Download From conference to crisis

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From conference to crisis:
Understanding the Great Powers’ pursuit of interests in Iran from 1945-6 and its
ramifications
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From conference to crisis:
Understanding the Great Powers’ pursuit of interests in Iran from 1945-6 and its
ramifications
In February of 1945 delegations from Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States
met at Yalta in the Crimea to discuss the imminent end of World War II and their visions of the
post-war world. The plethora of issues discussed at the Yalta Conference is astounding; much
has been written about the agreements reached on Germany, Poland, other Central and Eastern
European countries, post-war reparations, and the formation of the United Nations. However,
certain important issues were given very little attention at the conference. Why these particular
issues did not receive much consideration becomes especially important to explore given that
some of these questions evolved into highly explosive crises, some only a year or two after the
conference’s end.
Perhaps the best example of one such topic is Allied relations with Iran. Further
exploration of the Iranian issue reveals a perplexing dichotomy between the way Iran was dealt
with at the Yalta Conference and the political situation that unfolded in Iran at the dawn of the
Cold War. Although by February of 1945 each of the Big Three countries (Britain, the United
States, and Russia) had made their interests in Iranian affairs well known, Iran was only briefly
discussed at the conference.1 Furthermore, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin were not present at
these discussions, which took place only among each country’s foreign ministers: Anthony Eden
for Britain, Vyacheslav Molotov for the Soviet Union, and Edward Stettinius for the United
States.2
1
United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1955, pp. 738-41; Stettinius, Edward R. Roosevelt
and the Russians. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1949, pp. 193-5; Clemens, Diane Shaver.
Yalta. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 255-258; Blake, Kristen. The U.S. – Soviet Confrontation in
Iran, 1945-1952: A Case in the Annals of the Cold War. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc.,
2009, p. 20.
2
Ibid.
-3Despite the fact that the Iranian issue received hardly any consideration at Yalta, it
quickly evolved into one of the first major crises of the Cold War. In early 1946, Iran filed a
complaint with the newly formed United Nations over Soviet influence in Azerbaijan, accusing
the Soviets of unduly continuing their troop presence in Iran as an excuse to meddle in Iran’s
internal affairs without regard for Iranian sovereignty.3 Though the crisis ended as the Soviet
Union eventually bowed to US and UN pressure, its significance as one of the first major ColdWar contestations cannot be diminished, as it seriously called into question the ability of the
three Allies to work together to craft a peaceful and secure post-war order.4
The fact that Iran received so little attention at Yalta requires, at the very least, a certain
amount of explanation. Only a holistic analysis of each Great Power’s interests in Iran can begin
to reveal why meaningful discussion on Iran was lacking at Yalta given that Iran became such an
important issue less than a year after the conference’s conclusion. Studying British and Russian
historic interests in Iran reveals that there may have been the possibility for an agreement on Iran
at Yalta, albeit one delineating spheres of influence in the style of the infamous Anglo-Soviet
“Percentages Agreement” signed only four months before Yalta. Such an agreement could have
allowed the US to preserve its geo-strategic interests in the Middle East as well. However, the
US’s insistence, both for moral and strategic reasons, in upholding national self-determination
and other Atlantic Charter ideals led Britain and the Soviet Union to lean away from such an
agreement, leaving a lack of meaningful discussion as the only feasible option. Iran’s transition
from a marginal issue at the Yalta conference to a major arena of crisis can then be understood as
a further ramification of American liberalism’s interaction with traditional notions of
imperialism.
3
Blake, pp. 28, 35-8.
Blake, pp. 28, 35-8; Fawcett, Louise L’Estrange. Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 2, 177-8.
4
-4These insights raise the important question of whether the silence on Iran at Yalta helped
or hindered post-war peace and security in the long term. When considering alternative
scenarios and their possible ramifications given each Great Power’s interests in Iran, it becomes
clear that the lack of meaningful discussion at Yalta may have been the best of many unfavorable
outcomes. The Iranian crisis was solved without war or violence through the UN and other
diplomatic channels. Agreement on Iran at Yalta could not have ensured a better solution to the
crisis, nor can we be sure that it would have been sufficient to prevent a crisis from occurring.
Iran at the Yalta Conference
Transcripts of Yalta Conference minutes and memoirs of the participants tell a story in
which Britain and the United States were constantly stymied in their efforts to engage Molotov
in meaningful discussion on Iran. On February 8, 1945, Molotov, Eden and Stettinius first
discussed the Iranian issue at Yalta. Eden opened the session with an appeal to Iranian
sovereignty, stating that without it, Allied disunity over Iran may result.5 Although Soviet
desires for an oil concession in northern Iran were legitimate, Eden argued that no oil
concessions should be granted without the Iranian government’s consent, as the Allies had
previously committed to uphold Iranian sovereignty in the 1943 Declaration on Iran.6 Eden then
proposed that speedy Allied troop withdrawals would likely persuade the government to begin
granting oil concessions sooner.7 To this end, Eden proposed that the Allies make a commitment
5
United States, Malta and Yalta, p. 738; Stettinius, pp. 193-4.
United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 738-9; Stettinius, p. 194; United States Department of State. Foreign relations
of the United States diplomatic papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1943. < http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943CairoTehran>, p. 647.
7
United States, Malta and Yalta, p. 739; Stettinius, p. 194.
6
-5to wait until the war’s end before pressing for oil concessions and that troop withdrawals begin
as soon as supply routes through Iran were closed.8
Molotov replied that oil concessions and troop withdrawals were two entirely separate
questions. He refused to discuss troop withdrawals, declaring that the Soviet Union was not yet
ready for discussion on that question. Regarding oil concessions, Molotov stated that the
Iranians were initially amenable to the idea and then suddenly and rather inexplicably changed
their minds. As such, it was highly possible for the Iranians to change their minds again, as the
Soviet Union had persuaded them to do. Molotov proposed that the Allies wait out the situation
and monitor its development, since it was not urgent to take any action at the present time.9
Stettinius added that the Americans were prepared to leave discussions on oil concessions
until the war’s end, but that the United States was in full agreement with Eden regarding troop
withdrawals. Eden then repeated his assertion that a statement regarding oil concessions might
be beneficial for Allied relations with Iran, also adding that he wished troop withdrawal would
begin immediately after supply routes were closed. Molotov refused any meaningful discussion
on the issue, asserting that any statement on Iran at the Yalta Conference should merely affirm
that the Allies had exchanged views on the subject. Eden, not ready to give up, said he would
consider Molotov’s comments and make suggestions regarding Iran at future meetings.10
However, discussions on Iran at these future meetings were even more limited. On
February 9, Eden stated that he had submitted a paper on the Iranian issue, and Stettinius then
commented that the United States fully supported the British position as articulated in the paper:
that the Allies should agree to withdraw troops from Iran pari passu11 before the cessation of
8
Ibid.
Ibid.
10
United States, Malta and Yalta, p. 740; Stettinius, p. 195.
11
“at the same rate”
9
-6hostilities but only when the Iranian supply route was no longer needed, and that the Allies
would not press for oil concessions until fully withdrawing their troops. Molotov stalled by
asserting that the Soviet Delegation had not yet had sufficient time to read the paper, ending the
discussion.12
In a Foreign Ministers Meeting the next day, Eden asked Molotov if he had read and
considered the British paper, and Molotov merely replied that he had nothing new to say about
Iran. Eden pressed Molotov further, asking if he thought it advisable to issue an Allied
communiqué on Iran, and Molotov answered in the negative. Stettinius then argued that the
Allies should at least mention that Iranian issues had been “discussed and clarified” at Yalta.
Molotov opposed this, as well as Eden’s subsequent assertion that the Allies should say that the
1943 Declaration on Iran had been “reaffirmed and re-examined.”13 This would be the last time
Iran was mentioned in discussions at Yalta. The Yalta Protocol issued at the conclusion of the
conference stated only that “Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, and M. Molotov exchanged views on the
situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic
channel.”14
From this outline of events at Yalta, it becomes apparent that the lack of substantial
discussion on Iran was not due to apathy. Molotov’s persistent silence seems to be motivated by
important Soviet interests in Iran. Eden’s insistence on the issue shows that Britain also had vital
interests in the country. Even Stettinius’ reluctance to press the Soviets too much on the issue
cannot immediately be explained by a lack of American interests in Iran. Great Power interests
in Iran were complex and at times lent themselves to contradictory policy aims. In order to
12
United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 810, 813, 822, 824, 845, 860, 819-20.
Ibid., pp. 877, 882.
14
Ibid., p. 982.
13
-7understand Iran at the Yalta conference and the subsequent deterioration into crisis, these
complexities and contradictions must be unraveled.
Russian interests in Iran: a rising power striving for equality on the world stage
At the time of Yalta, much was said about the Soviet Union’s interests in Iranian
petroleum. In 1944, in response to Britain’s consolidated presence in southern Iranian oilfields
and the oil concessions American companies were seeking, the Soviet Union informed the
Iranian government of its desire for an oil concession in the northern part of Iran.15 However,
given the Soviet Union’s richness in natural resources, acquiring Iranian oil would not have been
necessary for preserving the Soviet Union’s vital interests.16 Thus, the Soviet bid for an oil
concession was likely politically motivated, and because of this, the Iranian government feared
the political implications of a Soviet oil concession in the north.17 Soviet troops had occupied
the region since the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion, and the Soviets had begun to infiltrate and
support separatist movements in the northern provinces, including Persian Azerbaijan, where
central government control was not as strong.18 In response to the Soviet bid for an oil
concession, Iran postponed all oil concessions to foreign powers on October 8, 1944.19 The
Soviet Union was quite angry at this reaction, inciting protests in Iran by means of Iran’s
15
Fawcett, p. 94; Bill, James A. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1988, p. 28; Blake, p. 19.
16
Fawcett, p. 94; Plokhii, Serhii. Lectures on the Yalta Conference. Harvard University History Research Seminar
82f., Cambridge, MA. Oct and Nov 2009.
17
Fawcett, p. 94.
18
Blake, pp. 13-4, 29; Fawcett, pp. 87-9, 93-4. Even in the 19th century Russia had begun to press its advantage in
regions, such as Persian Azerbaijan, in which the central Persian government was weak (LeDonne, John P. The
Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 149-50). LeDonne’s The
Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831 and The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917 detail the
historical precedent for Russian involvement in Persia (especially in Azerbaijan) prior to World War II; most
notably, Azerbaijan was included in the zone of influence delineated to the Russians in the 1907 Anglo-Russian
agreement (LeDonne, The Russian, p. 147).
19
Bill, p. 29; Blake, p. 19.
-8Communist Tudeh party.20 The anger Iran’s decision produced seems disproportionate to the
Soviet Union’s actual need for Iranian oil, further suggesting that political, expansionist motives
played a larger role in the Soviet Union’s policy toward Iran than oil itself.
Historically, the Soviet Union had been interested in Iran for a variety of reasons, most
obviously because of the 1,250-mile border the two countries shared. By the 1900s Russia
regarded Iran as an important buffer against external powers, especially against the British.21
Russia’s Tsars pursued a policy of influence in Iranian affairs, attempting to turn the country into
a Russian protectorate at least, or at most a fully-fledged member of the Russian Empire.22 Only
after Russia was weakened by economic problems and by war with Japan did it abandon its
aspirations for a completely Russian-dominated Iran and seek an agreement with Britain
delineating zones of influence.23 Despite this, the Soviet Union continued to pursue a policy of
influence in Iranian affairs, especially in Iran’s northern border regions. Such a policy was
viewed as vital to Soviet security interests in terms of protecting the border, promoting a
favorable trading environment, and bolstering the Soviet Union’s position relative to Britain.24
20
Bill, p. 29; Fawcett, pp. 94-5; Blake, p. 19.
Fawcett, p. 83; LeDonne, The Russian, pp. 116-9, 136, 308, 359, 368. Lord Palmerston in 1860 remarked that
Russia’s expansion was in part “directed to occupation of certain strategical points…from whence neighboring
states may be kept under control” (qtd. in LeDonne, The Russian, p. 368).
22
Fawcett, p. 83. In the 19th century Russia worked to transform Persia into a “client states” whose policies would
be in line with the Russian empire’s political and economic interests (LeDonne, John P. The Grand Strategy of the
Russian Empire, 1650-1831. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 208-9, 219, 225). Russia exercised its
influence especially in the Northern regions of Persia where the Persian central government was weaker; even in the
19th century Russia was observed to be pursuing a policy of “destabilization” of Persian Azerbaijan (LeDonne, The
Russian, pp. 119, 127, 135-6, 149-50, 363).
23
Fawcett, p. 83. LeDonne also mentions the economic problems Russia faced during this time as a product of its
loss in the Russo-Japanese war, stating that Russia’s defeat in this war was what led it to pursue a spheres-ofinfluence agreement with the British (LeDonne, The Grand, pp. 229, 232-3; LeDonne, The Russian, pp. 146-7).
24
Fawcett, p. 84. The 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement delineated northern Iran (including Persian Azerbaijan) as
Russia’s sphere of influence, and in 1915 the Russians incorporated this area of Persia into their empire (LeDonne,
The Russian, pp. 147, 338, 367). As early as 1864 Russian foreign minister Alexander Gorchakov justified Russia’s
expansion into Persia as vital because of “the turbulence of the frontier zones, the social unity of the Russo-Persian
frontier, and the development of Russian trade” (LeDonne, The Russian, p. 130; quote is from LeDonne, not
Gorchakov). These are many of the same reasons why Russia pursued a sphere of interest in Iran after 1907.
21
-9Although this historical account traces back to Tsarist times, the issues it raises had great
bearing on Soviet psychology at Yalta. In the eyes of the Soviets, the Conference represented
their country’s re-entry into the international arena as a great power. At Yalta the Soviet Union
was very concerned with being treated justly and on an equal footing with the United States and
Britain.25 The British had an empire, and the United States had a zone of influence in Latin
America. For the Soviet Union, its new distinction as one of the “Big Three” meant that the
pursuit of Soviet interests abroad should be legitimized in much the same way as Britain’s
imperial interests and the expansion of America’s global influence.26 Iran, like the other
territories upon which Russia exerted influence during the time of the Tsars, presented itself as a
logical sphere for Soviet imperialism and the expansion of Soviet influence abroad.
Thus, at Yalta, two alternatives presented themselves to the Soviet Delegation. The
Soviets could pursue an agreement delineating spheres of influence in Iran, as was previously
done in 1907. Such an agreement would have been similar to Churchill and Stalin’s October
1944 “Percentages Agreement” regarding spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.27 The fact that
Stalin so pointedly kept his word by allowing British influence to expand in Greece at the
expense of the Greek Communist party shows that Stalin was amenable to this type of deal, even
if it came at Communism’s expense.28 However, in the event that such an agreement were
impossible, the next viable alternative for the Soviets was to maintain the status quo. Although
25
Plokhii. In the years 18th and 19th-century Tsarist expansion, “deep strategic penetrations” were an important
element of the empire’s strategy; these “deep penetrations” gave the Russians a sense of “undisputed hegemony”
(LeDonne, The Grand, pp. 176, 208, 218). Through expansion and conquest, the leaders of the Russian empire
worked to place Russia among the world’s leading powers, both economically and politically (LeDonne, The
Russian, pp. 349, 352). One can see this same desire for Soviet hegemonic power at the Yalta conference. The
USSR very much wanted the Americans and the British to recognize its role as a great power in the post-war era,
emphasizing in its rhetoric its role as one of the “big three” (Plokhii; Clemens, pp. 48, 69, 73-5, 174).
26
Plokhii. These sentiments can especially be seen during discussions of UN membership at Yalta. The USSR felt
that, since the British empire and states in the US’s sphere of influence in Latin America would become members,
the Soviet republics should also be allowed membership in the UN (Clemens, pp. 53-4, 221, 234, 236).
27
Clemens, pp. 70-1.
28
Churchill, Winston S. Triumph and Tragedy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953, p. 617.
- 10 by 1945 the Soviets had exerted a powerful influence in Iranian affairs, especially in Persian
Azerbaijan and in Iran’s other northern provinces, their influence was by no means fully
consolidated. Further development of Soviet interests in the north was contingent on the Soviet
Union being able to maintain a troop presence in Iran, perhaps longer than Britain or the United
States would have liked. A lack of agreement would buy the Soviets enough time to finish
consolidating their interests in northern Iran.29
British interests in Iran: a waning power trying to maintain its presence overseas
Historically, Russia’s major competitor in Iran was not America but Britain, as Iran had
traditionally held great importance for British interests overseas.30 Unlike Russia, Britain was
not rich in natural resources, and its acquisition of key resources relied primarily on imports from
abroad, especially from its imperial holdings.31 Thus, while Soviet desire for an oil concession
in Iran was likely motivated by political reasons more than any urgent need for the oil itself,
British interests in Iran were in large part due to their need to import oil.32 Iranian oil had been
important for the British long before the Second World War. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company
was established in 1909, giving Britain an important foothold in Iran’s southern oil fields.33
Since then, Britain’s policy in Iran had focused primarily on maintaining its monopoly on Iranian
oil, especially as the US and the Soviet Union became increasingly more interested in obtaining
oil concessions in Iran.34
29
30
31
32
33
34
Fawcett, p. 93-5.
Fawcett, pp. 84, 141; LeDonne, The Russian, pp. 116-9, 127-8, 136, 295, 313-4, 349.
Bill, p. 57.
Ibid.; LeDonne, The Russian, pp. 148, 365.
Bill, pp. 27, 57.
Bill, pp. 27-30, 42; Blake, p. 9; Fawcett, p. 141.
- 11 By the time of the Yalta conference, the importance Britain placed on its Iranian oil
holdings was very clear. Britain had invested vast quantities of time, manpower, and other
resources in acquiring Iranian oil, and British efforts had produced tangible results. By the
1940s the British were operating one of the world’s largest oil refineries at Abadan, and this
refinery’s importance for the British is demonstrated in their concern for its security both when
planning and executing the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran.35 Losing its position in Iran,
then, was more than a matter of losing the potential for oil wealth in the future. A March 9,
1945, memo from Tehran to British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden states that Britain “[has] in
the shape of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s concession a valuable stake in the country.”36 For
Britain, losing its position in Iran would mean losing actual oil wealth and the investments put
into acquiring it.37
Iran was also an especially important part of Britain’s regional agenda during the Second
World War. After Hitler launched his invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the British
became especially concerned with the prevalence of German agents in Iran.38 The Iranian
government’s German leanings were cited as the reason for the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran on
August 25, 1941, and after the invasion occurred, British troops aided the passage of lend-lease
supplies through Iran to the Soviet Union.39 A March 20, 1944, memo from Tehran to Eden
discusses how this “vital supply line for carrying aid to Russia” was key in preserving Allied
35
Burrell, Dr. R. M, and Robert L. Jarman, eds. Iran Political Diaries: 1881-1965. vol. 12. Gerrards Cross,
England: Archive Editions, 1997, pp. vi, 191; Churchill, Winston S. The Grand Alliance. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1950, p. 478-9; Plokhii.
36
Burrell, p. 515.
37
In the 1890s Lord Lansdowne sent a memo to British minister in Tehran Sir Arthur Hardinge discussing Britain’s
“substantial and preeminent mercantile position” in southern Iran. In addition to its later oil refineries, British
interests in trading and commerce in southern Iran were, by the 1890s, already entrenched (qtd. in LeDonne, The
Russian, p. 338).
38
Churchill, Grand, pp. 477-9; Burrell, p. 483; Bill, p. 18; Blake, p. 9.
39
Burdett, A.L.P. and A. Seay, eds.. Iran in the Persian Gulf: 1820-1966. vol 4. Gerrards Cross, England: Archive
Editions, 2000, p 356; Bill, p. 18; Blake, p. 9.
- 12 strategic interests during the war.40 Iran’s role as an important supply route to the Soviet Union
was a vital part not only of Britain’s wartime interests in Iran but of American and Soviet
wartime interests as well.41
Although these wartime interests may not have had much bearing on British incentives
for maintaining a presence in Iran after the war, British discussion of such interests in Iran
reveals the presence of other, deeper interests in the country that extended into the post-war
period. Notwithstanding its proximity to British mandates in the Middle East, Iran is centrally
located along key trade and communication routes to India. In a July 10, 1941, memo to the War
Office, British General Wavell warns, “[i]t is essential to the defence of India that Germans
should be cleared out of Iran now.” 42 Iran’s relationship to India and the rest of the Middle East,
in addition to its oil, was perhaps the most significant reason for British interest in Iran both at
the time of the Anglo-Soviet invasion and at the time of the Yalta Conference.43 The same
March 9, 1945, memo to Eden outlining the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s importance states that
“for [oil] and for political reasons connected with the position of Persia in relation to India and
the Middle East it is necessary for Great Britain to ensure that her influence in this country is at
least as great as that of any other foreign country.” 44 The mere fact that this memo, the 1944
annual review of events affecting British interests in Iran, was copied to the Indian Government,
40
Burrell, p. 191.
United States Department of State. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1942. The Near East
and Africa. vol. 4. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942.
<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1942v04>, pp. 5-7.
42
Churchill, Grand, p. 477.
43
Churchill, Grand, pp. 496-7; Burrell, pp. 483, 515. LeDonne outlines British interests in India during the 18th and
th
19 centuries and how these interests often clashed with Russian aspirations in Persia (LeDonne, The Russian, pp.
18, 101, 117, 119, 128, 295, 300, 306, 311-3).
44
Burrell, p. 515.
41
- 13 the Minister Resident in Cairo, and the British Political Intelligence Centre in the Middle East
clearly shows how Iran was linked to British strategic interests in the area.45
Unlike the Soviet Union, whose interests lay primarily in northern Iran, Britain’s interests
in Iran were concentrated in the south, where British oil holdings and ports along imperial trade
and communication routes were located.46 Even into the 1940s, many in Britain were not
concerned about Soviet activities in the north as long as British interests in southern Iran were
preserved.47 Leo Amery, the British Secretary of State for India, asked the British Secretary of
State for foreign affairs in 1940 “whether we should not deliberately do a deal with Russia over
Iran[,]… encouraging her to do what she likes in the north, so long as she recognizes our
interests in the south.” 48
Thus, at Yalta, the possibility for an agreement on spheres of influence in Iran certainly
existed. In fact, there was historical precedent for such an agreement. On August 31, 1907,
Britain and Russia signed the Anglo-Russian Convention in St. Petersburg, dividing Persia into a
Russian zone of influence in the north, a British zone in the south, and a neutral zone
encompassing Tehran in the center.49 By the time of the Yalta Conference Britain’s power and
influence over its imperial holdings was waning.50 It therefore seems reasonable that Britain
might have turned to diplomacy in an attempt to preserve its position in Iran. After all, the
Anglo-Soviet “Percentages Agreement” in October of 1944 can be seen as an attempt by
45
Burrell, p. 438. In fact, as early as 1824 London had decided that headquarters for directing the British mission in
Tehran should be in Calcutta; the governor general would report to the Secretary of State for India in London instead
of to the Foreign Office (LeDonne, The Russian, p. 313).
46
Fawcett, p. 143; Blake, p. 10. In a 1915 agreement with Russia, Britain acquired the oil fields in the zone
designated as “neutral” by the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement, gaining control of Iran’s southern oil fields as well as
the entire coast of the Persian Gulf. (LeDonne, The Russian, p. 365).
47
Fawcett, pp. 143, 145, 151.
48
qtd. in Fawcett, p. 143.
49
Blake, p. 10; LeDonne, p. 365.
50
Bill, p. 44, Fawcett, pp. 141-2.
- 14 Churchill to preserve Britain’s position in Greece by diplomatic means, since the British had few
resources in the aftermath of World War II to devote to Greece.51 It seems reasonable to
conclude that a similar agreement would have allowed Britain to uphold its position in Iran.
At the same time, however, there was much talk in Britain about the necessity of
advocating for Iranian sovereignty, as many believed that upholding Iranian self-determination
was vital for Britain’s national interests. In his January 28, 1945, memo to Churchill regarding
British aims at the Yalta Conference, Eden lists guarantees of Iranian sovereignty as second only
to the establishment of a free and independent Poland.52 From the standpoint of British national
interests, Eden’s insistence on Iranian self-determination can be seen as a product of British fear
of the ramifications of Soviet influence in the north. Should the Soviets gain too much influence
over the Iranian government, they might gain enough leverage to force the British out of the
southern oilfields, jeopardizing both Britain’s oil interests and its geopolitical interests in the
south of the country.53 In fact, the British would be forced out of these oilfields by the Iranian
government in 1951, though the government made this decision independent of Soviet
influence.54
Despite all of this, Britain knew its policy on Iran at Yalta would need American backing
for it to have any chance of success, especially if concessions from the Soviets were required.55
While Britain’s capacity to maintain its overseas presence was diminishing, the United States
51
Churchill, Grand, pp. 67-8, 617.
Eden, Anthony. The Reckoning. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965, p. 588.
53
Fawcett, pp. 145, 155-8; Eden, pp. 632-3; Burrell, pp. 484, 488. At Stettinius and Eden’s Feb. 1, 1945 pre-Yaltaconference meeting aboard the HMS Sirius in Malta’s harbor, Eden told Stettinius of his desire for an agreement
with the Soviets at Yalta. Such an agreement was important, he argued, because the status quo was allowing the
Soviets to put undue “pressure…on the Persian Government, mainly in connexion with the oil concession which the
Persian Government had declined to give them” (United States, Malta and Yalta, p. 500). Implicit in this is his fear
that maintaining the status quo would allow the Soviets to undermine Britain’s interests in Iran.
54
Blake, pp. 62, 66.
55
Bill, p. 44.
52
- 15 was just emerging as a powerful global force.56 Thus, elucidating the American position on Iran
at Yalta is necessary in order to understand why Britain chose not to pursue an agreement
delineating spheres of influence in Iran. Since Britain’s choice left the Soviet Union with no
alternative to delaying discussion or agreement on the subject, American policy towards Iran
directly influenced Russia’s choices at Yalta as well. Therefore, American interest in Iran is a
vital and important object of study.
American interests in Iran: linking strategic interests to the rhetoric of self-determination
American interest in Iran, unlike that of the British and the Soviets, had little historical
precedent.57 In fact, American involvement in Iran only truly gained momentum after US troops
moved into the country in 1942 to aid in the passage of Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet
Union.58 As time passed, the Americans began to see good reason for continued involvement in
Iranian affairs.59 The potential for oil wealth was definitely an issue, but it did not hold the same
importance for the Americans as it did for the British. Though American companies had
attempted to gain oil concessions from Iran, by the time of the Yalta conference none of these
bids had yet succeeded.60 Thus, American petroleum interests in Iran were on the level of
potential future gains only, as the Americans did not have any ongoing oil-producing operations
in Iran. In addition, the United States had extended its influence into other Middle Eastern, oilproducing countries, especially Saudi Arabia, with the result that America had other arenas upon
which it could depend to satisfy its petroleum needs.61
56
57
58
59
60
61
Bill, p. 44; Fawcett, pp. 108, 141-2, 147.
Fawcett, p. 108; Blake, pp. 9-10.
Fawcett, p. 111; Blake, pp. 16-7.
Fawcett, p. 112; Blake, pp. 18-9.
Bill, p. 30; Fawcett, p. 108.
United States, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 163-4.
- 16 However, America did take strategic interest in Iran due to its proximity to Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf countries. As Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote to Roosevelt in an August 16,
1943, memo, “it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite
the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia.” 62 As the United States began
for the first time to acquire a greater foothold in the Middle East, a friendly Iranian government
was seen as necessary to guard against any violation of American interests in Saudi Arabia and
other Middle Eastern countries.63 From this evidence alone, one might believe that the United
States would, like Britain and the Soviet Union, potentially be amenable to an agreement on Iran
delineating spheres of influence. After Roosevelt wrote to Churchill in March of 1944 with
assurances that the Americans did not seek to interfere in British oilfields in southern Iran,
Churchill responded, “[l]et me reciprocate by giving you the fullest assurance that we have no
thought of trying to horn in upon your influences or property in Saudi Arabia.” 64 This kind of
rhetoric strikingly recalls Churchill and Stalin’s 1944 “Percentages Agreement” delineating
spheres of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.65
Despite these strategic concerns, further examination of Hull’s August 16, 1943, memo,
as well as other US State Department documents, reveals that the United States did not perceive
that an agreement delineating spheres of influence in Iran was in its national interests.66 Just
prior to discussing America’s interests in Saudi Arabia, Hull writes that America “has a vital
interest in the fulfillment of the principles of the [1941] Atlantic Charter and the establishment of
foundations for a lasting peace throughout the world,” and because of this “it is to the advantage
62
United States Department of State. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1943. The Near East
and Africa. vol. 4. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943.
<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943v04>, p. 378; qtd. in Bill, p. 19.
63
Bill, p. 19; United States, 1943, p. 378.
64
qtd. in Bill, p. 28.
65
Churchill, Triumph, p. 198.
66
United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 340-3.
- 17 of the United States to exert itself to see that Iran’s integrity and independence are maintained
and that she becomes prosperous and stable.” 67 This memo and others like it reveal how
America’s self-interested strategic motives, like Iran’s proximity to Saudi Arabia, were linked to
the more idealistic motives of self-determination and upholding Atlantic Charter values.68 Since
upholding these values was in weaker states’ interests as well as in the interests of peace and
world security, this logic equates American national interests with the interests of weaker states
and the establishment of a peaceful post-war order. American rhetoric in these memos is full of
idealism regarding what the United States can do to help Third World countries, bolstering a
moral claim with strategic justification.69 From these observations, the assumption underlying
American foreign policy logic at the end of World War II becomes apparent: what is good for
weaker states and for facilitating peace and world security is also good for the United States.
The Iranian government’s response to American interactions with Iran, especially during
and after the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion, further encouraged America’s assumption that pursuit
of Iranian self-determination was in both the United States’ and Iran’s interests. Because of its
insistence on Atlantic Charter values, America was perceived as largely above the traditional
Anglo-Russian imperialist competition in Iran.70 As a result, the Iranian government welcomed
an increased American presence to counter the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry, creating a
domestic Iranian environment favorable for the US to pursue its interests in Iran.71 Throughout
his correspondences with Roosevelt, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and other Iranian officials
constantly emphasized Iran’s desire for good relations with America, continuously stating their
67
United States, 1943, p. 378.
United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 340-3; United States, 1943, p. 378; United States, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 62930; United States, 1942, pp. 28, 128.
69
Ibid.
70
Bill, pp. 4-5.
71
United States, Malta and Yalta, p. 339; Fawcett, p. 109; Blake, p. 9; Bill, pp. 4-5; United States, 1942, pp. 214-15,
228.
68
- 18 hope that America could use its influence on Britain and the Soviet Union to achieve guarantees
of Iranian sovereignty.72 This explains some of the Iranians’ eagerness to hold the 1943 Great
Power conference in Tehran, and sure enough, the 1943 Tehran Conference produced the
Declaration on Iran, an Allied agreement with assurances of Iranian sovereignty.73 When the
Iranian Foreign Minister heard that the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain were
planning another conference in 1945, he presented the Americans with an offer to host the
conference in Tehran.74
Thus, at Yalta, the Americans viewed Iran as a test case for upholding the values laid out
in the Atlantic Charter: values of self-determination, democracy, freedom, and respect for the
sovereignty of all nations.75 These values were the cornerstone of the United Nations, and the
creation of a world organization to guarantee collective security was one of Roosevelt’s top
priorities at the Yalta Conference.76 The United Nations represented not only the future of interAllied cooperation but also American ideals regarding the role rich countries could play in
helping poorer ones.77 Allied cooperation on Iran, including guarantees of Iranian sovereignty,
would bode well for the future of the United Nations as well as for the promotion of Atlantic
Charter values seen as a key component of the United States’ interests abroad.78
Given this assessment of American interests, it seems surprising that the United States
did not support Iran more staunchly at Yalta. Though both the United States and Britain
72
United States, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 564-5, 627-8.
Ibid., p. 647.
74
United States, Malta and Yalta, p. 339.
75
United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 340-3; Fawcett, pp. 112, 119.
76
United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 340-3; Clemens, p. 216.
77
United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 340-3, 337-45; Fawcett, p. 112.
78
At Stettinius and Eden’s Feb. 1, 1945 pre-Yalta-conference meeting aboard the HMS Sirius in Malta’s harbor, “It
was agreed that for the three Powers to appear to default on the specific undertakings in the Tehran Declaration
would have repercussions elsewhere, for instance in connexion with Dumbarton Oaks” (United States, Malta and
Yalta, pp. 500-1).
73
- 19 repeatedly insisted on upholding Iranian sovereignty, the United States did not press the issue
very far with the Soviets, as the American delegation was cautious not to give the issue “undue
importance.” 79 The United States’ behavior at Yalta reflects the tensions and contradictions
inherent in a worldview that attempts to pursue a selfless ideology for self-interested reasons,
and it reveals how American idealism was tempered with reality. Even before Yalta this tension
in American policy is apparent. At the time of the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, the
United States responded to Iranian pleas for help in defending Iran’s sovereignty by citing the
fact that Nazism must be defeated at all costs, adding that Atlantic Charter values could not be
upheld if the Nazis were victorious.80 Similarly, the creation of the United Nations was one of
America’s most important aims at Yalta, as it was deemed necessary for preserving selfdetermination and other Atlantic Charter values for small nations.81 Alienating the Soviet Union
could put American plans for the United Nations in jeopardy, as the Soviets very well could
demand that the Americans make concessions on the their proposal for a United Nations in
return for Soviet concessions on Iran. Memoirs and Yalta Conference minutes clearly show the
United States’ reluctance to unduly alienate the Soviet Union.82 Thus, Iranian self-determination
was placed on the back burner, and the United States justified this by asserting that certain shortterm issues had to be addressed in order to defend Atlantic Charter values in the long term.
Despite the tensions inherent in its foreign-policy worldview, the fact remains that at
Yalta, the United States was not prepared to throw its support behind an agreement delineating
spheres of influence in Iran. Since the British knew that their Iranian policy would have no
79
United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 337-9, 443.
United States Department of State. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1941. The British
Commonwealth; the Near East and Africa. vol. 3. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941.
<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1941v03>, pp. 406-7, 415-7, 422-3, 432-4, 447.
81
Clemens 216; United States, 1941, pp. 406-7, 415-7, 422-3, 432-4, 447.
82
United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 738-40; Eden, pp. 590-1, 593.
80
- 20 chance of success without American backing, it became advantageous for them to argue for
Iranian self-determination and to discard the possibility of a spheres-of-influence agreement as
well.83 Since neither the United States nor Britain was amenable to this type of agreement, it
became advantageous for the Soviets to delay discussion and buy time to consolidate their
position in the north. This arrangement set the Soviet position in direct opposition to Britain and
America. Since no agreement directly and adequately addressing the Great Powers’ conflicting
interests in Iran was reached at Yalta or at the next Big Three conference at Potsdam, the Iranian
situation quickly devolved into confrontation and crisis.84
The implications of silence: would more discussion at Yalta have averted crisis?
Clearly, the silence on Iran at Yalta was not due to apathy; rather, this silence resulted
from the interaction of vital British, American, and Soviet interests in Iran. Yalta was, after all,
the first Big Three conference at which the end of the war was in sight and at which Allied
victory was almost certain. Because of this, post-war problems were much more prescient, and
agreement on difficult issues relating to the post-war order could no longer be deferred without
consequence. The challenges the Allies faced in resolving these problems set the backdrop for
future Cold War crises. However, arguing that agreement inevitably prevents future crises is
overly simplistic. Even considering issues upon which the Great Powers managed to reach
agreement, such as the demarcation of the Polish border and the composition of the new Polish
83
Bill, p. 44. It also bears mentioning that at Yalta, the British mentioned the Iranian issue first; at Malta the
American position on Iran was only articulated in response to Britain’s declaration that an agreement with the Soviet
Union on Iran was vital (United States, Malta and Yalta, pp. 500-1, 738).
84
At Potsdam the Allies agreed to withdraw all troops from Tehran and that “further stages of the withdrawal of
troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in
September 1945” (United States Department of State. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, The
Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945. vol. 2. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1945. <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945Berlinv02>, p. 1496). This was hardly a
meaningful resolution; the US had hardly any troops in Tehran at this time, and removing troops from Tehran would
hardly stymie Soviet efforts to consolidate Soviet interests in Iran’s northern regions (Ibid., pp. 316, 309).
- 21 government, crises still broke out in the early years of the Cold War. Because of this, the
ramifications of the lack of agreement on Iran bear further study.
An analysis of Great Power interests in Iran reveals that an agreement delineating spheres
of influence in Iran would have been the most likely alternative for the lack of meaningful
discussion and agreement at Yalta. However, these types of agreements came under the most
criticism in the years after the Conference, as they were labeled a sell-out of weaker states.85 It is
difficult to say whether or not an agreement on spheres of influences in Iran would have
prevented the crisis that developed in late 1945 and early 1946 over the continued presence of
Soviet troops in Azerbaijan past the deadline set for Allied troop withdrawals.86 If such an
agreement were reached, the United States and Britain would likely not have cared much about
Soviet troops in the north as long as their interests in their spheres were not compromised. Thus,
any potential crisis would most likely have developed because of Iranian domestic concerns
about Great Power actions, not because of conflicts among the great powers.
These reflections present an interesting paradox if the United States’ insistence on
upholding the Atlantic Charter ideals of self-determination and sovereignty for all nations
actually ended up precipitating one of the first major Cold War crises, especially given that
America viewed Atlantic Charter ideals as key to preserving post-war order and security.
However, the situation is much more complex. After all, United Nations pressure on the Soviets
played a key role in bringing the Iranian crisis to an end, and the United Nations was founded on
the basis of Atlantic Charter ideals. Could the United States have successfully led the push to
found a world organization while at the same time signing agreements that directly went against
such an organization’s founding principles? Such a move would seriously undermine the
85
Plokhii; Clemens, p. vii.
Bill, pp. 31-2; Hurewitz, J.C. ed. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 1535-1956.
vol. 2. Gerrards Cross, England: Archive Editions, 1987, p. 261.
86
- 22 organization’s legitimacy, and no small nation would value membership in such an organization
if it were widely known that the Great Powers could pursue any policies they liked without
regard for the United Nations or for Atlantic Charter ideals.
Daily events around the world constantly remind us that crises often occur despite the
best intentions. Even if we proceed under the assumption that an agreement delineating spheres
of influence in Iran would have, in fact, averted the 1945-46 crisis in Azerbaijan, a different sort
of crisis may well have appeared in its place. Since efforts at crisis prevention often fail, a
measure of good policy is that it creates tools for effective problem solving and management of
crises once they occur. Even when arguing that an agreement delineating spheres of influence in
Iran would have averted crisis in 1945-46, one has to concede that, at worst, America’s
insistence on Atlantic Charter ideals precipitated the crisis but also created an organization that
would play a crucial role in its resolution. Therefore, although the silence on Iran at Yalta
caused many problems, it may have been the best scenario available.
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- 24 -
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Special thanks to Oksana Mykhed, LeAnn House, Shelley Gruskin, and Ivan Bochkov for
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