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{ Journal of History and Social Science Democracy in the 17th Century: Progression and Regression Controversial Presidential Secrecy and National Security— Feared Yet Necessary Providing for the Common Defence: Executive War Powers in History and the Modern Age Reaping the Seeds of Conflict: The Dawes Act of 1887 Racial Complications of the 1936 Berlin Olympics Selling Society: Propaganda, Advertising, and the Culture of the 1920s The Second Amendment: A Collective Protective Right 1 Journal of History and Social Science Department of History and Social Science The Loomis Chaffee School Fall 2013 Eric LaForest and Lori Caligiuri, editors 2 Table of Contents Editorial Note and Synopses Pages 3-4 Alex Cohen ’16, “Democracy in the 17th Century: Progression and Regression? Carling Prize winner Pages 6-14 Victoria Smith ’14, “Controversial Presidential Secrecy and National Security—Feared Yet Necessary” WALKS Finalist and Runner-up Pages 15-25 Cameron Nelson ’14, “Providing for the Common Defence: Executive War Powers in History and the Modern Age” WALKS Finalist Pages 26-38 James Dion ’14, “Reaping the Seeds of Conflict: The Dawes Act of 1887” Pages 39-55 Carolyn Gershman ’14, “Racial Complications of the 1936 Berlin Olympics” Pages 56-76 Jack Kelly ’14, “Selling Society: Propaganda, Advertising, and the Culture of the 1920s” Pages 77-98 Sarah Regan ’14, “The Second Amendment: A Collective Protective Right” Pages 99-113 3 Editorial Note A season after the reelection of Barack Obama in the fall of 2012, the seven students whose work is featured here chose to focus on American political history and its many applications and consequences. It is no surprise that their findings run the gamut; the origins of democracy, the meanings of the Constitution, the power of the printed word, and domestic and foreign entanglements are all carefully examined and originally interpreted in this issue. When read together these essays open new vistas for viewing the layered past and uncertain future of American politics. Their thoughtful use of diverse primary and secondary sources problematizes our assumptions about the distribution of and access to political power in this country’s history. It is our sincere hope that you are engaged and enlightened by the best of what our department has to offer. –The Editors Synopses Alex Cohen ’16 “Democracy in the 17th Century: Progression and Regression? This Carling Prize-winning essay traces the uneven development of the democratic impulse in the early modern world. Its use of a wide range of historical contexts complements its argument that the reaction against autocracy could not be uniformly successful. Victoria Smith ’14 “Controversial Presidential Secrecy and National Security—Feared Yet Necessary This essay, the runner-up in last year’s WALKS essay competition, deftly interprets the Constitution and claims that its application over the course of American history supports the executive branch’s reliance on initial secrecy surrounding national security issues. Its balanced use of evidence—from the Roosevelt Corollary to the Mexican-American War to the War Powers Resolution—serves to reinforce this timely, sophisticated argument. Cameron Nelson ’14 “Providing for the Common Defence: Executive War Powers in History and the Modern Age” A WALKS finalist, Cameron Nelson here presents an urgent, complex defense of the continued expansion of presidential war powers. The essay’s careful organization, elegant prose, and expert treatment of the historiography of the Constitution provide the reader with ample reason to read on and to be persuaded. 4 James Dion ’14 “Reaping the Seeds of Conflict: The Dawes Act of 1887” Historical accounts of the 1887 Dawes Act have largely neglected the perspectives of Native Americans. This historiographically significant essay serves to correct that oversight and shed new light on a key moment in late-nineteenth-century Western history. Carolyn Gershman ’14 “Racial Complications of the 1936 Berlin Olympics” An ambitious and detailed evaluation of the 1936 Olympics, this essay blends narrative and analytical approaches to explore the historical significance of international sports culture and the role of the media in shaping Americans’ perceptions and judgments. Jack Kelly ’14 “Selling Society: Propaganda, Advertising, and the Culture of the 1920s” Drawing on examples from both political and cultural history, this essay examines the means by which American advertising could gain traction so quickly in the American Jazz Age economy. The twin contexts of military propaganda and technological change—and the markets for both—figure into this wide-ranging and stimulating work. Sarah Regan ’14 “The Second Amendment: A Collective Protective Right” This work, seeking to define the controversial Second Amendment in collective terms, provides the reader with a thorough analysis of precedents from the English political tradition and of historical shifts in the meaning of the Amendment over the course of American history. 5 Alex Cohen ’16 “Democracy in the 17th Century: Progression and Regression? The evolution of “democracy” within the context of world history, and the Early Modern World, 1630-1700 (“Early Modern World”), in particular, is not a straight-line, seamless progression towards an absolute “democratic” common good. During this period, the development of “democracy” is best characterized as a seeming contradiction between much forward progress in the evolution of certain democratic ideas and governance and the concurrent growth of patently undemocratic institutions, such as slavery, and the accumulation of power and wealth by monarchies through military conquest. Democratic ideas and institutions in the Early Modern World evolved as a reaction against autocratic systems of government and abuse of power by the ruling classes. Democracy was not prevalent by any means during this period. The noteworthy point, however, is that undemocratic impulses of autocratic rulers were increasingly challenged and resisted by common people who demanded greater participation in their own government. From the perspective of 300 years later, the elements of “democracy” as they evolved during the Early Modern World were imperfect first steps, “the perfect being the enemy of the good”.1 Today, we accept generally that democracy includes, among other things: the availability of equality of opportunity, broader participation of the citizenry in decision-making, the ability of citizens to select and elect their leaders, acceptance of majority rule and the rule of law, the guarantee of civil rights, such freedom of religion and expression, and an assumption that there must be limits on the powers of government vis-àvis the individual citizen. The democratic values and ideas were not the monopoly of the peoples and cultures defined by the European Enlightenment or the less stratified society 1 Attributed to Voltaire 6 and representative government in English North America, but rather were concepts shared and developed by many different people and cultures in the Early Modern World. By the same token, the rise in the use of military conquest accompanied by political and systematic economic exploitation, including slavery and land grabs, was not solely the domain of Europeans, but was also prevalent in other cultures of the period, particularly in Africa. It is indisputable that some of the most important developments towards democracy occurred in 17th century England. The religious and political turmoil of this period were, in hindsight, the result of forces directed toward the elimination of autocratic rule. The desire for religious freedom resulted, after the beheading of King Charles I, in Oliver Cromwell’s theological-based dictatorship.2 Nevertheless, an impetus for the English Civil War was the desire to reduce the power of the entrenched Anglican nobility over political and religious dissenters. While Cromwell’s harsh and intolerant rule resulted, after his death, in the restoration of the monarchy, it also resulted in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 that increased the power of the Parliament at the expense of the monarchy.3 Although the Parliament of this period was not democratically elected, as we understand the modern Parliament (or American Congress) today, it nevertheless represented a significant expansion of the political base that had previously ruled the country. Moreover, the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and its underlying political philosophy as expressed in the writings of John Locke that might be considered “democratic,” 3 were a major influence a century later on the politics of English North America, culminating in the 1776 Declaration of Independence, and the 1789 Constitution of the United States. While the founders of New England had no intention in the first instance of creating a “democracy,” but rather sought a social order based on godliness, the unintended 2 3 English Civil War Glorious Revolution 7 consequences of their experiment in self-rule led to the evolution of institutions and practices that we recognize today as basic building blocks of democracy. Thomas Hooker, a renowned Puritan minister, expressed the “godliness” component best: we are joined together in this commonwealth; to make sure that the gospel is freed up and purified and that’s why were making this government, along with rules and laws. The General Courts of Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay granted authority for local government collectively to the people who established the town. In Connecticut, for example, John Wareham and Thomas Hooker put forth the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1650), which included certain elements of democratic government.4 They provided for, among other things, representative assemblies, on which rule by the people and the rule of law were based, and recognized some religious and civil freedoms. Colony members were to meet together to run their community.4 They could also discuss and vote upon important issues, such the selection and election of officers to lead them, the establishment of tax rates, and how “common land” would be divided. The Code of Laws expanded upon the Fundamental Orders, and provided for many fundamental democratic ideas: “Forasmuch as the free fruition of such Liberties, Immunities, Privileges, as Humanity, Civility and Christianity, call for, as due to every man in his place and proportion, without Impeachmt and infringement,” was the Commonwealth created.4 It stated, among other things, that no man could be arrested without good reason, and, if so arrested, had the right to be tried in a court by his peers; and no man could have his property taken away by government. The introduction of some “democratic” practices did not, however, extend to freedom to worship another religion (punishable by death), or the right not to vote (in which case, one was whipped) or to remain “idle” (whereupon one was punished by as much pain 4 Fundamental Orders of Connecticut 8 as possible as determined by a court).4 This same Code of Laws provided that Native Indians had to produce, and grant custody of, goods for consumption solely by the English colonizers, the penalty of not doing so being death. Clearly, the benefits of New England “democracy” were limited to the colonizers alone. The movement towards democracy in English North America was also uneven in the Chesapeake Region colonies. They strayed from the initial “democratic” ideas, such as religious freedom and equality that led to their founding, in part because of economic success. The Virginia Colony began growing significant amounts of tobacco at the beginning of the 17th century.5 Later, the farmers began to use African and Indian slaves, as well as English indentured servants, to farm tobacco. By the 1630’s, the Virginia Colony became very rich as a result of the tobacco crop and its use of slavery, a clearly undemocratic development in the New World.5 Though the tobacco economy began to suffer in the 1660’s because of a prolonged economic depression, the English monarchy, as represented by Governor William Berkeley, continued to tax settlers/planters at pre-depression rates. The settlers agitated and, in 1676, a group of settlers led by Nathaniel Bacon, a relative of Governor Berkeley, took out their anger on peaceful local Native American tribes that stood in the way of their efforts to clear more land for tobacco cultivation.5 When Berkeley tried to rein in the settlers for what he considered their excessive Native American killings, Bacon and his followers rebelled and burned down Jamestown. Importantly, Bacon and his group sent a list of their grievances to Berkeley. Their principal grievances were unjust taxation, failure to protect the colony from Native Indian attacks, and the promotion of incompetent favorites in powerful positions. In defending himself against these grievances, Berkeley foreshadowed the return of 5 Chesapeake Region 9 more autocratic rule: "A king has long arms either to reward or punish", signaling to the rebels that even if they removed him from office, the English monarchy, though separated by an ocean, would still have the power to retaliate and punish the Virginia Colony.5 Bacon died, and, ultimately, the rebellion against Berkeley, the monarchic symbol, failed. Nevertheless, the precedent had been set for aggrieved citizens to demand fairness, specifically in terms of taxation, and government responsiveness to the needs of the people it governed. The evolution of ideas we consider “democratic” today were not the monopoly of European peoples and cultures alone. During the same period, there were some tenuous first steps in this regard in China.6 The backdrop against which these ideas began to be discussed was a period of economic upheaval in China that followed some initial prosperity from the development of trade relationships with the Europeans. China’s economic stability was jeopardized due to the decrease in arable land caused by flooding.6 This resulted in widespread famine. The Ming dynasty’s government did little to address the need for flood control; its inefficiency in this regard was compounded by the lack of revenue from its agricultural economy. Yet, Chinese farmers were still forced to pay taxes though their land was no longer arable. Out of this period of economic upheaval percolated the first “democratic” ideas in China.6 In 1644, Li Zicheng and Zheng Xionzhong led a peasant rebellion against the Mingruling dynasty. Li Zicheng’s ideas, around which rebelling peasants coalesced, included his belief in equality for all people in China. In addition, Li Zicheng advocated the equal division of land and the abolishment of the grain tax payment system.6 Li Zicheng’s march resulted in the eventual collapse of the Ming dynasty under Emperor Chongzhen. The 6 China 10 emperor hung himself, and the three hundred year reign of the Ming Dynasty ended. The rebels’ success, however, was short lived. The Manchus emerged and forced the rebels out of the city.6 By 1647, Li and Zheng were both captured and executed by the Manchus. With their death, the first discussion of more “democratic” government in China also ended, and there was a regression into autocracy. The seeds of democratic ideas also took root with non-Europeans as a reaction against European domination and enslavement. On a modest scale, an example of such a reaction was the creation of Quilombos in current day Brazil during the 1670’s.7 The growth in the demand for human labor and the African slave trade was most significant in the New World Portuguese colony of Brazil. The Portuguese were ruthless in their slave raiding and their exploitation of the captive slave population.7 To escape the reach of the Portuguese, runaway slaves created remote safe haven communities in Brazil known as Quilombos. These slaves, mostly African, created a system of elected governance similar to early New England commonwealths; they elected their “kings” based on their qualities of wisdom and bravery. During the 1630-1700 period, however, the majority of countries and cultures worldwide did not evolve or move toward creating a democratic environment. The citizenry had no say in how to run their country, nor did they have liberty, equality or civil rights. A case on point is the European Expansion in Central and South America. Both the Spanish and the Portuguese relentlessly and ruthlessly used the New World as a means to an end, the end being the aggrandizement of their own power and wealth through military conquest and economic exploitation. Prior to the Spanish conquest of South and Central America, many of the native 7 Brazil 11 cultures had achieved a relative agricultural and social equilibrium and stability. The Spanish did not seek to make peace or compromise with the native tribes.8 The Spanish had no intention of creating a “democratic” order in their colonies; instead they created a rigid social order and caste system, where they were designated the ruling class and the natives and slaves were relegated to the lowest status. They deliberately sought to dominate the local cultures, socially, religiously and militarily, and appropriate their wealth, in whatever form, whether gold, silver or spices. By so doing, the Spanish destroyed the fabric of Native American cultures. The Spanish forced Native Americans into slavery, and were also the first Europeans to introduce the use of African slaves into the New World.8 The Spanish further exercised their dominance over Native Americans by unilaterally imposing taxes on their belongings, impoverishing them as a result. These taxes were intended to enrich the Spanish conquerors, not to provide for the good of the native people from whom they were collected.8 As a result, the natives started a revolt led by Poe-pay. In 1680, he led a rebellion against the Spanish capital in Santa Fe and succeeded in killing over 400 Spaniards.8 Autocratic government and the resulting injustices bred revolt, as they were to do a century later, first in British North America, then subsequently in the early 19th century in the liberation of the Spanish colonies themselves. As noted earlier, during the Early Modern World, the rise of military conquest, accompanied by political and economic exploitation, particularly slavery, and the accumulation of massively disproportionate wealth through land seizures was not solely the domain of Europeans. An example of this is the rise of the Ndongo and Matamba Kingdoms, and their leader Queen Nzinga, in 17th century Africa.9 8 Spanish America 9 Africa 12 The Portuguese expansion into Africa in aggressive pursuit of slave labor, threatened the economic power and territorial control of Central African coastal states. One African leader, Queen Nzinga, who ruled Ndongo in the 1620’s and later Matamba during the 1640’s, proved to be an extremely adroit survivor in the face of successive Portuguese incursions.9 The key to her political survival and power was the commercial success resulting from her domination of the Central African slave trade. Through military conquest of, and slave raiding into, neighboring African states and strategic alliances with the Portuguese who initially aided her in that regard, she positioned her kingdom as the critical “middleman” in the slave trade – the gatekeeper of the source of slaves.9 When her alliance with the Portuguese fell apart, she re-grouped and founded Matamba, a new state further west; she forged a new alliance with the Dutch and attempted to reclaim Ndongo. While unsuccessful in reclaiming Ndongo, from 1640 through her death in 1661, she was successful in making Matamba a powerful commercial state based on her ruthless exploitation of fellow indigenous Africans.9 Matamba was on a par with, and not subservient to, the European states. In summary, while there was not a seamless progression in the development of democratic ideas during the 17th century, the evolution of democratic ideas and institutions throughout the world at this time had a common impetus – a reaction against autocratic systems of government and abuse of power by the ruling classes. For example, the founders of New England expanded upon Locke’s theories of representative government, and religious tolerance, but only so far. They recognized the exercise of freedom, but only the one recognized by each colony. At the same time, clear across the world, in China, the ideas of Li Zicheng regarding equality for all people, equitable division of land and taxation were 13 so powerful that people were willing to fight for them and a 300-year dynasty was crushed as a result. These ideas were considered so dangerous, however, that the Manchus stepped in and prevented them from becoming permanent. Despite the forward progress in the evolution of democratic ideas and institutions in some parts of the Early Modern World, elsewhere patently undemocratic institutions, such as slavery, also expanded. Through their superior military technology, buttressed by a belief in their inherent superiority over “less civilized” peoples, and using their religion as justification, Europeans successfully conquered, enslaved, and economically exploited many native peoples. Nonetheless, the seeds of democracy were successfully sown from time to time in the Early Modern World. The willingness of people to fight for democratic ideas and more participation in their own government, proved to be a lasting 17th century contribution to the evolution of democracy in our own time. 14 Victoria Smith ’14 “Controversial Presidential Secrecy and National Security—Feared Yet Necessary” "There must be a privilege for secrets of State, i.e. matters whose disclosure would endanger [sic] the Nation's governmental requirements or its relations of friendship and profit with other nations."- American Jurist John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law Delegates at the Constitutional Convention (1787) in Philadelphia sought to create an egalitarian society with a government that checked and balanced itself, ensuring that no one branch could attain an inordinate amount of power to overthrow the other two equal branches. In an effort to protect liberty and remove themselves from the tyrannical reign of the monarchy, the “Framers of the Constitution” divided the war powers between Congress and the president. For the past two hundred plus years, the tension between the public’s right to know what the American government is doing and the president’s right to secrecy in order to protect the national security of the United States has provoked heated debate. The legislative branch’s constitutional right to declare war and set limits to the president’s actions deeply contradicts the president’s ability to justify secrecy in the name of national security. If the president remains covert in his military intentions and actions, Congress may be unintentionally stripped of its constitutionally entrusted job. However, technological advances in modern warfare have dramatically increased the likelihood of a sudden threat to national security in America, fostering strengthened safety measures and precautions, but also calling into question the danger of public knowledge of military actions and plans. Although the “Framers of the Constitution” worked to limit the powers of the president by separating war powers between the executive and legislative branches, the Constitution allows room for initial secrecy in times of national security crisis when the release of information about actions and strategies could be detrimental to the lives of Americans and dangerous in the hands of a foreign enemy. Henceforth, the evolution of the United States Constitution and scholarly interpretation of the Constitution support the justification of initial secrecy through national security concerns. 15 As delegates at the Constitutional Convention crafted the Constitution, they considered the relationship between the president, the country, and the inevitable wars America would face. In The Federalist No. 4, John Jay, under the pseudonym Publius, expressed his sentiments about the allocation of war powers shared by celebrated scholars of the era: he believed that "absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of the people." John Jay highlighted the Founding Fathers’ fear of unilateral presidential power in times of war and in decisions to go to war. In their rejection of the British monarchy and their creation of a new republican government, the Founding Fathers moved away from the traditional concentration of war power in a single man’s hands. They believed that a collective group and a collaborative military decision would best keep the country safe from unwarranted and unnecessary wars. The delegates to the first Constitutional Convention believed that with a large group to debate and argue the issue of war, America would go to war far less often than if an executive, driven by avarice and ambition like any other man, were to solely possess the power. This separation of power is often referred to as the “separation of the power of the sword from the power of the purse,” meaning that while the president acts as Commander in Chief with the ability to direct military forces, only Congress retains the right to levy taxes in order to raise funds and forces to make war possible. Ultimately, the men who wrote the Constitution attempted to create safeguards to prevent excessive wars and protect the lives of Americans. Although these Framers created safeguards, language in some clauses of the Constitution and historical opinions indicate that there is some flexibility for secrecy to protect the common good. 16 In Article I, Section VIII, Congress retains the right to many of the divided war powers. The most important war powers include Congress’ right to the following: “ [8] to declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning the Captures on Land and Water; [14] to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.”1 The president, on the other hand, has few and limited war powers. Article II, Section II gives the remaining very few and limited war powers to the president, granting the president Commander in Chief. The powers delegated to the president seem to be “managerial and defensive” authority, while Congress possess true power that can lead to action.2 "The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure." - George Washington Presidents in the decade following the ratification of the Constitution largely respected the war powers of Congress outlined in the Constitution. George Washington abided by Congress’ right to declare war. Washington’s Secretary of War, General Henry Knox also affirmed Congress’ sole right to the declaration of war, saying, “If such measures are to be pursued they must result from the decisions of Congress who solely are vested with the powers of War."3 Although Washington and his Secretary of War acknowledged Congress’ right to the declaration and authorization of war, they did believe in the president’s discretion about sensitive military and strategic plans. The first authorization of war by Congress after the ratification of the Constitution was on September 29, 1789, when Congress passed legislation “for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of the frontiers of the United States from the hostile incursions of the Indians.”4 In the following years The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8(8, 14) Healy, Gene. The Cult of the Presidency: America's Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2008, “Our Magistrate and His Powers,” Page 31 3 Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. 2nd ed. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 4 1 Stat. 96, sec. 5 (1789) 1 2 17 Congress passed more statutes to protect the citizens of the Western Frontier.5 President Washington ordered Governor Arthur St. Clair to execute the legislature passed by Congress, but St. Clair’s forces suffered a great defeat by the Indians which spurred the first congressional investigation. Congress authorized a committee to investigate the failure of St. Clair’s forces and the committee asked Washington for papers to aid in their investigation. The Cabinet met privately and decided that the House of Representatives “was an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries... [and] might call for papers generally.”6 This statement seems to imply that the president must release all relevant military papers and records in order for Congress to complete its investigation; however, George Washington’s Cabinet further specified their opinion contrary to the above assumption. The Cabinet decided that the president "ought to communicate such paper as the public good would permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the public: consequently were to exercise a discretion."7 This statement permits the president to use secrecy, even when presenting information to Congress, if the truth or planned actions would endanger the public. George Washington’s Cabinet agreed that the president had the right to initial secrecy, even with Congress, when national security and the safety of the public were concerns. This early precedent, set by George Washington’s Cabinet, reflects the discretion that President Polk and many late twentieth century presidents have used throughout their administrations. The Mexican War has always sparked discussion about controversial wartime decisions. In early May of 1846, President Polk commanded that General Zachary Taylor station his troops on the Texan-Mexican border, believing in “the possibility of a collision between the American & Mexican forces.”8 Despite the report of alleged hostilities by Mexican forces by President Polk, 1 Stat.121 sec. 16 (1790); 1 Stat. 222 (1791) 1 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 303-5 (Albert Ellery Bergh, ed. 1903) 7 1 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 303-5 (Albert Ellery Bergh, ed. 1903) 8 Id. at 379 5 6 18 Congress and much of the country believed that Polk waged the Mexican war for land gains, namely for the lands of present day California, Oregon and Washington. Abraham Lincoln was especially skeptical of Polk’s actions, believing he stepped beyond his presidential war powers and began the Mexican war for land gain and power. Lincoln, who voted to censure Polk in Congress’ debate, reaffirmed the Framers’ desire of divided and limited war powers with his later statement: “Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose-- you allow him to make war at pleasure... This, our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing the oppression upon us."9 Lincoln summarized the sentiments of many members of the House when they evaluated Polk’s controversial actions during the beginning of the Mexican War, believing it to be "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States."10 Congress also wanted to investigate Polk’s expenditures related to foreign affairs and his interactions with other nations from May of 1841 to May of 1843. Polk refused to share the records with Congress with the justification that the president could use discretion about his spending, using the precedent set by George Washington’s Cabinet about executive discretion and the law that the president could release records of expenditures that "as in his judgement may be made public, and also for the amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to specify.”11 Congress accepted Polk’s justification and failed to receive the full report of his foreign spending. The emergence of confidential executive spending in early America reinforces the theory that the Constitution allows for some initial secrecy. Although the instances of clandestine expenditures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were small and infrequent, these early 1 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 451-52 (Roy Basler, ed. 1953) (emphasis in original.) Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1848) 11 Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. 2nd ed. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 9 10 19 examples paved the way for the dramatic increase in executive spending in the twentieth century. The first instance of secret spending was in 1790 when President Washington was awarded $40,000 "for the support of such persons as he shall commission to serve the United States in foreign parts."12 The “such persons” that will serve in “foreign parts” leaves much ambiguity and allows for secrecy about specific actions and plans abroad. President Madison also kept some of his foreign expenditures initially secret to the public. In 1811, Congress voted in a secret session for the temporary possession of the territory south of Georgia and Madison was given $100,000 to buy the land so it would not be taken by a European power. The American public did not find out about his purchase until the official statute was published in 1818. Madison’s initial secrecy allowed for the temporary purchase of the land. If the general public had been aware of the purchase, the foreign power could have been notified and could have obtained the territory with a higher offer. Covert spending continued into the twentieth century with the following early instances: 1) $25,000 travel fund for the president in 1906; 2) $50,000 for the Secretary of the Navy in 1916 to obtain information from abroad; 3) $20,000 for the Federal Bureau of Investigation "to meet unforeseen emergencies."13 During the Progressive Era, presidents exerted more executive power because they believed that their actions were justified by the Constitution. An example of this perceived expanded power is President Theodore Roosevelt’s addition of the “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, the predominant philosophy of foreign relations and public policy for nineteenth century America. This Corollary included the idea that the United States could become involved as a last resort "only if it became evident that [a foreign nations’] inability or unwillingness 12 13 1. Stat. 128-29 (1790) Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. 2nd ed. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 20 to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations." 14 Presidents of the twentieth and twenty first centuries drastically increased the amount of secret spending in allocating funds for special committees and intelligence agencies and in performing various military actions. Presidents of the twentieth century have been castigated for their secrecy and their disregard for the war powers of Congress. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 restated and redefined the war powers of the president. By virtue of the fact that the Resolution was necessary, many presidents have viewed Congress as passive and lenient in their usage of their war powers and defense of their war powers. The War Powers Resolution states in Section 4, that in the absence of a congressional declaration of war, whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into situations from which hostilities are likely to arise, the president must submit a written report to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate outlining the following: (A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities and involvement.15 Since the president has a period of 48 hours to notify the leaders of Congress about U.S. Armed Forces involvement in hostilities, the War Powers Resolution leaves room for initial presidential secrecy, allowing the president to set up his troops and plan strategies before a large amount of people gain knowledge of the actions and rationale behind them. Additionally, in Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, the language indicates that the executive branch must remove troops from hostilities if Congress has not granted the president a declaration or authorization of war within sixty days of the introduction of U.S. military forces. In the words of Harold Hongju Koh “Hence, presidents have 14 15 Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. 2nd ed. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2004. War Powers Resolution, H.R.J. Res. (H. J. Res 542) (1973). 15 21 interpreted the War Powers Resolution as granting implicit permission to engage in covert operations or conduct military operations that can be completed within the resolution’s sixty-day limitation.”16 The War Powers Resolution stands as yet another example of implied secrecy that presidents have used to their military advantage. For years, historians and constitutional scholars have studied the war powers outlined in the Constitution and examined presidents’ actions through an extremely critical lense. Although some notable historians that support a strict interpretation of the Constitution reject executive secrecy, many others delve deeper into the language of the Constitution and explore the intentions as well as the words of the creators of the Constitution. These historians believe initial presidential secrecy can be used in order to protect America and its people. John Hart Ely, the premier constitutional scholar of his generation, argues that "presidents can constitutionally fight unauthorized secret wars, sometimes, but not for more than a couple of days."17 This analysis is supported by the opinions of George Washington’s Cabinet and the statute about presidential discretion. Presidents are constitutionally allowed to repel sudden attacks and fight wars with initial secrecy and without congressional authorization. Senator Moynihan agreed with John Hart Ely stating his approval of initially covert presidential wars, "My first comment about so-called secret wars must be that there is no such thing. The preparations for war can be kept secret, but once the war commences, whatever its avowed nature, it becomes a public event..."18 Both John Hart Ely and Senator Moynihan agree that military actions can be kept secret and are usually most successful when kept secret; however, the president must seek congressional authorization after the few days of secrecy. Initial secrecy about military actions, particularly rescue missions and high stake strategies can be kept secret, but Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair (1990), 39-40 Ely, John Hart. War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. 18 Forum, "Should the U.S. Fight Secret Wars?" Harper's Mag., Sept. 1984, at 33, 35 (Daniel Patrick Moynihan). Accord, id. (William Colby); id. at 41 (Ray S Cline). 16 17 22 when information is known, the president must give full reports and records to Congress. The following statements perfectly summarize the opinions of scholars who approved of presidential secrecy: "The only legitimate basis for the delegation in the first place was the need for tactical secrecy in conducting military operations. Thus, it follows that when secrecy fails or is no longer necessary to the success of an operation, such action must be presented to the full Congress and may not continue without formal legislative authorization. When the United States is controlling the war-making activities of private forces, which are no secret to the enemy, there is no legitimate reason not to get congressional authorization for the executive's action."19 In the twenty first century, the internet, social media and increased global connections between people have made military knowledge even more potentially dangerous in the hands of citizens. Information about upcoming military actions can easily be shared in a matter of seconds, even if done so unintentionally. Because of the new age of technology in communication and military advancements, a foreign nations’ knowledge of America’s military actions can mean the difference between success and failure; therefore, initial presidential secrecy about military actions and rationale, although not necessary explicitly condoned by the Constitution, should be allowed in order to protect the lives and security of the American people. Recently, there has been much controversy concerning the true nature of and the motives behind the horrific attack on the American consulate in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012. It was announced as a planned terrorist attack, a violent response to an American made Anti-Muslim video, and a spontaneous reaction to recent strife in the area. Many Americans were appalled and frustrated that they did not know the full truth about the incidents in Benghazi; they believed that they had the right to know what happened to the brave Americans working at the consulate in Ely, John Hart. War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. 19 23 Libya. Further analysis and research about presidential war powers illustrates that public knowledge and outrage could have adversely affected America’s response to the attack and future actions. The presidential discretion, even with Congress, that George Washington’s Cabinet condoned remains validated by the safety and security of the American people. In addition, the secrecy about executive spending makes sense, because knowledge of expenditures could reveal military plans and greatly lessen the success of the forces or hurt the goals of the mission. If the United States had a specific rescue mission, it would be very dangerous for knowledge of the plans to be released. For this reason, for the protection of Americans, initial presidential secrecy is justified when national security and the lives of Americans are at stake. In conclusion, national security concerns rightly justify not absolute but rather initial presidential secrecy about military actions and the rationale behind them. Although the “Framers of the Constitution” were concerned about an omnipotent, power-hungry executive and sought to limit the president's power, their primary concern was the safety and security of the American people. Therefore, initial presidential secrecy, as long as it was detailed to Congress and authorized as soon as it was safe to do so, would have been justified by national security concerns. The evolution of executive powers from the original intentions of the delegates at the first Constitutional Convention, the expansion of presidential power and acceptance of this power by Congress and the public, further supports the justification of secrecy in modern, technologically-savvy America. Scholars have examined this evolution and added their own views to the debate about presidential secrecy, further supporting the executive’s military discretion. Given the ability of people around the world to connect instantaneously through technology, presidential secrecy remains not only acceptable but also necessary. 24 Bibliography Ely, John Hart. War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. Fisher, Louis. In the Name of National Security: Unchecked Presidential Power and the Reynolds Case. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. 2nd ed. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2004. Goldsmith, Jack L. The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2009. Healy, Gene. The Cult of the Presidency: America's Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2008. 25 Cameron Nelson ’14 “Providing for the Common Defence: Executive War Powers in History and the Modern Age” War poses as great a menace to the United States today as it has for more than two centuries; however, its evolutions in technology and tactics have rewrought the system of governmental oversight, threatening to disrupt some of the Constitution’s most fundamental safeguards. At center stage, the executive-legislative dynamic teeters perilously as the presidency assumes ever-greater license to initiate and interpret the nature of international conflicts. Since the Cold War, mounting constrictions of Congress’ constitutional duties have incurred critical scrutiny, even legal intervention in the form of the monumental and controversial War Powers Resolution of 1973. Yet, the exercise of Congress’ right via the elastic clause to enact legislation protecting its constitutional powers has likewise come under questioning, such that all that remains between these extremes of power is an ambiguous question of balance.1 Nor do Congress and the president constitute the sole focus of this debate; the nature of intelligence and war technology has rendered high-casualty, ground-based offensives all but obsolete, and a public informed by highly active media has become integral to federal policy. Militarily, there exist certain practical arguments for the redefinition of war and its accompanying procedures. And the will of the people, brought to bear on the actions of their representatives with unprecedented immediacy, may establish a heretofore illusory accountability in the politics of war. In effect, over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the expansion of presidential war powers has essentially been justified, as the shifting demands of federal government with respect to law, the military, and the public have produced appropriate permissions and restraints to warrant continued deference to the executive’s discretion. 1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 26 Law and Practice In any inquiry of this nature, a review of the Constitution may provide a foundation for ensuing examinations: firstly, Article I, section 8, which permits Congress "To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water."2 This element of the War Powers Clause is commonly thought of as preceding the president’s power to mobilize armed forces. It is, in fact, a lesser power than was described in the Articles of Confederation; originally, it fell also to Congress to make war, not merely to declare it.3 Clearly, the Framers resolved by this limitation that war was not the domain of the legislature. Secondly, Article II, section 2, comprises the executive equivalent of the congressional War Powers Clause. It provides that "The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States;” the intention of the Framers was to bring the military under the control of a single elected representative. During the North Carolina Ratifying Convention of 1788, James Iredell attested to the necessity of this clause, contending, "From the nature of the thing, the command of armies ought to be delegated to one person only. The secrecy, despatch, and decision, which are necessary in military operations, can only be expected from one person.”4 The majority of circumstances that have brought Congress and the president into disagreement have involved some overextension of Article I, section 8, that threatens the practice of Article II, section 2. It will be shown that this pattern of encroachments by Congress is generally motivated by partisan, inconsistent, or otherwise dubious interests. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Robert F. Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution (Mclean, Virginia: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1991), 80. 4 Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Founders' Constitution, 2nd ed., vol. 4, The Debates in the Several State Conventions... (New York, NY: Burt Franklin, 1888). 2 3 27 The power to declare war has since the birth of the nation adopted a necessary flexibility. The so-called Quasi-War with France, conducted under the administration of John Adams from 1798 to 1800, serves as a model for wars waged with the implicit, but not explicit, authorization of Congress. While there was no formal declaration of war, Congress appropriated significant military funding and terminated the 1778 treaty of amity and commerce with France.5 It was generally accepted that these were actions consistent with an informal authorization of the conflict.6 The Supreme Court would legitimize this assumption when in Talbot v. Seeman it was surmised "that congress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war... must be noticed.”7 The Barbary Wars would once again test the adolescent language of the War Powers Clause when in May of 1801 the Pasha of Tripoli declared war against the United States. President Jefferson, according to his strict constructionism, was helpless to command effectively, having only been given authority to defend American ships in the Mediterranean. Not until 1804 would Congress explicitly authorize warlike actions against Tripoli.8 Alexander Hamilton, rightfully critical of this stringent adherence to constitutional semantics, perceived the threat to the nation that this stagnancy created. His objection is duly noted: “It belongs to Congress only, to go to War. But when a foreign nation declares, or openly and avowedly makes war upon the United States, they are then by the very fact already at Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 25. Similar conditions would arise two centuries later during the Kosovar crisis. Although no formal authorization was given, Congress’ response to Clinton’s initial report was to forgo a declaration of war while also voting against requiring the president to discontinue U.S. involvement in NATO operations. It was even decided that $11.8 billion in funding should be appropriated to sustain U.S. activities in Bosnia. By neglecting to fully authorize hostilities, Congress’ purpose was not to truncate the operation, but rather it was to eschew political risk; the allocation of funding represented the minimum possible involvement of the legislature, relinquishing to the president both command and accountability. 6see John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11 (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 158-59. 7 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801). 7see also Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800). 8 Fisher, Presidential War Power, 34. 5 6 28 war.”9 This is no political ruse to ascertain greater powers; it is, rather, demanded by legitimate and urgent concerns for the nation’s security and effective self-defense. To fully understand the efforts of Congress to subdue the president’s powers, an investigation of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 is required. During and after the Vietnam War, amidst dismal levels of public approval, Congress sought to distance itself from the conflict. President Johnson’s response to initial aggression, however, was exemplary. Following an attack on the U.S.S. Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin, in which the president’s rapid response ensured that no American lives were lost, he announced in a public report his intention to request Congress “to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united... in defense of peace in southeast Asia.”10 And Congress was not unwilling to oblige the president. Shortly after Johnson’s Report on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, his approval rating rose thirty points to 72%, and Congress acted on his request with even greater unanimity: the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed by votes of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House.11 The reversal of these polling figures and enormous political pressure led Congress to pass the War Powers Resolution in the aftermath of Vietnam and the Nixon administration. Congress would claim that the resolution was "designed to insure that we will never again be involved in a situation... in which a President alone can conduct a protracted conflict without specific authorization from the Congress” -- a clearly fraudulent accusation, given Johnson’s unobjectionable compliance with the practice of consulting the legislature.12 By scapegoating the president, Congress could feign exclusion from the process of approval despite having been directly involved. The War Powers Resolution was, effectively, a corruption of legislative integrity by poll results, political popularity, and an avoidance of accountability. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, 745-47, quoted in Fisher, Presidential War Power, 35. Lyndon Baines Johnson, "Report on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident" (speech transcript, August 4, 1964). 11 Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution, 17. 12 Congressional Record, 93d Cong., 1st sess.,1973, p. 119, pt. 2, p. 36217, quoted in Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution, 34. 9 10 29 Judicial review of the War Powers Resolution would indicate several egregious defects, of which more than one imply unconstitutionality. Perhaps the most flagrant is the creation of a the legislative veto in U.S.C. § 1544(c), which states: Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.13 The ruling on the case of INS v. Chadha, in which it was determined that Congress could not overrule the Attorney General’s decision to suspend the deportation of an alien, clearly denounced § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as establishing congressional power in violation of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution.14 Section 1544(c) establishes a comparably untenable authority. James Madison pointed out that the legislative veto was unacceptable in that it created "an Imperium in imperio; or of two powers both of them supreme, yet each of them liable to be superseded by the other.”15 Indeed, the Framers strictly intended that every legal decision requiring the concurrence of the House and the Senate be submitted to the president.16 Furthermore, U.S.C. § 1543 also presents an unacceptable requirement: unconditional consultation. It is rightfully mandatory that the Congress be informed before entry into offensive war; however, the War Powers Resolution generalizes to all situations in which "involvement in hostilities” is implied, a requirement that threatens the Framers’ provisions for the secrecy of the president’s strategic deliberations. Ultimately, the War Powers Resolution was a political mechanism driven initially by protest of an War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93–148, § 5, Nov. 7, 1973, 87 Stat. 556. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 15 James Madison, Speech on Jay’s Treaty (Mar. 10, 1796), in 16 Madison Papers, 257, quoted in Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace, 226. 16 A concurrent resolution must be either approved or vetoed by the president. Only in the latter case could Congress bypass the president by overturning the executive veto. Otherwise, it does not fall to Congress to countermand the President’s authority. 13 14 30 unpopular war. Now, in the absence of political consensus, the integrity and effectiveness of the document’s legal implications are doubtful in the extreme. From the nation’s earliest conflicts to the War Powers Resolution, history has affirmed that the interference of Congress in the sensitive affairs of the Commander-in-Chief is neither justified nor conducive to the preservation of national security. Necessities of a Modern Military The nature of modern military engagements justifies an extension of presidential privilege even before Congress’ erosion of that privilege is considered. No longer are all wars unambiguous conflicts pitting one nation against another. The threat of isolated aggressions has grown, while weapons of mass destruction and transnational terrorism demand ever-greater vigilance of the Armed Forces and intelligence agencies. One concept that has faced great resistance is that of preemptive war. It is not so much a matter of debate that to effectively address modern threats requires advance action; however, many in Congress are reluctant to concede this point. The case of Dellums v. Bush identifies but one of continual clashes between Congress and the president over this perceived excess of power. Fifty-four members of the House and one senator brought an injunction against President George Bush, Sr., when he amassed troops in the Middle East in response to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.17 Their assertion, that this represented a breach of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution, was dismissed as not yet warranting judicial attention. To understand the cause of this, it is necessary to examine the case’s citation of Baker v. Carr, which established as judicial precedent that non-justiciable claims should be dismissed. The Court in Dellums v. Bush, as in Baker v. Carr, could not give redress to the congressmen due to their 17 Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (1990). 31 "failure to state a justiciable cause of action.”18 From a judicial standpoint, the question was still merely political, and a ruling on the constitutionality of the president’s actions would be premature.19 Secrecy, in the denotative sense, is of incalculable value to modern national security, especially given the proportion of combat consisting of precise strikes as opposed to broad offensives. Technology has reversed the Weinberger and Powell doctrines, enabling victory "not through using a maximum number of troops and firepower to overwhelm the enemy, but through a quick operation using special operations forces, airpower, and local militia.”20 Whereas secrecy before 9/11 implied merely executive discretion, today it has taken on a more literal meaning as an ideological war is waged on the necessary restriction of information. On numerous occasions the premature release of classified information has jeopardized operations and indeed lives. To evaluate an early example, the catastrophic end to the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961 was directly related to a breach of intelligence. The executive branch had employed the CIA to train and equip Cuban exiles for a surprise offensive, but a few days before their mobilization a story printed in the New York Times reported on highly delicate details of the project, even mentioning an impending invasion.21 President Kennedy was forced for political reasons to deny involvement, and Cuba acted immediately on the advantage of this early warning. Consequently, the government was helpless to provide tangible support to the rebels as they went to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, (1962). The second reason for the dismissal concerned the context of the alleged offense. The plaintiffs argued that Bush’s passage of U.N. Resolution 678 authorizing military action to repel the Iraqi invasion represented a preparation for impending war. However, the resolution would not come into effect until the next year. Moreover, at the time the injunction was brought against the president, the arrangement of a meeting between Bush and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, as well as one between Secretary of State James Baker and Saddam Hussein, had already been publicly announced. The Court’s ruling reflected the dubiety of cries that those gathered troops would be used in an actual, immediate offensive. 19see Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (1990). 20 Julian E. Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security -- from World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2010), 443-44. 21 Fisher, Presidential War Powers, 248-49. 18 19 32 their deaths.22 Returning to the statement of James Iredell regarding the importance of isolating the Commander-in-Chief powers, it is clear that modern military maneuvers necessitate more "secrecy, despatch, and decision” than ever before to ensure the safety of American operatives. The secrecy and efficiency of military activity are of the utmost importance as war evolves beyond a model of high-casualty, protracted commitments, and the cost is a just respect for the authorities of the executive branch in the midst of crisis. The Role of the Public The primary dissent on this subject issues from the public, whose role must be fully considered despite the problems it presents. A leader beholden to the people is vital to political progress and righteousness.23 As a product of this dynamic, the inevitable publicization of presidential records exercises an equitable restraint on the president. Still, the reactions and demands of the populace may easily be dilated by sensationalist media, thus requiring careful inspection before their merits can be determined. Congress and the president alike may be informed by the presentment of news and its effect on the public, as in the case of President Reagan’s invasion of Grenada in October of 1983. Operation Urgent Fury, as it was codenamed, also aimed to rescue American medical students taken captive in the wake of a military coup. Congress, fearing negative publicity, denounced it as an instance of American imperialism and a violation of the War Powers Resolution, even calling for a legal investigation. The aftermath would prove contrary to their expectations when news programs began covering images of the rescued students and of celebratory demonstrations in a successfully This event has repeatedly been misconstrued as a failure on the part of the president; on the contrary, any chance of success was forfeited by reporters crafting a sensational news story from improperly leaked information. 23 As political scientist Richard Neustadt pointed out in Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership, any president desirous of maintaining leadership is realistically bound to act in the interests of the general public. Such was the purpose of the Framers in emphasizing the nation’s democratic foundations. 23see Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1960). 22 33 restabilized Grenada. Polling conducted by ABC and CBS News indicated approval ratings in excess of 90%.24 The legal investigation was promptly discontinued. Congress’ reversal of its position was quick and shameless, and the convenience of its regression did not go unnoticed. A U.S. News & World Report article discerned lucidly "What finally persuaded... Congress to switch and back Reagan on the invasion... wasn’t what lawmakers found on their visit to the island, insiders report, but an avalanche of mail from voters back home heartily endorsing the President’s action. Veteran politicians had no trouble following that weathervane.”25 Thus the public can effectively hold Congress accountable for its politically opportunistic antagonism. Citizens collectively are perhaps the strongest defenders of their civil rights, and in the interest of deterring an overbearing government it is easy for public opinion to be turned against policies presented out of context. Appropriately, concern for the right to privacy generates considerable paranoia. In December of 2005, the New York Times leaked information regarding the president’s direction that the National Security Agency monitor the extranational communications of suspected enemies under the statutory military authority granted by Congress in the wake of 9/11.26 Reparations to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, in the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, or FAA, further outlined presidential liberties in the context of the threat of alQa’ida.27 The response was one of great resistance as multitudinous domestic organizations, fearing they would be targeted, submitted an injunction in protest. Their allegation that this constituted an explicit incursion on their private affairs indicates clearly that they were misinformed; FISA deals specifically with foreign intelligence, requiring that one party in a targeted communication be a nonU.S. citizen. Even when Americans are involved in such a communication, they cannot be Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution, 124. "Washington Whispers,” U.S. News & World Report, November 14, 1983, 23, quoted in Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution, 124. 26 Andrew C. McCarthy, "Congress Cannot Limit a President’s Constitutional Powers," in Domestic Wiretapping, ed. Sylvia Engdahl, Current Controversies (Detroit, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2008), 99. 27 Amnesty Intern. USA et al. v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, (2d Cir. 2011). 24 25 34 specifically targeted.28 The authority is also statutorily constrained, which in 2010 meant that only persons determined to be connected to al-Qa’ida were eligible targets. The court dismissed the case, entitled Amnesty et al. v. Clapper, on the grounds that no indication could be given that these organizations would be subjected to this highly specialized power. Fear of being spied upon has inspired fervent denouncements of government operations for decades. It is easy to overlook the regular review of these operations -- the National Security Agency’s activities are inspected every forty-five days, approximately -- to find only fault with a function of government justified by both congressional and judicial consent.29 Nevertheless, presidential war powers require review just as any authority of the nation’s elected leader. The private media industry, feeding as it does upon the public’s dependency, tends to report selectively, and not always in a manner that serves the critical responsibilities of an informed population. In fact, the media’s concern for profit can restrict public access to data, as in the 1980s when proposals to privatize government records led to the marketing of information formerly free or inexpensive. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for instance, provided financial records through a private contractor at no less than full market value.30 The United States Department of Agriculture likewise distributed its data through the Martin Marietta Corporation, providing it to consumers at a cost of hundreds of dollars.31 President Bush, Sr., would eventually terminate the policy, allowing the public into the debate and review of government publications once again.32 Freedom of information is integral to communicating popular will; this basic tenet of democracy 28John Schmidt, "Presidents Can Order Wiretapping for Foreign Intelligence Purposes," in Domestic Wiretapping, ed. Sylvia Engdahl, Current Controversies (Detroit, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2008), 89-90. 29 U.S. Department of Justice, "Claims Made by Opponents of the NSA Wiretapping Program Are Untrue," in Domestic Wiretapping, ed. Sylvia Engdahl, Current Controversies (Detroit, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2008), 95. 30 Anne Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information?: from Privacy to Public Access (N.p.: Basic Books, 1994), 171. 31 Branscomb, Who Owns Information?, 170-71. 32 Branscomb, Who Owns Information?, 171. 35 might be better served, however, if the public can directly handle information that the government willingly supplies. The delicate accord between Congress, the president, and the Constitution has shifted in time to accommodate the peril and promise of modernity. Ultimately, evaluation of constitutional provisions in the context of current threats lists distinctly toward the preservation of executive discretion. Throughout American history this principle has gained the support of the judicial branch and of the population, even enlisting the support of Congress when clear necessity supersedes political concerns. The opinion of the courts has upheld the distinction between isolated hostilities or noncommittal “partial” wars and the rarer “general” war, which rightly demands the consent of Congress and the concordance of all the nation’s assets. Congress, despite the measures it has taken against presidential privilege, is at least responsive to situational details, if only for the sake of political reputation. And a vital factor in balancing this equation is the American public, whose direct access to information will bring its influence to bear in the coming century with undreamed-of efficiency. Citizens’ freedom to be informed sustains the accountability of both Congress and the president, obliging each to exercise its allotted powers for naught but the sake of the people. If this model is appropriately observed, Congress shall be consulted exactly as far as security allows, and likewise the duties of the president shall not suffer the interference of Congress when they abide by this realistic interpretation of the Constitution. The power to declare war is bold and momentous; but the defense of the nation, and accordingly the authority to repel its enemies and to secure its interests whenever the need arises, is resoundingly placed in the confidence of the Commander-inChief. 36 Bibliography Amnesty Intern. USA et al. v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011). Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800). Branscomb, Anne Wells. Who Owns Information? : from Privacy to Public Access. N.p.: Basic Books, 1994. Elliot, Jonathan, ed. The Founders’ Constitution. 2nd ed. Vol. 4 of The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. New York, NY: Burt Franklin, 1888. Engdahl, Sylvia, ed. Domestic Wiretapping. Current Controversies. Detroit, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2008. Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Powers. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995. Johnson, Lyndon Baines. “Report on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.” Speech transcript, August 4, 1964. Neustadt, Richard. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1960. 37 Turner, Robert F. Repealing the War Powers Resolution. McLean, Virginia: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1991. The War Powers Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 93-148 (1973). Wormuth, Francis, and Edwin Firmage, with Francis Butler. To Chain the Dog of War: The War Powers of Congress in History and Law. Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1987. Yoo, John. The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2005. Zelizer, Julian E. Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security -- from World War II to the War on Terrorism. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2010. 38 James Dion ’14 “Reaping the Seeds of Conflict: The Dawes Act of 1887” In 1916, Carlos Montezuma responded critically to the Dawes Act’s policy of allotment when he published his newsletter, Wassaja. Meaning in the Apache language, “Let my people go,” Wassaja reflected Montezuma’s belief that the act stifled Native self-determination. But what is most shocking is that he opposed the Dawes Act some thirty years after it became law. Although the act clearly repressed the Natives, it did not silence them completely. Through manifest destiny, whites’ greed for and sense of entitlement to western lands met with Native resistance. While unrest was prevalent throughout the nineteenth century, whites began to view western turmoil as particularly problematic at the Civil War’s conclusion in 1865. After several unsuccessful attempts at resolving the tensions between whites and Natives in the west, the Dawes Act appeared to benefit both sides. Unfortunately however, the act concerned the interests of western whites above all else. Assimilation, by which tribal cultures and Native identities gradually eroded, failed to fulfill the promise it made to the Natives, and they were denied many of the rights of whites. Via the process of land allotment, the Dawes Act stripped Natives of most of their tribal lands and herded them onto cramped reservations, thus allowing whites to pour in and expand their control. Enhancing white freedom and limiting the presence of the Native American identities in society, the Dawes Act addressed the continued tension in the west by fundamentally altering society. Through profound social change, Natives witnessed whites rise to the top of the western social hierarchy, while the Natives faded from view. But was the Dawes Act successful? The profound social change appears to indicate this, as it empowered whites and mitigated outward conflict. But this assumption just begins to scratch at the surface of the Dawes Act. In order to dig deeper, we need to consult 39 Natives such as Montezuma, those individuals who experienced firsthand the injustices of the Dawes Act. A Background on Westward Expansion and the Rise of Western Tension After the Civil War’s conclusion in 1865, America was able to shift its focus back to the west. With construction on a transcontinental railroad having commenced in 1863, the prominence of the railroad out west assured the influx of more white settlers. As whites poured into the west, they began to establish their own societies, in which mechanized agriculture played a key role. However, this push west helped to eliminate the buffer zone that had been established via the western relocation of the Natives. Coming face to face with the whites, the Natives were particularly disturbed by the whites’ careless destruction of western land via mechanized agriculture. Both needing the land to survive and resentful of their forced western relocation, Natives were unwilling to meet white demands for land a second time. As historian Henry E. Fritz has described, “The inevitable consequence was that enmity grew between the original inhabitants and the white people who came to take their patrimony.”1 Clearly, this blossoming tension would need to be resolved if whites were to continue expanding westward. In an effort to restore order, the U.S. government recognized that some sort of federal Indian policy would be essential in the upcoming future. But with its decision to intervene in the crisis came two potentially groundbreaking questions. Would the government favor a particular group, and if it did, how would this impact the group that went unsupported? While government intervention seemed capable of calming tensions, early federal policy regarding the west had little effect. By 1887, the federal government had experimented with various policies, but none proved useful to western whites who wanted to subdue the Natives with as little Henry E. Fritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation: 1860-1890 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), 109. 1 40 risk to themselves as possible. Finding military force and peace unsuitable in dealing with the Natives, for both carried the risk of white casualties, the federal government searched for a policy that would open up western lands without threatening whites. In essence, the Dawes Act would focus entirely on mitigating the strength of the Natives, leaving white power unchecked. Proving to be one of the most controversial pieces of legislation concerning Natives in the west, the Dawes Act would shape not only western society, but also historiography. That is, the Dawes Act would inspire a generation of later historians to ruminate upon its social purpose and consequences. When Historiography Does Not Tell the Entire Story Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, several commendable historians, including Leonard A. Carlson, D.S. Otis, Francis Paul Prucha, and Henry E. Fritz, have all attempted to explain the purpose of the Dawes Act and its impact upon whites and Natives. Otis and Prucha have presented a relatively compelling argument that has demonstrated the perceived shift in the Dawes Act from pro-Native to pro-white. They have argued that the act attempted to promote white land interests in the west.2 Carlson has echoed Prucha and Otis, but has deepened his argument by detailing the hierarchy and atmosphere of white superiority that the act precipitated.3 Lastly, Fritz briefly explained the act’s betterment of whites and marginalization of the Natives. But he has also ruminated upon the failure of the Dawes Act. The act, in his opinion, ended up attaining goals quite different from those it started out with.4 All fall short of providing a 2 Kenneth R. Philp, review of Indians, Bureaucrats, and Land: The Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian Farming, by Leonard A. Carlson, American Indian Quarterly 6, no. 3 (1982), 385-387. Donald J. Berthrong, review of Indians, Bureaucrats, and Land: The Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian Farming, by Leonard A. Carlson, Agricultural History 56, no. 3 (1982), 600-603. 3 Kenneth R. Philp, review of The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands, by D.S. Otis and Francis Paul Prucha, The Journal of American History 61, no. 2 (1974), 529-530. Henry E. Fritz, review of The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands, by D.S. Otis and Francis Paul Prucha, Pacific Historical Review 43, no. 4 (1974), 606-608. 4 Herman J. Viola, review of The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890, by Henry E. Fritz, The Journal of American History 52, no. 3 (1965), 641. 41 reasonably comprehensive understanding of what the Dawes Act truly was, and how it changed the face of America. Not one piece of historiography has attempted to dwell on Native responses to the Dawes Act, much less appreciate the complexity of the Natives’ predicament. Any study of the Dawes Act is incomplete without the perspectives of the Natives. My paper seeks to resolve this issue by drawing attention to and providing these Native outlooks with the credit they should have always had. Such an approach, as we have seen in the research of other prominent historians, is quite unconventional, but necessary in my opinion. For, if we are truly to understand the extent to which the Dawes Act erased the Native identity and rendered them powerless, we must look at the act through the Natives’ eyes. Assimilation: A Nefarious Machination The process of assimilation enables us to analyze the complexity of the Dawes Act that lay beneath its facade. Through assimilation white culture was strengthened, while the identity of different tribes significantly waned over time. Although assimilation appeared to reach out to the Natives with the chance for acceptance in American society, it is important to note that this privilege could only be obtained through the Natives’ renunciation of their own identity. Those Natives who underwent the process of assimilation ceased to be Natives, and their conformity to white norms allowed white culture to grow rampant at the expense of fading tribal cultures. Thus, the Dawes Act approached the struggle in the west in terms of identity, as it clearly targeted the Native identity. Despite this clear purpose, another insidious intention was at play. The act reflected the ethnic intolerance that pervaded white society and attempted to bolster white superiority in society. If tribal identities declined and white culture soared, then society would slowly become more and more Henry G. Waltmann, review of The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890, by Henry E. Fritz, Ethnohistory 11, no. 1 (1964), 75-76. 42 uniform until only white beliefs remained. Assimilation therefore served a dual purpose. Not only did it erode tribalism and gradually diminish the Native opposition to whites, but also did it do so in a subtle way. Thus, this process disillusioned Natives and tricked them into giving up their old ways without endangering the lives of whites via military force. Although nefarious, assimilation appeared an ingenious and effective process. Assimilation instilled within the Natives a sense of false hope as it promised a considerable deal, but took much more than it gave. Reflecting the white prejudices of the time, assimilation repressed Native identities as the Dawes Act provided few material gains for Natives. Leonard Carlson has claimed, “Reformers were not concerned with what Indians wanted. An Indian who resisted assimilation was wrong.”5 The manifest contempt for Native identities at the very foundation of social reform presaged that the Dawes Act would likely not focus on aiding the Natives in any way. Henry Fritz also demonstrated the malevolent intentions of assimilation. He wrote, “Brigadier General Alfred Sully wrote that the easiest way to exterminate a wild Indian was to civilize him.”6 Assimilation bore the undertones of eradication, and threatened rather than uplifted the Natives. Fritz later mentioned, “This frontiersman was now on the side of the Indians. ‘If there was any integrity left in the white race,’ he wrote, ‘the treaty should be kept. Did not the Indians require a place to exist?’”7 Apparently, whites were not unanimous in repressing the Native identity; however, the singularity of this dissenting voice suggested the continued future of assimilation and Native suffering. Focusing in on the Native-government dynamic, Stephen Cornell proclaimed, “In earlier treaties, the Natives granted certain sovereign powers to the United States and accepted some Leonard A. Carlson, Indians, Bureaucrats, and Land: The Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian Farming (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 79. 6 Fritz, 45. 7 Fritz, 111-112. 5 43 limits on their activities, but maintained a substantial degree of freedom in their internal affairs.”8 Before the Dawes Act, Natives displayed a relationship with the government in which they compromised and remained sovereign. It is evident that the Natives viewed assimilation through this same lens of compromise, and felt that, while they would be stripped of their identity, their personal autonomy would not be hindered. Of course, the Native response to the government was much more complex. Richard White has explained, “Carlos Montezuma felt that the Natives’ salvation would come if they adopted the culture of the larger society. But Montezuma coupled his disdain for Indian cultures with a deep belief in Indian abilities.”9 Montezuma symbolized the Natives’ struggle to determine whether identity or salvation from persecution at the hands of whites was more important. This difficult choice helps to explain why some Natives adopted a practice that clearly did not favor their own interests. The inherent racism toward Native culture, supported by assimilation’s assault on identity, helped to form a growing sense of white superiority in society. Fritz has declared, “At best Indians were regarded as members of a primitive race and as a hindrance to progress. Generation would succeed generation before many westerners would admit than an injustice had been done the red man.”10 Not only did he illustrate the ethnic strife between Natives and whites, but also did he underscore western whites’ selfish refusal to address the blatant wrongs done the Natives. Richard White added to the sense of white domination of the Natives via immense power when he stated, “Where the federal government did not control relations between whites and Natives, conditions 8 Stephen Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 47. 9 Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own.” A New History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 439. 10 Fritz, 119. 44 became a nightmare. Whites could occasionally put genocide into practice.”11 Whites were vehemently opposed to accepting the Natives, but also, the possibility of genocide affirms that western society allowed whites to do as they pleased. The abuse of white power would not bode well for the Natives. Section Ten of the Dawes Act explicitly detailed, “That nothing in this act contained shall be so construed to affect the right and power of Congress to grant the right of way through any lands granted to an Indian, or a tribe of Indians.”12 In this sense, the Dawes Act came increasingly to confine the Natives, while it secured autonomy to the whites. This idea that whites should have the power of control suggests that whites did not accept, and were not comfortable with, Natives’ self-autonomy. Thus white control became, unjustly, the option that many whites demanded. As ethnic intolerance and the Dawes Act led to unprecedented white privileges, Natives paid a considerable price as their freedoms, particularly with respect to their self-determination, diminished. In this paragraph, we will explore and come to understand the Dawes Act in ways that should have been, but have yet to be, utilized. That is, we shall take what we already know and add another layer of complexity to it via the Natives’ responses and reactions to the concept of assimilation. It would appear that the Natives were initially disillusioned by assimilation, as many came to comment on its failure to live up to expectations. However, while many Natives had high hopes for assimilation, they also seemed to have a strategy behind accepting this process. Having proclaimed that the Natives were dying off in expectation of things, and that the whites would go home without trying to fulfill what they had promised the Natives,13 Sitting Bull, suffered a grand injustice as he personally witnessed western white soldiers massacre his people at Wounded Knee in 1890 over a tribal ritual known as the Ghost Dance. He manifested the sense of false hope that White, 340. U.S. Senate, General Allotment Act, 1887 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1887), 10. 13 Sitting Bull as quoted in Virgil J. Vogel, This Country Was Ours (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972), 181-182. 11 12 45 assimilation instilled within Natives, as well as the subsequent Native disaffection with whites. But Sitting Bull added complexity to the Native view of assimilation when he remarked, “You are shown how the white men work and make things. You are living in a new path. We need you to help us understand what the white men are up to.”14 In this, we see that certain Natives distrusted the promises of whites, but viewed assimilation as a way for them to protect themselves from the covert machinations of whites. But as Many Horses, who accompanied Sitting Bull on that fateful day in 1890, pointed out, “I will ask him, the white man, to help me understand his ways, then I will prepare the way for my children. There are but two ways. One leads to hunger and death, and the other leads to where the poor white man lives.”15 Thus, some Natives utilized assimilation as a lastditch effort to better their lives. They realized that assimilation would not provide them with much, but this little opportunity was better than the fairly certain reality of nothing. Above all, assimilation placed Natives in an uncomfortable position, for they would not gain much, regardless of their decision. And most importantly, even those Natives that did opt for assimilation revealed that they would continue to be at odds with whites. Therefore, assimilation failed to resolve the crucial issue of the tension between Natives and whites. And this powerful conclusion is available to us in large part because we decided to consider the credible perspectives of Natives, with regards to life after the Dawes Act. Allotment: Outward Repression and Internal Resentment Through land allotment, Natives were herded onto cramped reservations, but were not forced to give up their tribal heritage, as they were obliged to do through assimilation. Those Natives that did not assimilate were expected to accept the policy of land allotment. Restricting the Sitting Bull as quoted in W.C. Vanderwerth, Indian Oratory (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 233234. 15 Many Horses as quoted in Virginia I. Armstrong, I Have Spoken (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1971), 130. 14 46 Native Americans, land allotment developed the social hierarchy of white dominance, but unlike assimilation, appeared to escalate the Native-white conflict. Not all Natives were so inclined to trust in or follow the process of assimilation, and certain Native Americans refused to abandon the principles by which they had lived for so long. And if certain Natives retained their identity and continued to move freely in the west, then they would continue to be an obstacle as westward expansion pushed onward. Whites may have overpowered the Natives, but the notion of continued aggression and occasional white casualties seemed a source of continual discontent to many whites. Through land allotment, Natives were able to retain their identity, but were stripped of their lands and forced onto small, cramped reservations. In the meantime, the west was further opened to white settlement. Though the Native identity persisted, they lost the freedom of movement, and reservations represented a type of containment by which whites could control and keep an eye on the Natives. And while this significantly decreased the power of the Natives and placated whites who were worried about Native resistance, allotment merely intensified the Native grudge with whites, for Natives brooded for years to come upon this injustice of white control. Through land allotment, the Dawes Act came to weaken the social presence of the Native. Similar to a state of slavery, land allotment eliminated many of the freedoms central to Native society. Carlson has explained the policy of allotment, “The Dawes Act was compulsory. An individual could not refuse to accept an allotment.”16 We can thus witness that allotment was foisted upon the Natives. Since they were forced to make a decision, allotment portended the Natives’ loss of group and individual autonomy. Vine Deloria Jr. addressed this deprivation of self-determination when he declared, “Senator Henry Dawes of Massachusetts embraced the proposition that if every Indian family had its own piece of land, the natural greed in man would assume control of the 16 Carlson, 10. 47 individual Indian so that he would become a silent farmer.”17 Deloria highlighted the subtle machinations of land allotment. That is, Dawes envisioned his act as a means of stripping the Natives of their power, and rendering them incapable of opposition. Lastly, Carlson has substantiated the theory of the repressive nature of land allotment. He noted, “Indians living on allotted lands failed to benefit from the Dawes Act. “The administration of the Dawes Act was an open-ended federal policy shaped by outside economic interests.”18 From Carlson’s research, it is evident that the policy of allotment not only failed to address and resolve Native concerns, but also was corrupted by the notion of white superiority. Thus, allotment came to hinder Natives, as the government acted in a way that would better the lives of whites, and hurt or even ignore prospects for Native relief. Cognizant of the repressions of allotment, Natives opposed this policy much more immediately and enthusiastically than they opposed assimilation. Richard White revealed, “Montezuma scorned reservations, which he regarded as prisons, and despised the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which he viewed as an un-American tyranny.”19 Utilizing Montezuma as an example of Native opposition, White helped to underscore Natives’ resentment of the Dawes Act, as they perceived its denying them the freedom of movement. Deloria presented another incidence of Native response to the restrictions of land allotment when he wrote, “The Bureau of Indian Affairs misinterpreted the Dawes Act and began to threaten the tribes unless they agreed to allotment. A threat against the Kiowas frightened the western tribes, and they appealed to the Five Civilized Tribes for assistance in meeting the threat.”20 He thus illustrated the Natives’ desire to avoid land allotment, particularly as some tribes discerned its compulsory nature. In this sense, the Natives Vine Deloria Jr., Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence (New York: Delacorte Press, 1974), 5. 18 Carlson, 167. 19 White, 439-440. 20 Vine Deloria Jr., Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence (New York: Delacorte Press, 1974), 6-7. 17 48 seemed inclined to resist anything they viewed as a potential threat to their individual sense of freedom. Unfortunately however, Stephen Cornell demonstrated that the restriction of Natives as a result of the Dawes Act prevented their opposition from having its desired effect. Cornell claimed, “Indian opposition was widespread and ignored. Non-Indian opposition was faint against the chorus of support.”21 Although shared by many Natives, opposition failed to combat the repression they faced. Additionally, the failure of Native opposition to counteract white support indicated that the balance of power was clearly tipped in favor of the whites, allowing allotment to remain in place. Native opposition to allotment demonstrated much more than their desire to retain certain freedoms. Rather, their awareness of the restrictions of life under the Dawes Act, and the selfish interests of whites, gave new momentum to the Native-white conflict as Natives became resentful of the act’s blatant injustices. And yet, white historians can hint at and suggest what they want about what the Natives thought and felt. The truth of the matter is that, without Native evidence to substantiate their claims, we can’t know for certain about the Native perspective. I will seek to fix this problem and give credibility to the claims of white historians in this paragraph by including some Native thoughts. Though allotment did not threaten their cultural identity, Natives found that allotment certainly restricted their self-determination. Unlike assimilation, allotment presented absolutely no opportunity for Natives to better their lives or to counteract white secrecy. The confinement of the reservations, while holding the Natives in check physically, did nothing to limit the internal discontent of the Natives. Wovoka, who clung desperately to the hope that the white culture he deemed so corruptive and compulsive would one day disappear and leave the Natives with cultural freedom, was a popular figure among the Plains Indians. He promulgated, “The white man came. He fought you and beat you, and put you in barren places where a horned toad would die. He said 21 Cornell, 44. 49 you must stay there.”22 In this, Wovoka revealed the cruel reality of Native life on reservations. Worse than their confinement was the fact that the land was not suitable for life. And thus, Wovoka seemed resentful of the policy of allotment. Chief Joseph admirably endured white cruelty in pacifically accepting the forced relocation of his people, the Nez Percé. He revealed, “It is still our land. It may never again be our home, but my father sleeps there, and I love it.”23 In this quotation, he underscored the blatant injustice that was allotment. Evidently not even allowed to decide whether or not to relinquish their land, Natives were forced off of their land. Yet, some Natives, like Joseph, maintained close ties to the land, and became bitter when it was taken away. Finally, Joseph further discussed the harsh policy of allotment when he announced that, on many occasions, the government would just come in and demand the Natives’ land, even though the government had not legally purchased it.24 This blatant exploitation did not go unnoticed, and while the Natives could not openly refuse the whites without fear of injury or death, they certainly were not pleased. Thus, allotment helped to further discomfit the Natives. Convinced that whites would never treat them fairly, the Natives began to harbor a strong aversion to whites. And we can claim this with assertion, thanks to Joseph and Wovoka, two truthful eyewitnesses to the whites’ abuse of power. The Carelessness of the Dawes Act: The Birth of a Schism The Dawes Act failed to address conflict out west effectively. While it helped increase the power of whites, it failed to aid the Natives, and ensured that Native discontent would fester. Attacking the freedoms and identity of the Natives, and strengthening those of whites, the Dawes Act planted the seeds for additional Native resentment. Also, though many Natives assimilated, they were still scorned by white society, causing a prolonged disdain for whites. The Dawes Act Wovoka as quoted in Armstrong, 129. Chief Joseph as quoted in Vanderwerth, 273. 24 Chief Joseph as quoted in Vine Deloria Jr., and Jennings C. Wise, The Red Man in the New World Drama (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1971), 270. 22 23 50 ensured that tensions would continue, but on a significantly smaller scale. And while the act may have drastically shifted the balance of power in favor of whites, it did so only temporarily. That is, as opposed to eliminating the Native identity and ensuring a society completely dominated by whites out west, Native cultures continued feebly to endure. Several provisions of the Dawes Act, including allotment and assimilation, promised to enhance the Natives’ quality of living, but in reality cast Natives aside. Largely ignoring the Natives, the Dawes Act ensured that the Native presence faded even further from social concern. Rather than addressing the plight of the Natives out west, as a federal Indian policy would be expected to do, the Dawes Act did not seem to care much about the Natives, so long as whites remained in control. Thus, the Natives became a marginalized and ignored group. When Lawrence C. Kelly poignantly noted, “Sometime in the early 20th Century, the federal government would at last be out of the Indian business,”25 he illustrated the complete indifference of the government towards the Natives. The Natives seemed a burden that many white politicians would just as soon cast aside, rather than go through the trouble to ease. Kelly also mentioned, “Indian children often suffered at school. They were ridiculed by classmates and teachers alike.”26 In this case, he pointed out a major contradiction of the Dawes Act, as assimilation clearly did not lead to acceptance. Therefore, the government’s decision to let this injustice persist revealed the federal tendency to ignore the plight of the Natives, and even to welcome it if it enabled white control. Richard White accurately depicted this federal refusal to uplift Natives when he revealed, “Legal claims of other nations, let alone the unmentioned claims of Indians, were mere ‘cobweb tissues.’”27 The government, in White’s opinion, not only cast legitimate Native concerns aside, but also viewed them as pesky nuisances that would be better to get rid of. This evident inclination to move away from Native Lawrence C. Kelly, Federal Indian Policy (New York: Chelsea House, 1990), 72. Kelly, 80. 27 White, 73. 25 26 51 concerns prevented Natives from escaping their plight in the west. And consequently, without federal assistance the Natives would be incapable of overcoming white repression in society. The inevitable conclusion then was that Natives would continue to remain a lesser group that suffered unnecessary injustices, injustices that would often be hidden from eastern society. Laden with hypocrisies, the Dawes Act fueled a prolonged Native grudge as the act made lofty promises that it failed to uphold. As a result, Native disdain for whites endured long after the act’s passage. From its beginning, the Dawes Act appeared inclined to aid the troubled Natives. Section One explicitly stated, “An act to extend the protection of the laws of the United States over the Indians, and for other purposes.”28 Ostensibly, the Dawes Act seemed obligated to bring a degree of security and liberty to the Natives; however, the repressive reality created by allotment and assimilation clashed with this promise. But the Dawes Act stood as legal justification that Natives could use to demand that the government help to better their plight. Vine Deloria further revealed the hypocrisy of the act when he wrote, “Indians became a detached third-party observer to the process of policy formulation in every area except claims. Claims were designed to quiet Indian resentment.”29 From his perspective, claims implied lawmakers’ recognition that the act inherently provided for tension. He also announced, “Indians became an attachment to their lands as opposed to owners.”30 This abrupt reversal of course on the account of government can be seen, from the Native perspective, as a failure to live up to the standards it had promised. And consequently, the Natives had every right to feel bitter toward whites. Exploited and abandoned in their time of need, the Natives hardened themselves against whites. Distancing themselves from whites, the Natives managed to endure into the nineteenth century, and would use their discontent caused by the Dawes Act in future struggles against whites. U.S. Senate, General Allotment Act, 1887 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1887), 1. Vine Deloria Jr., American Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 248. 30 Deloria, 248. 28 29 52 Let us once again focus in on Native comments regarding life after the Dawes Act to further grasp their bitterness and their feud with the whites. The Dawes Act’s inability to fulfill the many promises it made to Natives helped to make compromise between whites and Natives unattainable. Sitting Bull remarked, “It is not what the Indians want, but what the commissioners want. Sometimes the commissioners say they compromise, but they never change the document.”31 His sarcastic tone near the end of the quotation illuminated his outrage at white exploitation of the Natives. Also, he revealed the futility of compromise, and suggested that Natives avoid negotiations with whites. He would go on to announce, “Let the soldiers come and take me away and kill me, wherever they like. I am not afraid. I was born a warrior.”32 In this rare instance of open defiance, Sitting Bull revealed his unwillingness to tolerate white injustice any longer. In so doing, he demonstrated that the Dawes Act was driving the two groups apart. Chief Joseph proclaimed, “Some of you (whites) think an Indian is like a wild animal. This is a great mistake. I believe much blood would be saved if we opened our hearts more.”33 Perhaps more powerful than Sitting Bull’s, Joseph’s comment highlights the great problem of the Dawes Act: its inability to treat Natives as human beings. And unnecessary tension thus arose. Whether or not the Dawes Act intended to provide for Natives, its blatant disregard of the promises it explicitly made would lead to a bitter schism between Natives and whites. The Native perspectives, while poignant, provide a clear snapshot of the late Nineteenth Century west, and allow us additionally to understand why matters in the following years would logically lead to the failure of the Dawes Act. Vogel, 181. Vogel, 182-183. 33 Vanderwerth, 260. 31 32 53 Final Thoughts on the Dawes Act: Conflict Still Persists The failure of the Dawes Act lay not so much in its enabling the Native American identity to survive. Rather, the Dawes Act fell short of white expectations because it fueled the fire of Native resentment. Instead of merely opposed to whites, the Natives were now severely embittered, and in this sense the Dawes Act ironically accelerated tension. Designed to reduce the source for conflict so as to limit the threat to whites out west, the Dawes Act merely reduced Natives’ outward opposition. But it did nothing to quiet the rage that burned within their hearts. As Stephen Cornell mentioned, “As long as Indian communities of some sort survive, there will be Indian cultures as well, whether in old or new forms. ‘We are the Native people. What we do is the Native culture.’”34 Outwardly, the Dawes Act enacted profound social change via allotment. But its attempt to extinguish internal Native beliefs via assimilation did not succeed. While whites came to dominate western society, the Dawes Act failed to impose uniformity of culture, and thus whites continued to worry about keeping the Natives in check. Thus, the act failed to resolve the issue it sought to address, as future whites would continue to struggle with the same question: how to deal with the Natives and their tensions? If we are truly students of history, we must seek the answers by continuing to pay attention to Natives and their views. Only then will we more deeply and clearly understand the Dawes Act and its consequences. 34 Cornell, 212. 54 Bibliography U.S. Senate. 49th Congress, 2nd Session. 24 Stat. 388, Ch.119, 25USCA 331, The General Allotment Act (or Dawes Act). Washington, Government Printing Office, 1887. Armstrong, Virginia I. I Have Spoken. Chicago: Swallow Press, 1971. Carlson, Leonard A. Indians, Bureaucrats, and Land: The Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian Farming. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981. Cornell, Stephen. The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Deloria Jr., Vine. Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence. New York: Delacorte Press, 1974. Deloria Jr., Vine. American Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985. Deloria Jr., Vine and Wise, Jennings C. The Red Man in the New World Drama. New York: CollierMacmillan, 1971. Fritz, Henry E. The Movement for Indian Assimilation: 1860-1890. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963. Kelly, Lawrence C. Federal Indian Policy. New York: Chelsea House, 1990. Otis, D.S. and Prucha, Francis Paul. The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973. Vanderwerth, W.C.. Indian Oratory. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971. Vogel, Virgil J. This Country Was Ours. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972. White, Richard. “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own.” A New History of the American West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 55 Carolyn Gershman ’14 “Racial Complications of the 1936 Berlin Olympics” In the years leading up to the 1936 Berlin Olympics, increasing public knowledge of antiSemitism, racism, and intolerance in Nazi Germany, notwithstanding Nazi propaganda, caused many Americans to question whether the Olympics, which symbolize international respect, coexistence, and brotherhood, should be held there under such circumstances. Preparations for the games started eight years prior to the Berlin Games’ inception; Berlin was a top contender, and the world grew excited, as always, for the start of another record-breaking Olympics. The press flocked to Germany to gain insight into the arrangements of the Games, but their findings revealed that Germany’s leader, Adolf Hitler, and his Nazi followers, had significantly different ideals and uses for the Games than that which the Olympic Games actually represented. International collaboration, pride, and honor champion the longstanding traditional Olympic Games, and this is what the press expected to find, yet released statements and newspaper articles painted a very different picture.1 As the public grew aware of the contrasting goals, talks of boycotts arose across America and Europe threatening the success of the Games and fostering immediate action from the International Olympic Committee (IOC), American Olympic Committee (AOC), and Amateur Athletic Union (AAU). Privately dealing with the newfound political crisis, while reassuring the public that the Games’ moral component remained intact, proved confusing: different officials had different opinions and ethical values and their positions wavered. In the end the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games were generally successful, but the question that begs to be answered is how could the values and aims of the Olympics, the ideologies of the United States, and the harsh realities of Nazism coexist, and why Articles published by the following: The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, The Washington Post, The Hartford Current, Chicago Daily Tribune, and NPR (All mentioned and cited later). 1 56 did not the American (and European) boycotts and protests of the Olympic Games succeed in having the Games relocated out of Berlin? The prize of hosting the Olympic Games proved to be something for which Germany was willing to fight. The meeting to nominate countries as the host for the 1936 Olympic Games was held in Monte Carlo, Monaco on April 23, 1927. At this meeting, delegates from each nominated city (Rio de Janeiro, Alexandria, Helsinki, Budapest, Lausanne, Berlin, Rome, and Barcelona) came to argue their merits, but at the time it was widely known that Berlin, Rome, and Barcelona had the best chances. Germany appointed President Otto Lewald [sic] to present Germany’s case; at this point it was important for Germany to highlight its financial stability, as it had been of concern to the IOC previously. While Rome presented a strong case that it was the only ancient city among the frontrunners, and that as the City of Seven Hills, it should have the honor of holding the games, and when Barcelona delegates claimed, “Spain was the mother country of South America…it would be gratifying to South American sportsmen if they were held in Barcelona,” it was Germany that presented the best case.2 Germany’s delegates pointed out that the games were supposed to be in Berlin in 1916, but because of the impending First World War, the games were forced to be cancelled. In addition, Germany wanted the chance to show the world that it had healed the wounds from its brutal defeat in that war. Four years later, after copious research on the various cities, a secret meeting was held in Barcelona, Spain on April 26, 1931. No official announcements were made, although it was verified that the votes were cast. It was said the voting was scattered, but that Berlin took the lead, with Barcelona following closely behind. No less than ten days later Berlin, Germany was announced as the city bestowed with the honor of hosting the 1936 Games. Germany took the news with widespread enthusiasm, and took it upon itself to produce the most aweinspiring, impressive Games yet. Because Germany already had a stadium with holding capacity “Eight Cities Out for the 1936 Olympics: Berlin, Rome and Barcelona to the Fore in Quest of the Games” The Christian Science Monitor (April 28, 1927). 2 57 totaling 50,000 which had been built for the 1916 Olympics, Germany was especially secure financially. With this extra money it expanded the stadium to seat 90,000 people, and built or restored tennis courts, multiple swimming pools, six soccer fields, a boxing hall, a dance hall, polo grounds, spaces for wrestling and fencing, a track, and much more. It set up the rowing regattas to be held at Long Lake where many previously built boathouses were available. At this time Germany’s enthused preparations foretold exciting and remarkable Games that embodied the very spirit of the Olympics. The Olympic Games represent much more than a sporting competition; they epitomize honor, glory, and international camaraderie. The Olympic Games are derived from the Ancient Greek original Olympiad. People came from all over Greece for the opportunity to compete and return to their city-states as heroes. But the noble competition did more than just deem one a hero; it required the combination of body, mind and will. The Olympic movement was created to link sports and education; contribute to building a friendlier, more peaceful, and more respectful world through sport, and to provide a satisfaction that only hard work and training can offer.3 The growth of Nazism in the 1930s brought values and ideologies that conflicted with those represented by the Olympic Games. The incompatible views were brought to the forefront beginning with the Games’ initial planning, preparations, and the opening ceremonies in 1936. During this time the Nazi Party slowly but surely gained a more significant upper hand in the government until it had so much power that it controlled most everything in Germany. There were many key elements of the Nazi system of governing, some more heinous than others, yet all of these ideologies: Racism, Herrenrasse (meaning: Master Race), Lebensraumpolitik (meaning: The creation of more living space for Germans), Führerprinzip (meaning: Belief in the leader—Hitler), Social Darwinism, Anti-Semitism, and Autarky (meaning: Germany needed to be economically 3 The Olympic Museum, “The Modern Olympic Games,” Evolution of the Olympic Games, 2007, [Page 3], digital file. 58 independent), were in place or would be in place in the years to come. Hitler’s views were widely known as he had, in 1923, attempted to seize the power in Munich with a group from the Nationalist Socialist Party. He was then imprisoned for his political crimes, and, while in prison, wrote his most famous book, Mein Kampf, which translates to “my struggle.” His “struggle,” however, was due to his delusional belief in the aspiration of Jews to gain world domination. Hitler wrote, “Here he stops at nothing, and in his vileness he becomes so gigantic that no one need be surprised if among our people the personification of the devil as the symbol of all evil assumes the living shape of the Jew,” which clearly exemplifies Hitler’s strong views against Jews.4 Although sickening and repulsive in manner, these views did not become a problem regarding the location of the Games until about three years prior to the Games’ inception. Throughout the process of preparing for the Games, Germany’s consistent manipulation of the IOC, AOC, and AAU, in order to maintain the honor of being host city while essentially doing whatever it wanted, caused chaos and lead to eventual boycotts of the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. While at first Germany put on a good show by demonstrating its peace efforts and having troops patrol national games in the regular season, it quickly became evident that there was much going on beneath the surface. Nazi ideologies began interfering with the standards of the Games.5 It was highly suspected that Jews were not being given the appropriate use of training facilities or being invited to training sessions.6 In addition there was much maltreatment of Jews in Germany on a regular basis, although these could not be taken into account as reason to move the games. Even so, on these rumors alone, The American Jewish Congress and the Jewish Labor Committee, as well as 4 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton Mifflin company, 1943), 394. Arthur J. Daley, “Berlin Faces Loss of Olympic Games.” New York Times (April 18, 1933). Arthur J. Daley, “A.A.U. Boycotts 1936 Olympics because of the Nazi Ban on Jews” New York Times, (November 21, 1933). Wireless to Chicago Daily Tribune "Nazi Sport Head Reaffirms Ban on German Jews.” Chicago Daily Tribune (Nov 23, 1933). 6 “Wireless to Chicago Daily Tribune "Nazi Sport Head Reaffirms Ban on German Jews.” Chicago Daily Tribune (Nov 23, 1933). 5 59 the non-sectarian Anti-Nazi League all responded to these discoveries, shortly followed by the AOC, IOC and AAU. Talk about boycotting, protesting, and moving the Games initiated all across the United States and Europe. Germany’s disregard of various committees’ reactions was palpably expressed on April 1, 1933 when the Nazis boycotted Jewish businesses across Germany, books were burned, and intermarriage banned.7 The issue the IOC faced was that regardless of what Germany’s government did to its own people, if it was unrelated to the Games, it could not affect the IOC’s decision to move or not to move the Games. Additional investigations took place into the Anti-Semitic attitude of Hitler’s government. Newspaper articles released alluded to the chance of the Games being shifted to either Rome or Tokyo, two other cities that would have gladly taken over the Games.8 Olympic protocol markedly stated that “there shall be no restriction of competition because of class, color, or creed,” therefore, because there was no official bar on Jews, regardless of the number of rallies by the AOC, AAU and American Jewish organizations, technically, the IOC did not have valid reasoning to approve moving the Games.9 But, if any type of Anti-Semitic ban affecting the Games appeared, it would give the IOC more than enough evidence for the Games’ location to be changed. Cancellation would occur on the off chance that a ban was placed so close to the Games’ initiation that there would not be any time to switch cities. In mid-April more conclusive indication of mistreated Jewish athletes proved evident; Margaret Bergmann-Lambert, a German champion in high-jumping received a letter from her club telling her she could no longer train there because she was Jewish. This was the end of her career.10 Lambert was one of the many Jewish athletes planning to participate in the Games that were told they could no longer train in the German facilities. While Howard Berkes, “Nazi Olympics Tangled Politics and Sport.” NPR. Podcast audio. June 7, 2008. Accessed March 4, 2013. 8 Arthur J. Daley, “Berlin Faces Loss of Olympic Games.” New York Times (April 18, 1933). 9 David Clay Large, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936. (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007),71. 10 Howard Berkes, "Nazi Olympics Tangled Politics and Sport.” NPR. Podcast audio. June 7, 2008. Accessed March 4, 2013. 7 60 athletes like Lambert could train in Jewish clubs, compared to the well-subsidized German clubs, the Jewish clubs were inadequate.11 Not only were there extensive threats of boycotts and protests in the United States, but across Europe as well. Furthermore, a massive rally, called the “Fair Play” campaign, which protested the Games’ location, swept across Southern and Western Europe.12 Boycotts threatened to break out in Sweden, and there were even planned protests in Palestine.13 One of the greatest adversaries of these boycotts was a man by the name of J. Sigfrid Edström, a Swedish IOC member. He epitomized one who was influenced by Germany’s manipulation as a member of the IOC. In 1933, he fully supported the Games taking place in Germany, and the Nazis’ ruling, and he spent the majority of 1934 writing letters convincing AOC members and German Jewish athletes that Jews would be treated fairly, but, eventually, a year before the Games, Edström came to his senses, realizing the Nazi beliefs were affecting athletes, and he began corresponding with German Officials seeking peace of mind. He was relieved by the responses he received, but like many other officials, unknown to him, he was fed false information for the sole reason of appeasing the uproar of complaints. Edström was not alone in his fickle mindset and manipulated views, Avery Brundage, the president of the AOC, another official who often changed his mind, had the belief that politics and sports were separate issues, and did not like the fact that they were so interconnected at this point. Later, however, he became one of the greatest advocates for upholding the values and honor of the Olympic Games. Henri Baillet-Latour, the former president of the IOC, obdurately believed that the IOC could not take a political stance, and that taking a stance should be prevented at all costs. He Susan D. Bachrach, The Nazi Olympics: Berlin 1936, comp. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (London, England: Little. Brown and Company, 2000), 41. 12 Lief Yttetgren. “The Questions of propriety: J. Sigfrid Edström, anti-Semitic and the 1936 Berlin Olympics.” AcedemicOneFile (Accessed March 4, 2013). 13 Lief Yttetgren. “The Questions of propriety: J. Sigfrid Edström, anti-Semitic and the 1936 Berlin Olympics.” AcedemicOneFile (Accessed March 4, 2013). 11 61 even went so far as to say that he respected the Nazis because as everything else was falling apart, they had a plan.14 While he did not particularly like the Nazi Anti-Semitic views, he firmly believed that if the Anti-Semitic behavior was confined to Germany alone, than the IOC had no right to interfere. Other officials, by contrast, could not have disagreed more. William May Garland, Charles Sherill, and Ernest Jahncke, all on the IOC, faced a major impasse; they knew that American Jewish organizations would continue fighting for their beliefs, they knew the IOC would prefer to keep the Games in Berlin, and they knew the right thing to do would be to move the Games, but they feared that they would cause an international incident that would cause further problems and further AntiSemitism. As time passed many opinions changed, but most importantly Baillet-Latour’s opinions changed as he began to see sense. Baillet-Latour sent a letter to Hitler affirming that the Games would be held to the standards of the Olympic Committee, expecting Hitler to respond favorably, as Hitler previously had promised that he would be abiding by Olympic guidelines but, instead, Hitler was outraged. The officials’ response was to try to keep Hitler out of the loop on the planning, but this immediately failed.15 Regardless, further talks of boycotts and cancellation continued. The IOC official meeting to discuss the issue of Anti-Semitism was to occur in June, 1933. The world avidly read the papers, eagerly awaiting the meeting’s outcome, as many countries were threatening not to participate and more than twenty champions had already decided not to compete in the Nazi Games.16 The IOC kept this all in mind going into the meeting, but overall it was Germany’s consistent manipulation of making Anti-Semitic rules, remarks, ideals, and then retracting, opposing or denying them that kept Berlin in the running as the host city. On June 7, 1933, in Vienna, the International Olympic Committee voted to keep the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin, putting to rest the worldwide debate. At the meeting, the German delegation promised that 14 David Clay Large, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936. (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 71. 15 David Clay Large, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936. (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 70. The Associated Press, “Toscanini Refuses To Go To Baireuth,” [sic] New York Times (June 6, 1933). 16 62 Jewish athletes could play for the teams if successful; “successful” referring to their performance in the training sessions, in which Jews were often unfairly judged and excluded. This compromise was at the prodding of Brig. Gen. Charles H. Sherrill, who forced the Germans to include a section specifically pertaining to Jews. Ironically, it was Dr. Theodore Leward, a man rumored to have been personally asked to step down by Hitler because of the Jewish blood in his family, who made the announcement. The statement, which put the majority of the IOC at ease, was printed in the New York Times on June, 8, 1933: 1. The German Olympic Committee has delegated the mandate that has been entrusted to it to a special organizing committee composed of Dr. Lewald, president; the Duke of MecklenburgSchwerin, Dr. Ritter von Halt Captain von Tschammer-Osten, president of the German Olympic Committee; Dr. Sahm, the Mayor of Berlin and Herr Diehm, secretary of German Olympic Committee 2. All the laws regulating the Olympic Games shall be observed. 3. As a principle, German Jews shall not be excluded from the German teams at the games of the eleventh Olympiad.17 It was decided with this promise of equality, despite the Anti-Semitic conduct that Germany had demonstrated, that the Games would still be held in “the Olympic Spirit,” and that Germany had not technically breached any Olympic codes. One of the fundamental reasons why the Hitler’s misdeeds were tolerated for so long before signs of protest or dissent from the Americans was due to America’s longstanding and deep-seated faith in democracy. The United States of America was founded upon this principle, and time after time reaped the benefits of its successes. In no way was it accurate to assume Americans would not continue to count on the system of democracy’s success in Germany. An editorial in The New York Times on January 31, 1933 palpably relays America’s faith, confirming; “President Hindenburg will retain supreme command, prepared to unmake Hitler as quickly as he has made him.”18 Because of John MacCormac, “Reich Keeps Games, Giving way on Jews” New York Times (Jun 8, 1933). 18 "Germany Ventures," The New York Times (New York City, NY), January 31, 1933, [Page 16], accessed October 20, 2013, http://search.proquest.com/docview/100624250/1413E5CDDEC32170733/1?accountid=40295. 17 63 the system of checks and balances that democracy brings—although Germany’s was different in certain aspects then the United States’—it was expected that because Hitler was Chancellor, he would be controlled by President Hindenburg, the constitution, and that the system of democracy that would prevail to self-correct Hitler’s misguided ways. Furthermore, in President Roosevelt’s inauguration speech, he announced, “We do not distrust the future of essential democracy,” which, in a sense, relieved American citizen’s feelings of guilt over not taking a stand one way or another on The Games. 19 Instead Roosevelt allowed the faith and belief to override the sense of impending complications. These assurances led the American public to believe that, “There is thus no warrant for immediate alarm,” and allow a false sense of security to settle for a short time. 20 However, some of the American public, the AOC, and the AAU were far from satisfied; they saw right through Germany’s guise, and when Germany’s actions did not improve, but in fact worsened, the situation escalated. Just because the IOC had stood by its decision, that did not mean the AOC, AAU and Jewish organizations would back down. On November 20, 1933, the New York Times released and article which stated; “The Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, the largest sports-governing body in the world, voted almost unanimously today to boycott the 1936 Olympic Games at Berlin unless there is a change in the attitude of Hitler government toward Jews in sport.”21 The reasoning was blunt; Germany’s Anti-Semitic attitude was unacceptable and would not be tolerated by a country like the United States of America. The Resolution, which was presented to the AOC and AAU by their president, Gustavus Town Kirby, found in the Chicago Daily Tribune on November 23, 1933, concluded: Thomas L. Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder (Princeton University Press, 1940), 310, in Margot Stern Strom, "The Democrat and the Dictator," Facing History and Ourselves Resource Book: Holocaust and Human Behavior (Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation, Inc: 1994), 158. 20 “Germany Ventures,” The New York Times (New York City, NY), January 31, 1933, [Page 16], accessed October 20, 2013, http://search.proquest.com/docview/100624250/1413E5CDDEC32170733/1?accountid=40295. 21 Arthur J. Daley, “A.A.U. Boycotts 1936 Olympics Because of the Nazi Ban on Jews” New York Times (November 20, 1933). 19 64 Whereas sport is the greatest if not the only true democracy in America, all therein being equal irrespective of race, color, religion, or social or financial conditions; and Whereas both the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States of America and the American Olympic Association were founded and exist upon these basic principles; and Whereas the Olympic Games of 1936 were awarded to the city of Berlin by the International Olympic Committee; and Whereas it is our understanding and belief that, at the time of such award, the German Olympic committee, representing itself and also the organizing committee of the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, accepted the games upon the basic principles of sports competition as herein referred to and reiterated its continued adherence to said principles as late as June of 1933; and Whereas it is believed and is common and universal knowledge that the German Olympic Committee and the Berlin organizing committee, under and by reason of the decrees and directions of the government of Germany, have violated the code of the Olympic Games and the fundamental ideals of sports competition in that they have deprived Germans of Jewish descent or belief from the rights of the Olympic competition, if not by direct restriction, certainly indirectly by the withdrawal from them of the rights of German citizenship and of a reasonable opportunity to train, prepare for and take part in sports competition in general and in the Olympic Games in particular…22 The Resolution clearly spells out three very important factors: 1) Because the United States of America, the AOC and the AAU all believed that equality is of the utmost importance, Germany’s values and actions were intolerable; 2) Germany was well aware of the rules and standards it was meant to keep as the host country for the 1936 Games; and 3) Germany obviously and publicly violated the code of the Olympic Games. Only two days after the resolution was publicized, on November 23, 1933, The Nazi Party blatantly defied the Resolution by having Hans von Schammer und Osten, head of the Reich Sports Office, release an order that said: 1—all persons elected to offices or boards of German athletic organizations must be in a position to meet the conditions of the government decree for the “restoration of professional civil service” which bars all Jews except front contestants. If the person to be chosen is a woman her father, brother, or husband must like-wise meet these conditions.23 This was enforced heavily, and although approval of non-Aryan members to athletic clubs was left up to the leaders of the clubs, all of the clubs were coordinated under Nazi rule, so it was Arthur J Daley. “A.A.U. Boycotts 1936 Olympics because of the Nazi Ban on Jews.” New York Times (Nov 21, 1933) Wireless to Chicago Daily Tribune “Nazi Sport Head Reaffirms Ban on German Jews.” Chicago Daily Tribune (Nov 23, 1933) 22 23 65 automatically put into effect for everyone.24 A consequence of the order was that two of Germany’s boxing champions, Eric Seelig and Johann Trollman, were banned from the sport for “racial reasons.” It was rules like these—rules that manipulated the system and appeared as one thing but meant another—that caused the most issues for the various Olympic Committees, that saw only what Germany wanted them to see. Comparatively manipulative was the announcement made by Dr. Karl Diem, secretary of the German Athletic Federation, in the April 19, 1933 New York Times asserting; “The German committee stands squarely on the ground of the Olympic Idea. There can be no question of any attempt at discrimination. On the contrary, all athletes coming to Germany in 1936 to participate in the games can count on being received with open arms and treated with the heartiest hospitality irrespective of nationality or race.”25 Diem’s statement is flagrantly misguided; aforementioned clear and factually accurate situations in which Jewish athletes have been kicked out of clubs or asked not to compete directly contradict his statement, but one of the tactics used here, and commonly used throughout the preparations of the Games is repetition. The consistent manipulative statements, promises, and speeches, although obviously falsified, were repeated so often, and from so many people, that people were bound to end up believing some of what they heard. It was Germany’s shameless disregard for Olympic values that caused not only the threat of boycotts of the Games, but also the actual boycotts of German products to continue to break out. Publicly, Germany was seemingly ignoring or denying that Anti-Semitic acts were occurring as well as threats of the Games cancellation. This is illustrated in a response to a letter written by Avery Brundage to Hitler, asking for assurance of fair treatment, and forewarning movement of the Games Wireless to Chicago Daily Tribune “Nazi Sport Head Reaffirms Ban on German Jews.” Chicago Daily Tribune (Nov 23, 1933). 25 Wireless to the New York Times, “Germany Pledges no Discrimination” The New York Times (April19, 1933). 24 66 or cancellation. The response, written by Hans von Tschammer und Osten, was the first official response the AAU had gotten to its protests, and it went as follows: 1. Neither the Reich Government nor I have as yet issued any statement regarding the barring of Jewish athletes from Turn and Sport organizations. 2. Neither the Reich Government nor I have prohibited the open participation of Jewish athletic organizations in athletic exercises. 3. The participation of Jews in athletic events has not been prohibited by proclamations issued either by the Reich Government or by myself. 4. If I should be notified that individual athletic bodies have in any way issued proclamations in opposition to the statements issued above, I shall make it my business to follow up each individual case and see to it that such actions be retracted.26 The letter was somewhat reassuring, and showed in the AAU’s voting to participate in the games: 58.25 to 55.7527 in favor of participating, but only three more AAU committee votes would have halted participation in the Games. So far, all of the voting from the various committees had been in Germany’s favor, and Germany had worked exceedingly hard to achieve this feat. Over the course of the next year, German officials continued releasing statements in attempts to appease the public. They were repeatedly bombarded with accusations of bars on Jewish participation, and although nothing was official, the earlier resignation of Jewish athletes only hurt their case. So on May 9, 1934 Dr. Lewald released another denial of any bar on Jewish participants: I want to say first that Germany has kept and will continue to keep that promise. Secondly, that there are and will be no qualifications or restrictions of any kind upon the admission of Jewish athletes to the German Olympic Team. Thirdly, Germany in the person of Hans von Tschammer und Osten….and Chancellor Hitler, is doing more than he promised.28 Wireless to the New York Times, “Call to Athletes Issued by Hitler,” New York Times (Dec 15, 1933). Jeremy Chaap, “An Olympic Boycott that Almost Worked,” http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/news/story?id=4396362, (August 13, 2009). 28 Herbert L. Matthews, “Reich Keeping Faith on Olympics, Says Official, Denying Bar to Jews,” New York Times (May 9, 1934). 26 27 67 In this statement, not only did Dr. Lewald maintain that Germany was following protocol, but he went on to say that it was doing more than necessary, by providing them with every training facility and encouraging participation. Contradicting these promises was the multitude of rumors dictating the exact opposite. With only two years until the opening ceremonies, and dozens of countries and athletes saying they would not compete, Hitler, out of fear of losing his Games, welcomed Avery Brundage, who took a trip to Berlin in September of 1934 to investigate. In the weeks leading up to Brundage’s trip, articles were released saying that Margaret Bergmann-Lambert, the high jumper who had been asked to leave, was being invited back onto the team.29 Upon arrival Brundage was personally taken to training facilities and allowed to talk to many Jewish athletes, and by the time his trip was over, he had nothing negative to report. In fact, he had only glowing excitement for what he had seen during his trip and he relayed this to the Olympic Committee Meeting, in effect ensuring the United States of America’s participation. Debate over the United States’ participation continued right up to the start of the Games. The announcements and newspaper articles indicate that the general public, throughout the entire Olympic process, had been fully aware of all predicaments and occurrences. They were more than just “aware”; however, as Americans had been closely following the stories of what was happening in Berlin, and according to a Washington Post article released on September 8, 1935, the opinion on U.S participation was split. In addition to American citizens’ keen observation and obsessive monitoring of the situation, America itself had adopted a somewhat Anti-Semitic attitude, which was heavily influenced by prominent American figures at the time, so it was no surprise that Anti-Semitic views were circulating. Henry Ford, founder of Ford Motor Company, a well-respected, popular American industrialist publicly advocated his personal Anti-Semitic mindset. His newspaper, The Dearborn 29 Howard Berkes, “Nazi Olympics Tangled Politics and Sport” NPR. (June 7, 2008). 68 Independent, published ninety two editions which specifically targeted Jews.30 These editions were later compiled in a book called The International Jew, which was translated and distributed internationally in the 1920s. The main point these editions made was of the conspiracy theory that claimed that the goal of the Jewish people was to take control of the world. When confronted about the severity of these editions, Ford’s response was merely, “They have fitted the situation up to this time. They fit now.”31 Later, his personal secretary, Ernest Liebold was recorded threatening, “When we get through with the Jews, there won’t be one of them who will dare raise his head in public.”32 In 1927, Ford publically apologized for his publications, but the damage was already done. Regardless of Ford’s apology, his ideologies had wormed its way into the minds of the American people through The Dearborn Independent, discussions of controversy, articles about the publications, and more. Whether or not they agreed with Ford’s views was irrelevant; he had planted a seed that alluded to the duplicity, inferiority, and disingenuous nature of Jews across The United States and in effect shifted attitudes, however slight, toward supporting The “Nazi” Games. Ford and Liebold were not the only ones affecting attitudes of rational Americans with radical views; Charles E. Coughlin, a widely popular priest, began using his reach to spread his Anti-Semitic outlook. He too believed that Jews were seeking world power and additionally blamed Jewish bankers for the Russian Revolution.33 Coughlin disseminated these views daily with 3.5 million listeners of his radio show. He most famously blamed the economic crisis on Jews in the early 1930s with the assertion that, “We have lived to see the day that modern Shylocks have grown fat and wealthy, praised and defied, because they have perpetuated the ancient crime of usury under the modern racket of Jewish Virtual Library. Henry Ford Creates A Jewish Conspiracy Theory. Copyright 2013 The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/olympics.html 31 “The International Jew: Anti-Semitism from the Roaring Twenties Revived on the Web,” ADL: Anti-Defamation League, last modified July 1999, http://archive.adl.org/special_reports/ij/print.asp 32 “The International Jew: Anti-Semitism from the Roaring Twenties Revived on the Web,” ADL: Anti-Defamation League, last modified July 1999, http://archive.adl.org/special_reports/ij/print.asp 33 “Anti-Semitism,” Father Coughlin, http://www.fathercoughlin.org/father-coughlin-anti-semitism.html 30 69 statesmanship.”34 It was estimated that approximately twenty five percent of Coughlin’s listeners actually agreed with his opinions; but again, it was not those who agreed who he would have swayed anyway, it is those who unknowingly internalize bits of what he said and unknowingly change their attitudes over so slightly. Consequently, there was much Anti-Semitism present in America in the time leading up to the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, yet there were also the American citizens who stayed true to intrinsic American values of equality and prosperity. Catholic and Protestant organizations were among those citizens, and they began joining the “stay home” movement, which spread across the United States. Jeremiah T. Mahoney, the new head of the AAU, requested that the American people put their energy toward demanding cancellation of the trip, but tourists coming home from summer trips in Germany claimed that there were absolutely no signs of Anti-Semitism.35 The fact that the tourists were saying this meant that Hitler had been successful in his attempts of hushing the matter up. On September 22, 1935 a newspaper article, by Rev. Dr. S. McC. Cavert, revealed just how wrong those tourists were: On the surface everything seemed serene. The lovely Bavarian villages were full of lighthearted peasants. The music festival was entrancing…A new national pride was in the air…the superficial tourist would go home and tell his neighbors that life is normal in Germany. But how much there is beneath the surface that the casual tourist never sees! The average tourist does not read such publications of Julius Streicher. Julius Streicher is no ordinary citizen; he is the leader of the Nazi party in Franconia and an intimate friend of Adolf Hitler. The display window of his publication house was filled with papers and books either viciously Anti-Semitic in character or setting forth the pseudo-science of racialism as the foundation of the new German State. The average tourist does not talk with German exiles from their Fatherland-men and women who ardently love Germany but have had to leave it in order to save their lives or avoid the living death of concentration camps….The average tourist does not see the way in which a deliberate policy of segregation is being forced upon the Jews. They are being excluded from public baths and summer resorts. They are forbidden to go to the regular public schools…36 “Charles E. Coughlin,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, last modified May 11, 2012, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005516 35 Ben Dulaney, “ Berlin Builds Giant Olympic Stadium While Athletes Toss Hot Words,” The Washington Post (September 8, 1935) 36 Ben Dulaney, “ Berlin Builds Giant Olympic Stadium While Athletes Toss Hot Words,” The Washington Post (September 8, 1935) 34 70 As Rev. Dr. S. McC. Cavert’s article confirms, in the end, it was Germany’s skillful and consistent acts of duplicity and manipulation that ensured them the honor as host city. While they did issue bans, they were careful to retract them and any Anti-Semitic statements if the talks of boycotts and cancellation became too concrete. They put on shows for the officials who visited to investigate; mainly, they strong-armed a huge win by persuading Avery Brundage, president of the AOC. Certain officials and many American Jewish and Catholic organizations saw right through Germany’s guise, but the IOC was mostly convinced. After all, Hitler constantly assured them of Germany’s integrity. “Rest assured that I shall stoutly maintain the American principle that all citizens are equal under law,”37 Hitler firmly promised, but the fact of the matter was that German Anti-Semitism was severe and continuing to increase. Hitler and the Nazis outmaneuvered all of the Olympic Committees, Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant organizations, and the 1936 Olympic Games were held in Berlin, Germany. Hitler himself opened the Games, the walls of the stadiums were covered in Swastikas, and Hitler famously saluted the crowd. Throughout the Games, The Reich Press Chamber was stringently censoring any radio, press, or publications, and the Ministry of Propaganda released many guidelines to maintain their camouflaged racist policies. On August 3, 1936 Joseph Goebbels, head of Ministry of Propaganda, announced: “The racial point of view should not be used in any way in reporting sports results; above all Negroes should not be insensitively reported. . . . Negroes are American citizens and must be treated with respect as Americans.”38 This was not widely known, and, in addition, the week before the Games Hitler issued a “clean up,” which ensued arresting all Gypsies, and removing all signs and posters which banned Jews from entering various places. David Clay Large, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936. (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 73 Jewish Virtual Library. The Nazi Olympics. Copyright 2013 The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/olympics.html 37 38 71 The boycotts, protests, and rallies all failed due to Hitler’s careful, manipulative planning. In the end it was the Nazis’ Olympics; they succeeded in deceiving every committee far enough to achieve their goal. Very few Jews competed in the Games, as the Maccabee League of Jewish athletes had withdrawn all of its contestants six months before the Games, and other Jewish Athletes were either too fearful to participate or had been previously banned. 39 Germany painted a picture of tolerance and peaceful bliss to the outside world while Anti-Semitic violent, heinous crimes actually took place. The Games should have been moved to a different location, for the ideologies of the Olympics clashed remarkably with the Nazi ideologies. The United States of America should not have sent athletes; as a nation founded on principles of equality for all; it had abundant evidence of the Nazi’s odious philosophies. The Games became a tool in the Nazi regime’s rise to power, a chance to display its power to the world, to gain supporters, and to put up a peaceful front. The ideals of the Olympic Games were not held in their usual sanctity due to the Nazi regime, and therefore they should not have been held in Berlin, Germany. The 1936 Berlin Olympics truly became “The Nazi Games” rather than a competition in accordance with the Olympic Oath, which was taken by athletes in the 1920s to “take part in these Olympic Games, respecting and abiding by the rules which govern them, in the true spirit of sportsmanship, for the glory of the sport and the honour of our teams.”40 39 Herbert L. Matthews. “Diplomats exempt in Nuremberg Laws: Foreigners Enjoying Privileges Will Not Be Affected by Paragraph 3, Hitler Rules.” The New York Times. (December 1, 1935) 40 “FAQ: What is the Olympic Oath?” Official Website of the Olympic Movement. Last modified September 12, 2011. Accessed March 5, 2013. http://registration.olympic.org/en/faq/detail/id/28. 72 Bibliography The, Associated Press. "Hitler's Support Expected for Olympics of 1936 in Berlin; Preparations Under Way." New York Times (1923-Current File), Mar 15, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100739970?accountid=40295. Adelman, Melvin L. "The Nazi Olympics." JSTOR. Accessed January 24, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3786438 . ADL: Anti-Defamation League. "The International Jew: Anti-Semitism from the Roaring Twenties Revived on the Web." ADL: Anti-Defamation League. Last modified July 1999. Accessed May 6, 2013. http://archive.adl.org/special_reports/ij/print.asp. American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise. "The Nazi Olympics." Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed March 4, 2013. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/olympics.html. American-Israeli Coopertive Enterprise. "The International Jew." Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed May 6, 2013. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/ford.html. The Associated Press. "Will make Effort to Shift Olympics." New York Times (1923-Current File), Nov 17, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100846217?accountid=40295. The Associated Press. "Toscanini Refuses to Go to Baireuth." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 06, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100673905?accountid=40295. Bachrach, Susan D. The Nazi Olympics: Berlin 1936. Compiled by United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. London, England: Little. Brown and Company, 2000. "Berlin Will Stage the 1936 Olympics." The Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current File), Jun 07, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/513375007?accountid=40295. "The Democrat and the Dictator," Facing History and Ourselves Resource Book: Holocaust and Human Behavior (Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation, Inc: 1994), 157. Dulaney, Ben. "Berlin Builds Giant Olympic Stadium while Athletes Toss Hot Words." The Washington Post (1923-1954), Sep 08, 1935. http://search.proquest.com/docview/150621341?accountid=40295. "Eight Cities Out for 1936 Olympics." The Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current File), Apr 28, 1927. http://search.proquest.com/docview/512172885?accountid=40295. "FAQ: What is the Olympic Oath?" Official Website of the Olympic Movemeny. Last modified September 12, 2011. Accessed March 5, 2013. http://registration.olympic.org/en/faq/detail/id/28. "Germany is Preparing for Olympics Well in Advance." The Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current File), May 03, 1927. http://search.proquest.com/docview/512165387?accountid=40295. 73 Germany Seeks 1936 Olympics for Berlin; Government Funds Aiding 1928 Campaign." New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 16, 1927. http://search.proquest.com/docview/104222104?accountid=40295. "Germany to make Bid for Olympics." The Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current File), Feb 16, 1927. http://search.proquest.com/docview/512091733?accountid=40295. Hilton, Christopher. "Hitler's Olympics: The 1936 Berlin Olympic Games." JSTOR. Accessed February 2013. Hitler, Adolf, and Ralph Manheim. Mein Kampf,. Boston: Houghton Mifflin company, 1943. "Hitler Spikes Drive Against 1936 Olympics." The Hartford Courant (1923-1987), Jun 25, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/558301259?accountid=40295. J. Daley, Arthur "Berlin Faces Loss of Olympic Games." New York Times (1923-Current File), Apr 18, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100688878?accountid=40295. J. Arthur, Daley. Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. "A.A.U. Boycotts 1936 Olympics because of the Nazi Ban on Jews." New York Times (1923-Current File), Nov 21, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100814597?accountid=40295. L. Mathews, Herbert. Wireless to THE NEW,YORK TIMES. "Reich Keeping Faith on Olympics, Says Official, Denying Bar to Jews." New York Times (1923-Current File), May 09, 1934. http://search.proquest.com/docview/101247594?accountid=40295. Large, David Clay. Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936. New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. MacCormac, John. Wireless to TheNew York Times. By, John MacCormac. "Reich Keeps Games, Giving Way on Jews." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 08, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100653448?accountid=40295. MacDonogh, Giles. 1938 Hitler’s Games. New York, NY, United States: Basic Books, 2009. Mandell, Richard D. The Nazi Olympics. New York, New York, United States: The Macmillan Company, 1971. Murray, John. "Berlin Games: How Hitler Stole the Olympic Dream." JSTOR. "Nazi Olympics Tangled Politics and Sport." NPR. Podcast audio. June 7, 2008. Accessed March 4, 2013. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91246674. "Nazi Sport Head Reaffirms Ban on German Jews." Chicago Daily Tribune (1923-1963), Nov 23, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/181512941?accountid=40295. The New York Times (New York City, NY). "Germany Ventures." January 31, 1933, 16. Accessed October 20, 2013. 74 http://search.proquest.com/docview/100624250/1413E5CDDEC32170733/1?accountid= 40295. The Olympic Museum. "The Modern Olympic Games." Evolution of the Olympic Games, 2007, 3. Digital file. Orlow, Dietrich. The History of The Nazi Party: 1919-1933. N.p.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969. "The Nazi Olympics." JSTOR. Accessed January 24, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1856674 . Pitblado, Michael. "Berlin Games: How the Nazis Stole the Olynpic Dream." JSTOR. "Power Rests with A.A.U." New York Times (1923-Current File), Dec 08, 1934. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100960874?accountid=40295. "Public Men Urge Olympic Boycott." New York Times (1923-Current File), Sep 12, 1935. http://search.proquest.com/docview/101375902?accountid=40295. Special Cable to THE NEW,YORK TIMES. "Berlin Maps Plans for 1936 Olympic Games; Selection of City Stirs Wide Enthusiasm." New York Times (1923-Current File), May 16, 1931. http://search.proquest.com/docview/99350603?accountid=40295. "Start Vote to Pick 1936 Olympic City." New York Times (1923-Current File), Apr 27, 1931. http://search.proquest.com/docview/99411074?accountid=40295. 2013 Old Time Radio. "Anti-Semitism." Father Coughlin. Accessed May 6, 2013. http://www.fathercoughlin.org/father-coughlin-anti-semitism.html. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. "Charles E. Coughlin." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Last modified May 11, 2012. Accessed May 6, 2013. http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005516. "Nazi Olympics, Berlin 1936." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Last modified May 11, 2012. Accessed March 4, 2013. http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005680. UR J. "Berlin Faces Loss of Olympic Games." New York Times (1923-Current File), Apr 18, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100688878?accountid=40295. Whaley, Joachim. "The Nazi Olympics. Sport, Politics and Appeasement in the 1930s." Academic OneFile. Last modified January 17, 2013. http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA131200409&v=2.1&u=s1641&it=r&p= AONE&sw=w. Wireless to THE NEW,YORK TIMES. "Diplomats Exempt in Nuremberg Laws." New York Times (1923-Current File), Dec 01, 1935. http://search.proquest.com/docview/101287919?accountid=40295. 75 Wireless to THE NEW,YORK TIMES. "Yielding by Nazis on Olympics Likely." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 07, 1933. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100663977?accountid=40295. Wireless to The New York Times. "Germany Pledges No Discrimination." New York Times (1923Current File), Apr 19, 1933 http://search.proquest.com/docview/100715108?accountid=40295. Yttergren, Lief. "The Questions of propriety: J. Sigfrid Edstrom, anti-semitic and the 1936 Berlin Olympics." Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies. Accessed March 4, 2013. http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA175877050&v=2.1&u=22502&it=r&p= AONE&sw=w. 76 Jack Kelly ’14, “Selling Society: Propaganda, Advertising, and the Culture of the 1920s” Advertising is ubiquitous in modern society. Look around: billboards line the nation’s highways and dot its buildings; short advertisements interrupt radio and television broadcasts; advertisements of all sizes are plastered across newspapers, magazines, and websites; logos stand prominently in both movies and homes. For better or for worse, advertising has become an integral part of American culture. Advertising has existed as long as human civilization, the product of the world’s first business seeking to gain an edge in the world’s first cities.1 But only relatively recently did advertising become what it is today, the massive cultural presence that inundates everyday American life. Before the nineteenth century, there was little opportunity for mass-market advertising in American society; there were newspapers, but they were low in circulation and carried few advertisements.2 The Market Revolution, the expansion of the markets in the early nineteenth century, created the opportunity for national brands, and with the advent of the Penny Press came the opportunity for national advertising.3 But it would take decades before businesses would fully realize the potential of branding and advertising on a national scale. Although advertising visionaries such as Thomas J. Barratt, the creator of the first modern advertisement, would experiment and begin to find success in the later half of the nineteenth century,4 it was not until the 1920s, with a combination of both progressive ideas and commercial growth, that advertising begin to thrive as both an industry and an increasingly formative influence of American culture. 1 Encyclopedia of World Trade From Ancient Times to the Present, s.v. "ADVERTISING," accessed May 27, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sharpewt/advertising. 2 Encyclopedia of American Studies, s.v. "Advertising," accessed May 27, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/jhueas/advertising . 3 Encyclopedia of the United States in the Nineteenth Century, s.v. "ADVERTISING," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/galeus/advertising. 4 Matt Haig, Brand Failures: The Truth about the 100 Biggest Branding Mistakes of All Time, 2nd ed. (London: Kogan Page, 2011), 204. 77 Following a tumultuous decade of global warfare and civil unrest, the 1920s began with a return to what Warren G. Harding referred to as, “normalcy,” a nondescript notion of life before World War I.5 But the world had changed irrevocably since the start of the century, and World War I had forever transformed politics both nationally and internationally; in many respects, there was no “normalcy” to which America could return. While a wave of conservatism spread across America, the remnants of the dying progressive movement did not disappear. The industrial modernization brought about by influential business thinkers such as Henry Ford and Frederick Taylor continued to mature and spread.6 The feminist movement, having gained suffrage with the Nineteenth Amendment, continued to have a presence despite weakening from lack of unified vision.7 Advertising was reborn with the emergence of new ideas and theories, spreading new attitudes toward consumption and consumerism among the American public. With both the return of conservative politics and the perseverance of liberal social mores, the culture of the 1920s reflected an odd mixture of the traditional and the contemporary. Indeed, the 1920s were a decade perhaps unlike any other in American history, as ideas old and new coalesced into a unique culture of carefree prosperity, both real and superficial. The culture of the 1920s existed in a relatively rigidly defined period, beginning with the end of World War I and Harding‘s election, and ending with the stock market crash of 1929. The period’s origins, however, have a less definite chronology. A strong case can be made that the period was the product of discontent and disillusionment with World War I, and this argument has certain merit; Harding’s return to “normalcy” was ultimately a The Crystal Reference Encyclopedia, s.v. "Harding, Warren G(amaliel) (2 Nov 1865 – 2 Aug 1923)," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/cre/harding_warren_g_amaliel_2_nov_1865_2_aug_1923. 6 Encyclopedia of American Studies, s.v. "Ford, Henry," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/jhueas/ford_henry. 7 The Reader's Companion to U.S. Women's History, s.v. "Feminism and Feminisms," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/rcuswh/feminism_and_feminisms. 5 78 powerful catalyst in the genesis of the 1920s.8 But an attribution of the 1920s culture to any one event, however significant, would be fallaciously narrow in its scope. The 1920s were influenced by not only the First World War, but also the frustrations and triumphs of the progressive period. Advertising, enjoying a resurgence marked by the new techniques and philosophies of the Progressive Era, was one of such influential factors. To a certain extent, the effects of advertising on the 1920s are hard to discern; while advertising helped shape the culture of the 1920s, so too did the culture of the 1920s shape advertising. Historians have debated the extent to which one affected the other; some argue that advertising was a leading factor in the evolution of 1920s culture, while others contend it was more a product of the culture than its cause. Regardless, the importance of advertising in the shaping of the 1920s is undeniable. Despite not always being the primary agent of societal change, the rise of advertising and propaganda in the early twentieth century played a distinct and significant role in the development of 1920s society, altering the prevailing attitudes toward nativism, consumerism, mass-entertainment, and feminism. The influence of advertising in the 1920s began not with the post-war corporate boom but rather with the American entry into World War I. On April 6, 1917, in response to the growing threat of German naval warfare, the United States formally declared war on Germany. A week later, on April 13, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson issued Executive Order 2594, establishing the Committee on Public Information, or CPI.9 The CPI was a government organization that effectively served as a propaganda machine for the United States during World War I, attempting to generate public support and enthusiasm for the 8 AFrederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920's. (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1931), 108-109. 9 Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present, s.v. "CPI (Committee on Public Information)," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/abcprop/cpi_committee_on_public_information. 79 American war effort. The CPI was not the first effort of the American government to control public opinion; Espionage and Sedition Acts under John Adams had long ago established the practice. But the CPI was revolutionary in that it was the first effort to apply the scientific mindset of the Progressive Era to the field of public manipulation; it was America’s first producer of modern propaganda.10 In 1900, Sigmund Freud published his seminal work, The Interpretation of Dreams, which established the field of modern psychoanalysis. While many of his ideas would later be determined false, the core principle of his works remained true; people’s actions and emotions are guided by unconscious desires. Edward Bernays, both Freud’s nephew and a high-ranking member of the CPI, took his uncle’s theories and applied them to propaganda.11 With the work of Bernays and fellow pioneer Carl R. Byoir, the CPI tried to appeal to people’s underlying desires, hoping to influence not only their rational thought but also their emotions. The resulting propaganda campaigns proved tremendously successful, and the public’s cautious support of the war effort soon exploded into nationalistic fervor.12 In effect, the Commission on Public Information was the nation’s first modern advertising agency; instead of selling consumer goods, it sold the idea of America itself. The campaigns of the CPI were tremendously influential on both the public and later advertising. Throughout the war, it released thousands of posters aimed at generating powerful emotional responses, each one appealing to different aspects of their viewers’ characters such as patriotism, morality, dreams, or even sexuality13 Some were dire and dramatic; one such poster reads, “Must children die and mothers plead in vain? Buy more liberty Ibid. Encyclopedia of Intelligence & Counterintelligence, s.v. "Journalism and Propaganda," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sharpint/journalism_and_propaganda. 12 Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal History, 42. 13 Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. "ADVERTISING," 10 11 80 bonds.”(Fig. 1) Others were authoritarian and nationalistic, such as James Montgomery Flagg’s famous depiction of Uncle Sam forcefully proclaiming, “I want you for US Army” (Fig. 2). But all were effective in eliciting the desired response, fervent patriotism. The CPI’s other campaigns were also successful. To put a personal touch on the government’s message, the CPI recruited 75,000 volunteers to work as “Four-Minute Men,” speakers who would deliver short but poignant speeches that rallied public support.14 The aggressive sale of War Bonds both financed the war and gave the American people a personal stake in its success. The CPI spread its messages through every medium available, ensuring the country was blanketed with as much pro-American propaganda as possible by producing articles, movies, cartoons, pamphlets, and billboards.15 The Committee on Public Information did more than just raise public support for the war. Like the public relations industry that it would later inspire, the CPI was entrusted with the protection of the United States’ image, both at home and abroad. While George Creel, the leader of the committee, emphasized the importance of a positive message, one that focused on the greatness of America rather than the ills of its enemies,16 propaganda inevitably depicted Germany in an unfavorable light. Recruitment advertisements often portrayed the Germans as animals or savages who had the potential to destroy civilization; one such poster commands, “Destroy This Mad Brute,” over an image of a club-wielding German ape (Fig. 3). America had a large immigrant population, many whom hailed from Germany, and as the war continued, many feared they lacked patriotism or were even spying 14 Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present, s.v. "Creel, George," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/abcprop/creel_george. 15 Germany and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History, s.v. "Committee on Public Information," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/abcgeamrle/committee_on_public_information. 16 George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (London, England: Harper & Brothers, 1920), 4. 81 for their countries of origin. Germans bore the brunt of this fear, but it extended to most immigrants, especially those from countries under the rule of the Central Powers. To address this, the CPI printed ads in foreign languages and created the Friends of German Democracy, an organization aimed to secure the support of German immigrants for the American war effort.17 Yet these actions did little to offset the rising nativism that their propaganda oft encouraged, and in preemptive fear of the German propaganda machine, the CPI expanded their efforts to establish the cultural superiority of America both nationally and domestically as the war drew on.18 By the end of the war, the American public had become increasingly zealous in its nationalistic and nativist views. While the CPI was not the only source of nativist sentiment, the organization’s prominence no doubt served to exacerbate it. Nativism and nationalism proved intrinsic to the cultural development of the early 1920s, as the wave of conservatism brought by the end of the war took these sentiments in new directions. Some reactions were direct; the passage of anti-immigration legislation such as the National Origins Act was a direct response to people’s fears that America would be compromised by immigrants refusing to integrate.19 Fears of German brewers had given rise to resurgence in the Temperance Movement, and mounting distrust of immigrants during the war served to augment the movement’s power; the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment and the passage of the Volstead Act became inevitable. While the CPI had campaigned in favor of America’s labor system, the nationalistic pride and nativism the CPI had created brought about its downfall; fearing the influence of Communism after the success of the Russian Germany and the Americas, "Committee on Public Information," Claude E. Fike, "The Influence of the Creel Committee and the American Red Cross on RussianAmerican Relations, 1917-1919," The Journal of Modern History 31, no. 2 (1959): 93-105. 19 The Reader's Companion to American History, s.v. "NATIVISM," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/rcah/nativism. 17 18 82 revolution, the American public repudiated it, and the government quickly dismantled and destroyed the labor movement and its power. But in a much broader sense, the nationalism created by the CPI contributed to the general conservative mindset of the 1920s, and however unintentionally, the CPI helped set the tone for the rest of the decade. On August 21, 1919, Woodrow Wilson formally abolished the Committee of Public Information with issuance of Executive Order 3154.20 While some members of the committee went into politics, many more, such as Edward Bernays and Carl R. Byoir, were drawn to the emerging post-war business world that would dominate the 1920s, seeking to apply the techniques of the CPI to businesses trying to sell their products.21 By this time, advertising agencies were already a stalwart in the American business environment, having first developed in the 1840s in response to the Market Revolution.22 The first advertising agencies, however, were much different than those of today; they functioned primarily as middlemen who found advertisers for the newspapers they represented. But when those roles began to switch toward the end of the nineteenth century, and advertisement agencies became the clients of the businesses, advertising agencies began to control the advertisements themselves. But despite these developments, the growth of the advertisement industry was relatively stagnant, expanding with the economy but continuing to occupy a subdued role in business. With end of the World War I however, advertising exploded in both significance and creativity; advertising spending doubled from $1.5 billion in 1918 to $3 billion in 1920 as the practices developed in the CPI spread.23 Combined with the economic boom that followed World War I, new advertising techniques were instrumental in the creation of a new consumer culture. During the 1920s, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion s.v. "CPI (Committee on Public Information).” Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. "ADVERTISING." 22 Ibid. 23 Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. "ADVERTISING." 20 21 83 two schools of advertising battled for dominance, “reason why” advertising and “image” advertising. “Reason why” advertisements represented the more traditional school of advertising thought pioneered by Progressive Era adman, Albert D. Lasker. The goal of these advertisements was to convince viewers of a product’s quality by providing a reason the consumer should buy it.24 “Image” advertising, however, focused not on the product but rather its appearance to customer. Much like the propaganda of the CPI, these advertisements attempted to win over customers by appealing to their emotions on a subconscious level; creating a desirable image became more important than the product itself.25 While the two techniques coexisted in the 1920s, image advertising quickly became the most prominent, as Theodore F. MacManus and other proponents of the technique used it to create many successful campaigns that made Madison Avenue a burgeoning hub of the American advertising world.26 While “reason why” advertisements became secondary, they were still used to great effect in the 1920s, as later advertisers combined both Lasker’s and MacManus’s ideas in creative and effective campaigns.27 With the transition to image advertising, companies essentially began to sell ideas to their customers in place of the products themselves. While CPI ads had mainly appealed to patriotism and morality, the advertising of the 1920s largely targeted the dreams of its audience for happiness and fulfillment in life.28 Coca-Cola, for example, had earlier campaigned on the health benefits of the beverage in a manner typical of reason why advertising (Fig. 4), but in the 1920s, the company began to market “satisfaction” instead of health, changing its slogan to “Delicious and Refreshing” (Fig. 5). In a similar shift, cigarette Encyclopedia of American Studies, s.v. "Advertising." Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. "ADVERTISING." 28 Encyclopedia of American Studies, s.v. "Advertising," 24 25 84 brands stopped emphasizing the quality of their tobacco (Fig. 6) and instead began to emphasize the idea that smoking made life more comfortable and less strenuous; advertisements began to feature abstract qualities such as “mildness” that made cigarettes seem more appealing.29 Other advertisements made little mention of the product at all, only mentioning the brand and the emotions associated with it; one advertisement from the era claims, “the happiest words in the world” are “have a Camel” (Fig. 7). For the businesses, the effect of these new techniques was immediate; Coca-Cola cemented itself as a national icon, while the tobacco industry enjoyed great expansion. But such campaigns also had great effect on society as a whole. As these new advertising techniques spread, advertising increasingly convinced the public’s subconscious minds that the ills of their lives could be quelled through the consumption of mass manufactured goods; as the 1920s progressed, consumerism played an increasingly prominent role in American society.30 Consumerism was not new to America; the first glimpse of the nation’s later habits of consumption could be seen as early as the mass manufacturing of the Market Revolution. As the century progressed and manufacturing developed, consumerism increasingly became a tenet of American culture. But it was not until the 1920s that consumerism truly became intrinsic to American society. The rise of Madison Avenue played no small part in this change, as advertising promising happiness and prosperity successfully appealed to its viewer’s emotions, creating a market of eager consumers. Advertising alone was not enough for the rise of consumerism to occur, but the social climate of 1920s provided the perfect opportunity. Businessmen such as Henry Ford pioneered “welfare capitalism” and “Fordism,” movements for greater worker benefits predicated not on morality but rather the idea that higher purchasing power would allow greater consumption of manufactured 29 30 Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. "ADVERTISING." Encyclopedia of American Studies, s.v. "Advertising," 85 goods.31 When combined with the booming speculative economy, advertising and welfare capitalism led to an increase consumer spending that cemented consumerism as fundamental component of American society in the culmination of decades of market growth. While the main medium for advertising before 1920s was print, the 1920s saw the explosion of radio as a means of advertising. The Radio Broadcasting Corporation, RCA, was formed in 1918, but the first licensed commercial radio station was not created until October 1920, when KDKA in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was formed to cover the election between Warren G. Harding and James M. Cox.32 The radio industry saw exponential growth during the 1920s; by the end of the decade, public spending on radio had increased tenfold, and countless radio stations had developed under the ownership of large corporations like RCA.33 It was not long before advertisers began to exploit the opportunity with which they were presented. In 1923, the few radio advertisements consisted of the occasional product description. But by 1924, radio had become Madison Avenue’s domain; advertisers produced almost all of the content, attempting to influence public perception of brands through association with popular programming.34 For example, Pepsodent, a toothpaste brand, sponsored The Amos ‘n’ Andy Show, while other programming such as The Fleischmann Yeast Hour made the connection between the content and business even more explicit. Traditional, explicit advertising grew more popular as the decade progressed, but most advertising agencies feared a negative response to such invasive advertisements could Encyclopedia of American Studies, s.v. "Ford, Henry," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/jhueas/ford_henry. 32 Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal History, 67. 33 Key Concepts in Radio Studies, s.v. "Commercialism," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sageukrs/commercialism. 34 Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. "ADVERTISING." 31 86 impede radio’s growth.35 Ultimately, the plans of the agencies were successful; by the end of the decade, radio content and advertisements brought $3.4 billion in revenues a year.36 In addition to expanding advertising’s influence on 1920’s society, radio itself had a profound impact on national culture. While initially consisting of news and political efforts, radio stations quickly became the nation’s most prominent source of entertainment, as stations began broadcasting music and radio shows that were instantly accessible.37 Advertising did not cause the rise of radio alone; with many Americans enjoying the decade’s prosperity, an increasing need developed for leisure and entertainment. But as advertisers increasingly fed the appetites of the American public for radio content, a mass culture began to develop in American society,38 a direct forebear of the “pop culture” of today. Other forms of mass entertainment developed during the 1920s that further extended the burgeoning nationwide culture, products of both radio’s success and the decade’s apparent prosperity. Sports such as baseball, now with a pervasive broadcast medium, developed into national obsessions,39 while advances in movie technology allowed the rise of “talkies,” movies with synchronized sound.40 Soon, a celebrity culture followed, as Americans clamored to follow the latest actions of their favorite sports players and movie stars.41 By the end of the decade, the nation engaged with entertainment in a completely different manner Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. "ADVERTISING." Ibid. 37 Key Concepts in Radio Studies, s.v. "Advertising," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sageukrs/advertising. 38 Key Concepts in Radio Studies, s.v. "Imagined Community," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sageukrs/imagined_community. 39 Key Concepts in Radio Studies, s.v. "Sport," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sageukrs/sport. 40 The Reader's Companion to American History, s.v. "MOVIES," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/rcah/movies. 41 Encyclopedia of American Studies, s.v. "Celebrity," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/jhueas/celebrity. 35 36 87 than it had just decades earlier, a change in no small way influenced by the concurrent and mutually beneficial rises of radio and advertising. Radio was not the only means through which advertising had significant influence on 1920’s culture. In the 1920s, advertising helped to both shape and keep alive feminist attitudes in American society. While many women in the 1920s sought to further establish their equality with men, the feminist movement began to flounder politically after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment; without a universal goal, there was less unity among feminist organizations and groups.42 Socially however, feminist attitudes thrived in the 1920s, in no small part because of advertising. In response to the increasing demand among young women for independence and equality, advertisers began to appeal to those qualities in their advertisements. In their ads, advertisers combined the values of consumerism with feminism, selling a vision of freedom for women based on consumption of manufactured goods and entertainment.43 One such advertisement addresses itself to “Career Girls,” claiming its cosmetic product would help women get ahead in the business world (Fig. 8). Edward Bernays, for example, now a veteran of Madison Avenue, launched the “Torches of Freedom” campaign, encouraging women to smoke to establish their independence and equality.44 The ideas imparted by these campaigns helped lead to the emergence of the “flappers,” defiant young women in the nation’s cities who repudiated the restrictive social tradition of previous generations.45 While much of the flapper culture was one of rebellion, such as establishing greater equality in dress through more masculine 42 The Reader's Companion to U.S. Women's History, s.v. "Feminism and Feminisms," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/rcuswh/feminism_and_feminisms. 43 The Reader's Companion to U.S. Women's History, s.v. "Consumerism and Consumption," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/rcuswh/consumerism_and_consumption. 44 Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, s.v. "Public Relations," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/estimc/public_relations. 45 Encyclopedia of American Studies, s.v. "Flappers," accessed June 02, 2013, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/jhueas/flappers. 88 clothing, the prevailing philosophy of the flappers mirrored that of Madison Avenue. In this way, the culture of partying and copious consumption driven by the flappers and other 1920s youth was in part, a result of advertising’s profound influence on American society. Advertising’s immense influence on American society did not last forever, and as the culture of the 1920s began to perish, so too did advertising’s influence founder. On October 29, 1929, the American stock market crashed, bringing with it many of America’s industries. As consumer spending rapidly dropped and businesses struggled to stay afloat, advertising spending saw significant decline. Soon, the industry was in free-fall; total billings plunged from $3.4 billion in 1929 to $1.4 billion just two years later.46 While the industry eventually recovered, it never occupied the same formative role that it did in the 1920s.47 Amidst the widespread poverty of the Great Depression, the American public grew weary of the dreams promised by advertising, and a general sense of cynicism began to spread regarding it, a sentiment that would never fully disappear. Americans were disillusioned by advertisements and their promises, and even in the industry’s later heights in the 1950s, public perception would never be as complacent as it was in the 1920s.48 For this reason, a sizable contingent of historians consider the 1920s to be the golden age of advertising; while the industry would later grow larger, never again would it possess so much direct influence on American culture. While the full extent of propaganda and advertising’s effect on the 1920s continues to be the subject of historical debate, it remains clear that advertising was a fundamental component of 1920s culture. Advertising was an essential part of the decade’s character; while not always a driving force of action, it was omnipresent, frequently influencing the American people. Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. "ADVERTISING." Daniel Pope, "Review of The Mirror Makers, by Stephen Fox," The Business History Review 60, no. 1 (1986): 147; Stephen Fox, The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertising and Its Creators (New York, NY: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 48 Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. "ADVERTISING." 46 47 89 The 1920s provided the ideal environment for advertising’s rise; the thriving corporate world was a perfect vessel for the industry’s rebirth. In many ways, the story of advertising tells the story of the 1920s; from the CPI to the rise of Madison Avenue, advertising evolved in unison with the culture of the 1920s. Advertising did not create the institutions of the 1920s, but it did amplify their presence and significance, as seen through the rise of nativism, consumerism, mass- entertainment, and feminism. While sometimes direct and other times less so, the cultural significance of advertising to the 1920s is undeniable. Advertising and the 1920s were codependent; one could not have existed in its entirety without the other. While the events of World War I and the 1920s were essential to the rise of advertising, so too was the rise of advertising essential to the decade’s culture and society. The 1920s represented the pinnacle of the relationship between advertising and American society, the only time in history where they existed truly symbiotically, each developing and influencing the other equally. 90 Figures Figure 1 CPI Poster for Liberty Bonds49 Figure 2 James Montgomery Flagg’s renowned WWI recruitment poster50 Walter H. Everett, Must Children Die and Mothers Plead in Vain?, image, 16, Learn NC Multimedia, University of North Carolina, School of Education, Chapel Hill, NC, accessed October 12, 2013, http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/ww1posters/4978. 50 James Montgomery Flagg, Uncle Sam, image, 1917, 5, Learn NC Multimedia, University of North Carolina, School of Education, Chapel Hill, NC, accessed October 12, 2013, http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/ww1posters/6203. 49 91 Figure 3 Anti-German CPI poster51 Figure 4 1905 Coca-Cola Advertisement52 Figure 5 H.R. Hopps, Destroy This Mad Brute - Enlist U.S Army, image, 1917, The History Project, Collection of Roland Marchand, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA, accessed October 12, 2013, http://historyproject.ucdavis.edu/ic/image_details.php?id=2652. 52 Coca Cola, A Beverage for Men and Ladies, image, 1905, Coca-Cola Magazine Ads, 1905, Adbranch.com, accessed October 12, 2013, http://www.adbranch.com/coca-cola-managazine-ads-1905/. 51 92 1920s Coca-Cola Advertisement53 Figure 6 1890s Poet Cigars Advertisement54 Figure 7 In Every Glass There's Satisfaction; Drink Coca-Cola, image, Coca Cola Ads of the 1920s, Vintage Ad Browser, accessed October 12, 2013, http://www.vintageadbrowser.com/coke-ads-1920s. 54 Poet Cigars, Highest Grade, image, D0254, Emergence of Advertising in America, Duke University, Durham, NC, accessed October 12, 2013, http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/eaa_D0254/#info. 53 93 1920s Camel Cigarettes Advertisement55 Figure 8 1920s Cosmetics Advertisement56 Have A Camel Cigarette, The Happiest Words in World, image, 1927, Ads of the 1920s, Vintage Ad Browser, accessed October 12, 2013, http://www.vintageadbrowser.com/tobacco-ads-1920s/4. 56 How Career Girls Overcome the Greatest Handicap to Success, image, Office Ads of the 1920s, Vintage Ad Browser, accessed October 12, 2013, http://www.vintageadbrowser.com/office-ads-1920s/2. 55 94 Bibliography Allen, Frederick Lewis. 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Journal of Advertising 14, no. 4 (1985): 66-67. 98 Sarah Regan ’14 “The Second Amendment: A Collective Protective Right” When the Second Amendment was ratified in 1791, America had just emerged from the grasping hands of Great Britain’s monarchial rule. Whether laws were modeled after British laws, or modeled in opposition to British laws, there is no doubt that British influence still permeated many aspects of American life. From the experience of living under British rule, the colonists knew which legislation they wanted to adopt into the new government, and which pieces they wanted to abandon. The Second Amendment was a mixture of the two: first of all, the kings’ early abuses led them to believe they needed a defense from an oppressive government. Secondly, elements such as restrictions on who could bear arms and for what reasons appealed to the colonists. The Second Amendment states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”1 Due to the fact that the militia is obsolete and has been replaced by the National Guard, this paper argues that a part of the Second Amendment has become null and void. If we look back at the original intentions of the Founding Fathers for the Second Amendment, we can see that they did not intend for this right to be an unrestricted right to bear arms for personal use. The framers believed the Second Amendment was a collective right to be exercised only under specific situations as a protection from an oppressive government, within a militia. This paper will explore the historical context in which the Second Amendment was written and consider political theory of the time. When the English colonists came to North America, they were guaranteed the same exact rights here as they were in England, including rights involving arms. Although there 1 It was written during a time when the available weapons were very different from those available to us today. 99 were some exceptions, until the American Revolution, the government in the colonies was basically a replica or mini model of the government in England. So, if we look at the history of gun laws in America, we must look first at the gun laws in Britain from which they originated. It is only through close examination of laws and circumstances in Britain that we may successfully deduce the purpose of the founding fathers when they wrote, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The militia first became popular during “The long war with the Hapsburg Empire…[which] contributed to an upsurge of national sentiment. Faith in English militia was vindicated as free men held their own against…professional standing armies of the Spanish King. English men came to believe that the militia was the best security for their country and their liberties.”2 For more historical context, it must be understood that “[the] militia might keep and bear arms in accordance with their militia duties for the defense of the realm.”3 In other words, the militia acted as the police force because at the time, citizens did not have the luxury of police officers or government-funded protection. Their responsibility to defend themselves was in their hands. However, the difference between the police and the militia is this: the police protect citizens on behalf of the government, but a militia is intended to protect people against their government. This was during a time of dictatorial rulers who overstepped their boundaries and crushed the rights of their people. The militia was a legal way to fight oppression of the government because the people were unable to express their opinions through the ballot box, due to the structure of a monarchy. Like the United States, Britain had its own bill of rights; as Saul Cornell has claimed, “the English Bill of Rights…the king could Robert J. Cottrol, ed., Gun Control and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the Second Amendment (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1994), 190. 3 Cottrol, Gun Control and the Constitution, 197. 2 100 not…dismantle and disarm the militia.”4 In a sense, this was the British government’s form of checks and balances on power. The English Bill of Rights succeeds more thoroughly in outlining how this right to bear arms is to be used than Second Amendment does with its vague and confusing language. It clearly favors the collective rights view. In the contemporary debate over guns, there are two major viewpoints: the collective right view, and the individual right view. The collective right view says that the right to bear arms is only protected if it is a group of people bearing arms, as in a militia. The individual right view says that it is the right of each individual person alone to bear a gun. The English Bill of Rights stated, “There was no individual right to bear arms; the rights of subject could be protected only by the political process and fundamental laws of the land.”5 William Blackstone, a prominent English politician, judge, and political commentator, highlighted the need to regulate any sort of arms allowed when he said, “[bearing arms] is indeed a public allowance, and under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance…when sanctions of society are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.”6 Blackstone made two important points: one, that the bearing arms is a “public allowance” not an intrinsic right, and therefore it is subject to regulation. Secondly, Blackstone also notes that arms are solely to be used when there is oppression of the government. This right is one of resistance against injustices. Going back to Locke’s idea of the social contract: when the government breaks their part of the deal to serve and represent the people of the United States, it is the right of the people to break out of this contract. The right to bear arms is a key element in that process. Saul Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in Early America (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 198. 5 Ibid. 6 Earl R. Kruschke, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Continuing American Dilemma (New York, NY: Charles C Thomas, 1985), 9. 4 101 Now that we have established that the roots of our government and particularly our Bill of Rights, of which the Second Amendment is a part, it is important to make the connection that, since the collective rights theory was the predominant theory in Britain at the time, and since our government and many of its important documents were based off of English law, the collective rights theory is the one that the founding fathers intended to uphold when this amendment was written and ratified. In short, the Second Amendment came from laws already in place in England, and since those laws did not protect the individuals right to a gun, the Bill of Rights did not protect the individual right. “None of the rights found in the Bill of Rights is granted or created by that document,”7 hence the right that it protected was the preexisting right of a collective group to bear arms in defiance of the government. A key phrase when discussing the role of guns in colonial society is “civic duty” or “civic purpose:” “The right to have arms was linked to a particular civic purpose. It was analogous to the right to petition, another political safeguard protecting English liberty against arbitrary power.”8 This thought reinforces the idea of the militia and coming together to protect freedoms from oppression. Going back to Blackstone’s fifth auxiliary right which states that, “in civil society, one gave up right to self-defense,”9 it is easily seen that through civic duty, militia, and the social contract that one makes with the government upon entering civil society, the right to bear arms was intended not for self defense or other self serving purposes, but solely for defense of the liberty of the people as a whole. Furthermore, since in the United States we have a police force, and almost the entire country is considered “civilized” society, the right to own a gun is no longer one that we are entitled to. In theory, with the protection of the police, it should not be necessary. Kruschke, The Right to Keep, 7. Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding, 15. 9 Ibid. 7 8 102 In the days of the frontier, where many citizens had no protection on behalf of the government, owning a gun was almost necessary to defend against rebellions and other threats. But now, with government protection, we have entered the civil society and forfeited our right to own a gun for individual protection. Perhaps we can better understand the colonists’ fear of a domineering government by looking at how the militia had been manipulated in England in the past. King Henry II issued the Assize of Arms in 1181, which stated that, the “clear purpose [of the military] was to strengthen and maintain the King’s authority.”10 Clearly, to those seeking democracy, this was a perversion of power that mutated the militia into a pawn that served the Kings’ whims. The colonists were extremely opposed to this idea, and did not want archaic ideas such as these to permeate their utopia. Therefore, the militia was created as an antithesis to unbridled power of the government, and the idea of the militia being a safeguard from oppression emerged. So, when the Second Amendment was written, it was clearly intended to protect the people from political oppression; the colonists were allowed to bear arms therefore, but not without restriction. Since many of our country’s ideals were formed either in opposition to England, or based off of pieces of the government that they found useful, we can see that when “in 1328 Parliament passed the…Statute of Northampton” which restricted the use of arms11, this was one of pieces of legislation that the colonists approved of since they modeled laws in America off of it. This was one of the earliest pieces of legislation restricting gun use. A fine line existed between a right to defend liberty and anarchy, and restriction of arms was an effective way to balance power and assure that that line was not crossed. Later we will see further evidence of why and how the founding fathers supported restriction of arms, but for 10 11 Cottrol, Gun Control and the Constitution, 188. Ibid 189. 103 now we must make another connection between our government and laws and those of England; it is important to know that the idea was engendered in English law. Analysis and careful consideration of quotes from the time when the Second Amendment was being drafted are also helpful in decoding its complexities. James Madison was the author of the Second Amendment. His views on gun rights can be interpreted through looking at pieces of his legislation: “In a ‘bill for the preservation of deer,’ Madison proposed a stiff penalty for individuals who hunted out of season…this law penalized person who ‘shall bear a gun out of his enclosed ground unless whilst performing military duty.”12 Madison’s word choice serves as an insightful view into Madison’s distinction between “bearing a gun for personal use and for common defense.”13 Clearly Madison, the author of the Second Amendment, saw the difference between the individualist view and the collective view. It can be inferred, as proven in his legislation, that he opposed the idea of owning a gun for personal use. Therefore, if we are trying to decipher the original meaning of the framers, it is clear that the Second Amendment was intended to be a collective right. The people also held similar views: as stated before, they did not want anarchy and regulation was not seen as “antithetical to liberty.” Americans did not strive for unregulated liberty, but rather well regulated liberty14. Therefore, “outside of a well-regulated society governed by the rule of law, liberty was nothing more than anarchy”15 which the colonists clearly opposed. This quote demonstrates the importance of regulation. In accordance with their beliefs, all able-bodied citizens were required to purchase a military-style assault weapon and take shooting lessons.16 While the government did not simply hand out arms, they did Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding, 29. Ibid 14 Ibid 3. 15 Ibid 27. 16 Ibid 2. 12 13 104 want the people to be armed to defend liberty, particularly before the American Revolution when many of the rights of the colonists were being breached. However, requiring that weapons be owned should not be misinterpreted as the government encouraging violence or promoting individuals to take matters into their own hands: it was a precautionary measure during a turbulent time that eventually erupted into the American Revolution. Madison’s proposed bill mustn’t be over interpreted, however, requiring gun lessons speaks volumes, and goes back to the Statute of Northampton. The requirement of training supports the idea that the government did not intend for individuals to have unlimited freedom to use their guns as they wanted. Colonists were trained to combat, not to shoot invaders in their houses. They were trained for a purpose: to defend and promote democracy. Another restriction that was contemplated during the time was who could carry a gun. James Madison was not alone in his support of restricted gun use; “Samuel Adams stressed that only peaceable citizens should be protected in their right of keeping their own arms.”17 This accounts for our current laws restricting the gun usage of criminals or anyone who has been in jail. This recognition that not all people are fit to be gun owners supports the notion that owning a gun is not an intrinsic right as pro-gun organizations such as the NRA would like to believe. Returning to the origin of the right to bear arms, the idea came from the debate between Federalists and Anti-federalists as an issue of states rights versus federal rights.18 Anti-federalists believed that, when the Second Amendment was added to the Constitution as a precursor for it to be ratified, it would be the “ultimate check on federal power”19 if the federal government grew to be oppressive and abused their power: the state regulated militias would always be there to step in and defend their rights. Cottrol, Gun Control and the Constitution, 649. Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding, 5 19 Ibid. 17 18 105 The Second Amendment can also be analyzed through its diction. When examining the Second Amendment, it is important to know the definitions of the words in context of the time period. One of the most important and perhaps most argued words in the amendment is “militia.” According the George Mason, “Who are the Militia? They now consist of the whole people.”20 All white, male, able-bodied citizens between an average minimum and maximum age were considered part of the militia.21 Professor Cress, author of An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear arms, makes the point that state constitutions “regularly used the words ‘man’ or ‘person’ in regard to individual rights…” however in the Second Amendment, the word phrase “the people” is used instead. This choice to use “the people” over “person” is a deliberate one intended to mean that this right is, once again, a collective right. Professor Cress continues, saying, “’the people’ in regard to a right to bear arms is intended to refer to the ‘sovereign society’ collectively organized.”22 The diction and context both heavily support the idea that the right to bear arms was intended to be a collective right. The diction separates it from other rights such as freedom of conscience that are seen and inviolable intrinsic rights. Samuel Adams agreed, quoting William Blackstone, “Having arms for their defense he [Blackstone] tells us is ‘a public allowance, under due restrictions…when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.”23 Similar to Britain, under the Assize of Arms, Samuel Adams and his colleagues believed owning a gun was closely intertwined with legal responsibilities of service to the state. The states relied on the militia as their power to enforce their rights, and so they exercised that right as much as possible by requiring those eligible to own a gun. In the eighteenth century, without the militia, the right to own a gun Cottrol, Gun Control and the Constitution, 647. Kruschke, The Right to Keep, 10. 22 Cottrol, Gun Control and the Constitution, 645-647 23 Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding, 13-15 20 21 106 would have been null and void: “Citizens had both a right and an obligation to arm themselves so that they might participate in the militia,”24 meaning that, once again, the individualist view point is not a viable or supportable stance when looked at throughout history. Furthermore, we may see this right as neither purely collective nor individual, but as an issue of states’ rights. In the modern era, we no longer have a real militia, so it can hardly be considered a collective right under the original meaning, which protected the right to bear arms within a militia. The issue of gun rights has always been complex and controversial. When the 14th Amendment was undergoing construction, Republicans intended for it to grant the federal government “the power to incorporate the fundamental liberties protected by the Bill of Rights,” which meant Congress and courts would have the power to protect certain rights such as the right to bear arms. However, Democrats in favor of states’ rights argued that the Second Amendment was intended to give power to the states. If the federal government was given control over protecting Second Amendment, it would zap power from the states that was originally given to them in a compromise over the Constitution. The courts agreed and adopted the “Democratic states’ rights theory of the Second Amendment.” 25 The closer it is examined, the easier it is to see that the amendment was intended to be anything but a personal right. It was intended to give the states power to defend themselves from the federal government, and the people as a whole the right to defend themselves against their government when it was oppressive. The well regulated militia that the Amendment refers to is a weapon of the states that they wanted to hone and make as sharp as possible, which 24 25 Ibid 17. Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding, 6. 107 explains the requirement of all white men of a certain age being required to own a gun and serve in the militia. The state’s rights theory eventually morphed into the very different, modern, collective rights theory in the early 1900s. The impetus for this change was the steadily climbing rate of organized crime, especially in cities. 26 The extreme injustices such as a lack of voting rights triggered the violence that lead to legislators crying for laws that would hopefully lower crime rates. As a result, the Congress threw away the state militias in favor of the National Guard so that ordinary citizens could not and would not claim that having a gun was part of their duty to the militia; thus, the tie between civic duty and bearing arms was severed.27 In contrast with colonial times when, “The Supreme Court…defined the militia to mean all citizens…capable of bearing arms,” and “ these men were expected to appear bearing arms… of the common use at the time,” now the militia is limited to members of the modern day National Guard.28 However, the National Guard, while it does defend states, does not defend citizens from an oppressive government because the National Guard is a government organization. Slowly, the right of individuals to carry guns has been sapped away, but not in favor of the original collective viewpoint of the founding fathers and those who ratified the amendment. Antithetical to the original purpose, the Second Amendment now further serves the government, not the people. While the militia does serve the state governments, it still serves the national government. So, while it is a collective right in the sense that it is the whole state’s militia, it is not individual enough to protect the people themselves from an oppressive state government. The individual viewpoint was born from the opposition of those trying to restrict the usage of guns; defenders of this viewpoint Ibid. Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding, 6. 28 Kruschke, The Right to Keep, 10-11. 26 27 108 automatically looked at the Second Amendment pointing at only the second part of the amendment which states, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” but completely ignored the important preamble which sets out the purpose of the amendment, and the context from which the amendment came29 When we look at early colonial law, we see that the preliminary states’ bills of rights during the pre-revolutionary era restricted the power of government, not rights of the citizens.30 If the individual right to own a gun was never established, and there is no evidence that it was, then the Second Amendment was not restricting the usage of guns by individual for personal purposes. In that sense, defenders of the individual right are correct in saying that there is no amendment restricting the use of individual guns, however, that concept was not existing and therefore could not be upheld or shot down. Another interesting fact that stands out when early state constitutions are analyzed is that the state could force an individual to defend the state, but not himself. No early state constitutions protected the individual’s right to bear arms for self-defense. The right to self-defense, a complicated issue, was excluded from constitutional law. To an English subject, self-defense was not as heavily touted as it is today: “Flight, not armed confrontation, was the legal obligation of English subjects when faced with a threat of personal safety.”31 That is, English citizens were expected to run the other way if attacked, not fight back. Violence was used sparingly and was more of a last resort rather than a first defense mechanism for English subjects. Gun violence then was certainly not the issue it is today in our modern society. Also, further restricting gun usage in colonial times, were not only regulations on who could own a gun and the required lessons, but also other precautions that the government took. Reinstating Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding, 6. Cottrol, Gun Control and the Constitution, 202-203 31 Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding, 16. 29 30 109 the gun laws that regulated minutemen during the Revolutionary days “would certainly involve more intrusive gun regulation, not less…mandatory gun registration…government officials in their homes [inspecting] privately owned weapons,”32 measures that pro-gun rights organizations would certainly balk at. The history of the amendment can be understood more thoroughly through a judicial lens. Due to the controversial nature of the Second Amendment, courts, particularly the Supreme Court, tend to shy away from cases that deal with the Second Amendment and from defining what the amendment explicitly means for the citizens of the United States. One of the earliest Supreme Court cases daring to deal with the Second Amendment was City of Salina v. Blaksley, 1905. James Blaksley was charged with carrying a revolver in the city while under the influence of liquor. The Court ruled that the militia is the military of the people, and their purpose is defense during times of peace during which standing armies are prohibited. They declared that “the manner of bearing [arms]…is clearly indicated to be as a member of a well-regulated militia….and was therefore not within the provision of the Bill of Rights and was not protected by its terms.”33 In 1911, the case Strickland v. State was brought before the Supreme Court of Georgia. This case involved whether or not it was constitutional to demand that anyone who carries a gun must have a license. Gun rights supporters argued that requiring a license was an infringement on the Second Amendment right to bear arms because in order to obtain a license, you must pay a certain amount of money. They argued that this disenfranchised people who could not afford a license to carry a weapon. However, the court ruled that it was within their power to regulate the right to bear arms. Hence, it was declared that the Second Amendment did not guarantee unlimited 32 33 Ibid, 2. Kruschke, The Right to Keep, 48. 110 use of guns to everyone; states were allowed to utilize restrictions and requirements. In the official ruling, the judges stipulated that, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but the general assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be born.”34 In another Supreme Court case of 1938, United States v. Miller, the court clearly ruled, “that the constitution does not guarantee a right to be armed for private purposes unrelated to organized state militia, whether they be hunting, recreation, or even self-protection.” The court recognized that the man who possessed the gun in question did not “have a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.” In other words, since he was not serving in a militia, he had no right to carry his gun.35 In both cases, the Supreme Court confirmed that bearing arms is linked to militia service. The founders intended for arms to be beared only by militias rebelling against an oppressive government. Even the Supreme Court has affirmed this view, putting the highest court of the land behind it. Whether this is the best interpretation of the Second Amendment for the modern day United States is another question; however it can be safely deduced that James Madison’s intent when he drafted the amendment was not to protect the individual’s right to defend his house or himself using a gun. We must also take into account that in the 1700s, the framers could not have possibly imagined the weapons of mass destruction we have available to us today. The laws that sufficed 200 years ago may not still be the most effective today. Through careful examination of works by respected politicians such as William Blackstone and Samuel Adams and many of their contemporaries, we can see that the individualist viewpoint did not emerge until well after the amendment had been 34 Ibid. 111 established. The key to this amendment lies in the preface, which specifically states the purpose. In law, intent is a very important word. When a criminal is tried for murder, if it is proven there was no intent, they can be absolved of murder. In the case of the Second Amendment, the purpose for bearing a gun that makes it legal is very clear: to protect the people. This piece, the intent, is the difference between legally bearing a gun and illegally possessing one. 112 Bibliography Cornell, Saul. A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in Early America. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006. Cottrol, Robert J., ed. Gun Control and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the Second Amendment. New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1994. Gun Cite. http://www.guncite.com/court/state/83p619.html. Kruschke, Earl R. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Continuing American Dilemma. New York, NY: Charles C Thomas, 1985. Monk, Linda R. "The Second Amendment." In The Bill of Rights: A User's Guide, 86-97. 3rd ed. N.p.: Close Up Foundation, 2000. 113