Download Political Elite and Socio-economic Regulation

THE ELITE CHARACTER AND STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS:
SLOVENIA AND ESTONIA IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Frane Adam, Matevž Tomši and Primož Kristan
Introduction: The composition of the elite in transition countries
One characteristic of post-socialist political elites is their heterogeneity. Namely, they are
made up of individuals and groups with various social and historical origins and ideological
orientations: former dissidents with diverse roots, more or less reformist members of the excommunist nomenclature, members of professional groups (so-called technocrats), people
from the sphere of the Church and even some members of pre-war political elites.1 According
to Agh, the transitional political elite possesses a number of common characteristics such as
its distance from the non-elite and a lack of professionalism. For this reason, society perceives
it as a unified actor which »monopolises politics and exerts control over all social life« (Agh
1996: 45). But several antagonisms and conflicts exist among the various elite segments,
especially the competition for control over key resources which the actors are trying to obtain
through different social linkages (the search for allies, various 'coalitions'); all of this means
we are not dealing with a uniform group.
The social conditions in the countries of the former communist bloc are largely characterised
by the relationship between so-called old and new elites; i.e., between elites derived from the
ranks of the former regime and the relatively heterogeneous elites formed during the process
of system transition. It must, however, be stressed that it is often difficult to make a clear-cut
division between the old and new elites. Even the former nomenclature has in fact
experienced various transformations and part of it has embraced (at least formally) democratic
principles and norms, thus the thought and action patterns which are essentially a relic of the
former undemocratic system are often found in recently-founded political parties.
1
Attila Agh defines the five characteristic transitional types of politician: politicians of morality,
politicians of historical vision, politicians of coincidence, the old nomenclature and the emerging
professional political elite. For more details, see Agh (1996).
1
Nevertheless, a key question of post-socialist transformations concerns the position and role
of the former holders of monopolistic social power such as the members of former communist
elites: in other words, whether and to what extent they were able to retain key social resources
and thereby continue to influence the development of these societies. In view of this, there are
two interpretations of post-socialist conditions. The theory of elite reproduction holds that
changes in Central and Eastern Europe did not have an impact on the composition of elites
since the nomenclature was able to stay at the top of the social structure and become the new
grand bourgeoisie. According to Hankiss (1990), the communist elites (at least their
‘reformed’ parts) used their political capital to acquire economic assets (through processes
like ‘spontaneous privatisation’). During the transition process, the nomenclature managed to
stay in its positions because it succeeded in a particular rapid conversion (Matonyte/Mink
2003). The socio-economic structure of post-communist societies is thus argued to be
designed according to the needs of this elite, described in terms like ‘political capitalism’
(Staniszkis 1991) or ‘crony capitalism’ (Hanley 2000). According to the theory of elite
circulation, however, these transformations are brought about by structural changes at the top
of the social hierarchy, i.e., the key positions occupied by new people on the basis of new
principles (Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995: 616).
Yet in some interpretations the findings of empirical research do not categorically corroborate
either the theory of reproduction or the theory of circulation (see Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995:
636).2 It is evident that in the process of post-socialist transition no revolutionary changes
occurred in this region in general. Thus, part of the old elite – mainly its bureaucratic faction –
left the elite, although a large part of the elite of the late 1980s retained their key positions. On
the other hand, a large share of post-socialist elites is made up of people who did not belong
to the nomenclature. However, with these new members usually no great 'structural shifts'
occurred since most of them came from the ranks of professionals and mid-level bureaucracy,
i.e., those who at the end of the 1980s wielded at least some power (ibid.: 622-624).
The reproduction of elites in Russia is understandable since the social changes in that country
occurred more slowly, were less fundamental and no strong counter-elite had existed that
2
A lengthy international comparative study of national elites (which formed part of the research
project ‘Social Stratification in Eastern Europe’) was conducted in several countries of the postsocialist transition in the 1990-94 period. It was carried out by Ivan Szelenyi and his colleagues and
initiated in 1990. By mid-1994, surveys had been completed in six countries: Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Russia.
2
could have pushed the communist party personnel out. Thus, in the conditions of relative
social instability, where democratic institutions do not function properly, communist party
personnel have the advantage over the new players. In the cases of Hungary and Poland, the
principle of the circulation of elites holds greater weight.3 This can be accounted for by the
relatively well-developed civil societies there (in comparison to Russia) and a strong political
counter-elite, which defeated the former communists in the first free elections.
A research study of the profile of the national elite was also conducted in the Czech Republic.
The results indicate that in terms of the economic elite the level of reproduction is quite high,
while in terms of political, administrative and cultural elites we can speak of circulation
(Srubar 1998).4 One should also mention here a comparative study of national elites carried
out in the Baltic countries which concludes that with the Baltic elites there is a combination of
continuity and change. Here, A. Steen, the author of the study, uses the term ‘elite
recirculation’ (Steen 1997).5
It is thus evident that the configuration of national elites, meaning the relative position and
size of various elite circles in the constellation of power (Dogan 2003a: 1), differs
considerably from one post-socialist country to another, and the same is true for the balance
3
Wasilewski’s 1998 study of the current Polish elite (573 interviews were conducted with
representatives of political, administrative and economic elites) gives somewhat different results in
terms of the reproduction of the Polish elite: among the new elite, supposedly over a quarter (27%) of
those belonged to the elite during the communist rule. According to the author, this share represents a
‘significant reproduction of the old elite’ (Wasilewski 1999: 4).
4
40% of the Czech transitional economic elite occupied elite positions before 1989. Of these 40%,
85% were ex-communist party members, while 57% of the new economic elite were former
communist party members (the percentage of 'party members' in the economic elite is considerably
greater than the percentages in the political and cultural elites). In current managerial structures, only
23% of managers in fact held general manager positions before 1989, however, 50% of them were at
that time deputy general managers or members of the board of directors (i.e., they belonged to some
kind of second-rank managerial staff). 30% of the cultural elite held elite positions during
communism. The results are similar in the case of the political elite, thus displaying a relatively low
level of continuity. 35% of the members of the new political elite used to be communist party
members (Srubar 1998).
5
The proportion of the elites who were members of the Communist Party and who held high positions
in the former regime are: 55% in Latvia, 54% in Estonia and in 44% Lithuania (Steen 1997: 158). One
reason for the smaller proportion of ex-Communist Party members in new Lithuanian elites may lie in
the more pronounced left-right political cleavage (which has stimulated a more critical focus on the
past), while in the case of the other two countries ethnic cleavages between the indigenous and
Russophone populations were prevalent. In Estonia and Latvia, an intensive de-Russification of the
elites occurred, meaning that the ethnicity of candidates for elite positions was more important than
their political background.
3
between the reproduction and circulation of elites. It is precisely the balance and relations
among the recently emerged factions of the post-socialist elite that decisively determine the
character of political regimes (primarily in terms of the division of power in society, i.e., the
level of its dispersal or concentration, as well as in terms of the social order as a whole). The
types of elites in post-socialist societies differ from one another in a similar way as do the
configurations of elites. The character of a political system in fact depends largely on the type
of relations among the various political elites (Field et al.. 1990; Higley/Burton 1998). This is
particularly true in the case of a system transformation in which elites play the role of
institution-builders (Kaminski/Kurczewska 1994).6
The majority of research on elites in post-socialist societies has generally been of a
descriptive nature and focused on formal positions and characteristics (Bozoki 2003). At the
same time, it offers empirical evidence for further elaboration and stimulates criticism and
new investigations. Our review of the evidence on the formation and dynamics of positional
elites in post-socialist societies clearly indicates there is neither pure reproduction nor pure
circulation, but we can speak of a greater inclination to one or other form in these countries.
For the cases of Slovenia, the most economically developed, and Estonia, the fastest
developing, post-communist country we will seek to more precisely define these mixed forms,
for example, the relations between reproduction and circulation, and their consequences for
political modernisation7 and socio-economic development.
6
In their classification, Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowski specify four types of political elites on the
basis of two factors: the level of integration and differentiation of elites: consensual, fragmented,
divided and ideocratic elites. 6 In countries with a consensual elite (Visegrad countries, Baltic
countries, Slovenia) where all the key political players abide by the rules and where a relative balance
of power between different factions of political elite exists, the entrenchment of long-term political
stability is most likely. However, in most countries of the former Soviet Union, of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and in Albania, where there is practically no
consensus on the fundamental norms of political activity, a specific part of the political elite is
explicitly dominant. Accordingly, the chances of successful political transformation, meaning the
establishment of a stable polyarchical democracy (as well as the reforming of the remaining societal
spheres), are relatively small, at least in the near future.
7
Here we understand modernisation as a complex process of social changes in various fields (politics,
the economy, science etc.) in the function of catching up with the so called developmental core,
meaning those states perceived to be the most developed. From the viewpoint of post-socialist states,
such a referential framework mainly comprises the most developed member states of the European
Union.
4
Elites and political dynamics
Besides being former communist countries, Slovenia and Estonia share several similar
characteristics. First, they are both small countries in terms of the size of their territory and
number of inhabitants. Second, they are new countries that gained independence only after the
collapse of communist regimes. (In the case of Estonia, independence was, in fact, regained
since it was a sovereign country in the period between two World Wars.) Third, they were the
most economically developed regions in former multi-national settings (although Slovenia
was at the considerably higher level in this regard) with the most Western contacts due to
their geographical closeness to Western Europe: Slovenia borders Austria and Italy and
Estonia has a maritime border with Finland.
However, the nature of the communist regimes in these two countries differed considerably in
some aspects. The Slovenian regime was, in general, much more open and Slovenia enjoyed
more regional autonomy, while with Estonia the oppressiveness of the Soviet regime
remained strong up until the beginning of perestroika and Estonians were exposed to a severe
process of Russification – the result of which was about one-third of Estonia's population
inhabited with Russian-speaking people (who mostly settled during the Soviet period) at the
time of establishing the country's independence.
The two new EU members, despite the abovementioned similarities, experienced different
dynamics of their systemic transformation. They established varying types of socio-economic
regulation and different institutional settings which consequently determined the results of the
transition process. Our analysis intends to show how these differences were determined partly
by the logic of ‘path-dependence’, in other words, the conditions at the start of the transition
process as well as by the character of the main actors, namely the elites, especially political
ones, the relations between them and their strategic choices. In the following part of the text,
we will briefly outline political developments in both countries in the post-communist period,
the elite configurations and their consequences for socio-economic development.
Slovenia
The Slovenian political space is characterised by a bipolar division into two political blocs.
The first is the so-called ‘left-liberal’ and the second the so-called ‘right’ bloc, with neither
5
being fully internally homogenous. They can be most clearly divided regarding their
institutional origins. The two parties that for the most of the after-independence period played
the main role in the first camp – the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) and the Social
Democrats (SD) (until 2005 the United List of Social Democrats) have their organisational
roots in the old (socialist) regime – the latter is the successor to the former ruling Communist
Party.8 The other bloc consists of three main parties – the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS)
which is the dominant party here, the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) and New Slovenia
(NSi) – which were established during the process of democratisation. The distinction
between the 'old' and 'new' parties as they are often labelled in public discourse largely covers
the left-right cleavage ('left' as the 'old' and 'right' as the 'new' parties).9 At first, the cleavage
mostly referred to the positions of both camps in the past, meaning both the period between
the two world wars and the communist period as well as to some other positions of a symbolic
and ideological nature like the role of religion and the Catholic Church in society (In this
regard, the 'left' takes a quite lenient attitude to the communist period while it is sceptical ands
not rejective of the public engagement of the Church, while the 'right' is strongly critical of
communism yet relatively supportive of the Church). While this 'cultural war' still has some
potential for political mobilisation (although it has declined in the last few years), the issue of
socio-economic regulation is gaining in importance and becoming the main point of
controversy especially when centre-righnist government in 2005 launched a comprehensive
programme of social and economic reforms directed at liberalisation and de-etatisation that
should enhance the competitiveness and innovativeness of the Slovenian economy and society
at large. These reforms are encountering considerable reluctance on the part of the opposition
which warns against an increase in social inequality and the impoverishment of a considerable
share of the population – meaning it is demonstrating its 'leftist nature' in terms of its social
orientation and scepticism of ‘unleashed’ capitalism.
8
It has to be mentioned that the LDS acquired some special features. Regarding the origin of its
membership it is quite a heterogeneous party. Its dominant core originates from the former Socialist
Youth Organisation which, in the second half of the 1980s, became ever more critical of the regime; it
can be said that it was an opposition within the (communist) party and its members had contacts with
dissident circles (opposition outside the communist party). In 1994, a small but very significant section
of members of two parties from the new political elite (members of the Demos coalition that governed
from 1990 to 1992) joined the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia.
9
The labelling of both political blocs as 'the left' (first camp) and 'the right' (second camp) which is
usual in public discourse has been a paradox for a long time (and to some extent it has blurred the
picture of the Slovenian political space) since members of the business elite belong to proponents of
‘the left’, mostly the LDS, while many of those who considered themselves de-privileged (which is
often described in terms of injustices suffered under the communist regime) have supported ‘the right’.
6
The victory of the ‘right’ in the 2004 parliamentary elections brought a major change in the
constellation of political forces which was, nevertheless, reversed in 2008 when the ‘left’ gain
power again. For the most of the post-communist period, the Slovenian political space was
dominated by a 'left-liberal' bloc in which the LDS played a central part.10 From the first
parliamentary elections in 1990 onwards, there were five 'political turns' (including the
establishment of the first non-communist government in 1990, and the current one), in other
words, changes of the political options in power (and five different heads of government,
including the current one). However, in this (21-year) period governments not dominated by
'left-liberal' parties were in place for just six and a half years. Although all LDS-led
governments were composed of parties from different camps, this party dominated them and
‘spring parties’ only played a marginal role in these coalitions.
The political domination of the ‘left-liberal’ bloc was strongly related to the configuration of
the general elite in post-communist Slovenia. Research conducted in 1995 on Slovenian
functional elites in politics, culture and the business sector11 provided some data on the
relations between the old (people who occupied high positions before 1988 and were able to
preserve them) and the new elites (those assuming elite positions after 1988). In fact, this
showed a fairly high level of reproduction in all elite sectors (the highest in the business
sector),12 much higher than in other comparable Central European countries (Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland) where the change in the regime resulted in fundamental changes to the
elite positions and thus the circulation of elites was higher. The consequence was that the vast
majority of the elite gravitated (regarding its voting preferences) towards the political part of
the retention elite, represented by the LDS and SD. This faction of the political elite had much
better connections with various strategic groups within society, above all the management,
business and academic sphere, the social sciences circles and the media. Its advantage thus
laid in its intellectual and cadre potential as well as financial resources, which led to its
10
LDS now become a marginal political party. It even feel out of parliament after the 2011 ecections,
receiving only 1,5% votes.
11
It should be stated that, regarding the research on elites in Slovenia carried out in 1995, a positional
determination of the elites was performed. In this context, individuals are part of an elite if they
occupy key positions in three main social areas: in politics (e.g. ministers, representatives in
parliament, high state administrators, party leaders), in the economy (managers in leading companies)
and in the cultural sphere (leading staff in cultural and scientific institutions, media establishments and
professional associations).
12
The rate of reproduction amounts on average to 77%, with the highest individual level being in the
business sector (84%) and the lowest in politics (66%), while in culture it reaches 78% (Kramberger
1998, 1999; Igli /Rus 2000).
7
disproportionate influence and informal power within society. This informal power
contributed to the dominance of ‘the left’ more than their legitimate power, i.e. support among
the population, since the both blocs were more or less in balance until the parliamentary
elections in 2000 (when LDS and left bloc won with high majority).
Estonia
The political space in post-communist Estonia has been characterised by the fact that, unlike
in most other Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania),
the former communist elite did not manage to politically survive, at least not in the form of a
strong communist successor party. Moreover, there is no strong left in Estonian political life.
Among the political parties currently represented in parliament, only one (the Social
Democratic Party) – may be considered as centre-leftist-oriented.13 The others are labelled
centrist or centre-rightist.14 This means that it is mostly liberal and conservative forces
competing for political support and an exchange in positions of political power.
Estonian political life has been characterised by high political dynamics in terms of the
frequent changes of power-holders. Since 1990 there have been thirten governments and eight
different people have headed up the government. However, the situation stabilised after 2005
when posistion of Prime Minister is continously held by Andrus Ansip form liberal oriented
Estonian Reform Party. Most governments have been centre-rightist-oriented. Only one Prime
Minister can be declared a social democrat (Andres Tarand, then not a party affiliate but who
later led the Moderates) but even the government he led was not left-centre-oriented in
general due to the fact that the coalition parties come from centrist and centre-rightist political
options.
13
But even the orientation of this party seems to bear some traits of the New Labour (Lagerspetz/Vogt
2004: 65) and is thus not similar to the classical social-democratic parties.
14
The Centre Party is labelled by some as ‘left leaning’ (Pettai 2004: 993). However, it is a member of
the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party. The Estonian People’s Union is also sometimes
described as a ‘left of centre’ party, which refers to its more left-oriented (by Estonian standards)
social and economics policies advocating more state regulation and subsidising. However, in cultural
terms it is conservatively oriented, proclaiming national and traditional values. This demonstrates how
difficult it is for many post-communist parties to be located in the categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’. As
observed by some political analysts, the classical left-right cleavage has not yet evolved in Estonian
political life (Grofman et al.. 2001).
8
It is obvious that Estonian politics is, notwithstanding the quite frequent change of
governments (particularly in the first decade after independence), dominated by a
conservative-liberal option (Vogt 2003). This relates to the configuration of elites which has
experienced the considerable circulation of the key positions. The circulation was, as
mentioned before, not very 'deep' meaning that (mostly the younger) people recruited to the
elite positions have not been complete newcomers since they occupied positions of some
importance even at the end of communist period (Steen 1997; Steen/Ruus 2002).15 However,
this influences the ideological composition of the political sphere and society at large since
the vast majority of them embrace a neo-liberal ideology.
Although Estonia has had, at least in the first years of its independence, considerable
continuity in terms of the communist pedigree of the political elite, this has not had an impact
on the rightist character of the political space. 16 One of the authors, on the other side, in his
recent study argues that the elites’ strong rightist orientations are levelling out or even
declining (Steen 2007).17 What is surprising here is his notion that the state option for
resolving traditional collective problems found strong support among all elite groups in the
period between 1994 and 2003. Considering Estonia’s low healthcare expenditure and its
falling rate of total expenditure on social protection, a return to the state option seems very
unlikely. In fact, even political parties belonging to the left side of the Estonian political
spectrum are clearly pro-market, so much so that in many countries they might qualify as
steadfast right-wingers (Vogt 2003: 83). The change in ideological affiliation also occurred to
some top functionaries of the former regime. Evidently the position in the former regime’s
15
As stated by Steen, ‘While the nomenclature was largely removed from power, the younger, well
educated, mid-level leaders from the former regime are continuing and are now occupying most of the
top positions’ (Steen 1997: 166).
16
As stated by Ruus and Taru in their study on members of the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament): ‘A
majority of all Estonian MPs have right-wing orientations, and consequently, previous membership of
the Communist Party has only a minor impact on leftist attitudes’ (Ruus /Taru 2003: 67).
17
In a study of elites’ beliefs and economic reforms in the Baltic states and Russia (280-315 face-toface interviews of top leaders – parliamentary deputies, administrative officials, directors of major
private companies and state enterprises, NGO leaders, the judiciary, culture institutions and local
government – were conducted in every state and combined with the World Bank and IMF statistical
material), Steen comes to the conclusion that ‘…the elites’ rightist orientations were strong during the
initial phase of reforms and are fairly stable during the 1994-2003 period. The elite support for private
ownership was extremely high in the beginning among all elite groups but is apparently declining
gradually as the effects of capitalism, e.g. income inequality hits population. The state option for
solving traditional collective problems has strong support among all elite groups during the entire
period’ (Steen 2007: 96).
9
power structure did not determine ideological preferences in the post-communist situation as
happened in some other countries like Slovenia.
Left-wing and right-wing hegemony
One could say that both Slovenia and Estonia have for most of the post-communist period
been characterised by politico-ideological hegemony. What differs is the content and bearer of
this hegemony. While in Slovenia it was undertaken by a 'leftist-liberal' camp (Adam/Tomsic
2002) and oriented toward gradualism, in Estonia it was conducted by a conservative-liberal
option and directed at radical change in the sense of the liberalisation of society (Lagerspetz
2001; Lagerspetz/Vogt 2004). Hegemony in Slovenia was maintained in conditions of a
bipolar structure of the political space, despite the fact that the electoral support for both
camps was often quite in balance, mainly through informal elite networks. Hegemony in
Estonia was, despite the absence of a dominant political entity and the relative fragmentation
of the political space, maintained through a wide value and policy consensus of the main
political actors.
It seems that the presence of an ‘external threat’ in the form of Russia as a strong neighbour
and former oppressor as well as the large Russophone population acted as a homogeniser of
Estonian elites on the basis of a national and neo-liberal ideological platform. In the case of
Slovenia, the absence of such a strong ongoing threat (despite the fact that its ex-Yugoslav
neighbours were at war) prevented such homogenisation. Instead, the so-called ‘soft
transition’ with the important role of the ‘old’ elite which managed to stay in many key
positions in society, combined with traditions of strong ideological polarisation, maintained
the state of a bipolar constellation and the domination of one political bloc.
The composition of Slovenian elites and dynamics of the political space have been the subject
of dispute among scholars. Some consider this situation to be unproblematic, stressing the
benign effect of elite reproduction, especially political and social stability – Slovenia
experienced less social turbulence than any other transition country – while at the same time
relativising the significance of the data indicates a high level of elite continuity (Igli /Rus
2000; Kramberger/Vehovar 2000) or attributing that to the positive role of the old communist
elite in the democratisation process (Miheljak/Toš 2005). However, other more critical
10
interpretations exist, including those advocated by the authors of this article (Adam/Tomsic
2000, 2002; Tomsic 2002). According to them, the high level of elite reproduction is
producing a long-term malignant effect (although this might not be apparent in the short
term), including a possible shift towards an oligarchic democracy or delegative democracy
(see O’Donnell 1998), and the establishment of monopolies and rent-seeking behaviour.
Similarly, assessments of Estonian political development are not univocal. It is generally
accepted that the country achieved great progress in the last fifteen years in terms of the
development of its economy, society and political life. The tempo of its systemic
modernisation is probably the fastest in the region and is thus often labelled the 'model pupil'
of the applicants for EU accession (Smith 2002). For this achievement, the political actors in
this period certainly deserve credit. In spite of this, certain observers detect some considerable
deficiencies characterising Estonian politics and society like increasing social inequality,
political egotism and a lack of responsibility, widespread clientelism etc. 18 The main problem
perceived is the elitist behaviour of political leaders and their insensitivity to the interests and
preferences of ordinary people.19 The differing experience of certain social and ethnic groups
results in polarised assessments of the democratic process in terms of their satisfaction with
the state of democracy (Evans/Lipsmeyer 2001).20
State-society relation
The strength of civil society
18
In April 2001, a group of Estonian social researchers addressed the public in an appeal raising their
concerns about the course of the country’s development. In their view, Estonia had drifted into a
political, social and ethical crisis. They described the notion of ‘Two Estonias, which symbolise a
wide gap between power elite and disempowered ordinary citizens (Lagerspetz/Vogt 2004: 57).
19
This elite-centeredness, based on the principles of speed, efficiency and expertise, is argued to also
be characteristic of the process of Estonia’s integration into the European Union (Raik 2002).
20
In their analysis two authors conclude, that the gap between ethnic Estonians and Russian speaking
is narrowing after initial differences and so called two groups’ status. Considering the data from 1990
to 1996, findings on the development of trust in the two ethnic communities indicate “considerable
progress toward the creation of a homogeneous civil society” (Titma/Raemmer 2007). According to
this analysis, differences between the groups are overcome by similarities resulting in the fact that ‘the
Estonians’ feel less threatened by Russian speaking minority every year.’ Surprisingly, this conclusion
is drawn in despite of the noted (significant) difference between the two groups in relation to poverty
issue. For example, namely 85% of Russians as opposed to 54% of Estonians believe that poor people
have very little chance to escape from the poverty gap (Ibid.).
11
Numerous definitions of civil society exist, yet most of them agree (are compatible) with the
notion, that civil society represents intermediary sphere, some kind of buffer-zone between
individuals’ micro world and big institutions (Berger/Luckmann 1995). In this respect
intermediary sphere is constructed of a string of organizations and associations that we add
(count) to, so-called, Third- or nonprofit-voluntary sector. This sphere is important from
democracy point of view, as well as sustainability of social cohesion. Its development
indicates tension towards self-organization and activity of the citizens. On the other hand,
some segments of civil society are included into decision- and policy-making processes. This
in fact means, that connections exist between the political elite and leadership of civic
associations or NGOs. Here we encounter differences among particular states, in some cases
civil society is more included into social and civic dialogue, in other cases less so or it is
detached (pushed away) from main decisions and therefore not presented with social
acknowledgment.
Regarding relevance and development of civil society in Estonia and Slovenia there are some
comparative data available, however it is difficult to make a general picture of respective
relations on the basis of these data. Findings of cross-national studies show that Slovenia has
more developed civil society seemingly to a larger extent included into public policies.
Let us take a look at some findings from European Values Study (1999-2000). On the basis of
data about membership and activity in voluntary organizations, it is evident that in Estonia, in
the period between 1990 and 1999, a significant decrease in participation occurred. In the year
1990, 73% of respondents were included into voluntary associations, whereas nine years later
only 34%. Similar is the proportion in active participation that also decreased for one half.
This can be explained as a transition shock that caused severe social turbulences. Concerning
Slovenia, trend is the opposite. In the year 1990, civil society was weaker than in Estonia,
however last measurement shows progress and mean scores are much better. Consequently
Slovenia, together with the Czech Republic and Slovakia, constitutes a relatively successful
group in the European context. Estonia on the other side, fell into the group of countries with
less developed civil society (together with Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania,
Portugal and Spain) better only than the average of Russia and Turkey. Similar results can be
drawn from the so-called Global civil society index that is based on variables or data from
EVS (Anheier/Stares 2002).
12
Considering these data we need to be skeptical since they do not allow making firm
conclusions. Besides methodological problems that comparative research in Europe is dealing
with, the issue is also remote time period since transition is proceeding towards completion in
the last three years. In both countries political and economic stability has been accomplished
as well as higher standard of living. In the last Eurobarometer survey (Special Eurobarometer
237 “European Social Reality”) conducted in 2006-2007, we can observe noticeable
progression of Estonia regarding the extent of active participation or voluntary work in the
EU. Estonia, still being below the European average is positioned considerably higher than
most of the new EU members. Slovenia (close behind are the Czech Republic and Slovakia) is
positioned higher, slightly above EU average.
Proceeding from this data and considering other findings21 we hypothesize that organized
civil society in both countries is gaining on importance, however in general still playing a
rather weak role as a partner to political elite. In Slovenia, its influence is more pronounced
and we can also conclude that there are more connections and cooperation between civil
society and politics (which is not necessarily positive due to possibility of emergence of rentseeking behavior or “special interest groups” as argued by M. Olson).
In post-communist countries, there is dominant position of the state vis a vis civil society
(Korkut, 2005). This is caused by exclusivist way of conduct by the hand of political
elites(Agh, 1996), as well as structural conditions of functioning of civil sphere, i.e. its
weakness of in terms of its personal, financial and organisational resources (Nagle and Mahr,
1999; Ost, 1993; 2000). Moreover, the societies are characterised by elitism of both politics
and civil society. Reasons for this could be found in: 1. convergence of political and civil
society elites (their interconnectedness in terms strong – although often informal – ties
between elite members) and. 2). missing link between leaders and masses in both political and
civic associations (Korkut, 1999:149). This leaves the ordinary citizens out of political and
social life.
21
One of the foreign authors observing the Estonian political life and the role of civil society during
the accession negotiation with the EU speaks about strong prevalence of the civil servants and
government, and stresses the technocratic elite-centered decision-making.
13
As regards our two compared countries, one could speak about two types of elitism. Estonia is
characterised by (neo)liberal elitism where interest groups are relatively weak thus political
influence is exercised on predominantly individualist basis, while in Slovenia prevails
(neo)corporatist elitism with overlapping and interlocking of political and non-political elites.
Both types contribute to the exclusion of ‘unconnected’ individuals and groups who can not
effectively participate in decision-making processes.
Liberal vs corporatist state regulation
Our thesis is that Estonian elite created the type of state which is close to the model of liberal
minimalist state whereas its Slovenian counterpart produced a model close to the corporatist
welfare state. Much of empirical evidence confirms this. Regarding healthcare expenditure, in
2003 Estonia with 4.2% of GDP was only placed higher than Lithuania (3.9) and Latvia (3.0)
but Slovenia spent almost twice as much (7.8), while other figures are Czech Republic (7.1),
Hungary (6.2), Slovakia (5.8) and Poland (4.3). Total expenditure on social protection in
Estonia decreased from 14.4% of GDP in 2000, 13.6% of GDP in 2001, 13.2% of GDP in
2002 to 13.4% of GDP in 2003 (Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2006-07).
Some recent data show that satisfaction with standard of living and the quality of life is much
higher in Slovenia than in Estonia, despite outright positive mood of the Estonians, according
to the Eurobarometer data. Considering percent of respondents satisfied with standard of
living and the quality of life Slovenia places equal or even above EU-25 average, whereas
Estonia stays well bellow.22 Social protection, in particular health care, is another issue of
concern among 53% of Estonians, whereas only 29% of respondents are concerned in
Slovenia (also see Eurobarometer 2007). It should be, however, stressed that Estonians are
according to this survey, the most optimistic and future-oriented nation in the EU. Regarding
the socio-economic situation in the next 12 months as well as in the next five years, they
expect substantial improvements.
22
Regarding satisfaction with ‘the quality of life in the areas where you live’ 90% of Slovenians’ as
opposed to 78% of Estonians answered affirmatively. In case of ‘standard of living’, the relation is
83% (Slovenia) and 68% (Estonia). EU-25 average is 86% (‘quality of life’) and 83% for ‘standard of
living’ (Special EB 2007).
14
Regarding labour market, development of institutional regulative mechanisms also differ in
both countries. After the initial decline in union membership associated with transformational
recession, institutional changes and sectoral reallocations, unions have become more
homogenous organizations and genuine representatives of sectoral interests, which also led to
the fragmentation of union structures and the rise of new specialized unions (Feldman 2006).
Representation of workers interests in Slovenia is well developed and institutionally
coordinated, whereas in Estonia labour unions play no significant role, particularly not in
wage bargaining. Collective bargaining is most important factor in determining wages in
Slovenia, leaving only little manoeuvrable space for employers to regulate wages according to
their business interests and situation on labour market. Minimum wage is being set by
negotiations between employers and labour unions, whereas enactment is in the domain of
competent minister (Ivan
2007). Legal employment protection in Slovenia is the highest
among Central and Eastern European transition countries.23 In Estonia, legal protection of
permanent employment as well as protection from collective dismissal is basically almost at
the same level as in Slovenia, however national report for Estonia (2007) accentuates sheer
formality of legal protection since many employers systematically violate legal regulations by
exerting pressure on employees to register themselves as self-employed and thus reduce the
costs of wages (Ivan
2007). The government’s interference in the wages of the business
sector is limited and confined to the establishment of minimum wages and adherence to the
provisions of the wages law, which means mainly that “the employees as the weaker party in
the labour market are given internationally acknowledged guarantees” (Alas/Svetlik 2004).
According to Alas and Svetlik Estonian government regulates wages of only about 10% of the
employees.
In economic theory, two distinctive models or patterns of economic coordination, namely
coordinated market economies (CME)24 and liberal market economies (LME)25, are linked to
23
Legal employment protection index (EPL, OECD 1999) for Slovenia is 3.5, for Hungary 1.7 and for
Estonia 2.6 (Ivan 2007).
24
“In CMEs willingness to invest in industry-specific skills is present. This is backed up by a financial
system, which is able to provide firms with ‘patient’ capital. Investments are monitored through close
relationships to stakeholders in dense business networks and cross-ownership with overall large
blockholders of shares. This longer-term investment horizon, in turn, makes it possible for firms to
retain workers in economic downturns. Otherwise no worker would be willing to invest in industry or
even firm-specific assets. Furthermore, this relationship is corroborated by a generous social security
system and more consensual industrial relations, which combined give workers additional employment
and unemployment protection, as well as ‘wage protection’. So the comparative institutional
advantage of these firms is their ability to invest in firm-specific or industry specific skills (assets).
15
Slovenia and Estonia. Feldman (2006) argues, that the emergence of either type of industrial
relations in both countries can be understood by examining inherited institutions (legacies)
and strategic policy choices regarding privatization and monetary policy (strategic policies).
Legacies determine the emerging institutions in the transition period and differ sharply
between Slovenia and Estonia. Thus for example the decentralized institution of workers selfmanagement (horizontal ties) in former Yugoslavia as opposed to centralized Soviet system of
political control over economic affairs, resulted in different role and extent of worker union
involvement and privatization. Considering privatization policy choices new elites in Estonia
leaned heavily on foreign investment, which significantly weakened old interests and worker
influence (Feldman 2006).
Discussion and conclusion
The specific configurations of the Slovenian and Estonian elites led to gradual changes and a
high degree in continuity in the first case and to changes of great speed and depth in the
second. Slovenia managed to avoid abrupt social tensions that could have resulted from a big
increase in the inequality and impoverishment of larger segments of the population. It
achieved a relatively high quality of life as indicated by, for example, the Human
Development Index. In the meantime, the high elite reproduction related to excessive political
control over key areas and the marginalisation of alternative options (not only in the political
sphere) led to growing inertia and staggering systemic reforms resulting in the low efficiency
of the government and shrinking competitiveness of the economy (as indicated by low
rankings in surveys like the World Competitiveness Yearbook and the Global
Competitiveness Index). Estonia became the fastest growing former-communist country.
Different comparative surveys see Estonian state/political institutions as being the most
These skills are actually ‘produced’ by the dual vocational training, as in Germany, where apprentices
acquire a great deal of practical firm experience. Encompassing business associations and relatively
close relationships between firms make this possible through common standard-setting and prevention
of free-riding” (Buchens 2005).
25
“On the contrary, for firms in LMEs access to capital is through highly liquid markets. Shareholders
rely on takeovers as disciplining measures. Capital markets demand disclosure of short-term
profitability figures. This, in turn, is ensured by fast hire-and-fire. Wages are negotiated on the firm
level. Workers will invest in more portable assets, general skills. Low unemployment and employment
protection reinforce this. So, in contrast to CMEs, in LMEs comparative institutional advantage of
firms operating in this highly competitive environment lies within their high degree of flexibility”
(Ibid.)
16
efficient and development-oriented (especially in terms of providing a business-friendly
environment) in the region. But this happened at the expense of excluding certain segments of
the population, which resulted in their frustration and cynicism. It is obvious that political
hegemony, regardless of its ideological basis, produces some problematic effects for the
proper functioning of democracy since it leads to the self-sufficiency of power-holders and a
lack of responsiveness towards the citizenry, in turn generating their distrust of political
institutions and, at worst, of the system as such.
The course of political development and systemic transition is determined to some extent by
‘path-dependence’. After the breakdown of the Soviet regime, Estonia faced serious socioeconomic conditions. They had a choice: to either stay trapped in a vicious circle of underachievement at the Western periphery or to do something to break this circle and make a
developmental breakthrough. Slovenia’s situation was quite different. Its relative openness
towards the West and its more market-oriented economy together with some degree of
political and especially cultural autonomy (which was not the case in the Baltic countries)
during the times of socialist Yugoslavia made the change in the socio-economic formation
less traumatic. This led to the prevalence of a notion of the relative compatibility of the
Slovenian institutional setting with the West which rejected a deep and sudden break with the
past, arguing for a ‘soft transition’, in other words, piecemeal and gradual institutional
changes in order to preserve social stability. This soft transition was strongly connected with
the abovementioned high elite reproduction, meaning that most old communist-era elites
retained their positions in the new circumstances. However, the political actors still had to
make their choices. The Estonian elite decided to modernise society through a widespread and
rapid liberalisation and deregulation, while the Slovenian one embraced a gradualist approach
that led to much slower and more cautious reforms.
Both transition models have proved to be successful in some way. Estonia is considered to be
the fastest-developing state that is rapidly approaching the EU average. Slovenia, on the other
hand, has succeeded in maintaining the highest GDP in the region – despite having lower
economic growth than Estonia – and economic stability. Here, two key factors need to be
mentioned. The first refers to the structural, particularly historical and geo-political
circumstances (path-dependence). The second has a ‘subjective’ nature and largely depends
on the decisions and composition of elite groups. Our thesis is that the type of capitalism in
both states needs to be explained within this context. In the case of Slovenia managerial
17
capitalism with a strong (significant) role of the government evolved, while in Estonia we can
observe the emergence of classical (market) capitalism with only a small (marginal) role of
the state. Whereas in Slovenia we can speak of a ‘corporatist welfare state’ when it comes to
Estonia one can at most observe a ‘residual welfare state’ and a minimum state. What is
interesting is that the Estonian elite did not take the nearby Scandinavian model of restricted
capitalism and universal welfare state as a reference. The social order that emerged is thus
much closer to the Anglo-Saxon model of entrepreneurship, free-market ideology and the
limited role of the state.
However, the story of elites and capitalism in both states is still not over. Recent events and
observations tell us that Estonia went too far in the neo-liberal direction, while Slovenia
exaggeratedly leaned in the corporatist direction. In the former the reforms were quick and
ruthless while in the latter they were too slow. Estonia’s ‘pure’ or liberal type of capitalism
introduced significant social inequalities, poverty and the exclusion of quite large social
groups (mostly the Russophone minority). It is true that in Slovenia shifts in social
stratification also occurred but a much more significant problem hindering the “meritocratic”
principles and economic competitiveness seems to be the rigidity of the labour market and
taxation system. In Slovenia, some liberal reforms were launched, with limited success. In
Estonia a segment of the political elite has already started to consider a bigger role for the
state (Steen 2007). In addition, we can detect the importance of the social learning factor of
elites that, along with path-dependence and the elites’ creative responses to historical and geopolitical limitations, is significantly influencing the course and quality of social development.
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