Download Market structures, political institutions, and democratization: the

RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 87
Review of International Political Economy 4:1 Spring 1997: 87–126
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
Market structures, political institutions,
and democratization: the Latin American
and East European experiences
David Bartlett and Wendy Hunter
Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University
A B S TRA CT
This article develops a structural and institutional framework for exploring
the prospects for stable democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
Its guiding premise is that democratic consolidation hinges on the willingness of societal actors to use the party system as their primary medium
of interest articulation. The structural analysis examines how the resources
of agents in different socioeconomic systems influence their affinity for
party or non-party strategies. The institutional component assesses how
party and state institutions reshape actors’ strategic incentives. Integrating
the two logics leads to the following argument: market structures in the
developing capitalist countries of Latin America encourage economic elites
to circumvent the democratic process. Structural conditions in Eastern
Europe’s transitional socialist countries induce a wider range of actors to
employ party strategies, but place anti-democratic elements in a favored
position within the electoral arena. Democratic consolidation in the two
regions necessitates the building of party and state institutions capable of
overcoming these structural impediments.
K E YW O RD S
Eastern Europe; Latin America; democratic transitions; political institutions; social structures; economic reform.
Comparing transitions from authoritarian rule in Latin America and
Eastern Europe has become a prominent theme of the contemporary
literature in political economy. What can we learn from comparisons of
two regions possessing such dissimilar political, economic and social
structures?
Our objective in this article is to analyze the factors shaping prospects
for stable democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Our guiding
premise is that the central problem of democratic consolidation in postauthoritarian countries is inducing societal actors to choose ‘voice’ in the
electoral arena over ‘exit’ to non-party media of interest articulation and
© 1997 Routledge 0969–2290
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 88
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
to secure their long-term ‘loyalty’ to democratic principles (Hirschman,
1970). The historical experiences of the western countries illustrate the
difficulties of attaining these goals. Establishment of stable participatory
democracies required two hundred years in the West, where highly
developed markets provided actors with a range of alternatives to
democratic contestation (Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Rustow,
1970). The challenges confronting the fledgling democracies of the South
and East are even more daunting. We argue that the structural features
of Latin America’s market economies give owners of capital and land
incentives and opportunities to pursue non-party political strategies.
Conversely, the very same resources that allow economic elites in capitalist systems to exit from the electoral arena are missing or poorly
developed in the transitional economies of the East. Paradoxically, this
creates a broader social base for party contestation in Eastern Europe
than in the capitalist South. But because the agents least endowed with
market skills are also the ones most likely to choose party strategies, the
electoral system tends to favor the most reactionary elements of postcommunist society.
Our analysis of the socioeconomic determinants of political strategies
therefore suggests two different kinds of structural obstacles to stable
democracy in the two regions. The fundamental dilemma facing the postauthoritarian countries of Latin America is overcoming the reluctance of
economic elites to support mass participatory democracy, which they
have often perceived as a threat to their proprietary interests. The main
predicament in Eastern Europe is transforming the behavior of actors
who already view parties as their principal mode of interest representation but whose activities do not advance the goal of creating liberal
democracies and market economies.
We go on to argue that whether the Latin American and East European
countries surmount these structural barriers to democratic consolidation
hinges on the nature of party and state institutions. Certain institutional
configurations reinforce structural tendencies, while others may override socioeconomic constraints by altering the incentives and policy
preferences of societal actors. We thus maintain that a clear picture of
post-authoritarian trajectories in the two regions demands careful
analysis of the relationship between social structures and political institutions, heretofore treated independently in much of the literature on
transitions to democracy.
We begin by critically analyzing extant approaches to post-authoritarian outcomes in Latin America and Eastern Europe, assessing their
explanatory power with respect to both inter- and intra-regional patterns.
We then develop an alternative model of democratic transitions, suggesting a way of integrating structural and institutional analyses to
illuminate the factors that promote or impede democratic consolidation
88
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 89
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
in the South and East. While we refer selectively to empirical cases to
demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of this integrative framework, our approach is heuristic and polemical: we believe that the interaction of market structures and political institutions constitutes the most
promising sphere of research on transitions to democracy, and offer a set
of hypotheses about that relationship with the hope of spurring further
theoretical refinements and empirical testing.
T HE ORE T I CAL A P P RO A CH E S TO
P OS T - AU T HORITA RIA N O U TCO M E S
The literature on post-authoritarian outcomes is organized into three
general schools (Kitschelt, 1992a). One emphasizes the role of political
processes in transitions to democracy. Examples include ‘path dependency’ approaches (Bruszt and Stark, 1990, 1991; Fishman, 1990; Karl
and Schmitter, 1991; Linz, 1990a; Stepan, 1986) and models of the
strategic interactions of key actors engaged in the transition (Collier and
Norden, 1992; Kitschelt, 1992b; Przeworski, 1991). Process-type explanations assume that the modes of transition (e.g. ‘reforma’, ‘ruptura’,
‘pactada’) and actors’ choices of electoral rules and constitutional designs
exert an independent impact on the prospects of democratic consolidation. Such approaches are useful for explaining political patterns in the
immediate post-authoritarian period. For example, the ability of the military to extract guarantees of political autonomy made for relatively
smooth transitions to civilian rule in Brazil and Chile, while the failure
of the Argentine junta to do so created serious problems for the successor
government of Raul Alfonsín. However, modes of transition models are
poorly suited to explaining long-term trajectories, which depend largely
on the broader socioeconomic structures in which negotiated pacts and
other strategies are embedded. Nor can they account for changes in the
distribution of power that invalidate predictions of actors’ choices and
strategies based on the initial configuration of forces. Finally, neither the
modes of transition nor strategic choice variants of the process school
can anticipate shifts in actors’ interests as the institutional environment
evolves and previously unforeseen opportunities and inducements arise.
A second school focuses on the ways in which social and economic
structures inherited from the authoritarian period impinge on the political behavior of agents now engaged in democratic contestation. For
instance, Claus Offe (1991) argues that the legacies of Marxism-Leninism,
central economic planning, and ethnic-national conflicts make the challenges confronting post-communist Eastern Europe more formidable
than those facing Latin America. Herbert Kitschelt (1992c) develops a
structural model of party cleavages in Eastern Europe, positing that economic system type and level of industrial development determine the
89
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 90
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
axes of electoral competition as well as the relative strength of liberal and
conservative parties. Iván Szelényi and Szonja Szelény (1992) utilize a
class-based approach to explain the underrepresentation of social democratic constituencies in Eastern Europe’s first post-communist elections.
The chief virtue of structural approaches is their ability to illuminate
the broad socioeconomic differences between Eastern Europe and Latin
America, thereby supplying an indispensable theoretical foundation for
any interregional comparison. By showing how preexisting social structures shape the preferences and strategies of political agents during the
consolidation phase, such approaches advance on modes of transition
and other process-type explanations that emphasize short-term patterns.
The main drawback of structural theory is its inability to explain the
widely divergent political trends among countries possessing similar
socioeconomic attributes. Why do some Latin American countries show
strong signs of achieving stable democracy (e.g. Chile) while others
(Brazil) do not? By the same token, why do certain East European countries (e.g. Czech Republic) display favorable prospects for democratic
consolidation, while others (Romania) remain mired in social conflict
and stagnation? Such disparities highlight the importance of the institutional context in which democratization in the two regions takes place.
Exemplary of the institutional approach to transitions is the growing
body of scholarly research on the sources and consequences of alternative constitutional designs in new democracies (Elster, 1993; Geddes,
1993; Lijphart, 1992; Merkel, 1992; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Other
contributors to the institutional school include Scott Mainwaring and
Timothy Scully (1995), who argue that the degree of institutionalization
of Latin American party systems helps determine levels of stability in
democratic countries of the region. Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) similarly
emphasizes party institutions in his comparison of ‘delegative’ and
‘representative’ democracies. He contends that the former’s lack of a
‘network of institutionalized powers that gives texture to the policymaking process’ prevents political parties from engendering the social
consensus necessary for democratic consolidation.
Regrettably, state institutions and their role in democratization have
received somewhat less attention in the transitions literature. Exceptions
include O’Donnell (1993), who examines the juridical dimensions of the
state’s authority structure in new democracies. M. Stephen Fish (1991)
argues that a robust civil society requires a well-constituted state. For
societal groups effectively to press their claims on the state, they must
have something to ‘push up against’. Kurt Weyland (1996a) maintains
that redemocratization in Brazil had the unintended consequence of
splintering an already highly fragmented state and thereby heightening
actors’ incentives to bypass the party system and establish privileged
relationships with specific state agencies. This form of post-authoritarian
90
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 91
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
clientelism benefits elites at the expense of the poor and unorganized,
thwarting implementation of equity-enhancing reforms in a country
whose tremendous socioeconomic inequalities pose a threat to democratic consolidation.
In our view, the institutional school has three important limitations.
First, while the literature arguing the superiority of certain constitutional
designs over others (e.g. parliamentarianism over presidentialism) is
compelling (Linz, 1990b; Linz and Valenzuela, 1994; Stepan and Skach,
1993), this variant of the ‘new institutionalism’ cannot explain divergent
outcomes among countries possessing similar institutional frameworks
(e.g. Argentina and Peru). Second, the institutional literature generally
views party and state organizations independently of each other. But
whether parties promote stable democracy rests in no small part on their
relationship to the state, underscoring the need for a theoretical approach
that explicitly incorporates the interaction between the two spheres.
Finally, the institutional school offers little insight into what shapes
actors’ views about party and state institutions. Whether political agents
perceive these organizations as effective mechanisms of interest articulation largely depends on their structural position in society.
MARK E T S T RUCT U RE S , P O L ITICA L IN S TITU TIO N S
A ND S T A B L E D E M O CRA CY
The broad meaning of ‘democracy’ and the generalizability of western
liberal norms to other regions of the world remain a source of dispute
among political scientists. For our purposes, we embrace Adam
Przeworski’s conception of democracy as ‘organized uncertainty’. Here,
‘consolidated democracy’ describes a political system in which a critical
mass of actors exhibits: (1) an ex ante commitment to the rules of democratic contestation, the results of which are a priori unknown to
participants; and (2) an ex post compliance with those outcomes, whereby
the losers bide their time for the next round of competition and the
winners resist the impulse to exploit their newly won power and harass
the losers (1991: 10–50). In our view, this conception is far better suited
to addressing the problems of new democracies than modernization
theory (e.g. Lipset, 1981), which stresses the affinity between stable
democracy and advanced industrial capitalism in the west. It also
advances on traditional liberal theories of democracy (e.g. Dahl, 1971),
which emphasize the formal attributes of stable democracies (freedom
of expression, the right to vote, free and fair elections, etc.). Post-authoritarian countries face the task not merely of erecting the legal apparatus
of democracy, but of inducing political elites to enter the democratic
game even at the risk of losing and persuading ordinary citizens that
they can protect their interests without resort to extra-democratic means.
91
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 92
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
Following Przeworski, we presume that democratic consolidation so
conceived is especially problematic in Latin America (which had a long
history of civilian government before the recent wave of democratization, but where popular participation was often limited and the results
of democratic elections were periodically overturned by military officials) and Eastern Europe (whose communist regimes made no effort
even to fulfill the legal prerequisites of competitive democracy).
The heuristic model developed below integrates the logics of structural and institutional analyses: how do socioeconomic structures and
political institutions shape actors’ willingness to enter the democratic
game and abide by the rules of democracy after they have entered?
The core assumption underpinning the model is that the long-term
democratic consolidation in the South and East hinges on the formation
of broad-based party systems. Political parties perform a variety of
functions vital to the prospects of stable democracy in the two regions.
An effective party system engenders confidence in the democratic
process, moderates and channels societal demands into institutionalized
media of conflict resolution, lengthens the time horizon of actors by
providing electoral losers with the means to mobilize their resources for
subsequent rounds of competition, and prevents the grievances of disenchanted groups from spilling over into the sort of mass mobilization that
antagonizes elites and invites reimposition of authoritarian rule. Political
parties also help democratically elected officials to govern. Effective
governance through parties is especially critical in countries facing
serious economic adjustment problems, as is the case in most of
Latin America and Eastern Europe. Adjustment policies that require
consent by a duly elected legislature are apt to be more modest than
those initiated by executive decree, but also more likely to gain the broad
social consensus necessary for successful implementation (O’Donnell,
1994: 63–4).
We do not assign a central role to corporatist intermediation and other
non-party modes of interest representation. While corporatism has
promoted stability in many Western democracies (Katzenstein, 1985a,
1985b; Offe, 1981; Schmitter, 1979), it is not likely to foster democratic
consolidation in post-authoritarian Latin America and Eastern Europe.
While intermediary interest organizations may be decisive in forcing
authoritarian regimes from power, once the founding elections have been
scheduled they are usually displaced by political parties, whose territorial constituencies are better suited for mobilizing broad-based support.
Free riding further hinders functionally based interest associations
in new democracies, as popular enthusiasm for mass mobilization
attending the ancien régime’s ouster wanes and local agents embrace the
principle of voluntary participation (Schmitter, 1992: 430–3). Developments in Latin America and Eastern Europe substantiate this pessimistic
92
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 93
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
appraisal of the possibilities of interest representation via non-party
mechanisms. Historically, state corporatism in the Southern Cone
excluded major sectors of labor, while interest group lobbying promoted
clientelism and rent seeking among economic elites. More inclusive
forms of corporatism might bolster Latin America’s new democracies.
But owing to the region’s gross socioeconomic inequalities, inclusionary
corporatism would require complementary party organizations to ensure
adequate representation of marginalized groups and to give organized
labor added leverage in tripartite bargaining with the state and business
(Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1977). National social pacts have not proven
very durable in the South since the return to democracy, as ineffectual
peak associations and slack labor demand induced workers to accept
wage concessions in plant-level negotiations (Blake, 1994; McGuire,
1994). Meanwhile, postcommunist Eastern Europe lacks the robust, independent civil associations underlying Western European-style societal
corporatism. Inchoate forms of tripartite bargaining have emerged in
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Charap et al., 1992: 12–13;
Patkai, 1993; Slay, 1994: 117–18, 186–7). But corporatist intermediation
remains limited, as associations of workers and enterprise managers are
hampered by organizational fragmentation, poor financing and adverse
economic conditions (Bresser Pereira et al., 1993: 211).
We therefore focus on the role of party systems in new democracies.
How do socioeconomic structures and political institutions affect actors’
perceptions of the utility of parties as media of interest representation?
The structural component of our theoretical framework examines the
impact of markets on actors’ affinity for party-type strategies. We argue
that the higher the degree of marketization, the greater the opportunities
for disinvestment, patronage and other non-party strategies detrimental
to stability in young democracies. This leads us to surmise that broadbased participation in electoral politics is most likely in non-market
environments, where actors enjoy fewer exit options. But because parties
tend to favor reactionary groups in non-market economies, such systems
do not promote democratic consolidation.
The institutional component of the model examines how the specific
features of party and state organizations mold post-authoritarian outcomes. We argue that whether party systems promote stable democracy
depends on their ability to balance ‘representation’ and ‘control’.
Similarly, a strong social consensus for democracy requires state institutions that balance ‘embeddedness’ and ‘coherence’. Representation and
embeddedness make political leaders accountable to their constituencies,
thereby encouraging actors to exercise voice through the electoral system
and discouraging losers from exiting the democratic arena. Institutional
arrangements that meld the representative and embedded dimensions of
parties and states thus provide new democracies with the legitimacy
93
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 94
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
essential for long-term stability. Meanwhile, control and coherence insulate party and state institutions from the immediate demands of mass
societal groups while shielding those agencies from capture by individual sectors advancing particularistic agendas. The controlling and cohering elements of institutions promote democratic consolidation in two
ways. First, they give economic elites confidence that their property rights
will be adequately protected under mass democracy, thus inducing those
actors to stay in the electoral arena. Second, they allow state agencies to
provide universal welfare and other collective goods necessary to keep
underprivileged groups loyal to the democratic order. In short, party and
state institutions help foster participation among actors whose structural
position in the post-authoritarian environment would otherwise suggest
a proclivity for non-democratic political strategies.
Our decision to approach democratic transitions from an avowedly
political economy perspective is not intended to diminish the importance of non-economic factors. Clearly, the political strategies of actors
are shaped by a variety of considerations (ethnic, national, cultural, religious, etc.) in addition to economic interests. But our focus on the
economic dimensions of democratization allows us to situate Latin
America and Eastern Europe (whose key differences emanate precisely
from their structural attributes at the time of transition) in an analytically useful comparative framework. Moreover, this approach permits
us to build on current scholarly research on democratic transitions that
stresses the interplay between the economic and political components of
democratization (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman, 1995).
Structural determinants of political strategies
We start with a simple, stylized model consisting of three factors of
production (capital, labor and land) and three economic system types
(market, partial market and non-market). This provides an essential theoretical foundation for comparing the ways in which socioeconomic
structures inherited from the authoritarian period shape the resources
and incentives of actors in Latin America and Eastern Europe. These
economic system types differ markedly across the two regions.
The following are the decisive features of the ‘market’ systems of the
south. Private property is the predominant form of ownership. Income
streams deriving from private ownership of capital are legally protected
and ideologically legitimized. While state regulations strongly influence
the strategies of workers, producers and consumers, the market determines the main patterns of resource allocation in the economy. Functioning markets for labor, capital and commodities subject economic
agents to effective competition and enable those actors to forge horizontal connections independently of the state. In the ‘non-market’ systems of
94
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 95
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
the former Soviet Union and the Balkan peninsula, collectivization has
obliterated the landowning elite while marginalization of small-scale
enterprises has eradicated most vestiges of the entrepreneurial class.
Decades of central planning and isolation from the world economy have
depleted the physical capital of large-scale industry, eroded the skills
of enterprise management, and undermined the work ethic of labor.
Elimination of commercial banks and other financial intermediaries
has deprived producers and households of the means to raise capital,
accumulate savings, and diversify income portfolios. The ‘partial market’
systems of East Central Europe differ from non-markets to the degree that
the transition from central planning has progressed considerably farther
and a politically consequential entrepreneurial class has emerged. But
such systems remain distinct even from market economies, like those of
many Latin American countries, that possess sizeable state sectors and a
dirigiste tradition.1
The structural features of these economic systems allow us to deduce
the probable political strategies of the three types of asset holders. We
hypothesize that the extent of marketization shapes the economic
resources and hence the political strategies of holders of these assets.
Table 1 shows the relative intensity of societal support for party-type
modes of interest representation in each system. The model suggests that
economic elites in Latin America tend to look to non-party strategies, as
the availability of markets enlarges their opportunities to circumvent
political parties. While well-developed markets do not preclude elite
participation in electoral politics, they do increase the diversity of actors’
incomes and heighten factor mobility. The model indicates a higher
dependence on party strategies in non-market systems of the East, where
socialism removed many of the exit options available to agents in the
capitalist South. Finally, we expect actors in partial market economies
to adopt mixed political strategies.2
Capital
We hypothesize that the higher the level of marketization, the greater
the incentives and capacities for holders of capital assets to pursue nonparty political strategies. Access to export markets enables producers to
divert supplies from the domestic market. Highly diversified portfolios
Table 1 Societal preferences for party strategy
Capital
Land
Labor
Market
Partial market
Non-market
LOW
LOW
HIGH
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
95
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 96
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
facilitate tax evasion and concealment of income and permit producers
to tolerate the revenue losses stemming from production shutdowns.
Markets give owners of capital the financial resources to establish particularistic ties to state agencies, enabling them to exchange economic
concessions for political favors. Finally, highly mobile or fungible assets
allow industrial and financial capital to influence state policy via disinvestment. While not costless, these instruments enjoy one important
advantage over party-type strategies. Mobilization through political
parties requires higher levels of collective action, and hence creates
greater problems of free riding and dispersion of benefits.
Holders of capital in partial market systems like the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland enjoy fewer opportunities for exit from the party
system. The relatively advanced state of marketization and privatization
gives nascent entrepreneurial groups greater flexibility than their
counterparts in non-markets. But due to the low level of accumulation
under central planning, capital owners in these systems lack the structural advantages enjoyed by elites in full-fledged market economies.
Enterprise managers can draw on their long-standing connections to the
state to lobby for regulatory exceptions, tax breaks and other favors. But
lacking large amounts of liquid resources, their ability to forge particularistic links to the state is limited.3 Poorly developed capital markets
and an inconvertible currency prevent business groups from using the
threat of disinvestment for political gain. Nor is limiting production an
effective instrument: lockouts and withholding supplies from the local
market are not credible threats when most of the state sector is undergoing capacity reductions and few enterprises possess large export
markets to which they can divert production.
Owing to these constraints on non-party mechanisms, party strategies
will prove a more attractive option for capital than in the market cases.
But to the extent that capital in partial markets resorts to party modes
of interest representation, it will not function as a cohesive bloc. The
progression of markets creates divisions within the ranks of producers,
with pro-reform entrepreneurs pitted against the managers of smokestack industries likely to suffer under increasing competition.
A different dynamic obtains in non-market cases like Romania,
Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia. In the East Central European countries,
marketization weakens the electoral potential of anti-reform industrial
groups by inducing putative entrepreneurs to defect. The possibility that
industrial groups will splinter in this fashion is diminished in nonmarket environments. State enterprises in such countries cannot readily
convert their capital assets in ways that would allow them to enter
competitive markets. Because the costs of exit are higher than in partial
markets, conservative blocs of old guard enterprise managers are more
easily maintained, politically powerful and inclined to look to parties as
96
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 97
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
their primary mode of interest representation. At the same time, proreform elements of industry will remain numerically small and thus
handicapped within the party system.
Land
Landowners operate under greater constraints than owners of capital.
The inherent nature of land circumscribes possibilities for disinvestment,
as asset immobility hinders physical transfers of production to alternative sites. Limits on the productive life of farmland compel owners
periodically to remove portions of it from production, thereby reducing
income streams. Endemic oversupply in world agricultural markets
generates downward pressure on prices and profits. Finally, a variety
of factors (short production windows, seasonal fluctuations in demand,
vagaries of weather and environment, vulnerability to shifts in world
markets) expose agricultural producers to high uncertainty. The degree
of marketization of agricultural sectors strongly affects how holders of
land respond to these constraints. Our model suggests that the more
marketized the agrarian sector, the greater the affinity of land holders
for individualistic economic strategies. The less marketized, the greater
their dependence on party mobilization and direct state assistance to
compensate for these structural liabilities.
Highly mechanized, capital-intensive, modernized agrarian producers
enjoy a number of economic means of reducing uncertainty unavailable
to landowners in less marketized systems. They can widen their investment portfolios by diversifying into food processing or agro-industry,
transform their production lines by developing specialized, high-value
commodities, liquidate poorly performing assets, and tap export
markets. These strategies simultaneously reduce producers’ reliance on
price supports and other forms of state protection and afford them
considerable leverage over the state. The state’s dependence on cash
crops for foreign exchange enables producers to extract economic concessions. Moreover, producers who enjoy access to external markets can
acquire political leverage by threatening to divert supplies from important domestic constituencies (Bates, 1981).
The model suggests that agricultural producers in partial market
economies will pursue a mixture of party and non-party strategies. Their
relatively poorly diversified income portfolios render them vulnerable to
adverse shifts in world markets and hence more dependent on the state
for subsidies, price supports and other insurance mechanisms. But the
patterns of agrarian responses within partial markets will be bifurcated.
Efficient producers will avail themselves of the limited yet growing number of marketing outlets to divert production away from state-controlled
distributional networks. This imparts to modern sectors a bias towards
non-party strategies comparable to those employed by producers in
97
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 98
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
highly marketized contexts. But traditional producers lack the skills,
fungible assets and market experience effectively to employ non-party
strategies. For this reason, the most backward elements of the agrarian
sectors in East Central Europe are highly amenable to electoral mobilization by rural-based parties. The policy platforms of those parties typically
appeal to fears of encroaching market competition, rapid integration into
the world economy, and increasing penetration of foreign capital.
The pull of electoral strategies will be stronger in non-market
systems like Russia, where opportunities for exit to the market are even
more restricted. This makes economically backward producers highly
susceptible to mobilization by agrarian parties, whose anti-market
orientation is amplified by populist appeals to national, cultural and
religious sentiments. Alternatively, agrarian producers will resort to a
political strategy emphasizing physical coercion of the peasantry. Their
inability to diversify into non-land income sources makes them extremely dependent on the maintenance of a low-cost and servile rural
labor force.4 And so in addition to mobilization by right-wing parties,
landed elites may well be compelled to seek state protection via direct
repression of local labor. Thus, in contrast to the opportunistic non-party
strategies favored by producers in highly marketized systems, the nonparty tactics employed by their counterparts in poorly developed
markets are defensive in nature.
Labor
The structural model suggests that party mobilization will be the
preferred strategy of labor in all three economic systems. In each case,
workers face major obstacles to the use of economic strategies. In particular, the free rider problem constrains their capacity to utilize strikes,
organized labor’s principal economic weapon. Whereas holders of capital
and land can effectively employ their main instruments of economic
leverage in ways that do not require high levels of collective action, the
efficacy of labor strikes hinges on the mobilization of large numbers of
workers (Offe, 1981: 146–50). For the former, disinvestment and production shutdowns generate losses that are dispersed throughout the
enterprise, but need not impose onerous burdens on individual capitalists and landowners. By contrast, labor strikes entail severe personal
hardships and high risks for participating workers and their families.
Management may induce defections through selective payoffs, sustain
production by hiring replacements, or eliminate strikers’ jobs altogether.
But while the collective action problem circumscribes the effectiveness
of strikes in all economic systems, the level of marketization strongly
influences the range of alternative economic and political instruments
available to workers. In regions where markets are more developed, like
Latin America, skilled workers in dynamic sectors and industries vital
98
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 99
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
to foreign exchange are well positioned to adopt a strategy of corporatist bargaining with business and the state. But while corporatism in
the capitalist South has periodically advanced the position of individual
sectors of labor, it has not improved the economic lot of labor as a
whole. Moreover, the exclusionary nature of corporatist intermediation
undermines the goal of establishing participatory democracy. Ad hoc
concertation and other non-institutionalized variants of extra-party
representation also tend to exclude lower strata of labor. Because lowskilled workers do not perceive negotiated pacts as an effective means
of representing their interests, they look to party mobilization as their
primary political strategy.
In the partial market economies of Eastern Europe, highly skilled
workers possessing transferable assets are likely to choose individualistic economic strategies over direct bargaining with the state. The
disintegration of the state sector has created multiple opportunities for
new competitors, whose entry costs remain low relative to those facing
entrepreneurs in the more established markets of Latin America.
Defections of the most entrepreneurial members of the labor force from
state enterprises to small-scale business undercut the collective bargaining power of organized labor. Low-skilled workers remaining in the
state sector will therefore look to the electoral arena as their chief
medium of interest representation. The fact that the principal asset of
blue-collar labor in the former socialist countries resides in its large
numbers reinforces its affinity for party-type strategies.
The structural features of non-market systems impart to labor a strong
bias towards party strategies. The virtual absence of market opportunities limits possibilities for entrepreneurship and other economic
strategies. Moreover, the paucity of autonomous civil associations in
Eastern Europe eliminates an essential precondition for institutionalized
corporatism. These factors leave labor almost completely dependent on
electoral mobilization. Yet the collective action problem also impairs
party-type strategies. Voter apathy induces many blue-collar workers to
stay home during elections, while upward socioeconomic mobility leads
others to defect to bourgeois parties. Labor thus finds itself in a paradoxical position: its structural position renders it highly dependent on
electoral strategies, but the collective action problems distinctive to labor
parties sap their cohesion and create strong incentives for workers to
resort to politically destabilizing non-party strategies.
Structural preferences and political trajectories
To sum up, the model outlined above links the features of three general
types of economic systems to sectoral perceptions of the efficacy of
political parties. In market economies, holders of capital and land have
99
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 100
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
Table 2 Structurally determined trajectories
Market
Partial market
Non-market
Broad-based
party system
UNLIKELY
STABLE
POSSIBLE
STABLE
LIKELY
UNSTABLE
Labor-based
system
POSSIBLE
UNSTABLE
POSSIBLE
UNSTABLE
POSSIBLE
UNSTABLE
Capital–labor
coalition
UNLIKELY
UNSTABLE
POSSIBLE
UNSTABLE
LIKELY
UNSTABLE
Worker–farmer
coalition
UNLIKELY
UNSTABLE
POSSIBLE
UNSTABLE
POSSIBLE
UNSTABLE
Agro-industrial
coalition
POSSIBLE
UNSTABLE
POSSIBLE
UNSTABLE
POSSIBLE
UNSTABLE
a relatively low affinity for electoral strategies. In countries where
opportunities for exit to the market are limited, these actors look to the
party system as their principal mode of interest representation. In all
three systems, collective action problems constrain labor’s ability to use
economic instruments. Workers therefore look to the electoral arena,
where they can most easily bring to bear their numerical advantages.
Table 2 connects these structurally determined societal preferences to
broader political tendencies in Latin America and Eastern Europe. The
horizontal axis shows the same three economic system types displayed
in Table 1. The vertical axis presents five possible configurations
reflecting different levels of sectoral participation in electoral politics. In
a ‘broad-based party system’, holders of capital, land and labor all view
the electoral arena as their primary medium of political action. In ‘laborbased’ systems, the interests of organized labor prevail over those of
capital and landowners, who consequently turn to non-party strategies.
The remaining three ideal types – ‘capital–labor’, ‘worker–farmer’ and
‘agro-industrial’ – designate party systems dominated by two-sector
coalitions.5
For each party configuration, we pose two questions. First, what is
the likelihood of its emergence in different economic systems? Second,
what are the prospects for stable democracy in the various combinations
of party and economic system type?
Broad-based systems are most conducive to stable democracy. All three
asset holders view the party system as fair and effective, reducing
incentives to resort to politically destabilizing non-party mechanisms.
The fact that the party system is socially balanced encourages conciliation and compromise, promotes moderation, and discourages dissatisfied
groups from taking their grievances to the streets in ways threatening
to economic and political elites. But given capital and land’s affinity for
100
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 101
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
non-party strategies, such systems are unlikely to emerge in market
economies. Ironically, broad-based party systems are most apt to appear
in non-market economies, whose structure limits the opportunities for
all three sectors to pursue non-market strategies. However, such systems
are also unstable insofar as the most reactionary groups in society tend
to dominate party institutions. For example, the strong performance of
ultranationalists and former communists in the December 1993 parliamentary elections in Russia enlarged the anti-reform and anti-democratic
bloc within the Parliament. Broad-based systems are also possible in
partial market economies, but show greater inclination towards westerntype liberalism as the expansion of markets and private property opens
up political space for entrepreneurs and other progressive elements.
Labor-based systems are possible in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
In both cases, postwar industrialization created a large, physically
concentrated and highly mobilizable working class. Labor-based populism is also politically unstable in the two regions, but for quite different
reasons. Historically, labor party domination of Latin American governments has produced wage–price spirals that spur capital flight and
induce economic elites to appeal for restoration of authoritarian rule. By
contrast, the partial and non-market systems of Eastern Europe possess
no sizeable propertied class whose interests are threatened by organized
labor. Indeed, far from perceiving organized labor as a threat, managers
of smokestack industry and landed elites in the region are likely to share
many of the economic policy preferences of blue-collar workers. Thus,
the main danger of labor-dominated party systems in Eastern Europe
stems from the anti-reform orientation of labor and its possible allies
from the ranks of capital and land.
Capital–labor coalitions are highly improbable in market economies
given the endemic economic conflicts between workers and capitalists.6
Yet they are quite possible in partial and non-market systems, where
managers of steel, mining and other backward industries threatened by
economic transformation ally with blue-collar workers lacking the skills
to exit to emerging markets. Defections to the market by entrepreneurial
workers and managers may undercut such coalitions in partial markets.
These alliances will be most durable in non-market economies, where
the cleaving effects of emerging markets are weakest. Should capital–
labor parties acquire control of the legislature, it may not be possible to
proceed with economic reform within the framework of democracy. This
describes the dilemma facing Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who has
employed emergency executive powers in an attempt to circumvent
opposition to his economic reform program by the conservative bloc in
the Parliament.
Worker–farmer coalitions are also improbable in market economies,
where urban and rural groups often clash over food prices, wages, social
101
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 102
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
welfare and other distributional issues. The one exception is the
red–green coalitions of northern Europe, where region-specific factors
enabled social democratic parties to maintain political hegemony for
much of the twentieth century (Esping-Anderson, 1985). The structural
model does envision a variant of the worker–farmer coalition in partial
and non-markets. But the socioeconomic conditions underpinning stable
social democracy in Scandinavia are absent in Eastern Europe. Because
the Scandinavian countries already possessed high levels of capital
accumulation and consolidated liberal states when they established
their social welfare systems, redistribution could take place without provoking urban–rural conflicts or antagonizing business elites. By contrast,
worker–farmer coalitions in Eastern Europe face poorly developed
markets and a recent history of authoritarianism, circumstances rendering heavy redistribution incompatible with liberal democracy.
Agro-industrial coalitions are possible in all three economic systems,
but are likely to employ different political strategies. While the agroindustrial alliances in early postwar Latin America were sometimes
organized through political parties,7 such coalitions typically rely on
non-party mechanisms. In the l960s and 1970s, industrial and agrarian
elites, anxious to protect their economic interests against the Left and
organized labor, colluded in support of military coups. In addition to
supporting political repression, the most advanced sectors of capital
and agriculture undertook portfolio diversification, export expansion
and other market strategies. The strategies used by agro-industrial coalitions in market economies are deleterious to participatory democracy to
the degree that they exclude labor and the underprivileged.
The absence of opportunities for exit leaves agro-industrial groups in
non-market economies far more dependent on electoral strategies.
Because the most backward elements of industry and agriculture are
also those most inclined to utilize the party system, such coalitions are
highly destabilizing. While the tactics employed by such actors may be
formally ‘democratic’, the result of their ascent in the electoral arena is
to diminish prospects for stable democracy. On the one hand, their antimarket platforms are often accompanied by appeals to ethnic/national
sentiments that undermine democratic consolidation. On the other, if
they succeed in using their voting power in the legislature to block
reform policy, political executives will face strong pressures to issue
decrees to overcome the stalemate. For this reason, it is precisely in nonmarket cases like Russia that the tension between economic reform and
political democracy is sharpest.
Implications and limitations of structural theory
What does structural analysis tell us about the prospects for stable democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe? The central implication of
102
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 103
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
the model developed above is that post-authoritarian trajectories in the
two regions do not bode well for long-term democratic consolidation.
The social configuration most conducive to that outcome (broad-based
party systems in market economies) is not likely to emerge. The party
systems most apt to appear in the universe of cases under consideration
(broad-based and capital–labor coalitions in non-markets) are the ones
least propitious for democracy. Other configurations coded as ‘possible’
(agro-industrial, worker–farmer) are also unfavorable for democratic
consolidation. The cases where broad-based party systems are both
possible and politically auspicious are limited to partial market
economies like the Czech Republic and Hungary. Here, advanced
economic reforms create cleavages in the ranks of blue-collar workers
and industrial managers and open political space for pro-market parties.
In contrast to the non-market cases, where the favored position of reactionary groups in the party system raises the danger of a restoration
of authoritarianism, the presence of strong liberal parties in the partial
market countries makes it possible for successor governments to
enact market reforms within a democratic framework.
The experience of the industrialized west, where broad-based party
systems emerged in market economies, appears to contradict one of
the key predictions of the structural model. However, one should
note that the evolution of stable capitalist democracies in the west took
many decades to achieve. The long gestation and periodic breakdown
of democracy in the west reflects the ambivalence of economic elites
towards mass enfranchisement (Luebbert, 1987; Rueschemeyer et al.,
1992). The hesitancy of these actors fully to embrace participatory democracy demonstrates that broad sectoral support of party systems is in fact
problematic. This underscores the need for a structural approach to
democratic transitions capable of theorizing about the socioeconomic
determinants of political preferences. What structural reasoning cannot
explain is why actors whose socioeconomic position militates against
their entry into the electoral system would eventually accept it as the
main arena of political contestation. To understand how otherwise reluctant actors are induced to abide by the rules of democratic competition,
we must examine how party and state institutions overcome structural
proclivities and transform actors’ incentives and strategies.
P ART I E S , S T A T E IN S TITU TIO N S A N D
DE MOCRAT I C CO N S O L ID A TIO N
The structural model suggests that the main task confronting the new
democracies of Latin America is persuading economic elites wary of mass
democracy to exercise voice through the electoral system. The central
problem in Eastern Europe is to engender commitment to democratic
103
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 104
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
ideals and practices among actors who have already entered the party
system but who exhibit reactionary tendencies. In this section, we use
institutional analysis to address the following questions: what types of
party and state institutions overcome the hesitancy of holders of capital
and land to enter the electoral arena and sustain loyalty to participatory
democracy? What institutional configurations are most liable to inculcate democratic principles in actors strongly inclined to use the party
system in ways pernicious to stable democracy?
We argue the following. Party institutions that strike a balance
between representation and control promote stable democracy by simultaneously holding political leaders accountable to the electorate and
insulating them from the immediate demands of rank-and-file members.
State institutions that combine embeddedness and coherence provide the
collective goods needed to elicit support from mass constituencies and
reassure economic elites that their interests will be adequately safeguarded under democratic contestation. Mature democracies require
such goods to remain economically and politically robust. Countries
undergoing transitions from authoritarian rule, where societal actors
retain the means and incentives to employ non-democratic political
strategies, demand them for the sake of democratic consolidation itself.
Party institutions
Scholarly research on parties has generated a wealth of hypotheses and
empirical findings concerning the political consequences of various institutional arrangements. These configurations strongly influence the
relative weight of the controlling and representative dimensions of party
systems. ‘Control’ refers to the capacity of party leaders to moderate the
claims of rank-and-file members, negotiate with the state and leaders of
other parties, and enforce consequent agreements on their own followers.
‘Representation’ designates the extent to which the party system as a
whole includes broad societal interests as well as the degree to which
party leaders are responsive to rank-and-file demands. We hypothesize
that the controlling element of party systems is enhanced under parliamentary governments, electoral systems based on the winner-take-all
rule, low levels of party fragmentation, and candidate selection via
closed lists. Representation is favored under presidential governments,
electoral systems based on proportional representation, high party fragmentation, and open-list selection procedures.
The choice of constitutional design in new democracies helps determine the balance between accountability and party discipline. Because
they fuse executive and legislative power, parliamentary systems create
incentives for party leaders to assemble and maintain stable coalitions.
The availability of sanctions for poor governmental performance, notably
104
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 105
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
the no-confidence vote, deepens the political interdependence of prime
ministers and members of parliament. This increases inducements for
party leaders to implement coherent policy programs and adhere to
agreements struck with coalition partners. By contrast, presidential
systems are often associated with weak parties oriented towards appeals
to short-term constituent interests. The separate power bases and electoral mandates of the executive and legislature encourage party leaders
to pursue individualistic strategies aimed at delivering specific benefits
to local constituencies at the expense of party unity and national-level
governance. They also weaken incentives for cooperation between the
two branches and frustrate coalition building, creating a tendency for
political deadlock and inviting accretion of executive power via rule by
decree (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 1–54, 176–85; Stepan and Skach, 1993:
16–22).
Electoral procedures also shape the representative and controlling
elements of party systems. Proportional representation augments representation by widening inclusion of minority parties, which need only
garner a small percentage of the vote to secure seats in the legislature.
PR systems undermine control to the extent that they create incentives
for party leaders to provide specific benefits to narrow constituencies
organized along geographic, partisan or ethnic lines. By contrast, winnertake-all schemes are more exclusive of minority interests. Because losers
receive no compensation in the legislature, political influence depends
largely on the ability of parties to win elections. Winner-take-all systems
therefore favor large national parties capable of formulating broad,
programmatic policy platforms and mounting electoral campaigns
designed to maximize aggregate vote shares.
Fragmented party systems strengthen representation at the expense of
control. Large numbers of parliamentary parties frustrate coalition
building, multiply opportunities for defection, and generate incentives
for party elites to cultivate specific constituencies through ideological
appeals or pork-barrel politics. Systems comprised of small numbers of
parties are more conducive to the construction of stable winning coalitions and effective national-level governance, factors that reinforce the
need for strong party discipline and enforcement of agreements.
The selection of candidates via closed lists determined by the party
leadership also bolsters the controlling dimension. This institutional
configuration enables party professionals to dominate the electoral arena
by giving them instruments to screen prospective candidates for ideological conformity and tailor district-level activities to national campaign
strategies. It also enhances their control of the legislative process by
making individual members of parliament dependent on central party
organizations for financing and logistical support. Open lists weaken the
capacity of party elites to control candidate recruitment and broaden
105
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 106
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
opportunities for outsiders to challenge established politicians by
building independent local constituencies.
Typology of party institutions
Various mixtures of these institutional features yield four general types
of party systems, each reflecting different weights of representation and
control. Effective party systems are distinguished by high levels of both
control and representation. Here, rank-and-file members perceive that
the party leadership is sufficiently attuned to their interests and policy
preferences to obviate resort to alternative mechanisms. At the same
time, party elites are able to channel and moderate the demands of the
mass membership, assuaging the fears of propertied groups and enabling
the leadership to fashion bargains palatable to rival parties and the state.
High control also enhances the durability of such agreements by giving
interlocutors confidence that the party leadership will be able to extract
compliance from the rank-and-file.
The polar opposite is the minimal party system, distinguished by low
representation and control. This combination prevents party systems
from performing the basic functions usually associated with modern
democracies: aggregation and representation of societal interests, preparation of coherent policy platforms, formation of effective electoral
strategies, and competent governance. Such systems stand at high risk
of widespread social unrest and mass mobilization outside of party
channels.
The combination of low control and high representation describes
mass-dominated party systems. Here, most voters regard parties as responsive to their interests. But the inability of party leaders to restrain the
demands of the rank-and-file prevents them from cutting deals likely to
be viewed as credible and binding by the state and other parties. Party
leaders find themselves repeatedly yielding to the immediate demands
of the membership, constantly shifting in the face of changes in public
opinion. While the participatory dimension of mass-dominated systems
might provide new democracies with some measure of short-term
stability, the absence of institutionalized mechanisms capable of moderating demands from below is likely to imperil long-term governability.
In elite-dominated party systems, where control is high but representation
low, leaders are able to negotiate effectively with other political agents.
This encourages elite participation in electoral politics by reassuring holders of capital and land that support of the party system will not imperil
their proprietary interests. But because the resultant agreements are not
underpinned by broad social support, rank-and-file members lack a sense
of efficacy within party organizations. This endangers both governance
and long-term stability: because large numbers of societal actors view the
party system as an exclusive arena for political notables, they will face
106
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 107
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
strong inducements to withhold support of current policies and employ
non-party mechanisms of interest representation.
State institutions
While an examination of parties is an indispensable complement to structural analysis, a clear understanding of the impact of political institutions
only emerges when parties are considered in relation to state organizations. Democratic consolidation requires state institutions that are
simultaneously responsive to the needs of individual agents and capable
of providing collective goods to society, such as universal law, national
defense, fiscal and monetary control, and social welfare. Universal law
guarantees the civil liberties of citizens, protects economic elites from
arbitrary seizures of property, and provides a medium through which
aggrieved actors can seek redress. National defense protects citizens
from the internal and external threats to personal security that might
otherwise dissuade them from engaging in democratic contestation.
Fiscal and monetary regulation enables fledgling democracies to lay a
foundation for the economic growth needed to support social welfare
systems. Without an adequate social safety net, large numbers of lowincome citizens may fall below the subsistence level and turn to
non-democratic methods of defending their interests. In the absence of
robust economic growth, equity-enhancing reforms will require heavy
redistribution of resources, which is likely to provoke the ire of economic
elites and ignite inter-class and inter-ethnic conflicts.
The ability of the state to supply these goods depends on its internal
coherence. The concept of state ‘coherence’ derives from Max Weber’s
(1947) ideal type. It refers to the organizational characteristics of the state
that foster internal agreement and a common sense of purpose among
ministries and bureaucrats: a skilled technocracy assembled through
meritocratic recruiting procedures, clearly demarcated spheres of legal
jurisdiction, and insulation from partisan political pressures. While
coherence so conceived is often associated with authoritarian regimes,
we argue that it is a critical precondition of democratic consolidation.
States lacking a corporate identity and political autonomy will be unable
to provide the collective goods underpinning stable democracy, as rival
elites and sectoral groups exploit divisions within the state administration and advance their particularistic agendas.
The institutional arrangements conducive to the provision of collective
goods are well known. Universal law hinges on the existence of an
independent judiciary capable of checking abuses by elected politicians
and appointed officials as well as circumscribing the legal spheres of
jurisdiction of state agencies. Fulfilling national defense requirements
while sustaining civilian control of the military necessitates a routinized
107
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 108
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
chain of command that prevents actors from employing force to
resolve domestic political conflict. This is particularly important in postauthoritarian countries, where the consolidation of democracy requires
checks on the deployment of military power for purposes not approved
by civilian decision makers. Effective macroeconomic regulation demands
an institutional framework that shields central banks and finance ministries from attempts by politicians and societal groups to skew budgetary
and monetary policy toward narrow interests. Moreover, fiscal and monetary control requires the separation of these agencies to prevent the monetization of budget deficits, which fuels inflation and incites capital
flight.8 Finally, delivery of the universal social welfare services needed to
inculcate broad societal support for democracy necessitates insulation of
the providing agencies from interest group penetration. Partisan manipulation of social welfare policy impairs the state’s ability to supply a
safety net for vulnerable groups, which is especially crucial for new
democracies undergoing economic restructuring.
But the internal coherence that enables the state to provide these
goods must be balanced by embeddedness, especially in new democracies. The notion of embeddedness describes the network of informal and
institutionalized linkages connecting state agencies and private actors.
Several scholars have employed this concept to explain the economic
successes of the East Asian ‘developmental states’ (Evans, 1992). We
posit that embeddedness is equally vital to democratic consolidation in
the post-authoritarian countries of Latin America and Eastern Europe.
The provision of social welfare and other collective goods essential to
stable democracy requires state actors to forge close links to private
agents, whose cooperation is essential for implementation of stabilization policies and restoration of growth. Such privileged connections
between the state and private actors do correspond to non-party strategies as we earlier defined them. But to the extent that these links promote
growth of the national economy, they foster democratic consolidation
by enabling the state to supply universal goods to society and transform
democratic politics into a positive-sum game. The main danger of high
levels of embeddedness is that elites may capture a disproportionate
share of national income, leading ordinary citizens to perceive the state
as a vassal to a narrow stratum of society.
In short, stable democracy in the South and East requires a delicate
balance between the state coherence that underpins social equity and
the embeddedness that affords economic elites privileged access to state
institutions. When coherence overrides embeddedness, democracy stands
at risk of deteriorating into authoritarianism. When embeddedness
supersedes coherence, rent-seeking alliances between state agencies and
private actors may compromise the provision of essential collective
goods.
108
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 109
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
Typology of state institutions
The coding of state institutions along these dimensions yields four
possible combinations. An effective state possesses high levels of both
coherence and embeddedness. The internal cohesion of the state allows
it to initiate policies aimed at promoting the collective welfare of the
nation and shelters it from capture by political elites and sectoral actors.
At the same time, the state’s extensive connections to society enable it
to gather the information needed to formulate well-designed policies,
monitor their implementation, and elicit favorable responses by private
capital. State autonomy is thus balanced by accountability; rationaltechnical decision making is bolstered by political support. These qualities
enhance stable democracy. The state’s capacity to supply universal law,
social welfare and other collective goods lowers the cost of maintaining
internal order by obviating resort to physical coercion and interference
in the personal affairs of citizens. At the same time, its embeddedness
in society imparts to the citizenry a sense of political efficacy that induces
actors voluntarily to play by the rules of democratic contestation.
At the opposite pole lies the minimal state, which possesses neither the
internal cohesion requisite to governance nor the immersion in society
that allows citizens to check the arbitrary exercise of political power.
Such polities are apt to degenerate either into anarchy, where state
authority breaks down entirely, or predation, where individual cliques
appropriate state agencies for their own aggrandizement and extract rents
from citizens in exchange for access to state services. The activities of
the minimal state thus become completely personalized, deregularized
and arbitrary.
In contrast to the minimal state, which becomes the vassal of ruling
elites, the penetrated state is liable to capture by societal actors. Here, low
coherence is combined with high embeddedness, rendering the state
vulnerable to the specific demands of groups organized along sectoral,
regional or ethnic lines. Such an institutional configuration impedes
democratic consolidation, as the penetration of the state by favored
actors generates resentment among excluded groups and heightens the
latter’s incentives to resort to mass mobilization and other destabilizing
activities.
The penetrating state is characterized by high coherence and low
embeddedness. Where the penetrated state is beholden to powerful societal actors, the penetrating state is insufficiently responsive to the claims
of citizens. While the high autonomy of the state enables the technocracy
to formulate coherent programs, its low embeddedness deprives private
agents of a strong stake in their execution. Carefully elaborated policies
aimed at advancing broad national goals are therefore at risk of being
sabotaged in the implementation phase. And so while the state does not
succumb to pressures exerted by privileged groups as in penetrated
109
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 110
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
Table 3 Institutionally determined trajectories
Configuration
Trajectory
Examples
EFFECTIVE PARTY
EFFECTIVE STATE
STABLE DEMOCRACY
CHILE
URUGUAY
CZECH REPUBLIC
MINIMAL PARTY
MINIMAL STATE
PRAETORIANISM
PERU
GEORGIA
AZERBAIJAN
MASS-DOMINATED
PARTY
PENETRATED STATE
FRAGMENTED
DEMOCRACY
ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
POLAND
ELITE-DOMINATED
PARTY
PENETRATED STATE
OLIGARCHY
ROMANIA
PARAGUAY
ELITE-DOMINATED
PARTY
PENETRATING STATE
LIMITED
DEMOCRACY
MEXICO
HUNGARY
states, the absence of a sense of efficacy among the citizenry undermines
long-term support for democracy.
Links between party and state institutions
Table 3 shows five possible combinations of party and state institutions,
each of which suggests different political trajectories for new democracies.9
Effective party system, effective state: stable democracy
This configuration favors stable democracy by providing both the mass
citizenry and elite groups with well-institutionalized mechanisms of
interest representation. The fusion of representativeness and embeddedness simultaneously gives ordinary citizens effective voice via the
party system and affords economic elites access to the state. Meanwhile,
the combination of control and coherence protects political parties and
state agencies from complete capture by labor, capital or landowners.
Party institutions address the short-term needs of the rank-and-file
while giving leaders the political space needed to negotiate credible
agreements and assemble durable governing coalitions. Similarly, state
institutions secure the confidence of the sectors vital to national economic
performance while reducing opportunities for bureaucrats to forge clientelistic links to individual enterprises.
110
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 111
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
Among the Latin American cases, post-authoritarian Chile most
closely resembles stable democracy so conceived: a party system dominated by a small number of disciplined, programmatic parties coupled
with an efficient state administration. This institutional framework
enabled the major political parties and key state agencies to continue
the main elements of the neoliberal programs initiated by the Pinochet
regime and respond to popular demands for progressive social legislation. In addition to creating an economic foundation for equityenhancing reforms, their promotion of pro-growth policies has reassured
business elites still uneasy about a return to the chaos of the Allende
years (Roberts, 1994; Silva, 1996; Weyland, 1997). Uruguay also exhibits
some of the institutional features of stable democracy. That country’s
intricate political system combines strong centripetal features (a presidency endowed with broad executive authority over fiscal policy and
other issue areas) with institutionalized mechanisms for popular inclusion (notably direct popular referenda on legislation and a ‘double
simultaneous’ electoral scheme that permits voters to choose both
between political parties and among competing lists within parties). The
result is an institutional bias towards moderate, incremental economic
policies that have enjoyed higher levels of public support than those
undertaken in Brazil, Argentina and Peru, where stabilization has
proceeded largely through executive decree (Haggard and Kaufman,
1995: 212–18; O’Donnell, 1994: 63–4).
Among the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, the Czech
Republic comes closest to the ideal type of stable democracy. The orderly
separation of Czechoslovakia in 1992 reinforced the liberal orientation
of the Czech Republic and enhanced governability by transforming the
previous tricameral federal structure into a unified state. Subsequently,
the institutional structure of the Czech party system reduced fragmentation by prescribing a threshold for admission to the legislature and
enhanced discipline by empowering party leaders to assemble closed
candidate lists. These factors that promoted the controlling element of
the party system were balanced by proportional representation, which
served to broaden inclusion of minority groups. The Czech Republic’s
strong state administration and balanced party system enabled the
center-right government of Václav Klaus to implement a highly
successful stabilization program and launch an ambitious privatization
scheme based on mass distribution of vouchers to Czech citizens. Strains
within the government led to unanticipated setbacks in the spring 1996
elections, in which communist and nationalist parties gained parliamentary seats at the governing coalition’s expense. But the centrist,
moderate tendencies of the Czech party system persisted despite the loss
of Klaus’ majority in the Parliament. Three weeks after the elections,
Klaus formed a new government composed of the original members of
111
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 112
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
his center-right coalition along with the center-left social democrats – a
political alignment that virtually ensured the country’s continued movement toward a market economy and integration into the west (Judt, 1992;
Olson, 1993; McGregor, 1993; Central European Report, 9 July 1996).
Minimal party system, minimal state: praetorianism
This is the institutional configuration least propitious for democratic
consolidation. The party system cannot mediate social demands; the state
cannot supply collective goods. The probable result is a political freefor-all, unrestrained popular mobilization outside of institutionalized
channels. This condition of extreme polarization is akin to what Samuel
Huntington (1968) calls ‘praetorianism’. Here, the restoration of order
may require the imposition of martial law or full-fledged military rule.
Among the Latin American countries, Peru exhibits the strongest
tendencies towards praetorianism. In the 1980s, the combination of
eroding state capacity and a debilitated party system produced a wave
of social mobilization that culminated with the rise of Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path). The failure of party and state institutions to meet the
simultaneous challenges of guerrilla insurgency and economic crisis led
to the victory of the political outsider Alberto Fujimori in the 1990 presidential election. Continued disintegration of social order soon prompted
Fujimori to call in the military (Degregori and Grompone, 1991: 23–36;
Mauceri, 1995). The imposition of martial law did enable the government to quell the insurgency and implement an effective stabilization
program. However, it did not create a firm institutional foundation
for Peru’s return to competitive democracy. While Fujimori’s decisive
reelection in April 1995 indicated substantial popular support for his
strong-armed measures, it also demonstrated further erosion of an already
fragile party system.
The successor states of the former Soviet Union likewise show
disturbing signs of descent into praetorianism. The collapse of unified
military command and the emergence of local militias have fueled armed
conflict in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan and Moldova. In the Baltic
republics and other countries, the absence of constitutionally guaranteed
minority rights has exacerbated long-standing ethnic/national tensions.
Elsewhere, the breakdown of monetary and budgetary control has
ignited hyperinflation and disrupted trade and commerce. Russia and
Ukraine have not yet deteriorated into praetorianism so defined.
However, in both cases the failure of party systems to moderate socioeconomic tensions and the inability of state agencies to provide social
safety nets have contributed to the rise of nationalist and communist
parties that threaten the position of democratic governments.
Boris Yeltsin’s triumph in the June 1996 presidential election induced
a collective sigh of relief from Western governments alarmed at recent
112
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 113
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
communist gains in the Russian Parliament and fearful of the global
repercussions of a victory by the communist Gennady Zyuganov (Parish,
1996). But neither the conduct of that election nor its aftermath provided
much confidence about the prospects for democratic consolidation in
the Russian Federation. Government interference in state-controlled
television resulted in a heavy media bias toward Yeltsin and against
opposition candidates (with the notable exception of Aleksander
Lebed, soon anointed as Yeltsin’s national security chief to ensure the
President’s victory in the runoff election). Indeed, partisan manipulation
of the Russian media in 1996 even surpassed that in the 1991 presidential election and 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections (Berlin, 1996;
Rutland, 1996a). Yeltsin meanwhile prevailed on the Russian Central
Bank to release funds for political payoffs to teachers, miners, defense
contractors and other constituencies – a development that underscored
the continued institutional weakness of Russian state institutions and
deepened skepticism about the government’s capacity to implement a
credible stabilization program (Morvant, 1996). Equally ominous, the
1996 election demonstrated the immaturity of the Russian party system,
which deepened the polarization of society between the ‘winners’ and
‘losers’ of the post-communist transition and undermined the institutional moorings of market reform and democratization. With no robust
centrist or center-left parties available to mediate their interests,
pensioners and other vulnerable groups turned in large numbers to
Zyuganov – who managed a respectable showing in both the first and
second rounds (32 and 40 percent respectively) despite Yeltsin’s appropriation of state resources for electoral patronage. Pro-market elements,
who lacked a strong liberal party and who cast their lot with the
maverick Grigorii Yavlinksy in the first voting round, had no place else
to go in the runoff besides Boris Yeltsin – whose ability to proceed with
economic reform depended less on party institutions than on executive
decrees and elite machinations (Orttung, 1996a, 1996b; Rutland, 1996b).
Mass-dominated party system, penetrated state: fragmented democracy
Provision of the collective goods essential to democratic consolidation
presupposes a state that is not bombarded by unbridled societal
demands. Fragmented democracy describes a system where party
leaders cannot mediate claims of their followers and the state itself is
heavily embedded in society but internally divided. Because state and
party elites are beholden to particularistic sectoral interests, policy
making degenerates into patronage and political payoffs. Unable to
formulate coherent policy strategies, governments attempt one ad hoc
program after another, careening from crisis to crisis until draconian
measures become necessary to restore economic and political stability.
This opens the way for the emergence of neo-populist leaders with
113
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 114
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
authoritarian tendencies who promise to ‘save the day’ through rule by
decree.
The particularism emanating from this institutional configuration does
not necessarily threaten democracy in advanced market economies,
where high levels of development allow the state to supply an adequate
level of social welfare services. But when democratization takes place in
regions residing at lower levels of economic development (Latin
America) or undergoing systemic transformations (Eastern Europe), the
margin for error is much narrower, the bottom of the social safety net
much closer to the subsistence level. If interest group penetration
prevents the state from providing universal coverage, large numbers of
citizens may fall below the poverty line, breeding resentment among
excluded sectors.
Among the Latin American cases, Argentina is a prototypical example
of a fragmented democracy. Urban labor mobilized under Peronism
formed the core of the populist coalition that dominated Argentine
politics in the early postwar period. Yet Peronism more closely resembled a movement than a party. The fact that large landowners, another
strategically vital class, lacked connections to well-institutionalized
parties further destabilized the Argentine polity. The ISI strategies
initiated by the Peronists begot inefficient state industries, a stagnant
agrarian sector, hyperinflation and rising labor militancy that ultimately led to military rule (Waisman, 1987). The current government of
Carlos Menem has sought to reverse the excesses of the previous
Peronist regimes by pursuing a neoliberal stabilization and adjustment
program. This program – implemented mainly through executive decree
– curtailed inflation, accelerated privatization of state-owned enterprises,
and spurred a degree of economic growth that resulted in Menem’s
reelection in May 1995. But these short-term successes concealed the fact
that the Argentine state and party system remain poorly institutionalized (McGuire, 1994, 1995). Because Menem has relied on a strategy of
circumventing democratic channels via executive decree, the long-term
prospects for economic and political stability in Argentina are suspect.
The dangers of this strategy became clear in 1995, when the fallout of
Mexico’s financial crisis triggered rising unemployment and imperiled
Argentina’s convertibility plan. As in Mexico, Argentina’s economic
recovery has been slow, placing Menem at risk of a steady dissipation
of his political support.
Brazil represents another variant of fragmented democracy. In contrast
to Argentina, where a mass-based labor movement dominated the
political arena, an assortment of particularistic groups (notably agroindustrial elites, public sector groups and regional cliques) penetrate
Brazilian party and state institutions. Open-list candidate selection, weak
voter loyalty, and high party fragmentation reinforce the tendency of
114
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 115
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
party leaders to focus on short-term electoral exigencies (Mainwaring,
1992; Power, 1991). Meanwhile, the growing incoherence of an enormous
state bureaucracy emboldens powerful sectors to capture individual
agencies. State and party elites yield to political pressure to fund local
pork-barrel projects while shortchanging more cost-effective federal
programs. Brazilian politicians thus focus their efforts on securing
specific benefits for their constituencies rather than social security,
national education and policies aimed at raising aggregate economic
growth. The result has been to promote a culture of corruption and keep
millions of Brazilians in abject poverty. On the surface, the success of
the Plano Real stabilization program and the electoral triumph of its
principal architect, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, suggest that Brazil has
begun to alleviate these problems. But a number of the deficiencies of
fragmented democracies persist under the new presidency, including
corruption and clientelistic pressures in the Congress which have
impeded Cardoso’s attempts to reform taxation, public administration
and social security (Weyland, 1996b).
Among the former communist countries, Poland most vividly exemplifies fragmented democracy. This is chiefly attributable to specific
institutional features of the successor state and party system. Poland’s
unique position as the first East European country to throw off the
communist yoke complicated its negotiated transition to democracy.
Uncertainty over the Soviet Union’s response, overestimation of the
Communist Party’s political power, and underestimation of their own
electoral potential induced Solidarity leaders to accept a deal incommensurate with the actual balance of forces. Two of their concessions –
the decision to reserve 65 percent of the seats in the Sejm for the
communists and to elect General Wojciech Jaruzelski as president – were
subsequently corrected. But the third – Solidarity’s decision to defer key
constitutional questions until after the founding elections – had lasting
consequences. By the time the Polish authorities got around to writing
a new constitution, Solidarity had split apart, Lech Walesa had been
elected president, and members of Parliament were embroiled in
conflicts over the balance of executive and legislative power and the
institutional prerogatives of the two houses of Parliament itself. Poland’s
‘Little Constitution’, finally approved in 1992, demonstrated the effects
of legislative logrolling and bureaucratic turf protection (Elster, 1993:
200–13; Holmes, 1993). The failure of Polish interlocutors to establish a
parliamentary threshold deepened institutional fragmentation in the
post-communist period. The 1991 parliamentary elections installed
some twenty-nine parties in the Sejm, none of which proved able to
assemble durable governing coalitions. A succession of weak governments grappled with a fractious legislature over economic reform,
privatization, abortion and other issues.
115
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 116
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
In spring l993, Poland’s fifth post-communist government fell by a
single vote of no-confidence. A general election later that year resulted
in the formation of a new government headed by a coalition of socialist
and agrarian parties. The Sejm meanwhile agreed to create a parliamentary threshold and enact other electoral reforms aimed at reducing
party fragmentation. However, it left unresolved the relationship
between the offices of president and prime minister, which was crucial
insofar as effective governance required both stable parliamentary majorities and prime ministerial independence from the head of state. In the
fall 1995 presidential election, Walesa was defeated by the former
communist Aleksander Kwasniewski – who quickly announced his
intention to convene a special constitutional assembly, composed of delegates elected separately from the legislature, if the Sejm failed to approve
a permanent constitution before the 1997 parliamentary elections. While
Kwasniewski’s election presented little danger of a return to authoritarian rule, the inability of Polish authorities to settle basic constitutional
questions raised the specter of continued institutional fragmentation and
policy stalemate (Gross, 1992; McGregor, 1993; Sabbat-Swidlicka, 1992;
Vinton, 1994; Central European Report, 13 February 1996).
Elite-dominated party system, penetrated state: oligarchy
In contrast to fragmented democracies, where the state is penetrated by
powerful societal groups unconstrained by effective party mechanisms,
here the state is captured by small numbers of political elites operating
through highly controlled parties. As a result, there is no meaningful
separation of party and state. State institutions are geared towards the
valorization of individual party politicos rather than broad collective
goals.
The fact that Romania comes closest to oligarchy so defined reflects
the legacies of the neo-Stalinist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu. The
extreme concentration of authority and atomization of society under
Ceausescu enabled former Communist Party elites to restore themselves
to power under the auspices of the National Salvation Front. The leader
of the Front was elected president in May 1990 in a campaign marked
by widespread fraud, press propaganda, voter intimidation and restrictions on the activities of rival parties. The coercive apparatus of the
Securitate, which emerged basically intact from the 1989 revolution,
bolstered the Front’s putative electoral mandate. The new regime quickly
suppressed the anti-government demonstrations organized by university students in June 1990, post-communist Romania’s first significant
display of an emergent civil society. With the apparent assent of
the government, Securitate forces transported thousands of miners
to Bucharest to beat up the demonstrators and ransack the offices of
opposition parties (Stokes, 1993: 172–5; Verdery and Klingman, 1992).
116
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 117
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
Meanwhile, Romanian political elites showed few signs of easing longstanding tensions with the country’s ethnic Hungarian minority. The
National Salvation Front’s decision unilaterally to impose conditions for
the election of a constitutional assembly gave minority groups little
confidence that their civil rights would be adequately protected under
a post-communist constitution (Elster, 1993: 188–91).
Among the Latin American countries, Paraguay most closely fits this
conception of political oligarchy. The regime of Alfrédo Stroessner was
something of a modern-day throwback to nineteenth-century-style
caudillo systems. The ruling Colorado Party, the military and the state
administration became the personal instruments of Stroessner and his
clan.
Elite-dominated party system, penetrating state: limited democracy
Like oligarchies, limited democracies are distinguished by highly centralized party organizations. But here, the political power of the dominant
parties is partially balanced by a state bureaucracy possessing a strong
corporate identity. While the ideology and overarching vision of party
elites animate the penetrative activities of the state, the internal cohesion of the bureaucracy shields the state from complete capture.
Mexico is the archetype of limited democracy so defined. While the
PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) dominates the electoral system
and the policy-making process, the bureaucracy possesses the cohesion
and technocratic capability that allow the Mexican state to provide
collective goods to society and pursue long-range objectives. These institutional characteristics created a foundation for steady economic growth
and low inflation for most of the postwar period, enabling the PRI to
supply benefits to rural and urban constituencies that solidified its political hegemony. More recently, state technocrats served as the driving
force behind the North American Free Trade Agreement and other
neoliberal measures that threatened the patronage resources of traditional elements of the party.
While Hungary’s multi-party system generates more effective electoral
competition than Mexico’s, that country’s post-communist political institutions exhibit several important features of limited democracy. Unlike
Poland’s Solidarity, which functioned as a mass societal movement prior
to 1989, the Hungarian opposition was an elite movement that yielded
successor parties characterized by weak links to grassroots members.
And unlike Czechoslovakia, which was ruled by a neo-Stalinist regime
before the Velvet Revolution, Hungary’s long history of market
reforms created a highly skilled cadre of technocrats, many of whom
retained key positions in the state administration after the collapse of
the one-party system. The specific circumstances of Hungary’s negotiated transition augmented the centralizing tendencies of this institutional
117
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 118
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
combination of an elite-dominated party system and a strong state
administration. Soviet acceptance of the results of Poland’s 1989 election
encouraged radicals within the Hungarian opposition to reject a compromise between moderates and reform communists to hold popular
presidential elections, which the communists expected to win. The
radicals staged a national referendum on the presidential question,
leading to the creation of a powerful prime ministerial government.
Other institutional choices of the Hungarian negotiators reinforced the
elitist bent of the party system and enhanced the capacity of postcommunist governments to build durable parliamentary majorities:
intricate electoral rules featuring strong majoritarian elements and heavy
reliance on closed party lists; a nominating system aimed at winnowing
the number of candidates running in single party districts and the
number of parties able to formulate lists for PR districts; and a unicameral legislature operating under a 4 percent threshold and the
procedure of constructive no-confidence (Bozóki, 1992, 1993; Comisso,
1992; Ilonszki, 1993).
Meanwhile, the high technical competence of Hungary’s postcommunist state institutions helped offset the concentration of executive
authority in the prime minister’s office. During the early 1990s, the balance of power within the Hungarian state shifted towards the Ministry
of Finance and National Bank at the expense of branch ministries, whose
institutional power derived largely from the now defunct Communist
Party. This enabled agencies responsible for macroeconomic regulation
to dominate stabilization policy and parry efforts by party elites to
appropriate state resources for partisan ends. The institutional advantages of a centralized prime ministerial government and strong state
administration were amply displayed in spring 1995, when the
Hungarian authorities surmounted fierce public opposition and implemented a harsh austerity package, the Bokros Program, which achieved
substantial improvements to Hungary’s internal deficit and current
account (Bartlett, 1996, 1997).
Theoretically, limited democracies are more adept at crisis management than fragmented democracies. Because state agencies are well
positioned to formulate adjustment programs and party leaders to
extract compliance from the rank-and-file, they are not prone to the
punctuated crises common in countries like Argentina, Brazil and
Poland. Moreover, their insulation from sectoral penetration better
enables them to supply universal welfare and avert mass mobilization
by low-income groups.
But the low levels of embeddedness and representation in limited
democracies may eventually deprive them of broad social support,
imperiling long-term democratic consolidation. Corruption may also
undermine limited democracies. When party elites begin to exploit state
118
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 119
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
offices for personal or political aggrandizement, such systems are at risk
of deteriorating into oligarchic rule. In Mexico, persistent electoral fraud
and internal scandals stimulated significant organized opposition, illustrated most dramatically by the 1994 Chiapas rebellion. The spectacular
collapse of the economy in December 1994, coupled with internecine
conflicts within the PRI’s senior leadership and fraying of the social pacts
underpinning the party’s heterodox adjustment strategy, called into
question the viability of the Mexican model (Dornbusch and Werner,
1994). In Hungary, attempts by the government of the Magyar Demokrata
Fórum (MDF) to load the state administration with political sympathizers compromised the bureaucracy’s cohesion and undermined the
delicate balance between party power and state autonomy that separates
‘limited democracy’ from ‘oligarchy’. Subsequently, the exaggerated
disproportionality of Hungary’s electoral system allowed the winner of
the second post-communist election, the Magyar Szocialista Párt
(MSZP) to parley its 33 percent vote into a 54 percent legislative majority
– prompting concerns about the dangers of latent authoritarianism
(Arato, 1994).
CONCL US I ON: I NTE RA CTIO N O F M A RK E T
S T RUCT U RE S AND P O L ITICA L IN S TITU TIO N S
In this article, we have assessed the prospects for stable democracy in
Latin America and Eastern Europe. Structural analysis suggests that the
socioeconomic position of elites in the market economies of Latin
America creates incentives and opportunities for those agents to pursue
non-party political strategies. The paucity of these same resources in the
transitional economies of Eastern Europe reduces opportunities for exit
from the electoral arena. While this creates a large potential base for
party contestation in the former communist countries, it also places the
most reactionary elements of society in a favored position in the electoral system. The structural approach thus enables us to deduce the
strategic preferences of actors in markedly different socioeconomic
systems. However, it cannot explain (1) divergent trajectories in countries possessing similar economic systems, or (2) why agents whose
socioeconomic position militates against party strategies choose to enter
the democratic arena. The institutional model fills these gaps by
exploring how party and state institutions reshape actors’ incentives and
transform their political behavior.
In our view, future theorizing and research on transitions to democracy should focus on the interaction of market structures and political
institutions. A synthesis of the two theoretical approaches points to the
following questions: When do structures and institutions converge?
When do party and state institutions override structural impediments
119
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 120
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
to democratic consolidation? As a point of departure for this scholarly
agenda, we offer the following suppositions.
Structural factors are likely to overwhelm even favorable institutional
configurations when the economic resources of capital and landed elites
give them inordinate political power. In other cases, institutions merely
reinforce structural tendencies. Clearly, the combination of minimal
state and minimal party institutions is apt to prove destabilizing in
all socioeconomic systems. The fusion of penetrated states and elitedominated parties also strengthens anti-democratic trends in most
structural environments. High party control assuages economic elites,
but low internal coherence prevents state agencies from delivering the
collective goods necessary to elicit the citizenry’s long-term commitment
to democratic principles.
In some circumstances, institutions may override unfavorable structural conditions. An effective party system and an effective state imbue
the broad citizenry with a sense of political efficacy. This combination
also protects the proprietary claims of elites in market economies while
providing low-income sectors with a measure of economic security,
giving both groups incentives to enter the electoral arena. It may
also transform the behavior of anti-democratic actors in non-market
economies. But while this institutional configuration represents the best
hope for participatory democracy, the shortage of cases conforming to
the pattern (Chile, Czech Republic) suggests that it is not a very probable outcome in either the South or the East.
The combination of a penetrating state and an elite-dominated party
system may constitute a more realistic, albeit less inclusive, institutional
alternative in the two regions. In Latin America, elites would enjoy an
advantage in the party system, but the state would remain sufficiently
insulated to sustain the provision of goods to society at large. In Eastern
Europe, high party control would soften the distributional conflicts
arising from economic transformation that might imperil democracy in
more balanced party systems. By relieving party leaders of incessant
pressure from the rank-and-file, such an institutional arrangement would
create political space for conservative parties to endorse urgent economic
reforms and tolerate a liberal opposition. If the experience of the West
provides any lessons for the countries of the South and East, it is that the
survival of democracy requires the protection of elite interests. Economic
and political elites are most likely to move from grudging acceptance
to full endorsement of democracy when they occupy a privileged position in the party system. Here, they come to view democracy not simply
as an expedient alternative to authoritarian rule but as their most preferred political order. This suggests a form of democracy where popular
sovereignty is somewhat circumscribed, but where the democratic order
is ultimately more stable and hence civil liberties more secure.
120
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 121
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
NO TE S
We would like to thank the following people for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article: Deborah Avant, Robert Bates, Nancy Bermeo,
M. Steven Fish, Erwin Hargrove, Herbert Kitschelt, Jeffrey Kopstein, Kurt
Weyland, Deborah Yashar, two anonymous referees and the members of the
panel on ‘Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: The Latin American and East
European Experiences’ at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, DC, September 1993.
1 We treat these as systemic features of the three generic types that cut across
variations in levels of economic development. For an interesting analysis of
the impact of economic development on the political strategies of actors in
transitions to democracy, see Kitschelt (1992c).
2 Other scholars have examined the impact of income portfolio, factor endowment and factor mobility on the political behavior and policy preferences of
actors in market economies. See, for example, Frieden (1991), Paige (1975)
and Rogowski (1989). Our structural model employs a similar logic to answer
a different question: how do the resources of agents situated in different
socioeconomic systems affect the relative intensity of their preferences for
party and non-party strategies?
3 Bargaining between the state and producers is common in both centrally
planned and dirigiste capitalist economies, but is driven by a different
dynamic. In the former, state enterprises extract regulatory exceptions in
exchange for their acceptance of production goals vital to central planners.
In the latter, producers provide political and financial support in exchange
for lucrative public contracts, favorable credit lines and other specific
economic benefits.
4 For similar reasons, backward agrarian producers in the market economies
of Latin America have also periodically mobilized through reactionary
parties and resorted to physical coercion of rural labor. See Paige’s discussion of the political strategies of landowners in backward agrarian economies
(1975: 18–25).
5 We do not treat two other configurations suggested by the model, agrariandominated and capital-dominated party systems. While theoretically
interesting, they are unlikely to appear in the universe of cases under consideration. In neither Latin America nor East Europe are the agrarian and
business sectors sufficiently large to dominate the party systems by themselves. Accordingly, we expect that owners of capital or land who choose a
party strategy will seek out coalition partners.
6 The coalitions between industrial elites and the urban popular sector that
emerged in Latin America in the 1930s constitute an exception to this generalization. These coalitions supported the early import substitution
industrialization (ISI) strategies pursued by populist governments in the
more advanced countries of the region. But these alliances subsequently split
apart as a result of mounting socioeconomic conflicts between capital and
labor. See Kaufman (1979: 199–201).
7 An example was the alliance of industrial-financial and agrarian elites in
Chile during the presidency of Jorge Alessandri (1958–64). See Stallings
(1978: Chapters 3 and 4).
8 Fiscal and monetary institutions are closely integrated in some of the East
Asian ‘developmental states’. See Haggard (1990) and Haggard et al. (1993).
121
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 122
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
However, separation of the fiscal and monetary spheres is crucial in
economies with a high inflationary bias, as is the case in post-authoritarian
Latin America and Eastern Europe.
9 We do not address other institutional combinations that are either empirically
unlikely (e.g. ‘minimal party, effective state’) or theoretically uninteresting
(e.g. ‘mass-dominated party, penetrating state’).
RE FE RE N CE S
Arato, Andrew (1994) ‘Elections, coalitions, and constitutionalism in Hungary:
disproportionality and the danger of constitutional dictatorship’, East
European Constitutional Review 3(3) (Summer): 26–32.
Bartlett, David (1996) ‘Democracy, institutional change, and stabilization policy
in Hungary’, Europe-Asia Studies 48(1) (January): 47–83.
—— (1997) The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reform and
Democratization in Hungary, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (forthcoming).
Bates, Robert (1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of
Agricultural Policies, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Berlin, Laura (1996) ‘Media monitors: election a step backwards’, OMRI Special
Report 14 (5 July).
Blake, Charles (1994) ‘Social pacts and inflation control in new democracies: the
impact of “wildcat cooperation” in Argentina and Uruguay’, Comparative
Political Studies 27(3) (October): 381–401.
Bozóki, András (1992) ‘Political transition and constitutional change in Hungary’,
in András Bozoki, Andras Körösény and George Schöpflin (eds) PostCommunist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, New York: St Martin’s
Press.
—— (1993) ‘Hungary’s road to systemic change: the opposition roundtable’, East
European Politics and Societies 7(2) (Spring): 276–308.
Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos, Maravall, José María and Przeworski (1993) Economic
Reforms in New Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bruszt, László and Stark, David (1990) ‘Negotiating the institutions of democracy: contingent choices and strategic interactions in the Hungarian and
Polish transitions’, Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism, Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University.
—— (1991) ‘Paths of extrication and possibilities of transformation’, Working
Papers on Transitions from State Socialism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Central European Report (13 February 1996) ‘Pressure on to create new constitution’.
Central European Report (9 July 1996) ‘Czech politics’.
Central European Report (9 July 1996) ‘Polish politics’.
Charap, Joshua, Dyba, Karel and Kupka, Martin (1992) ‘The reform process in
Czechoslovakia: an assessment of recent developments and prospects for the
future’, Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 4(1).
Collier, David and Norden, Deborah (1992) ‘Strategic choice models of political
change in Latin America’, Comparative Politics 24(2) (January): 229–43.
Comisso, Ellen (1992) ‘Debate on the transition of post-communist societies to a
market economy’, Acta Oeconomica 44(3–4): 249–54.
Dahl, Robert (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press.
Degregori, Carlos Iván and Grompone, Romeo (1991) Elecciones 1990: Demonios
122
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 123
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
y Redentores en el Nuevo Perú, Lima: IEP Ediciones.
Dornbusch, Rudiger and Werner, Alejandro (1994) ‘Mexico: stabilization, reform,
and no growth’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 253–315.
Elster, Jon (1993) ‘Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: rebuilding the boat
in the open sea’, Public Administration 71 (Spring/Summer): 169–217.
Esping-Anderson, Gøsta (1985) Politics against Markets: The Social-Democratic Road
to Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Evans, Peter (1992) ‘The state as a problem and solution: predation, embedded
autonomy, and structural change’, in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman
(eds) The Politics of Economic Adjustment, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, pp. 139–81.
Fish, M. Stephen (1991) ‘The emergence of independent associations and the
transformation of Russian political society’, The Journal of Communist Studies
7(3) (September): 299–334.
Fishman, Robert (1990) ‘Rethinking state and regime: southern Europe’s transition to democracy’, World Politics 42(3) (April): 422–40.
Frieden, Jeffry (1991) ‘Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance’, International Organization 45(4) (August):
425–51.
Geddes, Barbara (1993) ‘Institutional choice in post-communist Eastern Europe’,
unpublished manuscript presented at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
Gross, Jan (1992) ‘Poland: from civil society to political nation’, in Ivo Banac
(ed.) Eastern Europe in Revolution, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp.
56–71.
Haggard, Stephan (1990) Pathways From the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in
the Newly Industrializing Countries, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Haggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert (1995) The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Haggard, Stephan, Cooper, Richard and Moon, Chung-in (1993) ‘Policy reform
in Korea’, in Robert Bates and Anne Krueger (eds) Political and Economic
Interactions in Economic Reform Policy: Evidence from Eight Countries,
Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 294–331.
Hirschman, Albert (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Holmes, Stephen (1993) ‘The postcommunist presidency’, East European Constitutional Review 2(4) (Fall/Winter): 36–9.
Huntington, Samuel (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press.
Ilonszki, Gabriella (1993) ‘Research note: tradition and innovation in the development of parliamentary government in Hungary’, Journal of Theoretical
Politics 5(2): 253–65.
Judt, Tony (1992) ‘Metamorphosis: the democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia’,
in Ivo Banac (ed.) Eastern Europe in Revolution, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, pp. 96–116.
Karl, Terry and Schmitter, Philippe (1991) ‘Modes of transition and types of
democracy in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe’, International
Social Science Journal (May): 269–84.
Katzenstein, Peter (1985a) Small States in World Markets, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
—— (1985b) Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of
Industry, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kaufman, Robert (1979) ‘Industrial change and authoritarian rule in Latin
123
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 124
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
America: a concrete review of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model’, in
David Collier (ed.) The New Authoritarianism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, pp. 165–253.
Kitschelt, Herbert (1992a) ‘Political regime change: structure and process-driven
explanations?’, American Political Science Review 86(4) (December): 1028–34.
—— (1992b) ‘Explaining the choice of electoral laws in new democracies: the
experience of Southern and Eastern Europe’, unpublished manuscript.
—— (1992c) ‘The formation of party systems in East Central Europe’, Politics &
Society 20(1) (March): 7–50.
Lehmbruch, Gerhard and Schmitter, Philippe (1977) ‘Liberal corporatism and
party government’, Comparative Political Studies 10(1) (April): 91–125.
Lijphart, Arend (1992) ‘Democratization and constitutional choices in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 4(2)
(April): 207–33.
Linz, Juan (1990a) ‘Transitions to democracy’, The Washington Quarterly
(Summer): 143–64.
—— (1990b) ‘The perils of presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy 1(1) (Winter):
51–69.
Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred (1990) ‘Democratic transition and consolidation:
Southern Europe and South America with reflections on Eastern Europe’,
unpublished manuscript.
Linz, Juan and Valenzuela, Arturo (1994) The Failure of Presidential Democracy:
The Case of Latin America, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1981) Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Luebbert, Gregory (1987) ‘Social foundations of political order in interwar
Europe’, World Politics XXXIX(4) (July): 449–78.
Mainwaring, Scott (1992) ‘Brazilian party underdevelopment’, Political Science
Quarterly 107(4) (Winter): 677–707.
Mainwaring, Scott and Scully, Tim (eds) (1995) Building Democratic Institutions:
Party Systems in Latin America, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Mauceri, Philip (1995) ‘State reform, coalitions, and the neoliberal autogolpe in
Peru’, Latin American Research Review 30(1): 7–37.
McGregor, James (1993) ‘Fragmentation and capacity in Central and East
European parliaments’, unpublished manuscript presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
McGuire, James (1994) ‘Economic reform and political shenanigans in Menem’s
Argentina, 1989–1993’, unpublished manuscript presented at the 18th
International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta,
Georgia.
—— (1995) ‘Political parties and democracy in Argentina’, in Scott Mainwaring
and Timothy Scully (eds) Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in
Latin America, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Merkel, Wolfgang (1994) ‘Problems of democratic consolidation in East Central
Europe’, unpublished manuscript presented at the Ninth International
Conference of Europeanists, Chicago.
Moore, Barrington (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press.
Morvant, Penny (1996) ‘Yeltsin seeks to buy voters’ allegiance’, OMRI Analytical
Brief 1(172) (14 June).
O’Donnell, Guillermo (1993) ‘On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist
countries’, World Development 21(8) (August): 1355–69.
124
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 125
DEMOCRATIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND EAST EUROPE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
—— (1994) ‘Delegative democracy’, Journal of Democracy 5(1) (January): 55–69.
Offe, Claus (1981) ‘The attribution of public status to interest groups: observations on the West German case’, in Suzanne Berger, Albert Hirschman and
Charles Maier (eds) Organizing Interests in Western Europe, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 123–58.
—— (1991) ‘Capitalism by design? Democratic theory facing the triple transition
in East Central Europe’, Social Research 58(4) (Winter): 865–92.
Olson, David (1993) ‘Dissolution of the state: political parties and the 1992 election in Czechoslovakia’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26(3)
(September): 301–14.
Orttung, Robert (1996a) ‘Looking toward the second round of the Russian elections: the wooing of Lebed gets underway’, OMRI Analytical Brief 1(175) (17
June).
—— (1996b) ‘Russia: Lebed backs Yeltsin in presidential runoff’, OMRI Analytical
Brief 1(181) (18 June).
Paige, Jeffery (1975) Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture
in the Underdeveloped World, New York: The Free Press.
Parish, Scott (1996) ‘International implications of the Russian presidential election’, OMRI Analytical Brief 1(17) (14 June).
Patkai, Judith (1993) ‘Hungarian government signs social contract with unions’,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report 2(5) (29 January): 43–5.
Power, Timothy (1991) ‘Politicized democracy: competition, institutions, and
“civic fatigue” in Brazil’, Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs
33(3) (Fall): 75–112.
Przeworski, Adam (1991) Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms
in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roberts, Kenneth (1994) ‘Rethinking economic alternatives: left parties and the
articulation of popular demands in Chile and Peru’, unpublished manuscript
presented at the XVIII International Congress of the Latin American Studies
Association, Atlanta, Georgia.
Rogowski, Ronald (1989) Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic
Political Alignments, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Stephens, Evelyn Huber and Stephens, John (1992)
Capitalist Development & Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Rustow, Dankwart (1970) ‘Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model’,
Comparative Politics 2(3) (April): 337–63.
Rutland, Peter (1996a) ‘Money, guns, and votes: the currency of power in Russia’,
OMRI Analytical Brief 1(194) (21 June).
—— (1996b) ‘Chernomyrdin warns off Lebed’, OMRI Special Report 14 (5 July).
Sabbat-Swidlicka, Anna (1992) ‘Poland: weak government, fractious Sejm,
isolated President’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report 1(15)
(April): 1–7.
Schmitter, Philippe (1979) ‘Still the century of corporatism?’, in Philippe
Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds) Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, London: Sage Publications, pp. 7–52.
—— (1992) ‘The consolidation of democracy and representation of social groups’,
American Behavioral Scientist 35(4–5) (March/June): 430–3.
Shugart, Matthew and Carey, John (1992) Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional
Design and Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Silva, Eduardo (1996) ‘From dictatorship to democracy: the business-state nexus
in Chile’s economic transformation, 1975–1994’, Comparative Politics 28(3)
(April): 299–320.
125
RIPE 4/1 01-03-C
25/4/97 8:51 am
Page 126
ARTICLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Folio
Slay, Ben (1994) The Polish Economy: Crisis, Reform, and Transformation, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Stallings, Barbara (1978) Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958–
1973, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Stepan, Alfred (1986) ‘Paths toward redemocratization: theoretical and empirical considerations’, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and
Laurence Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 64–84.
Stepan, Alfred and Skach, Cindy (1993) ‘Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation: parliamentarianism versus presidentialism’, World
Politics 46(1) (October): 1–22.
Stokes, Gale (1993) The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism
in Eastern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Szelényi, Iván and Szelény, Szonja (1992) ‘Classes and parties in the transition
to postcommunism: the case of Hungary, 1989–90’, in Christiane Lemke and
Gary Marks (eds) The Crisis of Socialism in Europe, Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, pp. 114–35.
Verdery, Katherine and Klingman, Gail (1992) ‘Romania after Ceausescu: postcommunist communism?’, in Ivo Banac (ed.) Eastern Europe in Revolution,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 117–47.
Vinton, Louisa (1994) ‘Power shifts in Poland’s ruling coalition’, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report 3(11) (18 March).
Waisman, Carlos (1987) Reversal of Development in Argentina: Postwar
Counterrevolutionary Policies and their Structural Consequences, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Weber, Max (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Weyland, Kurt (1996a) Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil,
Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.
—— (1996b) ‘How much political clout do economic forces have? Conflicts over
social security insurance reform in Brazil’, Journal of Public Policy 16(1): 57–84.
—— (1997) ‘ “Growth with equity” in Chile’s new democracy?’, Latin American
Research Review 32(1) (Spring): 36–67.
126