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Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
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Political Geography
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo
Climate change, conflict, and cooperation: Global analysis of the
effectiveness of international river treaties in addressing water
variability
Shlomi Dinar a, *, David Katz b, Lucia De Stefano c, Brian Blankespoor d
a
Florida International University, SIPA Building, Room 525, 11200 SW 8th Street, Miami, FL 33199, United States
University of Haifa, Israel
Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
d
World Bank, United States
b
c
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Available online
Climate-driven water variability is a natural phenomenon that is observed across river basins, but one
that is predicted to increase due to climate change. Environmental change of this kind may aggravate
political tensions, especially in regions which are not equipped with an appropriate institutional apparatus. Increased variability is also likely to challenge regions with existing institutional capacity. We
argue that our best attempts to assess the ability of states to deal with variability in the future rest with
considering how agreements have fared in the past. In this paper, we explore treaty effectiveness, or
treaty resilience, by investigating whether particular water allocation and institutional mechanisms help
mitigate inter-country tensions over shared water. We use water-related events from the Basins at Risk
events database as a dependent variable to test particular hypotheses regarding the impact of treaty
design on conflict and cooperation over time. A broad set of climatic, geographic, political, and economic
variables are used as controls. The analysis is conducted for the years 1948e2001 using the country dyad
as the level of observation. Findings pertaining to our primary explanatory variables suggest that country
dyads governed by treaties with water allocation mechanisms exhibiting both flexibility and specificity
evince more cooperative behavior. Country dyads governed by treaties with a larger sum of institutional
mechanisms likewise evince a higher level of cooperation, although certain institutional mechanisms
appear to be more important than others.
© 2014 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. Published by
Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Water variability
Climate change
International water treaties
Water allocation mechanisms
Institutional mechanisms
Conflict
Cooperation
Treaty effectiveness
Introduction
Annual and seasonal variability in river flow is well known and
well documented by riparian communities, scientists, engineers and
policy makers (Milliman, Farnsworth, Jones, Xu, & Smith, 2008;
Milly, Dunne, & Vecchia, 2005). Yet, the projected effects of
climate change may render future river flow variability outside the
bounds of previously observed runoff events (IPCC, 2007: 31; Milly
et al., 2008). These effects may be particularly salient in international river basins where several riparians are affected. For example,
rivers such as the Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates in the Middle East are
expected to experience reductions in stream flow, likely increasing
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 305 348 6958; fax: þ1 305 348 6562.
E-mail addresses: dinars@fiu.edu (S. Dinar), [email protected] (D. Katz),
[email protected] (L. De Stefano), [email protected] (B. Blankespoor).
water shortages and salinity, while other basins such as the Congo in
equatorial Africa and the La Plata in South America will experience
increases in flow, adding to the salience of issues such as floods and
inundation (Arnell, 1999; 2004; Milly et al., 2005).
Climate change and water variability are also expected to
intensify security concerns within international river basins
(Brown, 1989; Gleick, 1989; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007). A report
titled National Security and the Threat of Climate Change claims that
one of the most destabilizing impacts from climate change will be
in the form of reduced access to freshwater (CNA, 2007: 13e16).
Despite the often cited claim that ‘water is a source of cooperation,
rather than violent conflict’ (Wolf & Hamner, 2000), some observers have stressed that, be it in the form of heightened political
tensions or more extreme violent exchanges, climate change and
the projected increase in water variability may further complicate
existing shared water management strategies and may have
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.08.003
0962-6298/© 2014 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
56
S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
significant economic, social, environmental, and political conse€m, 2005;
quences (Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockstro
Walker et al., 2006).
Given the links between climate change, water variability, and
inter-state tensions, the role of institutions in assuaging potential
conflicts between states seems paramount (Salehyan, 2008: 317). In
the realm of international water, treaties often constitute the main
governing apparatus and have been shown to assuage conflict and
promote cooperation (Brochmann, 2012). Yet, beyond the mere
existence of a treaty, the design of the agreement is also important
for understanding the treaty's ability to deal with water variability
(Zentner, 2012). That is, different mechanisms codified in a given
treaty should impact differently on treaty effectiveness in promoting cooperation and reducing conflict. Guided by recent
research exploring treaty effectiveness in the area of international
water (particularly, De Stefano et al., 2012; Drieschova &
Fischhendler, 2011; Drieschova, Giordano, & Fischhendler, 2008;
Stinnett & Tir, 2009), this paper empirically examines the influence of specific water allocation and institutional mechanisms
specified in treaties on conflict and cooperation within basins.
Below we examine in more detail the relationship between
climate change, water variability, and security. We then discuss the
various allocation and institutional mechanisms that may promote
institutional effectiveness. Following that, we explain our methodology and propose hypotheses regarding the effects of the
different allocation and institutional mechanisms on conflict and
cooperation. We also describe our dataset and choice of variables,
including climatic, geographic, and socio-economic variables that
may likewise impact conflict and cooperation. Next, we present and
discuss our results and close the article with conclusions and policy
implications.
Climate change, water variability and security
One of the most forceful links made between climate change
and water variability came out of a 2008 Technical Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change claiming that
increased precipitation intensity and variability is projected to increase the risks of flooding and drought in many areas, affecting
food stability as well as exacerbating many forms of water pollution
(Bates et al., 2008). These hydrological changes will in turn increase
the vulnerability of certain regions and communities and present
substantial challenges to water infrastructure and services (IPCC,
€ ro
€ smarty,
2007; Kabat, Schulze, Hellmuth, & Veraart, 2002; Vo
Green, Salisbury, & Lammers, 2000). According to Barnett, climate
change may have indirect negative effects that can undermine the
legitimacy of governments, threaten individual and collective
economic livelihood, and affect human health (2003). Regions
comprised of developing countries, which may lack the capacity to
deal with and adapt to climate change impacts and are more reliant
on climate sensitive resources, may fare even worse (Barnett &
Adger, 2007).
The increase in future water variability forecasted by most
climate change scenarios is, therefore, one form of change that may
alter current hydropolitical balances. Already, changes in mean
water flows have been observed (Dai, Qian, Trenberth, & Milliman,
2009). In addition, the beneficial impacts of increased annual runoff
in some areas are likely to be tempered by negative effects of
increased precipitation variability and seasonal runoff shifts on
water supply, water quality and flood risk (IPCC, 2007). According
to Buhaug, Gleditsch, and Thiesen (2008), climate-induced events
such as floods and droughts are expected to constitute a large
threat to human security and the prospects of sustained peace. In
this context, climate change may further act as a ‘threat multiplier’
exacerbating existing economic, social, and political problems
(CNA, 2007). Consequently, inter-state tensions and instances of
conflict may rise as water variability increases (Bernauer &
Siegfried, 2012).
Climate change, water variability and treaty capacity
Studies have demonstrated that institutions help prevent and
assuage disputes between countries (Mitchell & Keilbach, 2001).
According to Chayes and Chayes (1993), treaties alter states'
behavior, their respective relationships, and their expectations of
one another creating a framework for extended interaction and
cooperation. Specific to water, evidence suggests that the likelihood
of political tensions is related to the interaction between variability,
or rates of change within a basin, and the absence of institutions
(particularly treaties) to absorb that change (Stahl, 2005; Wolf,
Stahl, & Macomber, 2003). Treaties that govern river basins
constitute an important means for managing transboundary water
resources thereby preventing the emergence or escalation of disputes (Brochmann & Hensel, 2009; Tir & Stinnett, 2012). In turn,
water agreements can promote wider cooperation and enhance
basin security more generally (Brochmann, 2012; Conca & Dabelko,
2002; Dinar, 2011; Intelligence Community Assessment, 2012).
Despite the role of water agreements in assuaging conflict
(Brochmann, 2012; Brochmann & Hensel, 2009), some scholars
have suggested that the mere presence of an international water
regime does not provide any guarantee that it will ultimately
contribute towards sustained cooperation (Dombrowsky, 2007). In
regions already governed by a water treaty, climate change and
variability could affect the ability of basin states to meet their water
agreement commitments and effectively manage transboundary
waters (Ansink & Ruijs, 2008; Drieschova et al., 2008; Goulden,
Conway, & Persechino, 2009). This may be particularly salient in
the case of agreements that are not appropriately designed to deal
with environmental change and similar forms of uncertainty.
Increased variability may thus raise serious questions about the
adequacy of many existing transboundary arrangements even in
areas that have exemplified cooperation in the past (Cooley et al.,
2009: 28). As such, administrative instruments for transboundary
basins, and specifically the mechanisms codified in treaties should
be assessed for their ability to address potential impacts of climate
change (Alavian et al., 2009: 24; WDR, 2011: 230). Treaty design
and treaty capacity are, therefore, directly related to the ability of
the treaty to assuage tension (Young & Levy, 1999). As the existing
qualitative literature points out, the presence of particular allocation and institutional mechanisms may suggest which treaties are
more effective under conditions of water variability and climatic
change (Gleick, 2010; Odom & Wolf, 2008). Various mechanisms
can potentially mitigate grievances and enhance cooperation over
water, thus contributing to the effectiveness of the treaty over time
(Cooley et al., 2009; Fischhendler, 2008b). This study seeks to
contribute to existing empirical research on international water
treaty design (De Stefano et al., 2012; Tir & Stinnett, 2012) by
examining an array of water allocation and institutional mechanisms. We discuss these treaty instruments below in the context of
the extant literature. In the case of water allocation mechanisms, in
particular, it is noteworthy that no systematic empirical work has
been conducted to scrutinize their effectiveness in a comparative
fashion.
Allocation mechanism design
Examining the relationship between allocation mechanisms and
water variability, Drieschova et al. (2008) concluded that an allocation mechanism's flexibility determines its capacity to deal with
climate change and increased water variability. Such a
S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
characteristic becomes particularly relevant when considering
treaties that are distributive in nature, allocating water among the
parties. If the allocation mechanism codified in the agreement is
rigid and inflexible, the parties are less capable of honoring their
treaty commitments once water availability changes due to environmental conditions. The authors enumerate several allocation
mechanisms.
First, the authors consider direct allocation mechanisms, which
clearly stipulate how the water is to be divided. One type, a ‘direct
flexible’ allocation mechanism, divides the resource by percentages. A flexible mechanism may also include provisions that allow
countries to average a particular allocation over a given set of time
or make-up transfers of water which they owe their fellow riparian
from a previous period in a following period (McCaffrey, 2003).
Mechanisms that recognize that water allocations may have to be
reduced due to water availability also indicate flexibility, as do
mechanisms that specify that an upstream riparian deliver a minimum flow to a downstream riparian (Cooley et al., 2009). Such
types of allocation arrangements are preferable in situations of high
water variability since the same stock amounts of water that were
available when the treaty was negotiated are unlikely to be available uniformly throughout time.1 A ‘direct fixed’ allocation mechanism, on the other hand, divides resources by absolute volumes
and effectively ignores the uncertainty that may arise given climatic change (Drieschova & Fischhendler, 2011: 12).
Drieschova et al., also consider ‘indirect flexible’ allocation
mechanisms and general principles such as ‘consultations between
the parties’ and ‘prioritization of uses’ as well as ‘equitable utilization’ and ‘needs-based’ approaches, respectively. While these
exhibit flexibility they are also open-ended, which may be problematic in the context of climate change, when clearer direction is
required under conditions of uncertainty. According to the authors,
it is specific, or direct, mechanisms that “ensure credibility and
action, which appear to have a number of advantages for variability
management” (2008: 7).
57
resolution mechanisms to deal with commitment problems as well
as informational problems that arise from ambiguous treaties.
Furthermore, a conflict resolution mechanism provides a forum for
discussing concerns not originally envisioned in the treaty
(Drieschova et al., 2008). Another mechanism that further signals
that the treaty is more institutionalized and may help to overcome
environmental challenges across time is a joint commission or
committee. Such a body enables treaty signatories to confront
environmental uncertainties as they arise or manage technical information (Allan & Cosgrove, 2002; McCaffrey, 2003). In addition to
being mandated with proposing plans and projects for implementation, the commission may also have a monitoring and conflict resolution mandate (Dombrowsky, 2007; Gerlak & Grant,
2009). In her study of the Indus Basin, for example, Zawahri
(2009) finds that the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) has
played an invaluable role in the treaty's implementation since 1960.
Zawahri attributes a large part of the stable cooperation witnessed
since the treaty's inception to the success of the PIC to negotiate,
monitor, and manage the basin.
Adaptability mechanisms
De Stefano et al. (2012) argue that treaties that codify tangible
adaptability mechanisms create a means for dealing with water
variability. Pertaining to water allocation treaties, in particular,
adaptation mechanisms for dealing with drought or flooding may
be highly pertinent. The literature points to a number of specific
mechanisms treaties may employ so as to deal with drought.
Combined with some of the allocation mechanisms discussed
above, authors have pointed to: ‘immediate consultations between
the respective states’, ‘stricter irrigation procedures’, ‘specific
reservoir releases’, and ‘data sharing’ (McCaffrey, 2003; Turton,
2003). Arrangements that provide for desalination, wastewater
reclamation and increased storage capacity have also been touted
as important for augmenting supplies of water in times of drought
(Dziegielewski, 2003: 324; Iglesias, Garrote, & Flores, 2007).
Institutional mechanisms
Beyond the allocation mechanism, the type or design of
institutional arrangements codified in agreements is also likely
relevant to determining treaty effectiveness and stability (Barrett,
2003). In fact, treaties governing highly contentious issues, such
as water quantity, tend to include such institutional provisions
(Tir & Stinnett, 2011). Thus, a comprehensive analysis of treaty
effectiveness and design should examine not only the type of
allocation arrangements included in the treaty but likewise account for the institutional mechanisms. Below we discuss four
major institutional mechanisms that have been investigated in
previous empirical research (enforcement, monitoring, conflict
resolution and joint commission). We identify two additional
mechanisms that have not been systematically investigated in
large-n studies (adaptability and self-enforcement mechanisms).
Enforcement, monitoring, conflict resolution and joint commission
Enforcement mechanisms are imperative as they provide states
the power to punish defectors (Susskind, 1994: 99e121), and thus
make agreements more robust, effective, and credible. Enforcement
may be facilitated by the presence of monitoring mechanisms since
states often fear that other parties to an agreement may cheat or
free-ride (Keohane & Martin, 1995). In addition, monitoring
mechanisms potentially provide a means through which the parties
can scrutinize each other's behavior or a medium for regularly
inspecting the overall condition of the river basin. The presence of a
conflict resolution mechanism could also prove invaluable. According to Koremons and Betz (2013), states require dispute
Self-enforcement mechanisms: side-payments, benefit-sharing and
issue-linkage
Side-payments and cost-sharing arrangements, benefit-sharing
schemes, and issue-linkage are often utilized by parties to foster
formalized cooperation (Bernauer, 1996; Dinar, 2006; Katz &
€
Fischhendler, 2011; Phillips, Daoudy, McCaffrey, Ojendal,
&
Turton, 2006; Weinthal, 2002; Wolf & Hamner, 2000). This is
particularly relevant in asymmetric negotiations where incentives
need to be created so that parties perceive benefits from an
agreement (Folmer, van Mouche, & Ragland, 1993). Yet, the same
strategies that facilitate treaty formation can also be utilized to
foster treaty stability once the treaty has been negotiated. A treaty
that restructures the incentives of the parties to engage in sustained cooperation is more effective and self-enforcing. All three
strategies may be used to broaden cooperation and further bind the
parties to the agreement's tenants by making it costlier to defect
(Barrett, 2003). Examples of treaties codifying such strategies
include the 1973 Helmand River Agreement between Iran and
Afghanistan (financial transfers for additional water allocations),
1986 Orange River Agreement between South Africa and Lesotho
(hydropower generation as part of the water allocation agreement),
and 1998 Framework Agreement among various Central Asian
countries (oil and fuel supplies in exchange for timely water releases). Issue linkage, however, can be a double-edged sword, also
allowing for exogenous factors to interfere with treaty functioning
(Katz & Fischhendler, 2011). Thus, its impact on cooperation cannot
be assumed a priori.
58
S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
Methodology
In this study, we seek to assess the efficacy of various allocation
and institutional mechanisms in assuaging conflict and promoting
cooperation under conditions of water variability. Below we present a description of the database and variables used to conduct our
empirical analysis. Based on the theoretical discussion above, we
include hypotheses regarding the expected impact of the allocation
and institutional arrangements. A number of control variables are
also included, ranging from climate variability to a variety of sociopolitical and economic factors.
Description of dataset and variables
We assembled a cross-sectional database of all treaties ratified
between 1948 and 2001 taking the riparian country pairs (dyads) as
our unit of observation.2 Treaties, and their texts were taken from
the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD, 2012)
treaty bank. The database covers 221 dyads representing 89
different countries in 65 different basins. Our analytical framework
considers long-term trends and, therefore, uses long range mean
values over the period covered. A similar cross-sectional approach
used to investigate environmental treaty formation or examine
international water treaties has been adopted by Neumayer
(2002a), Dinar et al. (2010), Dinar et al. (2011), and De Stefano
et al. (2012).
Dependent variable
Resilience and hydropolitical stability can be evidenced when
riparians evince more cooperative behavior relative to conflictive
behavior, which can be achieved through effective water treaties
governing the basin (Brochmann, 2012; Wolf, 2007). In order to
measure treaty effectiveness, we utilize a combined measure of
conflict and cooperation. We use this proxy because river riparians
most often exhibit both types of relations throughout time (Zeitoun
& Mirumachi, 2008).3
We develop our combined conflict-cooperation indicator based
on the water events data stored in the International Water Events
Database at Oregon State University (OSU), created under the
framework of the Basins at Risk project (BAR) (De Stefano,
Edwards, de Silva, & Wolf, 2010; Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003).4
Each event includes a brief summary and source of information,
and is coded by date, country dyad, basin, and issue area. Each
event is also coded according to the type of event (conflictive or
cooperative) and its intensity using the BAR scale, which ranges
from 7, the most conflictive (war), through 0 (neutral events),
and up to þ7, the most cooperative (voluntary merging of
countries).
To extract the events relevant to treaties examined in this study,
we first re-coded the events by country-basin dyad so that we could
relate the events to a specific international basin. Secondly, for each
treaty, we identified which events had occurred after the signature
of the agreement and, among those, which were relevant to water
quantity or allocation. In cases where a treaty replaced a preexisting agreement, the relevant events were assigned accordingly. The
data processing produced a database listing the number and intensity (BAR values) of all the events relevant to each country-basin
dyad. In order to treat the categorical BAR values as ordinal values,
we use the anti-logged equivalent for each event intensity level.
This is in line with previous studies using BAR events data (e.g.
Brochmann, 2012; Yoffe and Larson, 2001). We derive a measure
(AvgBAR) of the mean of the anti-logged values of conflictive and
cooperative relations between the countries in the dyad since
treaty signature.
Explanatory variables
Allocation mechanisms. A number of allocation mechanisms were
identified based on a review of all available international water
allocation treaties housed in the TFDD treaty databank and a joint
TFDD-International Water Management Institute (IWMI) categorization. These were evaluated as to their flexibility and specificity
based on the three tier typology from Drieschova et al. (2008).
While these allocation methods may not be substitutable (as
different contexts may warrant different mechanisms), we expect
those basins governed by allocation mechanisms that display both
a flexible and specific allocation regime to exhibit more cooperation in their hydro-relations. Those treaties codifying only a specific, albeit direct, allocation arrangement (such as a ‘fixed’
allocation) or only an ‘indirect flexible’ allocation arrangement
(such as an allocation regime determined by ‘consultation’) are
expected to elicit less cooperation. In other words, flexible allocation mechanisms promote effective variability management but
they must also possess some level of specificity (e.g. an allocation
regime that divides available water by a set percentage). Table 1
enumerates the various allocation methods according to these
three general categories (specific, flexible, specific and flexible).
Examples of treaties are also provided for each mechanism.
Our statistical model includes different specifications to assess
the effectiveness of the allocation mechanisms in reducing tensions
and promoting cooperation. The first is a binary variable indicating
whether or not an allocation method was specified in the treaty
(Allocate). The other specifications assess the particular type of
allocation mechanism (Specific, Flexible, and Specific*Flexible)
each of which are binary dummy variables based on the categorization described above.
Institutional mechanisms. In this study we also document the
absence or presence of institutional mechanisms including
enforcement, monitoring, conflict resolution and joint commissions. These mechanisms have already been cataloged by TFDD's
treaty databank. To this assortment of four mechanisms, we add the
existence of adaptability and self-enforcement mechanisms. Since
these two mechanisms have not been subject to systematic
empirical investigation, we cataloged the information based on a
reading of the treaties.
Our model includes a count variable (Number of institutional
mechanisms). In all cases, theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, the
more such mechanisms are codified in an agreement the greater
the level of cooperation (and the lower the level of conflict). We
also include a binary variable, indicating the presence or absence of
each type of institutional arrangement in order to isolate the
impact of each mechanism (Enforcement, Monitoring, Conflict
Resolution, Commission, Adaptability, Self-enforcement).
Control variables
Water variability. While water variability is an inherent characteristic across river basins, climate change is predicted to intensify
such variability. All else being equal, higher water variability has
been shown to lead to political tensions between states sharing
river basins (Stahl, 2005; Yoffe et al., 2003).5 Results presented in
Wolf, Stahl and Macomber (2003: 1), for example, demonstrate that
“extreme events of conflict were more frequent in marginal climates with highly variable hydrologic conditions, while the riparians of rivers with less extreme natural conditions have been more
moderate in their conflict/cooperation relationship.”
For the most part, empirical studies investigating international
conflict and cooperation over water have utilized static measures of
water availability. Given that this study focuses on the performance
of treaties in contexts of water variability, we use a measure of past
hydrological variability. In particular, we use the coefficient of
S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
59
Table 1
Allocation mechanisms categorization.
Allocation mechanism
Definition
Generic example(s)
Treaty example(s)
Flexible
Specific
Fixed quantities
Refers to allocations whereby a
party receives a defined volume
or rate of water that does not
vary.
✓
Refers to allocations that may
change with approval of certain
parties.
✓
X
Consultation
Refers to allocations that are
determined by a third party,
typically a river basin
organization or technical
committee, or a group of
negotiators at a later date.
Agreement between His
Majesty's government of Nepal
and the government of India on
the Gandak Irrigation and
Power Project; 12/14/1959
Agreement of withdrawal of
water from Lake Constance
between Switzerland, Austria,
and the Federal Republic of
Germany; 4/30/1966
Agreement on the cooperation
for the sustainable
development of the Mekong
River Basin between Thailand,
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia;
4/5/1995
X
Prior approval
✓
X
Prioritization of uses
Refers to allocations that meet
certain needs/uses before
others.
Country A gets 100 acre-feet of
water every month.
Country B is assured a minimum
flow of 100 cubic feet per second at
the border at all times.
Country A requires higher water
use than was agreed upon because
of a new irrigation system and has
to seek the consent of the other
party.
Joint Commission will study the
needs of each country and the
availability of water, then
determine allocations based on
their findings.
Water ministers of each country
will consult and agree on
allocations.
Country A receives enough water to
fulfill domestic uses.
Enough water is left instream to
protect the environment.
Indigenous water rights are
protected first.
✓
X
Fixed quantities which vary
according to water
availability
Refers to allocations whereby a
party receives a defined volume
or rate of water that varies
according to the amount of
water available.
Complementary settlement to
the agreement of cooperation
between the government of the
Eastern Republic of Uruguay
and the government of the
Federal Republic of Brazil for
the use of natural resources and
the development of the
Cuareim river basin; 5/6/1997
Treaty on the development and
utilization of the water
resources of the Komati River
Basin between the government
of the Kingdom of Swaziland
and the government of the
Republic of South Africa; 3/13/
1992
✓
✓
Fixed quantities recouped in
the following period
Refers to allocation whereby a
party receives a defined volume
or rate of water that is averaged
over a set amount of time.
✓
✓
Percentage
Refers to allocations that divide
water based on percentages or
ratios.
Country A receives 50% and Country
B receives 50% of the available
water.
✓
✓
Allocation of entire rivers
Refers to allocations that are
based on land/territory.
Country A gets full use of all streams
that originate within its borders.
Country B gets full use of all streams
north of a certain geographic
location.
✓
✓
Country A gets 100 acre-feet of
water if there is 500 acre-feet
available and 50 acre-feet of water
if there is less than 500 acre-feet
available.
Country B is assured a minimum
flow of 100 cubic feet per second
during the wet season and 50 cubic
feet per second in the dry season.
Country A gets 100 acre-feet of
water every year on a 3 year
average. Year 1 could be 90 acrefeet; Year 2 could be 95 acre-feet;
and Year 3 could be 115 acre-feet.
variation (CV) for precipitation in each basin. Precipitation data
from the Climate Research Unit (Mitchell & Jones, 2005) downloaded at the CGIAR website6 constitute the input values for the
precipitation CV. The CV is calculated to measure inter-annual
precipitation over all monthly observations for the time period
(1901e2001).7 Our rationale for calculating the CV as a long-term
measure is based on our empirical assumption that water variability is embedded in the basin's history and that it is long-term
water variability that affects conflict and cooperation over time in
a given basin. Our CV measure likewise follows precedent set by
previous studies (De Stefano et al., 2012; Dinar et al., 2010, 2011).
All else equal, we expect basins that witness higher variability to
exhibit less cooperative behavior. However, some research has
found that water scarcity can facilitate treaty formation (Tir &
Exchange of notes between the
United States and Mexico
constituting an agreement
concerning the loan of waters of
the Colorado River for irrigation
of lands in the Mexicali Valley;
8/24/1966
Agreement between Iran and
the Soviet Union for the joint
utilization of the frontier parts
of the rivers Aras and Atrak for
irrigation and power
generation; 8/11/1957
Agreement between Norway
and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the utilization of
water power on the Pasvik
(Paatso) River; 12/18/1957
Ackerman, 2009), while others have identified a more nuanced
relationship between water scarcity (and variability) and treaty
formation, whereby formal cooperation is enhanced only up to a
certain level of scarcity (and variability), after which formal cooperation is negatively affected as scarcity and variability continue to
increase (Dinar, 2009; Dinar et al., 2010, 2011). Though our study
evaluates treaty performance rather than treaty formation, in light
of these findings, our model tests for both a linear (Precipitation
CV) as well as a quadratic relationship (Precipitation CV Squared)
between variability and cooperative/conflictive behavior.
Geography. The physical attributes of shared rivers have long been
recognized as important to understanding conflict and cooperation
over transboundary water (e.g. LeMarquand, 1977; Toset, Gleditsch,
60
S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
& Hegre, 2000). In particular, empirical studies considering the
river basin as the unit of analysis find that the greater the significance of the particular basin to the respective countries the higher
the cooperation evinced. In addition, the more control a country
has over a given river basin the less cooperation (or more conflict) is
evinced because that country perceives more benefits from unilateral action (Espey & Towfique, 2004; see also Gleditsch, Furlong,
Hegre, Lacina, & Owen, 2006).
Similar to Espey and Towfique (2004), we expect less cooperative behavior in cases where the percentage of the basin within the
boundaries of one country is higher compared to the other country.
On the other hand, we expect more cooperative behavior in cases
where the river basin comprises a larger percentage of the countries' territory.
We derive two sets of geographic measures. The first set proxies
for the level of control a given country (within the dyad) has over
the basin as well as the level of control the entire country dyad has
over the basin. The second set proxies for the importance of the
basin to a given country (within the dyad) as well as the importance
of the basin to the entire country dyad. The measure for control is
derived by calculating the percentage of the total river basin within
the boundaries of each country while the proxy for importance is
derived by calculating the size of the river basin within the country
as a percentage of the total area of the country. Two numbers are
then derived for that dyad so as to gauge asymmetry and countrywide nuances: a ratio derived value and a sum derived value (Basin
Control Sum; Basin Control Ratio; Basin Importance Sum; Basin
Importance Ratio). The variables are derived and calculated based
on data in OSU's International River Basin Register.
certain types of institutional mechanisms. For instance, existence of
a conflict dispute resolution mechanism may be more prevalent
among dyads with a history of military conflict. To measure the
history of militarized disputes, we use the Correlates of War (COW)
dataset (Militarized Interstate Disputes, v3.1). We created a dyadic
count of the river riparians involved in militarized disputes (disputes could be bilateral or multilateral). The total number of
recorded disputes is used for each river dyad (Military).
Studies have shown that heightened trade facilitates environmental treaty formation and acts as a contract enforcing mechanism (Neumayer, 2002b; Stein, 2003). This is in line with a more
general literature that claims that increased interdependence in the
form of trade decreases the likelihood of militarized conflict among
countries and enhances cooperative political relations (Mansfield &
Pollins, 2003). Research examining international water treaties has
likewise found a significant and positive relationship between
cooperation and trade (Brochmann & Hensel, 2009; Dinar et al.,
2011; Espey & Towfique, 2004; Tir & Ackerman, 2009). We follow
a similar rationale, expecting higher trade dependency within a
dyad to increase the likelihood of cooperative behavior. In this
framework, we adopt the finding by Vivek and Vamvakidis (2005)
that relatively important trading partners tend not to change
much over time, which justifies the use of long-term values. Using
average annual country-level data from the Gleditsch (2012)
dataset, we constructed an annual trade variable for each dyad
that expresses total trade (imports þ exports) between Country 1
and Country 2 as a fraction of their combined GDP, describing the
economic importance of trade to the riparians (Trade Importance).8 A similar proxy is used by Sigman (2004).
Governance and democracy. Based on the Democratic Peace Theory,
scholars have claimed that political regime type should also matter
for explaining conflict and cooperation over the environment.
Neumayer (2002a), for example, finds that democracies tend to
exhibit higher environmental commitment. Gleditsch (1998) suggests that democratic countries sharing a river should be more
peaceful in their hydropolitical relations in comparison to nondemocratic countries. Brochmann and Hensel (2009), who
consider conflictual river claims and their subsequent settlement,
find that river claims are less likely to begin, and more likely to
experience peaceful settlement attempts if claims do begin, between two democracies as opposed to dyads with less democratic
forms of government. Tir and Ackerman (2009) make a similar
conjecture and find that dyads with joint democracies are more
likely to conclude water treaties.
We follow a similar rationale and expect that, ceterus paribus, a
higher level of democracy will lead to more cooperative behavior.
We calculate a combined democracy score for each dyad (Democracy) based on the Polity IV database (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers,
2013), which ranges from 10 for institutionalized autocracies to
10 for institutionalized democracies.
Power and wealth. The literature provides a variety of views
relating to the role of power in international hydropolitics. Some
authors have claimed that an asymmetric inter-riparian power
relationship impedes international cooperation over shared rivers
(Hijri & Gray, 1998; Just & Netanyahu, 1998). Others (particularly
those echoing neorealist assumptions) have argued that hegemony,
or power asymmetry, facilitates cooperation especially when the
stronger party is downstream and initiates and imposes a cooperative regime (Lowi, 1993). Empirical studies have likewise found
evidence for the links among power asymmetry, cooperation, and
reduced conflict (Song & Whittington, 2004; Tir & Ackerman, 2009;
Toset et al., 2000).9
Authors associated with the neo-liberal institutionalist school of
international relations have seconded the importance of hegemony
for explaining international cooperation, but have argued that such
asymmetry is not a necessary prerequisite for cooperation (Barrett,
2003; Keohane, 1982, 1984; Young, 1989: 353). This argument has
also been confirmed in empirical works on international water
treaty formation and negotiation onset, suggesting that even
countries of equal power cooperate (Brochmann & Hensel, 2009;
Dinar et al., 2011; Espey & Towfique, 2004).
Further challenging neorealist claims, examples may be cited to
demonstrate that even the hegemonic downstream riparian acts in
a rather benign nature whereby cooperation is not coerced or
enforced, but rather encouraged and sustained (e.g. IndiaeBhutan
hydropolitical relations). Cases where the upstream state is also the
hegemon and cooperates willingly with an otherwise weaker
downstream state can likewise be cited (e.g. 1973 Colorado River
Agreement between the United States and Mexico). As Linerooth
writes in the context of pollution control, “the more developed
upper riparian nations may wish to create ‘good will’ with their
neighbors by contributing more to pollution control while [themselves] benefiting less” (1990; see also Shmueli, 1999). Finally, and
based on this latter argument regarding power asymmetry, studies
have claimed that cooperation in the environmental realm may be
Overall relations: militarized history and trade. Overall political and
economic relations between countries should also affect their
hydropolitical relations (Brochmann & Hensel, 2009: 415; Yoffe
et al., 2003: 1117). We use measures of a history of militarized
disputes and trade to proxy for overall relations between states
sharing a river basin.
Following Hensel et al. (2008) and Brochmann and Hensel
(2011), we hypothesize that countries with overall unfriendly relations (a result of a history of militarized conflict) will be more
likely to experience conflictive events and less likely to experience
cooperation. The intensity of these events should also be affected.
Furthermore, inclusion of a history of militarized conflict variable is
an important control in terms of understanding the presence of
S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
61
Table 2
Summary of variables and expected impact on treaty effectiveness and levels of cooperation.
Variable Category
Measured as
Expected impact on treaty
effectiveness and levels of cooperation
Allocation mechanisms
Presence of water allocation mechanism
Flexible allocation mechanism
Specific allocation mechanism
Flexible and specific allocation mechanism
Number of institutional mechanisms
Individual institutional mechanism (6 separate institutional mechanisms)
Precipitation coefficient of variation
Precipitation coefficient of variation squared
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Initially positive but negative
after a certain threshold
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Positive
Insignificant
Positive
Institutional mechanisms
Water variability
Geography
Governance and democracy
Overall relations
Power and wealth
Level of control of basin by riparians (ratio and sum)
Level of importance of basin to riparians (ratio and sum)
Combined democracy score
Number of militarized exchanges
Total trade as a fraction of combined GDP
GDP ratio
GDP per capita ratio
better encouraged and sustained using incentives rather than
coercion (Barkin & Shambaugh, 1999; Young, 1994).
Given the varied expectations and empirical results regarding
power and conflict and cooperation over water, we do not expect
power asymmetry to be an important explanatory variable. Our
expectation is further supported by the argument that brute power
has been largely ineffective in the realm of hydropolitics (Barnett,
2000; Wolf, 1998). However, and in line with some of the neoliberal institutionalist literature cited above, we expect differences in wealth to matter given the wealthier state's proclivity to
create ‘good will’ (e.g. by providing incentives) with the less
developed riparian. Consequently, we expect more cooperative
behavior in economically asymmetric dyads.
To reflect the economic and welfare asymmetry discussed
above, we use annual country-level real GDP and per capita GDP
data from Gleditsch (2012). Average values of these two variables
were calculated for each of the dyad countries for the time period
for which data was available. Ratios of these average values were
then calculated for each dyad, with the larger value country serving
as the numerator and the lesser value the denominator, such that
larger values always indicate greater asymmetry. The ratio of total
GDP (GDP Ratio) is a measure of overall power asymmetry, or
economic power, while the ratio of the per capita GDP (GDP per
Capita Ratio) is a measure of wealth asymmetry, or welfare power.
By way of summary, Table 2 lists all the variables enumerated
above and indicates the expected impact on treaty effectiveness
and cooperation. The actual regression runs were based on the
following equation:
with a BAR score and were included in the regressions. Under half
(48%) of the dyads evaluated stipulated a water allocation mechanism (either specific, flexible or both). The average number of
institutional mechanisms per dyad was 3.4. Few extreme conflictive
events were recorded (i.e. negative BAR values in Fig. 1). In fact, no
instances of war (BAR ¼ 7), and only an isolated number of instances of events more extreme than “Political-military hostile
actions” (BAR ¼ 4) were recorded during the studied time frame.
“Minor official exchanges” (BAR ¼ 1) were the single most common
type of event.10 Regression results are presented in Table 4.
Starting with Model 1, which evaluated the mere presence of an
allocation mechanism and the number of institutional mechanisms,
we find, counter to our expectations, the average BAR score to be
negatively affected by the presence of an allocation mechanism.
Our general expectation was that basins governed by treaties with
an allocation mechanism should reflect a higher level of cooperation as opposed to a basin governed by a more generic treaty
without an allocation mechanism (De Stefano et al., 2012). A
number of reasons may explain this outcome. For one, treaties that
do not anticipate problems over water allocation are less likely to
include an allocation mechanism. In other words, there may be an
endogeneity problem in that treaties having that type of mechanism are often negotiated between countries that anticipate allocation problems to arise. However, based on a broader assessment
of our results we believe another, more plausible, explanation may
be in order. In particular, the generic allocation variable does not
distinguish between the various allocation mechanisms we are
examining, which could further impact conflict and cooperation.
AvgBAR ¼ B0 þ B1 Allocation þ B2 Institutions þ B3 Controls þ e
(1)
where AvgBAR represents the dependent variable indicating level
of cooperation/conflict, Allocation, Institutions and Controls
represent the respective vectors of explanatory and control variables, betas represent parameters to be estimated, and e represents
an error term. Higher AvgBAR scores represent higher levels
cooperation.
Results
Descriptive statistics and regression results
Descriptive statistics of the dataset are provided in Table 3. Of
the 221 country dyads in the dataset, 141 had at least one event
Table 3
Summary statistics.
Mean
Standard Deviation
AvgBAR
0.38
0.58
Number of Institutional
3.38
1.14
Mechanisms Per Dyad
Percentage of dyads containing the following mechanisms:
Allocate
0.48
0.50
Specific
0.33
0.47
Flexible
0.32
0.47
Specific*Flexible
0.18
0.38
Enforcement
0.43
0.50
Monitoring
0.82
0.39
Conflict resolution
0.70
0.46
Commission
0.96
0.19
Adaptability
0.24
0.43
Self-enforcement
0.24
0.43
62
S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
Fig. 1. Total number of water events by BAR value.
In fact, it is only when our models distinguish between the
categories of allocation mechanisms (models 4e6), that results
suggest a more nuanced relationship between treaty design and
conflict and cooperation over shared rivers. It appears that
allocation mechanisms that are either only specific in nature (such
as arrangements that call on the parties to divide/share a set or
fixed amount of water) or only flexible in nature (such as a mechanism that directs the parties to set up ad hoc consultations in an
effort to determine water allocations at a future date) bode negatively for cooperation between states. This is distinct from an
allocation mechanism that exemplifies both flexibility and specificity (like those allocation mechanisms that call on the parties to
divide available water by a percentage or ratio). Results suggest a
strong positive effect on levels of cooperation. In other words,
mechanisms that prescribe both specific and flexible water allocation features tend to increase the likelihood of cooperative
behavior among river riparians, relative to treaties with only one
type of allocation feature.
Our expectation that the assembly of institutional mechanisms
will contribute to increased cooperation is supported and follows
the findings of other scholars (Tir & Stinnett, 2012). Specifically, the
greater the number of such mechanisms in a treaty, the higher the
expected level of cooperation. This finding is robust with a highly
significant relationship (models 1e3). When considering the
institutional features individually, the self-enforcement, enforcement, and adaptability mechanisms appear to be most central for
Table 4
Water allocation/quantity agreements regression results.
Constant
Allocation mechanism
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Basic treaty
attributes only
Basic treaty attributes
& climatic and
geographic controls
Basic treaty
attributes &
all controls
Detailed treaty
attributes only
Detailed treaty
attributes & climatic
and geographic controls
Detailed treaty
attributes & all
controls
24.925**
13.110
52.503***
8.219
37.795
34.511
35.663***
8.867
78.075**
35.843
36.285***
9.731
41.854*
22.594
50.355
40.696
80.507
43.827
60.497***
12.002
72.431***
11.567
93.632***
18.197
36.726***
12.808
59.309***
11.923
69.553***
18.066
26.739**
13.090
61.548***
12.181
68.425***
17.912
50.861***
10.256
2.759
11.456
16.989*
9.920
15.821
21.432
35.502***
10.342
33.252***
10.052
31.616***
11.056
13.203
11.190
22.927**
9.380
24.029
20.007
19.439*
10.179
28.273***
9.907
225.391***
77.178
114.731***
43.639
0.447***
0.137
0.106*
0.060
0.410
0.511
30.028***
10.691
11.793
10.766
19.465**
9.602
31.345
19.721
19.080*
10.777
29.955***
9.983
249.631***
84.188
120.877***
45.540
0.446***
0.148
0.084
0.059
0.177
1.282
2.634***
0.789
2711.989
1788.494
0.017
0.203
3.115
2.895
0.579
Flexible
Specific
Flexible & specific
Number of institutional
mechanisms
Enforcement
16.096***
3.620
10.545***
3.516
10.899***
3.471
Monitoring
Conflict resolution
Commission
Adaptability
Self-enforcement
Precipitation CV
183.755**
77.462
79.241*
43.992
0.466***
0.136
0.121**
0.062
Precipitation CV squared
Basin sum (Control)
Basin ratio (Importance)
Democracy
Military
Trade importance
GDP ratio
GDP per capita ratio
R-squared
0.286
0.417
236.509***
82.498
100.428**
45.375
0.487**
0.149
0.123**
0.059
0.925
1.174
1.829**
0.793
3084.150*
1778.690
0.035
0.209
6.796*
2.839
0.493
S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
treaty effectiveness. Interestingly, the conflict resolution mechanism is both negative and significant meaning that the existence of
a conflict resolution variable by itself reduced the average BAR
score. While this result is counter to our expectations, it is possible
that countries that codify such a conflict resolution mechanism
often deal with complex cooperation problems, which the mechanism is not able to resolve (Koremenos, 2007). Alternatively, it is
also possible that the conflict resolution mechanism negotiated for
the treaties considered in this study are not institutionally mature
because the bargaining process that saw the negotiation of these
treaties was debilitated by particular transaction costs. (De Bryune
& Fischhendler, 2013). To our surprise, the monitoring and commission mechanisms proved to be insignificant. This is perhaps
because these two mechanisms are closely associated with the
enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms, respectively.
Among the control variables, most all performed as expected.
Starting with the climatic variables, we find evidence that average
BAR score increases as a function of water variability. While this may
not be in line with common arguments regarding environmental
change, international security, and conflict, it is in line with previous
scholarship that has found a robust relationship among water
variability, scarcity, and cooperation (Dinar et al., 2010; Tir &
Ackerman, 2009). However, like the results reflected in Dinar et al.
(2010), the negative coefficient on the squared CV term indicates a
relationship resembling an inverted U-shaped curve. That is, beyond
a certain level of variability the incidence of cooperation begins to
decrease and/or the incidence of conflict increases. Thus, the proposition that very high water variability may increase the likelihood
of conflict (or at least lower instances of cooperation) is still entirely
viable, as high water variability makes it increasingly difficult for
riparians to cooperate and honor their treaty commitments.
Per the geographical variables, our results suggest that when
both states in a given dyad control a large portion of the basin, the
level of cooperation evinced is negatively affected. Gleditsch et al.
(2006) make a similar discovery, finding that it is the absolute
size of the resources (rather than the disparity in the distribution
within a dyad) that is a cause for conflict and rivalry.11 As the more
general environmental politics literature suggests, both states may
be more inclined to engage in unilateral behavior given their
increased control of the resource and consequently diminishing
reliance on the other state (Young 1989, 354). However, when
proxying for the importance of the basin to the individual states,
our results indicate that when one state deems the basin important
(compared to the other state) the level of cooperation increases. It
seems that the state which considers the river basin to be more
important for its needs will work to foster cooperation with the
other state, which is less dependent on the basin.12 Dieperink
(2011) describes a similar dynamic, specifically as it relates to the
efforts of the Netherlands to foster cooperation, in the context of
the Rhine Chlorides negotiations.
Our political and economic variables also provided interesting
results. The democracy variable was insignificant across the models
tested. While somewhat surprising given earlier theoretical
research on the linkages between democracy and environmental
stewardship, the finding is not uncommon. Earlier empirical work
on international freshwater also obtained insignificant results for
the democracy variable (Brochmann & Hensel, 2011; Espey &
Towfique, 2004). Focusing on Europe, Bernauer and Kuhn (2010)
observe that democracy does not necessarily produce equitable
international behavior, finding, for instance, that free riding incentives are strong pertaining to river pollution.
Measures for overall country relations did exhibit significant
results. In particular, the more incidents of militarized encounters in
a given dyad the less cooperation was witnessed post-treaty. This
result was robust across all models tested and suggests that while a
63
history of militarized conflict may not necessarily stifle the likelihood of treaty formation or peaceful settlements (Hensel et al.,
2008; Tir & Ackerman, 2009), hydro-relations, more broadly, may
very well be vulnerable to a history of protracted conflict (Yoffe et al.,
2003). Trade levels between two countries as a percentage of their
GDP also yielded a positive and significant result, suggesting that
increased trade is associated with cooperation on water-related issues. Complementing other empirical studies on international
freshwater, we find that trade performs a kind of contract enforcing
role even after treaty signature (Brochmann, 2012). Finally, our
expectation that welfare asymmetry (which proxies for preponderance in financial capabilities and the capacity of a richer state to
incentivize less rich states to cooperate) as opposed to sheer power
asymmetry, was likewise supported. Preponderance in levels of
wealth between two countries may thus be conducive to cooperation and follows not only arguments made in the environmental
politics and negotiation literature but also results in other empirical
studies on international water (Brochmann, 2012; Dinar et al., 2011;
Raustiala & Victor, 1998; Zartman & Rubin, 2000).
Conclusions and policy implications
Our analysis is couched in recent empirical research, which investigates the general role of treaties in reducing conflict
(Brochmann, 2012; Tir & Stinnett, 2012). Our investigation also
contributes to a body of research that considers treaty design,
particularly as it relates to whether particular allocation and
institutional mechanisms contribute to the agreement's effectiveness and capacity to promote cooperative inter-state relations under conditions of water variability.
Our results suggest that high water variability actually drives
states to exhibit cooperative behavior. However, we find that once
variability increases beyond a certain threshold, cooperative
behavior is negatively affected. Thus, the claim that climate change
could have potentially destabilizing effects on international river
basins (Intelligence Community Assessment, 2012) is also supported. High variability is currently evidenced for river basins in
transitional climate zones such as the outer tropics and sub-tropics.
Africa, in particular, stands out as the continent with the largest
exposure to very high variability e especially parts of the Nile,
Niger, Lake Chad, Okavango, and Zambezi (De Stefano et al., 2012).
In addition to Sub-Saharan and northern Africa basins, parts of the
Euphrates-Tigris, Kura-Araks, the Colorado and Rio Grande, are
predicted to experience very high variability and are therefore at
risk of experiencing incidences of conflict and reduced cooperation
in the future (De Stefano et al., 2012).
Considering the allocation mechanisms, we find that only
mechanisms that prescribe both flexibility and specificity
contribute positively to cooperative behavior. In other words, when
negotiating new treaties or revising existing treaties policy-makers
should refrain from adopting allocation stipulations that are either
too vague (i.e. consultation) or too rigid (i.e. a fixed allocation
regime) as these do not seem to bode well for sustained cooperation, particularly under conditions of water variability. Fischhendler
(2008a) finds that treaties which incorporate ambiguity, particularly as it relates to an allocation regime, allow the parties to more
easily present the agreement to their domestic constituencies and
respective parliaments in an effort to successfully ratify the treaty.
While we recognize that ambiguous treaties may facilitate treaty
formation, our own empirical results suggest that in the long-run
such vagueness and ambiguity will have detrimental implications
in terms of treaty implementation, a finding supported by
Fischhendler (2008b).
Our results for the non-allocative institutional mechanisms
reveal that treaties containing these institutional mechanisms are
64
S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66
likely to witness heightened cooperation. This is to be expected
since a treaty that is increasingly institutionalized and includes
more mechanisms (so as to bind the parties to the agreement)
tends to be more stable in the long run. However, particular
mechanisms matter more than others and should perhaps take
precedence by treaty negotiators and policy makers. In particular,
treaties that codify and employ a direct enforcement measure, an
adaptability mechanism, and a self-enforcement clause, evince
higher levels of cooperation. This suggests that compared to conflict resolution, monitoring, and international commission clauses,
the enforcement, self-enforcement, and adaptability mechanisms
better bind the parties to the treaty. Enforcement and selfenforcement mechanisms, respectively, provide clear repercussions for defection and incentivize cooperative behavior by
altering the parties' pay-off structure. Adaptability mechanisms
often prescribe the building of some infrastructural project to
augment or control water supplies thus further compelling the
parties to invest in the agreement and its success (Global Water
Partnership, 2000). For instance, reflecting on the importance of
an adaptability mechanism, Salman and Uprety (2002) underscore
that the 1996 Ganges Treaty did not include water augmentation or
flood mitigation instruments. Consequently, the agreement lacked
recourse to deal with water variability which, according to the
authors, explains the heightened tensions between India and
Bangladesh in the post-treaty period.
Results for our political, economic, and geographic variables also
provide important implications for policy. For example, a history of
militarized incidents within a dyad negatively affects cooperation
suggesting that a history of political conflict reduces cooperative
relations over water. Enhanced trade has the opposite effect,
increasing the likelihood of water-related cooperation after a treaty
has been signed. Accordingly, increased trade can be used to boost
relations over water. Asymmetries across countries, both in economic and spatial terms, also seem to bode positively for cooperation. Richer states are in a position to promote cooperation by
providing incentives to less rich states. This is likely accomplished
through financial transfers or other forms of economic carrots. In
terms of geography, a state that deems the basin as more important
to its needs is likely to press or incentivize the other state to honor
the agreement, thus facilitating cooperation.
We conclude with some suggestions for future research. For one,
new variables and measures are needed to explore treaty performance in the context of water variability. To date, studies related to
international conflict and cooperation over water measure only the
presence of a treaty or an institutional provision codified in the
treaty. Thus, data assessing the actual implementation of treaties,
and their respective mechanisms, would prove useful. Another path
for further research can examine the actual resilience of the basin
to climate change and water variability based on the presence of a
treaty and its associated mechanisms. Our study examines the
relationship between a set of treaty mechanisms, conflict and
cooperation in a given basin. Arguably, such an approach provides a
type of proxy for basin resilience (if conflict is reduced and cooperation promoted one can argue that the basin is more peaceful and
increasingly resilient to water-related political tensions). However,
examining how treaties and associated mechanisms decrease the
impact of water variability, say, on the basin population or mitigate
any other socio-economic effects may provide a better proxy for
basin resilience. This type of analysis will require further development of global datasets measuring impacts of events related to high
water variability (floods and droughts). Finally, and for reasons of
data availability, our dataset extends only to 2001. Treaty design has
evolved over time, with newer treaties containing more specified
mechanisms. As data becomes available, these more recent treaties
can help validate and refine the findings of the present study.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their
thoughtful comments and suggestions. We acknowledge the
Research Support Budget of the World Bank for the funding provided for this project. We are grateful to Thomas Bernauer for his
comments on a prior version of this paper. Olivia Odom, Amy
McNally, and Pradeep Kurukulasuriya contributed to an early
version of this project.
Endnotes
1
This distinction is likewise echoed in the Third Assessment Report. It was argued
that “one major implication of climate change for agreements between competing
users (within a region or upstream versus downstream) is that allocating rights in
absolute terms may lead to further disputes in years to come when the total absolute amount of water available may be different” (IPCC, 2001: 225).
2
Our study extends only to 2001 because one of our control variables, the military
exchanges variable, ceases to report data beyond 2001. In line with standard statistical practice, our analysis could not go beyond 2001.
3
Such a measure provides a comprehensive assessment of hydropolitical relations
in the basin, which could potentially be inaccurate if one only considered conflictive
or cooperative behavior alone. For the sake of completeness, however, we also ran
separate regressions using only cooperative events and only conflictive events.
Results from these regressions were not qualitatively different from those obtained
using the combination of both types of events.
4
Other databases utilized in large-n studies pertaining to conflict and cooperation
over water include the Correlates of War (used by Tir & Stinnett, 2012) and Issues
Correlates of War (used by Brochmann & Hensel, 2009). Despite their merits, the
Correlates of War database pertains to all forms of militarized conflicts (so the
reason for the conflict may not necessarily be water related) and the Issues Correlates of War only pertains to conflicting claims (contentious events) and research
is still underway to collect claims data for basins/countries in Asia, Africa, and parts
of Europe.
5
According to the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence (2008) “climate
change could threaten domestic stability in some states, potentially contributing to
intra- or, less likely, inter-state conflict, particularly over access to increasingly
scarce water resources.
6
Accessed online on 23 June 2012 at: http://www.cgiar-csi.org/data/uea-cru-ts-v310-01-historic-climate-database.
7
Using run-off data provides another way to measure variability but run-off data is
not consistently available on a yearly basis like the precipitation data, which is also
available across a much longer time frame. See World Bank Water and Climate
Change Project (World Bank, 2009) and CLIRUN-II (Strzepek et al., 2008).
8
Given that exports from Country 1 to Country 2 were not always equal to imports
by Country 2 from Country 1, due to discrepancies in national accounting, we took
the average of the two for each dyad.
9
It is important to note that these results and arguments could also be supporting
the ‘hydro-hegemony’ school of thought which argues that the most powerful state
in the basin is able to determine the outcome of basin interactions, including
cooperation, assuming the most powerful state will benefit from such a policy
(Zeitoun & Warner, 2006).
10
In the TFDD Water Events database, events are coded according to the following
scale: 7 Formal declaration of war; extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation
or high strategic costs; 6 Extensive military acts; 5 Small scale military acts; 4
Politicalemilitary hostile actions; 3 Diplomaticeeconomic hostile actions; 2
Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction; 1 Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction; 0 Neutral or non-significant acts for the
inter-nation situation; 1 Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressionsdmild
verbal support; 2 Official verbal support of goals, values or regime; 3 Cultural or
scientific agreement or support (non-strategic); 4 Non-military economic, technological or industrial agreement; 5 Military economic or strategic support; 6 International freshwater treaty; major strategic alliance (regional or international); 7
Voluntary unification into one nation.
11
In fact, our variable measuring the percent of the basin within a country (i.e.
ratio/proxying for one state that has comparative control of the basin) came out
insignificant. Similarly it was highly correlated with another geographical variable.
In all, we removed it from the analysis.
12
Our variable measuring the size of the river basin within the country as a percentage of the total area of the countries (i.e. sum/proxying for the importance of
the basin to both states) also came out insignificant and highly correlated with
another geographical variable. Thus, it was removed from the statistical analysis.
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