. 23, No. 6, p. 42)
It is found that the Chinese economy is negatively affected when only the TTIP is realized. The decrease in China’s GDP could be up to 0.5
percent (see Figure 6). When both the TTIP and
the TPP are realized and China is excluded, the combined
damage to the Chinese economy is higher than the damage of the case of the TTIP alone being realized, and the decrease
in China’s GDP could be as high as 1.8 percent (see Figure 9).Nonetheless, inclusion of China in the TPP while
being excluded from the TTIP results in up to a 1.7-percent increase in Chinese GDP, suggesting that the
positive impacts of China’s participation in the TPP would compensate for the negative impacts of the
TTIP. According to the results of the present paper, the Chinese Government should reconsider its exclusion from the TPP. Although
participating in regional FTAs, such as China–RCEP, China–GCC, China–Norway, China–India and China–Korea FTAs, will have positive effects on
the Chinese economy, the
benefits of being part of the TPP would likely outweigh those from these FTAs, and offer
higher GDP and trade increases for the Chinese economy. Therefore, it is recommended that China should
pursue being part of the TPP to offset the negative impacts of the TTIP.
Chinese inclusion revitalizes the TPP & improves China’s economy
Gordon 14 (Bernard, Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of New Hampshire, 4/11,
“Bring China Into TPP,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/bring-china-tpp-10227?page=2)
China in the TPP would be a large development. As with its WTO participation a decade ago, TPP
membership would help move
China to a more open economy, which is among the reasons China’s reformers urge early participation. Last year, when Robert
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Zoellick observed that with Japan
in the TPP the group would represent almost 40 percent of global GDP, he concluded
“Japan’s involvement is a very big deal.” China’s involvement would be an even bigger deal and just how big,
especially for the U.S., is suggested in a study of a proposed China-U.S. Economic Partnership, soon to be published
by the Peterson Institute. As a result of the bilateral FTA it projected, the study concluded that U.S. exports would grow by
13 percent, particularly in America’s service, agriculture and advanced-manufacturing sectors. Within a decade the gains to the U.S.
would be $170 billion a year, nearly a full percentage point of GDP. The TPP of course is much more than about trade.
Well beyond issues of market access and tariffs, its more than two dozen chapters deal with state-owned enterprises, issues of government
procurement, small and medium businesses, labor and the environment, intellectual property, and more. That range of issues tells two stories.
The first is that the single most important thing to know about the Trans-Pacific Partnership is that it will set the rules of the global economy’s
main actors in the years ahead. For the United States, which in the postwar years played the major rules-setting role for global trade, nothing is
more important than that future rule-making role.
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Extend: “TPP Economic Reform Turn”
TPP causes critical Chinese reforms, spurs broad cooperation
Naughton 15 (Barry, So Kwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs at the Graduate School of
International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, 10/7, “What Will
the TPP Mean for China?,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/china-tpp-trans-pacific-partnershipobama-us-trade-xi/)
Third, TPP increases the pressures within China for more decisive economic reforms. China launched the Shanghai Free
Trade Zone (FTZ) two years ago, partly in order to pilot measures of external liberalization that would be useful in a new round of reform. The
possibility that TPP would be agreed to was a consideration, and part of the impetus for the Shanghai FTZ. However, the FTZ has so far underperformed expectations. Now, the
new trade agreement will present officials with a clear benchmark of global
best practice. The TPP will give advocates of economic reform within China a new argument to support
more substantial opening measures. The TPP challenges China to up its game in economic opening, regulation,
and economic diplomacy. If China chooses, TPP can be the catalyst for a new round of global engagement
that China sorely needs.
TPP is critical to Chinese reforms that ensure stable growth
Shambaugh 15 (David, 1/7, Brookings Inst. Fellow, “China, U.S. Should Make New Ties,”
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/07-china-us-should-make-new-gainsshambaugh)
Joining the TPP would have the same positive systemic effects on the Chinese economy that joining the WTO did
14 years ago, as it would jar many of the entrenched institutional interests (particularly in the financial and State industrial
sectors, but also in energy, transport, and telecommunications). In all of these sectors, China's economy is essentially closed
and protected - joining the TPP and phasing in the high (and open) standards that the TPP is expected to establish
would be an enormous jolt to these sectors, but that is just what they need if China is to realize its own Third
Plenum economic goals.
TPP is critical to Chinese reforms necessary to sustain growth
Mitchell 15 (Tom, staff @ Financial Times, “China lays out ‘countermeasures’ to offset exclusion from
TPP,” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8e81ab8c-763c-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7.html#axzz47uiteo1h)
At a time when Beijing is struggling to reach its annual growth target of “about 7 per cent,” some Chinese
government officials see
TPP membership as an opportunity to push through difficult economic and state sector reforms. In the
late 1990s, then premier Zhu Rongji used China’s negotiations to join the World Trade Organisation to advance an
ambitious reform agenda. “The bigger issue is [TPP] potentially helping to force reform from the outside,” said
Andrew Polk, Beijing-based economist for the Conference Board. “That calculation is absolutely being considered by more
reformist elements of the government.” Chinese officials have acknowledged the potential boost from the TPP’s “higher
standard” requirements related to competition, environmental protection, investment and labour. “The pressure of these reforms is
good for China and TPP member-countries’ competitiveness,” Ma Jun, PBoC chief economist, wrote in a commentary
published earlier this month in the official Shanghai Securities News. “[Such reforms] would substantially enhance China’s own
economic growth potential.”
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Chinese Politics DA Answers (NDCA)
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Clear signals on TPP are critical to spurring a Chinese reform agenda that saves their
economy
Kennedy 16 (Scott, fellow @ Center for Strategic & Int’l Studies, “Economic Consequences of China’s
Slowdown,” http://csis.org/files/publication/151116_Kennedy_Economic_Consequences.pdf)
The most pressing challenge then is not faster growth, but more unambiguously market-oriented economic policies that are also more clearly
articulated and explained. It
is in China’s strong self-interest to calm markets and restore the confidence of
investors, domestic and global. Even if further stimulus is warranted, accompanying it with greater
liberalization and market access, for example in services, would be an important signal that Xi Jinping is not just a
fair-weather reformer. At the same time, the United States can emphasize even further the benefits to China and to the bilateral
relationship of China pursuing an unambiguous reform policy agenda. The conclusion and implementation of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) would also serve as bright directional arrows pointing China to further open its economy,
as remaining outside TPP would put China’s economy at a strategic disadvantage precisely in those high-valueadded sectors in which it is hoping to develop greater capacity. Finally, China’s hosting of the G-20 process in 2016 provides another
opportunity to strengthen coordination of macroeconomic policies and further hone strategies toward healthier and broad-based growth
strategies.
TPP provides political cover for needed economic reforms
Wang 16 (Fei-Ling, 2016, Professor of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology,
“China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Significant Challenges and Profound Opportunities,” February
10th, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/01/2016127134617824774.html)
By its design, the TPP is an external source of important domestic policy reforms for its member nations. It could also be
a great
opportunity for China to launch some otherwise difficult domestic reforms such as moving away from its statemonopolized, investment-driven and overly subsidized export-led growth model. It could help China to reform its legal system
and especially improve its IPR protection, labor protection and environmental protection. The much desired upgrading of the
Chinese economy to be more intensive, innovative, and equitable could be motivated and facilitated
by a TPP membership. The consequential challenges presented by the TPP could very well create and sustain painful but
necessary reforms that will better China and its economic future in the long run, if Beijing joins the TPP with good
compliances.
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