Download Fulgencio Batista: Why History Will Absolve Him

Fulgencio Batista:
Why History Will
Absolve Him
Fidel Castro’s recent illness has focused attention on the Cuban dictator’s
career. Castro’s successes in establishing and maintaining a Communist
dictatorship 90 miles off the coast of the United States are remarkable
achievements. Unfortunately, these successes have been achieved at the
Cuban people’s expense. By examining the history of the proceeding Batista
regime, a perspective will hopefully emerge which illustrates how Castro
deceived the Cuban people and how cruel and unnecessary his totalitarian
dictatorship has been.
This biography, of Castro’s predecessor, Fulgencio Batista is based on an
earlier version written by David Bennett which appeared in August 1996 in
the Melbourne based publication, The Sentinel.
The Historical
Significance of
Fulgencio
Batista
One of the myths perpetuated by the extreme
Left since Fidel Castro came to power in
January 1959 is that contemporary Cuba is a
dynamic and politically vibrant nation.
Whatever Castro's past and present successes in
promoting international discord, the current
domestic Cuban political scene is staid and
uneventful, as befits a totalitarian nation where
all politics are controlled by Fidel Castro and/or
his brother Raúl. This situation starkly contrasts
with the fluidity, passionate dynamism and
complexities of pre-Castro Cuba, which were
personified by the major figure of that by-gone
era, Fulgencio Batista.
Because the Castro regime's political repression
is too brazen and apparent to deny, apologists
for it have asserted that this has been offset by
1
the tremendous achievements that have
allegedly occurred in the area of higher living
standards. To help justify this warped logic, the
excesses of Fulgencio Batista's career have been
exaggerated, his positive achievements ignored
and in the process his important role in Cuban
history negated. It is the purpose of this article
to redress this historical vilification.
Spanish
Colonial Rule
and 'Yankee'
Intervention:
Their
Respective
Legacies
Until 1958 Cuba had a potent political tradition * Cortes - the
Spanish
of competing political parties and activism.
Parliament
This tradition can be traced back to 1876 with
the promulgation of a new Spanish constitution.
Mid to late nineteenth century Spanish politics
were immersed in dynastic struggles and
ensuing wars of succession. The only
substantive issue that lay outside this paradigm
was that of Cuban autonomy. Cuban
representatives in the Spanish Cortes* were
successful in drawing attention to the cause of
Cuban Home Rule.
A notable figure who took exception to this
constitutionalist approach was the poet José
Martí, of whom Castro claims to be a disciple.
Such a claim, while ridiculous and insulting, is
not surprising, because the major ideological
issue in Cuba up until 1958, was not that of free
market economics versus state intervention, but
what Martí stood for and which party and/or
leader could claim his mantle. It was his death
in combat in 1895 which sparked Cuba's War of
Independence.
The United States' military intervention, at the
point at which Cuba was about to break free
from Spain and the ensuing four year
occupation (1898-1902), became a tremendous
source of national frustration which is still to be
fully exorcised from the Cuban psyche. On
terminating its occupation, the United States
retained the right to intervene in Cuban affairs
2
so as to protect American properties and
investments under the notorious Platt
Amendment. If the aim of this amendment was
to provide stability, then it proved to be
counterproductive.
The new nation was polarized between the
Liberal and the Moderate parties (the latter
metamorphosised into the Conservative and
eventually the Democratic Party).
Consequently, a pattern developed whereby the
losing party in an election, instead of accepting
the result, would stage a revolt in order to
provoke American intervention. Despite the
economic boom that Cuba enjoyed following
the First World War (which spawned a not
inconsiderable middle class), American
dominance, both real and imagined, as well as
racial unrest amongst the Negro minority,
served to retard Cuba's development of a
positive national identity.
Frustrated
Nationalism
Spawns the
Dictatorship of
Gerado
Machado
A milestone in Cuba's struggle for self-assertion
was seemingly reached in 1924, when a
successful businessman, independence hero and
retired general, Gerado Machado of the
opposition Liberal Party was elected president.
He pledged that his business acumen would
raise the standard of living and, most
importantly, that he would bring true
independence to the island republic. Machado
launched a vast and unprecedented public
works programme. A less benevolent
innovation of his was the establishment of
Cuba's first secret police and the subsequent
imposition of a dictatorship in 1928 after being
re-elected with a new Constitution that favored
him. The trappings of democracy were
maintained but their hollowness was evident in
Machado's purge of the ruling Liberal Party and
of the opposition Conservative Party. Machado
justified these dictatorial acts on the basis that
3
they promoted stability and thereby denied the
Americans a pretext for intervention.
Cuba's New
Class: 'The
Generation of
1933'
Machado (as is the case with Castro) was only
interested in holding power for the sake of
having it. His regime's brutal suppression of
student demonstrations in September 1930
spawned the 'Generation of 1933'. This caste
would maintain their profile in Cuban politics
for a quarter of a century between Machado's
fall in 1933 and Castro's rise to power in late
1958. In the aftermath of the suppression of the
student demonstrations, a clandestine and
predominately middle class organisation called
the ABC was founded. Between 1931 and 1933
both actual and suspected members of the ABC
were hunted down by Machado's secret police.
Sergeant
Batista's
Emergence
Some of the dissidents that were apprehended
were tried (if they were relatively fortunate
enough) by military tribunals. It was as a court
stenographer, that a young Sergeant Batista was
first exposed to and gained an invaluable
insight into the dark side of Cuban politics. In
1921, at the age of twenty, Batista entered the
Cuban army and by 1928 he had risen to the
rank of sergeant, which was as far as someone
of his humble background could rise.
The ill effects of the Great Depression,
combined with the corrupt Machado's
unpopularity, precipitated massive and violent
ABC-instigated riots in July 1933. In the face of
this explosion of unrest and the Roosevelt
Administration's hostility, Machado resigned
and fled first to Bahamas and later to Miami.
Due to the strong intervention of the American
Ambassador Sumner Wells, Carlos Manuel de
Céspedes (whose father had led an abortive bid
for independence from Spain from 1868 until
his death in 1874 - the bid for independence
continued until 1878) was chosen as the new
* One
Machadista
who escaped
to America
was Desi
Arnaz, later
of I Love
Lucy fame.
4
provisional president. His elevation to the
presidency was supported by the ABC, the
National Union (an anti- Machado organisation
which had emerged from a split from the
Liberal Party) and other smaller parties.
Céspedes’s assumption of the presidency was
accepted by, (but not actively supported) by the
Conservative Party.
Despite Machado’s fall there was still a strong
public groundswell for a radical break with the
past and this was manifested by the lynching of
Machadistas*. The students at Havana
University were at the forefront in demanding a
significant shift. Their capacity to affect change
depended on their success in making common
cause with the disgruntled elements within the
army. During the unrest against Machado, a
group of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs)
were killed. As the chief orator at the funeral of
Sergeant Miguel Angel Hernández, Batista was
able to project himself as, and gain acceptance
as the champion of NCO concerns. From this
position Batista helped lead a NCO mutiny
demanding higher wages and better living
conditions as a pretext to take part in the antiMachado revolution.
The Revolution
of 1933
Taking advantage of this discord, a newspaper
editor named Sergio Carbó made contact with
the mutineers and helped persuade them to
make common cause with the students and
depose the faltering Céspedes government. A
five member junta (‘the Pentarquía’) succeeded
Céspedes on an interim basis. However due to
internal tension the Pentarquía did not function
properly and the initiative subsequently passed
to the Student Directory (Directorio
Estudiantil), the leading student political
organisation, which with Batista’s support,
appointed the former Dean of Physiology, Dr.
Grau San Martín as president in September
5
1933. In his four-month stint as president, Grau
made a profound impact on the public. His
myopic, if not effeminate persona attracted
widespread popularity because it contrasted
with Machado's brutal machismo. The new
president's declaration of 'Cuba for the Cubans'
and his advocacy of what he termed 'Cubanism',
which was essentially Yankee bashing, revived
memories of the 1898 Revolution. For many,
Grau had assumed Martí's mantle.
Batista Moves
Against the
Revolution's
Flawed Idol
For Colonel Batista,* Grau's first presidency
provided a breathing space during which he
could consolidate his hold over the army. This
was accomplished in November 1933, when
Batista crushed an ABC backed revolt by the
army's hostile officer corps. By January 1934,
with middle class opposition to Grau
galvanizing and the continued threat of
American intervention, Batista (with the
support of some members of the Student
Directory) moved swiftly by deposing Grau.
*A
promotion he
received for
'services to
the
revolution'
and which he
would hold
until
promoted to
the rank of
General.
This coup helped polarize Cuban society. For
many people, Grau became an idol. Carlos Prío
Socarrás, who had been a prominent leader of
the Student Directory, helped found the Cuban
Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario
Cubano (Auténtico), which derived its
popularity from its stated commitment of
restoring Grau. Another avowed adherent of
Grau's, Antonio Guiteras, (who despite being
lionized in contemporary Cuba, was in fact a
vehement anti-Communist) organized the Joven
Cuba, a militant revolutionary organisation that
was committed to bring drastic changes by
carrying out terrorist actions to promote
political unrest. Needing a shield, Batista
installed Carlos Mendieta, the leader of the
National Union, as the new president.
The New
The Mendieta regime was primarily composed
6
Strongman
of the more moderate elements of the antiMachado opposition and they regarded Batista
as a pliant tool who would help underwrite their
rule. As army chief of staff, Batista concerned
himself with bettering the living conditions of
armed forces personnel (most of whom had
received rapid promotion) and their families.
Thus barracks were upgraded, pay hikes
granted, health services and night school
literacy classes provided for armed forces
personnel. Consequently when the Joven Cuba
led by Antonio Guiteras took advantage of a
general strike in 1935 the army was committed
and steady enough to crush the revolt.
(Guiteras died in a shoot out with the army
during this revolt). This abortive revolution
highlighted the depth of the chasm between
Cuban government and the Cuban people.
Reform From
Above
As a result of this repression, the congressional
and presidential elections held in January 1936
were of little meaning to most Cubans.
Nonetheless the restoration of constitutional
processes was a positive development in that it
helped promote a framework for later
democratic progress. Meanwhile Batista was
confronted with the dilemma of commanding a
largely inactive army, which faced a hostile
populace. To surmount these interrelated
challenges, Batista had over one thousand
Escuelas Cívico Rurales (Rural Public Schools)
built to educate peasant families and these
schools were also built in the most remote parts
of the island. Army officers were active in
establishing these schools and in teaching in
them. Despite the much-heralded advances
attributed to the Castro regime in eliminating
illiteracy, Cuba already had a literacy rate of
80% in 1958.
By exerting pressure on the Congress, Batista
ensured that the tax base was broadened so that
7
social and public works programs (including the
construction of Tuberculosis sanatoriums in the
remote parts of the country) could be increased.
Much of the military's reformist stance was
influenced by the Roosevelt Administration's
New Deal policy. American/Cuban relations
were considerably bolstered in 1934 with the
repeal of the Platt Amendment. In the area of
race relations, Cuba at this time was more
advanced than the United States. Batista (who
probably had African ancestry) took strong
exception to racial discrimination. Batista also
supported the Association of Cane Growers,
and by doing so was able to mollify middle
class reservations about his progressive
orientation, whilst also undercutting American
influence over Cuba's vital sugar industry.
Consequently, in overall terms during the
1930s, Batista was able to reposition the role of
the military from being the force that
underwrote an unpopular elite, to an
intermediary body, which safeguarded the
public interest.
Democratization Nonetheless, the high rate of voter abstention in
and
the March 1938 mid-term congressional
Reconciliation
elections was a warning to Batista of continuing
public discontent against the oligarchic political
parties represented in the Congress. Realizing
that new alliances had to be made, Batista
allowed the legalization of the Cuban
Communist Party, which eventually constituted
itself in the pre-Castro era as the Popular
Socialist Party (PPS).
Accordingly, the PPS was given a free hand to
organize amongst trade unions and the
Communists entered into a strategic alliance
with the Batista regime. Of greater significance
in terms of political re-alignments was Batista's
8
reconciliation with the Auténtico Party. This
was affected in November 1939 when the
Auténticos took part in elections to a
Constituent Assembly, which was charged with
the task of writing a new constitution.
These elections, in contrast to the previous
year's congressional elections, were a positive
milestone. The parties that took part ranged
from staunch Machadistas to Communists. The
party which made the greatest gains was the
Auténticos. The Constitution of 1940, which the
Constituent Assembly subsequently drew up,
was highly democratic. It contained provision
for a president that was elected for a four-year
term, who was banned from succeeding himself
for eight years. A quasi-parliamentary system
was provided for with the creation of the post of
Prime Minister. Provisions were made
enshrining the right to strike, collective
bargaining and compulsory paid holidays.
(*) The
delayed
completion of
the1940
Constitution
forced the
postponement
of the
scheduled
elections in
February
leaving the
country in a
void without
a president.
Batista, in a
patriotic
gesture,
picked-up his
The most remarkable appointment was that of
opponents
Dr. Juan Marinello of the PPS as a Minister
Without Portfolio in 1943. Marinello’s post was Grau and Prío
in his car and
Batista retired from the army in December
1939 and subsequently presented himself as a
candidate for president under the 1940
Constitution. (Batista’s retirement laid the
groundwork for an abortive military revolt in
February 1941 from army officers who were
alienated by their loss of power). The nonAuténtico parties formed an alliance called the
'Democratic Socialist Coalition' which
consequently rallied around Batista because he
was considered to be the only figure that could
defeat Grau. After fairly winning the June 1940
presidential election (*), Batista formed a
broad-based cabinet, representing the parties
which had backed him.
assumed in 1944, by another PPS stalwart,
9
Carlos Rafael Rodríguez as part of a cabinet reshuffle that occurred that year. The appointment
of the then 27 year old Rodríquez was
subsequently to become all the more amazing
because he would later hold the position of
vice-president of Cuba under Castro and for a
time he was the third most powerful man in the
country after Castro and his brother Raúl. The
PPS’s willingness to take part in the Cabinet of
National Unity was due to the Soviet Union’s
alliance with the United States during the
Second World War. (The ABC Party also took
the opportunity to join this new cabinet).
all three
together with
Chibás met
President
Laredo Bru
to express
their
unanimous
agreement for
him to remain
as President
through
October
when the
formal
transfer of
power
ceremony
took place.
As president, Batista strictly adhered to the new
Constitution. Cuba's relations with the United
States were strengthened by her declaration of
war on the Axis in 1941. The onset of the
Second World War generated a strong
economic recovery and there were increased
demands for Cuban exports, particularly sugar.
Allowing US warships and aircraft to use Cuba
as a base to refuel fostered further goodwill in
terms of Cuban/American relations.
For many Cubans the real test of Batista's
democratic sincerity was whether he would
retire once his term expired in 1944. With the
notable exception of the new Republican Party
(which had split from the DemocraticRepublican Party in 1942 and entered into an
alliance with the Auténticos) the same parties
that had backed Batista four years earlier, fell in
behind his Prime Minister, Carlos Saladrigas, a
one-time ABC stalwart. Despite this united
backing, Saladrigas lost to Grau. This upset
10
victory can be attributed to the mystical, if not
saintly mantle that had been attached to Grau's
persona since his previous interlude as
president. To general disbelief Batista handed
power over to Grau and departed for four years
of self-imposed exile.
Failed
Expectations:
Auténtico Party
Misrule - 1944
to 1952
The nearly eight years of Auténtico Party rule
were to become the most corrupt that Cuba had
yet experienced. Grau's unassuming personality
conveyed the impression of humility and moral
rectitude, but belied the fact that he was a
highly manipulative and cynical character.
During his four years in office, Grau and his
sister-in-law extorted money and accepted
bribes. This type of behaviour extended to the
caste of the ruling 'Generation of 1933' and it
became not uncommon for Auténtico Party
politicians to acquire palatial residences.
In spite of high taxation rates during the period
of Auténtico Party rule, the government was
often unable to service its commitments
because taxation revenue was siphoned off to
illegitimate activities. When Grau's term
expired in 1948 his Education Minister, José
Manuel Alemán brazenly absconded with
millions of dollars. Having struggled mightily
to gain power so as to advance the public good,
the 'Generation of 1933' apparently regarded
public money as their own.
Grau's attempt to alter the Constitution to allow
himself a second term caused a split within the
ruling Auténticos and led to the foundation of
the Cuban People's Party in 1947, which
became popularly known as the Ortodoxo
Party. Their leader was the charismatic but
unstable Senator Eddy Chibás (who had
supported Batista’s deposition of Grau in 1934).
Pressure from within the Auténtico Party
caused Grau to relent in his attempts to amend
11
the Constitution and seek re-election. Grau then
backed Prío's presidential candidacy as the
Auténtico Party standard bearer.
Prío's presidential election in June 1948 was
primarily because of his adroit distribution of
patronage, rather than the electorate's
endorsement of Grau's performance as
president. A revealing aspect of the election
result was that the runner up was not the
flamboyant Eddy Chibás, but the Liberal Party's
Dr. Ricardo Nuñez Portuondo, a respected
surgeon. It was also noteworthy that the PPS's
candidate Juan Marinello came a distant fourth
and last. Nuñez’s strong showing was
attributable to the exiled Batista, who was
elected to the Senate.
The corruption of Prío's regime exceeded that
of his predecessor and the scourge of
gangsterism continued to erode public life. It
should be pointed out at this juncture that
Batista has unfairly been portrayed as a front
man for American and Cuban gangsters,
(particularly with regard to his alleged links to
Meyer Lansky). The caricature of pretotalitarian Cuban politics as essentially a shell
game for gangster bosses is inaccurate and
insulting to the Cuban people.
Fidel Castro
in the
University of
Havana was a
member of
UIR.
The problem of gangsterism was derived from
the deep involvement that crime gangs had in
three revolutionary political groups: Acción
Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG), that descended
from Joven Cuba plus two ostensible student
political groups at Havana University, the
Socialist Revolutionary Movement (MSR) and
the Insurrectional Revolutionary Union
(UIR)(*). Grau’s action of bringing both the
MSR’s and the UIR’s chiefs into the National
Police in order to placate these gangs and
subsequently align them to the Auténtico Party
12
was probably his worst abuse of power because
it promoted an environment of general
lawlessness and extortion.
Batista on his return to power in the 1950s
terminated this private political gangsterism
which subsequently resulted in some members
of the UIR and MSR actually partaking in
political activity by supporting anti-government
insurrectionary groups (which were more often
than not financed by the exiled Prío). In order
to limit the scope of opposition to his regime,
Batista was somewhat more permissive to the
gambling and smuggling by former members of
MSR and UIR in return for their foregoing
extortion activities and not opposing his regime.
Batista ReEnters the Fray
However, Batista’s return to power still lay in
the future and in the interim Prío would prove
to be a wily opponent. As president, Prío
attacked Chibás and in the process began to win
over the Liberal and Democratic parties from
Batista.
On returning to Cuba in 1948 Senator Batista
decided to run for president in 1952. To solidify
his political base, Batista founded the Unitary
Action Party (PAU) in 1949 as a vehicle with
which to run for president. Rafael Díaz Balart,
then Fidel Castro's brother-in-law led the PAU's
youth wing. The PAU in contrast to the Liberal
and Democratic parties identified with the
Revolution of 1933, asserting that the
corruption of the 'Generation of 1933'
contrasted with Batista's positive record.
13
Batista's chances of winning the 1952
presidential election were seemingly bolstered
when the temperamental Chibás committed
suicide in August 1951 and Grau split with the
Auténticos and founded the Cubanidad Party.
As Cuba approached what would have been the
historic elections of June 1952, the man who
seemed to hold the balance of power was the
Mayor of Havana, Nicolás Castellanos, the
leader of the Cuban National Party (PNC).
Batista reached an understanding with
Castellanos that whichever party, out of the
PAU and the PNC, had had the most members
in 1951 would support the other party’s
candidate for president in the 1952 elections. As
the capital's mayor, Castellanos held the second
most powerful and lucrative position in Cuba
(after the presidency). Having declined Grau's
offer to be the Cubinandad Party's presidential
candidate, Castellanos fell in behind the
Auténticos. The pay back from Prío was that he
would back candidates of Castellanos' Havana
based PNC in some electoral contests outside
the capital. Once this deal was struck, Grau reunited his party in February with the
Auténticos. The flow-on effect continued in the
same month with both the Liberal and
Democratic parties pledging their support to the
Auténtico Party presidential candidate, Carlos
Hevia. His glaring point of attraction was that
he was about the only apparently honest senior
Auténtico Party figure. Consequently Hevia's
candidacy began to swing the undecided voter
away from the Ortodoxo presidential candidate,
Roberto Agramonte.
These political re-alignments, particularly
Castellanos's new alliance with the Auténticos,
seemed to thwart Batista's chances of victory.
Between February and early March 1952 the
PAU was racked by defections to the now
14
Auténtico-aligned PNC. This state of affairs
was intolerable to Batista. From Batista's
perspective it was bad enough that the
Auténticos had been elected in 1944, but even
more infuriating to him was that they would
probably continue to hold office, even after
proving themselves so unfit to rule.
10 th March,
A group of young, professionally trained junior
1952: Batista's
officers approached Batista in January 1952 and
Surprise Return asked him to lead a coup against Prío. These
to Power
officers were sick of the corruption of the
Auténtico Party and the favoritism shown to
officers linked to the ruling party. They realized
that Batista's support was crucial because he
could persuade their superiors, who were NCOs
in the 1930s, to withhold their support for Prío.
Batista initially scorned their approaches
(although his indignation was not such that he
would report them). But as the rate of
defections from his party ripped into Batista's
base, his determination to re-assert himself
increased. When informed on the 8th of March
of a further swag of defections from the PAU,
the senator (who realized that a coup would be
attempted regardless of his participation)
decided to act. Two days later, without
consulting his family or campaign staff, he
detoured from a scheduled election rally and
met up with the army plotters, who escorted
him to the Columbia Barracks. Batista asked the
assembled officers (most of whom were old
comrades) to support his coup. Prío on hearing
that the Columbia Army Barracks had raised the
vertical five colour standard of the blue, white,
red, yellow and green flag of the 1933
Revolution, fled to Matanzas Province, but on
discovering that no military units outside
Havana would support him, entered the
Mexican Embassy and then fled the country.
The Recycled
The coup was accomplished in seventy-seven
15
Regime's Shaky
Underpinnings
minutes with only three (accidental) fatalities
and this swiftness was due to the decadence of
Auténtico Party rule. Other than Prío's
banishment (and a nominal ban on the PPS, so
as to gain US diplomatic recognition) there
were no bloody purges or mass arrests on
Batista assuming the post of Chief of State,
although Castellanos was dismissed as Mayor
of Havana. The new government forged a close
relationship with the Central Organisation of
Cuban Unions (CTC) who, like their leader
Eusebio Mujal, had been aligned to the
Auténtico Party. The CTC, beside the army
became the other pillar underpinning the
regime. Meanwhile, Batista's second wife Marta
established and headed a quasi-official charity.
Despite the ease of the coup (or perhaps
because of it), the seeds of the second Batista
regime's demise were implanted, particularly
with regard to the army. The officers who
initiated the coup resented Batista's preference
for officers who had been NCOs in the 1930s.
To insulate himself from any backlash, Batista
cultivated links with contemporary NCOs - a
policy that would later rebound because it
undermined the lines of authority within the
army.
Fidel Castro
Gains
Prominence
The man who would later draw out and
capitalize on these internal contradictions was
Fidel Castro. On the 26th of July 1953 Castro
launched his famous attack on the Moncada
Barracks. The attack was more comical than
heroic, but still very tragic due to the number of
people who died as a result of it. Castro, as
Hitler had done following his failed 1923 Beer
Hall Putsch, turned the situation to his
advantage when he was placed on trial.
In contrast to contemporary Cuba, where there
are some political prisoners serving terms of up
16
to thirty years for the mildest forms of dissent,
Castro and his cohorts received a fair trial.
From the dock Castro utilized his extraordinary
oratorical talents when he delivered a speech in
his defence, later entitled "History Will Absolve
Me". Castro’s cause subsequently received
nationwide publicity. Sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment, Castro was sent to the Model
Prison on the Isle of Pines. There he was treated
in a decent fashion befitting the prison's name
and even allowed to maintain a correspondence
with his political contacts on the outside.
Castro launched his attack in 1953 for the
calculated reason that it was the centenary of
Martí's birth. The Batista Government
organized a year of national celebration. This
policy of glorifying Martí is the only one of
Batista's that the Castro regime has continued.
On another level, after he had returned to power
Batista launched an extensive public works
programme, thus reversing the breakdown in
services that had occurred under the Auténtico
Party.
Having ruled Cuba for two years as Chief of
State, Batista scheduled elections for November
1954. Co-opting collaborationist elements
within the Auténtico Party, Batista re-launched
the PAU as the Progressive Action Party (PAP)
and used the Crane bird as his mascot. Batista
launched an energetic presidential campaign.
The opportunistic Grau offered himself as the
opposition candidate to Batista as a means of
reclaiming the mantle of Auténtico Party leader
from the exiled Prío. Realizing that he had no
chance of winning, Grau withdrew his
candidature the day before polling. Although
the government's claim that there was a 70%
turnout was exaggerated, the balloting was
generally fair. Shortly after his inauguration for
a four-year term as president in February 1955,
17
Batista took the unfortunate and tragic step of
releasing Castro, who shortly thereafter
departed for Mexico. Batista's decision to
release Castro and other political prisoners was
part of a general amnesty which was solicited
by the opposition parties and the public. This
release of political prisoners was made on the
premise that the restoration of constitutional
processes constituted a return to normality and
the government’s political opponents would
consequently take the opportunity to oppose
him within the constitutional parameters.
Batista's Second As a constitutional president once again, Batista
Presidency:
exercised his prerogatives within institutional
Positive
constraints. The government launched a
Achievements
National Program for Economic Development
which encouraged foreign investment (most of
it American, but also including French and
West German investment) and the promotion of
light industry (so as to boost permanent
employment) and these policies led to a
consumer boom. Using the leverage of
increased investment opportunities the
government lobbied the United States to
increase its quota of purchases of Cuba's sugar
crop. In the realm of industrial relations, the
government took a strong pro-labour stand,
supporting wage increases for unionized
workers.
The Descent
It was at the point at which Batista seemed to be
at the pinnacle of his career that the painful
descent commenced. The question therefore
emerges of why such a promising government
was to later so ignominiously and dramatically
fall. An important piece in this jigsaw puzzle
was Batista’s mishandling of talks with the
opposition between December 1955 and March
1956 which became known as the ‘Civic
Dialogue’. Batista’s intermediaries negotiated
with representatives from opposition parties,
18
who had assembled under the banner of the
Society of Friends of the Republic (SAR) which
was led by the elderly and highly respected
independence war hero, Cosme de la Torriente.
This dialogue was actually a dialogue of the
deaf due to the irreconcilable differences and
expectations between the respective negotiating
parties. Batista conceptualized the talks as an
entry point for the mainstream opposition
parties by which they would acknowledge the
legitimacy of his regime and consequently take
the next step of opposing it within a
constitutional framework. From the SAR’s
perspective the talks were a means by which
Batista would negotiate the mechanics of
forgoing power in return for immunity for him
and his supporters.
The inevitable collapse of the talks resulted in
the opposition announcing that they would
boycott mid-term 1957 congressional elections.
In response to this boycott announcement,
Batista committed one of the worst mistakes of
his second presidency, that of canceling the
1957 congressional elections. Although Batista
committed himself to holding the 1958
presidential election (in which he was
constitutionally barred from standing) the
failure of the Civic Dialogue and cancellation of
the congressional elections served as a rousing
confirmation to the broad mass of the Cuban
people that the Batista regime was self-serving
and could only be removed by force. With the
considerable benefit of hindsight Batista should
have proceeded with the 1957 congressional
elections and instigated a break with the three
junior parties in the ruling Progressive
Coalition, the Liberal, Democratic and Radical
parties so that there was a safety valve of
electoral activity.
19
A violent revolutionary cycle ensued shortly
after the collapse of the Civic Dialogue.
Between 1956 and late 1958 a myriad of revolts
were instigated by a range of diverse
revolutionary groups. These revolts and the
groups who undertook them do not warrant
detailing, except to make the general point that
they created the necessary environment for
Castro’s phantom guerilla force to triumph in
January 1959.
One of the most important revolts was the one
that was undertaken by a new university
revolutionary group, the Revolutionary
Directorate (DR). The DR launched an
audacious attack on the presidential palace on
March the 13th 1957 which almost killed Batista
and his family. This attack (which was funded
and instigated by Prío) failed because Batista
kept his nerve. Although a subsequent loyalist
rally drew an estimated quarter of a million
people before the presidential palace to show
their support for Batista, the attack actually
marked the beginning of end for the regime.
This was because the 13th of March attack on
the presidential palace demonstrated the
regime’s underlying vulnerability and because it
contributed to a cycle of repression which
would subsequently benefit Castro.
Castro himself landed in Oriente Province in
December 1956 and then proceeded to the
remote mountainous Sierra Maestra. The yacht
that Castro and his party returned on, the
Granma, was purchased by Prío's ill-gotten
funds. (During his exile, the ever scheming Prío
wanted to establish a base of operations in Haiti
and he subsequently helped finance the election
20
campaign of a Dr. Francois Duvalier. Prío
also made a pact with the Dominican
Republic’s dictator Rafael Trujillo, but this later
fell through). Castro's guerilla campaign has
been mythologized as a military epic. The truth
is somewhat different, as there were no more
than three hundred combat deaths during the
two-year insurgency.
Being the skilled propagandist that he is, Castro
used his opportunities during his interviews
with the New York Times journalist Herbert
Mathews in the Sierra Maestra to convey the
impression that his insurgency was more potent
than it actually was. Castro's real achievement
was primarily political in that he was able to
make his 26 th of July Movement into a
heterogeneous organisation due to the bonanza
of the Mathews-generated publicity. The 26th of
July Movement was similar to the old ABC as it
was organized on a cell basis and was highly
effective in conducting a campaign of
disruption in urban centres through selective
assassinations, industrial sabotage, infiltration
of government agencies, violent demonstrations
and the kidnapping of foreigners.
Che Guevara, an influential 26th of July
Movement strategist observed that the more the
regime resorted to repression, the more people
would turn against it. The nature of the struggle
was a class one, because most of the ranks of
the 26th of July Movement were drawn from the
middle class, while the personnel of the secret
police, the SIM (the Military Intelligence
Service) were drawn from humbler
backgrounds and they were consequently
motivated by class resentments.
The ‘excesses’ that army officers committed in
the 1950s were derived from the anger which
they felt at seeing fellow officers being
21
indiscriminately killed by terrorist actions
committed by 26th of July Movement partisans.
Castro was very successful in construing
government action taken to protect the
population from terrorist actions which killed
innocent civilians. This lack of respect for
human life set the scene for the Castro regime’s
brutal repression.
Internal
Contradictions
As the democratic space narrowed, the Batista
regime became more corrupt as it needed to
maintain the support of the security forces.
The nature of the societal divisions, which
underpinned Castro's rebellion, also existed
within the army. Throughout 1957 Batista
refrained from launching an offensive against
the rebels in the Sierra Maestra because the
Batistiano officers and the NCOs on whom
Batista relied were not trained in guerrilla
warfare and not prepared to undertake
successful sustained offensive action. The
professionally trained officers (who had
instigated Batista's return to power) may have
been competent, but Batista distrusted them too
much to allow them a free hand.
There were also deep divisions on the Castro
side and had Batista exploited them, (the way
that Castro was exploiting the government's) his
regime might have survived. Even as Castro's
reputation as a Robin Hood fighting Batista's
Sheriff of Nottingham grew, it was apparent to
some Cubans that a Castro triumph might not
usher in a democracy. From the Sierra Maestra
there were reports of executions of 26th of July
Movement partisans for minor breaches of
discipline and that Castro (later titled the
'Maximum Leader') demanded absolute loyalty
from those he led. Castro's authoritarianism
22
created strains between him and his liberal,
predominately middle class operatives who
were the backbone of the rebellion. While this
tension might have proved fatal, even then,
Castro displayed a remarkable knack for turning
adversity to his advantage.
Castro's
Duplicity
The unsuccessful general strike of April 1958 is
officially regarded in contemporary Cuba as the
greatest setback in the struggle against Batista.
The truth however is that the strike's failure
enabled Castro to consolidate his power over
the 26th of July Movement and subsequently
hasten Batista's demise. The organizers of the
strike were the liberal elements within the 26th
of July Movement. Although Castro pledged his
support to them, he delivered none. The Batista
Government's determined and brutal response,
combined with the crucial support that it
received from the CTC ensured the strike's
failure. The resulting leadership vacuum in the
26th of July Movement was filled by ardent
Fidelistas, while the strident measures that were
taken to crush the strike solidified middle class
opposition to Batista.
Fortified by the crushing of the strike, Batista
ordered the professional officer corps to engage
and wipe out the rebels in their Sierra Maestra
base. That the June 1958 offensive failed was
testament to Castro's success in exploiting the
army's weaknesses. Throughout his guerrilla
campaign, Castro emphasized in his radio
broadcasts his commitment to constitutional
democracy and his distaste at fighting the
honorable elements within the army, whom he
hoped would unburden him by overthrowing
the Batista 'tyranny'. This form of psychological
warfare was highly successful; the officers in
combat were often negligent in pressing their
advantage. During the June offensive Castro
maintained cordial contacts with officers such
23
as Major Quevedo and this helped sabotage the
offensive. This cultivation of the army
concealed Castro's real intentions, for on
coming to power he would destroy that
institution, even executing those officers that
had maintained their distance from Batista and
in the process helped to deliver Castro victory.
The failure of the June offensive seemed to
herald Batista's demise. The impression that the
historical tide was against Batista had
seemingly been confirmed when the
Eisenhower Administration placed an arms
embargo against his regime in March 1958,
which did much to undermine army morale.
Nonetheless, Batista fought on, prophetically
convinced that a Castro victory would mean a
permanent dictatorship for Cuba. Meanwhile
Castro held back, developing his psychological
advantage and waiting for the time to strike
when the army began to disintegrate from
within. The timing of when matters would reach
their climax, hinged on the success of Castro’s
election boycott campaign.
Castro Deceives
the Cuban
People at the
Crucial
Juncture
Castro realized that a clean election would
short-circuit his revolutionary route to power
and despite his declared and explicit
commitment to constitutional democracy he
pronounced all-inclusive death sentences
against running candidates in the November
1958 general elections. The leading opposition
presidential candidate, Carlos Marquez Sterling
of the electionist wing of the Ortodoxo Party,
the Free People’s Party, (Grau's candidacy and
his wing of the Auténtico Party were too
discredited to be taken seriously), courageously
defied the strong election boycott movement
because of his fears for the long term prospects
for Cuban democracy should Castro prevail.
24
The election victory of the PAP's Andrés
Rivero Agüero (who had initially built a
political base in the Cuban Liberal Party but
had followed Batista into the PAU in 1949) was
due to the success of Castro’s boycott
movement. Rivero Agüero had previously
served as prime minister and his humble
background, apparent financial probity and
administrative competence (Cuba maintained a
high economic growth rate despite the political
turbulence during this period) made him the
most credible candidate that the regime could
offer.
For all of Rivero Agüero’s possible virtues as
president, it was tragic that the overwhelming
majority of the Cuban people forewent the
opportunity to vote for an impeccable democrat
in the person of Carlos Marquez Sterling
because he could have saved them from the
totalitarian future that remained in store.
Marquez Sterling had had an ambivalent
political relationship with Batista, which
reflected the latter’s ambiguity as a democrat.
(Marquez Sterling had been the president of the
Constituent Assembly which had produced the
1940 Constitution). Although Marquez Sterling
had commenced his political career as an antiMachado Liberal he finished it as an avowed
Ortodoxo due to that party’s democratic bona
fides. (Marquez Sterling’s presidential
candidacy was also supported by minority
factions within the ruling Progressive
Coalition).
Castro’s success in seducing the
overwhelming majority of the Cuban electorate
to boycott the November 1958 presidential
election was testament to his charisma (which
still entrances many people around the world
today). For all Castro’s personal magnetism, it
25
is highly improbable that the Cuban people
would have courageously rallied to his cause
had they actually known that he was a
totalitarian dictator in waiting. The
overwhelming support that Castro enjoyed at
this point was also due to his masterstroke in
publicly designating Manuel Urrutia as the
future provisional president of Cuba. Urrutia
was a respected former judge who was a
staunch democrat, avowed anti-communist and
someone who was known to be committed to
free and democratic elections. (Unfortunately,
from the very beginning of his tenure as
president, Urrutia ignored violations of the
Cuban Constitution and thereby provided
Castro with sufficient scope to consolidate his
de facto dictatorial power). The cabinet that
Urrutia assembled, which held nominal power
between January and July 1959, was the most
honest and talented in Cuban history. However
the Urrutia presidency would be nothing more
than a useful front for Castro which enabled
him to establish a police state. A crucial
prerequisite to Castro’s establishment of a
permanent dictatorship was the bloody purge he
undertook in eliminating hundreds of
Batistianos so that his ‘Rebel Army’ displaced
Cuba’s regular army. For this reason the
execution of Batistiano ‘war criminals’ was an
immediate priority for Castro on him taking de
facto power.
The final and fatal missed opportunity which
enabled Castro to assume dictatorial power was
American ambivalence about offering Batista
and his family asylum in the United States. In
December 1958, William Pawley acting as an
unofficial emissary of the United States
government asked Batista if he would leave the
government to a military junta and depart to
Daytona where he had lived in self-imposed
26
exile from 1946 to 1948. Batista, point blank,
asked Pawley if he was authorized by the State
Department to make the offer. Pawley
remained silent. Later that month the American
Ambassador, Earl Smith visited President
Batista but did not offer him and his family
asylum in the United States. The American
failure to offer the outgoing Cuban president
Batista an expeditious exit was a mistake
because it could have forestalled the immediate
catalyst for Castro’s revolutionary seizure of
power.
Furthermore, from Daytona Batista might have
exercised a degree of political influence
because his outgoing Machadista vice-president
Dr. Guás Inclán could have secured a Batistiano
political base in a post-Batista democratic Cuba.
This was because Guás Inclán was due to
assume the post of Mayor of Havana which he
had been elected to in November 1958. By
holding the second most important position in
Cuba many Batistianos would have taken
refuge in Guás Inclán’s Liberal Party.
Although the ostensible junior coalition party,
the Liberal Party, due Batista’s role in
protecting it following the 1933 Revolution,
had always provided him (with the notable
exception of 1952) with a legitimate block vote
approximating between fifteen and twenty
percent. (This voting base in conjunction with
Castro’s successful boycott campaign had
secured Rivero Agüero´s victory over Marquez
Sterling). This scenario would have been
possible only if the whole political structure had
not collapsed.
The Regime
Unravels
The stunning success that the Rebel Army
enjoyed when it launched its December 1958
offensive was not due to its military prowess,
27
but rather the breakdown in their opponent's
morale due to overwhelming hostility toward
the person of President Batista. The maxim that
success in guerrilla war is not achieved by
destroying your enemy militarily, but by
destroying their morale was proven to be
correct. Despite their overwhelming superior
numerical strength, government units when
confronted mostly surrendered, fled or defected.
On learning that the Army Chief of Staff,
General Francisco Tabernilla Dolz had ordered
General Eulogio Cantillo, who commanded
operations in Oriente Province to meet with
Castro behind his back, Batista decided to
abandon power as quickly as he had once seized
it. At the 1959 New Year's party held at his
home at Camp Columbia army barracks, Batista
told his assembled guests of his immediate
resignation. Batista took some of the guests
with him and his wife (and those of his children
that were still in Cuba), departing from Camp
Columbia’s military airport. The impetuous
nature of their escape belied the radical and
tragic transformation that it heralded for Cuba.
Batista's Final
Exile
Batista took initial refuge in the neighboring
Dominican Republic. Realizing that the
unpopularity of Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican
Republic’s dictator, in Cuba, doomed Trujillo’s
support for an invasion of that country in
August 1959 to be carried out by Cuban exiles,
(this project is not to be confused with the
failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 1961)
Batista broke with Trujillo and departed for
Portugal and eventually settled in Spain. During
his fourteen-year exile Batista remained in
contact with former cabinet ministers, but not
with Cuba's growing Diaspora. This ostracism
did not particularly disturb Batista, because he
blamed the Cuban middle class for his fall, and
they now constituted the bulk of Cuba's exile
28
community. Indeed, Castro's elimination of the
middle class gave Batista a sense of bittersweet
satisfaction. Otherwise, the frustration of exile
was lessened somewhat by financial security,
the time that Batista spent with his family, him
becoming a practicing Roman Catholic and the
solace he found in writing. The two best known
books that Batista published during his second
exile were Cuba Betrayed and The Growth and
Decline of the Cuban Republic. The latter book
was aimed at highlighting the role, and arguing
the case that the 1933 Revolution was in
keeping with Martí's legacy and asserting that
Castro's seizure of power was the antithesis of
that tradition.
Indeed for all his faults, an objective analysis of
Batista’s career indicates that he brought Cuba
closer in line with Martí’s vision of an
independent, democratic and prosperous
republic than Castro ever did. It was under
Batista’s stewardship that the promises of the
1933 Revolution were being fulfilled: in 1934
the Platt amendment was abrogated, a
democratic constitution was promulgated in
1940 and from 1955, Cuba due to the
application of the Government’s National
Economic Development Program utilized, its
geographical proximity to the United States as a
strategic asset towards Cuba becoming a
developed nation with a diversified agricultural
and industrial base.
By contrast, Cuba as a totalitarian state under
Castro became overly dependant on the Soviet
bloc with regard to its trading and financial
arrangements. Consequently Cuba was
dangerously exposed following the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the
Soviet Union in 1991. Utilizing the skills of
brilliant technocrats such as Carlos Lage, Castro
29
was able to stave off economic collapse.
Nonetheless it is disturbing that Castro did not
allow economic reform to be further advanced
due to his concern that a civil society could
emerge which could threaten his power.
Therefore Cuba in a post-Soviet world is now
even more dependant upon sugar as its major
export and on tourism than it ever was under
Batista. Indeed contemporary Cuban society is
divided between those who through Communist
Party connections have access to American
dollars by having access to government run
hotels that are patronized by foreign tourists and
most Cubans who are denied such access.
While Batista, from his exile devoted his energy
toward vindicating his legacy by writing books
that extolled the virtues of his regime and
attacked its communist successor, Castro
himself had not forgotten his former nemesis. In
August 1973 Castro dispatched a special agent,
Tony de la Guardia, on a secret mission to
kidnap Batista and bring him back to Cuba for a
show trial and subsequent execution. On the
night that de la Guardia arrived in Madrid,
Batista died from a sudden and unexpected
heart attack in Marebella, Spain. (Interestingly,
and brutally, Castro had Tony de la Guardia
executed in July 1989, along with General
Arnaldo Ochoa, by scapegoating them for drug
smuggling, because the Cuban dictator feared
that they possessed the capacity to stage a
successful military coup).
Fulgencio
Batista's Tragic
Epitaph
That Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar continues to be
reviled by history is testament to the scale of
Castro's triumph over him. Batista might
receive a more balanced and just re-appraisal
should Cubans regain their freedom to
objectively study and analyze their history. It
was Batista's misfortune that his arch-nemesis
Fidel Castro was such a formidable adversary.
30
For Batista was not so much an evil man, as a
tragic one, who ultimately destroyed everything
that he tried to build.
More than anything, Batista craved acceptance
and legitimacy. For that reason he initially gave
way to a democracy, only to overturn it when
faced with the prospect of rejection and
Batista's failed struggle against Castro thwarted
his attempts to liberalize his regime and
Castro's victory over him has ushered in over
two generations of totalitarian tyranny, which is
yet to end.
While Castro may have been more able than
Batista, his striving for absolute power
illustrated that Castro's motivations are more
basic. Hence Batista is a more complex
historical character and a more detailed study of
him might eventuate in history offering some
absolution for his actions in relative terms and a
critical appreciation that he too, similar to the
Cuban people whom he attempted to serve,
ultimately fell victim to Castro’s chicanery.
David Bennett as Convener of Historical and Current Affairs Analysis (HCAA) would
like to thank Roberto A. Torricella for his comments, corrections and suggestions to a
previous edition of this article. Information and insight into pre-totalitarian Cuba can be
gained by visiting two websites assembled by Mr. Torricella
http://www.cubarepublicana.org and www.cubarepublicana.org.
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32