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UNIVERSITA KARLOVA
FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD
INSTITUT MEZINÁRODNÍCH STUDIÍ
MAGISTERSKÁ DIPLOMOVÁ PRÁCE
THE FULL GENERATION OF PEACE AND THE SINO –
AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT, 1969 - 1976
THE DOMESTIC FACTORS AND INFLUENCES ON THE AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE NIXON AND FORD
ADMINISTRATIONS
Jan Bečka
Vedoucí práce: Doc. PhDr. Miloš Calda
Praha 2007
ČESTNÉ PROHLÁŠENÍ
Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto diplomovou práci vypracoval samostatně a použil jsem pouze níže
uvedených pramenů.
V Praze dne 11.1.2007
Jan Bečka
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Before proceeding further, I would like to thank those people without whom the
writing of this thesis would have been much more difficult, if not entirely impossible. Doc.
PhDr. Miloš Calda, in addition to guiding me through most of my research on the topic and
providing me with many useful advices on methodology, kindly agreed to read and review
the final draft of the thesis and contributed many helpful comments and suggestions.
The Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, Netherlands, awarded me a short-term
research grant which enabled me to study archival materials and other primary sources,
which would have found hard to obtain elsewhere. Thanks to these materials, I became
acquainted with many interesting facts, which otherwise could have easily gone unnoticed,
especially in relation to the Republican Party and its role in the making of the American
foreign policy, as well as to the public opinion and various interest groups and lobbies.
And finally, Professor Robert C. Kenzer of the University of Richmond, Virginia,
where I spent one semester in the academic year 2005/2006, mostly doing research on the
American foreign policy in the 1970’s, had spent many hours with me, pointing out
interesting publications and other sources that I could find useful, raising relevant
questions and thus helping to clarify my research topic and to improve my thesis.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
5
THE OPENING TO CHINA IN HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY – A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT SOURCES
11
PRELUDE - THE LEGACY OF THE PAST AND THE PROMISE FOR THE
FUTURE
18
ACT I - THE “COVERT” PHASE OF THE SINO – AMERICAN
RAPPROCHEMENT (1969 – 1971)
33
ACT II - GREAT EXPECTATIONS, GREAT CHALLENGES: THE
RAPPROCHEMENT GAINS MOMENTUM (1971 – 1972)
53
ACT III - THE RE-EVALUATION AND DECLINE OF THE TRIANGULAR
DIPLOMACY (1973 – 1976)
73
CONCLUSION
95
SOURCES USED
102
RESUMÉ (IN CZECH)
111
4
INTRODUCTION
Even more than thirty years after leaving office, Richard Nixon still remains one of
the most controversial presidents in the history of the United States. The only president
who was ever forced to resign in the middle of his term, Nixon became associated with
various illegal activities, with excessive desire for power and secretiveness, which
sometimes bordered on paranoia, and also with the strengthening (albeit temporary) of the
executive, which Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. later called the “Imperial Presidency”.
Today, if Nixon is mentioned, two things would probably come to mind of an
average American – the Watergate Affair and the détente policies, especially the opening
to China. It is interesting to observe a certain discrepancy between how the Nixon
Administration and the president himself were and are viewed on the matters of domestic
policy and on the matters of foreign policy. Since Nixon’s direct participation in Watergate
and in the cover-up attempts which followed was proven, and since various other members
of the administration were also implicated in various criminal and illegal activities 1 , the
overall view of the Nixon Presidency is not surprisingly rather negative. It is often argued
that Nixon caused the American people to lose their confidence in American political
institutions and in the American democracy itself, which eventually led to the election
victory of Jimmy Carter in 1976. On the other hand, however, Nixon’s exploits in the area
of foreign policy and international diplomacy are in general seen in a more positive light.
The president, together with Henry Kissinger, is often credited not only for redefining the
overall American foreign policy strategy, but also for specific accomplishments which
these new strategies brought. The negotiations with the American principal adversary,
Soviet Union, finally yielded the SALT I treaty, which was a major breakthrough in terms
of the limitation of armaments; the Vietnam War, a nightmare which has haunted one
entire generation of Americans, ended for the United States during the Nixon Presidency,
even though the “peace with honor” collapsed after only two years; and last, but definitely
not least, a new relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, a
relationship which had not existed since the Communist victory in China in 1949. In all of
these cases, Nixon and Kissinger, or Kissinger and Nixon, were considered to be the key
1
For example, Nixon’s Vice-President, Spiro Agnew, was forced to resign on tax evasion and money
laundering charges in October 1973. H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, two of Nixon’s most trusted
aides, were forced to resign due to their involvement in Watergate and were later imprisoned. John N.
Mitchell, the Attorney General during the Nixon Administration, was also convicted of being involved in
the affair.
5
figures which had made the American success possible. Both were seen as skilful
diplomats, experts on foreign policy and international relations, and pragmatic negotiators
who were flexible enough to achieve some sort of understanding with their Communist
opponents, while at the same time they did not sacrifice the basic ideals on which the
American foreign policy had been founded since the end of World War II.
Out of all these accomplishments, the opening to the PRC was and still is viewed as
the most spectacular and most unexpected move of the American foreign policy during
Nixon’s presidency. China has always had some sort of magical attraction for the
Americans. In the 19th and 20th century, the Americans fought for “the Chinese markets and
the Chinese souls”. American merchant navy, which gained yet another base in 1898 after
the acquisition of the Philippines, sought to become a major trading force in dealing with
China. At the same time, American missionaries built schools, preached the gospel and
called for the betterment of the fate of the Chinese people. In these decades, the United
States assumed something of a protective stance towards China – in 1899, for example,
American Secretary of State John Hay came up with the concept of the “Open Door
Policy” 2 , which, at least as it was officially presented, mainly sought to maintain Chinese
sovereignty and territorial integrity; during the 1930’s, the Japanese aggression in
Manchuria and later China proper led, among other things, to the deterioration of the
relations between the United States and imperial Japan; and in the American
contemplations of the new world order after World War II, China was to become one of
the “four policemen” 3 who were to guarantee peace and stability. The relationship between
both countries was not only political and commercial, but also in a way deeply emotional.
Thus, the defeat of General Chiang Kai-shek and the establishment of a communist
government in October 1949 came as a shock to the American political elites as well as the
American society, a shock which the Americans never really recovered from. In the
following years, the United States supported the Nationalist government, which has
established itself on the island of Taiwan, with the hope of one day regaining control over
2
The “Open Door Policy”, although it could have been in part inspired by the desire to see China undivided
and unified, was mainly created to protect American trading interests, which were threatened by the
continuing expansion of the European powers, such as Great Britain and Germany, as well as imperial
Japan, in China. La Feber, Walter. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume II: The
American Search for Opportunity, 1865 – 1913. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993, pp. 169 –
170.
3
The other three policemen were to be the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
Roosevelt also believed that China should be a permanent member of the future Security Council of the
United Nations and should thus have the veto power. Kissinger, Henry. Umění diplomacie. Od Richelieua
po pád Berlínské zdi. Prostor, Praha 1999, p. 404.
6
the mainland. As this hope slowly faded, American strategy of ignoring the government in
Beijing and the PRC as such was slowly becoming untenable. Yet, until Richard Nixon
became president in 1969, hardly anyone has openly talked about the re-evaluation of the
American policy towards China. Such a step seemed to be extremely complicated, because
it would also require a possible realignment of the American system of alliances in East
and Southeast Asia; the proponents of such move would have to face criticism from the
lobbies and pressure groups in the United States which supported the Nationalist China;
and, last but not least, there was no indication that the PRC was interested in any form of
normalization in the first place. On the other hand, the bond between China and the United
States, at least on the American side, still lingered even after 1949. The communist
government was criticized, accused of anti-American propaganda and of supporting North
Korea and later North Vietnam; China as country was virtually off limits to the Americans,
with no diplomatic and trade relations and restrictions on travel. China was thus ignored but never forgotten. There always was a feeling that one day this abnormal state of affairs
must change, and there even was a certain sense of inevitability of such a change.
The election victory of Richard Nixon in November 1968 seems to be exactly the
thing that the Sino-American relations needed to enter into a new era. Nixon, with the
support of his National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, were
keen on improving the relations with Beijing. The reasons and motives for this endeavor
will be discussed in detail later, but in general it can be said that they were closely related
with the American attempts to end the Vietnam War and to achieve stability in Indochina.
Another important reason which is often mentioned was the openly manifested conflict
between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, which Nixon and Kissinger
wanted to use to divide the “Communist block” by driving a wedge between the two
biggest communist countries.
Much has already been written about Nixon’s and Kissinger’s foreign policy
towards China, about the extremely complicated and sometimes tense negotiations
between the Americans and the Chinese, and about the implications of the opening to
Beijing for the system of international relations and for the American allies. An extensive
research was done into various international factors, which enabled Nixon to carry out his
turn-around move and establish relations, albeit still informal, with the PRC. All these
issues and factors are no doubt interesting and some of them were indeed crucial for the
success of the rapprochement process. This thesis, however, focuses on a rather different,
but hopefully also very interesting, aspect of Nixon’s China policy, that is, on the
7
American domestic political situation and on the way how this fundamental change in
America’s foreign policy orientation was presented to the American political establishment
and the American people and how it was subsequently received.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the international events can hardly be
ignored or dismissed as unimportant. On the other hand, it is necessary to see that even
with such developments taking place, the successful reception of the rapprochement
process in the United States was not guaranteed. When analyzing the opening to China
during the Nixon Presidency, it is always important to take into account the developments
inside the United States as well. In other words, why is it that Nixon could achieve
something that other presidents before him did not even want to talk about?
In the following chapters, several key issues will be discussed which significantly
influenced the American foreign policy during the Nixon and Ford presidencies. The very
system of foreign-policy-making which Nixon instituted together with Kissinger and which
gave crucial powers and control over the American diplomacy into the hands of the
president and his national security advisor is one such factor worthy of consideration.
Nixon, who harbored a deep mistrust for the Department of State, did all he could to
marginalize its role and even to keep his own Secretary of State, William Rogers, in the
dark about the real American foreign policy objectives. Nixon also had a penchant, which
he shared with Kissinger, for secret, backstage diplomacy, which proved especially
important in dealing with such countries as the PRC or the Soviet Union. Most of the
important negotiations and talks were shrouded in a cloak of confidentiality and were only
presented to the public when Nixon was sure of their success. In this way, Nixon, like
Kissinger, was building his image of a master diplomat and negotiator who was
indispensable for the United States and whose skill greatly improved the deteriorating
American position in the world.
Another important element in understanding the American reaction to the
rapprochement with China was the role of the American press and media in general. Both
Nixon and Kissinger were able to work well with the journalists (at least during Nixon’s
first term in office) and were often able to present their foreign policy in the most favorable
light. Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972, for example, was in general praised as an
important success by the American press. While it was definitely a landmark for the SinoAmerican relations, its real significance was perhaps somewhat inflated and exaggerated
by some journalists. In any case, the skillful use of the opportunities that the world of
media offered helped in a way to make Kissinger’s and Nixon’s foreign policy appear
8
“attractive” and acceptable even for those who would otherwise oppose it. But this positive
view was not to endure forever.
Détente, no matter how successful and beneficial to the American interests it
appeared in the beginning, gradually ran into problems. Although several successes were
achieved, many of Nixon’s key objectives were not attained to by the time he was leaving
office in 1974. Even the rapprochement with the PRC, after it got to a relatively good start
in 1971, slowly began to stagnate after 1972 and it came to a virtual standstill during the
Ford Presidency. Again, as it is often the case, many reasons can be found for such a
development. While the international politics and events outside of the United States did
definitely play their part, further continuation and expansion of the rapprochement
encountered growing opposition in the United States. The initial excitement, even
euphoria, over the new bridge to Beijing, gradually disappeared and left the room open for
questions and doubts. Not even the president’s rhetoric could conceal that there was not
much in concrete terms which the new relationship has brought to the United States, at
least in such terms that could be openly talked about. It seemed as if the rapprochement,
and in fact détente in general, failed to deliver what Nixon and Kissinger hoped for.
Slowly, the conservative opponents of détente, who were relatively silent before 1972,
began to raise their heads and voices. Especially after the Watergate affair began to fully
unravel, Nixon’s position was getting weaker and weaker and even his foreign policy came
under close scrutiny. Yet, again it is interesting to note that while it was later argued that
Nixon’s and Kissinger’s foreign policy did not bring the results intended, both men were
still praised as great diplomats and statesmen, and Kissinger, who was not too tainted by
Watergate and related scandals, maintained a very high popularity with the American
people for a considerable period of time.
The Ford Presidency, while only being a short interlude, is also interesting from the
point of view of this thesis, because it was largely a continuation of Nixon’s foreign policy,
but without Nixon. Its results were disappointing at best and once more, the domestic
factors of the American politics had had an important, if not decisive, impact on its success
or failure.
Thus, this thesis, while it certainly does not omit the most important developments
in the international relations, seek to evaluate the rapprochement with China, which was a
part of the broader framework of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s “new world order” strategy, in
the light of American domestic political and social situation. In other words, why was it
9
that, as the American popular saying goes, “only Nixon could go to China”? 4 The answer
can be found in analyzing the role of Nixon’s personality, his image of a staunch anticommunist, and his ability to maneuver and gain support of others. Nixon was indeed able
to convince some opponents of the rapprochement, like the Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, while marginalizing the influence of others, for example the remaining members of
the China Lobby or some of the dissenting officials of the Department of State. The other
key piece of the puzzle is the system of foreign-policy-making under Nixon and Kissinger,
which gave them unprecedented influence over all the important decisions made and
enabled them to implement their visions of the power diplomacy as well as their pragmatic
realism. And finally, it is necessary to look at the role of the media, which, at least initially,
were sympathetic to the new course of the American foreign policy and which enabled
Nixon and Kissinger to present their policies as a great success.
It is unavoidable in a thesis like this to also touch on the question of whether the
rapprochement to China really was such a great success as it is sometimes presented in the
media and also in the historiography. It is also inevitable that a question arises how much
of this “success” can be contributed to Nixon, how much to Kissinger and how much was
simply a result of circumstances and developments largely beyond their control. This thesis
tends to come to the conclusion that the rapprochement indeed was a milestone in the
American foreign policy and that, from the short term point of view, it was an achievement
worthy of praise. On the other hand, from the long-term point of view5 , it did not achieve
most of the goals it was intended to achieve, and like the whole concept of détente, it failed
to significantly improve the American image abroad and to raise the self-confidence of the
American people. In other words, the initial expectations, accompanied by euphoria and
excitement, gradually transformed into growing frustration and disillusionment. Contrary
to the popular belief, it can also be stated that President Nixon was a key figure in the
formulation of the new American foreign policy, especially in case of the rapprochement
process, and that as his position weakened, détente was slowly doomed to stagnate and
crumble. The domestic consensus on foreign policy, which Nixon sought to create, clearly
failed to emerge.
4
This phrase appeared in newspapers and publications devoted to Nixon and the rapprochement and it
gradually became so popular that it even appeared in the movie Star Trek IV: The Undiscovered Country. It
is one of the proofs of the great effect that the opening to China had on Nixon’s image as diplomat and
statesman.
5
This line of argumentation is somewhat similar to the assertion of William Bundy that Nixon was able to
handle crises and to achieve short-term successes, but his planning and carrying out of long-term policies
was much less successful. Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon
Presidency. Hill and Wang, New York 1998, p. 512.
10
THE OPENING TO CHINA IN HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT SOURCES
Before proceeding to the thesis itself, it would perhaps be useful to briefly review
and analyze various sources relevant to the topic. In the past decades, numerous
monographs, articles and publications in general have been written about the Nixon
Administration, Nixon’s foreign policy, détente and related issues. It is impossible, due to
the limited extent of this review, to go over each of these books, consulted during the
writing of this thesis, in detail; on the other hand, it is necessary to point out certain trends
in the American historiography in relation to the Nixon era and also to show how have
these trends transformed after some previously confidential materials became publicly
accessible.
The primary sources are another important category. These include not only
internal documents and papers of the Nixon Administration, but also documents of other
organizations and institutions, as well as newspaper articles and periodicals of the time.
Such sources, if placed into a proper context using the secondary literature, can provide
interesting insights into the working of the Nixon and Ford Administration and also into
the general perception of the American foreign policy by a wide spectrum of people from
different segments of the American society.
And finally, there is one other category of primary sources that will be dealt with.
Many of those who participated in the making of the American foreign policy during the
above mentioned administrations have published memoirs or similar books. These
publications, while they do not by themselves always portray events and developments
accurately, can reveal interesting personal opinions and remarks as well as the bitter rivalry
which in some cases plagued the Nixon Administration. Again, due to the brevity of this
review, it will only be possible to mention those that can be considered the most relevant
from the view point of this thesis.
A. Primary sources – archival materials, newspapers and other periodicals
Since the archives were made accessible to the public, the perception of the foreignpolicy-making process during the Nixon Administration has been somewhat altered. The
documents, such as memoranda from the meetings of the National Security Council (NSC),
briefing from the president’s meetings with his advisors or confidential dispatches sent by
11
Kissinger to Nixon from China and other places, show interesting information, which has
sometimes never been previously included in the books dealing with the subject. While
many of these documents are only available in the archives 6 , some have been transferred
into digital form 7 and some have even been published in printed version. 8 These primary
sources often show that the Nixon Administration, while it tried as much as possible to
appear unified and well-functioning, was plagued by internal problems, such as rivalry
between different executive branches (Department of State, Department of Defense,
National Security Council etc.). They also reveal many interesting aspects of the often
discussed Nixon – Kissinger relationship, which, while being initially productive and
successful, later turned sour and even hostile. While some of these things can be found in
various other publications, the archival sources play their indispensable part in any
research focusing on American politics or foreign policy or in any such research in general.
Another important primary source, consulted for the purpose of writing this thesis,
is the archive of the National Republican Convention during the years of the Nixon and
Ford Presidency. 9 This archive contains, among others, briefings from the meetings of the
Republican Convention, including speeches of such prominent Republicans as George H.
W. Bush, Gerald Ford or Spiro Agnew. These documents show the almost unassailable
position Richard Nixon held in his own party even after the Watergate scandal began to
engulf him. A vast majority of those speaking at the convention at some point, even those
who were not enthusiastic supporters of Richard Nixon, backed and supported his foreign
policy. It is also interesting to observe what the Republicans thought of the American
foreign policy in general and what issues did they consider to be national priorities.
The newspaper articles and articles from other periodicals definitely fall into this
category as well. In the introduction it was noted that Nixon and especially Kissinger
worked well with the press and used all the possibilities the media offered to increase their
popularity and build their image. It has to be said that their strategy proved initially
6
An important source in this respect would be the archive of the Richard Nixon Security Files and also of the
Richard Nixon Office Files. Both are accessible in the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, Netherlands,
www.roosevelt.nl as part of the Papers of the Nixon White House collection.
7
Some of these materials are available on the internet at various websites, dedicated to the American history
and the Cold War. For example, one of such projects is The National Security Archive, which is run by the
George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ . Another important digital
database is the Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), made accessible by the provisions of
the Freedom of Information Act of 1967.
8
One such publication is especially interesting from the point of view of the Sino – American relations.
Burr, William (ed.). The Kissinger Transcripts. The Top Secrets Talks with Beijing and Moscow. The New
Press, Washington D.C. 1999.
9
This archive is again available at the Roosevelt Study Center.
12
successful and that if it was not for the Watergate affair, it would probably have remained
somewhat successful for both terms Nixon spent in office. It does not mean that the press
did not criticize the president; nor does it mean that many of the American newspapers,
which can be considered liberal, welcomed the election victory of Richard Nixon in 1968.
However, in terms of the evaluation of the administration’s foreign policy, and especially
of the rapprochement with China, the press did not spare too much praise in describing
Nixon’s and Kissinger’s role. The role of such sources as newspaper 10 articles, columns
and essays is not so much informative, especially when the fact that journalists did not
have access to the confidential information is taken into account; however, the press could,
and did, influence the public opinion and helped to create the image of the president and
his advisor as genial diplomats and master tacticians. On the other hand, an analysis of the
press gives the researcher an interesting opportunity to find out the feelings of “the
ordinary people”, the “silent majority” which Nixon referred to, both by means of
interviews 11 and by means of the letters to the editor. In some cases, such articles provide
interesting insights into the public opinion. The role of the press in this respect is thus
twofold – on one hand, it could be used by the president to present his views directly to the
public and thus to get a wider support for his initiatives; on the other hand, the press in
some cases reflected the opinion of the public and signaled to the president how far he can
go with some of his policies and plans.
B. The Nixon Era Historiography and Other Relevant Scholarly Publications
Such an interesting and intriguing, as well as controversial, topic as the Nixon
Administration and its foreign policy prompted the writing of many historical, political and
social analyses and commentaries. As with the primary sources, it is almost impossible to
mention all of these books or even the majority of them in this short review. Instead, it
could perhaps be useful to divide the relevant publications into several categories and
choose several examples for each category.
The Nixon Administration as such has attracted the attention of many historians and
political scientists. For many of these authors, the excesses that Nixon had committed
(abuse of the executive powers, marginalization of the role of the Congress, the
10
For the purpose of this thesis, the leading newspapers in the United States, such as The New York Times,
The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Daily Tribune and others were analyzed. The
Time magazine played an important role as well, since it even chose Nixon and Kissinger for its Men of the
Year award in 1972 (Nixon was chosen even twice, for the first time in 1971).
11
For an example, please see: Holles, Everett R. “In Conservative San Diego, Nixon’s Trip is Traumatic.”
The New York Times, February 26, 1972, p. 11.
13
wiretapping scandals etc.) have clearly demonstrated that the presidency has gotten out of
control and that there is a need to curb the presidential powers. This was the case of Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr. 12 or even earlier, of Rowland Evans, Jr. and Robert D. Novak. 13 For
these authors, Nixon’s presidency was simply a violation of the principles of American
democracy and they saw in Nixon something of a dictator. The negative view of the
administration as such was further bolstered by Watergate. Given the fact that Nixon was
forced to resign and that his involvement in Watergate was proven, it comes as no surprise
that even in later publications his time in office is seen almost as a “dark hour” of the
American politics. On the other hand, there are authors, who have even quite recently
defended Nixon and see Watergate as a conspiracy of ultra-conservatives who disliked
Nixon’s
pragmatic
foreign
policy
and
détente. 14
However,
similar
theories
notwithstanding, in general the American historiography has adopted the trend of seeing
the Nixon years in a prevailingly negative light.
The Nixon foreign policy, as was mentioned earlier, is a little different case. In the
years immediately after Nixon’s resignation, the historians tended to view the foreign
policy initiatives, such as détente and the Nixon Doctrine, in a more positive light. For
example, Robert S. Litwak 15 argues that although not all the moves that Kissinger and
Nixon made were successful, no other policy would have been more successful under the
existing circumstances. According to Litwak, Nixon and Kissinger chose the best strategy
they possibly could. As the years went on, the historians writing about the foreign policy of
Nixon and Kissinger became more critical, though. Richard A. Melanson 16 wrote that
Nixon and Kissinger failed, because they were not able to neither maintain the domestic
foreign policy consensus of their predecessors nor create a new consensus of their own.
William Bundy says in his book 17 that while Nixon was good in sensing the public mood
and in using slogans and keynote themes, he was often not able to introduce any coherent
new policy. This apparent shift in the historiography of the foreign policy during Nixon’s
12
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. The Imperial Presidency. Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1973.
Evans, Rowland Jr. and Robert D. Novak. Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power. Random
House, New York 1971.
14
Colodny, Len and Robert Gettlin. A Silent Coup. The Removal of a President. St Martin’s Press, New York
1991.
15
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984.
16
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War. St.
Martin’s Press, New York 1991.
17
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. Hill and Wang,
New York 1998.
13
14
era was probably caused by the opening of the archives, which had shown that Nixon’s
policies were not in fact able to meet the expected objectives, and also by the later
developments in the world, which have proven many of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s basic
policy tenets as invalid or at least inaccurate.
It is also necessary to mention some books which shed light on the often
complicated and complex Nixon – Kissinger relationship. According to the belief, shared
by many Americans, the true mastermind of the American foreign policy was Henry
Kissinger, while Nixon was just a good manipulator and campaigner for his advisor’s
foreign policies. That was not necessarily the case. Especially in relation to China, it was
apparently Nixon who came up with the idea of contacting the government in Beijing and
Kissinger actually initially opposed it. 18 It is reasonable to assume that it was not the only
case when Nixon actually originated the idea while Kissinger was tasked with its practical
implementation. Some authors even go so far as to argue that it was Nixon, not Kissinger,
who was in fact creating the entire American foreign policy and that without Nixon this
foreign policy quickly fell apart. For example, Richard C. Thornton sees the “Kissinger
Shogunate”, i.e. the time when Kissinger was de facto in charge of the American foreign
policy 19 , as the least successful period in the history of American foreign-policy-making. 20
Most authors in general also agree that Nixon grew increasingly suspicious of his advisor
and that he even thought of replacing him with someone else, which, for the reasons
discussed later in the thesis, never happened.
Finally, there are books which do not exactly fit the above categories but which
have to be mentioned at least briefly. To understand some of the challenges that Nixon
could face in the United States when pursuing the rapprochement with China, it is useful to
read through Stanley D. Bachrack’s book “The Committee of One Million: China Lobby
Politics, 1953 - 1971”. 21 This book explains very well the structure, goals and methods of
the famous China Lobby, which was for many years one of the main opponents of the
opening to China. The main limitation of this book, however, is that it ends in 1971, and
thus does not show the activities of the lobby in the following years. To include some
books dealing with the impact of the opening to China had countries other than the United
18
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2004.
19
This happened when Nixon was too absorbed by the Watergate scandal to be able to take care of the
foreign policy issues and also later during the Ford Administration.
20
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy. Paragon House,
New York 1989.
21
Bachrack, Stanley D. The Committee of One Million. The Politics of China Lobby, 1953- 1971. Columbia
University Press, New York 1976.
15
States, it is possible to point out, for example, “Alliance in Anxiety” 22 by Go Ito. These
reactions of American allies to the rapprochement with China were important for the
situation in the United States, both from the point of view of implementing the Nixon
Doctrine but also from the point of view of the influence the allies could have on the
American public opinion and on some of the American legislators and members of the
political establishment.
In conclusion to this section one last thing needs to be pointed out about these
secondary sources, which also applies to some of the primary sources. This thesis deals not
only with the Nixon era but also with the Ford Presidency. It could appear that the sources
consulted deal mostly with the foreign policy and the general political situation during the
five years of the Nixon Administration. Since the Ford Administration was in many ways a
continuation of the Nixon Administration (especially in its foreign policy strategy and
orientation), however, a majority of these sources also include some information on the
years of détente and related problems, such as the rapprochement with China, after Nixon
left office. This connection between the two administrations and their foreign policies was
made all the stronger by the fact that Henry Kissinger remained Secretary of State for the
entire time Gerald Ford served as President.
C. Memoirs and Similar Sources
The last major category of sources is represented by the accounts written by those who
directly participated or were witnesses of the events mentioned above. The perils and
dangers of using the memoir literature are in general well-known and it is not necessary to
discuss them here. Personal rivalries, “lapses of memory”, and the desire to improve one’s
image and increase his or her importance are the main pitfalls into which the authors of
memoirs may fall. On the other hand, the memoirs can bring some interesting personal
observations into the otherwise dry list of facts, places and dates. They can also explain
things which can’t be explained just by using archives or secondary sources and sometimes
they provide alternate answers to various questions.
Henry Kissinger has over the years proven to be a prolific writer. While not all of his
books are related to the time he served in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, at least one
22
Ito, Go. Alliance in Anxiety: Détente and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle. Routledge, New York
2003.
16
of them deals with this period in detail. 23 President Nixon also published his memoirs 24 ,
which are written in a somewhat cautious style and which do not offer as many interesting
insights and thoughts as they perhaps could. It might be interesting as well to mention that
John Ehrlichman, the Assistant for Domestic Affairs to Richard Nixon, who was later
imprisoned for his involvement in the Watergate scandal, published a book called The
China Card, which was a novel, but which was based on his memories from the time he
served in the White House. 25
23
Kissinger, Henry. Roky v Bílém domě. BB/art, Praha 2006.
Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. Grosset &Dunlap, New York 1978.
25
Ehrlichman, John. The China Card. A Novel. Simon and Schuster, New York 1986.
24
17
PRELUDE – THE LEGACY OF THE PAST AND THE PROMISE FOR
THE FUTURE
"Who, who, who, who are our enemies? Who, who, who, who are our friends?" – Nixon in
China (an opera by John Adams) 26
The Nixon Administration came into office at a very complicated time for the
United States, both from the domestic and from the international point of view. The
previous administrations, mainly that of Lyndon B. Johnson, have not been able to solve
the longstanding problems that America was facing. The United States was loosing
prestige abroad while at the same time violent protests were rocking the foundations of the
American nation at home. Richard M. Nixon, the newly elected president, had to find a
way how to redefine the American position in the world and restore the American selfconfidence. The situation, so it seemed to Nixon and his closest advisor, Henry Kissinger,
called for a major realignment of the extant power alliances and for an almost complete
overhaul of the American foreign policy. In 1968, Nixon was elected neither because he
was so overwhelmingly popular nor because his Democratic opponent was so incompetent
and weak; he was elected because he, unlike the Democrats, seemed to have a clear vision
of what was to be done. It would thus be useful to look briefly at what this vision really
was and also at what challenges Nixon had to deal with, both in the United States and on
the international scene.
A. The Legacy of the Past: The Defeats Abroad and Conflicts at Home
Ever since the end of World War II, there existed something resembling a
consensus in the United States with regards to the American foreign policy. The emergence
of the Soviet Union as a major world power and later as a principal American adversary
naturally led to the bipolar division of the world, with the United States becoming the
leader of the “free world” against the “Communist block”. The containment strategy, first
formulated by George F. Kennan, and later implemented by President Harry Truman and
by his successors in the Oval Office, formed the basic foundation of American foreign
26
The opera inspired by Nixon’s visit to China was composed by an American composer, John Adams,
between 1985 and 1987, and it premiered on October 22, 1987, in Houston. The libretto of the opera was
written by Alice Goodman. Adams, John. Nixon in China (Audio CD Booklet). Nonesuch, New York
1990.
18
policy for more than two decades. This approach did not always prevent military conflicts
from erupting, as in the case of the Korean War. Yet, overall, its basic tenets were accepted
by the American society as a whole and it was thus something that the administrations
could turn back to, something of starting point. Now in 1968, perhaps for the first time
since 1945, the new administration of Richard M. Nixon had to work without this
consensus. 27 How did this happen?
The main problem that the United States was facing abroad was, beyond any doubt,
the war in Vietnam. Under John F. Kennedy and especially under Lyndon B. Johnson, the
American military presence in Vietnam had risen significantly. What was originally an
incremental policy of helping the South Vietnamese government during the Kennedy
Administration became a long-term commitment during the presidency of his successor. 28
By 1968, the United States did not appear anywhere closer to the final victory, especially
after the Tet offensive had shown that the enemy forces were stronger than anticipated. For
the Americans, this was a new situation. Never before had the United States lost a war,
especially with such an inferior opponent as the North Vietnamese seemed to be. The
containment seemed to be inefficient in this case and the domestic foreign policy
consensus, which formed around it, began to fall apart. The embattled president lost the
popular support and his approval ratings dropped to the all-time low of 36 percent. 29 The
violent protests, associated with the Civil Rights Movement, took on another dimension
with the demonstrations against the Vietnam War. Lyndon Johnson, who felt more and
more isolated and abandoned, finally decided in March 1968 not to run for office again.
The divided and weakened Democratic Party then nominated Hubert Humphrey, a man
who did not have the backing of many members of his own party and who was also
disliked and mistrusted by some of the key American allies abroad. 30
Vietnam and the internal division it caused was not the only problem that Nixon
had to tackle after becoming president. The United States’ prestige in the world was slowly
27
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War. St.
Martin’s Press, New York 1991, p. 33.
28
In 1965, Johnson sent 200,000 American troops into Vietnam and this number was further increasing.
Hook, Stephen W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II. CQ Press,
Washington D.C. 2004, p. 121.
29
This value is based on a Gallup Poll, taken in March 1968.
The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu./cgibin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/PresJob/PresJob.htx;start=HS_fullresults?pr=Johnson [ 10.1.2007].
30
Nguyen Van Thieu, the leader of South Vietnam, personally disliked Humphrey and did not trust him.
Humphrey was not popular with the Nationalist leadership of the Republic of China (Taiwan), either.
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. Hill and Wang,
New York 1998, pp. 46 – 47.
19
declining. In Latin America, the leftist forces were now firmly established in Cuba, despite
the American efforts to overthrow the Castro government. There was a danger that other
Latin American countries could turn socialist or communist as well. The decolonization
process, which has started in the 1960’s, had forced the United States to try to gain
influence in the newly established states and struggle for it with the Soviet Union and also
with China. And in Europe, the American allies were increasingly worried about the
seemingly powerless and paralyzed United States. While there still was the nuclear arsenal,
which would hopefully deter the Soviet Union from any major attack on Western Europe
or North America 31 , the Americans did not seem to be able to keep the communist
insurgence in check in various local conflicts all across the globe. The American foreign
policy, which many experts see as a constant oscillation between messianic desire to help
the other nations and make the world better and outright isolationism, seemed to be
returning back to the latter. The American people were tired of the extensive American
involvement abroad, especially since this involvement produced little positive results and
was costly both in terms of American lives and resources.
From the viewpoint of this thesis, there was another long-term problematic issue
which the new administration would eventually try to solve – the relations, or better say
non-relations, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Ever since 1949, the mainland
China with its communist government was ignored 32 and the United States instead chose to
support the Nationalist Kuomintang forces on Taiwan. The Republic of China (ROC), as
Taiwan was and is officially called, thus still held the seat in the United Nations Security
Council, and all the resolutions which were drafted to change this were vetoed by the
United States. By 1968, the American political establishment had already given up on the
hope that the Beijing government would collapse and that China would be “retaken”. The
days of Douglas McArthur and his bold plans of the invasion of China and use of nuclear
weapons in Manchuria were long gone. 33 Yet, Nixon’s predecessor in the White House,
Lyndon B. Johnson, still felt that the PRC was “expansionist” and “militaristic” power, and
31
Even the power of this deterrent was questioned, however, as it was believed that by the time Nixon came
into office, the Soviets had actual missile superiority over the United States and were further building
armaments. Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy.
Paragon House, New York 1989, pp. 3 – 5.
32
The American relationship with China was illustrated by the famous incident when the American Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles refused to shake hands with his Chinese counterpart during the peace talks in
Geneva in 1954. Zhou Enlai later admitted he was very offended by the behavior of Dulles. Kissinger,
Henry. Roky v Bílém domě. BB/art, Praha 2006, p. 968.
33
It has to be pointed out, though, that even during the Korean War the plans of Douglas McArthur were not
accepted and finally led to his dismissal. At that time, it was feared that an open attack on China would
start World War III Dvorchak, Robert J. Korejská válka, 1950 – 1953. Jota, Brno 1996, pp. 197 – 199.
20
thus he did not seriously entertain a change in the American China policy. 34 This of course
comes as no surprise. On one hand, it seemed that even the international situation did not
allow such a move, even though already since Nikita Khrushchev became the leader of
Soviet Union in 1958, signs of tension between the communist superpowers could be
observed. Some historians even argue that before Nixon became president the American
military strategists and the American political establishment were blind to the possibility of
an alliance with China, even though in some respects this alliance would have been
logical. 35 On the other hand, it must be pointed out that regardless of the international
circumstances, an open move to establish relations with “Red China” could amount to a
political suicide in the United States. The accusations that the Roosevelt and Truman
Administrations “sold China down the river” were still not forgotten even after twenty
years. 36 The China Lobby, consisting of conservative Congressmen, Senators, journalists
and other influential people, carried out successful propaganda in favor of the Nationalist
China and sought to discredit anyone who would try to change the existing state of affairs.
Under such circumstances, only a person “waterproof” to the accusations of procommunist leanings could seriously contemplate to approach the government in Beijing.
And Richard M. Nixon was exactly such a person.
Thus, in conclusion, the challenges that Nixon faced at the time he was elected
were considerable. On the international level, he had to restore the confidence of
America’s allies in American military prowess and in the American willingness to defend
its sphere of influence abroad, while at the same time finding a way to scale down the
costly and unpopular American involvement in fighting communism in the developing
world. He had to formulate such a policy which would gain the support of the majority of
the American people, the “silent majority” or the “little men” that he often referred to, and
which would finally bring the successes the Americans needed to grow self-confident and
proud of their nation again. And he had to redefine the American relationship to its main
adversaries, that is, the Soviet Union and the PRC, so that he could create “the new world
order” in which the United States would occupy a privileged position. Originally, Nixon
34
Garson, Robert. “Lyndon B. Johnson and the China Enigma”. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 32,
No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 67 – 68.
35
Ito, Go. Alliance in Anxiety: Détente and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle. Routledge, New York
2003, p. 7.
36
Hook, Stephen W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II, p. 74.
21
sought to modify the containment strategy 37 ; eventually, he decided to replace it with
détente and with his own modern version of pragmatic realpolitik.
B. Richard Nixon as the Diplomat-in-Chief – His Personality and His Foreign Policy
Vision and Priorities
The elections of 1968 brought a great comeback of Richard Nixon. A man who was
once believed to be out of politics for good managed to end the eight-year long Democratic
dominance of the White House and to repay the Democrats for his own defeat in 1960.
The new president was a man of paradoxes – on one hand, he was a skilful negotiator, a
gifted speaker and great statesman; on the other, he was often unsure of himself, was
jealous of other peoples’ success and apparently became addicted to power. His coming
into the Oval Office meant a dramatic change to the way the American foreign policy was
conducted and implemented. Under the “Imperial Presidency” model, the foreign policy
became a domain of the president and the handful of people he seemed to trust, among
whom the prominent position was occupied by Henry Kissinger.
B.1. Nixon’s Personal Convictions and Abilities as the Determinants of His Success
Richard Nixon’s political career was long and full of great downfalls but also
successes. A son of conservative Quaker parents, Nixon’s mindset was from the early
childhood influenced by conservative values, evangelical Christianity and staunch anticommunism. It comes as no surprise then that from the very beginning of his political
career he identified himself with the conservative wing of the Republican Party. 38 After
studying law at Duke University in North Carolina and working for a short time as a
lawyer in California, and after his military service during World War II, he decided to
enter politics. He ran for the House in 1946, defeating the incumbent Democratic candidate
Jerry Voorhis. Nixon made use of his anti-communism during the campaign, and he won
largely on the account of labeling his opponent “a Communist” after he was endorsed by
the CIO - PAC. 39 While in Congress, Nixon was very active during the HUAC hearings,
especially in the Alger Hiss case. 40 In 1950, he was elected to the Senate, again having
accused his opponent, Helen Gahagan Douglas, of pro-communist leanings. This tactic
37
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, p. 4.
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, p. 34.
39
The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was at the time seen as an organization, infiltrated and
controlled by the communists .Sullivan, Patricia. Days of Hope. Race and Democracy in the New Deal
Era. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1996, p. 234.
40
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 5.
38
22
earned him the nickname “Tricky Dick” but it also made him more popular with the
conservative elements of the Republican Party. He was also initially very close to the
China Lobby, supported Douglas McArthur during the Korean War controversy and was
always ready to attack his opponents for being too liberal and soft on Communism. All
these public speeches and appearances made him more well-known and influential inside
the Republican Party; on the other hand, however, many Democrats viewed him as their
personal enemy and they never forgave him his offensive and insulting rhetoric against
them. 41 In 1952, Nixon was chosen as Eisenhower’s vice-presidential candidate, both
because of his anti-communism and also as a way of balancing the ticket.
As Vice-President, Nixon became more involved in the matters of foreign policy
than any other vice-president before him. He was often sent by Eisenhower to attend
various state functions abroad and thus had the chance to meet with many foreign
statesmen and diplomats. He became famous for his legendary “kitchen debate” with the
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev during the American National Exhibition in Moscow in
July 1959. Nixon’s views of foreign policy and international relations began to change
somewhat, however, due to the time he spent as Vice-President. While he remained anticommunist, he developed a certain sense of respect for his communist adversaries. He also
shifted from his original isolationist stance 42 more towards internationalism, and realized
that the United States cannot simply reject its obligations to the world community and to
its allies.
During the 1950’s, Nixon was building up his renown as a foreign policy expert by
writing for various journals and scholarly periodicals. He became a skillful campaigner and
learned to understand the public mood and to seemingly adapt his own priorities and
agenda to it, although it was known that he usually did not let the popular opinion or that
of the American allies to influence his decisions. 43 He also learned to work with the press
and the media, even though he never fully overcame his mistrust for the journalists, which
was later exacerbated by his election defeats in 1960 and 1962, for which he blamed,
among others, the “liberal media”. 44 The presidential elections in 1960, which he lost by a
41
Among those most fiercely attacked by Nixon were, for example, Dean Acheson or Harry Truman.
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, p. 34.
42
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 5.
43
Ibid, p. 4.
44
Nixon appeared in a press conference, which he called “his last” and he said that “you [the journalists]
won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore”. Greenberg, David. “Like Nixon, Dean May Survive.”
SpokesmanReview.com, January 26, 2004, http://www.spokesmanreview.com/breaking/story.asp?ID=1477
[11.1.2007].
23
very slight margin 45 , dealt his political ambitions a harsh blow. Only two years later,
Nixon lost another election, this time to the Senate in his home state, California. Worn-out
and disappointed, Nixon withdrew from politics and returned to his original profession at
the bar. He did not, however, disappear entirely. During the following six years, he
traveled extensively, kept his contacts in the American political establishment and in the
governments of foreign countries, and continued to write for journals and periodicals,
dealing mainly with foreign policy and international affairs. One of these contributions he
wrote is especially interesting. In October 1967, when Nixon’s name already began to
appear in relation to the possible nomination for the Republican presidential elections
ticket, he published a short article called Asia after Vietnam. 46 In this article, as some
historians argue, he first tentatively proposed the possibility of the opening to China as
well as the concept which has later become known as the Nixon Doctrine. 47
When the election year 1960 came, Nixon appeared once more as the top
Republican candidate for the presidency. He came with the program of “stability and
order”, with which he appealed to the “silent majority” of Americans, disgusted with the
excesses of the “noisy minority”. Nixon’s conservativism and his anti-communism made
him trustworthy enough for the more conservative circles of the American society; his lack
of militant radicalism made him acceptable for those who would never vote for such
Republican candidates as Barry Goldwater. In the matters of domestic policy, Nixon’s
approach seemed moderate. He was ready to return some of the agenda back from the
federal to the state level, while keeping the federal control over such programs as welfare
and social security or environmental protection. 48 With the help of his pragmatic and
“common sense” attitude, Nixon hoped that the “common folk”, tired of the “leaders’
class”, would carry him to the White House.
45
Nixon only lost by 112,827 votes or 0.17% of the popular vote; he received 219 electoral votes, while
John F. Kennedy got 303. Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections,
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html [22.12.2006].
46
Nixon, Richard M. “Asia after Vietnam”. Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLVI, No. 1 (October 1967), pp. 111 –
125. Nixon stated in the article (p.121), that it is no longer possible to ignore China and to leave its vast
population in “angry isolation”.
47
The Nixon Doctrine, announced by the President on Guam on July 25, 1969, stated that while the United
States would keep its commitments abroad, including the maintenance of the nuclear shield for its closest
allies and other nations whose survival was in the “vital interest” of the United States, it would look more
towards the other nations to assume responsibility if a less serious enemy aggression should occur. Litwak,
Robert. S Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969 1976. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984, p. 52. For the effects of the Nixon Doctrine on the
American allies, namely Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, see: Ito, Go. Alliance in Anxiety: Détente and the
Sino-American-Japanese Triangle.
48
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, p. 42.
24
Perhaps surprisingly, Nixon initially kept a low profile on his foreign policy plans
during the campaign and for some time, tried to avoid criticizing his predecessor, Lyndon
B. Johnson. He felt that the public was perhaps not yet ready for many of the bold,
innovative strategies he had in mind. Besides, Nixon was obsessed with secrecy and even
during his presidential years he often waited until the last minute to reveal his diplomatic
or military moves. That did not mean, however, that he did not use his contacts in other
countries and his foreign policy expertise to influence the outcome of the elections. The
public statement by the Democratic candidate, Hubert Humphrey, which he made in
October 1968, shortly before the elections, gave Nixon the opportunity he waited for.
Humphrey declared that he was ready to stop the bombing of North Vietnam and that he
was willing to take this risk, acceptable as a price for future peace. Nixon used his friend
and political ally, Anne Chenault 49 , who had close ties to both the Chinese Nationalists and
the Thieu government in Saigon, to open a back channel to these two allied countries.
Chenault conveyed a message to Thieu that the Democrats were about to abandon his
government to be able to withdraw from Indochina. As a result, Thieu, who already
disliked Humphrey, openly sided with Nixon and, more importantly, he refused to enter the
peace negotiations which Humphrey saw as a way to end the war. The negotiation process
collapsed, which beyond any doubt influenced the outcome of the upcoming elections.
Although Nixon’s direct participation in this secret plot is not proven 50 , it is very likely he
at least knew about it. Some of his close aides and coworkers were definitely involved and
some of them even met with Chenault and instructed her before she went to Saigon. 51
Once more, the “Tricky Dick” face of the new president came to light, perhaps as a
harbinger of the things which were to come.
It would be unreasonable to presume that the collapse of the negotiations would by
itself tip the balance in Nixon’s favor in November 1968. On the other hand, the elections
49
Chenault was never rewarded by Nixon for her service to him by being appointed to some position in his
administration. In later years, she served as a committeewomen in the GOP organization in Washington
D.C., being mainly active in matters of foreign policy, and for some time, also in the American delegation
to the UNESCO. Donald Rumsfeld and Anne Chenault on American Foreign Policy. Meetings of the
Republican National Committee, 1911 - 1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911 – 1980, Part 1, Series
B, Reel 18, pp. 23 – 25.
50
When he was asked directly by President Johnson, who found out about the plot through phone call
surveillance, Nixon denied any involvement and any knowledge of the plan. Bundy, William. A Tangled
Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 43.
51
Spiro Agnew knew about the Chenault mission, and John Mitchell instructed her to present Thieu with
The Republican (i.e. Nixon’s) standpoint on the possibility of the peace negotiations. Bundy, William. A
Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, pp. 41 – 42.
25
were again very close 52 and every vote counted. However, the end often justifies the
means, as Richard Nixon would probably have said. The most important thing was that
after the elections, the United States had a new Republican president. This new president
had a definite vision of the role he wanted the United Sates to play in the world; not only
so, he had also already planned how and with whom he would carry this vision out.
B.2. Nixon’s Foreign Policy Vision – America and the New World Order
To understand properly what role the newly established relationship with China
was to play in the overall foreign policy strategy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, it
is necessary at first to look at what this strategy meant in broader terms. In other words,
what were some of the key priorities that both men saw as vital in 1968? And what system
of international relations did they seek to create?
Both Nixon and Kissinger were ardent students of history, international politics,
and diplomacy. Both were also to a degree influenced by the same authors and the same
statesmen and diplomats. Especially Kissinger was intrigued by the study of the Vienna
Congress and the congress diplomacy of the 19th century. 53 He admired Castlereagh and
Metternich, although he, like Nixon, believed that their weakness lay in the inability to
transcend their own limits or at least to try to do so. 54 Another author which influenced
both Kissinger and Nixon was Clausewitz with his theories about war. And finally,
Bismarck and his realpolitik were another important source of inspiration. The foreign
policy approach of Nixon and Kissinger was thus a peculiar mixture of pragmatism,
realism and, to a certain degree, idealism. Both men were convinced that the bipolar
division of the world was immutable and even desirable in the coming decades as it
promoted a certain degree of stability. Instead of seeking to change the existing status quo,
Nixon tried to preserve it by the means of creating a stable five power international
order 55 , in which all the participating sides would have an interest in a stable a peaceful
international environment. This world order was to be created through the détente policy,
or, in other words, the relaxation of tensions between the rival superpowers. There were
52
Nixon and Agnew won by 511,944 votes or by 0.7% of the popular vote, and they earned 301 votes in the
Electoral College compared to 191 which went to the Democrats. Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections,
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html [22.12.2006].
53
He wrote his final dissertation at Harvard about the congressional diplomacy in Europe after the
Napoleonic Wars.
54
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976, p. 57.
55
These five powers were the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and Europe. Thornton, Richard
C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, p. 10.
26
several reasons for this relaxation. The main one was perhaps the fact that by the time
Nixon became president, the main American adversary, the USSR, had largely caught up
with the United States with regards to the overall military capabilities. 56 Thus it was in the
interest of the United States to seek equilibrium by establishing a less confrontational
approach to the Soviets. Nixon assumed that the Soviet Union, and also China, while being
“revolutionary powers” in the past, have now become or were in the process of becoming
“status quo powers” and that they would be willing to cooperate in the “new world order”
system. 57 This assumption had proven wrong very soon, however. When Nixon and
Kissinger found out that the USSR has no interest in maintaining the status quo 58 , they
sought to bolster their negotiating position vis-à-vis Kremlin by establishing a new
relationship with Beijing. The so-called triangular diplomacy, as Nixon saw it, gave a
considerable advantage to the United States, because it could choose whether and at what
time to cooperate with the USSR or China. The Sino-Soviet split was an important factor
that Nixon and Kissinger calculated with in their détente strategy. Another advantage of
the United States was, as Go Ito argues, that it was a part of both the “military power
triangle” and the “economic power triangle”. By having relations with all the important
powers and centers of power, the United States could theoretically assume the role of a
mediator or an arbiter and increase its influence by playing the other countries against each
other. 59 This strategy was initially successful, but as will be discussed in the subsequent
chapters, it did not ultimately produce the intended results.
It has often been argued that Nixon and Kissinger were still captives of the “Cold
War mentality”. While they believed they were seeking innovative policies and
overcoming the barriers of the old way of thinking, they were not able, or not willing, to
take into account certain new developments in the world. The changes in the developing
world, the emergence of new nation-states and their demands for a stronger voice in the
decisions made about the international affairs did not fit into Nixon’s and Kissinger’s
bipolar thinking. In their focus on the power diplomacy and realpolitik, they only counted
with the “strong” states, while largely ignoring the “weak” ones. As a result, it can be said
56
Hook, Stephen W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II, p. 139.
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of
Stability,1969 – 1976, p. 55.
58
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, p. 10.
59
The “military power triangle” included the United States, China and the Soviet Union, while the
“economic power triangle” included the United States, Japan and Europe. For more, see: Ito, Go. Alliance
in Anxiety: Détente and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle.
57
27
that their policy was inherently flawed. 60 By not paying attention to the local conflicts and
to the developments in the Third World, and by ascribing too much power and influence to
the superpowers (as was the case of the relationship between China and North Vietnam or
between the Soviet Union and Egypt}, they have doomed some of their initiatives to fail.
There is another important aspect of the Nixon - Kissinger foreign policy which
needs to be mentioned. While Nixon was an anti-communist, he was sometimes willing to
lay his convictions aside when dealing with communist countries. Especially since he
believed that they were seeking a status quo, Nixon thought that the communist ideology
had become something of a façade in the Soviet Union and to a degree also in China. He
thus saw the need for a “realistic”, “pragmatic” relationship with China, devoid of
ideological barriers. 61 He had a similar approach to the relations between Washington and
Moscow. On the other hand, Kissinger was probably even more pragmatic in certain
respects that Nixon. It is sometimes argued that while Nixon wished to maintain a
modified containment position late into his first term, Kissinger pressed for a shift toward a
completely new world order. 62 Thus, while Kissinger was sometimes willing to sacrifice
even old American allies and friends, like Thieu, Chiang Kai-shek or the Pakistani leader
Yahya Khan, Nixon felt that American commitments, accepted either by him or by his
predecessors, should be fulfilled. This showed especially clearly during the long and
complicated negotiations with the North Vietnamese, when Kissinger often offered far
more than Nixon was willing to accept. This eventually led to an increasing tension
between both men.
After this brief overview of détente and of the foreign policy vision Richard Nixon
had when he was elected president, it is possible to proceed further and to look at the role
the People’s Republic of China was to play in Nixon’s plans.
B.3. Nixon and the “Red China” – A Complete Turnaround of the American Foreign
Policy?
As mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter, the opening to China was
something Nixon had on his mind already before his election victory. Although in the past
he was a strong supporter of the Nationalist government and he advocated harsh position
60
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2004, p. 49.
61
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1999, p. 17.
62
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, p. xxii.
28
when dealing with the PRC 63 , Nixon began to adopt a different stance during his travels in
Asia in the 1960’s. He realized that the Nationalists, under the existing circumstances, have
no chance of retaking the mainland. 64 He still saw China as a threat, especially in the light
of the assistance the Chinese offered to the North Vietnamese government, but unlike his
predecessor, he chose a different strategy to counter this threat. President Johnson was
extremely suspicious of China and he, for a time, even contemplated an attack on the
Chinese nuclear installations. 65 Although this attack never materialized, Johnson believed
until the end of his time in office that there was a need for the United States to cooperate
with the Soviet Union against China. 66 On the other hand, Nixon sought to establish a
closer cooperation with the Chinese, which was to serve as leverage against the Soviet
Union. In this respect, Nixon took Johnson’s strategy and turned it around.
Even though Nixon really wished to establish a new form of relationship with the
Beijing government, there was no guarantee that this endeavor would be successful. The
president was beyond any doubt aware of the magnanimity and complexity of this task, but
perhaps it was this magnanimity and complexity which made him even more resolute to
carry it out. Besides, in 1969, when Nixon officially became president, the international
circumstances for approaching the Chinese were more favorable than ever. The
relationship between the PRC and the USSR, already sour for a long time, now turned even
more hostile. On March 2, the Chinese Army occupied the disputed Damansky (Zhenbao
in Chinese) island on the Ussuri river, which forms the border between China and Russia.
The subsequent clashes between the Chinese and Soviet armed forces led to many
casualties on both sides and the tension began to rapidly increase. The Soviets deployed a
large number of military forces on the Sino-Soviet border 67 , while Mao started to mobilize
the Chinese for the war with the “northern enemy”. Although the clashes eventually
stopped and the tension abated, the Chinese were aware of their vulnerable position. Even
though it was difficult for the Chinese leaders to talk openly about a possible re-alignment
63
In 1953, for example, he supported Eisenhower’s massive retaliation threat made against China. Bundy,
William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 8.
64
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 17.
65
The Chinese carried out their first successful nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964. The Chinese nuclear
program became a source of concern not only to the Americans, but also to the Soviets. Federation of
American Scientists (Weapons of Mass Destruction),
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke/index.html [28.12.2006].
66
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 20.
67
The Soviet forces in the Far East amounted in 1969 to 45 mechanized and tank divisions, 1,200 combat
aircraft and at least 100 hundred intermediate range nuclear missiles. Nálevka, Vladimír. Světová politika
ve 20. století II. Aleš Skřivan ml., Praha 2000, p. 71.
29
or even cooperation with the United States, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai made it clear that
the principal adversary of the PRC was no longer the “imperialist America” but rather the
“revisionist Soviet Union”. 68 This was an opportunity Nixon clearly did not want to miss.
Besides, already in 1968 there were signals that the Chinese wanted to talk with the
Americans, often delivered to the American officials through various intermediaries. Under
such circumstances, the opening to China did not seem as unrealistic or impossible to
achieve.
A question, however, needs to be asked – what exactly in concrete terms did Nixon
expect from this relationship? This question is especially important when the success or
failure of Nixon’s and Ford’s China policy are taken into question. It is clear that, as
mentioned already, that power diplomacy was one of the key aspects of the opening to
China. By playing the “China Card”, Nixon hoped to force the Soviet Union to make an
attempt to improve its relations with the United States. It can even be said that in a certain
sense the détente with China was a prerequisite for the détente with the Soviet Union. 69
The possibility of an alliance between China and the United States, Nixon argued, would
force the Soviets to make more compromises in such vital areas as the arms limitation
talks. This motive, while it definitely played an important role, was however not the only
reason behind the shift in the American foreign policy.
The president hoped that a closer relationship with China would give him further
leverage on the North Vietnamese government. Since a vast majority of the military
supplies came to North Vietnam through China, Nixon believed that the Beijing
government could restrain Hanoi and force it to take the negotiations with the United
States seriously. And it was not only Vietnam that was at stake, but also Laos and
Cambodia. In all of these countries, communist forces were on the move. Nixon saw the
opening to China as a way to keep the communist infiltration of Southeast Asia in check
and, for this reason, felt that the establishment of a relationship with the PRC is crucial for
the future of the entire Asian continent. 70 One of the priorities of the new administration, if
not the top priority, was to end the American involvement in Vietnam. The détente with
China could lead to this “peace with honor” for the United States, while giving the South
68
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, pp. 56 – 57.
Hook, Stephen W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II, p. 145.
70
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 14.
69
30
Vietnamese people a chance to decide about their own fate. 71 If this goal were reached, the
“tilt toward Beijing” would definitely pay off.
Nixon often saw himself as a great diplomat, with a mission to restore the
American hegemony in the world by making all the important decisions about America’s
foreign policy. On the other hand, he was aware that in his strategic and geopolitical plans
and endeavors he still had to take into account the domestic political and social factors.
This was especially true for such a sensitive issue as the relations with the two Chinas
definitely were. Even though many Americans realized the need to change the abnormal
state of affairs that existed between the PRC and the United States, it seemed that few were
prepared for concrete steps to be taken. This was one of the reasons why Nixon decided to
keep the negotiations with the Beijing government secret until the very last moment. Not
only the public was not informed about it, but even the Department of State was left in the
dark. On the other hand, Nixon needed to convince Henry Kissinger, who was to serve as
the American envoy in the talks with Chinese leadership, of the need to start the
rapprochement process. In this respect, the public was later led to believe that it was
actually Kissinger who came up with the whole idea. It was not the case, however. On the
contrary, when Nixon first told Kissinger of his plan to start the talks with China, Kissinger
called it a “flight of fancy”. 72 On another occasion, Kissinger criticized Nixon for “being
detached from reality”. 73 Yet, once the national security advisor was gained for the idea,
and once the first round of talks in Warsaw started, he became absorbed by the
rapprochement process and in a way wanted to monopolize it for himself. It is always
important to keep in mind, however, who the originator of the opening to China was when
evaluating various aspects of the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy and of the
Kissinger – Nixon relationship.
The domestic factors influencing the American foreign policy were not limited only
to the executive branch of government or the public opinion. Nixon was aware that his
attempts to redefine the relationship with China would arouse a strong opposition from the
supporters of the ROC, that is, the China Lobby, as well as from the conservative members
of both the Democratic and Republican Parties. He knew he will have to develop a way
how to deal with these pressures and to carry out his policies in the most effective manner
possible. Thus, together with Henry Kissinger, he decided to restructure the American
71
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, p. 43.
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 32.
73
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 19.
72
31
foreign-policy-making establishment and to concentrate most of the important powers in
his (and Kissinger’s) own hands. This process started almost immediately after Nixon
became president, and, as the next chapter will reveal, was initially largely successful. In
addition to this restructuring effort, Nixon also began to prepare the public for the radical
policy shift by making various pronouncements about the need to solve problems by
negotiation and about the need to adapt to the reality. Nixon was a master of such tactic
and, together with his reputation of being an anti-communist and his ability to win over
some of his opponents and silence the others, he was often able to achieve his goals with
fewer complications than would otherwise be expected.
The opening to China was, however, not a mere part of the puzzle in the
complicated structure of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s foreign policy. It had another dimension
as well. For Nixon, to get to China before the Democrats was a matter of prestige 74 - he
carved to be first ever American president to visit the country and the one who would be
forever remembered for “opening the door” to China. The rapprochement from this point
of view had not only political, military, and strategic importance, but also a deep symbolic
significance.
74
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 18.
32
ACT I – THE “COVERT” PHASE OF THE SINO – AMERICAN
RAPPROCHEMENT (1969 – 1971)
“News, news, news, news, news -- has a... has a...has a... has a kind of mystery has a...has
a... has a kind of mystery." – Nixon in China (opera by John Adams)
The election victory of Richard M. Nixon in November 1968 brought a shift in the
American foreign policy and a change in the way this policy was being made. Nixon, as
discussed in the previous chapter, had a bold vision of a new strategy for the United States,
a strategy that would allow America to redefine some of her commitments and
responsibilities while strengthening her overall position in the international relations vis-àvis her communist adversaries, but also her allies, who were growing more and more selfconfident and independent. The success of this new strategy depended largely on the
international situation and on the diplomatic skills of the president and Henry Kissinger.
On the other hand, however, to a degree, the way how foreign policy was made in the
United States and what support it gained among the American political establishment and
the American people in general also determined its ultimate success or failure. Nixon and
Kissinger, before launching their diplomatic initiatives, set out to reform the American
foreign policy establishment and its position in relation to the legislative branch of the
government.
A. “The Imperial Presidency” and Its Foreign Policy Making Process
Nixon decided that in order to carry out his proposed policies in the most effective
manner possible, the least number of people possible must be involved in making the
important decisions. He chose Henry Kissinger as his national security advisor not only
because both men shared a similar vision of détente and power politics, but also because
both of them agreed on how the American diplomacy should be run. Together, they have
been able to form a new foreign policy establishment that remained in place for most of the
time President Nixon was in office.
33
A.1. The National Security Council versus the Department of State - An Uneven
Contest
One of the basic tenets of the new foreign-policy-making system was the increased
influence of the National Security Council (NSC) and the diminished role of the
Department of State. The shift was something quite unprecedented in the American history
– the NSC had only been established in 1947 75 and was mainly designed for crisis
management and for advising the president on security issues. Now, under Nixon, it was to
serve as the main center for gathering information, devising new policy strategies and even
implementing these strategies through negotiations and backdoor diplomacy. While such a
shift might initially appear strange, for Nixon it was not only logical but also highly
desirable. Thus, it would perhaps be interesting to look at some of the underlying motives
behind this restructuring move.
It is clear that Nixon and Kissinger never trusted the Department of State officials.
For Nixon, the career diplomats were too liberal but, at the same time, stiff and resistant to
any change. 76 He also felt that the members of the foreign policy establishment were too
patrician and snobbish, which made the president, who was often unsure of himself, uneasy
and indignant. 77 All of these reasons, however, would probably not have been enough to
justify such a major change. There was another, more important argument. The
Department of State, in the president’s eyes, had grown too large and bureaucratic to be
ever able to effectively participate in the foreign-policy-making process. Thus, it was the
much smaller and more efficient NSC, which was to focus on the “big picture”, while the
Department of State was to deal with the less important, technical aspects of various issues.
Nixon began to implement these changes immediately after his inauguration in
January 1969. On January 20, a document called the National Security Decision
Memorandum (NSDM) 2 was passed. This document provided for the expansion of the
influence of the NSC. The Senior Inter-Department Group, which existed under the
previous administrations and which was chaired by the secretary of state, was replaced by
the NSC Review Group, chaired by the national security advisor. The NSC staff was
75
The NSC was established by President Harry Truman under the National Security Act of 1947. Hook,
Stephen W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II. CQ Press, Washington D.C.
2004, p. 55.
76
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. Hill and Wang,
New York 1998, p. 58.
77
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984, p. 66.
34
significantly expanded 78 and a number of sub-committees, responsible for drafting
analyses and preparing memoranda for the president, were established. 79 It was clear at
first sight who the main beneficiary of the new state of affairs was. Kissinger now had
virtually unlimited access to the president, becoming the true “gatekeeper” and the “closest
confidant of the president”. 80
The relationship between the Department of State and the NSC can be best
illustrated on the relationship of Henry Kissinger and William Rogers, who was Nixon’s
secretary of state during his first term in office. Rogers, a friend of the president from the
previous years and an experienced lawyer, was not picked by Nixon because of his foreign
policy experience. In fact, he had none. That was seen as an advantage by Nixon, who later
claimed he chose Rogers precisely because he was not an experienced diplomat and had
almost no knowledge of international relations. 81 Nixon once remarked that “no Secretary
of State is really important; the President makes foreign policy”. 82 From this viewpoint,
Rogers must have seemed the ideal choice, even though during his time in office he
demonstrated more creativity and personal interest than the president probably expected or
liked. In addition to his lack of experience, Rogers was thought to possess one other
important personal attribute - loyalty. This proved especially important in the later years,
when Rogers many times experienced embarrassing moments when he was the last one to
learn about new American policy or about some important decision which was made
behind his back. Although he threatened the president with his resignation many times,
Rogers never publicly voiced his grievances and thus contributed to the harmonious image
of the Nixon Administration.
The position of the National Security Advisor was on a totally different level. As
Nixon remarks in his memoirs, “From the outset of my administration... I planned to direct
foreign policy from the White House. Therefore I regarded my choice of a national
78
The number of NSC staffers grew from 12 to 34. Kissinger usually picked his subordinates himself. These
included, for example, Winston Lord, Lawrence Eagleburger, William Haig or Helmut Sonnefeldt.
Kissinger, Henry. Roky v Bílém domě. BB/art, Praha 2006, p. 32.
79
Among these committees were the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) – crisis management; the
Verification Panel – the SALT initiatives; the Intelligence Committee – intelligence agencies oversight; the
’40 Committee – covert intelligence operations supervision ; the Defense Program Review Committee
(DPRC) – Pentagon budget oversight; and the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) – negotiations with
North Vietnam. There were also ad-hoc committees. All of the permanent and ad-hoc committees were
chaired by Kissinger himself. Robert S. Litwak. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy
and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969 – 1976, pp. 68 – 70.
80
Hook, Stephen W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II, p. 55.
81
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 53.
82
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976, p. 49.
35
security advisor as crucial”. 83 Kissinger was interviewed by Nixon in December 1968 and
the president almost immediately decided to choose him as his national security advisor.
This nomination received wide acclaim from all sides of the American political spectrum,
from the conservatives and liberals alike.84 For the conservatives, Kissinger appeared to be
anti-communist enough to prevent the United States from retreating too far before the
communist aggression; for the liberals, especially for those who read some of Kissinger’s
works, he seemed flexible enough to propose new strategies, which could solve some of
the long-term problems that the previous administrations had not been able to tackle. It is
perhaps interesting to note that Kissinger had so much of the president’s confidence and
trust at that point that he was actually given the task of interviewing William Rogers before
he was appointed for the position of the secretary of state 85 – a very unusual occurrence
indeed! That this further contributed to the animosity Rogers felt toward Kissinger goes
without saying; however, in the long run Rogers was bound to be defeated, because he
never enjoyed the privilege of an almost unlimited access to the president and also because
the president simply did not take him seriously.
Another thing needs to be taken into account when thinking about the advantages
that the new foreign policy establishment alignment had for Nixon, especially with the
China policy in view. From the very beginning, Nixon and Kissinger decided that
especially the conduct of the rapprochement process with China will be “their own
agenda” 86 , with the Department of State’s involvement reduced to the absolute minimum
necessary. The president was obsessed with secrecy and was almost paranoid when some
important information was leaked. It was clear from the outset that the Department of
State, with its hundreds of employees, was very susceptible to such leaks. On the other
hand, the much smaller NSC personnel was easier to control 87 , and even though some
information made it to the press from time to time, overall Nixon and Kissinger were
usually able to keep their actions secret until the time they themselves decided to reveal
them.
83
Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. Grosset &Dunlap, New York 1978, p. 25.
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976, p. 49.
85
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 52.
86
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1999, p. 25.
87
Some of the methods that were used to ensure the information stayed secret were on the border of
illegality, especially the wire-tapping of the phone lines of the NSC and White House staff. Later, the
public revelation of these practices contributed to Nixon’s fall.
84
36
A.2. “The Imperial Presidency” and the Role of Congress in Determining and
Controlling the Course of the American Foreign Policy
The relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government was
extremely complex and intricate during the Nixon Administration. The president had to
work with a Congress, which was controlled by the opposition Democrats, for all the six
years he spent in office. While he acknowledged that in domestic issues, both he and the
Congress must work together, the foreign policy was something which he did not want the
legislators to get involved in. In the years of his administration before Watergate, Nixon
was often able to convince the Congress that the need for secrecy and for flexible approach
to the foreign policy justified the fact that the Legislative was only informed about the
important decisions after they were done. However, after Watergate and the decline of the
“Imperial Presidency”, the Congress began to re-assert its influence and control over the
foreign policy yet again.
The president was not so naïve as to openly declare that he did not wish the
Congress to get involved in the shaping of American foreign policy. On the contrary, he
often asserted that he needed a strong Congress to help him achieve his goals. In a way that
was true. Nixon needed the Congress to affirm and support his foreign policy in the same
way he needed the “silent majority” to rally around his cause and to back it. That did not
mean, however, that the Congress had to be informed in detail about how the policy was
conducted. The Senators and Congressmen were only rarely so much as briefed on the
matters of foreign policy. 88 Even if the president decided to discuss some of his plans with
the members of Congress, he often chose those who he deemed to be loyal – thus, he
would approach the Republicans while leaving out the Democrats or he would speak to his
friends only. He also intentionally ignored the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which
he saw as a potential threat to the implementation of his policies. And of course he sought
to keep in the dark such members of the Congress who were known for their adherence to
various pressure groups and lobbies, like the China Lobby. The issue was, as the Soviet
Ambassador to Washington Dobrynin later remarked, that “…the White House not only
shaped American foreign policy, but also directly carried it out without the intrusion of
Congress and the public, which were totally unaware of this secret channel of
diplomacy”. 89
88
89
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 344.
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2004, p. 36.
37
It would be inaccurate to argue, however, that Nixon was able to do whatever he
wanted with the Congress simply standing by and watching. In many cases, like, for
example, the incursion into Cambodia, he met with a stiff resistance from the legislators,
and had to eventually abandon his plans. The dissatisfaction of the Congress with the
secrecy of Nixon’s foreign policy and reliance on the back channels began to surface
relatively soon. 90 While the public remained favorably inclined to the Administration for a
longer period of time, especially due to the fact that détente policies did seemingly bring
positive results, the congressional support for Nixon began to dissipate. In the end, while
Nixon called for a further expansion of the presidential powers and the executive privilege,
the Congress, partially in response to Watergate and related scandals, passed a number of
acts which actually curbed the presidential powers. 91 This weakening of the presidential
power vis-à-vis the Congress was seen by some authors as the main reason for the
stagnation and failure of détente; for others, it was rather the result of the disillusionment
with détente and with the Nixon Administration in general.
A.3. The White House and the Pentagon – An Uneasy Relationship
The last particular relationship which should be mentioned in this section on the
foreign-policy-making process under Nixon is the relationship between the White House
and the military. In many of the key initiatives of the Nixon Administration, like the SALT
or the opening to China, the Pentagon played an important role and without its cooperation,
or at least quiescence, these initiatives would be extremely hard to accomplish.
Nixon’s choice of his secretary of defense was not as clear-cut as in the case of the
national security advisor or the secretary of state. He originally picked Democratic Senator
Henry M. Jackson, whom he saw as a very influential figure and who also had knowledge
of military and foreign relations issues. 92 Jackson, however, refused. Nixon then turned to
Melvin Laird, a Republican Congressman from Wisconsin, who also had a large power
base in the Congress. Initially, Nixon and Kissinger had probably intended that Laird
would play a role similar to that of William Rogers, but Laird was not as pliable as his
counterpart from the Department of State. He did not fear to go public when he did not
agree with the Administration’s policies, like for example, during the negotiations with the
90
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War. St.
Martin’s Press, New York 1991, p. 73.
91
Some of these included, for example, the Jackson – Vanik Amendment (1974), the Eagleton Amendment
(1973) or the War Powers Resolution (1973).
92
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 53.
38
Soviet Union prior to the conclusion of the SALT treaty. 93 He insisted on keeping the
American superiority in nuclear weapons and due to his interventions, several clauses,
which the military did not agree with, were eventually dropped or altered.
On the other hand, it has to be said that Laird gradually became a supporter of the
Nixon - Kissinger foreign policy. He publicly defended the Nixon Doctrine, as well as the
Vietnamization process in Indochina. 94 Unlike William Rogers, Melvin Laird was
eventually co-opted into the inner circle that was making the decisions about foreign policy
during the Nixon Administration. Although he was probably not informed about
everything that was going on, he was often invited to the briefings with the president and
to the meetings of various sub-committees of the NSC. This can also be attributed to the
change in the relationship between Kissinger and Laird. While at the beginning there was
animosity between both men, as Kissinger was jealously guarding his prominent position
inside the administration, later this animosity abated. Kissinger realized that Laird could be
a powerful ally against Rogers and against the administration’s opponents in the Congress,
while Laird saw Kissinger as an intermediary through which he could present Pentagon’s
standpoints on important issues to the president.
This short analysis of the foreign policy mechanism during the Nixon
Administration should be hopefully sufficient to reveal how the important decisions were
made regarding détente and other issues. The centerpiece of the system was the president
himself, who was to a certain degree influenced by Kissinger and by other members of his
administration. Due to Nixon’s “hands-on approach” and due to the relatively small
number of people involved in the process, the whole mechanism seemed efficient and
effective. There was a dark side to this efficiency, however. Much of the success of
Nixon’s policies domestically hinged upon the president’s momentary political strength
and popularity. When Nixon enjoyed high approval ratings, he was able to “sell” his
policies, using slogans such as the “full generation of peace” 95 , even when these policies
did not always bring the expected results. As soon as the president’s position weakened,
which became apparent especially during the Watergate investigations, the foreign policy
consensus began once more to crumble and fall apart. In other words, as Henry Kissinger
once remarked, Nixon’s personality and his specific political style were the key to some of
93
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976, p. 113.
94
Ibid, p. 128.
95
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, p. 66.
39
his successes. 96 A lasting consensus and a long-term foreign policy, however, cannot rest
on just one person, no matter how gifted and intelligent he or she is.
B. The Rapprochement Takes Off – Building Bridges to Beijing
With the new foreign-policy-making system firmly in place, Nixon and Kissinger
could set out to implement their foreign-policy agenda. The rapprochement with the PRC,
especially in the light of the favorable developments on the international level, soon
became the top priority. There were, however, several problems and obstacles that the
Americans had to overcome. Since they were starting from scratch as no official or
unofficial channels of communication had been established, there was first a need to find a
way how to contact the Chinese, a problem which took quite a long time to solve. Also,
Nixon, faithful to his “negotiation-from-the-position-of strength-approach”, did not want to
reveal to Mao and Zhou how important the rapprochement was for him personally and for
the new American foreign policy doctrine. And, at the same time, he had to make sure that
no news of the American overtures to China would get to the American public or media, or
even worse, to the American allies in Europe and Asia.
B.1. An Anxious Waiting Game – The American Search for an Intermediary
Sometimes, the students of international relations who focus on the Sino –
American rapprochement, ask a simple yet logical question. If the rapprochement was one
of the top priorities of the new administration, why did it take more than two years for
Henry Kissinger to get to Beijing? To answer this question, it is necessary to take into
account the specific nature of the state of affairs between the People’s Republic of China
and the United States as well as the atmosphere of the Cold War, which had pervaded the
international relations of the post-war decades.
Following the border skirmishes between the USSR and the PRC in the spring of
1969, Nixon realized the time to act had come. The president and Henry Kissinger now
looked for different ways how to get the message across to the Chinese. There were several
different possibilities. Soon after he became president, Nixon went to Europe, hoping to reaffirm the relations between the United States and its allies in the NATO. Especially one
stop on his itinerary deserves special attention from the point of view of the rapprochement
process. While in Paris, Nixon met the French President and his old friend, Charles de
96
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976, p. 50.
40
Gaulle. De Gaulle was known for his more conciliatory approach to the communist
countries and he advised Nixon to cultivate ties with the PRC. 97 Although nothing specific
came out of this meeting, Nixon’s resolve to carry out his policy was beyond any doubt
strengthened by de Gaulle’s approval.
In the coming months, Nixon visited two other countries with governments that
were known to keep close with the PRC – Pakistan and Romania. 98 When talking to both
leaders, Yahya Khan and Nicolae Ceauşescu, the American president dropped hints that
the United States was now ready to enter into “serious talks” with the communist
government in Beijing. 99 Again, there were promises from both men that they would
deliver the message to the Chinese, but time was passing quickly and nothing was really
happening. Nixon and Kissinger felt they had no other choice than to turn to the despised
and heavily criticized Department of State. Kissinger instructed Walter Stoessel,
American Ambassador to Poland, to contact the Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw directly.
It comes as no surprise that Kissinger did not inform, at least initially, William Rogers and
that Stoessel was to report back to the national security advisor rather than to his own
superiors. It also goes without question that Kissinger was not happy with the Warsaw
initiative, because the Department of State was partially involved.
It took Stoessel three months to deliver the message, not because of his
incompetence, as Nixon and Kissinger believed at the time 100 , but mainly because of the
fact that the Chinese officials were afraid of being seen with any American and often
literarily ran away. 101 After the initial contact, however, things got into motion relatively
quickly. Two informal meetings between the two ambassadors in December 1969 were
followed by another two in January and February 1970. While the signs were encouraging
and both sides were apparently willing to talk, problems appeared within the Nixon
Administration. The Department of State warned against a too rapid pace of the
negotiations, in fear of the repercussions such a move may have for the relationship with
97
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 53.
In case of Pakistan, the friendly relations with China resulted from the close cooperation between the
Soviet Union and India. To balance the Soviet influence in the area, the Chinese decided to support
Pakistan, principal rival of India. In case of Romania, the Soviet – Romanian split, which intensified after
Romania refused to participate in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, led the Romanian leadership to
turn to Beijing.
99
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 22.
100
In his later account of the event, however, Kissinger described Stoessel as intelligent and extremely
competent, which was almost exactly opposite of what he said in 1969.
Kissinger, Henry. Umění diplomacie. Od Richelieua k pádu Berlínské zdi. Prostor, Praha 1999, p. 759
101
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 23.
98
41
the ROC and Japan. 102 Kissinger used this opportunity to criticize once more the career
diplomats for being too rigid and cautious. He also suspected that in case the talks turned
out to be successful, the public praise would be reaped by Rogers, something he did not
want to let happen at any cost. Despite these problems, however, the contacts between both
sides continued and the first round of more formal talks between the Chinese and
American representatives was scheduled to start in May 1970, again in Warsaw. These
talks never materialized, however. In early May, the American forces entered Cambodia,
with the U.S. Air Force carrying out strikes deep within the Cambodian territory since
March already. 103 The Cambodian incursion was carried out despite the fact that there was
significant danger that the Chinese would call off the talks, which in fact was exactly what
happened. 104
The failure of the Warsaw talks prompted Nixon and Kissinger to look for other
alternatives. This time they turned to Vernon Walters, American Military Attaché in Paris,
to convey to the Chinese that despite the Cambodian military operation, the United States
still wanted to talk. 105 The main beneficiary of this new arrangement was no doubt Henry
Kissinger. The Department of State, which was getting dangerously close to actually
influencing the talks with the Chinese, was bypassed. From now on, the subordinates of
William Rogers, at least the vast majority of them, had almost no idea what was going on
behind the scenes. On the other hand, Kissinger had been able to institute himself as the
person in charge of the rapprochement process. 106 In a matter of several months, Kissinger
completely changed his stance on the PRC issue, and turned from a skeptic into its ardent
advocate.
In the months following the cancellation of the Warsaw talks, little was going on as
far as rapprochement was concerned. One reason was that Nixon’s attention was turned to
the other matters, as he had to deal with the violent demonstrations against the Cambodian
102
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 107.
During the Operation Menu, the American bombers dropped around 100,000 tones of bombs, four times
more than was dropped on Japan during the course of World War II. The raids on Cambodia were carried
without the approval or even notification of the Congress and were only revealed when Nixon announced
in April the “incursion of the American troops” into Cambodia to destroy North Vietnamese bases.
Buckley, Roger. The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2002, p. 147.
104
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 79.
105
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 25.
106
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, pp. 80 – 82.
103
42
incursion 107 and with the subsequent reaction by the Congress. 108 The Cambodian
operation, while it caused some casualties to the enemy, showed the limits of Nixon’s
popular support as well as of the tolerance of the Congress.
However, the American president was not the only one to face problems at home.
In China, the Cambodian incursion had put the proponents of the rapprochement on the
defensive. While the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai still argued for the process to
continue, Mao Zedong wavered. The hard-line group, which was led by Marshall Lin Bao,
who had close ties with the army, wanted to cooperate with the Soviets and drive the
Americans from the Asian mainland. 109 It was only in September 1970 that the “activist”
fraction of Zhou Enlai prevailed and the Chinese establishment returned to the
rapprochement policy line.
The significant breakthrough finally came in the fall of 1970. In October, the
Pakistani leader Yahya Khan visited the United States on the occasion of the 25th
anniversary of the United Nations. During the course of his stay, he was invited to the
White House, where he received a new message from the president for the Chinese
leaders. 110 This time, however, the message had the intended effect. By December, the
Chinese replied, through the Pakistani Ambassador in the United States, affirming that they
would be “glad to receive an American emissary”. 111 The hide and seek game, so it
seemed, was finally over, and Nixon and Kissinger could proceed to the next part of their
plan.
In this initial phase, it is possible to observe a transfer of the China policy from the
hands of the Department of State, that is, the career diplomats, under control of the White
House. While the negotiations with the PRC were heading to a good start, they had so far
been done in secret and the Administration thus did not know what the reaction of the
general public would be. In anticipation of the talks in Beijing, Nixon began to “prepare”
the American people by making small steps – in the summer of 1969 he announced that the
United States will unilaterally repeal some of the sanctions against the PRC which were in
107
On June 4, four students were killed by the State Guard at the Kent State University. There were more
violent clashes all across the United States.
108
The Senate was about to pass the Cooper-Church Amendment, which would have cut all the financial
support for the Cambodian forces and all the funds for American operations in Cambodia. Although the
bill was not passed until December 1970, and even then it was modified, it was a significant defeat for
Nixon.
109
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 165.
110
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 26.
111
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 109.
43
place since 1949. 112 In April 1971, when these proposals were accepted by the Congress,
the President implied that there is more to follow by saying that he “was testing the water
to see how deep it is” before proceeding with other steps, leading ultimately to the
“normalization of our relations with mainland China”. 113 The reaction in Congress was
overwhelmingly positive, with some legislators calling such a move “a commendable
initiative that was long overdue”. 114 Such signs were definitely encouraging, but the real
test was to come in July 1971, when Kissinger’s trip to Beijing was to be publicly
announced.
B.2. Kissinger in China – The Meeting of Two Worlds
With the Chinese response in hand, Nixon and Kissinger began to discuss the
details of the talks to be held in Beijing. Since the message from Mao was not detailed in
terms of exact time, the Americans did not have to respond immediately. The fact that it
was the Chinese who had taken initiative (another message came through Romania again
inviting an American envoy to China) betrayed their desperate hope to improve the
bilateral relations, now that they felt threatened on all sides.115 They were ready to start the
negotiations even after the United States carried out another military operation in early
1971 116 , this time in Laos. There is one interesting episode which is worth mentioning in
relation to the Chinese interest in the talks. When Nixon and Kissinger were not
responding to the Chinese invitation fast enough, the Chinese tried to put them under
pressure by inviting Democrats. 117 Nixon, however, made it clear that he does not want
any political visitors from the United States to China before he comes to Beijing himself,
and the Chinese later dropped the whole idea.
As it is clear from the preceding pages, the attempts to get the rapprochement
process started were long and complex. However, since they were not known to the public,
112
After these measures would have become effective, the Americans could once more travel to China, they
could bring back Chinese goods (not exceeding the value of $100) and the United States could export
some limited amount of grain to China. Kissinger, Henry. Umění diplomacie. Od Richelieua po pád
Berlínské zdi, p. 756.
113
Finney, John F. “Congress Is Calm on China Moves”. The New York Times, May 2, 1971, p. 8.
114
Ibid.
115
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 26.
116
The operation Lam Son 719, conducted together with the South Vietnamese Army, started on January 30
and ended on March 21, 1971.
117
Edward Kennedy and Mike Mansfield were among the potential candidates to be invited. It seems,
however, that this was merely a Chinese ploy to put more pressure on Nixon to send his envoy and also
to accept the negotiation topics that the Chinese prepared. Mann, James. About Face: A History of
America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton, p. 28.
44
many people tend to associate the first major breakthrough in the bilateral relations with
the famous incident in April 1971, when the American table tennis team, playing at the 31st
World Championship in Nagoya, was invited by the Chinese leadership to visit China. This
event, resulting from a chance 118 rather than being planned beforehand, did not have much
of a real impact on the rapprochement process, which was already advancing well by April
1971. It had a deep symbolic meaning, however. The American players were among the
first American citizens to come to Beijing after the events of 1949. This visit attracted
immense attention of the American press and aroused a great excitement among the
American public. It showed Nixon and Kissinger, once more, that the American people
might already be prepared for the opening to China. It also gave Nixon a good chance to
show Kissinger’s trip as a logical continuation of the “ping pong” diplomacy, even though
it would have happened anyway.
After another letter from China, which was received in Washington on April 27,
and subsequent reply sent by President Nixon on May 10, it was decided that the meeting
in Beijing would take place in the early days of July. 119 The Chinese agreed to the
American condition that this meeting must at first remain secret. While it seems logical
that all the steps taken toward China had been secret until then, it also appears that Nixon
and Kissinger contemplated whether they should announce this trip beforehand. There
were obvious advantages to the early disclosure, especially that it would soften the shock
that the American allies would have to deal with, Nixon finally decided to keep the visit
secret until it has actually taken place. While the American people would likely have
received the news favorably, even enthusiastically, the president was afraid that the China
Lobby might try to block the whole process should it had known about it ahead of time. 120
Another question to solve was who would actually go to China. Again, contrary to
the popular belief, Kissinger was not the only choice that Nixon was considering. Other
names which appeared in relation to the trip were, for example, George H. W. Bush,
Nelson Rockefeller or David Bruce. The reason why Nixon chose Kissinger was that he
felt Kissinger would be able to best communicate to the Chinese the American vision of
the mutual Sino - American relationship. This was beyond any doubt a valid argument
since Kissinger was the closest aide of the president, at least as far as the foreign policy
issues were concerned. While Kissinger seemed like the best choice, however, Nixon was
118
One of the American players missed the bus after his team’s practice and the Chinese players gave him a
ride back to the hotel on their own bus.
119
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 232.
120
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 117.
45
also worried about the potential effects his visit in China could have. As mentioned earlier,
Nixon was extremely keen on receiving the credit for the opening to China. He knew that
he could not go on this secret trip himself, but at the same time he was worried that
Kissinger would become too popular as a result of it.121 He even for some time tried to
persuade the Chinese to receive Kissinger in a different city than Beijing, so that he could
be the first American politician to come to the Chinese capital rather than his national
security advisor. 122 Besides, just about the time Kissinger was getting ready to go to
Beijing, The New York Times began publishing the so-called Pentagon Papers, which were
leaked from the White House by its former staffer, Daniel Ellsberg. These papers, while
they did not contain any compromising information about the Nixon Administration,
showed how President Johnson lied about the American involvement in Vietnam in 1964.
The White House unsuccessfully tried to prevent the newspaper from publishing the
documents under the pretext that it could compromise American safety and prolong the
war in Vietnam. 123 The fact that Daniel Ellsberg was originally chosen by Kissinger
caused Nixon to become more suspicious toward him as well. The president, who was
infuriated by this leak of sensitive material, even ordered one of Kissinger’s aides, David
Young, to keep an eye on Kissinger and to find out whether he was in any way involved in
the leaking of information from the NSC. 124
Regardless of these complications, Kissinger’s visit of China in the end went as
planned. After traveling to Paris, Thailand and India, Kissinger arrived to Pakistan, where,
on the early morning of July 9, he boarded a military plane to Beijing together with his
three aides. When in Beijing, Kissinger spent most time in talks with Zhou Enlai, although
he also met with other Chinese officials and representatives of the military. Kissinger was
immediately enthralled with Zhou and it seemed that the sympathy was mutual. However,
in terms of concrete things on which both men would agree, these meetings in fact brought
little progress. The first issue that Zhou and Kissinger talked about was Indochina. The
Chinese continued to assert that the Americans must withdraw from Indochina, without
121
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 118
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 31.
123
John Mitchell, the Attorney General in the Nixon Administration, claimed that the publishing of the
Documents would cause “irreparable injury to the safety of the United States”. The Time, June 28, 1971.
Time Almanac of the 20th Century (CD), Time Magazine Company Inc., New York 1995.
124
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy. Paragon
House, New York 1989, pp. 150 – 151. It is clear that Kissinger must have been aware at least of some
of these practices, and he knew President did not trust him and his staffers fully. Kissinger,
Henry. Roky v Bílém domě, p. 32.
122
46
giving any guarantees that they would restrain North Vietnam from attacking and
occupying the South. 125 On the other hand, Kissinger was somewhat able to quell Zhou’s
fears of the American – Japanese alliance, which Zhou initially saw as the “American
rearming of Japanese militarists”. 126 No specific provisions were made at this point
regarding the potential military cooperation between China and the United States against
the Soviet Union, even though Kissinger promised to provide the Chinese with intelligence
information about the Soviet military deployments and about the progress in the
disarmament talks. Other topics then included general relations between the world powers,
the situation in South Asia and the visit of President Richard Nixon to Beijing. Both men
also agreed that there was a need for a permanent secret channel between Beijing and
Washington to be established. 127
However, not surprisingly, the main topic that Zhou and Kissinger discussed was
Taiwan. The Chinese Prime Minister clearly stated in order for the United States to
establish normal diplomatic relations with Beijing, it must recognize that Taiwan is a
province (an inalienable part) of the PRC, recognize solely the government in Beijing,
abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROC, and withdraw
all American forces from the island. 128 Kissinger, in response, said that the American
military was ready to pull-out from Taiwan at any time when the relations with the PRC
“allowed it”; he also said that that he did not support the view of “two Chinas”, but rather
the “One China Policy” and that he hoped that the problems between Beijing and Taipei
could be solved peacefully; and finally he indicated the American willingness to support
the Chinese entry into the UN, to which Zhou replied that it was not an “urgent matter”. 129
Kissinger’s comments on Taiwan are especially important when we take into account that
later Kissinger stated that the Taiwan issue was only briefly mentioned during the talks. 130
This “lapse of memory” can perhaps be explained by Kissinger’s feeling that he went too
125
The Chinese clearly stated that they would “not interfere in the Vietnamese affairs”. Memcon, Kissinger
and Zhou, July 9, 1971, ( 4:35 - 11:20 p.m.), pp. 31 – 32. Box 1033, China HAK Memcons July 1971,
The National Security Archive (GWU), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-34.pdf
[6.1.2007].
126
Ibid, p. 29.
127
Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, July 11, 1971 (10:35 - 11:55 a.m.), pp. 11 – 12. Box 1033, China HAK
Memcons July 1971, The National Security Archive (GWU),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-38.pdf [6.1.2007].
128
Kissinger to Nixon, My Talks with Chou En-lai, July 14, 1971, p. 12. Box 1033, Miscellaneous
Memoranda Relating to HAK Trip to PRC, July 1971, The National Security Archive (GWU),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-40.pdf [6.1.2007].
129
Ibid, pp. 12 – 13.
130
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 32.
47
far in making compromises with the Chinese at the expense of Taiwan. On the other hand,
his way of expressing himself was ambiguous enough and did not necessarily point to any
future commitment from the American side.
Overall, Kissinger described his three-day visit as a “very moving experience”,
although he warned Nixon that he should not hold too high expectations of the future,
because “profound differences and years of isolation yawn between us [the Americans] and
the Chinese”. 131 The Kissinger visit was no doubt an important milestone in the
rapprochement process and a result of almost two years of hard and tiring work on the field
of diplomacy. For Nixon, however, this meeting, important as it was, was simply a prelude
to a much more glamorous and spectacular leap in the Sino - American relations – his own
visit of China.
B.3. The Reactions to Kissinger’s Trip to China – From Euphoria to Horror
July 15, 1971 remains an important date in the history of the Sino - American
rapprochement process. On this day, at 7.30 p.m., Pacific Time, President Nixon appeared
on TV and announced that Henry Kissinger had just visited the People’s Republic of
China. Not only so, he also announced that he had accepted the Chinese invitation to visit
Beijing next year. 132 The same announcement was also made in China.
A change in the American foreign policy towards the PRC had been expected for
some time already. However, it was the unexpected, “bolt-out-of-the-blue”, announcement
of the expected that made Nixon’s TV appearance special. Due to a strict information
embargo on Kissinger’s trip, minimal number of people was informed 133 about it prior to
the official announcement. Even William Rogers, Nixon’s own secretary of state, was only
told about Kissinger’s trip on July 9 134 , after Kissinger had already departed and even then
he was not told the truth – instead, Nixon informed him that Kissinger was suddenly
invited by the Chinese. Once more, Rogers kept his grievances inside the administration
and did not publicly reveal them. 135
131
Kissinger to Nixon, My Talks with Chou En-lai, July 14, 1971, p. 26.
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 230.
133
It is interesting, however, that the military and the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, knew about
Kissinger’s trip. Charles Redford, one of Kissinger’s aides, was actually working for Admiral Thomas M.
Moorer, Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was able to get some of the secret memos to him.
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 36.
134
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 135.
135
Rogers was only told the whole truth on July 11 by Alexander Haig, who was ordered to do so by Nixon.
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 30.
132
48
It was the Department of State, however, not the National Security Council or the
president that had to bear the brunt of angry and confused reactions which began to arrive
almost immediately after the announcement. On specific orders of Nixon and Kissinger, no
foreign governments were to be informed ahead of time. The Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
was told by Kissinger minutes before Nixon’s speech was aired. The mood in the Soviet
Union after the announcement was of course gloomy and grim. 136 The Soviets did not
know exactly what to expect from this dramatic shift in the long-standing American policy.
On the other hand, it seemed very unlikely to the Soviet strategists and leaders that the
United States and China would seriously contemplate forming a coalition, directed against
the Soviet Union. 137 As Kissinger had written in his memo, and as the Soviets surely knew,
the differences between both countries were far too great for anything like this to happen
anytime soon. Thus, the Soviet leadership decided to take a reserved stance, trying to keep
the détente process going while at the same time improving its own relationship with the
PRC.
The reaction was much stronger and emotional in Japan and in Taiwan, which were
even more threatened by the American rapprochement with China. Especially the Japanese
felt very bitter about not being informed ahead of time. Japanese Prime Minister Sato, who
learned about the whole issue three minutes before it was announced on TV, said that “this
drastic change in the world situation” put Japan in “difficult international conditions” and
that the whole country now felt “uneasy” and “irritated”. 138 The “Nixon shokku”, as the
surprise Nixon and Kissinger prepared for Japan was often called, disrupted the special
relationship between both countries which was never fully restored to the original level. 139
On the other hand, the whole incident led the Japanese government to pursue a more
independent foreign policy. The Japanese realized that the best way to deal with the change
in American foreign relations was to “follow suit” and normalize their own relations with
China. Probably under the influence of Kissinger, the Chinese accepted this move and the
negotiations between the government in Beijing and the Japanese government went
quickly ahead. On September 29, 1972, the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan
and of the Government of the People’s Republic of China was signed in Beijing, which
136
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 231.
For more on the Soviet strategic thinking in the wake of Kissinger’s trip to Beijing, see: Garrison, Jean.
Making China Policy: From Nixon to G. W. Bush. Lynne Riener Publishers, Boulder 2005, chapters 1
and 2.
138
Ito, Go. Alliance in Anxiety: Détente and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle. Routledge, New York
2003, p. 54.
139
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 240.
137
49
established official diplomatic relations between the two countries. 140 Thus, ironically,
Japan had normalized its relationship with China almost seven years before the United
States.
In Taiwan, the reaction to the sudden announcement was similar to the one in
Japan. The only difference was that the ROC was more dependent on the United States
than Japan and thus had to accept the new reality with a hope that the US would not
abandon it completely. In the following months, several American politicians and
government officials were dispatched to Taiwan to talk to Chiang Kai-shek and to assuage
his fears, including an old friend of the Nationalist government, Ronald Reagan. As in the
case of Japan, however, the former pre-rapprochement relationship was never fully
restored and the mutual trust was not rebuilt.
In Europe, on the contrary, the announcement was in most cases received
favorably. In Paris, Bonn and London, it was seen as a success of détente and as a
significant shift in the American thinking. 141 Nixon and Kissinger were praised for their
pragmatic approach to the international situation and for their attempts to overcome the
barriers of ideology and bipolar vision of the world.
Perhaps even more interesting than the international reactions that the
announcement provoked was the reception it got in the United States proper. It has to be
said that the American response was overwhelmingly positive and that the mood in
America was in general cheerful. 142 The media especially praised President Nixon and
Henry Kissinger for doing what none of their far more liberal predecessors was able or
willing to do. In the light of this seemingly spectacular success, even potential opponents
of the new China policy kept silent or even praised Nixon themselves. Ronald Reagan, for
example, said he was happy about Nixon’s announcement that he would go to China in
1972. 143 Barry Goldwater also did not publicly criticize Nixon, although he did not
necessarily agree with the visit. Both Reagan and Goldwater were informed about
Kissinger’s trip to China by Kissinger himself 144 before the public announcement was
made and both thus had time to prepare for the questions of the journalists. On the other
hand, for some the fact that they now had to praise Nixon was definitely a bitter pill to
140
The negotiations were started by the government of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, but the Communiqué was
signed by the new Japanese government of Kakuei Tanaka.
141
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 144.
142
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 240.
143
“Nixon Move Pleases Reagan”. The New York Times, July 16, 1971, p. 24.
144
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 37.
50
swallow. Senator Edward Kennedy was one such person. Just two years before, on March
20, 1969, he criticized the “war policy” that the United States was practicing toward the
PRC for twenty years already. 145 In an apparent jibe at Nixon, he said that the United
States must pursue a new policy, not because of American “softness” or “weakness”, but
because China simply can no longer be ignored. 146 Now, in 1971, he was forced to praise
Nixon for his great initiative, starting the rapprochement process with China. 147 The same
applied to Hubert Humphrey, the unsuccessful Democratic candidate in the 1968
presidential elections, who previously criticized the Nixon Administration for continuing
the trend “of ignoring the existence of a government controlling a vast population” so that
it does not have negotiate with it and recognize it.148 On the other hand, there were many
Democrats who sincerely appreciated the China initiative like, for example, Senator Mike
Mansfield, who supported the opening to China for quite a long time. Overall, it can be
argued that the support for the rapprochement process was bipartisan in nature, with the
dissenting voices mostly on the extreme right or the extreme left of the American political
spectrum. 149 Even the reaction of the China Lobby was initially muted, even though, as it
would be discussed in the next chapter, the members of pro-Taiwanese pressure groups
still had not given up their fight entirely.
The visit of Henry Kissinger to Beijing and its subsequent public announcement
concluded the first phase of the Sino - American rapprochement. It was definitely one of
the milestones in the relationship of both countries and it can be considered one of the most
important achievements of the Nixon Administration in the foreign relations area. It was a
result of fortuitous developments in the world situation, especially the Sino - Soviet split
and ensuing fear of “encirclement”, felt by the Chinese. It was also the result of the new
approach to the foreign-policy-making instituted by Nixon and Kissinger. So far, their
gambles and their tight, even “dictatorial” control of the American foreign policy
establishment, paid off. The future was to show, however, how strong the enthusiasm of
145
Edward Kennedy on U.S. China Policy ( An Address before the National Committee on U.S .China
Relations, New York City), March 20, 1969. Reports and Memoranda of the Research Division of the
Headquarters of the RNC, 1938-1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911 – 1980, Part 2, Reel 9.
146
Ibid.
147
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 37.
148
Hubert Humphrey on U.S. China Policy, October 21, 1969. Reports and Memoranda of the Research
Division of the Headquarters of the RNC, 1938-1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911 – 1980, Part
2, Reel 9.
149
On the extreme right, Communist China was still not a partner to be approached; on the extreme left, there
were worries that the opening to China would lead to a buildup of tension in the Soviet – American
relationship.
51
the American politicians and the American people towards the détente policies and the
rapprochement was and how deep the roots of the new domestic consensus on foreign
policy that Nixon and Kissinger sought to create were.
52
ACT II - GREAT EXPECTATIONS, GREAT CHALLENGES: THE
RAPPROCHEMENT GAINS MOMENTUM (1971 - 1972)
“Your flight was smooth, I hope?" "Oh, yes! Smoother than usual, I guess” – Nixon in
China (an opera by John Adams)
Following Kissinger’s trip to China, when the euphoria slowly began to calm down
and “the dust began to settle”, an important question loomed before the Nixon
Administration. While the initial step of the opening to the PRC had received, perhaps
unexpectedly, overwhelmingly positive reactions from the majority of the American
political establishment and the public alike, it was now important to keep this enthusiasm
alive. On one hand, Nixon and Kissinger had to continue in presenting their China policy
as success to the American people; on the other, they had to make sure that the
rapprochement crossed the imaginary threshold of symbolism and started bringing concrete
results.
A. The Buildup for Nixon’s Visit to China – The Winding Road to Beijing
Now that the Nixon Administration’s new policy towards the PRC became publicly
known and that the president’s planned visit to China was officially announced, the
rapprochement process entered a new, perhaps even more complicated, phase. On the
domestic political scene, the old China Lobby tried desperately to prevent the
rapprochement process from moving forward, while a new China Lobby was pushing it
frantically ahead. On the international level, Nixon and Kissinger had to manage difficult
negotiations with the Chinese, while at the same time playing their power game with the
Soviet Union and Vietnam. This second phase of the rapprochement culminated with the
historic visit of President Nixon in Beijing in February 1972.
A.1. The Old and the New China Lobbies and The Re-Evaluation of the China Policy
Various lobbies and pressure groups have traditionally had an important influence
on both the American domestic and foreign policy. This is especially true of the American
relationship with China after the end of World War II. The supporters of the Nationalist
government in Beijing, together with those conservative and anti-communist politicians
and other influential personalities from American social, economic and cultural circles,
53
have formed a number of organizations, which are usually referred to collectively as the
China Lobby. 150 For nearly twenty years, this lobby played an important role in shaping
America’s stance towards the most populous nation in the world. Prior to Nixon, so it
seems, no other American president dared to challenge this group and to propose a change
in the China policy. In the words of Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, even in the early
1960’s, “… the presidents would much rather leave town than to discuss the China issue
[in Congress]” 151 For Nixon, the China lobby apparently was not a major threat, even
though he expected it to oppose his overtures to China. In this respect, it is often argued
that Nixon’s anti-communism and his well-know conservativism enabled him to make
exactly the moves which his liberal predecessors were not able to do. While this argument
seems to explain the relative ease with which Nixon was able to “sell” his new policy to
the Americans, it is not sufficient in itself to provide an answer to the question why the
opposition to the opening to China was so muted in 1971. The American reception of
Nixon’s approach of Beijing reflected not only their trust in their president’s integrity and
foreign policy genius, but also a general shift in the attitude towards China.
One of the reasons behind the relatively weak opposition mounted against the new
China policy was in fact the weakening of the “old” China Lobby itself. Already in 1970,
when nothing was yet known of the secret negotiations with Beijing, one Department of
State official remarked: “I haven’t seen any evidence of the China Lobby in the five years I
have been working on China. We can now think about China policy without looking over
our shoulders”. 152 While this is definitely an overstatement, it can be argued that the
political clout which the China Lobby possessed in the earlier years had significantly
diminished even before Nixon was elected president. It was not the “lack of interest” that
caused this development, however, or at least this lack of interest was not the main factor.
It is true that in 1971 the China Lobby would have hardly put together the one million
150
Since the establishment of the communist regime in the mainland China, a number of vocal supporters of
the Nationalist government on Taiwan could be found among the American legislators, foreign policy
experts and businessmen. These people, some of whom are mentioned below, are collectively referred to
as the China Lobby, although they were organized in many different committees and associations. For two
decades, they managed to keep the question of opening to China a “taboo”; they have repeatedly
supported the sanctions against the Beijing government; and they also called for more military and
material aid to the government in Taipei. The China Lobby had supporters among the Republicans
and the Democrats alike, and it was a powerful political force which every president had to take into
account. By the time Nixon became president, however, the influence of the Lobby already began to
wane. For more on the role and structure of the China Lobby in the 1950’s and 1960’s, see for example:
Bachrack, Stanley. The Committee of One Million: “China Lobby” Politics, 1953 – 1971. Columbia
University Press, New York 1976.
151
Finney, John F. “Congress Is Calm on China Moves”. The New York Times, May 2, 1971, p. 8.
152
“‘China Lobby’, Once Powerful Factor in the American Politics, Appears Victim of a Lack of Interest”.
The New York Times, April 26, 1970, p. 14.
54
signatures which it presented in 1953 to President Eisenhower on a petition supporting
hard-line policy against “Red China”. Yet, in 1971, the Committee of One Million, as the
most important segment of the China Lobby was officially called, still had 40,000 dues
paying members and operated with a yearly budget of $300,000 – its highest ever since it
was formed in 1953. 153 The problem was clearly different – the lobby was loosing its most
influential and vocal supporters in the Congress.
By 1970, many of the leading representatives of the China Lobby retired from the
active political life. Walter H. Judd, who served in China for some time as a medical
doctor, and who was a long-term member of the Congress (R – MN), did not run for reelection in 1963 and has subsequently “faded from the scene.” 154 William F. Knowland (RCA), known in some circles as the “Senator from Formosa” and a bitter personal rival of
President Nixon, left the Senate in 1958, and his control of The Oakland Tribune in the
later years did not mean much in terms of political influence.155 Senator Styles Bridges (R
– NH), another important advocate of the Nationalists and member of the China Lobby,
died in 1961. Senator William E. Jenner (R – IN) was not even considered by his party as a
candidate for reelection in 1958.
The list could go on for much longer, but just these few examples are sufficient to
shed some light on the reasons behind the China Lobby’s retreat from prominence. It is
beyond any doubt that in 1971 there still were people who were against any “softness” in
the American relationship with the PRC. They did not, however, have the influence
anymore to do much about it. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there were a number
of prominent Republicans who were “close” to the China Lobby, like Ronald Reagan and
Barry Goldwater, yet they were careful enough not to oppose the president openly when he
was obviously enjoying widespread support and when he was highly popular. Some of the
former adherents of the Lobby, like the already mentioned Anne Chenault, now even
claimed that there is no organized pressure group on behalf of the Nationalists! 156
On the other hand, a “new” China Lobby began to form in the 1960’s. Even though
the names of both lobbies were identical, their goals were exactly opposite. The “new”
China Lobby called for a shift in the American foreign policy toward China, for
153
“China Lobby Says It Will Still Fight”. The New York Times, October 27, 1971, p. 15.
Finney, John F. “Congress Is Calm on China Moves”, p. 8.
155
Montgomery, Gayle B. and James W. Johnson One Step from the White House: The Rise and Fall of
Senator William F. Knowland. University of California Press, Berkeley 1998, pp. 229 -231, 295 – 296.
156
Anne Chenault claimed that “although the group [Committee of One Million] might have been a good
thing in the past”, now it was time to start the “era of negotiations” with Beijing. She also said that she
“did not even belong to the Committee of One Million”. “‘China Lobby’, Once Powerful Factor in the
American Politics, Appears Victim of a Lack of Interest”, p. 14.
154
55
recognition of the government in Beijing and for the admission of the PRC to the United
Nations. While the “old” China Lobby was loosing its influence in the Congress, the “new”
China Lobby was gaining it. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, there were at
least two ardent supporters of the “new course” – Senators Jacob J. Javits (R – NY) and
Clifford P. Case (R – NJ). 157 Prominent Democratic politicians, such as Senator Mike
Mansfield (D – MT) or Edward Kennedy (D – MA) were also sympathetic to the reevaluation of the dysfunctional China policy. 158 Clearly, the rapprochement had bipartisan
support in 1971, with its advocates coming from both major parties. In addition to
politicians, the change was supported by many scholars and experts on foreign policy,
many of whom were members of the National Committee on U.S. - China Relations.
Clearly, as many observers stated in 1970 and 1971, there was “little fear of public
outcry” 159 about opening to Beijing and the Administration has “overestimated the extent
of pro-Nationalist, anti-Peking sentiment in the Congress”. 160
In the light of these facts, it is necessary to somewhat reconsider the conduct of the
rapprochement process in the first three years of the Nixon Administration. It goes without
saying that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were the architects of the new American
foreign policy and that their decision to approach the Chinese government was no doubt
both bold and revolutionary. Yet, on the other hand, to say that Nixon’s anti-communism
and conservativism were the key factors in making this policy acceptable to the Congress
and to the American people would not be entirely accurate. While these personal attributes
perhaps gave the president some more leverage and room to maneuver when dealing with
the conservative elements of his own party as well as of the opposition Democrats, the
general change in popular attitude toward the PRC was not of Nixon’s making. It is of
course highly hypothetical, but if a Democratic candidate won the elections in 1968, he
might have been able to pursue the same China policy without having to deal with an
entrenched, indomitable opposition. Besides, even Nixon’s unflinching conservativism,
especially in domestic politics, began to be questioned after some of the steps he had made
in 1971, especially the institution of the ninety-day long freeze of all wages and prices.
157
Finney, John F. “Congress Is Calm on China Moves”, p. 8.
Edward Kennedy on U.S. China Policy (An Address before the National Committee on U.S. China
Relations, New York City), March 20, 1969. Reports and Memoranda of the Research Division of the
Headquarters of the RNC, 1938-1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911 – 1980, Part 2, Reel 9.
159
“‘China Lobby’, Once Powerful Factor in the American Politics, Appears Victim of a Lack of Interest”,
p.14.
160
Finney, John F. “Congress Is Calm on China Moves”, p. 8.
158
56
Nixon’s decision to start the rapprochement process was, however, a masterpiece as
the president was able, perhaps inadvertently but perhaps deliberately, to identify with the
majority public opinion and to do what many Americans subconsciously felt should be
done. After all, Nixon’s ability to read and understand the wishes and anxieties of the
“silent majority” was initially seen as one of the key ingredients of his success. 161
Perhaps we should ask one more hypothetical question before moving on to the
next stages of the rapprochement process. It was already discussed in the preceding chapter
why Nixon and Kissinger decided to keep Kissinger’s visit to China secret until the very
last moment. The reasons that were given at the time, that is, the fear of domestic
opposition to the new policy and of the possible inflated speculations in the media, can
perhaps be found plausible and justified to a certain degree. On the other hand, it seems
very unlikely that just these motives were behind Nixon’s decision. It does not seem likely
especially since Nixon had no doubt known by 1970, when the secret negotiations got off
to a start, that the popular mood has changed and the domestic opposition to the
rapprochement would not be nearly as strong as in the past. 162 It is reasonable to believe
that the tight information embargo on the China visit was, once more, at least in part
motivated by Nixon’s love of secrecy and of the feeling “that he knows something the
others do not know”. It is also likely that Nixon, as mentioned earlier, wanted to be the first
person to officially announce the dramatic shift in American foreign policy. He no doubt
hoped that he would reap the praise of the media, public and politicians alike, that he will
be forever associated with this grand new strategy. In the end, however, Nixon’s tactic
backfired. His popularity soared, but not nearly as fast and as high as that of Henry
Kissinger. As the “Superkraut” and “the smartest guy around” was celebrated by the media
all over the country, 163 Nixon began to resent his advisor’s new celebrity status and the
latent rivalry between both men started to grow.
161
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War. St.
Martin’s Press, New York, 1991, p. 38.
162
On the other hand, it could have been that Nixon and Kissinger did really overestimate the strength of the
anti-Chinese feelings among the American people. Even many years later, Kissinger still defended the
secretive methods by saying that the American population was hostile to any opening and that it saw
China as more dangerous than the USSR. Kissinger, Henry. Umění diplomacie. Od Richelieua po pád
Berlínské zdi. Prostor, Praha 1999, p. 753.
163
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2004, p. 144.
57
A.2. The Prelude for Nixon’s Beijing Visit – Playing with Words, Postponing the
Solutions
Ever since President Nixon publicly announced that he would go to China in 1972,
frantic preparations took place for this historic trip. There were numerous questions to be
discussed and solved. The president made it clear that he did not want any incidents to
happen during his stay in the Chinese capital 164 and thus the negotiators often went over
the smallest details and all the logistic and technical aspects of the trip. But there were far
more complicated issues to tackle.
Soon after the announcement on July 15, Nixon sent another message to Zhou,
confirming the opening of the secret channel in Paris, again using the services of the
American Military Attaché Vernon Walters. 165 The talks with the Chinese Ambassador to
France, Huang Chen, were usually conducted by Henry Kissinger, who was at the same
time meeting the North Vietnamese for secret negotiations in the French capital. Much of
the agenda in these Chen - Kissinger meetings dealt with Nixon’s planned visit to
Beijing 166 , but the two also discussed the international situation. On August 16, for
example, the Soviet Union and the situation in South Asia dominated the meeting. 167 It
was decided that Kissinger would go to China once more in October 1971 to iron out the
last details of the president’s trip and to discuss a host of other issues such as the deblocking of frozen Chinese assets or concluding various bilateral treaties on trade and
cultural exchanges.
The declassified documents clearly show that it was mostly Kissinger who was
providing useful information to the Chinese side. The Chinese were informed on the
developments in talks with Soviets and the North Vietnamese, at the same time when the
Soviets were largely kept in the dark about the true nature of the emerging Sino - American
164
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1999, p. 39.
165
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. Hill and Wang,
New York 1998, p. 241.
166
Kissinger to Nixon, September 13 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, September 13, 1971,
pp. 1 – 3. RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, Box
330, China Exchanges July-October 20, 1971, The National Security Archive (GWU),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc5.pdf [6.1.2007].
167
Kissinger to Nixon, My August 16 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, August 16, 1971, pp. 2
- 3. RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, box 330.
China Exchanges July-October 20, 1971, The National Security Archive (GWU)
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc2.pdf [6.1.2007].
58
relationship. From the very beginning, it was evident that Nixon and Kissinger attributed
more importance to Beijing than to Moscow in their triangular power game. 168
The fall of 1971 proved to be quite complicated from the viewpoint of international
relations. Especially the deteriorating situation in East Pakistan turned into a nightmare for
the American President. Following the victory of Bengali pro-independence Awami
League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in the elections of 1970, a political crisis engulfed
Pakistan. The Pakistani leader, Yahya Khan, finally made the decision to arrest Rahman
and conduct a military operation in East Pakistan to suppress the irredentist movement.
This action was widely criticized by the world public opinion and by the United Nations.
The Nixon Administration, however, sided with Khan - both because of the debt Nixon felt
he had towards the Pakistani leader for his help with starting the negotiations with China
and also because the Americans wanted to prevent the strengthening of India, supported by
the Soviet Union. 169 Another reason for supporting Pakistan was that it was also supported
by China, and thus the Americans had a chance to demonstrate before their new allies their
willingness to oppose the “Soviet - inspired aggression”. Henry Kissinger went so far as to
say that the United States had to “protect the tender shoot of our China policy from being
crushed by this combination of Soviet embrace and menace.” 170 From the military point of
view, however, there was little that the United States could do to save Pakistan from being
defeated. In December 1971, after air strikes against Pakistani targets, the Indian Army
attacked in the East Pakistan, In the United Nations, all three resolutions, calling for the
immediate cease-fire in the area, were vetoed by the Soviet Union. Nixon finally decided
to send the US Navy fleet, Task Force 74, into the Bay of Bengal, while the Chinese
moved their armed forces to the borders with Bhutan and Sikkim. 171 In the end, however, it
was India and the Soviet Union who were victorious. On December 16, Dhaka was taken
by Indian forces and India declared cease-fire, no doubt under the influence of the Soviets
who feared that a longer war could lead to a build-up of tensions between them and the
168
The United States and China were, as some experts argued, becoming “tacit allies” against
the USSR. For more detailed description of this development, see: Goh, Evelyn. From 'Red Menace' to
'Tacit' Ally: Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974. University of Oxford Press,
Oxford 2001 and chapter three of this thesis.
169
The fears of Indo – Soviet collusion seemed to be fully confirmed on August 9, 1971, when the Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union. Soon after, massive
airlifts of military supplies began to arrive to Delhi from the USSR. Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy. Paragon House, New York 1989, pp. 106 – 108.
170
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 166.
171
The Chinese were however very unlikely to intervene given their domestic problems with Marshall Lin
Bao, the unfavorable weather conditions in the Himalayan passes and the threats from the Soviet Union.
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, pp. 114 – 117.
59
United States. Besides, the Indian objectives were achieved. East Pakistan became an
independent country, Bangladesh, and Pakistan was thus divided and seriously weakened.
The strategic stability, which Nixon and Kissinger sought to maintain, was destroyed and
the whole affair became one of the first major blunders of the American foreign policy
during the Nixon - Kissinger era. 172 It was not to be the last one, however.
Despite the South Asian crisis, or perhaps because of it, Kissinger’s trip to Beijing
in October went as scheduled. This time, the national security advisor stayed in Beijing for
a whole week, again spending the bulk of his time in long discussions with Zhou Enlai.
Kissinger’s arrival coincided with the final culmination of the power struggle within the
Chinese leadership, which had for so long puzzled the Americans. It appears, although
detailed account of these events was never officially provided by the Chinese side, that
Marshall Lin Bao, the leader of the hardliners within the Chinese political establishment,
had somewhat modified his anti-Soviet stance by the summer of 1971. It is reasonable to
believe that since he saw the United States, especially because of the Taiwan question, as
the principal adversary of the PRC, he once more turned to Moscow. It also seems that the
Soviet leadership was perhaps counting on Lin Bao to stage a coup d'état to remove Mao
and stop the rapprochement from proceeding any further. Such a plan would make sense,
given the fact that Lin Bao had many allies and friends in the military circles. Regardless
of whether these allegations were true or not, however, Mao decided to tolerate no threats,
even if they were just potential. 173 In September 1971, Lin Bao was removed from his post
and attempted to flee to the Soviet Union, but his plane crashed in Mongolia, killing all on
board and prompting speculations whether it was shot down by Chinese fighter planes. 174
The whole incident greatly strengthened Zhou Enlai, whose vision of rapprochement with
the United States clearly prevailed, at least for the moment.
Kissinger’s visit again did not bring that much in terms of major breakthroughs on
the disputed issues. In fact, it is enough to just read Kissinger’s reports, which are full of
phrases such as “substantive discussions” and “solid base for negotiations”, but which also
admit that there were no “major surprises” and that “profound differences remained”. 175
Both sides reiterated their positions on such issues as Vietnam, Korea, Japan and Taiwan.
172
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984, p. 102.
173
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 169.
174
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 241.
175
Kissinger to Nixon, My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues. November 11, 1971, pp. 1 - 2. RG
59, State Department Top Secret Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-1973, POL 7 Kissinger, The National
Security Archive (GWU), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc20.pdf [6.1.2007].
60
Most of the time, however, was passed in trying to draft a communiqué that would be
issued jointly by the American and Chinese side at the end of Nixon’s visit in February of
the following year. Both sides were extremely cautious not to include any word or phrase,
which could be potentially harmful from the domestic or international point of view. Thus,
Kissinger and Zhou spent literarily hours wriggling over such words as “region” 176 ,
“superpower” and “major power” 177 or “interest”. 178 Especially Kissinger repeatedly
argued that the communiqué must be phrased in more general or even ambiguous terms, in
order for it to be acceptable for the American public. At one point, he told Zhou that “if
this communiqué was published in this form… all of those [in the United States] who
sought the improved relations with the People’s Republic would be discredited because it
will be said that the President came 12,000 miles in order to be asked to sign a document
containing the sharpest possible formulations against United States policy”. 179
While both statesmen were looking for the best way to express the viewpoints of
their respective countries, real problems remained largely unsolved. Especially the issue of
Taiwan was to remain a major hindrance to the improving of the mutual relations even in
the following years, and in fact, remains so until today. While in Beijing, Kissinger again
suggested the possibility of American withdrawal from Taiwan, but remained
noncommittal about any date when this was supposed to happen. He also once more
reiterated the American policy that there is only one China, which however was more the
position of himself than the official American line of policy. 180
During Kissinger’s stay in Beijing, one important problem in the Sino - American
relations was solved after all, although not by Kissinger and Zhou. On October 25, the
United Nations voted to expel the Republic of Taiwan and to admit the People’s Republic
of China. While this step was logical and long overdue, it was another embarrassing
blunder for the American foreign policy. While Kissinger secretly promised the Chinese
that the United States would not oppose their admittance into the UN, the Americans did
not want Taiwan to be expelled either. They were thus looking for a solution which would
176
In relation to Indochina. Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, Communique, Announcements of Trips, October
24, 1971 (9:23 - 11:20 p.m.), p. 3. Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files,
box 1034, Polo II - HAK China Trip October 1971 Transcript of Meetings, The National Security
Archive (GWU), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc16.pdf [6.1.2007].
177
Ibid, p. 7.
178
Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, Communique, October 25, 1971 (10:12 - 11:00 a.m.,) p. 3. Nixon
Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, box 1034, Polo II - HAK China Trip
October 1971 Transcript of Meetings. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc17.pdf
179
In relation to Indochina. Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, Communique, Announcements of Trips, p. 6.
180
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 172.
61
at least partially satisfy both sides – the PRC was to be accepted as a member and was to
receive the seat on the Security Council, while the ROC was to keep its representative in
the General Assembly. So, in fact the United States was operating on the basis of “Two
Chinas” policy in the United Nations, while promoting “One China” policy when dealing
with the Chinese. 181 The weeks before Kissinger’s departure for Beijing were filled with a
feverish activity to gain some of the “uncommitted” nations to vote for this proposal – for
example, such countries as Morocco, Austria, Argentina, Ireland, Venezuela and Italy,
among others. 182 This plan was especially supported by the Secretary of State, William
Rogers, and by the American Ambassador to the United Nations, George H. W. Bush.
However, in the end, all the American efforts were in vain. The Resolution 2758 of the
General Assembly 183 to expel the ROC and admit the PRC as the sole representative of
China was passed, while the American initiative to admit the PRC while saving the
Nationalist seat did not get enough votes. This failure had angered many American
politicians and officials, including Ronald Reagan, William Buckley and Barry Goldwater,
and especially George H. W. Bush 184 , who felt that he did not get enough support from the
Administration and that his attempts were actually sabotaged by Kissinger. This feeling
could have well been justified because although Kissinger publicly regretted what
happened and, as usual, blamed Rogers for it 185 , he later said privately that he was actually
“relieved” that the General Assembly voted the way it did. 186
Ultimately, neither of the above mentioned issues could threaten Nixon’s firm
resolve to go to China. Perhaps just to make sure that everything was arranged by
Kissinger according to the orders he was given, the president dispatched Alexander Haig to
China in January 1972. It is interesting that Haig was given a message, in which, among
other things, he informed the Chinese that the “pro-Soviet Union, pro-Taiwanese forces in
181
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 241.
Conversation Between President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and Between
President Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers, respectively, October 17, 1971, pp. 1-2. National
Archives, Nixon White House Tapes, Conversations 11-102 and 11-105, The National Security Archive
(GWU), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc9.pdf [6.1.2007].
183
The resolution was passed in the General Assembly to bypass the Security Council where the ROC and
the United States could use its veto powers to block it. It seems reasonable to believe, though, that the
United States would not have vetoed the resolution even if it was presented before the Security Council.
184
Bush, George and Victor Gould. Looking Forward. Doubleday, New York 1987, pp. 114 – 116.
185
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 38.
186
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 145.
182
62
the United States joined forces to oppose Nixon’s China visit”. 187 It seems likely that
Nixon wanted to convince the Chinese that his visit to Beijing was a risky venture which
must be vindicated by the Chinese more compromising attitude on some of the disputed
issues. It is also likely that Haig was sent to Beijing to somewhat balance out the previous
visits by Kissinger, who was seen by Nixon as being too easily enraptured by the Chinese
and thus easier to influence. Haig, who was a soldier and who did not like lengthy
philosophical and historical debates, was likely to deliver the president’s message almost
word per word. 188 In any case, Haig’s visit was probably never intended to be more than
just a last minute reminder of the importance of Nixon’s visit for both countries and it
again showed that it was one of the most important things on Nixon’s mind. Now, with all
the preparations done and everything firmly in place, the president could finally embark on
his historic mission to China.
B. Nixon in China - The Beginning of a New Era or the Beginning of an End?
On February 21, 1972, President Nixon got off the airplane at the Beijing Airport to
start what he rightly perceived as the most important trip abroad of his entire life. His visit
of China was more than just an astounding success of détente for Nixon – it was also a
fulfillment of a dream. The visit had been closely followed by the media and by the
American people. The images of Nixon shaking hands with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai
appeared in the newspapers all around the world. Even today, it is one of the things Nixon
is remembered for 189 , and unlike Watergate, it is a positive reminiscence for most people.
But, the symbolic significance notwithstanding, was it such a success as it is often
presented? On one hand, the trip had a short-term effect on the international standing of the
United States as well as on the domestic political situation in America. On the other, it
appears like this visit was to be the last high peak of the rapprochement process, after
which a stagnation and eventual decline had inevitably followed.
187
Haig’s Preparatory Mission for Nixon’s Visit to China in January 1972, p. 4. Diplomatic History Institute
of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xin zhongguo wenjiao fengyun [New China's Diplomatic
Experience] (Beijing, Shijie zhishi, 1991), Vol. 3, pp. 71 – 82, The National Security Archive (GWU),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc26.pdf [6.1.2007].
188
Haig repeatedly said that he would speak frankly, in “the soldier’s style”. He also said at one point that the
US attitude toward China did not change as a result of a newly found feeling of friendship for the PRC,
but solely as a result of the American attempt to protect its own interests, a thing which Kissinger would
probably never say in such an open fashion. Memcon, Haig and Zhou, 3 January 1972, Midnight, Great
Hall of the People, January 3, 1972, p. 3. Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security
Council Files, box 1037, China - A.M. Haig January Visit Jan. 1972, The National Security Archive
(GWU), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc24.pdf [6.1.2007].
189
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976, p. 51.
63
B.1. The President’s Visit to China and Its Immediate Effects
In 1971, Kissinger wrote in a memo to Nixon that his visit to China and his meeting
with Mao had the potential of “turning the page of history”. 190 Nixon came to China
prepared, in a way, to deny himself and his anti-communist past, much in the same way as
Ronald Reagan many years later met with the Soviet leaders. On one hand, the President
wanted to show that ideology no longer plays an important part in the American foreign
policy; at the same time, however, he could not expect the same of his Chinese
counterparts. Prior to meeting with Zhou and Mao, Kissinger warned Nixon that the
Chinese are “both pragmatic and fanatic”, “tough ideologues” who have experiences and
visions sharply different from those held by the Americans. 191 The Chinese had a
considerable advantage because the meeting was taking place on their home turf. They
could indulge their guests with the traditionally lavish Chinese hospitality and thus “seduce
them with their charm” 192 , a tactic employed by the Chinese rulers since ancient times.
Also, the fact that the Americans were coming to China evoked another image from the
Chinese history, that of the “inferior rulers”, coming to pay tribute to the Emperor of the
Middle Kingdom. 193
These factors, though Nixon was no doubt aware of them, were not so pressing on
the president’s mind, however, as he prepared to meet with the Chinese leaders. He was
more occupied with what strategy to choose in dealing with Zhou and Mao. Finally, he
decided to use the same strategy as Kissinger – that is, to talk with the Chinese on more
general terms and remain noncommittal on the key issues.
The key issues which were touched in the talks between Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai
and the President were still the same as in the past, although their order had shifted. To
Nixon’s relief, after he repeated the promises about the gradual withdrawal of the
American forces from Taiwan and his support for the “One China Policy”, Mao told him
that the Taiwan issue was now of “secondary importance”. 194 There were other more
190
Kissinger to Nixon, My Talks with Chou En-lai, July 14, 1971, p. 26. Box 1033, Miscellaneous
Memoranda Relating to HAK Trip to PRC, July 1971, The National Security Archive (GWU),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-40.pdf [6.1.2007].
191
Kissinger to Nixon, Your Encounter with the Chinese. February 5, 1972, pp. 1 – 2. Nixon Presidential
Materials Project, HAK Office Files, box 13, China, The National Security Archive (GWU),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc27.pdf [6.1.2007].
192
Ibid, p. 1.
193
Some authors later argued that while this “pilgrimage to China” was justifiable in the beginning, it became
a problem in the future when it started to be almost a tradition (Nixon’s visit was followed by another
visit of Henry Kissinger and also of Gerald Ford). Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s
Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton, p. 52.
194
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 305.
64
important issues – the Soviet Union, Indochina and also the normalization of relations
between the United States and the PRC. Again, not much has changed in terms of finding
compromises on these problems. While Nixon and Zhou agreed on the need to counter
Soviet expansionism, the Chinese resolutely rejected further American involvement in
Vietnam 195 and clearly stated that as long the North Vietnamese people are fighting for the
“liberation of Vietnam”, the Chinese are bound to support them. 196 On the matter of the
establishment of the official diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington, Nixon
indicated that such a move could be undertaken during his second term.
Again, like during the previous encounters with the Chinese, Nixon talked to Zhou
Enlai. The President did meet with Mao, but only for a short time almost immediately after
his arrival to China. 197 While Nixon was talking to the Chinese leaders and touring the
sights, William Rogers was negotiating with the Chinese Foreign Minister on more
technical matters, such as various trade, technology and culture agreements and treaties. 198
Henry Kissinger spent most of the time, yet again, re-writing, with his Chinese
counterparts, the official communiqué that was to be released at the end of the trip and
which touched on the most important issues in the bilateral relations between both
countries. This communiqué proved to be the toughest problem that Nixon and Kissinger
had to face during the entire trip. When the draft was shown to William Rogers, he
immediately protested. The text of the communiqué mentioned all the allies of the United
States in Asia but Taiwan – a situation which reminded Rogers of the ill-fated Dean
Acheson’s speech about the U.S. defense perimeter before the Korean War. The
Department of State immediately pointed out that such communiqué would imply that the
American treaty with Taiwan no longer stands, and, under pressure from Rogers, the
sentence about the defense commitments was altogether dropped from the final draft. 199
This caused some irritation on the part of the Chinese, who threatened to block the trade
negotiations with the United States if the whole problem was not cleared. In the end,
however, both sides were able to agree on a compromise formulation. 200 The final version
of the document, known as the Shanghai Communiqué, was released on February 27, last
day of President Nixon’s visit in China. It contained the American and Chinese view on the
195
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 195.
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 304.
197
Unbeknown to the Americans at that time was the fact that Mao nearly died several days before Nixon and
his entourage arrived to Beijing and even during his meeting with Nixon he had to be medicated.
198
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 305.
199
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, pp. 48 – 49.
200
Ibid, p. 47.
196
65
Taiwan issue, the desire of both countries to normalize the mutual relations, and their
willingness to oppose the efforts of “any country or a group of countries” to seek
hegemony in the Asia - Pacific region, a provision clearly aimed against the Soviet
Union. 201
What were some of the lessons learned from Nixon’s trip to China? First, it can be
argued that a major difference in opinions appeared between Nixon and Kissinger. While
Kissinger was ready to “throw Taiwan overboard”, Nixon, at least publicly, confirmed his
resolution to keep the American commitment to Taiwan. 202 The issue of the final wording
of the communiqué was one of the few occasions when the President sided with Rogers
and not with Kissinger. While it was well possible, and even likely, that Nixon felt ill of
leaving America’s long-term ally to his fate, it is also very likely that he already had the
upcoming presidential elections in mind. It was not acceptable, from the point of view of
the public opinion, to abandon Taiwan; the opening to China was one thing, but sacrificing
the Nationalist government for the uncertain future with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai was
something completely different. In this respect, Nixon appeared more realistic than
Kissinger, who sometimes forgot to take the domestic political situation and the mood of
the American people into account. Other than that, the President’s visit did not really solve
any of the outstanding problems in the Sino - American relations and it did not even chart
out any clear course for the future of the rapprochement process.
The immediate reactions to the President’s visit of China in the United States were in
general positive, though perhaps not as ecstatic as one year earlier when the Kissinger
announcement was made. The American public was well informed about the proceedings
by the media. The entire trip received full media coverage from Max Frankel, a journalist
working for The New York Times 203 , and other journalists. The overall evaluation of the
China visit was relatively optimistic, but it seemed that perhaps more was expected than
just the ambiguous Shanghai Communiqué. Thus, The Time 204 , for example, wrote about
the “glittering success” 205 of the President’s trip to Beijing. The most important thing, the
201
The Shanghai Communiqué, February 27, 1972. CNN Interactive Cold War Experience Series,
http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/15/documents/us.china/ [3.1.2007].
202
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 306.
203
He later received the Pulitzer Price for his reports on Nixon’s visit.
204
The Time afforded Nixon another honor when it nominated him for its Man of the Year Award for the
second time in a row. Unlike in 1971, however, in 1972, much to Nixon’s chagrin, he was nominated
together with Henry Kissinger.
205
The Time, March 6, 1972. Time Almanac of the 20th Century (CD), Time Magazine Company Inc., New
York 1995.
66
author of the article asserted, was that the event took place at all.206 The New York Times,
or more specifically the above mentioned Max Frankel, used similar words in describing
the week Nixon spent in China as “remarkable” and “incredible”, even though it at the
same time admitted that “ [the Chinese] did not give the level of official contact and the
pace of exchanges for which he [the President] had hoped on the way into China”. 207 The
Washington Post was perhaps even more accurate in evaluating Nixon’s accomplishment,
when it called it “a fairly glittering short-term success”.208 According to the paper, it was
rather difficult to determine whether the President’s adventure in China “succeeded” or
whether it has “failed”. 209 The same journalist asked rhetorically in The Los Angeles Times
whether the Nixon’s visit of China was more than a “social call”.210 Clearly, the journalists
were missing some more tangible results which could prove the advantages of the new
relationship with the PRC for the United States. However, it is also important to note that a
vast majority of the articles written on the visit did not question the basic need of
rapprochement with China and thus the fundamental validity of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s
approach.
The reactions of the American politicians and of the general public were equally
mixed. For the supporters of the new policy, Nixon’s visit of Beijing was laudable and was
seen as the next logical step on the way to the establishment of normal bilateral relations
between both countries. Together with Nixon’s upcoming trip to Moscow, it was also
believed to be an indispensable part of détente and of the President’s “Full Generation of
Peace” strategy, aimed at the re-evaluation of the American position in the world. On the
other hand, the conservative circles viewed the images of Nixon with Mao and Zhou,
America’s former adversaries, with deep misgivings and even hostility. Some of these
people, like, for example, William Buckley, John Ashbrook or Pat Buchanan, sharply
criticized the wording of the Shanghai Communiqué. 211 On the other hand, Nixon was able
to convince Reagan and Goldwater that the United States was not going to abandon
Taiwan, which for them appeared to be the major concern. Reagan went so far as publicly
206
The Time, March 6, 1972.
Frankel, Max. “Behind the Cold Print. Despite Modest China Communiqué, Journey Was a Most
Remarkable Event.” The New York Times, February 29, 1972, p. 16.
208
Alsop, Joseph. “The Nixon Feat is Short-Term”. The Washington Post, February 28, 1972, p. 21.
209
Alsop, Joseph. “The Nixon Feat is Short-Term”, p. 21.
210
Alsop, Joseph. “Nixon’s China Visit: More Than a Social Call, But How Much More?”, The Los Angeles
Times, February 28, 1972, p. C7.
211
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 198. It has to be
noted, however, that with most of these opponents, it was not only the matter of China, but the overall
Nixon’s approach to domestic and foreign policy, which was found inadequate. They often accused Nixon
of leaving the conservative values and of making “left turns”.
207
67
defending the President’s trip, saying that if “[it were a Democratic President in China] the
alarm would certainly be justified, but this is a Republican President and a fighter against
Communism”. 212 This time, Nixon’s reputation proved to be an advantage in rallying even
some of the more conservative elements in the GOP to his cause. Those Republicans who
were relatively close to Nixon, like Spiro Agnew and Gerald Ford, openly supported the
rapprochement.
Perhaps even more important, in the light of the upcoming elections, was the
response of “the common folk”, the “little men”. While the majority of people tended to
approve the President’s visit of China 213 , even though they did not know what outcome it
would bring, some demurred. Some conservative organizations and societies, like the
Conservative Book Club or the American Conservative Union, assumed a hostile stance to
the trip to Beijing even before it actually took place. 214 In some conservative areas, like
San Diego, the opposition to the China overtures was the prevailing attitude. The
disappointed Republicans established such organizations like Anti-Nixon Republicans of
California or California Republican Assembly. 215 The attitude of these people can in
general be summed up by a short interview, given by Col. Ivan Yeaton, one of those
Americans who served in China during World War II and who nostalgically remembered
the old times before the Communist takeover: “If he [Nixon] went to talk peace, he’s
wasting his time. If he wants to make a deal, he’s holding the short end of the stick. If he
felt that an approach was necessary, he should have sent someone else – not Kissinger, but
someone really tough”. 216 Such reaction, however, was usually typical for those who
considered themselves the “true conservatives” and for those who had personal reasons to
dislike the PRC – in general, the American population, the “silent majority”, still backed
Nixon. It was not until 1973 or even 1974 that this attitude began to change on a large
scale.
212
He also claimed that “the President told me personally that if the Red Chinese tried to take over Taiwan,
the United States will defend its ally”. Holles, Everett R. “In Conservative San Diego, Nixon’s Trip is
Traumatic.” The New York Times, February 26, 1972, p. 11.
213
The Gallup and NORC polls, which were designed to find out how favorable was the view Americans had
of the PRC, had shown a dramatic increase of popularity for China – from 5% in 1967, to 23% in May
1972 and even 49% in April 1973. After that, the approval ratings began to drop again as the
dissilusionment with the rapprochement began to take hold. Hirshberg, Matthew S. “Consistency and
Change in American Perceptions of China”. Political Behavior, Vol. 15, No. 3, (September 1993), p. 249
214
Raymont, Henry. “A Pro – Nixon Book Dropped by Club”. The New York Times, November 21, 1971, p.
43.
215
Holles, Everett R. “In Conservative San Diego, Nixon’s Trip is Traumatic”, p. 11.
216
Ibid.
68
The reaction that Nixon’s trip invoked abroad was also relatively calm. The “shock
waves” 217 , which the July 1971 announcement sent around the world, had by now largely
subsided. Soon after his return from China, Nixon sent his emissaries to the American
allies in Asia to brief them on the fresh developments in the rapprochement process. While
in Japan the American emissaries were received coldly, in Taiwan the reaction was not as
negative as Nixon might have feared. Chiang Kai-shek, who was also able to think
pragmatically when the situation called for it, realized that he could do nothing to stop or
change the new course of American policy and he now focused on securing the
continuation of American military and economic aid. 218 Nixon also made sure that the
governments of the European allies were sufficiently informed on his visit, sometimes
writing personal letters to the foreign heads of governments. 219 In Europe, the response
was overwhelmingly positive. The Italian President Andreotti, in a letter to Nixon,
congratulated the American President on the “event such as your [Nixon’s] visit to China,
which we considered entirely positive”. 220 He also mentioned the “prospects which these
meetings opened for the future development of the bilateral relations between the United
States and China, as well as for the international situation in general”. 221 Belgian Prime
Minister Eyskens also stated he understood the reasons which led the United States to seek
rapprochement with the PRC and even said that in the long run, the “U.S. - PRC
diplomatic recognition would be unavoidable”. 222 Similar reactions arrived from the
Netherlands, France and Finland, among others.
Nixon’s visit to Beijing then was a success in terms of demonstrating the rationality
and pragmatism of the new American approach to foreign policy. The problem was that in
the long run, the problems between both countries remained unsolved. Besides, since the
main achievement of the new Sino - American relationship was the secret intelligence and
later also military cooperation against the Soviet Union, which will be discussed in the
following chapter, there was little to show to the American people in terms of tangible
217
Kissinger to Nixon, My Talks with Chou En-lai, July 14, 1971, p. 26.
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 199.
219
Like, for example, the letter written to the Dutch Prime Minister Biesheuvel in March 1972. President’s
Letter to Biesheuvel on the Peking Visit, March 27, 1972. The Richard M. Nixon Security Files 1969 1974 Collection, Papers of the Nixon White House, Reel 19. Some letters were sent even before Nixon
actually went to China: President’s Letter to General Franco, January 8, 1972. The Richard M. Nixon
Security Files 1969 - 1974 Collection, Papers of the Nixon White House, Reel 22.
220
Letter from Italian President Andreotti to President Nixon, April 17, 1972, p. 1. The Richard M. Nixon
Security Files 1969 - 1974 Collection, Papers of the Nixon White House, Reel 16.
221
Ibid.
222
President’s Message to Prime Minister Eyskens, October 1, 1972, p. 2. The Richard M. Nixon
Security Files 1969 - 1974 Collection, Papers of the Nixon White House, Reel 2.
218
69
results. Soon, the American people will begin to ask whether the rapprochement does not
have only one beneficiary – the Chinese.
B.2. The Elections of 1962 – In the Shadow of the Détente
The elections of 1972 were supposed to be a triumph for President Nixon and the
Republican Party. Unlike four years earlier, Nixon’s election victory never appeared in
doubt. His nomination by the GOP was a sure thing and the Democratic Party was still
searching for someone whose vision and charisma could at least match that of Nixon. The
final pick of the Democrats, South Dakota Senator George McGovern, delighted the
Republicans. On one hand, he was far too liberal and too easily identifiable with the social
turmoil of the 1960’s. On the other, since he was a university professor and member of the
“leaders’ class”, Nixon could, and he did, attack him as elitist and snobbish, alienated from
the “silent majority” of Americans. 223 As in 1968, Nixon hoped to rally the conservative
segments of the American society to his cause, and he was willing to go as far as to
sacrifice the liberal Republicans for the conservative Democrats. This goal was made
easier when the candidate of the American Independent Party and the Governor of
Alabama, George Wallace, who could potentially steal away the conservative vote from
Nixon, was left paralyzed after an unsuccessful assassination attempt and had to withdraw
from the race.
Not surprisingly, the foreign policy and the accomplishments of the détente strategy
were among the most important topics of the 1972 presidential campaign. From the
Nixon’s point of view, 1972 was “the Year of Triumph”. 224 Shortly after his visit of
Beijing, in May 1972, Nixon arrived to Moscow to oversee the signing of the SALT I
treaty, which he presented as a significant breakthrough in the American efforts to limit the
stockpiling of armaments by both superpowers. In fact, the SALT initiative was accepted
in a less favorable way than the opening to China by the Americans. Especially the
conservative wing of the Republican Party, represented this time mainly by Ronald
Reagan, asserted that the treaty and, in fact, détente itself, is more advantageous to the
Soviets than to the United States 225 , even though the agreement ultimately got the support
of the Pentagon and the JCS. The main trouble for the Administration, however, was not
the Republican right, but Senator Henry Jackson (D-OH), one of the main opponents of
223
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, p. 42.
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 303.
225
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, p. 70.
224
70
détente with the Soviet Union within the Democratic Party. In the fall of 1972, using the
new taxes imposed by the Soviet leadership on the Jewish immigration from the USSR as a
pretext, Jackson mustered enough support in the Congress to pass the so-called JacksonVanik Amendment, which tied further grain sales to the USSR and the granting of the MFN
(Most Favored Nation) status to the Soviets to the question of the free Jewish
immigration. 226 Although this move was opposed by both Nixon and Kissinger, the
amendment was passed, meaning a defeat for the Administration. On the other side of the
American political scene, the Left was also becoming gradually dissatisfied with détente,
because it seemed that in many respects, it did not go far enough and did not solve
problems adequately.
There was especially the question of the Vietnam War, which was still dragging on
despite the fact that Nixon was elected in 1968 after he promised he would get the United
States out of Indochina as soon as possible. In 1972, however, there were finally signs of a
possible breakthrough. Following the China trip, Zhou Enlai talked to the North
Vietnamese and urged them to negotiate, though he did not exert any pressure on them or
did not threaten them with cutting the Chinese military aid. 227 Similar attempts to restrain
the North Vietnamese were made by the Soviets. Besides, Nixon was able to present the
Vietnamization of the war as successful as he was able to withdraw more and more
American troops from Vietnam. Finally, on October 26, 1972, the Administration declared
that the “peace in Indochina is at hand”, an announcement which had surely influenced the
electorate in Nixon’s favor. 228 Thus, although some challenges began to appear to the very
basic principles of détente in 1972, it still had the support of the American people. In
comparison to the successes of the “grand strategy” – the Beijing trip, the SALT I, the
“achievements” in Vietnam – the less successful episodes like the American handling of
the South Asian crisis appeared insignificant.
The elections in November 1972 finally brought a sweeping victory that Nixon
dreamt of .The Republican incumbent won in a landslide. 229 While the Republicans
triumphed in the presidential elections, however, they did not perform as well in the
elections to the Congress. The GOP had managed to take twelve seats in the House but lost
226
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976, p. 152.
227
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 233.
228
Kissinger, H. Roky v Bílém domě. BB/art, Praha 2006, pp. 1277 – 1278.
229
Nixon and Agnew received 60.67% of the popular vote and 520 electoral votes, while McGovern and R.
Sargent Shiver only won 37.52% of the popular vote and 17 electoral votes. The Republicans have carried
all states except for Massachusetts and Washington D.C. Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections,
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html [22.12.2006].
71
two in the Senate, thus resulting in a familiar picture for Nixon - the Democratic control of
both houses of the Congress. The elections thus revealed an interesting aspect of the
political situation in the United States in the 1970’s. It was clear that the successes in the
foreign policy sphere, which had no doubt influenced the elections 230 , had been attributed
to Nixon and Kissinger rather than to the Republican Party in general. Many of those who
voted for the Republican ticket in the presidential elections likely voted for Democratic
candidates in the House and Senate elections. This phenomenon can be ascribed either to
Nixon’s popularity, which was still high in November 1972, or simply to the fact that the
Democrats were not able to find a strong candidate for the presidency. This was potentially
dangerous for Nixon and for the GOP. If the support for détente and for the domestic
policy by the “new majority” rested on Nixon’s personal popularity and trustworthiness
then it was soon to get a serious blow as the Watergate scandal began to unravel. This is
perhaps one of the reasons behind the defeat of Gerald Ford in 1976 and behind the
growing disillusionment with détente in the coming years.
1972 was an important year from the point of view of the rapprochement with
China. Nixon’s historical visit of Beijing, although it in fact accomplished little in terms of
concrete results, carried with it a tremendous symbolic significance. While not all the
reactions in the United States were necessarily positive and approving, the subsequent
elections showed that détente, and the opening to China as its indispensable part, still
enjoyed the support of the majority of the American people. In the matter of months,
however, the whole scene was about to change as Richard Nixon was to experience a
dramatic fall out of favor and America was to be thrown into a political confusion and
turmoil.
230
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, p. 69.
72
ACT III - THE RE-EVALUATION AND DECLINE OF THE
TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY (1973 - 1976)
"How much of what we did was good?" – Nixon in China (an opera by John Adams)
The second presidential term of Richard M. Nixon, while starting on a relatively
upbeat note, soon turned into a nightmare for the President. While Nixon was able, at least
for a time, to solve the problems which had accumulated in the international affairs, he was
soon consumed fully by the domestic crisis, the Watergate affair. As a result, the domestic
foreign policy consensus, which Nixon sought to re-create, began to crumble. Another
issue of Watergate was that the embattled president left the control over the foreign policy
largely in the hands of Henry Kissinger. The ensuing period, which is sometimes called the
“Kissinger Shogunate” 231 and which continued into the presidency of Nixon’s successor,
Gerald Ford, can be characterized by a gradual disillusionment with détente, growing
mistrust towards the foreign policy making mechanism, created during the Nixon
Administration, and more assertive control, exercised over the American foreign policy by
the Congress. All these factors played their part in the 1976 election victory of Jimmy
Carter, who promised to bring more openness, honesty and transparency into the American
politics again.
A. The Decline of the “Imperial Presidency” and Nixon’s Fall (1973 – 1974)
The events of June 1972, largely unnoticed at the time they happened, had a
profound impact on the remaining time Richard Nixon spent in office. On one hand, his
administration was quickly losing support of the American people, with more and more
close associates of the President being forced to resign. On the other hand, it led to a
desperate attempt by Nixon to turn the attention of the public to his foreign policy exploits,
which, compared to the disasters at home, still looked relatively successful. Watergate also
brought an interesting twist into the already complicated relations between Nixon and
Kissinger, whose influence had grown almost out of proportion. And last, but definitely not
least, the re-evaluation of the American foreign policy in the light of the Watergate
revelations and other factors caused the stagnation and ultimate decline of many of the
détente projects, including the rapprochement with China
231
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy. Paragon House,
New York 1989, p. 199.
73
A.1. The End of the War in Indochina – The Dissilusionment with China Grows
Stronger
Soon after his re-election, President Nixon had to deal with the first serious problem. The
negotiations with the North Vietnamese in Paris, which he hoped would lead to a peace
treaty being signed before the end of the year, stalled yet again. The fault was not only on
the side of the North Vietnamese, but also on the side of Thieu, who was becoming
increasingly worried that the United States was ready to sacrifice the Saigon
government. 232 Nixon was desperate - he needed the agreement to be concluded by
January 20, when he was to be inaugurated into the office for the second time. He was also
worried that the new Congress, which would come into session on January 3, would cause
the United States to leave Indochina without any guarantee to South Vietnam at all. He
decided to force the North Vietnamese to a compromise, while at the same time convincing
Thieu with a show of American power. On the President’s orders, and despite the
opposition of Melvin Laird and the JCS, targets in North Vietnam were to be massively
bombed for the next two weeks. 233 In the end, the North Vietnamese were forced to return
to the negotiating table, allegedly after having used all their SAM missiles. 234 The
agreement between the governments of the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam
and the temporary revolutionary government of South Vietnam, known as the Paris Peace
Accords, was finally signed on January 27, 1973. 235
Although the document was presented by Nixon and Kissinger as the “peace with
honor”, it had serious flaws. The cease-fire it instituted was almost impossible to supervise
and enforce. Besides, the North Vietnamese did not agree to stop the combat operations in
Cambodia, although they made a similar promise about Laos. The North Vietnamese
forces remained in South Vietnam even after the Americans left in March 1973. Perhaps
the most serious flaw was that the South Vietnamese government was only willing to
accept the treaty after Nixon made a pledge to Thieu that if in future South Vietnam was in
danger, the United States would come to its aid – a pledge that the President knew he
would probably not be able to fulfill. The hopes that Nixon and Kissinger had about Saigon
232
Bundy, William: A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. Hill and Wang,
New York, 1998, p. 361.
233
During the Operation Linebacker II, which took place between December 18 and December 29, and
which is therefore also known as the Christmas Bombings, the American bombers attacked airfields,
military installations but also civilian targets in North Vietnam. The operation resulted in heavy casualties
on both sides. For more on Linebacker II, see: Ambrose, Stephen. The Christmas Bombings. Random
House, New York 2005.
234
Bundy, William: A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 362.
235
Nálevka, Vladimír. Světová politika ve 20. století II. Aleš Skřivan ml., Praha 2000, p. 149.
74
regime’s “fair chance of survival” were grossly misplaced, as the following months and
years were about to show. 236 The short-term effect, however, was once more positive, as
Nixon’s approval ratings climbed to an all-time high of 67% in February 1973. 237
The conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords did have a significant impact on the
Sino - American rapprochement as well, both from the international and from the domestic
perspective. In the United States, more people began to doubt the advantages of the new
relationship. The Chinese, as was alleged, did little to help the United States with Vietnam.
Such arguments were in line with the growing disillusionment with détente in general. In
this particular case, they were not completely justified, however. The Chinese simply did
not have the leverage necessary to convince or force Hanoi to accept American demands.
They did at least try to prolong the life of the Saigon government by advising the North
Vietnamese to postpone their final push south for a year or two, while at the same time
offering Hanoi Chinese military and economic aid for another five years as an
inducement. 238 The Chinese leadership had dilemmas of its own to face. On one hand, it
was not terribly enthusiastic about having a strong, unified Vietnam, an ally of the Soviet
Union and thus a potential enemy, on its southern border. From this point of view, the
American and Chinese goals of keeping Vietnam divided were largely similar – a fact that
was already apparent after the end of the first Indochina War in 1954. 239 On the other
hand, the Chinese could not simply afford to stop supporting Hanoi, because they would
loose all their remaining influence there, thus strengthening their Soviet rivals. As Zhou
Enlai stated clearly in October 1971, Chinese hands were “tied” 240 with respect to
Vietnam. The problem was that the Americans were simply not willing to believe this –
Nixon and Kissinger strongly felt that the world politics is done by the powerful only and
that the smaller states in the end always have to submit. In case of North Vietnam, which
was skillfully maneuvering between Beijing and Moscow, it was not the case. The
Vietnam issue thus revealed a very serious flaw of the triangular diplomacy – it showed
that it cannot in many cases lead to the outcomes that it was intended to bring at its
inception.
236
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976. Cambridge University Press, Boston 1984, p. 154.
237
The value is based on a Gallup Poll, taken in February 1973. The Roper Center for the Public Opinion
Research, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu./cgibin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/PresJob/PresJob.htx;start=HS_fullresults?pr=Nixon [10.1.2007].
238
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2004, pp. 285 – 286.
239
Nálevka, Vladimír. Světová politika ve 20. století II, p. 144.
240
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 239.
75
A.2. The Watergate Affair and Its Impact on the Rapprochement Process
Any satisfaction that the President might have felt over accomplishing the
American withdrawal from Vietnam soon began to disappear. Already in December 1972,
the investigation into the seemingly petty criminal offence, when five men broke into the
headquarters of the Democratic Party in June 1972, assumed an entirely new dimension.
Due to the investigative work of the journalists from The Washington Post, Judge Sirica,
and later, a special committee of the Senate chaired by Samuel J. Ervin, it became apparent
that the “burglars” had links to the White House. Although attempts were made by the
President and his aides to cover up the whole affair and to destroy the evidence, by April
1973 the situation was getting worse and worse. On April 30, two of the President’s closest
counsels, John Haldeman and H. R. Ehrlichman, were forced to resign. 241
Under such circumstances, Nixon did not have as much time or interest in the
foreign policy issues anymore. Thus, it was up to Henry Kissinger, who now served as the
national security advisor and the secretary of state at the same time, to continue pursuing
the détente policies. The Nixon - Kissinger relationship grew extremely complicated at this
time, as will be discussed in the following section, but Nixon simply did not have anyone
else to turn to. It was soon apparent, however, that even the “Superkraut” was not exactly
sure how to go on with many of the diplomatic and geopolitical initiatives, especially the
rapprochement with China.
In February 1973, shortly after the Paris Peace Accords were signed, Kissinger
went to China once more. The talks with Mao and Zhou were cordial and smooth – at one
point Kissinger even said that except for Great Britain, no country was so close to the
United States as the PRC. 242 However, it soon became apparent that the nature of the Sino
-American relationship was changing. While the American side originally wanted to use it
as a tool to put pressure on the Soviet Union while keeping friendly relations with both
Beijing and Moscow (the so-called tripolar strategy), Kissinger now began to lean more
and more in the direction of the Chinese. This change was initiated not so much by the
Americans, but by the Chinese who were nervous about détente with the Soviet Union and
241
242
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 380.
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1999, p. 60.
76
urged the United States to establish some sort of a military alliance against Moscow. 243 On
the American side, such move had the support of some Pentagon officials and military
commanders who later came up with a similar suggestion. Yet, it was something very
different from what President Nixon and Henry Kissinger envisaged at the beginning.
Besides, any open announcement of a military cooperation between the United States and
the PRC was bound to meet with a strong opposition in the Congress as well as among
many ordinary Americans. Thus, Kissinger was now leery of committing the
Administration to such an alliance, although he assured Mao and Zhou that the Chinese
territorial integrity is a key national interest of the United States. 244 The main result of the
February talks was thus the decision to open liaison offices in Washington and Beijing,
which would serve as a temporary measure before the official diplomatic relations were
established between both countries. 245
Meanwhile, the Congress realized that the Watergate affair had given it an
opportunity to weaken Nixon’s grip of the foreign policy. In 1973 and 1974, the legislators
began to seek to curb the presidential powers and to control the American foreign policy
direction by passing various bills and amendments. On June 29, 1973, for example, the
Congress forbade all future military operations by American forces in Indochina, thus
sealing the fate of the Thieu regime. 246 Even more important was the passing of the War
Powers Resolution, which was approved over the President’s veto, and which placed
restraints on sending American military units abroad and on the possible length of their
mission. 247 This resolution was seen as reflecting the general mood within the Congress
and the United States, which began to be more and more critical of what it perceived as
“excessive presidential powers” in the area of foreign policy making. 248 The President was
also criticized for the secrecy which accompanied and shrouded his foreign policy moves.
243
Goh, Evelyn. From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit' Ally: Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 19611974. University of Oxford Press, Oxford 2001, pp. 115 – 128.
244
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 401.
245
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, p. 310. The
Liaison Offices were finally opened in May 1973, with David E. Bruce becoming the first American
Liaison Officer in the PRC and General Huang Chen the first Chinese Liaison in the United States. These
legations were largely powerless, however, and the bilateral diplomacy was still conducted mainly
through secret channels.
246
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976, p. 160.
247
Under the provisions of this resolution, the President was obliged to consult the Congress before
committing troops overseas, report to the legislators on the need to continue their mission and terminate
this mission within sixty days unless the Congress agreed to extend it. The War Powers Resolution, The
Avalon Project at the Yale School of Law, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/warpower.htm
[19.12.2006].
248
Hook, Stephen W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II. CQ Press,
Washington D.C. 2004, p. 135.
77
The secrecy that was at the beginning seen as necessary was now blamed for many dubious
decisions made and was considered to be a major problem of the Nixon - Kissinger
diplomacy. 249 Under such circumstances, it was extremely difficult to make bold moves,
such as recognizing the People’s Republic, or even to continue with détente the way it was
conducted before.
For the rest of 1973, the President was battling his opponents and trying to devise
new strategies to dodge the Watergate prosecution. The televised hearings of the Senate
committee, during which former White House counsel John Dean testified against the
President, the “Saturday Night Massacre” of October 20, which led to the dismissal of the
special prosecutor Archibald C. Cox, and the demands for the release of the White House
tapes, which implicated the President in attempting to cover up Watergate, all contributed
to further erosion of Nixon’s position. Although Nixon tried to defend himself and assured
the nation that he “was not a crook” 250 , not many people seemed to believe him anymore.
Again such a backdrop, Kissinger went to China again in November 1973, only to
be confronted with a much colder response than before. One reason was that the position of
Zhou Enlai, the greatest advocate of the Sino - American rapprochement. was weakening
as Zhou was becoming ill and increasingly isolated from the political life. Mao Zedong
was growing disillusioned with the rapprochement as the United States clearly was not
ready to abandon détente with the Soviet Union and he even at a certain point accused
Zhou of a “rightist error”. 251 The Chairman was becoming increasingly suspicious of the
Soviet - American talks and even Kissinger’s assurances that there are no secret
agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union could not fully convince
him. 252 Besides, even Mao was losing his influence and Kissinger soon realized that he
would have to deal more and more with the new Chinese leadership, represented by Deng
Xiaoping, whom he both despised and underestimated. On the other hand, the Chinese
leaders now saw that Nixon was not as powerful as they originally thought and thus began
to doubt the pledges and promises he made.
One important document appeared in the fall of 1973 which had an impact on the
future of the Sino - American relations – the L-32 Memo, prepared by an American scholar
and expert on China, Michael Pillsbury. In this memo, Pillsbury, who learned through his
249
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 52.
250
Kilpatrick, Carroll. “Nixon Tells Editors, ‘I’m Not a Crook’”. The Washington Post, November 18, 1973,
p. A01.
251
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 339.
252
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 404.
78
contacts in China that the Chinese wanted to ask for American military help, argued in
favor of sales of defensive equipment to the PRC and of an outright military cooperation
with the Chinese against the Soviet Union. 253 This would supposedly lead to cementing the
relationship between the two countries, while at the same time it would force the Soviets to
divert some of their military forces from Eastern Europe and re-deploy them on the
Chinese border. In 1973, the Pentagon was not yet ready to accept these propositions, and
neither were Kissinger and Nixon. Two years later, however, the situation changed and the
modified version of the L-32 Memo became the foundation for the Sino - American
military cooperation.
The fall of the year 1973, however, also gave Nixon and Kissinger one success in
foreign relations that the President desperately needed to bolster his position and to divert
the attention away from Watergate. On October 6, 1973, during the Jewish feast of Yom
Kippur, the armies of Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, crossing the borders in the Golan
Heights and on the Sinai Peninsula. The Israeli forces were initially taken by surprise and
for a time, it seemed that the Jewish state was facing unavoidable defeat. After two weeks
of intensive fighting, however, the Syrians and Egyptians were pushed back and it was the
Israeli army that was advancing. This was accomplished also with the help of the United
States, which decided to send the much needed military supplies to Israel. 254 At the same
time, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that the war would not destroy the prospects of détente.
What followed was one of the brighter moments of the “Kissinger Shogunate”, with the
Secretary of State traveling between Moscow, Tel Aviv, Cairo and Damascus and trying to
find a solution to the crisis. The need to solve the problem quickly was made even more
pressing due to the boycott of oil exports to the United States and other countries by the
Arab members of the OPEC, which led to the Oil Crisis of 1973, and which prompted the
President to pass the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act on November 27. The legendary
“shuttle diplomacy” finally resulted in a cease-fire between Egypt and Israel on October 24
and an armistice in January 1974. On the Syrian front things were a little slower, but even
there a deal was reached in May 1974, with both the border areas supervised by the UN. 255
The Arab boycott against the United States and its allies ended on March 17, 1974, with
only Libya keeping the sanctions in place. Kissinger’s role in the solving of the crisis and
in laying a new foundation for the future of Israeli – Egyptian relations was very important,
253
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 59.
254
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 436.
255
Nálevka, Vladimír. Světová politika ve 20. století II, pp. 88 – 90.
79
perhaps crucial. The “shuttle diplomacy”, although it did not and could not solve all the
problems in the Middle East, managed to prevent the escalation of tensions while at the
same time preserving détente. 256
From the purely domestic point of view, however, it did little to improve the
President’s position. In fact, it might have made it even worse. While the successful
termination of hostilities in the Middle East was ascribed almost solely to Kissinger, the
Administration and the President were blamed for the effects of the oil crisis on the
American economy. In the winter months of 1973 and 1974, the tide was turning more and
more against Nixon and his survival in the Oval Office until the end of his second term
looked more and more doubtful.
A.3. The Peculiar Nature of the Nixon - Kissinger Relationship - From Latent
Tension to Open Animosity
The relationship between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had undergone a
significant transformation since the two men first discussed their visions of the “new world
order” in December 1968. It is definitely one of the factors which are worth mentioning
when analyzing the Sino - American rapprochement process and the American foreign
policy during the Nixon Administration in general because it can explain what some of the
underlying motives and reasons between various decisions taken between 1969 and 1974
were.
The relations between Kissinger and Nixon were never friendly or cordial. The two
of them kept their contact strictly on the official level of a coworker partnership. As
Kissinger later remarked, he never spent time with Nixon on such occasion as leisure
activities or even informal dinners and such – or in, Kissinger’s own words, “we never
went to a baseball game together”. 257 In the first two or three years, however, the
relationship was relatively productive and although Nixon never fully trusted Kissinger, he
was able to overcome such feelings. The situation began to change dramatically after
Kissinger’s first trip to Beijing in July 1971. As mentioned already, Kissinger’s popularity
grew immensely as a result of this major breakthrough in the Sino - American relations.
The joint nomination for The Time Man of the Year Award in 1972, no matter how trivial it
256
257
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 452.
Kissinger noted that from the very beginning he felt that there is a “latent tension” in his relationship with
Nixon. He also knew that he did not belong to the “inner circle” of those people who stayed with Nixon
since his defeat in the gubernatorial elections of 1962 and thus were seen by the President as truly loyal.
Kissinger, Henry. Roky v Bílém domě. BB/art, Praha 2006, p. 1339.
80
could seem to the reader today, enraged Nixon. He was extremely jealous of his position of
America’s greatest statesman and he began to see Kissinger as a threat. He was also aware
that Kissinger was better in cultivating the relations with the press and that he was
probably responsible for some of the leaks, even though he never confronted him openly
about it. 258 And perhaps the last proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back was the
Nobel Peace Prize which Kissinger received, together with Le Duc Tho, in 1973 for his
role in bringing an end to the war in Vietnam. 259
There was more behind the quickly developing animosity than just the fight for the
headlines and limelight, however. There were far more serious problems. As Kissinger
grew more self-confident and popular, he began to see himself as the chief framer of the
American foreign policy, a belief that he later also expressed in many of his books. He
thought that Nixon was too cautious and not enough forward-thinking to fully appreciate
and support the new design of the American foreign policy. The two had divergent
opinions on such things as the American commitment to the allies, degree of cooperation
and openness toward the PRC and the Soviet Union and many others. On the practical
level, Kissinger simply began to disregard the orders of the President and present his own
proposals and suggestions during the negotiations with the Chinese and the Soviets. For
example, during the negotiations in Moscow in April 1972, Kissinger made a great
concession on his own on the issue of the North Vietnamese withdrawal from the South
without consulting the President. When Nixon learned about this, he was furious and
ordered Kissinger to return home, which he refused. Nixon then allowed him to stay, but
was greatly displeased with his national security advisor and later called his mission in
Moscow a “complete failure”. 260 In the fall of the same year, a similar situation took place
during the secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese in Paris, when Kissinger
pressured the President into accepting the agreement with Hanoi quickly, regardless of the
consequences it would have for the Thieu government. This time, however, the President
did not acquiesce and instead ordered the bombing of North Vietnam. 261
The Vietnam dispute dealt a harsh blow to the Nixon - Kissinger relationship and
258
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, p. 176.
While Kissinger accepted the prize, although he did not come to receive it in person, Le Duc Tho refused
it, citing as reason the fact that the provisions of the Paris Peace Accords are not being implemented.
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, pp. xiv – xv.
260
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, p. 173.
261
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, pp. 355 – 362.
259
81
Nixon even thought of not including Kissinger in his second administration. 262 The
question why he in the end did not do so and why he instead decided that Kissinger would
occupy both the posts of the national security advisor and the secretary of state is thus not
only logical but also intriguing. Various conspiracy theories had over the time evolved
around this question. James Mann and, many years after him Len Colodny and Robert
Gettlin 263 , later tried to argue that Nixon was forced to keep Kissinger and even to
relinquish his own control over foreign policy because of pressure exerted on him by the
conservatives in the Pentagon and the military who saw Kissinger as a better advocate of
their interests. It was even asserted that the entire Watergate affair was orchestrated by
Nixon’s opponents who wanted to discredit the President and that Kissinger knew about
this plot or was even participating in it directly. These theories were never proven,
however, and even though Kissinger and Nixon did not get along well in 1972 and beyond,
there is no reason to believe that Kissinger actually conspired against the President. The
theory about Kissinger’s collusion with the Pentagon and about their close cooperation in
the subsequent years is further contradicted by the fact that Kissinger actually often
clashed with the new secretary of defense, James Schlesinger, and that both men were
rivals and enemies rather than allies. 264
The explanation to Nixon’s sudden change of mind was probably more prosaic.
With the Watergate menace hanging above his head, and with the need to present a
successful foreign policy to the Americans, Nixon could not afford to simply dismiss
Kissinger, who symbolized everything that had been achieved in the past four years. The
President, in a way, became a hostage of Kissinger’s popularity and of the fact that
Kissinger, “Mr. Clean”, was one of the few people in the Administration uninvolved in the
Watergate and the ensuing cover up. To fire Kissinger under such circumstances would be
a political suicide and Nixon knew it.
During Nixon’s second term, Kissinger’s popularity remained high, even though he
also was subjected for some criticism as détente began to stagnate. He had such a strong
support inside the Republican Party, for example, that there were attempts to amend the
262
Kissinger himself knew that the President was considering sacking him. In his own books he presents the
issue in a different light, though. He blames the journalists for damaging his relationship with the
President At the same time he argues that he himself was considering leaving the administration because
he found out that his phone line was tapped and his calls were recorded. Kissinger, Henry. Roky v Bílém
domě, p. 1329.
263
See Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, especially
chapter 5 and Colodny, Len and Robert Gettlin. A Silent Coup. The Removal of a President. St Martin’s
Press, New York 1991.
264
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 406.
82
Constitution so that Kissinger, a foreign-born American citizen, could run for the
presidential office. Rosemary Ginn, an influential member of the Republican National
Committee, argued that Kissinger, who “heads the list of men that Americans admire the
most” 265 , should not be “denied the right to seek presidency because of the accident of his
birth”. 266 Although his influence was somewhat weakened after Nixon’s resignation and
the coming of Gerald Ford into the Oval Office, he remained the architect of the American
foreign policy until the end of the Ford Administration in 1978.
The understanding of the Nixon – Kissinger relationship and its evolution after
Watergate is important for the understanding of the foreign-policy-making process in the
coming years. From January or perhaps April 1973 at latest, it is not really possible to talk
about the Nixon - Kissinger foreign policy, because the important decisions as well as
almost all the negotiations were now handled by Kissinger.
A.4. The Defeat and Resignation – American Foreign Policy Making and Its
Perception During the Last Stages of the Watergate Affair
As mentioned previously, nothing could save Richard Nixon’s failing popularity
after the Senate hearings of 1973 and the “Saturday night massacre”. Nixon’s approval
ratings fell to 27% in mid-October 267 , never to rise significantly again. The new
prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, who replaced Archibald Cox, kept demanding that Nixon turns
over the White House tapes. The case finally went before the Supreme Court which ruled
on July 24, 1974, that the executive privilege did not apply to this case and ordered the
President to release the tapes. 268 He complied with the order after six days, on July 30.
Meanwhile, after further resignations of other members of the White House Staff, the
House Judiciary Committee passed the first article of impeachment against the President
on July 27, followed by the second article on July 29 and the third on July 30. 269 With
265
A Report by Rosemary Ginn on the Constitutional Amendment, April 26, 1974, pp. 1 – 2. Meetings of the
Republican National Committee, 1911-1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911 – 1980, Part 1, Series
B, Reel 11.
266
Ibid. It has to be noted though that it was not clear at the time whether Kissinger would have had the
desire to pursue presidency, even if he had the chance.
267
The value is based on a Gallup Poll, taken in October 1973. The Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu./cgibin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/PresJob/PresJob.htx;start=HS_fullresults?pr=Nixon [10.1.2007].
268
In this case, United States of America vs. Nixon, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously, with only Judge
Rehnquist recusing. For the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, see Unites States of America vs.
Nixon, The Faith and Freedom Network,
http://www.faithandfreedom.us/documents/20thcentury/usvnixon.htm [5.1.2007].
269
The first article dealt with the obstruction of justice, the second with the abuse of power and the third with
the contempt for the Congress charges.
83
almost no supporters left and with the danger of impeachment hanging over his head, the
President finally decided to resign. On August 8, he addressed the nation for the last time,
announcing his resignation, effective as of noon, August 9. On the following day, he left
the White House, entered the Air Force One presidential airplane and flew back home to
California. The “long nightmare” of the nation was finally over.
The last months of Nixon’s Presidency were characteristic with a general disgust
that the American citizens felt toward politics and by the sense of dissilusionment and
disappointment that engulfed the nation. This phenomenon no doubt also influenced the
perception of American foreign policy of the past six years. The domestic foreign policy
consensus proved to be far more fragile than Nixon and Kissinger believed. Some experts
even argued that far from creating a new consensus, Nixon destroyed much of what was
left of the old one, especially of the cooperation between the executive and the legislative
that worked relatively smoothly in the Johnson years. 270 The methods that Nixon and
Kissinger used to achieve their goals, such as the secret deals and backstage channels, were
now condemned and rejected. And yet, the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration was
still not rejected as such; there were still people who wanted to give détente a chance and
who wished to see the continuation of such process as the arms limitation talks or the
rapprochement with China. While Nixon was completely discredited, Kissinger’s
popularity remained relatively high, as noted on the previous pages. Thus, there was a
certain belief that perhaps the “good” which détente brought could be saved and further
expanded if the Nixon - Kissinger policy was rid of the “Nixon element”. This point of
view was accurately presented in an article entitled Why Kissinger Must Choose Between
Nixon and The Country 271 , published in December 1973. In this long essay, the author
basically argues that although both Nixon and Kissinger have some share of responsibility
for the mistakes and problems of the past, Kissinger still can make the choice of
“separating the national and world crises from the Nixon’s crisis”, in other words to
continue the détente policies without the “overreactions” and excess of the President. 272
While there was “nothing further that Nixon can add to the formulation and the conduct of
American foreign policy for the next three years which can’t be done better without him”,
270
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War. St.
Martin’s Press, New York 1991, p. 74.
271
Hughes, Thomas L. “Why Kissinger Must Choose Between Nixon and The Country”. The New York
Times, December 30, 1973, pp. 8 – 9, 27 – 28, 31.
272
Ibid, pp. 28, 31.
84
Kissinger’s “pool of deference”, i.e., his popularity and trustworthiness, “was mostly
full”. 273
The implications of such thinking at the moment were clear. On one hand, it was
publicly acknowledged that the methods that were employed in making the foreign policy
during the Nixon Administration were deplorable and contrary to the principles of the
American democratic tradition and that something needed to change. On the other, it was
also acknowledged that Henry Kissinger as one of the architects of the new design of the
American foreign policy should stay, if only because there was no one else who could
continue carrying this policy out. It is reasonable to believe that for many people, the dark
side of Richard Nixon, which was fully revealed as the Watergate investigations went on,
was hard to reconcile with the successes such as the opening to China and the conclusion
of the SALT I treaty. Thus, the simplest way to explain this apparent contradiction was to
assume that it was Henry Kissinger who stood behind these foreign policy achievements,
while Nixon was behind the controversial decisions. Such theories, for example, presented
Kissinger as the originator of the opening to China. Kissinger never openly encouraged
such views, but also did not openly refute them. Especially in case of the opening to China,
however, the view of Kissinger as the formulator of the American foreign policy is grossly
inaccurate.
The Watergate affair and the decline of the “Imperial Presidency” had, however,
placed Kissinger into a very difficult position. On one hand, he remained the secretary of
state even under Gerald Ford and maintained his influence over the American foreign
policy; on the other hand, he was expected to deliver and to be successful with détente at
the same time when the opposition to détente grew stronger in the Congress, when the
United States was going through political turmoil, and when the validity of the basic tenets
of détente began to be disproved by the events on the international scene. The
rapprochement with the PRC, as one of the basic ingredients of the new American foreign
policy, was particularly hardly hit and it thus comes as no surprise that the Ford years
witnessed a stagnation, if not a decline, of the new Sino-American relationship.
273
Hughes, Thomas L. “Why Kissinger Must Choose Between Nixon and The Country”, pp. 8 – 9.
85
B. The Presidency of Gerald Ford and the Rapprochement Process – From Creeping
Stagnation to Outright Decline?
The Ford Presidency, one of the shortest in the nation’s history, is often seen as a
mere interlude between Nixon and Carter. From the point of view of détente and the
foreign policy in general, it is considered as a failure and a retreat from the bold,
innovative strategies of the early Nixon years. Ford himself is too often blamed for a lack
of creativity, boldness and experience which had allegedly contributed to the defeats that
the United States had suffered on the international scene.
If anything, such a view of Gerald Ford and his presidency is unfair and
unbalanced. While Ford was no doubt not as skilled and informed on the matters of foreign
policy and diplomacy as his predecessor, he entered the Oval Office at the worst moment
imaginable, both for his own party and for the United States in general. For the entire time,
Ford had to struggle with the legacy of Watergate, which was a fight he could not possibly
have won in such a short time. While it is true that the two years he served as president
were largely unsuccessful so far as foreign policy is concerned, it was not his only failure,
but much rather that of Henry Kissinger and the whole concept of détente and triangular
diplomacy.
B.1. The Political Personality of Gerald Ford and His Views on Foreign Policy
Since a considerable part of the first chapter, dealing with the Nixon Presidency,
was reserved for describing the career and the visions of Richard M. Nixon, it is only fair
to include a similar, albeit a much shorter, portion dedicated to Gerald Ford, if only to
compare the different political style and personality of both men.
Gerald Ford was born on July 14, 1913 in Omaha, Nebraska, but soon moved to
Grand Rapids, Michigan, where he was to spend a considerable part of his life. After
receiving an undergraduate degree from University of Michigan, Ford studied law at Yale.
Soon after he finished his studies in 1941, World War II began and Ford enlisted with the
Navy. When he returned as a highly decorated soldier, Ford decided to enter politics, and
he won his first elections in 1948, becoming a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives for the Grand Rapids District, an office which he held continuously until
1973. During his time in Congress, Ford was a member of various committees, including
the Appropriations Committee, and also served as a Minority Leader for eight years (1965
– 1973). During these years, Ford became influential and made many friends in both the
House and the Senate. In October 1973, after Nixon’s Vice-President Spiro Agnew was
86
forced to resign 274 , Ford was chosen as his successor. In less than a year, Nixon also
resigned and Ford suddenly became president. Up to this day, he was the only person in the
American history to have served both as vice-president and as a president without being
elected to either office.
Ford’s views on foreign policy had changed over the years. Prior to World War II,
during his studies at Yale, he was a convinced isolationist and he even signed a petition
that was intended to enforce the Neutrality Act of 1939. Yet, Pearl Harbor and his wartime
experiences made him reconsider his position. As he later remarked, “I came back a
converted internationalist”. 275 When Richard Nixon became president, Ford from the very
beginning supported his foreign policy and openly advocated it. In 1971, for example, he
praised Nixon before the National Republican Convention for “keeping his promises … for
ending the war in Vietnam” as well as for “achieving a strategic arms limitation
agreement”. 276 He also sponsored the Resolution of the NRC, which commended President
Nixon, among other things, for “opening the lines of communication with one third of the
world’s population [referring to the People’s Republic of China] previously in ‘angry
isolation’”. 277
It comes as no surprise that after he himself became president, Ford did not wish to
change the foreign policy of his predecessor in its essence, but rather in its form. He
believed that détente was beneficial for securing the world peace and that it was in
America’s best interest to pursue this course of foreign policy further. This applied to the
rapprochement process as well, and Kissinger thus could reassure the Chinese that the
promises made by Nixon would be honored by Ford. This was a pledge that the new
president could not fulfill, however. 278
274
Spiro Agnew was forced to resign on charges of money laundering and tax evasion, after it was
discovered that he accepted at least $29,000 in bribes in his previous office of the governor of Maryland.
275
A Brief Biography of Gerald Ford, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia,
http://www.americanpresident.org/history/geraldford/ [30.12.2006].
276
A Speech by Gerald Ford Before the National Republican Convention, December 10, 1971, p. 2. Meetings
of the Republican National Committee, 1911-1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911 – 1980, Part 1,
Series B, Reel 9.
277
Resolutions Regarding President Nixon’s Initiatives to Build a Lasting World Peace, December 11, 1971,
pp. 1 – 2. Meetings of the Republican National Committee, 1911-1980, Papers of the Republican Party
1911 – 1980, Part 1, Series B, Reel 9.
278
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 66
87
B.2. Détente at The Crossroads – The Domestic and Foreign Policy Concerns During
the Ford Presidency
Upon entering office, Gerald Ford proclaimed “I am Ford, not a Lincoln”. He knew
that in the political situation that ensued after months of the Watergate agony, there was no
place for splendid moves and spectacular policy shifts. He saw the need to “heal the
nation”, that is, to restore the confidence in politics in general and in the Republican Party,
while at the same time trying to preserve what was good about the programs his
predecessor had instituted both in domestic and in foreign policy. This, however, soon
proved to be an uphill struggle and Ford had to get used to loosing one battle after another.
Already the first weeks that the new president spent in office showed how deeply
the nation was struck by Watergate and how difficult it will be to accomplish the above
mentioned objectives. Compared to Nixon, Ford had at least one advantage. He had a
relatively good relationship with the Congress, which had stemmed from his long career in
the House. It did not help him much, however, because the legislators were now
determined to curb the presidential powers regardless of how occupied the Oval Office.
The congressional initiatives, such as the already mentioned Jackson – Vanik Amendment,
the Eagleton Amendment and the War Powers Resolution, threatened to produce a policy
deadlock. 279 On the other hand, Ford, compared to Nixon, also had one big disadvantage.
He did not posses the credentials of a staunch anti-communist and conservative and his
choice of Nelson Rockefeller, a well-know liberal, for his vice-president, further estranged
him from the conservative circles of the Republican Party. The constant pressure that he
was facing from Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater greatly limited his maneuvering
space and tied his hands in relation to the foreign policy in general and to the
rapprochement with the PRC especially.
In just a month since he became president, Ford’s approval rating dropped by
21%. 280 The reason was for this sharp decline in popularity was obvious - on September 8,
Ford granted “a full, free and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all the offenses
against the United States which… he committed or might have committed or taken part
279
280
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, p. 76.
In an August 1974 Gallup Poll, taken one week after Ford became president, his approval rating was 71%.
By mid-September, it had dropped down to 50%, with the disapproval rating climbing up from 3% to 28%
during the same period. The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research,
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu./cgibin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/PresJob/PresJob.htx;start=HS_fullresults?pr=Ford [10.1.2006].
88
in” 281 during his time in office. This move came although Ford claimed earlier that when
he would became president, he would not pardon Nixon. While today, with the benefit of
hindsight, it is possible to argue that Ford really desired to bring an end to the nation’s
“obsession with Watergate”, as he later claimed, at the time the pardon was given it created
a tremendous uproar and it gave rise to theories about a secret deal between Ford and
Nixon. 282 The public reaction to the pardon, which was quickly labeled the “corrupt
bargain”, was the first serious crisis that Ford had to deal with as president.
Other harsh blows began to follow soon. The November 1972 mid-term House and
Senate elections were a complete disaster for the GOP. The Democrats took 49 seats from
the Republicans in the House, increasing their majority to 66.8% of seats, and 4 seats in the
Senate, where they now held 61 out of 100 seats. Ford, like Nixon before him, thus had to
deal with a potentially hostile Congress for the rest of his time in office, with the difference
that from the very beginning there was no consensus on the basic issues and the Congress
did not give the new president any time to prove himself.
This was the backdrop, then, against which the foreign policy was conducted during
the Ford Presidency. From the purely administrational/personal point of view, there was
little change in the American foreign policy establishment. Henry Kissinger remained the
secretary of state, although he later lost his post of national security advisor, where he was
replaced in 1975 by Brent Scowcroft. Ford realized that especially when dealing with the
Chinese and Soviets was concerned, it was necessary to keep the sense of continuity of the
American foreign policy, and in this respect Kissinger was indispensable.
It is possible to argue that by the time Gerald Ford became president, détente was
on “its way to extinction”. 283 This development would have happened even if there was no
Watergate and domestic pressures on the foreign policy making. It became apparent that
mere negotiations with the Soviets and the Chinese did not prevent these countries from
pursuing their own policy of supporting revolutionary movements abroad – in other words,
contrary to Nixon’s and Kissinger’s beliefs, Moscow and Beijing simply did not seek
status quo. This was clear in the case of Angola, where various fractions in the civil war
281
President Gerald R. Ford's Proclamation 4311, Granting a Pardon to Richard Nixon, September 8, 1974.
The University of Texas Library, http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/740061.htm [7.1.2007].
282
These theories were of course never proven, although later it was revealed that prior to his resignation,
Nixon sent Alexander Haig to negotiate the pardon possibility with Ford. The Vice-President, however,
rejected these propositions and later acted on his own terms. For more, see: Woodward, Robert. Shadow:
Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate. Touchstone, New York 1999, pp. 1 – 39.
283
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, p. 325.
89
were supported by the PRC, Soviet Union and ultimately even the United States. 284 In
Southeast Asia, the fall of South Vietnam was getting ever closer, while Ford and
Kissinger could only sit and wait, their hands tied by the Congress. Besides, the PRC,
which was desperately trying to offset the Soviet influence in North Vietnam, which it
perceived as a Soviet vassal state 285 , supported the anti-Vietnamese and pro-Chinese
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Clearly, the new status quo, the “full generation of peace”,
was doomed to fail even before it started to exist. And it was not only the Third World
where détente was failing. The Vladivostok Summit between the American President
Gerald Ford and the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, which took place in November 1974,
failed to relax the tension between both countries, which began to build after the Jackson Vanik Amendment was passed. Further disarmament talks also began to be in doubt, as the
conservative wing of the Republican Party and such politicians as Senator Henry Jackson,
sponsor of the above mentioned Jackson - Vanik Amendment, were against it. Thus, even
though Kissinger was dispatched in February 1976 to Moscow to negotiate the SALT II,
the mission was seen as unsuccessful.
As far as the rapprochement with China is concerned, the whole process was
slowing down. The American side, both President Ford and Henry Kissinger, tried to
assure the Chinese that nothing had really changed. They also kept the same secret and
backchannel way to keep in touch with the Chinese leadership. Even after the Liaison
Office was opened in Beijing, it served other purposes than facilitating contact between
Beijing and Washington. The first liaison officer, David E. Bruce, was replaced by George
H. W. Bush in 1975. 286 Even after this change, however, the China policy remained largely
in the hands of Kissinger. 287 If the situation remained the same on the American side,
however, on the Chinese side it was dramatically changed. Zhou Enlai was dying and Mao
Zedong was seriously ill by November 1974, when Kissinger came to Beijing yet another
284
Of the three main groupings, the FNLA of Robert Holden was supported by the United States and the
PRC, while the MPLA of Agostinho Neto was backed by the USSR and Cuba. In November 1975, a fullfledged civil war erupted between these fractions and also the UNITA of Jonas Savimbi, which was in
turn backed by South Africa. Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign
Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969 – 1976, pp. 176 – 179 and Nálevka, Vladimír. Světová politika
ve 20. století II, pp. 170 – 171. The American involvement, after it was publicly revealed, was later
stopped by the so-called Tunney Amendment.
285
Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon – Kissinger Years. Reshaping America’s Foreign Policy, p. 308.
286
One of the main reasons why Bush was sent to China was probably the fact that he was still angry for not
being nominated as Ford’s Vice-President rather than Nelson Rockefeller. From the very beginning,
Bush disliked his service in China, which he considered a political exile and was trying to get back to the
United States as soon as possible. In 1976, he returned to Washington and was appointed Director of the
CIA.
287
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 374.
90
time, this time to prepare the visit of President Ford. For the first time, he had to deal
mostly with Deng Xiaoping, a representative of the new Chinese leadership. The problems
that remained unsolved during the previous visits and encounters resurfaced yet again. The
Chinese were disappointed that the United States still did not move toward full recognition
of the Beijing government, a move which would put the new Sino-American relationship
on a more solid foundation. Although Kissinger repeatedly promised the normalization of
bilateral relations, Ford, under attack from Reagan and Goldwater, was not able to carry
these promises out. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Deng was also
under pressure from the radicals within the Chinese Communist Party, the so-called Gang
of Four. 288 Thus, although he himself was more of a pragmatist that a hardliner, he was not
able to make any compromises on such sensitive issues as the status of Taiwan. The
Chinese now insisted that the normalization of relations must be accompanied at the same
time by the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan and the discontinuation
of the diplomatic relations with Taipei. Under the domestic political circumstances, not
only that Ford was not able to break-off with Taiwan, but he was actually, to Kissinger’s
horror, forced to publicly affirm his support for the Nationalist regime and for its possible
independence. 289 Thus, Kissinger found himself a victim of a Catch 22 – on one hand, he
was trying to convince the Chinese that the normalization and the break-off would
eventually happen, even though the date was postponed all the time; on the other, in order
not to damage Ford’s standing at home, he told the conservatives that the United States
was not even considering to establish regular diplomatic relations with Beijing. 290 Neither
side fully trusted him, however; besides, the Chinese soon became tired of this waiting
game.
The problem with the normalization clearly revealed one of the basic flaws of the
Nixon - Kissinger and later Ford - Kissinger approach of the Chinese. Their diplomacy
relied on personal pledges made by the American representatives in private, often with the
awareness that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry these pledges out.
The Chinese were not so familiar with the concept of the American political system as to
understand how limited really the power of the president in certain areas was and what
288
The gang consisted of Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen,
among others.
289
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 448.
290
When Barry Goldwater inquired with Kissinger regarding this question, the Secretary of State told him
that the normalization is not on the agenda. Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious
Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton, p. 72.
91
pressures he was subjected to. Thus, they often took these promises at face value and were
surprised and disappointed when they the American side did not live up to them.
There was another change in the mutual relations compared to 1971, however. By
1974 and 1975, the Soviet card did not carry with it as much value in Beijing anymore.
The Soviets made some overtures towards the Chinese leadership following Kissinger’s
first trip to Beijing, and even though the relationship was far from cordial in 1974, there
was no danger that the Soviet Army would attack the Chinese on the northern border.
Besides, with the disengagement from the Indochina, just a limited American support for
the FNLA in Angola and attempted re-evaluation of the American policy in the Middle
East, the Chinese were led to believe that the United States now entered the “era of
strategic passivity”. 291 The assurances that the Americans would not allow the Soviet
Union to seek hegemony in East Asia and that they would come to aid the Chinese seemed
much less credible in this light. This is also the reason why the Chinese initially rejected
the American offer for closer cooperation against the Soviet Union, which finally came in
1974, after Pentagon changed its original negative stance on the issue.
The only part of the relationship which seemed to be developing further was then
the secret sharing of intelligence information and the slowly expanding trade relations, in
particular the exports of technology and military equipment to China. Already in 1973,
there were proponents of the sale of such technologies as navigation systems to the PRC in
the United States. 292 Due to concerns about the use of such system for military purposes by
the Chinese government, however, no significant progress was made until 1975. During
the visit of President Ford in China in December 1975, it was suggested that China might
use its oil to buy weaponry abroad and the United States helped to negotiate a deal for the
Chinese government to buy fighter jets from Great Britain. 293 The problem was that after
many years of unsuccessful economic experiments, like the Great Leap Forward (1958 –
1962), and the chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1969/1976 294 ), the
Chinese
291
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, p. 339.
One of such people was the Secretary of Transportation in Nixon’s first administration, John A. Volpe. In
a letter written to the President in January 1973, shortly before he left office, he advocated the sales of
navigation systems developed by Boeing to the PRC. The Secretary of Transportation to the President on
the Boeing Sales to the PRC, January 31, 1973, pp. 1- 2. The Richard Nixon Security Files 1969 – 1974
Collection, Papers of the Nixon White House, Reel 16.
293
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 74.
294
Although Mao declared the revolution to be over in 1969, the term is often used to describe the time
period until the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976.
292
92
economy was in shambles 295 and the volume of the Chinese trade with the surrounding
world was on a very low level. 296 So, in other words, although the American companies
were interested in exporting to China, and the Chinese were interested in importing
weaponry and modern technologies, the PRC simply did not have the financial resources
necessary to pay for these transactions. This situation only began to improve in later years,
with the modernization and reformation of Chinese economy. In 1962, the United States
sold to China first two computers, which could be used for military purposes. 297
The intelligence sharing cooperation was also well underway by 1975, but the
whole program was somewhat one-sided. The Chinese were provided with thousands of
pages of confidential information on the Soviet military activities and capabilities,
including satellite images of the Soviet troops deployed on the Chinese border and in the
greater Far East and intercepted Soviet electronic messages. 298 In exchange, the Americans
were allowed to build their intelligence network in China, a work which was initiated by
James Lilley who, however, complained about the difficulty of getting “associates” among
the native Chinese and about the constant oversight by the Chinese authorities. The fact
that this relationship was much more advantageous to the Chinese than to the United States
was a constant source of criticism among the American military experts and Pentagon
officials, but during the Ford Presidency little changed.
The Nixon – Kissinger and Ford - Kissinger era of the Sino-American
rapprochement ended with the defeat of the Republicans in the presidential elections of
1976. The new administration of Jimmy Carter did finally achieve the goal Nixon had set
out to accomplish eight years earlier when it established official diplomatic relations with
Beijing on January 1, 1979. Many of the outstanding problems in the bilateral issues
remained, however, and they have persisted until today. The stagnation which the
rapprochement process experienced during the Ford Administration can hardly be blamed
on Ford or on Ford only. Rather, it was a result of various factors. In the American
domestic situation, the President had to face renewed challenge to détente from the
295
Although exact data are hard to obtain, it is in general believed that the Chinese GDP was actually
stagnating in late 1960’s, even going down from $119 to $118 billion between 1967 and 1968. Clark,
Colin. “Economic Development in Communist China”. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 2
(April 1976), p. 253.
296
In 1972, the approximate overall value of Chinese international trade stood at $5.72 billion, with the
exports at $2.95 billion and imports at $2.77 billion. Ibid, p. 252.
297
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton, p. 76.
298
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, p. 237.
93
conservative right of the Republican Party and, to secure his nomination for the elections
in 1976, had to be extremely cautious in dealing with such sensitive issues such as China
and Taiwan. The fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, finally sealed the American involvement
in Indochina, and strengthened calls for the return of isolationism as well as for a tougher
approach to the “Communist block” countries. The presidential power was now much
more limited than in 1968, curbed by various amendments, bills and laws. It is true that
Ford was somewhat clumsy 299 and that he lacked the foreign policy expertise of his
predecessor. Yet, the legacy that Ford inherited made it almost impossible for him, or
anyone else for that matter, to succeed. The crisis that the rapprochement and détente faced
in the last two years of the Kissinger Shogunate were the result of serious flaws in the
basic concept of these policies and of the widening gap between the high expectations
these policies aroused in the United States and the ensuing reality.
299
The visit of Gerald Ford in Beijing in December 1975 was plagued by various embarrassing moments and
the Chinese were in the end so dissatisfied with Ford that they decided to invite Nixon in February 1976
to show that they still respected him more than his successor. Mann, James. About Face: A History of
America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton, p. 71.
94
CONCLUSION
It is very difficult, even after more than thirty years have passed, to evaluate and
judge the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford Administrations. It is equally difficult to
ascertain with the absolute degree of certainty what factors had had the decisive influence
on the success or failure of détente as such, or of the opening to China in particular. Thus,
rather than to pronounce definitive judgments, this epilogue serves to offer some closing
remarks on the connection and even mutual influence that existed between the domestic
political situation in the United States and the rapprochement process with the PRC. While
these conclusions are tentative, they are hopefully supported by the arguments and
evidence made accessible to the reader in the previous chapters, and thus can at least
provide some interesting insights into the foreign-policy-making process and into the
development and transformation of the China policy between 1968 and 1972.
Richard M. Nixon, together with Henry Kissinger, set out in 1968 to reform the
system of international relations and to restore the global standing of the United States as
the number one superpower. This new policy, which can be summarily called détente, was
based on the assumption that the principal adversaries of the United States, the Soviet
Union and the People’s Republic of China, can be co-opted into this new world order and
that they also have a vested interest in achieving stability and in maintaining the status quo.
Nixon and Kissinger, who were both proponents of geopolitics and of power diplomacy,
hoped to force the Soviets and Chinese to accept their new role by utilizing the obvious
split between them and by playing them against each other. Thus, from this point of view,
the relationship with China, which had yet to be established, was crucial to the success of
détente, more important, at least in the eyes of the President and his advisor, than even the
old alliances in Asia and Europe.
To open the door to Beijing, and for that matter, to carry out much of their foreign
policy vision, Nixon and Kissinger felt they needed to create a new foreign-policy-making
establishment, or in President’s words, to “clean the house”. 300 They both shared a deep
mistrust for the “bureaucracy”, which pervaded the Department of State. From their point
of view, this institutions had become far too rigid, conservative and perhaps “elitist” to
300
Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969 - 1976. Cambridge University Press, Boston 1984, p. 64.
95
understand the need to adopt a new, bold, foreign policy and to implement it. Their new
system thus relied on the National Security Council, a much smaller unit, which was easier
to manage and control and which was seen as much more effective means to conduct
foreign policy. Thus, the concentration of the power to make decisions and even to know
about what was really going on behind the scenes of the official diplomacy was reserved
largely to just two people – the President and the National Security Advisor, Nixon and
Kissinger. The need for secrecy, with which Nixon was obsessed, and the habit of
informing not only the public, but also the Congress and even the Department of State, at
the very last minute, was justified by fears of domestic opposition to such shifts in foreign
policy as the opening to Beijing, as well as by the need to keep the Soviets in the dark
about the Administration’s plans. Another salient characteristic of the foreign-policymaking process during the Nixon Presidency, which was a logical issue of the above
mentioned facts, was the excessive reliance on unofficial diplomatic channels and
backstage deals. Most of the negotiations conducted by Nixon and Kissinger built on
verbal pledges and informal agreements, with the official proclamations and documents
usually being as vague and ambiguous as possible in order not “give away” the true
intentions of the Administration and also, if possible, not to commit the United States to
specific obligations.
Nixon and Kissinger aimed at creating a new domestic consensus on the foreign
policy, since the old, post-war consensus was shattered by the American unsuccessful
involvement in Vietnam and by the general decline of American prestige abroad. The new
American foreign policy, which the President presented to the nation, was a mixture of
pragmatism and realpolitik. This new approach, as its creators hoped, would be able to
transcend the old, Cold War boundaries of thinking, while at the same time it would not
build on any ideology, just on the national interest and strategic concerns – in other words,
Nixon and Kissinger, and perhaps more Kissinger than Nixon, were seeking to rid the
foreign policy of the “isms”, such as idealism or anti-communism. 301 Nixon, although he
did not let himself to be influenced by public opinion too much when making decisions,
was very a skilled campaigner and in most cases was able to correctly assess and interpret
the popular mood. His hope was that the “silent majority”, the conservative middle-class
America to which he was appealing most of the time, would accept the new foreign policy,
301
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1999, p. 55.
96
if only because the President, with his conservative and anti-Communist past, could be
trusted in that he would not make compromises or sacrifices detrimental to the United
States’ prestige and moral profile. Nixon thus felt that his reputation could prove an
advantage when announcing the opening to China - a step which he knew many Americans
saw as long overdue, but which his more “liberal” predecessors supposedly did not dare to
take because of their fear of being castigated for being “soft” on Communism.
Nixon’s and Kissinger’s strategy, while initially successful, gradually ran into
serious problems. Again, there was more than one reason and it is not possible to say
which one was the most important one or in which particular moment détente entered into
the long period of stagnation. It is, however, reasonable to believe that even if there had
been no Watergate, its immense impact on the American politics and society and on the
position of the president within the American political system nonwithstanding, the
initiatives associated with the Nixon - Kissinger foreign policy ultimately would have lost
public support. The backchannel diplomacy and the secret negotiations, typical for the
Nixon Administration, were perhaps effective in dealing with immediate crises, but were
not suitable as a long-term approach. It is reasonable to believe that, again regardless of
Watergate, the Congress as well as the general public would eventually have grown tired
of being perpetually kept in the dark. While a certain degree of secrecy is unavoidable in
the foreign policy making process of any administration, or even any government for that
matter, Nixon and Kissinger have clearly gone too far in this respect. It is argued by some
that Nixon was ill-suited to be the American president, because “he was too often tired of
the long process of negotiation and consultation, which is inherent to the American
democracy”. 302 While this is in a way an overstatement and Nixon can by no means be
called a dictator or even an opponent of democracy, it describes perfectly the President’s
view of the foreign policy, which he saw as his domain.
Yet, just the dissillusionment with the secretiveness of the Administration would
not have been enough to cause a widespread rejection of détente by the American public.
There was another, far more important problem – by 1973, or by 1974 at latest, it simply
became apparent that the new strategy is not bringing the results it was intended to bring.
Nixon promised a “full generation of peace” and détente was mainly to be a way for the
United States to be able to scale down its global involvement while at the same preserving
302
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. Hill and Wang,
New York 1998, p. 521.
97
the status quo. Regarding China, the President made it clear that one of the main things
that this new relationship should help create was peace and stability for East and Southeast
Asia, and more specifically, that it should help the United States to leave Vietnam through
the “peace with honor.” The rapprochement process did indeed have its high points and
moments, which will remain forever an important part of the American post-war history
and which have in a way become legendary. In this respect, it is of course possible and
logical to mention the most spectacular achievement of the rapprochement – Nixon’s trip
to Beijing in February 1972. This event carried with it an enormous symbolic significance
and the President, together with Henry Kissinger, is rightfully credited for it. Yet, apart
from the symbolism of this spectacular moment, there was little in terms of tangible,
concrete results that the rapprochement could offer the American people. The Chinese help
on finding a solution in Vietnam, for reasons mentioned earlier, was extremely limited; the
old problems between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, like the issue
of Taiwan, still remained; and the usefulness of this new relationship in exerting pressure
on the Soviets soon began to fade. Thus, many people began to ask, like some journalists
already did in 1971 303 , what the rapprochement really brought to the United States. In
other words, why did the Chinese suddenly decide to cooperate with America, their mortal
enemy so far - was it not because the rapprochement was mainly advantageous for “them”
rather than for “us”?
The Watergate affair of course brought a sudden, dramatic twist, to the way the
performance of the Nixon Administration was evaluated by the American general public.
Some people would argue that it was this scandal that caused the Americans to question
and ultimately to reject détente. They would also argue that the decline of the “Imperial
Presidency” made it impossible for many of the Nixon - Kissinger foreign policy initiatives
to be carried further. It is beyond any doubt that the newly exercised congressional
oversight over the foreign policy making process as well as various legislative means to
curb the presidential powers, listed in the preceding chapters, made it much more difficult
for Nixon and Kissinger to carry out the foreign policy in the “old”, pre-Watergate way. It
is also reasonable to believe that the general dissatisfaction and disgust which many
Americans felt towards the Administration after more and more of Watergate-related
issues were revealed, translated into their weaker support for détente, and thus for the
rapprochement. It goes without saying that the conservative groups, such as the China
303
Schwartz, Harry. “The Chinese Strategy”. The New York Times, July 19, 1971, p. 25.
98
Lobby, which were perhaps too stunned by the overwhelmingly positive response to the
initial phases of the opening to China to mount a serious challenge, began to raise their
heads and voices again, using the growing anti-Nixon mood in the American society. Yet it
is not possible to say that just the Watergate caused the Americans to reject détente. After
all, Henry Kissinger, who was often seen as the main architect of the new American
foreign policy, was still relatively popular. Besides, it is likely that Watergate led the
Americans to question the means, through which the foreign policy was conducted, rather
than its goals and general objectives. While the secret deals and one-on-one meetings with
the communist leaders were now subject to criticism, it was not necessarily a reason to call
for rapprochement to be stopped. The disillusionment with détente, which definitely began
to grow in the last two years of the Nixon Administration, was not primarily caused by the
Watergate; it was simply a result of the fact that détente, a part of which the opening to
China was, did not bring the results the Americans expected. In other words, it was not the
feeling of dissillusionment and disappointment which caused the stagnation of détente;
rather, it was the stagnation of détente which gave rise to this feeling.
And yet, despite these facts, it is not possible to say that the Nixon – Kissinger
years were a complete failure, like some authors 304 have done in the past. As it usually
happens in such cases, détente does not fit the simple pattern of seeing the world just in
black or white; rather, it can be found somewhere in the area of various shades of gray
between the two extreme ends. It is certainly not possible, when considering such failures
as Vietnam or the South Asian crisis, to wholeheartedly agree with a resolution of the
Republican National Convention, which commended President Nixon for “his magnificent
record on diplomacy in bringing an end… to the cold war”. 305 On the other hand, he and
Henry Kissinger have to be credited for trying to re-formulate the American approach to
the international relations which was clearly dysfunctional when by the time Nixon became
president. And, although the opening to China perhaps did not bring the results intended,
the images of Nixon with Mao and Zhou still testify even today to one of the most
important shifts in the American foreign policy after World War II. If Nixon did not give
the Americans the real change they were looking for, he at least gave them hope that the
things can change.
304
For a scathing criticism of the Nixon – Kissinger foreign policy, see for example: Hitchens, Christopher.
The Trial of Henry Kissinger. Verso, London and New York, 2003.
305
Resolution Commending President Nixon for His Foreign Policy Record, August 10, 1973, p. 2. Meetings
of the Republican National Committee, 1911-1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911 – 1980, Part 1,
Series B, Reel 11.
99
The Ford Administration, as far as foreign policy is concerned, is often seen as a
mere continuation of the Nixon Administration. This view is strengthened by the fact that
in both administrations, Henry Kissinger was one of the key figures in determining the
American course in international affairs. And yet, it is possible to observe some important
differences between the two periods.
President Ford was from the very beginning facing a daunting task of having to
convince the American public that his presidency was totally different from that of his
predecessor. He tried as hard as he could to restore the American confidence in politics and
in the Republican Party, although some steps he took, like the decision to pardon Nixon,
dealt his political ambitions a very harsh blow. His decision to seek re-election, or better to
say election, in 1976, had severely limited his options on pursuing a bold foreign policy. In
order to bolster the support within his own party, where he was under constant attack from
the conservative wing, he was forced to make public statements and declarations, which
made it look like he is in fact abandoning détente. At the same time, however, he hoped to
keep as much of the new relationship with the Soviet Union and the PRC as possible, and
he strived for continuity in dealing with Moscow and Beijing. His resolve to keep détente
going was clearly manifested by his presence at the Vladivostok Summit in 1974 or by his
visit of Beijing in 1975, which could have estranged him further with the conservatives at
home. This apparent paradox, which was not exactly understood in Beijing, was one of the
reasons Ford had such a low credit with the new Chinese leadership.
It was not the only paradox related to the foreign policy of the Ford Administration.
The new president definitely brought honesty, sincerity and personal integrity back to the
White House. He is rightfully credited for calming America down after the turmoil caused
by Watergate and thus the words of Jimmy Carter, who praised him in his inaugural
address for “for all he has done to heal our land” 306 , are definitely appropriate and fitting.
Yet, even during his time in office the foreign policy was still conducted in a way similar,
although not identical, to the times of Nixon. It was still largely under the control of a
small group of people led by Henry Kissinger, and the reliance on secret, unofficial
channels, was still heavy. That Ford committed himself to a foreign policy making style,
which was not compatible with his personality and which he probably did not fully
approve of, again showed his determination to continue the work his predecessor had
begun. It is likely that he believed that if the excesses and abuses of power, committed by
306
The Inaugural Address of President Carter, January 20, 1977. The University of Seattle Library,
http://www.seattleu.edu/artsci/history/us1945/docs/pres60.htm [4.1.2007].
100
Nixon, could be avoided, détente was still a viable approach to the American relations with
the outside world.
Again, like in the preceding case, it would not be fair to brand the Ford
Administration foreign policy as a failure. The stagnation of détente, as discussed in the
last chapter of this thesis, was not a result of Ford’s incompetence but rather of events
which he could not directly influence. For many people, the Ford era was a time of decline
perhaps because there were no spectacular events and sudden announcements, such as
those that thrilled the nation in 1971 and 1972. On the other hand, he should be credited for
the fact that while the rapprochement did not move much further, it was not completely
abandoned either. The same can be said about the arms limitation talks and the general
relationship with the Soviet Union. In other words, while the United States was not moving
too far ahead in dealing with the Soviets and the Chinese, it was not at least making too
many steps back. Given the odds Ford had to face and the legacy he inherited, this can be
considered a success.
I hope that this thesis has shown that although there was a close connection
between the domestic situation in the United States and the American foreign policy
initiatives, in this particular case mainly the opening to China, the domestic situation was
never the decisive or even the most important factor determining the success or failure of
détente. On the other hand, at times these domestic influences and concerns could have had
an impact on certain decisions being taken or on some policies being adopted. It was not,
however, in Washington or New York, where the ultimate fate of détente was decided;
rather, it was in places like Moscow, Beijing, Vietnam and later also Angola or Cambodia.
The growing American disillusionment with the new grand design was not dissilusionment
per se; it was primarily a reflection of the unfavorable reality and only secondarily of the
fact, that the limited successes détente brought could not satisfy the expectations that were,
perhaps, too high.
101
SOURCES USED
A. PRIMARY SOURCES
1. Materials from the Archives
a.
The Papers of the Nixon White House, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg
Letter from Italian President Andreotti to President Nixon, April 17, 1972. The Richard M.
Nixon Security Files 1969 - 1974 Collection, Papers of the Nixon White House, Reel 16.
President’s Letter to Biesheuvel on the Peking Visit, March 27, 1972. The Richard M. Nixon
Security Files 1969 - 1974 Collection, Papers of the Nixon White House, Reel 19.
President’s Letter to General Franco, January 8, 1972. The Richard M. Nixon Security Files
1969 - 1974 Collection, Papers of the Nixon White House, Reel 22.
President’s Message to Prime Minister Eyskens, October 1, 1972. The Richard M. Nixon
Security Files 1969 - 1974 Collection, Papers of the Nixon White House, Reel 2.
The Secretary of Transportation to the President on the Boeing Sales to the PRC, January
31, 1973. The Richard M. Nixon Security Files 1969- 1974 Collection, Papers of the Nixon
White House, Reel 16.
b.
The Papers of the Republican Party (1911 – 1980), Roosevelt Study Center,
Middelburg
A Report by Rosemary Ginn on the Constitutional Amendment, April 26, 1974. Meetings of
the Republican National Committee, 1911 - 1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911 1980, Part 1, Series B, Reel 11.
102
A Speech by Gerald Ford before the National Republican Convention, December 10, 1971.
Meetings of the Republican National Committee, 1911 - 1980, Papers of the Republican
Party 1911 - 1980, Part 1, Series B, Reel 9.
Donald Rumsfeld and Anne Chenault on American Foreign Policy. Meetings of the
Republican National Committee, 1911 - 1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911 - 1980,
Part 1, Series B, Reel 18.
Edward Kennedy on U.S. China Policy ( An Address before the National Committee on U.S.
China Relations, New York City), March 20, 1969. Reports and Memoranda of the Research
Division of the Headquarters of the RNC, 1938 - 1980, Papers of the Republican Party 1911
- 1980, Part 2, Reel 9.
Herbert Humphrey on U.S. China Policy, October 21, 1969. Reports and Memoranda of the
Research Division of the Headquarters of the RNC, 1938 - 1980, Papers of the Republican
Party 1911 - 1980, Part 2, Reel 9.
Resolution Commending President Nixon for His Foreign Policy Record, August 10, 1973.
Meetings of the Republican National Committee, 1911 - 1980, Papers of the Republican
Party 1911 - 1980, Part 1, Series B, Reel 11.
Resolutions Regarding President Nixon’s Initiatives to Build a Lasting World Peace,
December 11, 1971. Meetings of the Republican National Committee, 1911 - 1980, Papers
of the Republican Party 1911 - 1980, Part 1, Series B, Reel 9.
c.
The National Security Archive (Digital Collections), George Washington
University, Washington D.C.
Conversation between President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger
and between President Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers, respectively,
October 17, 1971. National Archives, Nixon White House Tapes, Conversations 11-102
and 11-105, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc9.pdf [6.1.2007].
103
Haig’s Preparatory Mission for Nixon’s Visit to China in January 1972. Diplomatic
History Institute of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xin zhongguo wenjiao
fengyun [New China's Diplomatic Experience] (Beijing, Shijie zhishi, 1991), Vol. 3, pp.
71-82, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc26.pdf [6.1.2007].
Kissinger to Nixon, My August 16 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, August
16, 1971. RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord),
1969-1977, box 330. China Exchanges July-October 20, 1971,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc2.pdf [6.1.2007].
Kissinger to Nixon, My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues, November 11, 1971.
RG 59, State Department Top Secret Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-1973, POL 7 Kissinger,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc20.pdf [6.1.2007].
Kissinger to Nixon, My Talks with Chou En-lai, July 14, 1971. Box 1033, Miscellaneous
Memoranda Relating to HAK Trip to PRC, July 1971,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-40.pdf [6.1.2007].
Kissinger to Nixon, September 13 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris,
September 13, 1971. RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston
Lord), 1969-1977, Box 330, China Exchanges July-October 20, 1971,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc5.pdf [6.1.2007].
Kissinger to Nixon, Your Encounter with the Chinese, February 5, 1972. Nixon Presidential
Materials Project, HAK Office Files, box 13, China,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc27.pdf [6.1.2007].
Memcon, Haig and Zhou, 3 January 1972, Midnight, Great Hall of the People, January 3,
1972. Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, box 1037,
China - A. M. Haig January Visit Jan. 1972,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc24.pdf [6.1.2007].
104
Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, Communique, October 25, 1971 (10:12 - 11:00 a.m.).
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, box 1034, Polo II –
HAK China Trip October 1971 Transcript of Meetings,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc17.pdf [6.1.2007].
Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, Communique, Announcements of Trips, October 24,
1971 (9:23 - 11:20 p.m.). Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security
Council Files, box 1034, Polo II - HAK China Trip October 1971 Transcript of Meetings,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc16.pdf [6.1.2007].
Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, July 9, 1971, ( 4:35 - 11:20 p.m.). Box 1033, China HAK
Memcons July 1971, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-34.pdf
[6.1.2007].
Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, July 11, 1971 (10:35 - 11:55 a.m.). Box 1033, China HAK
Memcons July 1971, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-38.pdf
[6.1.2007].
2. Other Relevant Historical Documents
President Gerald R. Ford's Proclamation 4311, Granting a Pardon to Richard Nixon,
September 8, 1974. The University of Texas Library
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/740061.htm [7.1.2007].
The Inaugural Address of President Carter, January 20, 1977. The University of Seattle
Library, http://www.seattleu.edu/artsci/history/us1945/docs/pres60.htm [4.1.2007].
The Shanghai Communiqué, February 27, 1972. CNN Interactive Cold War Experience
Series,
http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/15/documents/us.china/ [3.1.2007].
105
The War Powers Resolution, November 7, 1973. The Avalon Project at the Yale School of
Law, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/warpower.htm [19.12.2006].
United States vs. Nixon (The Ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States), July 24,
1974. The Faith and Freedom Network,
http://www.faithandfreedom.us/documents/20thcentury/usvnixon.htm [5.1.2007].
3. Memoirs and Similar Sources
Bush, George and Victor Gould. Looking Forward. Doubleday, New York 1987.
Ehrlichman, John. The China Card. A Novel. Simon and Schuster, New York 1986.
Kissinger, Henry. Roky v Bílém domě. BB Art, Praha 2006.
Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. Grosset &Dunlap, New York 1978.
4. Articles in Newspapers and Other Periodicals
Alsop, Joseph. “Nixon’s China Visit: More Than a Social Call, But How Much More?”. The
Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1972, p. C7.
Alsop, Joseph. “The Nixon Feat is Short-Term”. The Washington Post, February 28, 1972, p.
21.
“‘China Lobby’, Once Powerful Factor in the American Politics, Appears Victim of a Lack
of Interest”. The New York Times, April 26, 1970, p. 14.
“China Lobby Says It Will Still Fight”. The New York Times, October 27, 1971, p. 15.
Finney, John F. “Congress Is Calm on China Moves”. The New York Times, May 2, 1971,
p. 8.
106
Frankel, Max. “Behind the Cold Print. Despite Modest China Communiqué, Journey Was a
Most Remarkable Event.” The New York Times, February 29, 1972, p. 16.
Holles, Everett R. “In Conservative San Diego, Nixon’s Trip is Traumatic.” The New York
Times, February 26, 1972, p. 11.
Hughes, Thomas L. “Why Kissinger Must Choose Between Nixon and the Country”. The
New York Times, December 30, 1973, pp. 8 – 9, 27 – 28, 31.
Kilpatrick, Carroll. “Nixon Tells Editors, ‘I’m Not a Crook’”. The Washington Post,
November 18, 1973, p. A01.
“Nixon Move Pleases Reagan”. The New York Times, July 16, 1971, p. 24.
Raymont, Henry. “A Pro – Nixon Book Dropped by Club”. The New York Times, November
21, 1971, p. 43.
Schwartz, Harry. “The Chinese Strategy”. The New York Times, July 19, 1971, p. 25.
B. SECONDARY SOURCES
1. Monographs and Articles
Ambrose, Stephen. The Christmas Bombings. Random House, New York 2005.
Bachrack, Stanley D. The Committee of One Million. The Politics of China Lobby, 19531971. Columbia University Press, New York 1976.
Buckley, Roger. The United States in the Asia – Pacific since 1945. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2002.
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency.
Hill and Wang, New York 1998.
107
Burr, William (ed.). The Kissinger Transcripts. The Top Secrets Talks with Beijing and
Moscow. The New Press, Washington D.C. 1999.
Clark, Colin. “Economic Development in Communist China”. The Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 1976), pp. 239 – 264.
Colodny, Len and Robert Gettlin. A Silent Coup. The Removal of a President. St Martin’s
Press, New York 1991.
De Boer, Connie. “The Polls: Changing Attitudes and Policies Toward China”. The Public
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Summer 1980), pp. 267 – 273.
Dvorchak, Robert J. Korejská válka, 1950 – 1953. Jota, Brno 1996.
Evans, Rowland Jr. and Robert D. Novak. Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of
Power. Random House, New York 1971.
Garrison, Jean. Making China Policy: From Nixon to G. W. Bush. Lynne Riener Publishers,
Boulder 2005.
Garson, Robert. “Lyndon B. Johnson and the China Enigma”. Journal of Contemporary
History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 63 – 80.
Goh, Evelyn. From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit' Ally: Constructing the US Rapprochement with
China, 1961-1974. University of Oxford Press, Oxford 2001.
Hanhimaki, Jussi. Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2004.
Hirshberg, Matthew S. “Consistency and Change in American Perceptions of China”.
Political Behavior, Vol. 15, No. 3, (September 1993), pp. 247 – 263.
Hitchens, Christopher. The Trial of Henry Kissinger. Verso, London and New York, 2003.
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Hook, Stephen W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II. CQ
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Ito, Go. Alliance in Anxiety: Détente and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle. Routledge,
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Kissinger, Henry. Umění diplomacie. Od Richelieua k pádu Berlínské zdi. Prostor, Praha
1999.
La Feber, Walter. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume II: The
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1993
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of Stability, 1969 – 1976. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984.
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from
Nixon to Clinton. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1999.
Melanson, Richard A. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the
Vietnam War. St. Martin’s Press, New York 1991.
Montgomery, Gayle B. and James W. Johnson. One Step from the White House: The Rise
and Fall of Senator William F. Knowland. University of California Press, Berkeley 1998.
Nálevka, Vladimír. Světová politika ve 20. století II. Aleš Skřivan ml., Praha 2000.
Nixon, Richard. “Asia after Vietnam”. Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLVI, No. 1 (October 1967),
pp. 111 – 125.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. The Imperial Presidency. Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1973.
109
Shi, David E. and George B. Tindall. Dějiny Spojených států amerických. Lidové Noviny,
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110
RESUMÉ
Nástup Richarda Nixona do prezidentského úřadu v roce 1969 přinesl zásadní obrat
ve směřování americké zahraniční politiky. Nixon a jemu nejbližší poradce, Henry
Kissinger, usilovali o vytvoření nového mocensko-politického světového uspořádání, jež by
zajistilo mírové soužití se zeměmi komunistického bloku, zejména Sovětským svazem a
Čínskou lidovou republikou, a jež by zároveň obnovilo či posílilo postavení Spojených států
coby světového hegemona. Presidentův přístup k světové politice, známý často pod jménem
détente (tání), spočíval v uvolňování napětí mezi Spojenými státy a Sovětským svazem,
například pomocí jednání o odzbrojení. Na druhé straně se Nixon a Kissinger snažili využít
rozkolu mezi Moskvou a Pekingem, a navázat nový vztah s Čínou. V důsledku pak měly
Spojené státy manévrovat mezi oběma komunistickými mocnostmi a nutit je k ústupkům a
k zachovávání mocenské rovnováhy.
Nixonova éra byla specifická z hlediska fungování amerického zahraničněpolitického mechanismu. President a jeho poradce pro národní bezpečnost Henry Kissinger
soustředili ve svých rukou takřka veškerou odpovědnost za důležitá rozhodnutí, učiněná na
poli zahraniční politiky, zatímco ministerstvo zahraničí, Kongres i veřejnost byly, alespoň
z počátku, odsouzeny do role pouhých přihlížejících. Díky přísnému utajení a využití
neformálních kanálů se Nixonovi podařilo dosáhnout jistých úspěchů, z nichž asi
nejdůležitější, či alespoň nejznámější, je otevření se Číně, tedy navázání nového vztahu se
zemí, jež byla předchozích dvacet let Spojenými státy ignorována. Nixonova politika měla,
alespoň do roku 1973, podporu veřejnosti a vzbudila u řady Američanů velká, často
nerealistická očekávání.
Rok 1973 znamenal důležitý přelom ve fungování détente. Na jedné straně se
začínalo ukazovat, že tato politika nepřináší nutně takové výsledky, jaké se od ní očekávaly.
Na straně druhé byla Nixonova pozice čím dál více oslabována skandálem kolem vloupání
do hotelu Watergate, který nakonec o rok později vedl k jeho pádu. Détente pokračovala i za
jeho nástupce Forda, kdy bylo však již zcela zřejmé, že se dostala do slepé uličky.
Tato práce si klade za cíl ukázat vliv, jaký měly či neměly vnitropolitické faktory –
tedy například veřejné mínění, rozložení sil v Kongresu či různé lobbyistické skupiny, na
formování americké zahraniční politiky vůči Číně za prezidentů Forda a Nixona. Rovněž
usiluje o popis a analýzu předností i slabin nového systému formulování a implementace
zahraniční politiky, který president spolu s Kissingerem vytvořil. Je zcela zřejmé, že oba tyto
111
faktory sehrály určitou úlohu při budování nového vztahu s Čínou, třebaže možná poněkud
jinou než by se na první pohled zdálo.
112