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Intellect vs. Action: The Evolution of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1947 to 1961
Paul S. Carlock
Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies
Fall 2009
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We certify that we have read this professional paper and that, in our opinion, it is
satisfactory in scope and quality for the degree of Masters of Arts in Diplomacy and
Military Studies.
Committee
.
Dr. George Satterfield
Primary Reader
.
Dr. James Primm
Secondary Reader
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Abstract
This is a study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s evolution from an organization that
focused on intelligence gathering and analysis to one that focused primarily on covert,
paramilitary operations in the period from 1947-1961. The CIA was originally chartered by the
National Security Act of 1947 to be the eyes and ears of the President, but within a year of its
creation the agency had changed dramatically into an organization that served as the (secret)
foreign policy arm of the presidency in the “Cold War” against the Soviet Union. This change in
the CIA's mission and organization was directly attributable to National Security Council
Directive 10/2 of 1948 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. Through these acts, the
role of the CIA was irrevocably altered and the effects of this change can still be seen today at the
agency.
Understanding how these two events forever changed the CIA is crucial when examining
the actions, leaders, and organization of the agency and its ultimate effect on American foreign
policy during the Cold War. This understanding is also vitally important to the issue that I will
repeatedly come back to throughout the paper, where should the primary focus of the CIA lie,
with intelligence gathering and analysis or covert operations. This question has been a major
point of contention within the United States government for decades and will continue to be one
for the foreseeable future.
To conduct this study I relied heavily upon archival records, Federal laws and statutes,
After Action Reports by the CIA, Congressional reports on CIA covert operations, and memoirs
of participants involved with these operations. In most cases these primary sources speak for
themselves and give the reviewer an unprecedented look into the plans and decisions of key US
policy makers during the Cold War. I also used various secondary sources on the agency, its
leaders, and its operations from 1947 to 1961 in order to fully understand the evolution of the
CIA.
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Acknowledgements
This project would not have been possible without the efforts of several people.
The archivists and staff at the Truman Presidential Library and the Eisenhower
Presidential Library were invaluable in providing assistance with research and documents
on the early years of the CIA and both Presidents’ involvement with the agency. Without
their help, I would have been without important insights into the evolution of the agency.
Additionally, great thanks are due to my readers, Dr. George Satterfield, Associate
Professor of History at Hawaii Pacific University and Dr. James Primm, Associate
Professor of Political Science at Hawaii Pacific University. They both expertly guided
me from beginning to end, and their patience, encouragement, and willingness to provide
constructive criticism are greatly appreciated. Any errors or wrong assumptions within
the paper are mine alone however.
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Table of Contents
Abstract
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Acknowledgements
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Table of Contents
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Introduction __________________________________________________________________1
Part I: The Birth of an American Intelligence Agency_________________________________14
Chapter One: The Origins of the CIA and the National Security Act of 1947____________14
Chapter Two: The Origins of Covert Action at the CIA_____________________________34
Part II: The Consequences of Covert Action_________________________________________54
Chapter Three: The Iranian Coup of 1953________________________________________54
Chapter Four: The Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961___________________________________82
Conclusion______________
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Bibliography
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1
Introduction
Spies or similar agents have been used for most of recorded history. Secrets can
be a key to power and protecting secrets has been of vital importance to states and leaders
for thousands of years. In the early modern period of history most rulers relied upon their
spies and agents to maintain their power domestically and to protect against foreign
enemies. In the modern period of the last two centuries, however, the widespread use of
spies and other treacherous means of political intrigue began to fall out of favor,
particularly among democratic states. Of course, spies continue to be used and will more
than likely always be used, but in most modern nations the skullduggery and perfidy
associated with them is almost universally condemned as the antithesis of an open and
democratic society.
This idea and the accompanying fear of tyranny heavily influenced the founding
fathers of the United States, and although America undoubtedly used some spies during
the Revolutionary War, the American republic did not have an institutionalized spy
service until over 150 years after its founding. As with other democratic nations, the
United States viewed spies and their activities as more akin to the excesses of European
monarchs or to Machiavellian treachery, and as such they avoided their widespread use.
Also, as Amy Zegart adeptly points out, “some of the hallmarks of America democracyseparation of powers, regular elections, majority rule- all inhibit the design of an
intelligence agency and provide incentives for political actors to keep it that way.” 1 This
decision also came in large part because of the insular nature of most Americans,
1
Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999. pp. 53.
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particularly in relation to events in Europe and the rest of the world until recently. The
protection and distance from world events and possible enemies that the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans granted also provided Americans with a physical, and perhaps mental
sense of safety and well-being that made the need for spies seem unnecessary.
Even well into the twentieth century when America became closely linked to the
international political system, most American politicians still opposed any kind of
organized spy service. The small joint military and State Department code-breaking unit
that had operated during World War I was even closed down in 1929 by Secretary of
State Henry Stimpson who famously said, “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.” 2
Opinions similar to Stimpson’s were widespread throughout the State Department and the
military even as late as the end of World War II, which further hampered the creation of
an organized spy service. Naturally elements within the War Department and the Navy
Department during World War II eagerly sought to gather intelligence on enemy forces,
but these units were highly specialized and they worked directly for the Army or the
Navy, not for an organized intelligence agency. Soon however, world events would
begin to drastically alter not only the geographic landscape of Europe and Asia, but
would also forever change the structure of international affairs.
Coming out of World War II as an economic, political, and military super-power,
the United States was not only the world’s shining example of democracy and capitalism
it was also, by the late 1940s, looked at by many countries as the last line of defense
against communism and revolutionary socialism that loomed dangerously on the horizon.
Starting with President Truman, but really taking shape under the Eisenhower
2
Cline, Ray S. The CIA under Reagan, Bush, & Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to
Reagan. Washington: Acropolis Books, 1981. pp. 31
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administration all the elements of American power (military, economic, political, and
even cultural) began to take a more interventionist approach to world events during the
new “Cold War” between the United States and the Soviet Union. To effectively fight
what many saw as an immoral and authoritarian system bent on world domination, some
leaders in the United States supported drastic measures that went directly against the
traditional system of open government in America. Men like General Donovan, the
commander of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II pushed for the
creation of an organization that would not only monitor the growing power and influence
of the Soviet Union but would also have the ability to directly intervene internationally in
order to stop or contain its malign influence. This naturally had a drastic affect on
American foreign policy, and would eventually convince a succession of American
presidents to react to world events, particularly Soviet aggression in Europe and
communist supported revolutions in the Third World with much more direct and
unfortunately, sometimes quasi-legal covert measures.
The only institution a democratic society like the United States had for fulfilling
an intelligence agency role was the before mentioned Office of Strategic Services, an
organization formed during World War II to collect and analyze strategic intelligence for
the president and to conduct special operations missions behind enemy lines. The OSS
was disbanded at the end of the war though because President Truman disliked Donovan
and questioned the OSS’s methods and effectiveness. Truman’s opinion on the need for
an American intelligence organization quickly changed however with the rapid advance
of the Soviet Union’s influence in Eastern Europe soon after World War II. Giving in to
the political and security pressures put in motion by the Soviet Union, President Truman
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finally agreed to support the creation of an American intelligence agency. This agency,
the Central Intelligence Agency was officially created by the National Security Act of
1947 and given the mission of coordinating the nation’s intelligence activities and
collecting and analyzing intelligence for the President.
My thesis, or the central question I will examine in this paper is, how were the
mission, organization, and eventual evolution of the CIA affected by National Security
Council Directive 10/2 of 1948 and by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
These two acts drastically altered the original mission and scope of the CIA given by the
National Security Act of 1947 and their effects on the agency can still be seen today.
Since the CIA's change in mission and organization is directly attributable to these two
acts, reviewing both in detail will be a constant part of my analysis. Understanding how
these two events forever changed the CIA is crucial when examining the actions, leaders,
and organization of the agency and its ultimate effect on American foreign policy.
Throughout this paper I will also thoroughly review and analyze how, soon after
its creation, the CIA quickly evolved from its original role as an organization that simply
collected and analyzed intelligence to one focused almost solely on covert operations
against enemies (real or imagined) of the United States. This drastic shift was caused by
one internal and three external factors whose influence forever changed the CIA
including: the influence of former OSS members on policy within the CIA, the Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union, National Security Council Directive
10/2, and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. Later in the paper I will also use
two events, the CIA supported 1953 coup in Iran, and the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961 as
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case studies to give examples of how the change in the CIA’s mission altered not only the
CIA, but also drastically altered the foreign policy of the United States.
This understanding is also vitally important to the issue that I will repeatedly
come back to throughout the paper, namely what should be the primary focus of the CIA,
intelligence gathering and analysis or covert operations. This question has been a major
point of contention within the National Security Council, the United States Congress, in
numerous presidential administrations, and within the CIA itself for decades. Given the
history of the CIA and the government’s role in intelligence operations, more than likely
it will continue to be one well into the future. Although the question has both historical
and contemporary significance, my focus throughout this paper will only be on the
formative years of the agency from 1947-1961. However, any examination of the CIA
after this period will easily see that the decisions and actions of the CIA today continue to
be heavily influenced by the events of the agency’s past.
The factor internal to the CIA that helped lead to the shift concerned the influence
of the former OSS members of the CIA who wanted the organization to closely resemble
the OSS in mission and structure. These former OSS members heavily favored covert
and paramilitary style missions over the CIA's assigned mission of collecting and
analyzing intelligence. These same men also held most of the senior level leadership
positions in the CIA from its founding and continuing throughout most of its history. The
resulting friction this created between CIA leaders who wanted to focus primarily on
covert operations, and leaders who wanted to focus on intelligence collection and
analysis would eventually create two competing factions within the CIA that still
continue today.
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The three external factors that led to a more operational role for the CIA from
1947 to 1962 were all closely linked to each other. The first factor was the rapid spread
of Communism directly supported by the Soviet Union across Eastern Europe and into
Asia in the years following World War II. Many leaders in the United States and
Western Europe saw this as the inevitable result of Communism's revolutionary message
spreading around the globe. From the beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia
in 1917, one of Communism's main goals was not only to spread Communist ideas but
also to start revolutions against the ruling classes throughout the world. The threat of
these revolutions terrified most democratic nations and pushed them to closely align with
the United States against the Soviet Union.
In response to the actions of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe after World War
II, the National Security Council began to greatly enlarge the mission of the CIA by
charging it with planning and conducting various covert operations against the enemies of
the United States. These new instructions would constitute a second and key external
factor that would forever change the CIA, doctrinally and organizationally, and would
quickly lead to its evolution from an organization based on intelligence collection and
analysis to one based on direct covert action against the enemies of the United States
throughout the world. The most radical and far-reaching of these changes to the original
CIA mission was the already mentioned National Security Council Directive 10/2 of
1948, which I will explore in depth later in this paper. These covert operations by the
CIA would be used time and again by several administrations, often pushing the limits of
legality and morality, especially within a democratic society. Their results were also
more often than not, political disasters that embarrassed the United States internationally,
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and usually went directly against the values and ideals the country stood for.
Unfortunately, the frequent failure of these operations and the dangerous results that
often accompanied them, failed to convince several presidents to end their reliance on
using the CIA as a tool for conducting American foreign policy.
The third and final external factor that supported a new mission and direction for
the CIA would be the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. The act, which
authorized the CIA to make its administrative and financial records and procedures
secret, freed it from most of the regular rules and regulations governing the use of federal
funds. It also exempted the CIA from having to report any information on its members,
their functions, salaries, or even the number of personnel that worked for the CIA to
Congress. This law essentially gave the CIA unprecedented power to conceal the status
of its agents and their missions from Congress, the National Security Council, and from
the president.
It also allowed the leaders of the CIA to use federal funds at their own discretion
with little to no oversight from Congress, which often led to money being used for illegal
operations both in the United States and abroad. The new mandate and direction given
by the NSC Directive of 1948 and the freedom of operation gained from the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 would also eventually lead to the CIA's involvement
with coup d'états against democratically elected governments in Iran and Guatemala in
the 1950s, and would lead to the ill-fated Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961. These
events would in turn set precedents for the CIA's involvement in illegal activities outside
of its official mandate and would eventually lead to numerous foreign policy disasters for
the United States.
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Two seminal events added definition to the changed role of the CIA’s mission and
organization from 1947 to 1962, the CIA’s sponsored coup d'état in Iran in 1953 and the
Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961. Later in this paper I will thoroughly examine the
role of the CIA in the Iranian coup d'état of 1953, and in the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961
in order to operationally assess how the mission, organization, and the institution itself
changed from its founding in 1947 up until 1962. These two events serve as excellent
case studies, with each giving numerous examples of the CIA’s focus on quasi-legal
paramilitary operations at the expense of intelligence analysis. Both events also had a
major impact on American foreign policy during the Cold War, and each continues to
affect international relations and foreign policy today between the United States, the
Middle East, and Latin America. Both events were also unique in the fact that they either
set precedents for future CIA operations to drive American foreign policy by quasi-legal
means, as is the case with the Iranian coup, or they showed the limits of the CIA’s power
and influence as the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion did.
The CIA's involvement in Iran starting in 1952 was shaped by several outside
factors including America's attempt to contain the spread of communism in the Middle
East and in large part because of manipulation by Britain. Britain owned the majority
interest in most of Iran's oil fields at this time and the Iranian government's attempt to
nationalize its oil industry would have stripped control of all oil revenues from Britain.
Britain's response to the attempted nationalization was a series of embargos against
Iranian goods and a naval blockade of Iran itself. When Britain lost its legal claim to the
oil revenues in international courts, it then convinced the United States that Communist
influence had taken over the Iranian government and pushed for a joint covert operation
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to overthrow the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Mohammed
Mossadegh. In Mossadegh’s place they used elements of the Iranian military backed by
the CIA to reinstate the autocratic rule of the then current Shah, Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi. The reign of the pro-American Shah was notable for its secularization of the
country, severe suppression of political dissent, and the opulent lifestyle of the Shah in
contrast to the poor conditions of most Iranians. The abuses during the Shah's reign
eventually led to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which transformed Iran from a
constitutional monarchy to a fundamentalist Islamic republic under the control of the
anti-American Ayatollah Khomeini.
The infamous Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961 involved the CIA's use of Cuban
exiles to invade Cuba with support and training from the CIA and the United States
military in order to overthrow Fidel Castro's Populist government. Castro's government
had become a serious political and security concern for the United States, at least in the
minds of many American policy makers, due to his growing connection with the Soviet
Union and the CIA had been developing plans to oust him from power as soon as he
became the leader of Cuba. President Eisenhower approved the initial CIA plans
regarding anti-Castro forces being trained and equipped for guerrilla operations in Cuba
but the actual invasion occurred during the presidency of John F. Kennedy, who scaled
back some of the resources for the invasion and limited the US military's involvement in
the event, which many in the CIA consider the reason for the invasion's failure.
Ultimately however, the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion was due to several factors
including, incompetent planning and execution by the CIA, lack of intelligence on the
internal political and domestic situation in Cuba- including the substantial amount of
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support Castro had from the Cuban people, and the refusal by President Kennedy to fully
support the guerrillas with the US military.
The end result of the invasion was the complete defeat and capture of the CIA
backed guerrillas, while Castro's government gained international stature and his
domestic support soared. The failed invasion also pushed Castro to align much more
closely with the Soviet Union economically, politically, and militarily. A year and a half
later, this alignment would lead to the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War, the
Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the entire world close to the precipice of nuclear
destruction. At the CIA, the failed invasion also led to many of the leaders involved with
its planning being forced to resign while the CIA's relationship with President Kennedy
was permanently damaged. In fact, the CIA’s relationship with the Executive Branch, the
State Department, and the Pentagon would never be the same after the Bay of Pigs
Invasion, with each frequently questioning the CIA’s competence in conducting
operations and the accuracy of its intelligence assessments.
The story of the CIA from its creation in 1947 until 1962 can’t be fully
understood without also looking at the relationship between the CIA and the three
presidents it served during this period. For that reason, I will also examine the role that
those presidents had in the development and evolution of the CIA throughout this paper.
Each president is important because of the role they played in the organizational struggle
for dominance between covert operations and intelligence analysis at the CIA, as well as
for their influence in the debate over the legality of CIA operations and procedures. Each
man is also responsible in some way or another for the operations and plans of the CIA,
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both good and bad, while at the same time each was hurt politically by these failures,
both domestically and abroad.
The historiography available on the CIA and its various operations is immense,
running the gamut from scholarly monographs to biographies from agents and leaders
within the organization. Unfortunately, many of these take a polemic tone and either
seek to castigate the CIA or unilaterally defend its actions, regardless of the outcomes.
Few works on the CIA have focused exclusively on my thesis topic however, the effects
of NSC Directive 10/2 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 on the mission
and evolution of the CIA from 1947-1961. In order to understand how these acts forever
changed the CIA, I drew from numerous sources on both sides of the debate and
hopefully, the broad insight I gathered from them will illuminate the answers that I seek.
Most of my beginning research into the evolution of the CIA from 1947-1961 for
this paper came from official laws and statutes such as the National Security Act of 1947,
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and National Security Council Directive
10/2 of 1948. For understanding the origins of the CIA and the NSC (both legally and
through direct correspondence between government agencies and elected officials), I
drew heavily from the State Department’s official history of U.S. foreign policy
decisions, published online as: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950:
Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment. This source was invaluable for providing
the original versions of various laws, acts, presidential directives, and committee
decisions regarding the creation of America’s intelligence establishment. I also found
abundant material from the final published report of the U.S. Congress’ Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United
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States (Church Committee of 1975). The committee’s report highlighted numerous CIA
operations from 1947 until 1975 that shed light on my thesis regarding covert operations.
I also found a myriad of information on the CIA’s operations directly from the
CIA itself in the form of various after action reports and internal investigations that have
recently been declassified and published either online through the CIA or in monograph
form. These internal investigations not only highlighted the problems the agency
encountered during its operations, but also show the recommendations made to fix these
mistakes (although these recommendations were rarely followed). The final group of
primary sources that I relied on came from individuals who directly participated in the
events I examined, including: various personal letters and official directives issued by
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, memoirs from leaders and agents within
the CIA, and memoirs and official documents from White House officials and leaders
within the U.S. military. The online information provided by the Truman, Eisenhower,
and Kennedy Libraries, as well as archivist support from those same libraries was crucial
to my research into the topic.
The most valuable memoirs to my research were Kermit Roosevelt's book,
Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran, which discusses his involvement with the
Iranian Coup as the senior CIA officer in charge during the operation, former chief of the
CIA’s clandestine service and primary planner of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Richard
Bissell's book, Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs, and former
OSS member and director of the CIA from 1966-1973, Richard Helms’ book, A Look
over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. I realize however, that
many of these primary sources will be biased because of their pre-disposed viewpoints
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related to the events and because in many cases the authors did not have the necessary
historical perspective and distance from the subject to offer an objective analysis.
There are also abundant secondary sources that I reviewed including monographs,
historical reviews, and articles in academic journals. I used primary sources as much as
possible during my research, but several of these secondary sources were very valuable in
providing me with background information on my topic. In particular I found Stephen
Kinzer's book, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East
Terror, Tim Weiner's book, Legacy of Ashes: the History of the CIA, Howard Jones'
book, The Bay of Pigs, Amy Zegart’s book, Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA,
JCS, and NSC, David Rudgers’ article in The Journal of Contemporary History titled,
“The Origins of Covert Action”, and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones’ book, The CIA and American
Democracy to be invaluable in the development of my paper.
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Chapter 1
The origins of the CIA and the National
Security Act of 1947
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To understand the CIA’s evolution during its formative first years it is important
to look back at the people, events, and laws that shaped the agency and set it on the path
it would follow until present day. No one was more influential in the development of the
American intelligence agency than Major General William Donovan. Know as “Wild
Bill”, Donovan was a Congressional Medal of Honor recipient from World War I who
thanks to his political connections and friendship with President Roosevelt was made the
“Coordinator of Information” in 1941. 3 The short lived COI job made Donovan, at this
time a civilian, responsible for managing the fragmented and inefficient intelligence
activities of the State Department, the FBI, and American military, but each group fought
to maintain control over their own intelligence activities. This ultimately resulted in little
being done to fix the disjointed American intelligence system that existed prior to World
War II. Donovan also failed to make allies at the other departments due to his brash
personality and ties to the Republican Party, which alienated many government leaders at
the time.
In 1942 President Roosevelt changed the Office of Coordinator of Information
into the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS. Donovan was reinstated to his World War I
rank of Colonel, (he would eventually be a Major General by war’s end), and given
command of the OSS, which was charged with taking a more direct role in intelligence
gathering missions outside of the country, including focusing on covert paramilitary
operations against the enemies of the United States. 4 The OSS was put under the
nominal control of the military chain of command, although Donovan constantly tried to
gain more freedom of action for the OSS through his close relationship with the
3
Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. Guilford: The Lyons Press, 2006, pp.31.
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The CIA and American Democracy: Third Edition. Binghamton: Vail-Ballou
Press, 1993, pp. 18.
4
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president. Donovan also maintained close ties with the British Intelligence Service that
he had formed prior to the war as an envoy for President Roosevelt in London. This
relationship between the two organizations proved invaluable to the fledgling OSS as the
British provided much needed training in espionage and paramilitary operations. Later, it
would also be a hindrance for the OSS as its critics labeled it as merely a puppet or
extension of British Intelligence. 5
The creation of the OSS did not end the competition between it, the State
Department, the FBI, and the military over control of intelligence however. Each agency
or department continued to consider itself the rightful heir to American intelligence
efforts and therefore little to no cooperation occurred between the departments
throughout the war. Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover even tried to convince
President Roosevelt to give the FBI exclusive rights to collect and analyze all domestic
and foreign intelligence, but Roosevelt decided to split control between the OSS and the
FBI. 6 Due to Hoover’s growing political power, he gave the FBI control over American
intelligence capabilities throughout South America, and the OSS got jurisdiction over
Europe and Asia. However, this division of power did little to soothe the animosity
between Hoover and the OSS as he continued to question the competency and usefulness
of the OSS to the president and members of Congress. Hoover also went to great lengths
to obtain damning evidence of OSS mistakes and failures during the war, which he
planned to present to the president in order to destroy the group.
Relations between the OSS and American military leaders were also tense during
the war, although they never got as bad as they were between the OSS and FBI. Army
5
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007, pp. 7.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. New York: Doubleday,
1981, pp. 162-163.
6
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Chief of Staff General Marshal never particularly trusted Donovan because of his
political connections to the president and like most career officers he found the spying
and subversive actions conducted by the OSS to be improper for officers. 7 Marshal also
convinced the president to put the OSS under the control of the war department in order
to prevent any rogue operations that would endanger military operations. Relations
between the OSS and the Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific, General MacArthur
were much worse as MacArthur refused to allow OSS agents to operate in the
Philippines, although they did conduct numerous operations in Burma and in China
during the war. 8 Years later during the Korean War, MacArthur’s original distrust and
dislike of the OSS would transfer to the CIA as he refused to allow CIA agents to operate
in Japan and Korea and then discounted intelligence pointing to Chinese involvement in
the war. This would of course have drastic consequences for the United States as China’s
Army inflicted massive casualties on the American forces and forced the war to last for
over three years.
The OSS was made up of an eclectic mix of Ivy-League bluebloods, intellectuals,
adventure seekers, and soldiers of fortune that Donovan saw talent or promise in. After
their selection, these men received formal training in the unorthodox methods of the craft:
sabotage, infiltration, and espionage from the British Intelligence Service. Naturally, the
adventurous Donovan favored covert operations over espionage because of the prestige
they offered during a wartime situation and his opinion on this subject greatly influenced
7
Ambrose, Stephen E. Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. New York: Doubleday,
1981, pp. 16.
8
Leary, William M., ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents. Tuscaloosa: University
of Alabama Press, 1984, pp. 17.
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many of the members of the OSS. 9 Many of these agents and intelligence analysts would
also go on to be the founding members of the CIA and the experiences they gained during
the war would leave a lasting impression on them and in turn on the evolution of the
agency.
Famous names like Richard Helms, William Colby, William Casey, and Allen
Dulles all served as members of the OSS during the war and each would eventually serve
as the Director of Central Intelligence. Unfortunately their tutelage under Donovan and
their experience with covert operations during the war often led them to focus most of
their attention on covert operations once they moved over to the CIA. This focus on
covert operations at the expense of intelligence gathering and analysis would continually
haunt the CIA and hamper the decision making of numerous presidents. The internal
struggle between intelligence analysis and clandestine operations that came about
because of the focus of many of these former OSS agents would also go on for decades
continuing to the present day at the CIA.
The OSS was organized into several specialized sections, each responsible for a
specific mission within the agency. One of the most important and infamous sections
was the Special Operations Branch. The SO division was responsible for paramilitary
operations, guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, and sabotage missions, most of
which occurred behind enemy lines. As CIA historian Michael Warner points out, “the
SO Branch’s emphasis on guerrilla warfare and sabotage missions against the Nazis in
Europe and against the Japanese in Asia fit perfectly with Donovan’s vision of an offense
in depth, in which saboteurs, guerrillas, commandos, and other agents behind enemy lines
9
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The CIA and American Democracy: Third Edition. Binghamton: Vail-Ballou
Press, 1993, pp. 19.
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would support the Allied Armies during their advance.” 10 The OSS gained its reputation
through the exploits of the SO division during the war and the ethos and mentality of the
division would carry over to the CIA and be a major source of influence and inspiration
during the early years of the agency and even still today.
Another important section within the OSS was the Research and Analysis section,
headed by Harvard historian William Langer, which focused on collecting open source
intelligence and turning it into strategic analysis. Langer assembled a staff of some of the
country’s most prestigious scholars in the fields of history, economics, political science,
and geography to provide recommendations to aid the Allied war effort. The Research
and Analysis section’s greatest contribution came in its support of the Allied bombing
campaign in Europe when it identified German oil production as the crucial center of
gravity in the Nazi war effort. By encouraging the Allies to focus their bomber attacks
on German oil production facilities over other targets, the Research and Analysis section
effectively created an “oil offensive” that grounded the Luftwaffe, and ultimately
crippled the entire German war effort. Ultimately, the Research and Analysis section’s
contributions were so successful that when the OSS was disbanded at the end of the war,
it was the one part of the OSS that even rival agencies agreed needed to be saved. 11
The third in the trio of the most important sections of the OSS, the Secret
Intelligence Branch, was responsible for establishing secret field stations in capitals
throughout Europe and Asia, training case officers in Human Intelligence gathering, and
processing reports to send back to Washington. The SI division under the direction of
10
Warner, Michael. The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency. Washington:
CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2000. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/oss/index.htm (Accessed 30 Oct 2009)
11
Ibid. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/oss/index.htm (Accessed 30 Oct 2009)
20
Allen Dulles performed the classic espionage job for the OSS and their efforts in
gathering intelligence directly from Nazi party officials, military sources, and from
civilians in occupied areas provided the Allies with priceless information that aided in
victory. As Michael Warner notes is his study of the OSS for the CIA’s Center for the
Study of Intelligence, “by the end of the war the SI division had become a full-fledged
foreign intelligence service, with stations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, excellent
liaison contacts with other foreign services, and a growing body of operational
doctrine.” 12 These factors would also transfer over to the CIA through the efforts of
several SI division members who went to work for the agency after the war.
Ultimately, the OSS conducted numerous espionage and paramilitary operations
behind enemy lines in Europe and in Asia throughout the war, but these missions were
usually only moderately successful. The OSS did have some success working with the
French Resistance in occupied France and in harassing the Japanese Army in Burma and
China, but these efforts usually played a minor part in the eventual Allied victory. There
were also infamous disasters like General Donovan’s plan to parachute OSS members
directly into Germany in the last year of the war. Of the twenty-one two-man teams that
were sent in, only one completed their mission and survived. 13 Notwithstanding failures
of this magnitude, the OSS gained considerable fame during the war, and the numerous
OSS agents involved in operations during the war gained valuable experience and insight
into covert operations. However, in many ways the OSS was a product of the war and as
such, its existence after the war was questionable.
12
Ibid. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/oss/index.htm (Accessed 30 Oct 2009)
13
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007, pp. 4.
21
By late 1944 when victory over Nazi Germany seemed assured, President
Roosevelt began to think about plans for the postwar world. He ordered General
Donovan to conduct research into the prospects of a postwar intelligence service that
would serve the interests of the United States similar to the British Intelligence Serivce.
President Roosevelt believed in the need for this intelligence agency to be separate and
distinct from the military, but still able to work in conjunction with the country’s armed
forces. He also realized that any separate intelligence agency would automatically come
into jurisdictional conflicts with the State Department, the military and particularly with
Hoover and the FBI. Roosevelt was right to fear the possible wrath of Hoover, because
no sooner had Donovan begun his research into the topic, than Hoover had already used
his own spies to track the direction of Donovan’s report. This meant that long before the
final report hit the President’s desk, Hoover had already seen it in its entirety.
Donovan’s report concluded that, “once our enemies are defeated the demand will
be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace.” He
went on to say, “this will require two things: first, that intelligence control be returned to
the supervision of the President. Second, the establishment of a central authority
reporting directly to the President, with responsibility to frame intelligence objectives and
to collect and coordinate the intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in
planning and carrying out national policy and strategy.” Not surprisingly, Donovan
spoke highly of his organization to Roosevelt when he declared that, “the OSS has the
trained and specialized personnel needed for this task and that their talent should not be
wasted or dispersed.” 14
14
Leary, William M., ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents. Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1984, pp. 123-124.
22
Donovan’s report also recommended several policies for the new organization
that would blur legal and ethical lines. These recommendations were that the agency
should have the power and authority to, “perform subversive operations abroad, including
such other functions and duties relating to intelligence as the President from time to time
may direct, and that the agency should operate under an independent budget.” The
former part of the statement played right into Donovan’s penchant for action (covert,
paramilitary operations), over intelligence collection and analysis. Also the nebulous
language of this part of the report, particularly, “duties relating to intelligence that the
President from time to time may direct,” gave the proposed agency wide leeway. The
latter part of the statement was equally important because an independent budget, outside
of normal government controls and over watch would enable the free practice of covert
operations without interference from outside agencies or more importantly from
Congress. In the future, both of these recommendations would eventually find root at the
CIA, where they quickly led to excesses and disastrous actions that directly affected
presidential policy decisions. 15
Unfortunately for Donovan, excerpts of the final report were immediately leaked
to the press by J. Edgar Hoover in an attempt to discredit Donovan and the OSS. The
ensuing articles written by Walter Trohan for the anti-Roosevelt papers- the Chicago
Tribune, the New York Daily News, and the Wasington Times Herald, carried classified
parts of the report and called the proposed intelligence agency, “an all-powerful
intelligence service to spy on the postwar world and to pry into the lives of citizens at
15
Ibid, pp. 124-125.
23
home.” 16 The resulting uproar from the American public and from within Congress
about the possibility of an American “Gestapo” meant the end (at least temporarily) of a
postwar intelligence agency and effectively destroyed any chance of Donovan taking an
active role in any intelligence service in the future as well. A year later the death of
President Roosevelt would also spell the end the OSS. Without the patronage and
political protection of Roosevelt, Donovan’s numerous enemies were able to attack him
directly as well as attack the OSS’ record during the war. President Truman, unlike
Roosevelt was also no fan of Donovan and the accusations against the OSS and his
proposed intelligence agency particularly worried the new president. President Truman
summed up his opinion on the subject when he said, “America has no need for a
peacetime Gestapo.” 17
President Truman’s opinions on the subject had been greatly influenced by a
secret report he received on the wartime operations of the OSS conducted by President
Roosevelt’s military aide, Colonel Richard Park. Park’s report, which was manipulated
in part by the military, was a scathing indictment on the failures of the OSS that also
personally attacked Donovan as well. The report stated that the actions of the OSS
during the war had done, “serious harm to the citizens, business interests, and national
interests of the United States.” It went on to say that not only had the training of OSS
officers been, “crude and loosely organized”, which resulted in numerous disasters for the
Allies during he war, but also that, “the almost hopeless compromise of OSS personnel,
16
Troy, Thomas F. Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Frederick: University Publications of America, 1981, pp. 255.
17
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment
(Washington, DC 1996), Doc # 17. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/15_24.html
(accessed Oct 10, 2009)
24
makes their use as a secret intelligence agency in the postwar world inconceivable.” 18
The report, along with his already substantial suspicion of Donovan and the OSS, was the
final nail in the coffin for the agency. Ultimately, Truman decided to fire Donovan and
disband the organization only weeks after the war was over.
Truman’s presidential order to the OSS to disband in ten days also left the
organization reeling and barely able to save its files and information before closing shop.
To Richard Helms, then assigned in Germany, the order “seemed more punitive than
rational to expect an organization that stretched from Washington across Europe, with
elements in the Near East, Africa, China, Burma, India, and Vietnam to fold its tents,
abandon its properties, and rid itself of some 11,500 employees in ten days.” 19 The
analytical side of the OSS, most of the Research and Analysis section, was saved in part
and assigned to the State Department. However, the rest of the agency, along with
thousands of agents were released with most returning to civilian life. This unfortunately
left the United States with few options or capabilities regarding intelligence gathering
outside of military intelligence, which had limited resources and little support from
within the military itself.
World events and political pressure at home would soon change Truman’s
opinion on the need for some kind of centralized intelligence agency however. Just
months after the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had essentially annexed the
eastern part of Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania and installed Communist
regimes there to maintain their influence. Hungary and Czechoslovakia soon followed,
further deepening the suspicions in the United States and Britain that the Soviet Union
18
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007, pp.7.
Helms, Richard. A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. New York:
Random House, 2003, pp. 62.
19
25
was bent on world domination. The United States and the Soviet Union were still
officially allies at this point, but with the war over, each started to see the other as a rival
and possible enemy. By 1946, the expanding influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern
Europe, a civil war in Greece that was supported by the Communists, increased Soviet
pressure on Turkey and Iran, and the activism of Soviet-oriented political parties in
economically damaged Western Europe ended hopes for a co-operative postwar political
settlement in Europe. 20
These events also raised the real possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union
because of its threat to American national security and to world stability. This new “Cold
War” was also set in motion by a speech by Joseph Stalin in February 1946, where he
stated that Communism and capitalism were incompatible systems, and that the world’s
economy would eventually be transformed based on Communist principals. 21 Needless
to say, the American government and the governments of Western Europe took notice of
Stalin’s speech, particularly in light of Soviet political and military movements in Eastern
Europe. A month later, Winston Churchill would make his even more famous “Iron
Curtain” speech that essentially laid down the path that both sides would take during the
Cold War. 22 From this point on the temporary wartime alliance between the Soviet
Union and the United States would be a thing of the past as both nations began to
compete in earnest for supremacy in world affairs.
President Truman’s advisors, particularly Sidney Souers who would later become
the first Director of Central Intelligence, quickly convinced the President that he made a
20
Rudgers, David F. “The Origins of Covert Action.” The Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 35, No. 2
(April 2000) : pp. 250.
21
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The CIA and American Democracy: Third Edition. Binghamton: Vail-Ballou
Press, 1993, pp. 36.
22
Ibid, pp. 36.
26
mistake in unilaterally disbanding America’s only working intelligence service,
particularly in light of the new developments in Europe by the Soviet Union. To fix this
mistake President Truman looked to the military and the State Department to find a
solution that would create a viable intelligence system that would serve both the interests
of the president, and still work with the intelligence assets of both departments.
Unfortunately, the old rivalries over control of intelligence assets between the two had
never been resolved and once again each tried to get primary control over the entire
system. After hearing both sides, Truman sided with the military’s proposals, which
strangely enough gave the military most of the power and control over American
intelligence assets, not the president.
Truman’s Presidential directive in January 1946, created a central intelligence
system where each department (War, Navy, and State), retained almost complete control
over its own intelligence services. This totally separate and loosely organized system
was chaotic to say the least and it mirrored the same dysfunctions and inadequacies that
had led to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. It also created a Central
Intelligence Group (composed of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of the various
service’s intelligence arms) that served under a National Intelligence Authority- a board
that included the secretaries of state, war, the Navy, and a presidential appointee, the
newly designated Director of Central Intelligence, who was supposed to preside over the
CIG, but instead had very little power or autonomy. 23 The mission of the CIG, under the
supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence, was to plan, develop, and coordinate
23
Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999, pp. 178.
27
all foreign intelligence assets within the federal government in order to assure the
accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to national security. 24
Unfortunately, by having the CIG report directly to the National Intelligence
Authority instead of the president, the CIG was virtually powerless against the service
chiefs and civilian secretaries and its ability to recommend policy changes was almost
non-existent. As Amy Zegart points out, “the presidential order creating this new system
also guaranteed the continued existence of the various departments’ intelligence assets,
provided no authority for the CIG to collect intelligence or to conduct covert operations,
and explicitly prohibited the new agency from exercising any internal security functions
that might infringe on the FBI’s jurisdiction. Truman even gave the State, War, and
Navy departments control over the CIG budgets and staffing.” This state of affairs
pleased the departments warring over control of intelligence but it quickly became
apparent to Truman that the CIG was virtually useless because of the limits on its power
and its subordinate place within the National Intelligence hierarchy. 25
President Truman’s role in the debate over American intelligence assets is
complex because on one hand he wanted a viable intelligence network to support national
security, but on the other hand he was wary of the practices and excesses of the OSS
during the war. His first attempt at finding a middle ground in the debate that would
mollify the departments, but still serve his needs (the CIG), was a complete disaster. For
the system to work effectively, Truman knew he would have to increase the power of the
CIG, or its replacement as well as the power and influence of the Director of Central
24
Leary, William M., ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents. Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1984, pp. 126.
25
Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999, pp. 179
28
Intelligence. He also knew this would be a struggle because of the power of the separate
departments and because he was already in the middle of a fight with Congress over the
future of the armed services. This debate, which would re-align the entire structure of the
county’s military forces and much of the government bureaucracy controlling them, was
already shaping up to be a political nightmare for Truman, so naturally he was hesitant to
add more fuel to the fire by insisting on massive changes to the intelligence system at the
same time.
The National Security Act of 1947 is in many ways President Truman’s most
enduring legacy. His main goal in getting the act passed was to reform the War and Navy
Departments and to ensure that the nation remained a counterweight to the growing
influence of the Soviet Union. Truman realized, just as Stalin did, that the world was a
completely different place as a result of the war and that the country would have to adapt
to these drastic changes if it wanted to be an economic, political, and military power
above all others. Intelligence reform did become a part of the National Security Act due
to the already mentioned pressures from the Soviet Union in Europe, but it still remained
a secondary focus of the president and of the legislation behind the act. There was still
much distrust from the president in a permanent intelligence organization, and the various
departments still fought to maintain as much influence and control over any new
agency’s direction, as well as their own assets, but most realized that some kind of standalone intelligence agency had to be created.
That agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, was officially created by the
National Security Act of 1947 and charged with the mission of coordinating the nation’s
intelligence activities and collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence affecting
29
national security to the president and national command authority. The act also assigned
five primary tasks to the CIA: (1) to advise the National Security Council in matters
concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as
related to national security; (2) to make recommendations to the President through the
National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the
departments and agencies of the government as related to the national security; (3) to
correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the
dissemination of such intelligence within the government using where appropriate
existing agencies and facilities: Provided, that the agency shall have no police, subpoena,
law enforcement powers, or internal security functions; (4) to perform, for the benefit of
the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the
National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; (5)
to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. 26
Examining each of these tasks in detail is important in order to fully understand
the thought process behind creating the CIA, and in order to trace the development of the
agency from its genesis and continuing through its formative years. It is also important to
note that the intelligence organizations created by the National Security Act of 1947 were
in many ways a continuation of earlier organizations. For instance, the act created the
National Security Council, which is responsible for advising and assisting the President
on matters of national security and foreign policy. The NSC was really nothing more
than an extension and continuation of the earlier National Intelligence Authority that
President Truman created to oversee the Central Intelligence Group. From the beginning
26
U.S. Statutes at Large. 1948. Vol. 61, pp. 495-510. National Security Act of 1947.
30
the NSC was also responsible for actively directing the actions, plans, and missions of the
CIA. This fact would become of vast importance to the development and evolution of the
CIA, as various National Security Councils have completely changed or altered the
original mission of the CIA in order to adapt to changing world situations.
The statutory members of the NSC were: the President, the Vice-President, the
Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Treasury, the National Security Advisor, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The
inclusion of the President in the NSC, and his subsequent familiarity with NSC directives
is also important to note because several Presidents have used the excuse that they were
not aware of NSC directives or CIA actions after embarrassing events that have impacted
foreign policy have occurred. Anyone understanding the nature of the NSC and the
President’s role in it should quickly see that this is highly improbable. At the very least
the Vice-President presides over the NSC in the absence of the President and it is highly
unlikely that a Vice-President would oversee acts of the council and then not inform the
President of its actions and decisions.
Tasks one and two for the CIA from the 1947 National Security Act are very
similar and simply charge the CIA with advising the President on intelligence matters and
then recommending how to best coordinate all of the national intelligence assets from the
various government agencies and departments. This was first attempted with the CIA’s
previous incarnation, the Central Intelligence Group, but it failed miserably due to the
limited statutory powers given to the CIG. To ensure the CIA’s success in this regard,
Truman made sure the National Security Act of 1947 included provisions that would give
the CIA enough power and control over its own budget and affairs so it could be
31
independent from the other federal departments and agencies. Truman correctly realized
that for the CIA to succeed in its mission of analyzing and disseminating intelligence, it
had to be free from the influence of the other departments.
Task three is important for two reasons; first, it assigns the CIA its primary
mission, which is to collect and analyze foreign intelligence. The National Security Act
of 1947 is very specific that the CIA is to be an intelligence agency only. Nowhere in the
act is the CIA given the outright authority to engage in covert activities. The final report
of the U.S. Senate’s Church Committee in 1975 highlighted this point when it said,
“There is no reference to covert action in the 1947 National Security Act, nor is there any
evidence in the debates, committee reports, or legislative history of the 1947 Act to show
that Congress intended specifically to authorize covert operations.” 27
Task three is also very important because of its second clause, which states that
the CIA was to have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security
functions. President Truman considered this clause to be very important due to his
profound mistrust of the OSS and his fears that without these constraints, the CIA could
develop into a secret police organization akin to the Gestapo or Stalin’s NKVD. Truman
specifically wanted the CIA to focus on foreign intelligence only, and leave any domestic
intelligence and law enforcement duties to the FBI. Unfortunately, this prohibition on
CIA interference in domestic activities would be short lived as the agency frequently
became involved in domestic surveillance, mail and wire tampering, and even more
nefarious actions outside of the scope of this paper. 28
27
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the
United States [Church Committee]. 94th Cong., 2nd sess (April 26). Washington: GPO, 1976. pp. 149
28
Ibid.
32
Tasks four and five would be the most controversial of the tasks assigned to the
CIA, as they would eventually lead to the CIA conducting covert operations outside of its
original mandate. The language used in both tasks was written in such a vague manner
that it left open the possibility of future missions directed by the NSC that were of a
quasi-legal status. This nebulous direction served two purposes; first it protected the
President and the members of the NSC from the possible consequences of these quasilegal covert operations being discovered and second, it gave the CIA (under the
immediate direction of the NSC) the power to adapt to world events, particularly the
surreptitious actions of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. This point is clearly seen in
an address to Congress in 1947, where President Truman responded directly to the
actions of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and identified the consequences of this
growing threat to the peace and stability of not only Europe, but America as well. He
stated that it would be the policy of the United States “to help free peoples to maintain
their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements seeking to
impose on them totalitarian regimes.” He went on to say that the United States would not
allow “coercion or by such subterfuges as political infiltration,” in violation of the United
Nations Charter. 29 Despite his later admonishment once he was out of office of the
direction the CIA eventually took, it is undeniable that one of Truman’s primary
techniques for countering Soviet aggression throughout the world was covert action by
the CIA.
While the vague language contained in parts of the 1947 National Security Act
would leave the door open for subversive and covert operations by the CIA, the true
origins of the CIA’s almost unilateral focus on covert operations would still be almost a
29
Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. Guilford: The Lyons Press, 2006, pp. 3.
33
year away. The National Security Act of 1947 set the conditions for future inequity, but
the continuing Soviet aggression in Europe and soon into Asia as well, combined with the
National Security Council’s orders to counter these maneuvers would be the catalyst that
changed the CIA from an organization that collected and analyzed intelligence to one that
focused almost exclusively on covert, paramilitary operations. The fact that these
operations were almost entirely illegal and that they occurred without Congressional
oversight would only compound the problems associated with them and lead the CIA,
and indeed the entire country along a dark path.
34
Chapter 2
The Origins of Covert Action at the CIA
35
As the Soviet Union continued to consolidate its growing power base in East
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania after World War II, President Truman realized
that drastic measures short of war would have to be undertaken in order to contain Soviet
influence. This “Cold War” between the Soviet Union and the United States would force
both sides to adopt aggressive foreign policies in order to enhance their international
influence. It would also initiate a new international arms race, numerous proxy wars
fought throughout the world, and decades of intrigue between the intelligence services of
the Soviet Union and America’s Central Intelligence Agency.
In many ways the Cold War was as shaped by events as it was by inaccurate
perceptions between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both nations understood
very little about the actual foreign policy goals and national interests of the other. This
ignorance was due in part to differences in culture, language, and the vast geographical
distances that separated the two. However, from the American perspective, the main
factor that led to negative perceptions and conflict between the two nations was the
frequently erroneous analysis of the Soviet Union, politically and militarily by the
National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the supervision of
the President, the NSC set the policy goals and the direction for much of America’s
foreign policy during the Cold War, while the CIA was the primary tool that the President
and the NSC used to physically enact these policies.
One of the most influential events in shaping American foreign policy during the
Cold War was the 1946 communiqué from George Kennan known as the “Long
Telegram”. Kennan’s ideas in the telegram and his subsequent article in the Journal of
Foreign Affairs, which expanded on those thoughts, also had a direct role in the early
36
development and evolution of the NSC and the CIA. Kennan, who served as deputy head
of the U.S. embassy in Moscow during the war had closely studied the political aspects of
the Soviet Union and came to numerous conclusions regarding Soviet foreign policy and
their ultimate goals in the post war world. He compiled his various conclusions about
Soviet motives and foreign policy into the 8,000-word telegram, which immediately sent
shock waves through the American policy makers. Based on his assessment, which
seemed accurate in light of Soviet actions throughout Eastern Europe, President Truman
and the State Department started leaning towards more hard-line diplomatic and military
policies against the Soviet Union.
The telegram stated, “The Soviet Union believes that there can be no peaceful
coexistence with capitalism and everything possible must be done to advance the strength
and influence of the Soviet Union internationally. Conversely, no opportunity must be
missed to reduce the strength and influence of capitalist powers.” To this end Kennan
argued, “The Soviet Union puts much emphasis on deepening and exploiting the
differences and conflicts between capitalist powers, particularly the United States and
Britain. They believe that if these conflicts turn into war between capitalist powers, the
Soviet Union must encourage revolutionary upheavals within those countries to further
its interests.” 30 Naturally this statement brought back anxieties from the 1920s, when
many Western leaders feared the revolutionary aspect of Communism and its inherent
danger to democratic governments.
Kennan went on to say, “At bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world
affairs is the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was
30
The National Security Archive, The George Washington University. (Washington, DC 2009),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm (accessed November 8, 2009)
37
the insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people that lived in the vicinity of fierce nomadic
peoples. Later, as Russia came into contact with the economically advanced West, fears
of more competent, more powerful, and more highly organized Western society began to
reshape Russian policies.” 31 This analysis by Kennan served as a foundation of
American policy maker’s limited understanding of the Russian people’s cultural identity.
In many aspects he was correct, but his analysis of the effects of Russia’s history,
particularly its interaction with the invading Mongols, Tatars, Cossacks, and later the
French and Germans did not universally translate into a complete understanding of
modern Russia. It also does not fully take into account how much Communism changed
the political, economic, and military aspects of Russian society.
Later in the telegram, Kennan elaborated on the Russian mindset saying, “This
insecurity was one which afflicted the Russian rulers, not the Russian people; for Russian
rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic, fragile, and artificial in
its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with the political
systems of Western countries.” He then focuses on a key point that undoubtedly caught
the attention of the State Department and the President. “For this reason they have
always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between the Western world and
their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about the world or if
foreigners learned truth about Russia. And they have learned to seek security only in the
patient, but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival powers, never in compacts and
compromises with them.” 32 The Soviet Union’s conduct toward Nazi Germany during
31
32
Ibid.
Ibid.
38
the war and their subsequent actions in Easter Europe afterwards show Kennan’s clarity
on this point.
Next, Kennan outlined what he considered to be the primary goal of the USSR,
namely the advancement of international communism and an increase in the power and
influence of the Soviet Union over Western countries, particularly the United States.
Once again this played right into the fears the West had of communism and the Soviet
Union’s ultimate goals, which most considered to be communist domination of Western
political systems and the end of capitalism. To achieve this goal he believed that “Soviet
policy toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, will be directed toward
weakening the power and influence of Western nations, so there will be a vacuum which
will favor Communist-Soviet penetration into those areas.” 33 This assessment was
particularly important in light of the vast changes to the political and international
landscape that occurred after the war due to the end of colonialism and the subsequent
creation of numerous new countries in Africa and Asia. It was also important because of
the creation of the United Nations, which both helped and hindered the foreign policy
goals of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Kennan then theorized how the Soviet Union would extend its influence
internationally based on his first hand knowledge and the evidence of subversive political
activities conducted by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe after the war. “They will also
use a wide variety of national associations or bodies, which can be dominated or
influenced in order to achieve the penetration. These include: labor unions, youth
leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations,
cultural groups, liberal magazines, and publishing houses.” Kennan warned “By
33
Ibid.
39
penetrating and controlling these organizations, Moscow sees the possibility of
sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up an international lobby
capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various
countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to the USSR.” 34
One classic example of the Soviet Union’s strategy to paralyze Western powers
was its frequent use of its veto powers on the United Nations Security Council in order to
stifle American policies, particularly in Eastern Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union also
became very adept at using labor unions to not only spread Communist ideals but to gain
political power throughout Europe. This allowed Soviet supported Communist/Socialist
parties to flourish in France and Italy, where they came very close to winning control
over large parts of the government. As the Cold War continued they also put much
emphasis on gaining allies within the developing world, particularly in Africa and SouthEast Asia in the political vacuum left once most European powers gave up their colonial
possessions in those areas.
Along these lines Keenan also explored the Soviet Union’s use of propaganda
throughout Eastern Europe after the war to “undermine the general political and strategic
potential of major western powers.” To achieve this he said “Efforts will be made by the
Soviet Union in such countries to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures
of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, and to stimulate all forms of
disunity. The Soviet Union will also encourage all persons with grievances, whether
economic or racial, to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant
violent struggle for the destruction of other elements of Western society.” 35 Once again
34
35
Ibid.
Ibid.
40
Soviet encouragement of these revolutionary actions to weaken or destroy Western
governments and societies, aided by Communist propaganda, generated great fear in
Western policy makers, which was instrumental in further escalating Cold War tensions.
With the fame and notoriety that he gained from the Long Telegram and his other
writings analyzing the Soviet Union, Kennan was put in charge of the State Department’s
Policy Planning Staff by Secretary of State George Marshal in 1947. His analysis of the
Soviet threat while in that position helped inspire President Truman’s policy of
“containment” of the Soviet Union, which would come to be known as the “Truman
Doctrine”. Besides influencing the doctrine of containment, Kennan was also one of the
primary architects of other key policies during the Cold War aimed at the Soviet Union.
These included the Marshal Plan, which used the economic power of the United States to
battle communism in Europe and Asia and the Kennan authored National Security
Council Directive 10/2, which permanently changed the focus and mission of the CIA
towards covert operations. 36 Soon after its release, the telegram’s conclusions would also
be a primary factor that influenced the passing of the National Security Act of 1947,
which fashioned America’s modern military state, including the creation of the National
Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The numerous supporters of the use of covert operations, such as CIA Director
Allen Dulles, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, and later during the Eisenhower
administration, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also used Kennan’s analysis to
convince President Truman and later President Eisenhower of the necessity of using
covert operations as a counter against the subversive actions of the Soviet Union. These
36
Rudgers, David F. “The Origins of Covert Action.” The Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 35, No. 2
(April 2000) : pp. 254.
41
men argued that covert operations were necessary in order to prevent a Communist takeover of all of Europe. They also suggested that covert operations were not only cheaper
in terms of money and manpower than conventional military operations, but more
importantly, that they were also much easier to cover up and easier for the American
government to deny knowledge of. Arguably, this last aspect of covert operations was
the most appealing one to Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy because it
allowed them to use the CIA to pursue their own foreign policy goals outside of
congressional control and it protected them politically from any fall-out from failed
operations.
In light of his fame as one of the “fathers” of containment theory and of covert
action at the CIA through NSC Directive 10/2, it’s interesting to note that Kennan’s
opinion on the necessity of containment and of CIA led covert operations would change
drastically just a few years after he wrote the “Long Telegram”. By 1949, Kennan had
begun to question his own earlier analysis of the Soviet Union’s ultimate goals in Europe
and indeed the world. His original view of communism as a monolithic force bent on
world domination wavered and he began to believe in the chance for peace between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Kennan’s views on foreign policy
towards the Soviet Union differed from Secretary of State Marshall’s replacement, Dean
Acheson.
Acheson pushed for even more confrontational measures against the Soviets and
his arguments quickly garnered the support of President Truman. Kennan’s approach to
containment was more asymmetrical, or “differentiating between vital and peripheral
interests, of distinguishing between levels of threat, and of keeping responses
42
commensurate with the means at hand.” 37 In this sense he advocated the use of covert
and subversive political actions by the CIA to thwart the Soviets, but refrained from
relying on conventional military power. Acheson on the other hand supported a more
symmetrical approach, which viewed “all interests as vital, all threats as dangerous, and
all means available should be used to counter them.” 38 Acheson’s views essentially led
to preparations towards an armed confrontation between the Soviets and the United States
in Europe, as well as increased covert operations against the Soviet Union.
In October of 1947, as the debate over Kennan’s original analysis was still
brewing, Sidney Souers, President Truman’s Executive Secretary on the National
Security Council, and former Director of Central Intelligence argued for “the need for
psychological warfare operations to counter Soviet-inspired propaganda, particularly in
France and Italy.” He went on to recommend; “the conduct of covert activities such as
these should be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, since it already has contacts
and communications with appropriate organizations and agents in foreign countries.” 39
Souers’ recommendations provoked a strong response from the General Counsel for the
CIA, Lawrence Houston. Houston argued that it had never been the intent of Congress
that the CIA should conduct activities such as these, and that they could not be
undertaken without first obtaining the Congressional authorization and funding. 40
The question over the legality and indeed the morality of covert operations by the
CIA would be integral to the future of the CIA. Not surprisingly, President Truman and
37
Gaddis, John L. Stratgies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security
Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 346-347.
38
Ibid, pp. 346.
39
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment
(Washington, DC 1996), Doc # 245. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/241_249.html
(accessed Nov 10, 2009)
40
Ibid, Doc # 241.
43
the National Security Council sided with Souers in the debate and immediately began
planning for subversive operations against the Soviet Union and their allies in Europe, all
without Congressional oversight. This is one of the first examples of a president, in this
instance President Truman, using the NSC and the CIA to implement foreign policy
goals, all while circumventing Congress. Unfortunately, it would not be the last instance
of unilateral presidential foreign policy actions, as Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy all embarked on numerous foreign policy adventures with the help of the CIA,
and more importantly all without Congressional approval or knowledge.
The new policy of psychological and subversive political operations against the
Soviet Union began with National Security Council directive 4-A in December 1947.
The analysis behind this directive concluded that the Soviet Union was conducting
intensive propaganda campaigns against the United States using psychological, political,
and economic measures designed to undermine non-Communist elements in all countries.
It went on to state that the ultimate objective of these campaigns was not only to
undermine the prestige of the United States, but also the effectiveness of American
foreign policy, and to weaken and divide world opinion until any opposition to Soviet
policies was no longer possible by political, economic, or military means. 41 Based on
these conclusions, NSC directive 4-A ordered the Director of Central Intelligence to
“initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations
designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to
world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its
endeavors to promote world peace and security.” 42
41
42
Ibid, Doc # 256.
Ibid, Doc # 256.
44
The first covert operation that followed this new mandate involved American
interference with the Italian elections for prime minister in April of 1948. This
interference was deemed crucial because the Soviet Union had been supplying massive
amounts of money to the Italian Communist party and many in the State Department and
at the CIA feared that this would enable the Communists to win the elections and take
over the Italian government. Secretary of State Dean Acheson summed up the fears of
the State Department and of President Truman when he argued that losing Italy to the
Communists could very likely lead to the loss of France, West Germany, the Low
Countries, and eventually England as well. 43 This fear, along with President Truman’s
containment doctrine against the Soviet Union ensured full support for any clandestine
means to limit Soviet influence in the Italian elections. To fund these covert programs in
Italy, the CIA eventually laundered over 10 million dollars in captured Axis funds from
the war in order to ensure the pro-Western Christian Democratic Party won the
election. 44
George Kennan accurately described the mood within the State Department
during this period in his testimony before the Church Committee in 1975 saying, “we
were alarmed at the inroads of the Russian influence in Western Europe beyond the point
where the Russian troops had reached. And we were alarmed particularly over the
situation in France and Italy.” He went on to say, “We felt that the Communists were
using the very extensive funds that they then had in hand to gain control of key elements
of life in France and Italy, particularly the publishing companies, the press, the labor
43
Ambrose, Stephen E. Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. New York: Doubleday,
1981, pp. 168.
44
Andrew, Christopher. For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency
from Washington to Bush. New York: HarperCollins, 1995, pp. 172.
45
unions, student organizations, women’s organizations, and all sorts of organizations of
that sort, to gain control of them and use them as front organizations. That was just one
example of why we thought we ought to have some facility for covert operations.” 45
The CIA’s efforts to prevent a communist election victory in Italy succeeded, but
the lessons learned from the operation convinced the leaders of the CIA well as the
President that similar operations would be needed in the future to contain Soviet
influence elsewhere. This would set a dangerous precedent of American involvement in
subversive political warfare, which was highly illegal and went on for decades in
numerous countries around the world. Mark Wyatt, a CIA agent who worked on the
operation in Italy best described the mood of many agents involved in a program they
knew was highly illegal when he said, “at CIA headquarters we were absolutely terrified,
we were scared to death because we were going beyond our charter.” 46
The Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles saw things in a different light however. He
remarked to then CIA Chief of Operation Richard Helms, “I want you to understand how
important covert action operations are right now. Intelligence collection has its place- no
question, no doubt about it. But I want you to be sure that everyone in operations has it
firmly in mind that the White House and this administration have an intense interest in
every aspect of covert action.” Showing a knack for understanding the future focus of the
agency Dulles went on to say, “Make no mistake, the way we’re going, our
45
Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, U.S. Senate, book IV, Senate Report No. 94-755, 94th Congress, 2d session, pp. 31.
46
The National Security Archive, The George Washington University. (Washington, DC 2009),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interview/episode-3/wyatt1.html. (accessed 4 Nov, 2009)
46
responsibilities are running way ahead of our budget, and there’s a legitimate and
growing market for covert action.” 47
Almost simultaneous with the CIA’s subversive activities in Italy, another event
occurred that served as a major catalyst to convince President Truman and the NSC to
shift the focus of the CIA almost exclusively towards covert operations. In February
1948 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia seized control of the Czechoslovakian
government in a coup d'état. The Soviet Union’s overt role in the coup was unmistakable
and the subsequent political purges and bloodshed it caused in Czechoslovakia caught the
West’s attention. The events in Czechoslovakia also reminded many of Hitler’s move
against the country just ten years earlier, which naturally brought fears of a Soviet Army
invasion of Europe just as the Nazis had prior to World War II. In response to the coup,
President Truman immediately pushed for the passage of the Marshall Plan through
Congress as a means to economically rebuild the countries of Western Europe in order to
protect them against Communist subversion. By this time the United States and the
Soviet Union were locked into an ideological struggle for preeminence on the
international stage.
The coup d'état in Czechoslovakia was in many ways the final push that advocates
of covert action at the NSC and CIA needed to permanently alter the central focus of the
CIA. Their arguments that covert operations were the only way America could counter
similar Soviet actions throughout Europe even convinced President Truman, who had
originally opposed the continuation of the OSS after the war, in part because of its widespread use of these operations. There was no doubt that the events of the Cold War
47
Helms, Richard. A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. New York:
Random House, 2003, pp. 104-106.
47
drastically changed American foreign policy and covert operations were now considered
an integral tool in America’s arsenal. As Amy Zegart points out, “Clandestine activities
offered presidents flexible, responsive, and secret foreign policy weapons at a time when
Cold War combat made these attributes more desirable than ever before.” 48
In June 1948 the NSC would issue the most significant order in the history of the
CIA, NSC Directive 10/2, which permanently changed the mission and organization of
the agency and set it on the path it would follow for decades to come. NSC Directive
10/2 also superceded and cancelled NSC Directive 4-A, taking that directive’s mission of
covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet activities to new heights.
The NSC used the nebulous language in the National Security Act of 1947, particularly
the Act’s fifth task to the CIA to “Perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from
time to time direct” to legally justify issuing Directive 10/2 and in authorizing all future
covert and subversive operations. 49 Through the auspices of this clause in the National
Security Act the NSC, under the direction of the President, was able to order numerous
covert operations conducted by the CIA, and all without congressional support,
authorization, or even knowledge.
A close examination of some of the key clauses of NSC Directive 10/2 is essential
to understanding just how radically the directive changed the CIA’s mission and
organization from its creation. The first clause of the directive attempts to explain the
reasoning behind America’s shift toward using covert operations. It states, “The National
Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its
48
Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999, pp. 221.
49
U.S. Statutes at Large. 1948. Vol. 61, pp. 495-510. National Security Act of 1947.
48
satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of
the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world
peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must
be supplemented by covert operations.” 50 This explanation uses the various covert and
subversive acts of the Soviet Union in Europe, particularly in Italy, France, and
Czechoslovakia to justify America’s foreign policy shift to using the same operations.
By calling attention to these activities, and by classifying them as “vicious”, the NSC
portrayed the Soviet Union as an international threat, as well as essentially arguing that
the United States was only resorting to the same activities only after the Soviets did.
This justification was of course untrue, because the United States had already
conducted many of the same operations and activities during the war through the OSS. It
also subjectively implied that when the Soviet Union used covert and subversive
operations it was intrinsically evil, while America’s use of the same operations are only
in the interests of world peace and US national security. However, an analysis of the
CIA’s future covert operations in Guatemala, Iran, and Cuba, just to name a few, finds
many flaws with the assumption that America will only use covert operations in the
interests of world peace and US national security. It becomes much more difficult to
justify covert operations in defense of US national security when those operations involve
countries far from US soil, who pose little to no threat to American sovereignty, and
when those governments are democratically elected.
The second clause of the directive states, “The Central Intelligence Agency is
charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter50
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment
(Washington, DC 1996), Doc # 292 (National Security Council Directive 10/2, 18 June 1948).
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html (accessed October 10, 2009).
49
espionage operations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for operational reasons, not to
create a new agency for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility
for them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and put them under the
over-all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.” 51 This clause is pretty straight
forward in the fact that it directs the CIA to run all covert operations and that these
operations will be under the control of the CIA director, who naturally is under the direct
control of the NSC. The clause is also important because it notes the NSC’s desire to
prevent the creation of a new agency to control covert operations, which might not be
assigned under their direction and supervision. In this regard the NSC closely follows the
old idea that bureaucracies sometimes exist only to keep themselves in power.
Clause three states, “Under the authority of the National Security Act of 1947, the
National Security Council directs that in time of peace a new office of Special Projects
shall be created within the CIA to plan and conduct covert operations.” 52 The creation of
the Office of Special Projects essentially gave the CIA an in-house covert operations
organization that worked completely independent from the intelligence analysis side of
the agency. This would lead to numerous instances of faulty communication and
coordination between the two part of the agency, and operations frequently suffered
because of this fact. A year later the OSP would become the Office of Policy
Coordination and closely following its name it would in many cases use covert operations
to conduct American foreign policy and direct it towards illegal ends. The OPC also
experienced exponential growth at the CIA as it increased from around 300 agents in
51
52
Ibid.
Ibid.
50
1949 to over 6,000 by 1952. Its annual budget saw an even larger increase from $4
million in 1949 to $82 million in 1952, a nearly twenty-fold increase. 53
The final and most important clause of NSC Directive 10/2 laid out in detail the
types of covert actions the NSC charged the CIA with conducting. It stated, “In this
directive, ‘covert operations’ are understood to be all activities which are conducted or
sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of
friendly foreign states or groups.” 54 Of course the term “hostile states” is highly
subjective, which left the NSC and the President alone with the power to determine
which states or groups were hostile in order to best fit their own foreign policy agendas.
Along this vein, it could be reasonably argued that the Socialist regime in Cuba was
potentially hostile to the United States because of its ties to revolutionary socialism and
its proximity to American soil, but the same argument in regards to Iran or Guatemala
quickly falls short during close inspection.
The fifth clause goes on to say, “These covert operations must be so planned and
executed that any US government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized
persons and that if uncovered the US government can plausibly disclaim any
responsibility for them.” 55 This part of the directive would have undoubtedly raised
many eyebrows within Congress, if they had known about it of course. Essentially it
directed the CIA to not only go to great lengths to hide the true nature of our covert
operations from the enemies of the United States, but also from Congress and the
American public that it served as well. Unfortunately, this would quickly set precedents
53
Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, U.S. Senate, book IV, Senate Report No. 94-755, 94th Congress, 2d session, pp. 31-32.
54
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment
(Washington, DC 1996), Doc # 292 (National Security Council Directive 10/2, 18 June 1948).
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html (accessed October 10, 2009).
55
Ibid.
51
for illegal operations at the CIA that were hidden from the very organization that funded
them and from the very people that they were supposed to serve.
It went on the say “Specifically such operations shall include any covert activities
related to: propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and
evacuation procedures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to
underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support
of indigenous anti-communist elements in the countries of the free world.” 56 Even a
cursory glance at this list immediately brings to mind “Wild Bill” Donovan and the OSS
during World War II. After all of President Truman’s personal reservations about
Donovan and the activities of the OSS, including his fear of the OSS becoming an
American “Gestapo”, this list proves that Donovan’s original vision for an American
intelligence agency patterned off the OSS had indeed come to fruition.
However, from its creation with the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA was
never officially given the authority to engage in covert activities of any sort. In fact, at
no time during its formative years from 1947-1962 was the CIA legally authorized by any
piece of legislation to conduct subversive activities at home or abroad. Instead the
agency conducted covert and subversive actions under the direction of the NSC and the
President alone, without oversight and without any debate in the halls of Congress. In
short, NSC Directive 10/2 fundamentally changed the mission and organization of the
CIA and covert operations became the primary focus of the agency, while its original
purpose of analyzing and disseminating intelligence fell to the wayside.
The final piece in the evolution of the CIA from an organization focused on
intelligence analysis to one focused on covert operations was the Central Intelligence
56
Ibid.
52
Agency Act of 1949. In the act Congress authorized the CIA to use confidential fiscal
and administrative procedures in the process of its operations, and exempted it from
almost all the standard limitations and regulations established for the use of federal funds.
This opened up the funding floodgates for the CIA, which dramatically increased the
agency’s capacity for covert operations. More ominously it exempted the CIA from
having to report its "organization, functions, officials' names or their titles, their salaries,
or even the exact number of personnel employed by the CIA." 57 This provision would
allow the CIA to hide the details of its ongoing operations from Congress, including the
location and status of its agents, even when the operations were disasters that were
publicly exposed.
Strangely enough, considering my previous arguments about the lack of
congressional oversight and knowledge of CIA operations, the members of the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees quickly pushed this legislation through Congress.
After talking to the Director of the CIA and hearing his explanation of the Soviet threat,
the members of the committees convinced Congress as a whole to vote for it even though
very few knew the exact details of the bill. Realizing the ramifications of the bill Carl
Vinson, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said, “We will just have
to tell the House they will have to accept our judgment and we cannot answer a great
many questions that might be asked.” Another member of the committee who saw the
inherent dangers if the details of the bill became public agreed saying, “The less we say
about this bill, the better off all of us will be.”58
57
58
U.S. Statutes at Large. 1950a. Vol. 63, pp. 208-213. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007, pp. 40.
53
In the end, the new mandate and direction given by NSC Directive 10/2 and the
freedom of operation gained from the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 would
eventually lead to the CIA's tragic involvement with covert and subversive operations
around the globe. These events would set numerous precedents for the CIA’s
involvement in illegal activities outside of its original mission and would make
intelligence analysis a secondary mission at best. The operations made possible by NSC
10/2 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 would also eventually lead to
numerous foreign policy disasters for the United States that severely damaged the
country’s influence and prestige internationally. Unfortunately, it would take over
twenty years before Congress realized its mistakes in giving the CIA too much power and
freedom of maneuver and stepped in to regulate the agency. By this time however, the
direction of the CIA had already been set along the path of covert and subversive
operations, where regrettably it still exists today.
54
Chapter 3
The Iranian coup of 1953
55
The Iranian Coup of 1953 is undoubtedly one of the seminal events in the history
of the CIA. The coup, which was the first and most successful of many similar covert
actions conducted by the CIA, would have a major impact on U.S. foreign policy during
the Cold War and numerous lasting consequences for Iran and the Middle East. The coup
was also unique in the fact that it set precedents for future CIA covert operations to drive
American foreign policy by quasi-legal means. The reign of the pro-American Shah
made possible by the coup was notable for its secularization, severe suppression of
political dissent, and the opulent lifestyle of the Shah in contrast to the poverty of most
Iranians. The abuses during the Shah's reign, particularly by his CIA trained secret police
the SAVAK, would also eventually lead to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. This event
transformed Iran from a constitutional monarchy into a fundamentalist Islamic republic
under the control of the anti-American Ayatollah Khomeini. Today, the consequences of
the Iranian Coup of 1953 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 it helped spawn still
continue to affect the international relations and foreign policy between the United States
and the countries of the Middle East, particularly Iran.
The CIA's involvement in planning and conducting the Iranian coup started in
1952 and was shaped by two main factors. First, the Eisenhower Administration was
deeply concerned about the continuing spread of communism across Europe and Asia,
particularly in light of the loss of China to the Communists in 1949 and North Korea’s
invasion of South Korea in 1950. Many policy makers in the United States saw the
Middle East as the next logical area for communism’s expansion, particularly Iran
56
because of its vast oil resources and its long border with the Soviet Union. Analysts at
the NSC, the State Department, and the CIA also concluded (wrongly) that Iran’s
socialist prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh was influenced by Tudeh, Iran’s
Communist party and that he would deliver Iran right into the hands of the Soviet Union
if he was not overthrown and a more stable, pro-Western government installed in his
place.
The second factor that led to America’s involvement with the Iranian coup
concerned America’s closest ally, Britain. Britain came out of World War II with a
shattered economy and a tenuous hold on its colonial empire in the face of the nationalist
movements across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The massive amounts of oil that
Iran provided Britain, at almost no cost due to inequitable trade treaties made during the
colonial area, was one of the few bright spots in Britain’s postwar economy. Naturally,
the start of a nationalist movement in Iran, along with Mossadegh’s threats to nationalize
the oil industry, created immense worry in the British government.
Britain owned the majority interest in Iran's oil industry at this time and the
Iranian government's nationalization its oil industry would have stripped control of the oil
industry, and its massive revenues from Britain. Britain's response to the attempted
nationalization was a series of embargos against Iranian goods, threatening military
maneuvers near Iran, and eventually a naval blockade of Iran itself, which devastated the
Iranian economy. Britain also challenged the nationalization and seizure of oil assets in
international courts, but when Britain lost its legal claim to the oil revenues, it decided to
resort to subversive means to get rid of Mossadegh. After failing in its own coup against
Mossadegh, Britain then tried to convince the United States that Communist influence
57
had taken over the Iranian government and pushed for a joint covert operation to
overthrow the democratically elected Mossadegh government.
This joint US-British covert operation used elements of the Iranian military,
religious leaders that had been bribed, and numerous street gangs backed by the CIA to
carry out the coup and reinstate the autocratic rule of the then current Shah, Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi. To the Eisenhower administration and the leaders of the CIA the coup was
a smashing success that showed not only the power and influence of the United States,
but also the very real dangers inherent if Communism continued to spread around the
world. The Eisenhower Administration justified the coup with these fears of Communist
subversion and the possibility that the Soviet Union would take control of Iran. This idea
would be a reoccurring theme during the Cold War that convinced the NSC, the CIA, and
several Presidents that covert and subversive operations were vital in order to contain or
defeat the spread of Communism directly supported by the Soviet Union. These ideas
and the accompanying fears of Communist subversion would also lead American policy
makers to overreact when countries did not overwhelmingly support the policies of the
United States and the West.
In many cases the countries that attracted American suspicions were socialist or
nationalist, but most remained part of the unaligned movement, and thus were only
moderately influenced by the Soviet Union. Countries like Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba
before the Bay of Pigs Invasion all fit this description, but unfortunately they all became
targets of zealous anti-Communist policy makers in the United States. In each of these
countries the United States used the CIA to overthrow the government in order to prevent
communist control and to guarantee America’s interests were secured. This is
58
particularly disturbing when considering the fact that the governments in Iran and
Guatemala were both democratically elected, which casts a poor light on the reputation of
America as the defender of democracy. The CIA was very successful in Iran and
Guatemala, which lead to a growing sense of sense of hubris, but ultimately its operations
failed miserably in Cuba in large part because of this same hubris.
A brief examination of the history of Iran is crucial to understanding the events
and personalities that led up to the 1953 coup and why America got involved in Iran in
the first place. What is now modern day Iran was in ancient times the center of the
Persian Empire, one of the most powerful dynastic empires in ancient history. At its
height, the Persian Empire stretched from Afghanistan, throughout the Middle East and
well into Greece. However, as with most empires, the Persian Empire eventually
crumbled from within and without as hostile states and barbarians outside of the empire
began to chip away at its territory, which in turn caused the Persian civilization to be
forever altered. The most significant of these outside influences was of course brought
by Arab invaders who conquered most of the empire by the start of the 7th century and
immediately converted the peoples of the empire to Islam. 59
The Arab Empire that ruled Persia lasted for several centuries before it too was
conquered by another series of invaders, first the Seljuk Turks, and then the Mongol’s
under Genghis Khan. Eventually the Mongol’s lost control to the Safavid dynasty under
its leader Ismail who proclaimed himself the first Shah, or king, in 1501. 60 Following the
chaotic conditions in the region, the dynasty that Ismail started only lasted two centuries
59
Pollack, Kenneth. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America. New York: Random
House, 2004, pp. 9.
60
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken:
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 25.
59
before it was also destroyed by invading forces. The Persian state was finally reunified in
1795 by the Qajars- a Turkish tribe from Central Asia, who defeated the last of these
invaders and ruled Iran as a dynasty until the early 20th century. 61 The Qajar dynasty is
significant because under its rule Iran entered the modern era and more importantly,
during the final century of its rule, Iran would be forever changed by the “Great Game”.
The “Great Game” was the political and military conflict between Russia and
Britain for control over Central Asia, Afghanistan and India. This conflict, which lasted
from the early 19th century until just before World War I, would quickly spill into Iran as
both nations sought to control the area for its resources and for its important access to
India. The defining moment for Iran in the conflict was the signing of the Definitive
Treaty of 1814 with Britain, in which Iran agreed to restrict all foreign troops from
entering the country or training the Iranian Army in return for British protection from
outside forces. 62 This treaty allowed the British to have considerable influence in Iran’s
politics and its economy, which very quickly led to a large portion of Iran’s wealth going
straight to Britain.
Eventually the massive debt and economical instability that this system produced
forced the Shah to grant more and more control over Iran’s economy and resources to the
British government and to private British companies. The most momentous of these
concessions occurred in 1901 when the Shah sold the “special and exclusive privilege to
obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, carry away and sell natural gas and
61
Pollack, Kenneth. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America. New York: Random
House, 2004, pp. 13.
62
Ibid, pp. 14.
60
petroleum for a term of sixty years” to a British financier. 63 Although oil had yet to be
discovered in Iran at this time, it would soon permanently change every aspect of Iranian
society and make the country a priceless asset to the Britain Empire.
The increasingly poor economic conditions throughout Iran combined with the
excesses of the Shah eventually led to massive uprisings and riots at the beginning of the
20th century. By 1906 the entire country seemed on the edge of revolution, which forced
the shah to agree to the formation of a parliament, known as the Majlis to give the people
of Iran limited control of the government. The Majlis quickly created a constitution
based on Belgium’s (which was considered the most progressive in Europe) and set about
changing Iran into a modern state with a constitutional monarchy. 64 However, the Majlis
were unable to alter Britain’s political and economic control over the country, in large
part because the Shah was essentially a puppet of the British government by this time due
to his massive debts and the British influence within the Iranian Army.
The discovery of oil in 1908 and the subsequent formation of the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company in 1909 would be landmark events in the history of Iran. 65 Once massive
amounts of oil began to flow, along with substantial profits during the following decade,
Iran became more than just another piece in the Great Game between Russia and Britain.
Iran was now a crucial resource that fueled the future success of the entire British
Empire. As the British statesman Lord Curzon succinctly put it years later, “the Allies
63
Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1994, pp. 8.
64
Pollack, Kenneth. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America. New York: Random
House, 2004, pp. 21.
65
Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1994, pp. 12.
61
[in World War I] floated to victory on a wave of oil.” 66 To protect this resource and to
ensure that control over it remained in British hands, the British government was
prepared to go to great lengths.
Along these lines the British government used its influence over the Shah to force
him to sign the Anglo-Persian Agreement in 1919. This agreement essentially gave
Britain the power to train and lead Iran’s army, direct most aspects of its economy, and to
construct and manage the country’s roads, telephone lines, and railways. 67 Britain
counted on the authority of the Shah, along with considerable bribes behind the scenes, to
convince the Iranian parliament to automatically pass the agreement. However, many in
the Majlis vehemently opposed the agreement as an outright attack on its authority to
govern Iran and blamed the Shah for selling out to the British once again. In the end the
agreement did pass, thanks in large part to the continuing pressure on the Shah and the
Iranian government by Britain, and due to the presence of a large British Army in Iran.
The controversy over the Anglo-Persian Agreement did not end with its passage
however. The obvious inequities within the agreement and its effects on not only Iran’s
economy but also on its society as a whole caused an outpouring of nationalist sentiment
and animosity against the British and the authority of the Shah. The rise in nationalism in
Iran mirrored the sweeping changes occurring internationally in the aftermath of World
War I, as numerous colonies sought to free themselves from the yoke of colonialism.
Into this political firestorm arose one of the most powerful and influential figures in
Iranian history, Mohammad Mossadegh.
66
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken:
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 50.
67
Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1994, pp. 23.
62
Mossadegh, an aristocrat by birth who earned his law degree in Switzerland,
began to view the British influence in Iran, particularly on its economy as the main
reason Iran remained a backward nation compared to the nations of Europe. After first
serving as the Iranian Minister of Finance starting in the 1920s, Mossadegh later ran for a
seat in the Majlis in 1924, which he easily won, setting up his spectacular political
career. 68 From his position in the Iranian parliament, Mossadegh immediately began to
attack the economic policies of Britain, with specific emphasis on the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company. He also made many enemies in Iran with his brash style and insistence on
attacking corruption in the Majlis and in the rich, landowning class.
Mossadegh’s cousin described him best saying:
To his mind the parliament was the only mouthpiece of the people of Iran. No matter
how rigged the election or how corrupt its members, it was the only body that did not
depend for its power either on outside influence or on the [royal] court, but on the
authority of the constitution. The Majils became his soapbox. Elected to it time and
again by the people of Tehran, he used it to denounce the misconduct of the British and
the Russians, and later the Americans. When he said, ‘The Iranian himself is the best
person to manage his house,’ he was stating not only a conviction but a policy that he was
to pursue with unwavering purpose until his picture appeared on the cover of Time
magazine and he had thoroughly shaken the foundations of the world’s oil establishment.
Distinguished, highly emotional, and every inch the aristocrat, he believed so totally in
his own country that his words reached out and touched the common man. Mossadegh
was Iran’s first genuinely popular leader, and he knew it. 69
Mossadegh’s fame and political career seemed limitless but he soon ran into an
obstacle that even he could not surmount at the time. Mohammad Reza Khan was born
to a common family in a remote area of northern Iran. As a teenager he joined the
famous Cossack Brigade, the country’s only well-trained, modern army unit, which had
68
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken:
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 57.
69
Farmanfarmaian, Manucher., and Roxanne Farmanfarmaian. Blood and Oil: Inside the Shah’s Iran. New
York: Modern Library, 1999, pp. 166-170.
63
been founded by Russian officers and served as a private guard for the Qajar dynasty. 70
Reza would quickly use the fame and power that he earned as a member of the Cossack
Brigade to propel himself to even greater heights.
The anger against the shah and his disastrous economic policies continued to
escalate during Reza’s time in the Cossack Brigade. Due to Reza’s power within the
brigade, the British decided to use Reza as a means to get rid of the current prime
minister and replace him with someone under their control, who would unquestionably
support their policies. In 1921, with considerable backing from the British, Reza led over
2,000 troops into Tehran and promptly arrested the prime minister and the entire cabinet
and forced the Shah to accept a British selected prime minister as well as naming him the
commander of the Cossack Brigade. 71 With this move the British thought they had
gained total control over the Iranian government, but they were sorely mistaken.
Within months of the coup, Reza forced the British backed prime minister out of
power, and then persuaded the Shah to name him as minister of war. From this position,
Reza gathered even more power and influence over Iranian politics and the shah. In 1923
the Shah named Reza as the prime minister and soon after Reza suggested the Shah take
an extended trip to Europe for “health reasons”. Not surprisingly, the shah quickly
agreed, which made Reza the prime minister, army commander, and effective head of the
Iranian state, at least temporarily. 72
In late 1925 Reza Khan showed his ultimate motive when he made his move to
become the permanent head of the Iranian state. The British already backed Reza Khan
70
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken:
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 40.
71
Pollack, Kenneth. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America. New York: Random
House, 2004, pp. 27.
72
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken:
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 41.
64
because of his pledge to support their financial claims, and now his supporters in the
Majlis presented a bill that would end the Qajar dynasty and establish a new dynasty, the
Pahlavi, starting with Reza Khan. 73 Mossadegh naturally opposed the measure but Reza
Khan’s expanding control in the Majlis, combined with his support from the Iranian
Army and the British government led to the measure being passed. In April 1926,
ominously following in the tradition of Napoleon, Reza Khan (now Reza Shah) crowned
himself as the first king of the Pahlavi dynasty, and his regime was quickly recognized by
the British government. 74
With Reza firmly in charge of all aspects of the Iranian government, Mossadegh
found himself on the wrong side of the political spectrum, particularly after he had
directly challenged Reza taking the throne. Mossadegh retreated from politics for a time,
but fortunately Reza’s reign would only last fifteen years. Reza’s ties to the fascist
movements of the 1930s eventually led him to openly declare neutrality during World
War II, although in reality he supported Germany and allowed hundreds of German
agents to operate in Iran. 75 The Allies refused to accept this situation though, and they
invaded Iran early in the war and demanded that Reza cut all ties to Germany. Reza
refused and instead abdicated his throne in late 1941, which made his son, Mohammad
Reza the new Shah and left Iran once again open to British control. 76
With Reza gone, Mossadegh returned to the Majlis and immediately began
fighting against the foreign interests that he believed were destroying Iran. 1949 was a
73
Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1994, pp. 27-28.
74
Ibid, pp. 28.
75
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken:
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 45.
76
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Press, 1979,
pp. 30.
65
landmark year for both Iran and Mossadegh as the political party known as the National
Front was formed under his direction and leadership. The National Front was composed
of a coalition of urban middle and lower class nationalists, socialists, liberals, merchants,
various religious groups, and even some lower class toughs, who were associated with
the party, although not officially part of it. 77 The National Front directly opposed
Britain’s influence over the Iranian economy, particularly its controlling ownership in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The party and Mossadegh himself also came into conflict
with the new Shah over control of the government and over the Shah’s economic
policies, which were clearly following guidance from Britain.
Mossadegh and his National Front Party continued to gain more and more
prestige and power as a result of their attacks on the policies of Britain. In early 1951
Mossadegh decided that the time was right to legally challenge British control in Iran,
and he subsequently submitted a bill in the Majlis that called for the nationalization of
Iran’s oil industry. Almost simultaneously Mossadegh was also nominated to be the next
prime minister, which he astutely agreed to accept only when the Majlis approved the
resolution to nationalize the oil industry, which they did the same day. 78 The passage of
the bill was a shock to both the Shah, who was not consulted before it was signed into
law, and especially to Britain, which now found its lucrative oil revenues in serious
danger of coming to an end.
In response the British government immediately enacted a three part strategy to
regain their control over the oil industry and hopefully to remove Mossadegh and his
77
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 Coup D’ Etat in Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies.
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug 1987) : pp. 262.
78
Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1994, pp. 92.
66
National Front from power in the Majlis. The first part consisted of several legal
challenges both in Iran and abroad with the International Court of Justice. These
challenges all tried to hold Iran to the original oil agreements made from 1901-1906 that
gave them total control of the oil assets for sixty years. However, Mossadegh rejected all
of Britain’s attempts at addressing the matter in Iranian or international courts, which
then caused Britain to refuse to negotiate any further with Mossadegh and instead asked
the International Court, the United Nations, and the United States to arbitrate their
dispute with Iran. 79
Britain’s second line of attack on Iran’s decision to nationalize their oil industry
involved weakening Mossadegh’s domestic support by imposing various economic
sanctions on Iran. These sanctions included cutting off British exports of steel, iron,
sugar, and oil processing equipment to Iran, as well as threatening to take legal action
against any countries that bought oil from the newly established National Iranian Oil
Company. 80 Britain then pressured most of the other nations in Europe as well as the
United States to discourage their oil workers from accepting job offers by the Iranian
government, which brought oil production to a halt. Britain also put considerable
pressure on Mossadegh and his supporters by conducting military maneuvers in the area
and giving the appearance of preparing a naval blockade by moving several navy ships
just off the Iranian coast.
Britain’s third and most important strategy to regaining control of the Iranian oil
industry involved their attempts to remove Mossadegh from his position as prime
minister. Britain decided that covert, subversive action was the best method to achieve
79
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 Coup D’ Etat in Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies.
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug 1987) : pp. 263.
80
Ibid, pp. 263.
67
this and used a network of Iranian politicians, businessmen, army officers, and religious
leaders that were either pro-British or could be swayed with enough cash to support
British aims. 81 With these groups undermining Mossadegh’s support in Tehran and
within the Majlis and the continuing British pressure on the Shah to dismiss Mossadegh,
cracks began to appear in Mossadegh supporters, particularly within the National Front.
In July 1952 tensions between the Shah and Mossadegh came to a boil and Mossadegh
resigned as prime minister.
Unfortunately for the British however, their scheme backfired when a series of
massive demonstrations by Mossadegh supporters occurred in Tehran and other large
cities, which sent the country into chaos and swept Mossadegh back into the prime
minister’s office in less than a week. 82 Even worse for the British, Mossadegh found out
about most of their plans to unseat him and immediately began purging those pro-British
elements in the government and in the military. Once he realized the amount of support
the British had given the Iranian subversives and how the British had been controlling
these operations from their embassy, Mossadegh furiously broke diplomatic relations
with Britain and kicked the entire embassy staff out of the country in October 1952. 83
This effectively ended any chance the British had for kicking Mossadegh out of office
and appeared to solidify his position as prime minister.
With the British essentially shut out of Iran at this point, their only recourse left
for dealing with Mossadegh was through the United States. From the British standpoint
though, America’s position on Iran up to this point was neutral at best and pro-
81
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 Coup D’ Etat in Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies.
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug 1987) : pp. 263-264.
82
Ibid, pp. 265.
83
Ibid, pp. 266.
68
Mossadegh at worst. The Truman administration had repeatedly refused to support
British claims to Iranian oil and their plans for a coup against Mossadegh as well.
However, political changes were about to occur in America that would favor the British
plans for Iran. In less than a year, a new president would be in office and the British
would completely change America’s outlook on Iran and Mossadegh in order to suit their
plans through deft political manipulation and good old-fashioned propaganda.
When examining America’s involvement with Iran several key points stand out.
First, the Truman administration while deeply concerned about communist influence in
Iran, still refused to support the British position on Iran. President Truman had tried to
use the State Department as a mediator between Iran and Britain, but had failed because
Britain refused to accept losing control of the Iranian oil industry. The United Nations
had even less success as a mediator between the two nations. Britain’s early tries at
linking Mossadegh and the National Front to the Communists also made little headway
with the Truman administration.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson summed up the views of the Truman
administration on the subject of Mossadegh when he said, “Mossadegh represented a
very deep revolution, nationalist in character, which was sweeping not only Iran but the
whole Middle East.” 84 Much to Britain’s dismay, Acheson would later go on to say, “If
Mossadegh collapsed and affairs in Persia became chaotic, American public opinion
would want to know what we had been doing to stop this.” In other words, to Acheson
there was no other alternative but to secure Mossadegh’s political position by ending
84
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken:
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 92.
69
Britain’s attempts to strangle Iran’s economy and by concurrently convincing the British
to reach an agreement with him on the oil dispute. 85
While the Truman administration seemed to openly support Iran’s slow but steady
movement towards democracy through Mossadegh, the CIA prepared for other
alternatives. As early as the late 1940s, the CIA had been conducting various covert
activities in Iran in preparation for a future conflict with the Soviet Union. One of these
covert operations, codenamed BEDAMN, had been started in 1948 to counter communist
influence Iran through the use of propaganda and political action groups. As Mark
Gasiorowski points out, “the political arm of BEDAMN involved direct attacks on Soviet
allies in Iran and so-called black operations designed to turn Iranians against the Tudeh.
Attacks on Soviet allies usually involved hiring street gangs to break up Tudeh rallies,
while the black operations included the infiltration of agents provocateurs into Tudeh
demonstrations to provoke outrageous attacks on mosques in the name of Tudeh.” 86
While operation BEDAMN was originally meant to be used against the
communists in Iran, during the Eisenhower administration it would instead be used
against Mossadegh and his supporters. In the months leading up to the coup, the CIA
used the BEDAMN network to undermine Mossadegh’s support and authority within the
National Front, which quickly brought the political organization to the breaking point.
The CIA also used the BEDAMN network and Iranian agents formerly used by the
British to pay groups of Iranian thugs to cause mayhem during political rallies, which
made the Iranian people lose confidence in the ability of Mossadegh’s government to
85
Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1994, pp. 246.
86
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 Coup D’ Etat in Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies.
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug 1987) : pp. 268-269.
70
maintain order in the street. As the time came closer to conducting the coup, the CIA
station chief in Tehran, Roger Goiran was ordered by CIA Director Allen Dulles to use
the network, which at this time consisted of over one hundred agents with an annual
budget of one million dollars to directly support the coup against Mossadegh. 87
Goiran thought that this was a huge mistake however, and warned rather
intuitively that if the United States carried out the coup, Iranians would never forgive
them and the results would be disastrous for American interests in Iran and the Middle
East. Goiran’s opposition to the coup was so strong that he was recalled to Washington
and then removed as CIA station chief. 88 Not surprisingly, there was little to no open
dissention to the coup at the CIA after Goiran was fired.
Outside of operation BEDAMN, America’s direct involvement in Iran really
began after the British were expelled from the country in 1952. Of course, Iran had been
on the radar screen of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman early on, but under the
Eisenhower administration the United States stepped up its interference with Iranian
affairs. Naturally, the CIA was the Eisenhower administration’s main tool in influencing
and eventually directing American foreign policy in regards to Iran.
Undoubtedly, Dwight Eisenhower’s election in 1953 would be the turning point in
the Iranian crisis. Eisenhower and most of his administration disagreed with how
President Truman had dealt with the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold War,
and their opinion on Iran was no different. Eisenhower decided early on to take a much
harder stance against the Soviet Union and actively fight Communism anywhere it was
87
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken:
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 164.
88
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007, pp. 85.
71
found. Following this line of thought, keeping Iran from falling into the Soviet sphere of
influence became a much more important priority for the United States.
Sensing a change in priority for the new administration, Britain immediately
began to reiterate their view that Mossadegh was a Communist or at the very least
controlled and influenced by the Communists. This assertion then became central to the
British and later American arguments for a coup to remove Mossadegh from power. This
view was also supported by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the Director of the
CIA Allen Dulles who considered Mossadegh a Communist. Both men quickly
convinced President Eisenhower of Mossadegh’s political orientation and he authorized
the coup without reservation.
However, most of the mid-level State Department officials covering Iran and the
CIA’s Iran analysts did not support the reasoning behind the coup against Mossadegh.
They correctly surmised that the Tudeh party was weak and that it had little chance of
taking over the Iranian government. The Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern
Affairs, Henry Byroade and America’s ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson also opposed
the coup because they considered Mossadegh an ardent nationalist, not a Communist.
They also did not believe the NSC’s assessment that the country was in danger of
collapse because of economic and Communist subversion.89 In fact, most of the
assumptions that the CIA and the NSC made regarding Tudeh and its connections to
Mossadegh were incorrect and had come from British sources with an obvious bias.
The truth was, in the early 1950s, that Tudeh was a fairly strong organization
made up of about 20,000 urban-based working class Iranians, 8,000 of whom were
89
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 Coup D’ Etat in Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies.
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug 1987) : pp. 276.
72
located in Iran’s capital Tehran. 90 Tudeh also had connections within the Iranian Army
and strong ties to the country’s largest labor organization, the Central Council of the
United Trade Unions of Iranian Workers and Toilers. The Tudeh Party’s connection with
the Majlis was a little more intricate though, as certain blocks with the parliament had
close ties to Tudeh, while others opposed their policies and tried to distance themselves
from the part as much as possible. Mohammad Mossadegh’s relationship with the Tudeh
Party was complex because on one hand he was not a Communist and he never cared for
the group’s political goals, but he also found himself needing their support from time to
time in fighting British control over the economy and the Shah’s pro-British policies. 91
Tudeh’s ties to the Soviet Union, as well as Soviet control over their actions and
organization was also nowhere near as absolute as the West surmised. Certainly, Tudeh
had ties to the Soviet Union, but international communism was never a major force in
Iran. Also, the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 had left the Soviet Union in political
turmoil, which effectively prevented much direction from coming out of the Kremlin for
months. In retrospect, there was very little threat of the Soviet Union directly, or
indirectly assisting Tudeh in seizing control in Iran and Tudeh’s link to Mossadegh was
tenuous at best.
With the network of former British henchmen, thugs, and bribed mullahs from
Operation BEDAMN stirring up trouble in the streets of Iran, the CIA began to plan the
operational side of the coup almost from the moment Eisenhower was elected. Although
Mossadegh was still firmly entrenched in power at the end of 1952, there were noticeable
90
Behrooz, Maziar. "Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran." International Journal of Middle East
Studies. Vol. 33, No. 3 (Aug 2001) : pp. 364.
91
Pollack, Kenneth. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America. New York: Random
House, 2004, pp. 53.
73
cracks in the National Front, primarily between the religious leaders and Mossadegh, but
also between some of the trade union leaders and Mossadegh supporters. Operation
BEDAMN caused some of these political disputes, but most came from the simple fact
that the National Front was such a large grouping of political opposites that rivalries were
bound to occur. As Tehran and several other large cities in Iran experienced
demonstrations for and against Mossadegh, the CIA continued to work behind the scenes
gathering allies and setting the conditions for the forthcoming coup.
In 1953, just weeks after Eisenhower’s inauguration leaders from Britain and the
United States met to discuss their plans regarding the situation in Iran. British policy
makers had already thoroughly convinced the Dulles brothers that Mossadegh had to go
because of his ties to the Communists, and they in turn convinced the President. The two
sides then decided that the Americans would lead the operation, now named Operation
AJAX, but that it would be a joint CIA-British Intelligence (MI6) operation on the
ground. This really meant that America and the CIA would foot the bill for the entire
operation, as well as run the operation inside Iran, while the British would provide
intelligence on the situation in Iran and provide support from outside the country.
The coup consisted of four main parts. The first was already well underway
through Operation BEDAMN. As already stated, the main goal of the CIA in this part of
the operation was to use propaganda and other political actions against Mossadegh and
his supporters in the Majlis. The second part involved using political figures that
opposed Mossadegh, particularly mullahs from rival groups, as well opponents in the
Iranian government to openly attack Mossadegh and his policies. The third, and most
important part of the plan, required the Shah to fire Mossadegh from his position as prime
74
minister and replace him with a former pro-British general, currently controlled by the
CIA. The fourth and final part required the support of high-level Iranian Army officers,
particularly the commanders of key units in and around Tehran. 92
Kermit Roosevelt, the chief of the CIA’s Near East and South Asia division, was
chosen to be the operational leader of AJAX by CIA Director Dulles. Roosevelt, a
former member of the OSS, grandson of President Teddy Roosevelt and cousin to FDR,
was the logical choice because of his experience in the Middle East and his connection to
MI6. 93 Roosevelt totally believed in the Communist threat to Iran and Mossadegh’s
connection to the Communists. During his initial operations brief to the NSC he summed
up his analysis of the situation in Iran saying, “The Soviet threat is indeed genuine,
dangerous, and imminent. At this moment time seems to favor the Russians and their
unwitting ally, Dr. Mossadegh.” He went on the say, “The Iranian Army and the Iranian
people will back the Shah against Mossadegh and, most especially, against the
Russians.” 94
Roosevelt then gave his opinion on a very important point, one that almost
seemed lost on the NSC and the British, but definitely a point that would come back to
haunt the CIA in future covert operations. Roosevelt cautioned, “One point is central:
This can only be a joint undertaking, with the fullest cooperation from Iranians under the
confident, enthusiastic leadership of the Shah himself. Unless we can achieve such an
understanding and commonality of purpose, the success we seek can never be
92
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 Coup D’ Etat in Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies.
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug 1987) : pp. 272.
93
Ambrose, Stephen E. Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. New York: Doubleday,
1981, pp. 190.
94
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Press, 1979,
pp. 11-12.
75
achieved.” 95 In other words, Roosevelt plainly realized that the coup would only succeed
if the Iranian people were fully behind it, meaning it had to be done with the blessing of
the Shah or the results would be disastrous. Unfortunately for the United States, the CIA
would frequently make a habit in the future of conducting operations without considering
the consequences on all countries involved.
Correctly realizing that the Shah was the key to the success of the entire
operations, Roosevelt immediately began to court the Shah in order to gain his
acceptance of the operation. Mohammad Reza Shah was 32 years old at the time of the
coup and had been the Shah since his famous father abdicated in 1941, but he was not the
bold and aggressive man his father was. The Shah was considered by most to be naïve
and timid and as one British diplomat described him “He hates making decisions and
cannot be relied on to stick to them when taken. He just has no moral courage and
succumbs easily to fear.” 96 Kermit Roosevelt saw him in a different light though
describing him as “cautions, reserved, quietly inscrutable.” 97
Roosevelt planned to immediately meet with the Shah when he got to Iran in
order to convince him to go along with the coup, including the most important part,
issuing the Firmans or royal decrees that dismissed Mossadegh from his post as prime
minister and replaced him with a CIA controlled Army officer. The legality of these
decrees was questionable since it was not clear whether the Shah had the power to
dismiss the prime minister or not, but the CIA considered the decrees a vital part of the
coup that gave it at least the semblance of legitimacy. However, before Roosevelt met
95
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Press, 1979,
pp. 12.
96
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken:
John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 6.
97
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Press, 1979,
pp. 30.
76
with the Shah he arranged for another visitor to wear down the Shah’s resistance to the
coup and give him a little courage for the days ahead.
Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s twin sister was the polar opposite of the Shah. She
was loud, argumentative, and she frequently lectured her brother on how he failed to live
up to his duties as the Shah. Princess Ashraf was at first cool to the suggestion that she
talk to her brother about the coup. Her mind was quickly changed however, with gifts of
cash and a mink coat provided by an operative from MI6. 98 The princess then flew to
Iran and met with her brother, although she was only partially successful in convincing
him to support the coup.
Roosevelt knew the Shah was still not fully convinced of the success of a coup,
but he was determined to change his mind at any cost. The two men met almost every
night at midnight in order to keep Roosevelt’s identity and America’s involvement in Iran
secret. After several nights of explaining the plan to the Shah and pressing how
important the coup was to the United States, the Shah finally agreed to issue the Firmans
that the entire plan hinged on. The Shah’s one concession however, was that he and
Queen Soraya would leave Tehran and temporarily hideout at a family house on the
Caspian Sea in case the coup failed. The Shah said, “If by any chance things go wrong,
the Empress and I will take our plane straight to Baghdad. From there we can look the
situation over and decide to what place we should return.” 99 This cowardly suggestion
by the Shah did not bode well for the coup, which depended on at least the outward
display of his leadership in Tehran, but the Shah would not budge and Roosevelt had to
accept his terms.
98
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007, pp. 88.
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Press, 1979,
pp. 161.
99
77
Regardless of the Shah’s location during the coup, with the Firmans in hand
Roosevelt immediate set events in motion in August 1953. The commander of the Shah’s
Imperial Guard, Colonel Nasiri had been chosen because of his unquestionable loyalty to
the Shah to be the one who delivered the Firmans dismissing Mossadegh to the prime
minister in person. 100 He would then arrest Mossadegh and the coup would be complete,
and hopefully bloodless. Unfortunately for the CIA and for Nasiri himself however,
news of the impending coup had leaked out and Mossadegh was prepared with his own
loyal military supporters. When Nasiri arrived at Mossadegh’s house on the night of
August 15 to arrest him, Mossadegh was already gone and Nasiri was the one who was
arrested by forces under the Iranian Army Chief of Staff. 101
The next morning Mossadegh himself announced on Radio Tehran that there had
been a coup attempt organized the previous night by the Shah and “foreign elements” that
he did not identify, and that it had been crushed. 102 Roosevelt, who was listening
naturally thought the coup was a failure at this point and his superiors at the CIA ordered
him to leave the country as soon as possible. The Shah was also listening to the
broadcast too and immediately fled to Baghdad, which seemed to effectively put an end
to Operation AJAX. However, what neither Roosevelt, Mossadegh, or the Shah realized
was that there would soon be an astonishing turn events that would give the coup a new
life.
After the early morning announcement by Mossadegh of the coup’s failure,
Mossadegh’s Minister of Foreign Affairs made a broadcast where he made a savage and
100
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 Coup D’ Etat in Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies.
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug 1987) : pp. 273.
101
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Press,
1979, pp. 173-175.
102
Wilber, Donald. Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952August 1953. Nottingham: Spokesman, 2006, pp. 41-44.
78
lengthy attack on the Shah for his policies and for his participation in the coup. Soon
after an announcement was also made that Mossadegh had dissolved the Majlis. These
statements and actions by Mossadegh enraged the people and convinced many that
Mossadegh was going to abolish the monarchy and take over the country. 103 Tehran was
then thrown into chaos, as massive demonstrations for and against Mossadegh occurred
in the streets.
Witnessing these demonstrations and seeing a glimmer of hope for the coup,
Roosevelt once again started planning to oust Mossadegh. Realizing the inherent power
that the Firmans in his possession held, Roosevelt had numerous copies of them made
and then distributed throughout Tehran using his network of Iranian agents. The Firmans
and the accompanying propaganda against Mossadegh enraged tens of thousands of
Iranians in Tehran and numerous demonstrations occurred in the streets in support of the
Shah and in anger against Mossadegh. The decrees also caught the attention of many in
the Iranian Army, who had always been traditionally loyal to the Shah. Without his
knowledge, the end of Mossadegh’s government was now very near.
Now Roosevelt put his final plan in motion. For two days he would use his
Iranian network to create more demonstrations against Mossadegh, followed by other
demonstrations for Mossadegh, which would set loose numerous destructive mobs on the
Tehran. Then at the crucial moment when anarchy reached its peak on the third day,
Roosevelt’s agents would clear the streets of demonstrators and use his contracts in the
Army and the police to storm government buildings, defeat the remaining Mossadgh
103
Wilber, Donald. Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952August 1953. Nottingham: Spokesman, 2006, pp. 43-44.
79
supporters, and finally capture Mossadegh himself. 104 Mossadegh was completely taken
by surprise, particularly in light of his “victory” against the previous coup only days
before and could do little to stop the events. The final stages of the operations went
exactly as Roosevelt planned and on August 19th, 1953 the coup became final as
Mossadegh was forced from power and a new prime minister put in his place. 105
With Mossadegh’s removal complete, the Shah returned to Iran to take control
that he would hold for over twenty-five years. Roosevelt also returned home a hero to
both the British and the Americans, but neither Roosevelt nor either of the two countries
behind the coup truly understood what the operation would mean to Iran. The coup,
which amazingly succeeded on the second attempt would forever change Iran, and in
many ways the future direction of American foreign policy as well. Even with
Mossadegh gone, Britain’s power and influence was forever gone from Iran as well.
Despite the victory, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would lose its monopoly over
Iranian oil and instead Iran’s oil industry would be split between the United States,
Britain, and several countries in Europe. The coup’s success also meant the end of Tudeh
and Soviet influence in Iran.
In the final analysis of the events, decisions, and ultimate consequences of the
Iranian coup several interesting points stand out. First, the Cold War between the United
States and the Soviet Union unquestionably played a major role in the events in Iran, but
there were also other forces at work that had nothing to do with the Cold War. The
lingering effects of colonialism and its modern offshoot, neocolonialism was also a major
104
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror.
Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2003, pp. 169.
105
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Press,
1979, pp. 190-193.
80
factor that led to the coup in Iran. The British Empire’s objective of maintaining its
control over Iran’s oil wealth was a feeble attempt at holding on to the legacy of
colonialism, but the time had already passed on that archaic system. Britain could have
avoided a confrontation with Mossadegh over Iran’s oil if they had realized just how
much the world changed after World War II. Unfortunately, they were unable or more
likely unwilling to accept that colonialism and their empire was finished.
On the American side the Iranian coup happened mainly because of America’s
fear of monolithic Communism trying to take over the world. Few policy makers in the
United States realized that during the Cold War the Soviet Union was not in absolute
control of all international Communist movements, and certainly not in control of
Communism in Asia. During the Eisenhower administration, the President, Secretary of
State Dulles and CIA Director Dulles became totally fixated on Communist designs
against the West and it quickly clouded their judgment and led to decisions like
supporting the coup in Iran. Of course, Mohammad Mossadegh did not help matters with
his stubborn refusal to negotiate with the British and his lack of understanding at how
much the United States feared a Communist take over in Iran. His inability to adapt to
the changing political conditions at home and internationally and his lack of pragmatism
would be a major factor that led to his defeat as well.
In retrospect, America’s decision to conduct a coup against a democratically
elected government seems totally out of place with traditional American ideals. America
should have been a staunch ally to Iran in light of the country’s slow but steady path to
democracy. The United States has always prided itself as the champion of democracy
and an enemy of tyrants, but instead we squashed democracy right when it looked like it
81
would flourish in Iran and supported a dictator-the Shah for over two decades. At first
glimpse it’s hard to fathom how President Eisenhower, who led America’s war effort
against the tyranny of Nazi Germany in Europe, could support another tyrant in Iran. On
further examination though, it’s apparent that the events of the Cold War drastically
changed American foreign policy as much as they altered the perceptions and decision
making of numerous presidents.
At the CIA, the overwhelming success of Operation AJAX had an instant and farreaching effect on the future decision making of the agency. The operation was the first
time that the CIA conducted a coup against a democratically elected government, but it
would not be the last. A year after the Iranian coup, the CIA would conduct a second
successful coup in Guatemala against the democratically elected government of President
Arbenz as well. The success of the Iranian coup started the ball rolling though, and
convinced the CIA that it was capable of almost anything. It also made the agency
become a central part of American foreign policy during the Cold War. Along this line
of thought, covert action came to be seen as a cheap and effective way to drive American
foreign policy and shape the course of world events. Unfortunately, this would be a
lesson that continues to plague the CIA and the United States, up to the present day.
82
Chapter 4
The Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961
83
In many ways, the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961 represents the high
watermark of the CIA’s power and influence, and a turning point in relations between the
CIA and the presidency. The Bay of Pigs Invasion is also an example of some of the
worst aspects of American foreign policy and governmental decision making of the
twentieth century. The failed invasion showed the numerous mistakes made by the
agencies created with the National Security Act of 1947, including the NSC, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA. These agencies all became part of the national security state
that formed in the United States after World War II, and their mission to assist the
president in the conduct of American foreign policy was crucial to the national security of
the United States. Unfortunately, the poor decisions these agencies made in regards to
Cuba endangered US national security and directly led to the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs.
While each of these agencies shares at least part of the blame for the failed
invasion, without question the largest share of the blame belongs to the CIA. The CIA’s
planning for the operation was flawed from the start, due in large part to several incorrect
assumptions about the situation in Cuba and Castro’s ties to the Soviet Union. These
assumptions influenced the foreign policy decisions of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations in regards to Cuba and the Soviet Union and helped fuel the growing
Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The CIA’s execution
at the Bay of Pigs was also a disaster as the poorly trained army it used to invade Cuba
was quickly defeated due to lack of supplies and the refusal by President Kennedy to
84
support them with the US military. The sloppy execution of the invasion from a military
standpoint was also made possible by the of the lack of guidance to the president and lack
of assistance to the CIA by the Joint Chiefs, who quickly acquiesced to the CIA’s plans
even though they believed the invasion had little chance for success.
The frequent failure of the CIA to collect and then correctly analyze intelligence
on the decisions and actions of enemies and allies alike would be a constant problem
throughout the Cold War and beyond, and highlights the struggle that continues today
within the CIA between intelligence analysts and supporters of covert operations. In
particular, the numerous failures by the CIA in providing accurate and timely intelligence
to the president on matters of national security would be a major contributing factor to
several disastrous foreign policy decisions for the United States during the Cold War. In
the case of Cuba, the lack of intelligence on the internal political and domestic situation
in Cuba, specifically the amount of popular support Castro had from the Cuban people,
would be one of the primary reasons the Bay of Pigs Invasion failed miserably.
Since its creation in 1947, the CIA had enjoyed almost unrestricted freedom in
planning and conducting its operations and Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy
in most instances trusted the competency and decisions of the agency without hesitation.
This pattern of implicitly trusting the agency’s competence without much oversight into
its operations would lead to numerous instances of CIA involvement in illegal activities
outside of its original mandate throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Eventually, these illegal
activities lead to several high profile operations that ended in foreign policy disasters for
the United States, such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. As previously stated, the failures in
planning and executing the Bay of Pigs Invasion were numerous, but in many ways the
85
origins of the invasion start not with the ascension of Castro to power, but instead with
the National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Both of the National Security Act and the Central Intelligence Agency Act set the
CIA down the path towards its focus on covert paramilitary operations and away from its
original mandate as an agency started to collect and then analyze intelligence from
around the world. With the new mandate directed by these acts, and under the leadership
of several paramilitary focused directors and senior leaders, the CIA would embark on
several infamous operations aimed at overthrowing unfavorable governments throughout
the 1950s in Guatemala, Iran, and most famously in Cuba. The fact that the first two of
these governments were democratically elected gave the CIA little pause and would set a
precedent for the CIA in future operations as well. Consequently, since Presidents
Eisenhower and then Kennedy authorized the CIA to conduct these operations, both men
bear the ultimate responsibility for these actions by the CIA.
The Bay of Pigs Invasion, which was planned under the original orders of
President Eisenhower, and then executed by the CIA during the Kennedy administration,
was an attempt to topple the rapidly socialist leaning Castro regime in Cuba. In order to
maintain the illusion that there was no American involvement in the invasion, which was
deemed crucial by American policy makers and particularly President Kennedy, the plan
called for the use of anti-Castro Cuban exiles and no direct American participation in the
actual invasion. President Kennedy believed that by emphasizing “plausible deniability”,
or the misguided belief that by using Cuban exiles in the invasion force, and by limiting
direct U.S. military involvement, the invasion could not be directly linked to the
86
American government. 106 “Plausible deniability” would cloud President Kennedy’s
decisions throughout the operation and be a major factor in its failure. President
Kennedy’s belief in “plausible deniability” would come in large part from the advice and
analysis from the CIA on the domestic and military situation in Cuba. The CIA’s
insistence that Castro’s power and support in Cuba was weak, along with their
assessment that a limited attack on the island without the full backing of the American
military could succeed, would be one of the primary reasons President Kennedy put so
much faith in the ultimate success of the approach of “plausible deniability”.
Ultimately, the invasion turned out to be a spectacular failure that ended in the
defeat and capture of the entire invasion force. Castro, the Soviet Union, and indeed the
entire world also saw the obvious role that the United States had played in the invasion.
This in turn caused serious damage to American prestige and influence throughout the
world, specifically in Latin America and the rest of the Third World. Castro’s apparently
easy victory over “imperialist” America would also bolster his domestic and foreign
support, make him the champion of revolutionary socialism throughout the Third World,
and most ominously for the security of the United States, push Castro to closely align
Cuba politically and militarily with the Soviet Union. This alliance would lead to the
most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, which almost
ended in nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The colossal failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion can be directly attributed to three
factors: 1) incompetent planning and execution by the CIA, 2) President Kennedy’s
insistence on adhering to the principal of “plausible deniability”, and 3) the almost
106
Kornbluh, Peter, ed. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998. pp 2.
87
complete lack of intelligence on the internal political and domestic situation in Cuba,
specifically the amount of popular support Castro had from the Cuban people. Any one
of these factors by itself would have been more than enough to severely reduce the
invasion’s chance for success, but the combination of all three unquestionably doomed
the entire operation to failure. The strange thing is that several leaders within the CIA,
the State Department, the Pentagon, and even from the President’s cabinet identified
some or all of these negative factors very early in the planning phase of the operation.
Unfortunately, few of them actually relayed their concerns openly to each other, or more
importantly voiced them to the President when he asked for assessments and
recommendations.
The failure of numerous advisors, departments, and agencies to properly inform
and recommend policies and actions to President Kennedy, ultimately contributed as
much to the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion as the final decision made by the
President. President Kennedy’s special assistant Arthur Schlesinger adeptly relayed this
idea when he wrote, “After the Bay of Pigs Kennedy took a new view of the White House
staff. In the future, he made sure that he had the unfettered and confidential advice of his
own people. The Bay of Pigs gave us a license for the impolite inquiry and the rude
comment and we resolved to be less acquiescent the next time.” 107
The basic plan for the invasion called for a series of air strikes over several days
conducted by Cuban exile pilots and some Americans in order to destroy Castro’s small
air force and to disrupt his command and control over his military forces. The air strikes
would then be followed by an amphibious landing in southern Cuba by a force of Cuban
107
Schlesinger, Arthur M. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. New York: Mariner
Books, 2002. pp. 277-278.
88
exiles coming from a secret base in Nicaragua. The main aim of the invasion was to take
control of a large area inside Cuba, including landing strips, in order to allow American
supplies to be flow in, and then for the invasion force to hold off Castro’s forces long
enough for a Cuban exile government to establish itself as the rightful government in
Cuba. This government would then gain instant and public American support and
assistance against Castro’s regime. For the political aspect of the operation, the United
States turned to various exiled Cuban political groups in the Miami area that opposed
Castro and supported installing a pro-American democratic government in Cuba after
Castro’s regime was removed from power. The coalition movement that came together
in Miami to organize this government, called the Democratic Revolutionary Front, was
made up of various Cuban political factions operating in the south Florida area. These
factions were usually bitter rivals for power and influence in Miami’s Cuban community
but with pressure from the State Department and the CIA, they agreed to work together to
plan and organize a government in Cuba once Castro was overthrown. 108
The Cuban exiles for the invasion force were recruited mostly from in and around
the Miami area, and were then given military training at various CIA sponsored secret
training sites in Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, and at numerous locations
in the United States. 109 Most of the exiles had no military experience, but the CIA
counted on its training program and their patriotic fervor to turn them into soldiers.
Regrettably, this fervor did not last for some as hundreds of the exiles deserted during the
course of their training, which strained CIA recruiting operations to replace them and
108
Lynch, Grayston. Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Dulles: Potomac Books, 2000. pp.
20
109
Kornbluh, Peter, ed. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998. pp. 29, 34.
89
stretched the already small invasion force to its limits. The Cuban exiles were trained in
infantry tactics, demolitions, and over 100 were even given airborne training, but
strangely enough they did not receive much in the way of guerrilla training. This was
strange considering that the CIA’s contingency plan if the invasion force failed on the
beach was for them to retreat to the Escambray Mountains and conduct a protracted
guerrilla war against the Castro regime. Once again the Joint Chiefs failed to bring this
point up to the president, even though they debated it among themselves.
Recognizing the small number of Cuban exiles available for the attack, and
Castro’s overwhelming military strength, the CIA and American policy makers quickly
realized that a large uprising of the Cuban populous against the Castro regime would be
crucial to the operation’s ultimate success. Most of the hopes for the invasion, as well as
the operational plans developed by the CIA, depended almost solely on this massive
uprising against Castro. President Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, McGeorge
Bundy highlighted this point when he said, “Success in this operation is dependent on an
internal Cuban reaction.” 110 To help spark the fires of revolt against Castro, the CIA also
depended on the assistance of numerous anti-Castro guerrillas that operated in the
mountainous regions of central Cuba. The CIA had been giving limited amounts of
supplies to these guerillas for years and it was assumed that they would act as the first
strike force against Castro’s forces and be an example for the Cuban people, encouraging
them to revolt during the invasion. Unfortunately, no coordination was done with the
guerillas leading up to the invasion, which meant that they and the popular uprising
110
Gleijeses, Piero. "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs." Journal of Latin
American Studies Vol. 27, No. 1 (Feb 1995) : pp. 24.
90
predicted by the CIA never materialized and thus, Castro’s forces easily defeated the
vastly outnumbered invasion force within three days. 111
Upon individual examination of the three factors that led to the failure of the Bay
of Pigs Invasion, (the incompetence of the CIA, President Kennedy’s insistence on
plausible deniability, and a lack of intelligence on the internal situation in Cuba),
numerous points stand out that highlight their specific problems and issues. First, the
incompetent planning, decision-making, and execution of the operation by the CIA was
an instrumental factor in the invasion’s failure. Even the CIA’s own internal review of
the invasion by its Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick cited, “bad planning, poor
staffing, faulty intelligence, fragmentation of authority, mistreatment of exile forces, and
a failure to advise the President that success had become dubious, were all factors in the
failure of the operation.” 112 From the start of the planning phase during the Eisenhower
administration, the CIA made numerous inaccurate and incompetent assumptions, which
then led to poor operational decisions and ultimately tactical defeat at the Bay of Pigs.
These incorrect assumptions and decisions by the CIA failed to grasp sound military
doctrine in the conduct of the invasion and more importantly failed to understand the
proper interplay of political, economic, ideological, and intelligence considerations that
must be a focus of any paramilitary operation. 113 Without understanding and properly
using all of these elements of statecraft, the Bay of Pigs Invasion was destined to fail
from the onset.
111
Jones, Howard. The Bay of Pigs. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp 33, 53, 83, 126.
Kornbluh, Peter, ed. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998. pp. 11.
113
Jones, Howard. The Bay of Pigs. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 148.
112
91
Militarily, the CIA’s flawed assumptions were that Castro’s military forces, which
consisted of over 30,000 soldiers and around 200,000 militia members, were poorly
organized, trained, and equipped, and therefore it would not be able to withstand a
concerted attack by a well-trained and equipped force. 114 Actually, throughout the threeday battle Castro’s ground forces proved themselves to be more than capable of
conducting complex combat operations including: moving through harsh terrain in order
to reach the battle, maneuvering effectively under fire to exploit weak enemy positions,
and successfully using combined arms operations (simultaneous use of infantry, armor,
and artillery) in order to defeat the enemy. During the first part of the invasion, there was
some initial confusion on the part of Castro and his military leaders, but by the second
day Castro’s military had mobilized, pinned down the invasion force, and was on its way
to victory. The invasion force did inflict several thousand casualties on Castro’s forces
during the three-day battle, but in the end Castro’s military forces proved to be much
more proficient and numerous than anticipated.
The CIA also had intelligence that deliveries of Soviet weapons and equipment,
including MiG-21 fighters, tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons had been sent to
Cuba after Castro took power, and it was aware of dozens of Russian military advisers
that were present in Cuba. 115 But somehow, the CIA failed to realize that the
combination of these two factors meant that the Cuban military had more than a sufficient
amount of training and equipment to effectively defend the island from attack by
anything short of the full weight of the American military. The CIA analysts also
114
Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs." Political
Science Quarterly Vol. 99, No. 3 (1984) : pp. 473
115
Fursenko, Aleksandr., and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy,
1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998.
pp.92.
92
concluded that Castro’s Army would not be able to effectively respond to any attacks
because of a lack of centralized command and control by Castro himself. On this point
the CIA was partially correct, because it did take Castro until the second day of the
invasion before he could fully mobilize his military forces and direct all of their combat
power against the invasion force near the Bay of Pigs. But this prediction ultimately
proved to be worthless to the invasion force, because after the first day of the battle
Castro’s direct leadership presence brought his forces together and they were able to
successfully defeat the invasion force within forty-eight hours. 116
Perhaps even more dangerous to the invasion force than the Cuban ground forces
was the small but ultimately very effective Cuban Air Force that turned out to be the
biggest surprise (militarily) to the CIA. Castro’s Air Force consisted of only six small,
World War II vintage B-26 bombers, six World War II vintage single-engine propeller
fighter planes, and four Lockheed T-33 jet trainers that, according to the CIA, were
lightly armed and posed no threat to an invasion force. 117 This last miscalculation would
prove fatal for many in the invasion force however, as Cuban (and perhaps Soviet)
engineers rapidly modified the normally lightly armed T-33 to be able to carry rockets
and a pair of .50-caliber machine guns. This adaptation made the T-33s invaluable to
Castro’s victory as they destroyed four CIA and Cuban exile manned B-26s, killed
dozens of members of the invasion force, and most damaging, sunk some of the landing
craft and supply boats that were crucial for the success of the invasion 118
The devastating effectiveness of Castro’s Air Force against the invasion forces
was made possible by President Kennedy’s decision to severely limit air strikes on Cuba
116
Jones, Howard. The Bay of Pigs. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 124-125.
Ibid., pp. 41.
118
Ibid., pp. 76, 110.
117
93
leading up to the invasion. These air strikes in theory would have completely destroyed
Castro’s Air Force, or at least severely crippled them, and would have prevented them
from inflicting the serious damage that they did on the invasion forces. The CIA’s
Deputy Director for Plans (chief of the clandestine service) and architect of the invasion,
Richard Bissell was critical of Kennedy’s decision when he said, “canceling the air
strikes was certainly the gravest contributing factor in the operation’s failure.” 119
However, some in the CIA like Colonel Jack Hawkins, the operative in charge of the
Cuban exiles’ paramilitary training blamed the State Department and not Kennedy
saying, “It was really State that convinced the president to cut down the air strikes. That
was Rusk, the Secretary of State. So the Department of State crippled and destroyed this
operation.” 120 Several air strikes before and during the invasion were part of the original
plan for the operation but President Kennedy’s decision to drastically alter the planned air
strikes was based on several factors.
First and foremost was his insistence on hiding American involvement with the
invasion. Kennedy believed that several air strikes would draw too much attention to the
operation internationally, and eventually expose American involvement in the invasion.
The CIA responded to his fears by coming up with a ridiculous cover story of a defecting
Cuban pilot that decided to bomb Castro’s forces before heading to Miami. This
“defector” was Cuban all right, but his plane was an American mock-up of an actual
Cuban plane and the ruse lasted about five minutes once the press and Castro’s
ambassador to the United Nations got wind of it and presented facts that easily showed
119
Bissell, Richard. Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996. pp. 191.
120
Kornbluh, Peter, ed. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998. pp. 266.
94
the whole story as a fraud. 121 Eventually, Kennedy decided that the proposed air strikes
posed too much of a threat to keeping America’s involvement in the operations secret and
he ordered the CIA to limit their scope. Based on this guidance, Richard Bissell decided
to reduce the number of planes that attacked Cuba on April 15th and following the
president’s orders, he cancelled the remaining air strikes all together. 122
Secondly, President Kennedy never knew how important the air strikes were to
the invasion because the CIA, and to a lesser extent the Joint Chiefs never told him that
they were absolutely critical to the operation’s success, even though both groups thought
so. It is particularly disturbing that the Joint Chief’s did not relay their belief in the
importance of air cover to the President. Each one of the senior military officers had
extensive experience with air operations and correctly realized that air cover was key to
any operation. If President Kennedy had know that the possible success of the entire
operation hinged on the original plan of air strikes, more likely than not he would have let
the strikes continue, or at the very least he would have canceled the invasion altogether in
order to avoid disaster. Richard Bissell’s actions in severely reducing the air strikes, and
in not informing the President that without them the operation was much less likely to
succeed, gained him scorn from most of the CIA operatives leading the invasion and
directly endangered the success of the entire invasion. Two of these leading operatives,
Jake Esterline and Colonel Jack Hawkins even told Richard Bissell that the operation had
no chance of success and had to be cancelled and then tried to resign, but Bissell
appealed to their sense of duty and convinced them to stay on. He then assured them that
121
122
Ibid., pp. 3.
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007. pp. 174.
95
he would address their concerns with the President, although there is no evidence that he
did and the strikes were never reactivated. 123
The second major factor that led to the invasion’s failure was President
Kennedy’s emphasis on “plausible deniability”. Kennedy thought that hiding America’s
role in the invasion would be relatively easy, a mistaken idea that was nurtured from the
planning stage and all through the operation by the CIA. This ridiculous assumption was
flawed from the start by several factors including: numerous leaks that were reported in
the American press and from compromises in the security of the CIA operations both
domestically and abroad, and Castro’s numerous spies and informants throughout the
Miami area. 124 Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy stated it best
when he said, “based on everything, the leaks, the phony defections revealed at the UN,
and the CIA’s handling of the whole affair, I’m amazed that we thought there was a
chance of deniability.” 125
Basing operational decisions on plausible deniability, President Kennedy made
even more far-reaching decisions that doomed the operation. Kennedy’s most drastic
change to the original plan came when he changed the area of the amphibious invasion
from the area near the city of Trinidad, which had excellent port facilities, a large
(potentially anti-Castro) population, and was in close proximity to the Escambray
Mountains (and its rebel population), to a more isolated location near the Bay of Pigs,
123
Kornbluh, Peter, ed. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998. pp. 8.
124
Ibid., pp. 2, 299.
125
Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs." Political
Science Quarterly Vol. 99, No. 3 (1984) : pp. 488.
96
that had none of these advantages. 126 In fact the only thing the Bay of Pigs had going for
it militarily was its proximity to a landing strip, but this was deemed so crucial to the
operation in Kennedy’s mind that he immediately ordered the CIA to change the entire
operation to that location. The Bay of Pigs area was also surrounded by swamps and
marshes, which served to trap the invaders while proving to of little impediment to
Castro’s forces. The change to a remote region like the Bay of Pigs meant that any local
uprising could not to occur because there were simply too few people in the area. The
lack of a popular uprising to greet the invaders should have set off immediate warning
signals to policy makers in Washington, but no serious discussion on the matter was ever
brought up to the President and the plan went ahead as ordered, to disastrous
consequences.
Amphibious operations are already one of the most complex, dangerous, and
training intensive military operations in warfare, which the United States learned the hard
way during World War II. President Kennedy’s decision to switch to a night only attack
(once again to assist plausible deniability), would therefore create numerous problems for
the CIA and the invasion force, since night operations are infinitely more difficult,
especially for amateurs with limited training. In fact, during World War II the United
States conducted dozens of amphibious operations, making them quite proficient at this
complex operation, but not one of these ever occurred at night. 127 It is also interesting to
note that experience during the war showed that amphibious operations require close air
support to succeed. It is astounding then, that the Joint Chiefs, the CIA, and the
126
Fursenko, Aleksandr., and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy,
1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998.
pp. 85.
127
Jones, Howard. The Bay of Pigs. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp 171.
97
administration ultimately supported a nighttime amphibious operation, with untrained
soldiers, in an area not conductive to landings, and without air support. Every possible
sign for a military catastrophe was clearly visible to soldiers and civilians alike, but once
again no one from the CIA or the Pentagon voiced any serious concerns to the President,
and the operation went on as he ordered.
The third and arguably most important factor that led to the invasion’s failure was
the almost complete lack of intelligence on the internal political and military situation in
Cuba- including the substantial amount of popular support Castro had from the Cuban
people. This factor more than any other played a pivotal role in the invasion’s ultimate
failure. Planners and leaders at the CIA, the State Department, the Pentagon, and in the
Kennedy administration, including the president himself, all agreed that the success of the
invasion hinged on the support of anti-Castro guerrillas already in Cuba, and more
importantly, a substantial uprising of the Cuban people against Castro’s regime.
Strangely enough though, analysts at the CIA concluded as late as March 3rd (a month
before the invasion), that Castro had 75% of the Cuban population behind him. 128 These
figures don’t seem to give much hope at all to the idea that a massive popular uprising
against Castro would greet the invasion force on the beach in Cuba.
President Kennedy didn’t seem to be aware of these daunting numbers in support
of Castro, although the CIA did assure him that if the invasion force looked like it was
starting to lose, it could easily escape to the Escambray Mountains and link up with antiCastro guerrilla factions already there. 129 Neither the President nor any other policy
maker present during these discussions seemed to realize that the vast distance between
128
Gleijeses, Piero. "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs." Journal of Latin
American Studies Vol. 27, No. 1 (Feb 1995) : pp. 30.
129
Ibid., pp. 33-34.
98
the Bay of Pigs and the Escambray Mountains would make this “escape” impossible and
thus the invasion force would be trapped on the beach at the Bay of Pigs. In fact, after
the invasion force was on the verge of defeat President Kennedy told the CIA to order
them to, “dissolve into guerrilla-sized groups and fight their way inland to known
destinations (the Escambray Mountains) and continue fighting, while the United States
would supply them by air.” 130 Unfortunately, the CIA had never trained the Cuban exiles
for lengthy guerilla operations and their chances of fighting their way through Castro’s
forces surrounding the Bay of Pigs, and making it over eighty miles through swamps to
the mountains was non-existent. Arthur Schlesinger put the blame for the president’s
misconceptions on the invasion force’s ability to fight as guerrillas squarely on Richard
Bissell when he said, “All of us-Kennedy and Bundy and the rest- were hypnotized by
Dick Bissell to some degree, and assumed he knew what he was doing.” 131
In the final evaluation, the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion can be directly
attributed to numerous factors including: incompetent planning and execution by the
CIA, President Kennedy’s insistence on adhering to the principal of “plausible
deniability”, and most importantly, the almost complete lack of intelligence on the
internal political and domestic situation in Cuba. There were also numerous poor
decisions made by military leaders, intelligence analysts, and policy makers- including
the President that led to the disaster. The adherence to “Plausible deniability” was
undeniably President Kennedy’s greatest mistake up to and during the invasion as it
clouded his judgment regarding decisions throughout the operation and turned out to be a
130
Fursenko, Aleksandr., and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy,
1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998.
pp. 96.
131
Blight, James., and Peter Kornbluh, eds. Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999. pp. 65.
99
major factor in its failure. As Richard Bissell said in his rebuttal to Kirkpatrick’s internal
review of the invasion, “the defeat was directly attributable to a long series of policy
decisions. These “political compromises” were made to preserve plausible deniability. If
complete deniability had been consistent with maximum effectiveness, there would have
been no conflict of goals but in fact this could not (and never is) the case.” 132
Ultimately, the invasion turned out to be a spectacular failure that ended in the
defeat and capture of the entire 1500 man invasion force and the utter waste of a still
untold millions of dollars. The role that the United States played in the invasion was also
obvious to everyone, and it seriously damaged American prestige and influence
throughout Latin America and the rest of the Third World for decades. Castro’s victory
over “imperialist” America would also bolster his domestic and foreign support, make
him the champion of revolutionary socialism throughout the Third World, and eventually
see him outlast nine American Presidents, and even the Soviet Union itself. The failed
invasion also pushed Castro to align much more closely with the Soviet Union
economically, politically, and militarily. A year and a half later, this alignment would
lead to the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis,
which brought the entire world close to the precipice of nuclear destruction.
It is not unrealistic to say that the Bay of Pigs Invasion gave Castro total control
of Cuba, and enabled him to achieve international fame and stature. The results of the
failed invasion should have served to caution policy makers against future adventures in
the Third World. Unfortunately though, political and military lessons are frequently hard
to grasp, which is evident by America’s later involvement in Vietnam, Iraq, and
132
Kornbluh, Peter, ed. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998. pp. 13.
100
Afghanistan, just to name a few. Along these lines, the lessons of the Bay of Pigs
Invasion should continue to serve as a warning for policy makers and military strategists
who contemplate political and military actions in the Third World.
Conclusion
101
The organizational struggle between intelligence and covert action has been a part
of the Central Intelligence Agency since its inception. Yet, the struggle actually began
long before the CIA was created with the agency’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic
Services during World War II. The leaders of the OSS overwhelmingly preferred covert
action over intelligence in the short lifespan of the agency, which paired with its
inconsistent record during the war unfortunately helped lead to its downfall. In many
ways though, the OSS’s influence continued long after its termination and would
continue to shape and drive the CIA throughout its history.
As OSS veteran Edmund Taylor correctly pointed out, “The OSS set a precedent,
or a pattern, for United States intervention in the revolutionary struggles of the postwar
age. Donovan’s influence on U.S. foreign policy and military policy has continued to be
felt ever since his death; for good or ill he left a lasting mark on the nation’s power elite.”
He went further saying, “However indirectly, many of our latter-day Cold War successes,
disasters, and entrapments can ultimately be traced back to Donovan and the OSS.” 133
133
Smith, Richard H. OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Intelligence Agency. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972, pp. 261.
102
World War II would not only change the world’s political landscape, it would also
permanently alter the foreign policy and indeed the direction of the entire United States
government. The rise of the United States as an economic, political, and military giant
after the war also created the need for a new intelligence agency to keep tabs on friends
and foes alike. The policy makers that created this agency never intended for it to follow
in the footsteps of the OSS. However, the events of the Cold War and the flawed
assumptions about the power and influence of the Soviet Union would quickly change
those plans and forever alter the direction of that agency, sending it along a path it was
never meant to take.
In response to the actions of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe after World War
II, the National Security Council began to greatly enlarge the mission of the CIA by
charging it with planning and conducting various covert operations against the enemies of
the United States. These new instructions would dramatically change the CIA,
doctrinally and organizationally, and would quickly lead to its evolution from an
organization based on intelligence collection and analysis to one based on direct covert
action against the enemies of the United States throughout the world. This naturally had
a profound impact on American foreign policy, and would eventually convince a
succession of American presidents to react to world events, particularly Soviet aggression
in Europe and Communist supported revolutions in the Third World, with much more
direct and unfortunately, sometimes quasi-legal covert measures. Throughout all of this,
the NSC would set the policy goals and the direction for much of America’s foreign
policy during the Cold War, while the CIA was the primary tool that the NSC used to
physically enact these policies.
103
Above both the NSC and the CIA was the President, who gave either explicit or
limited guidance to the NSC, depending on which man held office at the time. This
system also worked well in insulating the President from foreign policy mistakes and
enabled the President and his advisors to declare ignorance when questioned by Congress
about illegal activities, particularly covert and subversive political operations, planned
and conducted by the NSC and CIA. Regardless of these presidential protests of
innocence or ignorance, the evidence is explicitly clear that Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, and Kennedy were all intimately aware of the policies and operations of the
NSC and the CIA, and in almost every instance they personally approved their actions.
From its creation with the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA was never
given the authority to engage in covert activities of any sort. In fact, at no time during its
formative years from 1947-1962 was the CIA legally authorized by any single piece of
legislation to conduct subversive activities at home or abroad. Nevertheless the agency
did conduct numerous covert actions during this period under the direction of the NSC
including: collection of foreign intelligence, paramilitary operations, and subversive
political actions abroad. As previously stated, the standard view is that the shift towards
focusing on these clandestine operations originally started in response to political and
military actions by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
In reality though, the reliance on these operations really flourished because
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy wanted to use the CIA to pursue their own
foreign policy agendas outside of the control and supervision of Congress. This is not to
say that the events of the Cold War didn’t have a huge impact on American foreign
policy towards the Soviet Union. To the contrary, these events were key in shaping
104
American foreign policy and presidential decisions. But, unquestionably the decisions of
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy were the central factor that contributed to
changing the mission and focus of the CIA, which in turn forced American foreign policy
along a dark path during the rest of the Cold War. In some instances Congress
acquiesced to CIA’s operations, as they did by passing the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949. However, in most instances Congress was completely unaware of the CIA’s
action throughout the world.
Ralph McGehee, a former agent with twenty-five years of experience at the CIA
said it best when he remarked, “The CIA is not now nor has it ever been a central
intelligence agency. It is the covert action arm of the President’s foreign policy advisers.
In that capacity it overthrows or supports foreign governments while reporting
‘intelligence’ justifying those activities.” He went on the say, “The CIA shapes its
intelligence, even in such critical areas as Soviet nuclear weapon capability, to support
presidential policy. Disinformation is a large part of its covert action responsibility, and
the American people are the primary target audience of its lies.” 134
In June 1948 under President Truman’s direction, the NSC would issue the most
significant order in the history of the CIA. NSC Directive 10/2 permanently changed the
mission and organization of the agency, redirecting its focus from intelligence collection
and analysis to covert and subversive operations. Later in the Cold War there would be
other significant directives from the NSC to the CIA, like NSC Directive-68 that set a
more aggressive tone toward the Soviet Union. However, no directive would have the
134
McGehee, Ralph. Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA. New York: Sheridan Square Publications,
1983, pp. 192.
105
groundbreaking and long lasting effects that NSC 10/2 did on the organization and
mission of the CIA.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 would also augment the radical
organizational and doctrinal changes from NSC 10/2 at the CIA. That act, which allowed
the CIA to hide its budget and ongoing operations from Congress, would dramatically
increase the number of covert operations conducted by the CIA. It would also encourage
the CIA to become involved in numerous illegal operations throughout the Cold War. In
the end, the act would also be instrumental in giving numerous presidents the ability to
drive American foreign policy without the constraints and review of Congress.
As covert operations became the primary function of the CIA soon after its
creation, the intelligence analysis side of the agency naturally suffered. The clandestine
side of the agency got priority for budget, personnel, and even for face time with policy
and decision makers. By 1952, clandestine operations had become such a focus at the
CIA that they used 60% of the CIA’s personnel and 74% of its budget. 135 Also, because
the State Department and the Defense Department still refused in most circumstances to
cooperate with the CIA in sharing intelligence and assets, the CIA began to produce its
own intelligence analysis through its own sources. Unfortunately, as Amy Zegart points
out, “this only added to the intelligence cacophony, duplicating the efforts of other
intelligence agencies and expanding the overall intelligence paper flow to senior policy
makers.” 136
135
Leary, William M., ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents. Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1984, pp. 5.
136
Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999, pp. 190.
106
As previously stated, the development and evolution of the CIA was as influenced
by the Cold War as it was by the three presidents that served during its formative years
from 1947 to 1962. Each of these men is important because of the role they played in the
organizational struggle for dominance between covert operations and intelligence
analysis at the CIA, as well as for their influence over the operations and procedures of
the CIA. Each man is also responsible in some way or another for the operations and
plans of the CIA, both good and bad, while at the same time each was hurt politically by
these failures, both domestically and abroad.
President Truman’s relationship with the CIA was extremely complex and it
changed several times during his administration. However, due to the rapid expansion of
the Soviet Union throughout Eastern Europe after World War II, the CIA's mission began
to evolve differently from Truman's original intent for the organization, which was
simply an intelligence gathering service for the president. Unfortunately for Truman, the
CIA’s lack of focus on intelligence led to its failure in predicting several key events
during his presidency including: the Soviet Union's successful testing of its first nuclear
bomb in 1949, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 and subsequent
Chinese involvement in the war against the United States.
Years after his administration was over, President Truman would lament how the
CIA’s focus had changed from intelligence analysis to covert operations and in fact stated
that, "the CIA was not intended as a 'Cloak & Dagger Outfit'! It was intended merely as
a center for keeping the President informed on what was going on in the world." He went
on further to say that, “The CIA should not be an agency to initiate policy or to act as a
107
spy organization. That was never the intention when it was organized.” 137 Despite these
statements by Truman, it is clear that the CIA’s mission changed and several covert
operations were carried out during his administration. In fact, eight-one covert operations
were conducted during his second term alone. 138 Therefore, in the end, at least part of the
blame for the evolution of the agency has to be put squarely on his shoulders.
Of the three presidents that presided over the CIA during its first fifteen years,
President Eisenhower sided in favor of covert operations over intelligence analysis the
most during his presidency. Agents and leaders of the CIA during the Eisenhower
administration saw this as the high tide of covert action, referring to this period as the
“Golden Age” of clandestine operations. 139 When the CIA did perform intelligence
gathering during the Eisenhower administration, for the most part they relied on
reconnaissance aircraft photos and signals intercepts instead of on the much harder to
achieve human intelligence. Unfortunately, this lead to numerous instances of faulty
analysis that overstated Soviet military capabilities and influenced poor decisions making
from the American government.
In addition, thanks in large part to the new freedom afforded the CIA by NSC
Directive 10/2 and the CIA Act of 1949, President Eisenhower frequently called on the
agency to overthrow governments he considered unfavorable to the United States, such as
in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. He also approved the initial plans to overthrow
the Castro regime in Cuba, although the actual operation took place during the Kennedy
administration. These operations would give the CIA excessive confidence in its ability
137
Harry S. Truman to David M. Noyes, December 1, 1963, David M. Noyes papers, Harry S. Truman
Presidential Library, Independence, MO. (Photocopy of original provided by HSTL on Oct 7, 2009).
138
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007, pp. 25.
139
Helms, Richard. A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. New York:
Random House, 2003, pp. 106.
108
to shape international events and drive the foreign policy of the United States. This sense
of hubris would eventually lead to disasters for the CIA and for the United States.
While President Eisenhower used the CIA predominantly for covert missions, he
also quickly realized the importance of timely intelligence, and more significantly how
the CIA's incorrect analysis of key events such as failing to predict the Soviet Union’s
development of a hydrogen bomb in 1953, and The Suez Crisis of 1956 caused foreign
policy headaches for the United States. By the end of his presidency, Eisenhower would
be disillusioned with the performance of the CIA and ultimately he considered the
agency's numerous covert missions and procedures a failure and a possible danger to
national security. These sentiments by Eisenhower are very similar to the ones felt by
President Truman, since both men talked disparagingly of the CIA while out of office,
but during their administrations they supported several covert operations by the agency.
Despite any misgivings by Eisenhower, the CIA’s evolution into an organization focused
almost exclusively on covert operations was complete early in his administration. In
1975, the Congressional Committee investigating possible illegal acts by the CIA, the
Church Committee, agreed with this idea stating, “By 1953 the agency had achieved the
basic structure and scale it retained for the next twenty years.” 140
President Kennedy's outlook on the world and national defense was significantly
different from Eisenhower's, but his plans for using the CIA in many ways closely
resembled his predecessor's. Early on, President Kennedy saw the imminent dangers of
Communist revolutions in the Third-World that were either directly or indirectly
supported by the Soviet Union and he immediately assigned the CIA to combat these
140
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the
United States [Church Committee]. 94th Cong., 2nd sess (April 26). Washington: GPO, 1976. Book 4, pp.
40.
109
issues, which was part of his overall "Flexible Response" strategy. This strategy sought
to directly challenge Communist expansion, particularly in the Third World, instead of
relying on the power of nuclear deterrence, as Eisenhower had. Of course in Kennedy’s
mind, direct response to Soviet aggression and political maneuvering would require
covert operations and therefore he gave the CIA wide latitude in planning and conducting
such operations.
President Kennedy's focus on Third World insurgencies would eventually lead to
America's involvement in Vietnam and much closer to home with the failed Bay of Pigs
Invasion in Cuba in 1961. The disastrous invasion as well as the numerous other failed
plots against Fidel Castro only added to Castro's prestige internationally would quickly
change Kennedy’s mind on the competence of the CIA. By the end of his short
administration, Kennedy had lost almost all faith in the abilities of the agency in
conducting operations and in its intelligence analysis. This sense of mistrust would
continue in almost every presidential administration that followed, although it did little to
change the conduct of the agency.
When examining the numerous CIA covert operations failures, it becomes readily
apparent that they have squandered still untold of amounts of blood and treasure and have
seriously damaged American prestige and influence internationally. In most of these
cases the CIA’s own internal reviews and after action reports agree with my assertion that
these covert operations ended in disaster and were more often than not caused by
incompetence and hubris as well as by actions of questionable legality and morality.
Unfortunately, these internal reviews were always declared top secret and their
conclusions and lessons were not shared within the agency, the Executive Branch, or with
110
Congress. This frequently led to the same mistakes being made over and over and
allowed the agency’s leaders to hide their actions and especially the appalling results of
these operations from the president and from Congress.
In summary, The CIA was created in 1947 to collect and analyze intelligence in
order to keep the president and the national command authority informed on events
around the world. As I have previously alluded to, this mission was quickly changed,
however and the future course of the CIA and indeed the foreign policy of the nation
were irrevocably altered in the process. I believe the CIA’s original mission is of
enormous importance to the national defense of the United States and therefore the
success or failure of the CIA is paramount to the safety and security of the nation.
Unfortunately, I would argue that most of the CIA’s time, effort, and resources have been
squandered on disastrous and quasi-legal covert adventures around the world that have
only served to hurt, not help the nation. The effects of many of these adventures are still
present today and they continue to influence and sometimes drive the actions and
decision-making process of the CIA.
The standard defense presented by many, past and present, at the CIA to this
assertion is that the agency’s numerous successes remain secret for reasons of national
security, while its failures easily become public record. This assertion is false however,
because while there have been successes throughout the history of the CIA, its countless
failures more than make up for any triumphs. The CIA has shown on numerous
occasions that it has failed in its original designated mission of coordinating the nation’s
intelligence activities and collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence affecting
national security. From assuring President Truman that North Korea would not invade
111
South Korea in 1950, and then subsequently predicting the Chinese would not get
involved in the war, to misreading the internal situation in Cuba once Castro took over, to
more recent events such as failing to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and
failing to prevent the attacks on America on September 11th, 2001, the CIA has showed
on numerous occasions its shortcomings as an intelligence agency.
It is my belief that the ultimate failure of the CIA is directly attributable to its
evolution from an intelligence agency into an organization focused almost solely on
covert, paramilitary style operations in order to direct or alter American foreign policy.
These types of operations and the frequently illegal and immoral actions that support
them are not what the CIA was created for and more importantly, they are not in keeping
with the ideals and values that made America the hallmark of democracy and an example
for the rest of the world to follow. The CIA’s failures since its creation in 1947 have
caused numerous foreign policy problems and risks to the national security of the United
States and will continue to do so well into the future unless the issue over supremacy
between intelligence and covert operations is solved once and for all. The survival and
continued prosperity of America itself may well depend on solving this issue, because
without the ability to understand the motives and actions of friends and foes alike, the
nation is dangerously exposed to the shifting winds of fortune.
112
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