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Sociology 3301: Sociology of Religion
Lecture 1: Defining the Field
How can we define religion? Many people think they know what it is, but it is
also the case that some theistic definitions are too narrow (e.g. excluding Buddhism),
while others so broad that more diverse social behaviors may be included (e.g.
nationalism, political views and beliefs providing individuals and groups a sense of worth
and meaning). To get at this question, then, we have to recognize that the way we define
our subject matter sets boundaries over what we can and cannot discuss under this
heading, and that what we see also excludes what we cannot consider. We also must be
aware that definitions are not mirrors of reality, but rather tools that are more or less
useful to those who use them.
Substantive Definitions:
One type of definition attempts to get at the substance, essence, or core of
religion. Edward Tylor (1873) did this when he defined religion as “belief in spiritual
beings” (a term inclusive of a deity or deities, but also the spirits of deceased ancestors
worshipped by various peoples).
Yet trying to define the essence of religion is hard, but even more so if the
definition is to be used cross-culturally. In the Western world, we tend to emphasize
religion as belief, some even measure religiosity by determining how orthodox someone
is. Yet, as R.R. Marett (1914) notes, in some religions ritual and emotion are primary,
while belief is only secondary. For example, Gill’s (2004) study of traditional Native
American religions found that these are expressed through tribal practices, prayer, and
religious objects, not creeds, dogmas, or theologies. Similarly, Orthodox Judaism focuses
more on behavior than belief. Indeed, anthropologists note that the emphasis on belief is a
Western bias that causes researchers to miss the underlying thrust of non-western
religions (e.g. concepts of deity or superhuman beings are peripheral to mainstream
Buddhism, though many practicing Buddhists do believe in them). This focus on belief at
least puts in question whether Buddhists who do not emphasize belief in superhuman
beings are practicing a religion. But is this emphasis on belief necessary?
Another substantive definitional approach was articulated by Emile Durkheim in
1912. Fascinated with cleansing practices and attitudinal changes prior to religious ritual
in various cultures, Durkheim argued that the division of life into sacred and profane
realms allows us to identify religion in any culture. Encountering holy objects or
engaging in ritual is associated with a psychological shift, a particular sense of awe,
feelings of fear and majesty not encountered elsewhere in a given culture. While not all
individual experiences of awe or sacredness are necessarily religious, Durkheim
emphasized religion as communal activity involving social groups. The sacred attitude
must be fundamentally a group experience if it is to be identified as religion. His
definition states: “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred
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things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite
into a single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”
This approach is helpful in a great many cases and avoids the above problem of
deciding which beliefs are intrinsically or inherently religious. Nevertheless, those who
have used this approach have often implied, even asserted a dualistic worldview, one
considering that life has a religious dimension and a non-religious dimension, one sacred,
the other profane, that cannot exist in the same time and space. For religious persons,
space is not homogeneous, some parts are qualitatively different from others (Eliade).
While true that that many people organize their life experience into separate categories,
not all do. For example, the Shakers attempted to sustain an attitude that all of life is
sacred, while the Bruderhof attempted to make all life hallowed and thus de-emphasize
sacraments and rituals. In their case, all of one’s life is to be lived in the spirit of worship
and the community works to sustain this attitude in simple, everyday acts of living. They
do not even erect a church building lest religion be identified with a distinct time and
place. Such groups do not seem to divide life into sacred and profane realms. In fact,
Davis (1949) argues that Durkheim’s distinction creates a false dichotomy in some
instances.
Given such examples, Greeley (1972) attempted to maintain the focus on
sacredness but avoid the dualism found in many earlier writers. He argues that any being,
social process or value that gives meaning and purpose to life tends to become a source of
reverence or profound respect. A sacred attitude is not totally unlike a secular outlook,
but involves a matter of intensified respect (e.g. this does not exclude the study of
nationalism, political ideologies, or any other system of profound loyalty as a form of
religion).
Such broad views bring us back to one underlying question in this whole debate:
whether religion by definition has to include only that which has an otherworldly or
supernatural dimension. Can nationalism be a form of religion? There is often much
symbolism, ritual, emotion, special days to celebrate, and so on, but does this involve the
same sort of awe and reverence that people feel toward the divine? Some say yes, some
say no. Some suggest that we focus on the sociology of the sacred in such cases, even if
the behavior is not a religion in the strictest sense – since anything that is considered
“sacred” in practice is likely to interest the sociologist of religion.
The major criticism of these substantive definitions is that they tend to focus
researcher’s attention solely on traditional forms of religion. Some feel that people in
complex and changing societies like ours are religious in new ways. Hence, the old,
substantive definitions are too narrow, too tradition bound, blinding sociologists to these
new forms of religiosity.
Functional Definitions:
Milton Yinger (1970) offered a more inclusive definition of religion that changed
the question from what a religion is to what it does. He suggests that we define a social
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phenomenon as religious if it fulfils the conscious and intended functions of religion.
Yinger, following Weber and Tillich, asserted that meaning in life is a basic human need.
A fundamental concern of human beings is to understand the purpose of life and the
meaning of death, suffering, evil, and injustice. Thus, religion “can be defined as a
system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with these
ultimate problems of human life.” Religion, in this sense, helps individuals cope with
these perplexities by offering an explanation and by providing a strategy to overcome
despair, hopelessness, and futility.
Of course, using this type of definition considerably expands the range of
phenomena that we consider under the heading of religion (e.g. nonthesistic, even nonsupernatural systems of belief and practice). Yinger states “It is not the nature of belief,
but the nature of believing that requires our study.” Anything that closes the gap between
fact and hope, that allows a leap of faith in the face of evil and suffering, is fair game.
Even a secular faith that science and technology will ultimately solve all our problems is,
on Yinger’s view, a religious or quasi religious phenomenon. Yinger speaks of religion as
comprising ways of life in these senses. Thus, employing traditional, narrow definitions
of religion may result in misunderstanding and misidentification of religion – particularly
in societies undergoing cultural change. As well, Yinger assumes that, to some extent at
least, all people are religious. He writes: “To me, the evidence is decisive: human nature
abhors a vacuum in systems of faith. This is not, then, a period of religious decline but is
one of religious change.” Hence, the assumption underlying the functional definition of
religion does not really invite the question of whether a society is becoming less religious
but rather asks what new forms religion is taking. Sociologists using this approach are
less likely to overlook non-traditional or alternative forms of religion or new ways that
people practice religion.
Yinger, without making judgments about the truth or falsity of belief, also
suggests that all people have a god or gods that give meaning to life (though the intensity
of the need for meaning/relative consistency of belief patterns vary). The task is to
discover what gives meaning to people’s lives, for that is their religion. Other scholars,
like Geertz (1968) disagree with Yinger over the assumption of an intrinsic and universal
need for transcendent meaning in life. Social scientists differ, then, about whether there is
an innate religious tendency in humans.
A second well-known functional definition of religion comes from Robert Bellah
(1970). Again influenced by Tillich’s idea of “ultimate concern,” Bellah defines it as “a
set of symbolic forms and acts that relate people to the ultimate conditions of their
existence.” Of course, “ultimate conditions of existence” are hard to identify and even
harder to measure. Still, Yinger and Bellah assert that any system of belief and action that
fails to address the fundamental questions of meaning in life is not a religion.
Some, such as Stark and Bainbridge (1996) have thus argued that a supernatural
dimension to the belief system is a fundamental characteristic of religion. Not only does
lacking such a dimension fail to address the “ultimate concern,” but the resultant
definition will be so broad and inclusive so as to be virtually meaningless. Nevertheless,
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Yinger opts for breadth. This shows the need for all of us to consider one’s own
orientation to the “ultimate concern” in deciding for ourselves what is and what does not
fit into a functional definition of religion.
A Symbolic Definition:
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1966) developed a symbolic definition of religion
that is somewhat more detailed in defining what religion does. Symbols – objects,
behaviors, or stories that represent or remind one of something else – are powerful forces
in human behavior, and also central to religion. Given the abstract nature of the focal
point of religion, symbols serve as an indispensible medium. Geertz was impressed with
the way in which various levels of meaning can be communicated through symbols – and
they are far more accessible to human observation than a subjective experience of
“ultimate concern.” Thus, he used symbols as the starting point for his definition of
religion.
For Geertz, religious symbols are distinct from non-religious ones in that the
former are macro symbols, those that help one interpret the meaning of life itself and that
involve a cosmology or worldview (e.g. a cross). Hence, their sacred function involves
their acquisition of a sense of sacredness or profound respect. In contrast, many nonreligious symbols are micro symbols, those that affect everyday interaction with other and
enhance daily communication and cooperation (e.g. a handshake). Micro symbols do not
purport to explain the purpose of life nor suggest values and beliefs that claim highest
priority in life.
Geertz’s definition of religion states: “Religion is (1) a system of symbols which
acts to (2) establish powerful, persuasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in
people by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing
these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem
uniquely realistic.” There are several important aspects here. First, religion involves a
system of symbols that provides a model of the world by helping people understand what
the world and life really are (e.g. a testing ground), and also prescribes what the world
ought to be (e.g. how to pass the test). Secondly, acknowledgement of the symbolic
structure affects ones moods and motivations, depth of feeling and directions for
appropriate behavior (one more transitory, the other more goal directed). Some religions
focus more on the former (e.g. mystical experience in Buddhism); others on religion as a
system of ethical goals. Nevertheless, all religions contain both and they feed off each
other as the very ethos of the religion. Thirdly, religion provides a worldview, a cognitive
ordering of concepts of nature, self, society, and the supernatural. It provides both intense
feelings and a cosmology that satisfies the intellectual need for reasonable explanations.
Yet, Geertz points out that not all intense feelings are religious (i.e. if no explanatory
perspective or worldview of the meaning of life is involved, the experience is not
religious.
There are 3 major challenges that seem to belie the meaningfulness of life and it is
these that a religious worldview must resolve: (1) a sense of coherence and
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reasonableness of events in life; (2) a sense of meaning in suffering so that it becomes
sufferable; and (3) a sense of moral order in which evil will be overcome and that virtue,
goodness, and justice will somehow, someday prevail. Symbol systems thus attempt to
account for, and even celebrate, the perceived ambiguities, puzzles, and paradoxes in
human experience. The wordview represents an intellectual process by which people can
affirm that life makes sense, that suffering is bearable, and that justice is not just a mirage
– that in the end, good will be rewarded.
Geertz moved on to consider how a particular worldview or set of concepts comes
to be believed. He asserts that symbols “act to clothe those conceptions in such an aura of
factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.” How is it, he asks,
that despite common sense, everyday experience, and empirical evidence people will
come to believe irrational and unsupportable things? Geertz answers that, when people
are involved and socialized into it, religious ritual often creates an aura in which a deeper
reality is said to be reached. Truths are experienced or understood that are more profound
than everyday experience provides.
Geertz also pointed out that religion is able to provide plausibility structures, a
foundation for social values that has authority outside of empirical observation and thus
cannot – for believers – be invalidated. Values and perspectives come to be shrouded in
sacredness and unquestioned certainty. Meanwhile, meaning is commonly stored or
encapsulated in symbols, that are powerful factors in people’s lives. These are far more
concrete and observable than an “ultimate concern.”
Geertz’s definition is, of course, long, abstract, and hard to translate into concrete
research procedures. Nevertheless, it does contribute significantly to the debate over what
distinguishes religion from other cultural phenomena. Central are his ideas that religion
must have a macro symbol system that acts to reinforce both a worldview and an ethos,
and that has a built-in system of believability or plausibility.
Researchers who employ qualitative methods like participant observation find
Geertz’s definition useful, for it identifies the general properties of religion and what to
observe, yet does not specify the content of religious belief. This also suits it to cross
cultural work. Quantitative sociologists, however, often find his ideas so broad that his
identification of religion is not helpful in defining researchable categories.
Ultimately, Geertz’s analysis is much more than a definition. It is an essay on how
religion works to reinforce itself and on what religion does in society. Hence, his
symbolic definition may be considered one type of functional definition.
The Concept of Religion as Employed in this Class:
The underlying interest in this course is to consider the ways that people generate
and sustain new systems of meaning in the midst of social change. As well, we are
interested in how people create their own systems of meaning. Usually, meaning systems
involve a synthesis of official religious doctrine with other cultural beliefs. Rather than
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distinguish religion from non-religion, we will seek to explore anything that provides
meaning and purpose in the lives of people. We will ask how people are religious rather
than whether they are. Hence, what we will be dealing with throughout the course will be
most compatible with the functionalist definitions of Yinger and Geertz, each of whom
was interested in religion as a cultural system. While we will incorporate the work of
scholars with differing conceptions, we will also address the broader issues of meaning in
a changing culture.
To synthesize the above debate over definitions, we now move on to highlight the
distinguishing characteristics of religion. First, religion is a social phenomenon that
involves the grouping of people around a faith perspective, a trusting in some object,
event, principle, or being as the center of worth and the source of meaning in life (e.g. a
profound commitment to Marxism, Nationalism, environmentalism, feminism, or faith in
science and technology as the ultimate solution to our human predicament could be
considered at least quasi-religious phenomena). Not only is it social, involving a grouping
of people with faith in a shared meaning system, religion, secondly, has to do with that
assortment of phenomena that communicates, celebrates, internalizes, interprets, and
extrapolates a faith. These phenomena include beliefs (myths), rites (worship), an ethos
(the moods and moral values of the group), a worldview (the cognitive perspective by
which the experiences of life are viewed as part of the larger and ultimately meaningful
cosmology), and a system of symbols that serve to encapsulate the deepest feelings and
emotion packed beliefs.
These criteria should be specific enough to distinguish religion from many other
cultural phenomena (e.g. a feeling of awe cannot considered religious unless it includes a
cognitive pattern that helps people make sense out of life and helps explain the meaning
of suffering, death, and injustice. On the other hand, hopefully these criteria are
sufficiently broad so that we do not miss the religious significance of non-traditional
groups.
Ultimately, then, religion is an interdependent system by which a community of
people are bonded:
(1) by a shared meaning system (a faith or worldview);
(2) by a set of myths (beliefs), rituals and symbol systems that sacralize the
meaning system for the members;
(3) by a sense of belonging to a reference group;
(4) by a system of ethics or values that is directive in the lives of the members;
and
(5) by a set of routinized social expectations and patterns.
Those phenomena in society that have most, but perhaps not all, of these
characteristics will be explored as possible “invisible religions” or “quasi-religions” that
can impact traditional religion and that may well be emerging as new religions in our
society.
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