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ENABLERS OF A WAR: THE AMERICAN PRESS AND VIETNAM,
1954-1960
____________
A Thesis
Presented
to the Faculty of
California State University, Chico
____________
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
History
____________
by
Kevin Allen Luty
Spring 2015
PUBLICATION RIGHTS
No portion of this thesis may be reprinted or reproduced in any manner
unacceptable to the usual copyright restrictions without the written permission of the
author.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Publication Rights ......................................................................................................
iii
Abstract ......................................................................................................................
v
CHAPTER
I.
Introduction ....................................................................................................
1
II.
Collaborators in Colonialism, 1954-1955 ......................................................
7
III.
Encouragers of Optimism, 1955-1956 ...........................................................
31
IV.
Purveyors of Pessimism, 1957-1960..............................................................
49
V.
Conclusion .....................................................................................................
70
Bibliography ..............................................................................................................
75
iv
ABSTRACT
ENABLERS OF A WAR: THE AMERICAN PRESS AND VIETNAM,
1954-1960
by
Kevin Allen Luty
Master of Arts in History
California State University, Chico
Spring 2015
Previous historical studies of the Vietnam War have examined thoroughly the
American news media’s opposition to the conflict. This thesis, however, will reveal how
at first the American press acted as a promoter of U.S. intervention in Vietnam from 1954
to 1960. Operating under the “can-do spirit” of the era, journalists believed that the
United States could succeed in creating an anticommunist state in Vietnam where the
French had failed. Convinced of South Vietnam’s centrality in the global struggle to
contain Communism, the press applauded when American negotiators successfully
placed the nation under the umbrella protection of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and raised no protests when the U.S. Military
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) began training and equipping the South Vietnamese
Army. Despite evidence that South Vietnamese Premier Ngo Dinh Diem lacked
v
widespread support, the American press backed him and cited his fraudulent presidential
victory in October 1955 as proof of his popularity. Unwilling to promote any course of
action that might threaten Diem, the U.S. media joined him in rejecting the 1956
unification elections called for by the 1954 Geneva Accords. In May 1957, Diem’s
supporters in the United States welcomed him when he visited Washington with a highly
orchestrated public relations campaign falsely depicting the president as a successful
democratic leader—a “Miracle Man of Asia.” In response to Diem’s few critics,
American commentators simply rationalized his police-state tactics as necessary reaction
to the Communist threat. Following a near-fatal coup attempt in 1960, the press finally
began to criticize Diem, but remained convinced about the ultimate necessity for
American involvement.
vi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For the American press no less than the U.S. government, the Cold War pitted
communism against the “Free World” in an existential battle for the future of civilization.
In the pages of popular newspapers, news magazines, and journals the basic assumptions
that underlay Washington’s Cold War consensus went unchallenged. Thus when the
United States intervened in foreign lands to prevent the spread of communism, as the
Eisenhower administration did in Vietnam from 1954-1960, the American press naturally
paid close attention. This thesis will analyze how the American press treated major policy
decisions that the U.S. government made in Vietnam during these formative years of its
engagement. It will examine in close detail press coverage of the Franco-American
negotiations over Vietnam, the U.S. government’s rejection of the all-Vietnam elections
stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Accords and the Eisenhower administration’s commitment
to South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem. American press coverage of these issues
and events, as the following pages will demonstrate, provided an important pretext for an
expanding American intervention and ultimately the resort to war because it depicted the
Republic of Vietnam as a vital security interest of the United States justifying providing
significant quantities of military and economic aid to ensure its survival.
In general, scholarship on the American press and Vietnam has focused on
determining whether an adversarial relationship existed between journalists and the U.S.
1
2
government during the Vietnam War. Peter Braestrup’s groundbreaking two-volume
study Big Story published in 1977 answers this question in the affirmative, claiming that
the American press reported the 1968 Tet Offensive as a psychological and military
victory for North Vietnam and the Viet Cong while officials correctly claimed the
opposite.1 Right revisionist historians adopted the adversarial press thesis to argue that
the media bears responsibility for the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. According to these writers,
who ironically challenged the initial orthodox position on the left that accepted news
coverage of Tet as accurate, correspondents intentionally misled the American public
about Tet to sour domestic attitudes toward the war and the U.S. military and civilian
officials carrying it out.2 Other leftist critics of American foreign policy such as Noam
Chomsky and Edward Herman, on the other hand, reject the adversarial label altogether.
They argue that the American press continued to defend U.S. involvement in Vietnam as
a noble, if misguided, venture despite disagreeing with U.S. government tactics during
the war.3
Prior scholars, by focusing on real or imagined conflict between the American
press and U.S. government, have paid only cursory attention to Vietnam news coverage
from the years 1954 to 1960. The studies that do exist mention this period if only to note
the glaring lack of disparity between the opinions that American journalists and the U.S.
officials charged with the task of nation-building in Vietnam expressed. According to
1
Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the
Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington, 1 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), 156.
2
Charles Mohr, “Once Again-Did the Press Lose Vietnam?” Columbia Journalism Review 22, no.
4 (November/December 1983): 53.
3
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the
Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 299.
3
most writers, the press lacked both the manpower and expertise to report accurately about
Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s, and thus relied on U.S. government sources who
exaggerated the successes of Ngo Dinh Diem and his American supporters. Philip
Knightley, in The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth Maker from
the Crimea to Iraq, states the case succinctly: “There were few experts on the area, and
most articles, in the period from 1954-1960, concentrated on the Communist menace and
the need for greater American involvement.”4
According to Susan Welch, the American press uncritically accepted President
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s policies in Vietnam largely due to the absence of access to any
contradictory information outside the U.S. government.5 Daniel Hallin, in The
Uncensored War, claims that articles journalists who went to Vietnam in the early 1960s
wrote tended to “reflect . . . the perspectives of American officialdom generally.”6 While
certainly largely dependent on official sources during this period, journalists also granted
legitimacy to U.S. nation-building techniques in Vietnam and the regime of Ngo Dinh
Diem because they genuinely feared Communist expansion in Southeast Asia and
accepted the “Domino Theory” as fact.
Like the American press, many observers accuse the academic community of
misrepresenting or underreporting Vietnam in the scholarly journals during the 1950s and
early 1960s. In his study of intellectuals and the Vietnam War, Robert Tomes
4
Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from
Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 409.
5
Susan Welch, “The American Press in Indochina, 1950-1956,” in Communication in
International Politics, Richard L. Merritt, ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 221.
6
Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1986), 9.
4
characterizes coverage as suffering from “a basic state of confusion over the objective
facts.”7 Similarly, Robert Scheer, in his 1965 study entitled How the United States Got
Involved in Vietnam, claims that the social scientists who researched Vietnam during the
1950s created “propaganda for the cause” that glorified Ngo Dinh Diem’s anticommunism and the American commitment to create a democratic South Vietnam.8
Reinforcing this viewpoint, other studies claim that the American Friends of Vietnam
(AFV), an influential lobby group with government ties, exerted an inordinate influence
on early Vietnam press coverage, specifically regarding coverage of Ngo Dinh Diem. In
America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast
Asia, Seth Jacobs argues that “Diem was treated with unconditional positive regard
by . . . the American media” thanks to the AFV until 1960.9 Historian Frederik Logevall
claims that the AFV successfully promoted Diem, “while drastically limiting the number
of articles even remotely critical of the Saigon government.”10
Historians contend that Diem received largely sympathetic press coverage
until full-time correspondents arrived in 1962 to reveal the ugly truth about his regime
and break with the U.S. government’s official line for the first time. William Prochnau, in
Once Upon a Distant War, writes that the newly arrived newsmen relied on “provocative,
7
Robert Tomes, Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War (New York: New
York University Press, 1998), 66.
8
Robert Scheer, How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam: A Report to the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Monica CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
1965), 33.
9
Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S.
Intervention in Southeast Asia (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 218.
10
Frederick Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s
Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012), 664.
5
new, adversarial standards that broke from the old and would be used to chronicle
America’s disaster in Vietnam.”11 According to James Aronson, it took the arrival of
such full-time correspondents as David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, and Malcolm Browne
“to get the American public—and the government—to realize and acknowledge that the
miracle of Diem was a costly myth.”12
Nevertheless, some historians acknowledge that scattered doubts about Diem
arose prior to 1962. However, they insist that the U.S. government still guided the
Vietnam narrative. William Hammond, in Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at
War, asserts that the press had ignored Diem’s “despotic tendencies” until an abortive
coup attempt nearly toppled his regime in 1960. Despite their shift in tone, American
correspondents remained largely dependent on official sources until early 1963.13 In
Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War, Clarence Wyatt claims that
the 1960 coup attempt accounted for a “swing in press opinion about Diem.”14 Even so,
the press “failed to present the whole story . . . in Vietnam” until full-time correspondents
arrived on the scene to seek out independent sources of information on a regular basis.15
This thesis will add an important new dimension to the literature on the
Vietnam War, explaining how the American press acted as a facilitator and promoter of
U.S. intervention in Vietnam during the 1950s. Unlike other studies on the topic,
11
William Prochnau, Once Upon a Distant War: David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, Peter Arnett—
Young War Correspondents and Their Early Vietnam Battles (New York: Random House, 1995), 31.
12
James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 191.
13
William M. Hammond, Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1998), 8.
14
Clarence Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1995), 67.
15
Ibid., 69.
6
however, it will not compare and contrast American press coverage from different eras to
identify the roots of a potentially adversarial relationship between correspondents and
officials. Rather, this fresh examination will demonstrate how the tone of American press
coverage about Vietnam from 1954 to 1960, while certainly in part a reflection of the
influence of the U.S. government and AFV, sprang mostly from the “can-do spirit” of the
age and widespread popular beliefs, that journalists shared, about American
exceptionalism and the evils of communism. Due to their stringent belief in the efficacy
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, American journalists were able to rationalize their
support for the draconian behavior of the Diem regime, while also rejecting all-Vietnam
elections and lobbying for France’s withdrawal. As a result, the American press, by
embracing greater U.S. responsibility for Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s, lent
legitimacy to policies that made military intervention in the mid-1960s inevitable.
CHAPTER II
COLLABORATORS IN COLONIALISM,
1954-1955
The American press accepted and in many cases outright endorsed the U.S.
government’s assumption of responsibility from France to prevent the triumph of
communism in Vietnam. Driven by fears of an international Communist conspiracy, both
American officials and the press believed that one could trace Communist activities in
Vietnam to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and ultimately the Soviet Union. Fear
of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia led reporters to support U.S. action for
collective defense such as taking the lead in creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) and generated enthusiasm for the anti-Communist South
Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. It also allowed American journalists to criticize
French policies in Vietnam, especially when they involved reconciliation with the Viet
Minh. By arguing that Franco-American objectives were basically incompatible,
journalists allowed the U.S. government to act unilaterally in Vietnam. Both American
intervention and the press’s support of it make sense only in the larger Cold War context.
The long American involvement in Vietnam began during the First Indochina War, when
the U.S. government funded the French war effort to defeat the Communist Viet Minh.
In the early 1950s, American policy-makers felt themselves justified in
fearing an expansive Communist conspiracy in Asia directed from Moscow. After
7
8
Chinese Communist forces defeated the Nationalist army of Jiang Jieshi in 1949, Soviet
Premier Josef Stalin spoke of a “second front” in Asia. In December of that year, PRC
leader Mao Zedong travelled to Moscow to sign a Sino-Soviet mutual defense pact
designed to meet potential foreign aggression.16 American fears heightened when Stalin
approved Communist North Korea’s plan to unify the country by military means in June
1950. After American troops intervened to defend South Korea, China sent troops to
meet the American forces below the Yalu River in November 1950. For three years, both
sides fought a bloody war that ended in stalemate. The Korean War and the triumph of
Mao Zedong in China convinced American officials that communism threatened all of
Asia.17 Thereafter, the war in Indochina between the Communist Viet Minh and the
French colonial regime took on international dimensions.
The French, who had ruled Indochina since late in the nineteenth century,
briefly lost control of Vietnam when Japan occupied the nation during World War II.
After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, France returned to Vietnam and confronted
an upstart independence movement led by Ho Chi Minh, a committed nationalist and
Communist. With widespread popular support, Ho’s Viet Minh forces fought
successfully against the French Union army and appeared poised to rule all of Vietnam.
The U.S. government, which had expressed opposition to French colonialism when
Franklin D. Roosevelt was president, faced a dilemma in Indochina where the distinction
between communism and anti-colonialism was blurred. Inspired by hysterical notions of
16
17
John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), 39.
George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 22.
9
an international Communist conspiracy, policy-makers ultimately identified Ho Chi Minh
as a Soviet provocateur, despite having no evidence that he actually received orders from
Moscow.18 In 1950, American fears seemed to be justified when Ho Chi Minh
established diplomatic ties with the PRC and the Chinese sent troops to the Vietnamese
border. On July 26, 1950, Harry S. Truman signed military aid legislation into law and
the U.S. began funding the French war effort in Vietnam to prevent Ho and his Viet Minh
from establishing Communist control of the nation.19
French troops greatly outnumbered the Viet Minh forces under the command
of Vo Nguyen Giap. However, the Viet Minh received weapons and advisors from the
PRC and by 1950 boasted a modern army. In the spring of 1951, Giap ordered attacks on
key areas such as the Red River Valley and the port of Haiphong. The French, under the
command of General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, resisted the attacks, but neither the
French nor the Viet Minh could properly claim the initiative. In an attempt to gain greater
support from the Vietnamese masses, the French granted more control over the war effort
to Vietnamese units in 1952. By suggesting that the Vietnamese were virtually
independent, the French procured increased American support for their efforts in June
1952.20 Viet Minh successes in early 1953, however, dampened enthusiasm for France’s
prospects among American officials. In April, the U.S. government demanded that
increases in American aid be met with a coherent French military plan to win the war.21
18
Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1983), 190.
19
Ibid., 192.
20
R.E.M. Irving, The First Indochina War (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 103.
21
Ibid., 104.
10
In response, the French intensified their war effort, implementing the Navarre Plan at the
end of 1953.
Bolstered by millions of dollars in aid and thousands of tons of American
equipment, General Henri Navarre decided to challenge the Viet Minh guerrillas for
supremacy by luring them into conventional battles. Navarre attacked the Viet Minh
throughout the Mekong Delta and along the Laotian border, while reinforcing French
strongholds. For Navarre, defending the French position at Dien Bien Phu, long
considered a hotbed of Viet Minh activity located in northwest Vietnam near the Laotian
border, assumed critical importance in the spring of 1954.22
After French Colonel Christian de Castries placed large artillery pieces around
the fortress at Dien Bien Phu in March, Giap attacked, quickly capturing the French
cannons and surrounding the base. In response, French Chief of Staff General Paul Ely
called for direct U.S. military assistance. Ultimately, American officials, including
President Dwight D. Eisenhower himself, considered direct military intervention
misguided and too costly. Unwilling to incur more casualties, and unable to secure
greater U.S. support, the French met with representatives of the Viet Minh in May at
Geneva, Switzerland to negotiate a cease-fire. After Geneva, Western powers including
France and the United States, met at Manila with representatives from Thailand, the
Philippines, Pakistan, New Zealand, and Australia to discuss the creation of a regional
security organization—SEATO—designed, in part, to provide justification for U.S.
protection of the new regime in South Vietnam.
22
314.
Ellen Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954),
11
During the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had
promoted the creation of a collective Southeast Asian security pact designed to deter
Communist aggression in the region and establish a legal basis for American intervention
in Vietnam.23 While Dulles envisioned a military response to Communist expansion in
Asia, other Western powers, notably Britain and France, desired a political solution based
on the Geneva Accords.24 Ultimately, SEATO allowed the signatories, including the
United States, to claim that an armed attack against southern Vietnam constituted a threat
to regional peace. The American press overwhelmingly supported the creation of
SEATO.25 However, some columnists did not believe that SEATO provided adequate
safeguards against the Communists realizing their designs in Southeast Asia and blamed
France for the weakness of the treaty. In a series of articles and letters to the editor
published by the Washington Post, SEATO’s critics laid siege to the agreement.
Two weeks prior to the formal consultations at Manila, correspondent
Chalmers Roberts outlined potential problems with the security pact under consideration.
In particular, he noted that France and Britain intended to honor the Geneva agreement
by refusing to sign a defense treaty that included South Vietnam. Roberts concluded that
“such a treaty will be only the merest beginning in the colossal problem of how to reverse
the growing communist strength in Asia.”26 Joseph and Stewart Alsop, who considered
the Geneva Agreement comparable to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s
23
Herring, America’s Longest War, 55.
24
Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), 243.
25
Susan Welch, “The American Press in Indochina, 1950-1956,” in Communication in
International Politics, Richard L. Merritt, ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 219.
26
Chalmers Roberts, “Southeast Asia Pact: Three Main Problems Involved,” Washington Post,
August 21, 1954.
12
resort to appeasement at Munich in capitulating to Nazi Germany’s Adolf Hitler in
September 1939, depicted SEATO as essentially a paper tiger. The Alsop brothers
believed that South Vietnam’s situation called for more drastic measures than SEATO, in
part because the French presence inflamed “the already violent nationalist feeling of the
Vietnamese population.”27 In a letter to the editor published after SEATO’s creation, Dr.
Phan Quang Dan criticized the French for failing to consult the Vietnamese during the
Manila Conference. Dan, an outspoken Vietnamese nationalist, argued that Vietnam had
every right to belong to SEATO, while France did not. He claimed that only an
independent Vietnam free from French influence could defeat communism.28
While the Geneva cease-fire and the creation of SEATO terminated French
military domination over Indochina, the rise of Ngo Dinh Diem signaled the end of
French political supremacy. During the First Indochina War, as Vietnamese nationalism
grew, so too did frustration with the French and Bao Dai, their puppet in Saigon. While
Bao Dai attempted to gain independence from France through negotiation, others such as
Ngo Dinh Diem called for a more vigorous approach. Diem had gained a small but
influential group of followers in the United States due to his unique blend of anticommunism, Catholicism, and Vietnamese nationalism. A relatively obscure figure in
Vietnamese political circles, Diem bolstered his nationalist credentials in September 1953
when he organized and attended a Unity Congress that criticized Bao Dai’s gradualist
27
Joseph and Stewart Alsop, “Rest of Vietnam Next Red Goal,” Washington Post, August 29,
28
Phan Quang Dan, “Vietnam and SEATO,” Letters to the Editor, Washington Post, September
1954.
18, 1954.
13
approach with the French.29 After the Congress, Bao Dai met with Diem on multiple
occasions to assuage nationalist doubts. One such meeting occurred in May 1954, as Dien
Bien Phu hung in the balance. At the meeting, Bao Dai appointed Diem premier of the
State of Vietnam. The U.S. supported Diem while the French considered his appointment
an invitation to civil war.30
Despite very serious objections to France’s attitude towards Diem, officials
within the Eisenhower administration believed that without the continued presence of the
French Expeditionary Corps, Vietnam’s security would be precarious at best. France
desired to cooperate with the United States in the interest of protecting her investments in
Vietnam and to avoid accusations of losing Vietnam to the Communists. Thus, in
September 1954, France and the United States agreed to pursue a cooperative effort in
preserving a free South Vietnam with Ngo Dinh Diem as premier.31 While agreeing to
nominally support Diem, France continued to search for alternatives. Some American
officials also had doubts about the premier, but the U.S. government chose to stay the
course with Diem primarily because of the political influence his supporters wielded.
Mike Mansfield, one of Diem’s boosters, had met Diem during the First Indochina War at
the request of Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Diem found a kindred spirit in
Mansfield, who shared his distaste for the French and their colonial past.32
29
Edward Miller, “Vision, Power and Agency: The Ascent of Ngo Dinh Diem, 1945-54,” Journal
of Southeast Asian Studies 35, no. 3 (October 2004): 453.
30
Kathryn Statler, “The Diem Experiment: Franco-American Conflict Over South Vietnam, July
1954-May 1955,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 6, no. 2/3 (Summer-Fall 1997): 147.
31
Kathryn Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 125.
32
Robert Scheer and Warren Hinckle, “The Vietnam Lobby,” Ramparts 4, no. 3 (July 1965): 18.
14
In August 1954, Senator Mansfield visited Vietnam as a member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee prior to returning home from the Manila conference. While
in Vietnam, he met with prominent supporters of Ngo Dinh Diem, including Wesley
Fishel, a Michigan State political science professor, and Edward Lansdale, a Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative. In issuing his second Indochina report to the
Eisenhower administration, Mansfield drew heavily on his conversations with Fishel and
Lansdale to argue that Diem’s regime needed unqualified American support.33 In Senate
speeches, Mansfield defended Diem against his critics and threatened to withdraw all
assistance to Indochina unless Diem remained in power. Mansfield’s endorsement lent
credibility to the premier in the press and in Washington. While non-committal on Diem
long-term, the press relied on Mansfield as a major source of information in reporting
positively about his regime in the fall of 1954.
Upon Mansfield’s return to the United States, the Washington Post claimed
that “Senator Mike Mansfield has been consistently the best-informed man on Capitol
Hill respecting the problems in Indochina.” Regarding Diem, the editorial repeated the
senator’s assertion that “the Diem government is the only force capable of inspiring
confidence and resisting the subversion of the Viet Minh.”34 Influenced by Mansfield’s
energetic defense of Diem, Eisenhower formally endorsed the premier with a letter
pledging direct American assistance to his regime on October 23. Eisenhower’s written
endorsement arrived amid great uncertainty about Diem’s ability to win support from the
33
Gregory A. Olson, Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation (East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1995), 40.
34
“Lessons of Indochina,” Washington Post, October 15, 1954, editorial.
15
Vietnamese National Army (VNA). General Nguyen Van Hinh, VNA Chief of Staff, and
a veteran of the First Indochina War had threatened to unseat Diem in September only to
have American officials in Saigon thwart his efforts. Despite avoiding a coup, grave
doubts remained about Diem’s control of the VNA. When the French floated Hinh’s
name as a possible replacement for Diem in October, Senator Mansfield persuaded the
Eisenhower administration to maintain support for Diem.35
In the press, Mansfield’s continued support for Diem during the Hinh crisis
deflected attention from the undeniable defects of the regime in Saigon. After noting that
Diem faced the possibility of a Hinh-led coup, the New York Times pointed out that
“Senator Mansfield expressed doubt over the advisability of aid being given if Ngo Dinh
Diem was overthrown.” The Christian Science Monitor specifically cited Mansfield
when arguing that “outspoken American support has kept Mr. Diem at the helm in the
face of growing opposition” from Hinh and other army officers.36 Hinh never organized a
coup against Diem, despite his popularity among influential South Vietnamese, because
the United States did not endorse his plans.37 In return for their support, the Eisenhower
administration urged Diem to make military and political reforms to shore up popular
support for his regime in the fall of 1954. Although his regime received enthusiastic
American support, both nationalist and communist opponents continued to besiege Diem.
His inability to provide strong leadership amid these threats caused Washington to
consider intervening directly in South Vietnamese political affairs.
35
Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution: The U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966 (New York: Harper &
Row, 1966), 118.
36
“President Ties Aid to Vietnam Results,” Christian Science Monitor, October 25, 1954, 7.
37
Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 18.
16
In late October 1954, the Eisenhower administration received word from
Donald Heath, its ambassador in Saigon, that the Diem regime was struggling to gain
popular support from the general population. American officials, particularly Secretary of
State Dulles, continued to believe that Diem represented South Vietnam’s best hope for
leadership. Indeed, Heath’s pessimistic appraisal only furthered speculation about his
impending replacement as ambassador.38 Eisenhower sealed Heath’s fate in November
when he named General J. Lawton Collins as his special representative in Vietnam.
Eisenhower gave Collins broad powers to help Diem’s regime achieve political stability.
Collins brought plans to reduce South Vietnam’s conventional army to a 100,000 man
force capable of protecting his regime from both the Communists and the politicalreligious sects. His arrival in Saigon convinced both the French and Vietnamese that the
U.S. planned to assume a greater role in determining affairs in South Vietnam.39 To the
consternation of both American and French officials, the American press argued that the
Collins Mission portended an American takeover in Vietnam.
Both the Washington Post and the New York Times praised Eisenhower’s
decision to dispatch Collins to Vietnam. While a New York Times editorial downplayed
any friction between the U.S. and French camps, it acknowledged that the two powers
needed to coordinate their activities in a more efficient manner. The Collins Mission,
according to the paper, indicated that the United States finally “appreciated the gravity of
the situation” in Vietnam. Accordingly, the New York Times called for “concerted action”
38
David L. Anderson, Trapped By Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 19531961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 84.
39
Bernard Fall, “Indochina Since Geneva,” Pacific Affairs, 28, no. 1 (March 1955): 23.
17
between the French, Vietnamese, and the Americans to reverse the Communist tide.40
The Washington Post took a far more cynical view of the French. A November 8 editorial
celebrated Collins’ appointment but claimed that “[h]arassments and obstructions seem to
have been thrown in the way of independent-minded Premier Diem by French interests
on the spot.” The editorial called for greater cooperation between the two powers and
insisted that foreign intervention remained essential to creating a stable South Vietnam.41
Prior to Collins’ arrival in Saigon, ambassador Donald Heath cabled the
Department of State to warn officials against providing too much information to the press
about his visit. Heath had spoken with French Chief of Staff General Paul Ely, who
expressed grave concerns about the implications of Collins mission. Ely suspected that if
certain aspects of Collins proposals became public, the Viet Minh could argue
successfully that France had violated the Geneva Accords.42 Ely had reason for concern.
The terms of the cease-fire forbade the “introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and
military personnel.”43 After negotiating with Collins in December, Ely agreed in principle
to let the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) train and organize the VNA
in place of the French.44 The agreement soon was made public and, as Ely feared, the
40
“Mission to Vietnam,” editorial, New York Times, November 5, 1954, 20.
41
“Collins to Indochina,” editorials, Washington Post, November 8, 1954, 12.
42
The Ambassador in Vietnam Donald Heath to the Department of State, 3 November 1954,
Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS with appropriate year), 1952-1954: Indochina, part
2 (Washington, DC, 1982), 13: 2204.
43
James Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1986), 146.
44
Anderson, Trapped By Success, 94.
18
Viet Minh then charged France and the United States with seeking to undermine the
Geneva Accords.45
The American press considered the Ely-Collins proposal a calculated risk that
placed the United States in the unenviable position of acting alone to save South
Vietnam. While some voices in the press raised concerns about American involvement,
they also emphasized the importance of Vietnam in the context of the larger Cold War. In
an article titled “U.S. Inherits Another Headache: France Turns Over Indo-China Job to
America,” the U.S. News and World Report described Washington’s assumption of
responsibility in Vietnam as “one of its biggest gambles in Asia since the Korean War.”46
A Washington Post editorial repeated the same theme, admitting that the United States
was taking a “calculated risk” in Vietnam. Still, the article depicted American
intervention as a positive alternative to French occupation.47 Columnist C.L. Sulzberger,
in the New York Times, speculated that U.S. “naval and air detachments in the Western
Pacific” would henceforth be responsible for the security of South Vietnam. While
American air strikes represented an imperfect deterrent to Communist aggression,
Sulzberger considered them an improvement over the traditional land forces employed by
the French.48
Reports that indicated a new role for the United States in Vietnam or detailed
sensitive information regarding military operations worried American officials in Saigon
45
“Vietminh Charges U.S. Breaks Truce, New York Times, December 9, 1954.
46
“U.S. Inherits Another Headache: France Turns Over Indo-China Job to America,” U.S. News
and World Report, December 10, 1954, 26.
47
“Gamble in Vietnam,” editorials, Washington Post, December 11, 1954, 10.
48
C.L. Sulzberger, “Indirect Aggression and Total War,” New York Times, December 20, 1954.
19
and Washington. Randolph Kidder, the Charge d’Affairs in Saigon, told the State
Department that such stories could lead the Viet Minh to file a complaint with the
International Control Commission, a multinational organization charged with enforcing
the Geneva Accords.49 Kenneth Young, a State Department official in the Office of
Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, informed Collins on December 15 that the
French were responsible for leaking information about his proposals with Ely. He
reassured the embassy that Washington would continue to keep “security questions under
close wraps.”50 Despite Young’s assurances, the press continued to reveal delicate
information about French and American activities in Vietnam as the U.S. government
attempted to sustain an uneasy relationship with Paris.
In mid-December 1954, Secretary of State Dulles travelled to Paris and met
with French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France and British Prime Minister Anthony
Eden to discuss German rearmament and Indochina. During one meeting, Dulles assured
Eden that, despite U.S. plans to send additional “training personnel” to Vietnam, the
United States intended to continue working with the French.51 Following the Paris talks,
the press continued to emphasize the expansive American role in Vietnam and its harmful
impact on Franco-American cooperation. In the Christian Science Monitor,
correspondent Ronald Stead claimed that the U.S. plan to “undertake accelerated and
intensified training of South Vietnam’s army” ensured that “suspicion of motives” soon
49
The Charge in Vietnam Randolph Kidder to the Department of State, December 14, 1954,
FRUS, 13, part 2, 2369.
50
Kenneth Young, Kenneth Young, Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast
Asian Affairs to J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative in Vietnam, 15 December 1954,
[correspondence]. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-1957. 1:
Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.
51
The Secretary of State to the Department of State, December 17, 1954, FRUS, 13, part 2, 2386.
20
would develop between France, the United States, and the South Vietnamese
government.52 Marquis Childs, in the Washington Post, opined that Franco-American
efforts to train South Vietnamese troops jointly remained “extremely difficult to
implement at the working level in view of the fierce conflicts and rivalries in the
suspicion-laden atmosphere of Saigon.”53
Although officials in the Eisenhower administration shared the press’s
concerns about working with the French, they did not want the United States to assume
full responsibility for Indochina in the early months of 1955. Dulles had argued
repeatedly against unilateral action in Vietnam and warned Eisenhower about alienating
the French, whose presence remained a vital security buffer against communist
encroachment. Dulles did not want the United States to bear full responsibility for the
shaky regime in Saigon and he understood that American officials had few contacts in
Vietnam besides Frenchmen.54 With these considerations in mind, the United States
continued funding the French Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam, while also seeking French
advice on policy decisions. Despite reaching tentative agreements on military decisions,
France and the United States continued to disagree about the viability of the Diem regime
during late 1954.55 The American press seized on the Diem issue to argue that French and
American objectives in Vietnam were incompatible.
52
Ronald Stead, “Vietnam: A House Divided,” Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1954, 9.
53
Marquis Childs, “Eden, Dulles Try to Aid Mendes-France,” Washington Post, December 31,
1954.
54
Daniel P. O’C. Greene, “John Foster Dulles and the End of the Franco-American Entente in
Indochina,” Diplomatic History 16, no. 4 (October 1992): 555.
55
Statler, Replacing France, 132.
21
In January 1955, some American observers considered Diem inept, while
others held that he was Indochina’s last best hope. All agreed, however, that Diem’s
nationalism made him unacceptable to the French. In a January 1955 edition of The
Reporter, Joseph Buttinger defended Diem against French charges that he took orders
from the United States and claimed that South Vietnam had achieved remarkable success
under the premier. Buttinger defended Diem’s Francophobia and called for the U.S.
government to help South Vietnam “in freeing itself from the remnants of a decaying
colonialism.”56 In a far more pessimistic article, published in Commentary, Peter Schmid
claimed that the Viet Minh enjoyed immense popular support, particularly in the
Vietnamese countryside. According to Schmid, Diem faced more than Communist
subversion, as political-religious sects with armies and followers of their own threatened
to unseat him as premier. Against these odds, Diem, who Schmid called a “rabid enemy
of the French,” stayed in power chiefly due to U.S. influence.57 French and American
divisions over Diem occupied much of the mainstream press’s attention as well.
Conventional publications provided a more measured analysis of South
Vietnam’s prospects for survival, but maintained that France presented a major
impediment to the nation’s battle against communism. In the New York Times, C.L.
Sulzberger called American and French policies “tangential,” noting for example that
Pierre Mendes-France had appointed Jean Sainteny, who had negotiated successfully
with Ho Chi Minh in 1946, as Paris’ consul in Hanoi, while the United States did not
56
57
Buttinger, “An Eyewitness Report on Vietnam,” 20.
Peter Schmid, “Free Indochina Fights Against Time: Vietnam’s Winding, Rocky Road,”
Commentary (January 1955), 28.
22
recognize the northern regime. Sulzberger insisted that France had accepted a Communist
takeover as inevitable.58 Shortly after his article appeared, the New York Times published
a letter to the editor from Joseph Buttinger that endorsed Sulzberger’s view and went a
step further. Buttinger charged the French with actively undermining the Diem regime,
while maintaining a friendly relationship with Ho Chi Minh. For him, a successful U.S.
foreign policy did not include consultations with the French.59 In a similar vein,
Newsweek contended that Diem’s odds for saving South Vietnam from Communist
subversion could improve only after French withdrawal, openly celebrating Diem’s effort
to rid South Vietnam of the last “vestiges of French colonial control.”60 Unfortunately for
Diem and his American backers in the press, French withdrawal also had allowed the
premier’s non-Communist opponents to coalesce into an anti-government force.
Three prominent nationalist groups in South Vietnam had opposed Diem’s
rise to power. The Cao Dai sect, named after its founder who preached an amalgamation
of Buddhism, Christianity, and Taoism, had fought reluctantly alongside the French
against the Viet Minh in the First Indochina War to maintain their large land-holdings in
the Vietnamese countryside.61 The Hoa-Hao sect, founded by Hyunh Phu So, claimed
nearly two million adherents to its brand of Buddhist Protestantism. During World War
II, Hoa Hao forces clashed with the Viet Minh and under banner of truce, the Viet Minh
assassinated So in cold blood, driving the Hoa Hao closer to the French. The Binh-Xuyen
58
C.L. Sulzberger, “Teaching the Sultan’s Horse to Speak,” New York Times, January 17, 1955.
59
Joseph Buttinger, “Our Policy Toward Vietnam,” Letters to the Editor, New York Times,
January 30, 1955.
60
61
“Indo-China: A Fateful Thumb,” Newsweek, January 31, 1955.
Bernard Fall, “Religion in Politics,” in Viet-Nam Witness: 1953-66, Bernard Fall, ed. (New
York: Praeger, 1966), 146.
23
sect claimed no religion, but operated Cholon’s Grand Monde Hotel and ran Saigon’s
police. The Binh Xuyen and its leader Le Van Vien also had supported the French in the
First Indochina War. For years, these three sects had relied on French subsidies to
maintain their armies, fiefdoms, and business operations until, in January 1955, the
French cut off all financial and military assistance to them.62 Despite holding seats in
Diem’s cabinet, sect leaders viewed the French withdrawal as leaving them endangered
and considered the new premier a threat to their survival.
In March 1955, the Hoa-Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen coalesced, forming
the United Front of National Forces, and demanded that Diem broaden his government.
Diem refused to negotiate with the sects and in late March, South Vietnam descended
into civil war, as the Binh Xuyen clashed with government forces.63 The sect crisis
seriously threatened Franco-American cooperation in Vietnam. During the early days of
fighting, the French aided the Binh Xuyen and withheld supplies from the VNA.
Americans in Saigon, including the CIA’s Edward Lansdale, provided intelligence to
loyalist troops. Washington supported Diem’s retaliatory actions against the Binh Xuyen,
while Paris blamed Diem for provoking the hostilities.64 The American press, fascinated
by armed conflict in Communist-contested third world nations, followed the sect crisis
closely.65 While expressing pessimism about Diem’s chances for victory, the press
62
Bernard Fall, “The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam,” Pacific Affairs 28, no. 3 (September
1955), 251.
63
Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New
York: Harper & Row, 1972), 252.
64
65
Fall, “The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam,” 253.
Clarence Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 63.
24
continued to depict France as a hindrance to his efforts, driving a wedge between Paris
and Washington.
On April 3, in a front-page New York Times story, Robert Alden detailed
Diem’s plan to charge France with obstructing his fight against the Binh Xuyen.
According to Alden, the United States sympathized with Diem’s military solution to the
crisis, while the French supported a political compromise between the sects and the
government.66 On the following day, Secretary of State Dulles cabled the embassy in
Saigon his dismay over articles indicating a divergence in French and American policies
in South Vietnam. Dulles told the embassy to inform General Ely that the United States
did not endorse such stories.67 As the fighting wore on in into mid-April, the press
remained convinced that the sect crisis had revealed major rifts between Paris and
Washington, specifically regarding Diem. Joan Thiriet of the Christian Science Monitor
claimed that the French had given up on the premier, while the Americans continued to
bankroll his fight against the sects.68 Although the French had been Diem’s most vocal
critics, American officials had their own doubts. On April 25, after weeks of internal
debates, Collins successfully persuaded the Eisenhower administration to support a
change in government. Before the orders reached the embassy, however, Diem defeated
the Binh Xuyen in a critical Saigon battle and Dulles renewed U.S. support for the
premier.69
66
Robert Alden, “Vietnam Blames French in Crisis,” New York Times, April 3, 1955, 1.
67
Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 4 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 1, 199.
68
Joan Thiriet, “Paris Weighs U.S. Policy in Vietnam,” Christian Science Monitor, April 20,
1955, 14.
69
Anderson, Trapped by Success, 110.
25
Dulles’ decision to support Diem despite the objections of Collins brought
Franco-American conflict in Vietnam to a boiling point. Dulles argued that Diem’s
victory had ruled out any alternative to his regime, while French Prime Minister Edgar
Faure claimed that Diem’s actions created a vacuum for the Viet Minh to fill. Predictably,
the press supported Dulles’ view, with the New York Times leading the charge.70 The
press also began to repeat charges made in earlier months about French ties to Hanoi. On
May 4, Gordon Walker, chief foreign correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor,
alleged that much of the “circumstantial evidence” pointed to French cooperation with
the Viet Minh. According to Walker, France secretly had been cutting deals with the PRC
and North Vietnam since the Geneva Conference to maintain economic privileges in
Vietnam in the event of a communist takeover.71 Accusations such as those Gordon
Walker made did not escape the notice of French officials. On May 11, Edgar Faure told
Douglas Dillon, the American ambassador in Paris, that he would endorse Diem to
disprove allegations made in the press about France’s “double game” in Vietnam.72
Faure’s endorsement did not reduce suspicion in the American press and doubts persisted
about France’s commitment to Diem after his victory against the sects.
By mid-May 1955, Diem’s loyalist forces had defeated the Binh Xuyen and
driven its leaders out of Saigon. According to Newsweek, the French remained opposed to
Diem and secretly had attempted to send arms to the Binh Xuyen in the wake of its May
70
Greene, “John Foster Dulles and the End of the Franco-American Entente in Indochina,” 557.
71
Gordon Walker, “France, Reds in Secret Pact?” Christian Science Monitor, May 4, 1955, 1.
72
Dillon to the Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, 1, 395.
26
defeat.73 On May 23, Newsweek charged the French with planting “rumors of impending
violence” in the South Vietnamese capital to undermine confidence in Diem.74 While
Newsweek’s charges against French remain debatable, the news magazine was correct to
point out that Diem’s victory had increased greatly animosity between French and
American officials. On the heels of Diem’s triumph, Secretary of State Dulles began
prodding the French government to recall any of their representatives who had opposed
the premier. Washington also relieved Ambassador Collins, who consistently had
defended the French, and replaced him with G. Frederick Reinhardt.75 These
developments, coupled with the mass withdrawal of French troops, signaled the end of
direct French military influence in South Vietnam. With the end of the sect crisis and the
French withdrawal ensured, American press coverage of Vietnam diminished
significantly.76 Although their interest did wane, journalists remained wary of French
intentions. Some worried that the Franco-American animosities arising from
disagreements regarding Vietnam might have lasting negative diplomatic consequences
for postwar Europe.
After World War II, the United States acted jointly with France to maintain its
dominance in Indochina largely due to the overriding need for French cooperation in
Europe. From 1950 to 1955, the United States and Britain attempted to convince France
that an armed West Germany was necessary to prevent Soviet expansion into Western
Europe. At trilateral talks between the three powers in May 1955, France finally accepted
73
“Indo-China: Dangerous Vacuum,” Newsweek, May 16, 1955, 16.
74
“Indo-China: Clash and Compromise,” Newsweek, May 23, 1955, 45.
75
Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History (New York: Praeger, 1972), 412.
76
Wyatt, 64.
27
rearmed West Germany’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), giving the United States a free hand in Vietnam.77 Germany’s rearmament and
the U.S. assumption of responsibility in Vietnam did not sit well with columnist C.L.
Sulzberger, who predicted “Trouble Ahead with Paris” in the June 15, 1955 edition of the
New York Times. There he claimed that French attitudes toward the United States had
soured as a result of German rearmament and would get worse with the French
withdrawal from Vietnam. According to Sulzberger, thousands of anti-American French
armed forces would “soon be disseminating their prejudices at home,” endangering
Franco-American cooperation in Europe.78 Other journalists argued that postponing the
French withdrawal endangered the success of the Diem regime.
Although the French High Command had given full autonomy to officers in
the VNA and French troops largely had evacuated Saigon, France retained a military
presence in Vietnam until April 28, 1956.79 France’s gradual withdrawal raised some
concerns among American journalists. In The Nation, roving Southeast Asian
correspondent Sam A. Jaffe noted that France, whose interests were “purely economic,”
continued to “occupy” Vietnam with 80,000 troops. Jaffe expressed skepticism about
Diem’s claims to leadership noting, for instance, that France “still controls the purse
strings” in Saigon.80 When Takashi Oka, staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor,
visited South Vietnam in the fall of 1955, he found that many of Diem’s critics believed
77
Greene, “John Foster Dulles and the End of the Franco-American Entente in Indochina,” 570.
78
C.L. Sulzberger, “Trouble Ahead With Paris: The Background,” New York Times, June 15,
79
Buttinger, Vietnam, 412.
80
Sam A. Jaffe, “Dilemma in Saigon: Which Way Democracy?” The Nation, June 25, 1955, 581.
1955.
28
that the president needed to take a firmer stand against the French. Oka spoke with
“revolutionaries . . . who berated Mr. Diem for not throwing the French out fast
enough.”81 Most journalists expressed relief at the French withdrawal no matter its pace,
applauding any developments that distanced South Vietnam from its colonial past.
The death blow to French aspirations in Vietnam occurred when Diem ousted
South Vietnamese Chief of State and former Emperor Bao Dai in an October 1955
referendum. Diem targeted Bao Dai in a massive propaganda campaign and ordered
police to intimidate voters on his way to a huge electoral victory.82 The undemocratic
nature of the vote prompted the French to cut diplomatic ties with Saigon. French
officials understood the pitfalls of propping up a nationalist leader with questionable
public support and dissuaded their American counterparts from going down the same
path.83 The American press interpreted the referendum as both an important democratic
exercise and an embarrassment for the French and their candidate Bao Dai.84 Although
the press celebrated the results of the election, journalists did acknowledge that Diem’s
victory meant that the 1956 all-Vietnam elections stipulated in arguably the most
important provision of the Geneva Accords would not take place.
On October 24, the Los Angeles Times termed the election a “vote of
confidence in Diem” and a “total repudiation of Bao Dai.” Diem’s overwhelming triumph
at the polls, the report concluded, guaranteed his rejection of the July 1956 unification
81
Takashi Oka, “Vietnam Measures Diem,” Christian Science Monitor, November 2, 1955.
82
Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 53.
83
Statler, Replacing France, 145.
84
Jessica Chapman, “Staging Democracy: South Vietnam’s 1955 Referendum to Depose Bao
Dai,” Diplomatic History, 30, no. 4 (September 2006): 698.
29
elections called for in the Geneva Accords.85 Henry R. Lieberman of the New York Times
reached the same verdict. From Saigon, he reported that “Premier Ngo Dinh Diem
tonight interpreted his victory over Bao Dai as a popular mandate not to proceed with
unification elections in Vietnam.”86 At a press conference, Diem told reporters that he
would not allow the elections until North Vietnam established true democratic conditions
for its citizens. Although the United States backed his position on the elections, Diem’s
supporters understood that even a truly democratic vote would make Ho Chi Minh the
leader of a unified Vietnam. Thus, officials in Washington and Saigon did not pressure
Diem to hold the elections, but requested that he publicly remain open to the holding of
them as a possibility.87 The election issue posed the final challenge to Franco-American
relations in Vietnam.88
Although neither South Vietnam nor the United States had signed the Geneva
Accords in 1954, both governments verbally had vowed not to undermine its terms. Thus,
when Diem refused to honor the elections in July 1956, North Vietnam protested his actions
to the international community. Hanoi’s protests did not result in any recriminations from
foreign governments, however, while the United States explicitly endorseed Diem’s right to
abrogate the accords. Like the U.S. government, the American press believed that only
signatories to the cease-fire had any obligation to insist on holding the elections. Convinced
that the balloting could not truly be free, the press endorsed Diem’s position. In promoting
and celebrating France’s withdrawal, the press already had encouraged greater American
85
“South Viet-Nam Voters Repudiate Ex-Emperor,” Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1955, 7.
86
Henry R. Lieberman, “Diem Sees Delay on Unity Upheld,” New York Times, October 26, 1955.
87
Herring, America’s Longest War, 67.
88
Statler, Replacing France, 155.
30
intervention in Vietnam. Now American journalists acted as enablers of the U.S. government
in continuing to prop up Diem as a consequence of their failure to demand the holding of the
elections to reunite the nation. Ultimately, Diem’s refusal to allow the vote to occur allowed
him to create a dictatorship in South Vietnam with tacit support from the American press and
the U.S. government.
CHAPTER III
ENCOURAGERS OF OPTIMISM,
1955-1956
After the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Eisenhower administration chose to
create a separate South Vietnam rather than endorse all-Vietnam elections and risk a Ho
Chi Minh victory. Initially, the United States acted without the support of France and
Britain, signatories to the Geneva Accords. By 1956, however, international opinion had
proved favorable to Washington’s opposition to the elections. Washington acted
confidently in postponing and obfuscating the election issue for a variety of reasons.
First, France’s power to enforce the agreement was negligible. Second, both the Soviet
Union and Britain opted to maintain a fragile détente between the Eastern and Western
Blocs rather than push for a unified Vietnam. Finally, the United States did not wish to
cross Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, a steadfast opponent of the elections.
Historians generally have forgotten another key reason for Washington’s
confidence in opposing Vietnamese elections in 1956 was the supportive role the
American press provided for its decision. With very few exceptions, the American press’s
stance towards the elections mirrored the U.S. government’s. Due to the influence of the
Vietnam Lobby, the press often rejected the elections outright, arguing that the North
Vietnamese lacked the ability to oversee a truly democratic plebiscite. In some cases,
individuals who took part in Operation Passage to Freedom drew on their experiences to
31
32
contend that North Vietnam’s violations of the Geneva armistice during the free
migration period made the elections ineffectual. Other commentators argued that Diem’s
government was simply not bound by the Geneva Accords. Whatever the reason, the
press allowed the election deadline to pass without comment or protest. While the press
consciously undermined the elections stipulation, it did so largely because that provision
rested on shaky foundations.
During July 1954 at the Geneva Conference, delegates from France and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) signed a cease-fire that ended the First
Indochina War and temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Tran Van Do,
representative of the South Vietnamese delegation, protested the partition, calling for a
unified Vietnam under United Nations control.89 The North Vietnamese, on the other
hand, called for immediate nationwide elections to unify Vietnam under one government.
At the insistence of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, both delegations
settled for a temporary partition.90 After weeks of negotiations, the Geneva powers
agreed that all-Vietnam elections, supervised by the International Control Commission,
would take place in July 1956. The delegates placed the elections provision in the ceasefire’s Final Declaration, which the participants did not sign and thus lacked clear legal
authority.91 Moreover, because only the French and Viet Minh signed the cease-fire at all,
the South Vietnamese could argue that the Geneva Accords did not apply below the 17th
parallel. Washington believed that the elections would result in a victory for Ho Chi
89
Bernard Fall, “The Cease-Fire-An Appraisal,” in Viet-Nam Witness: 1953-66, Bernard Fall (ed.)
(New York: Praeger, 1966), 61.
90
Bernard Fall, “Settlement at Geneva-Then and Now,” in Ibid., p. 71.
91
Ibid., 75.
33
Minh and used the ambiguity and vagueness of the elections provision to argue against its
implementation.92 Then South Vietnamese Premier Ngo Dinh Diem also feared a
Communist victory and became an increasingly vocal opponent of unification elections
with Washington’s support.
In the tendentious months after Geneva, Washington focused primarily on
bolstering the Diem regime against domestic and foreign rivals who threatened to unseat
him. Elections remained a background issue until January 1955, when the Eisenhower
administration began investigating the issue at the request of Ambassador J. Lawton
Collins.93 In April, the Defense Department recommended that the United States “Make
every effort to abolish or postpone indefinitely the elections proposed for Vietnam under
the Geneva Accords.”94 President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles elected to delay while urging Diem to consult with Hanoi on the elections
to appease international opinion. Despite Washington’s requests, Diem rejected
consultations with the North.95 He not only cited the fact that South Vietnam did not sign
the cease-fire, but also argued that the conditions in North Vietnam made a free vote
impossible. U.S. officials worried that Diem’s opposition to elections would reflect
poorly on the United States. Still, fears of a Ho Chi Minh victory overrode concerns
92
David Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-61
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 123.
93
Kathryn Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 157.
94
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs H. Struve Hensel to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson, 22 April 1955, Foreign Relations
of the United States (hereafter FRUS with appropriate year), 1955-1957, Vietnam (Washington, DC, 1985),
1: 280.
95
Statler, Replacing France, 177.
34
about domestic and international censure and the U.S. ultimately backed Diem’s stance
on the elections. The U.S. government found support from the press, which relied largely
on the opinions of the Vietnam Lobby for its expectations about the nationwide elections.
The Vietnam Lobby, a Washington interest group concerned mainly with
supporting and maintaining a non-Communist South Vietnam, began as an informal
network of Diem supporters. Wesley Fishel, the lobby’s founder, met Diem in Tokyo in
1950 and introduced the young politician to influential journalists, academics, and U.S.
government officials. In the fall and winter of 1954, individuals within the Vietnam
Lobby became concerned about Diem’s coverage in the American press.96 Joseph
Buttinger and Leo Cherne, who had helped Diem resettle refugees during the months
after Geneva, believed that the press was misrepresenting Diem. In response, they hired
Harold Oram, a public relations expert, to sway press opinion in Diem’s favor. In January
1955, at Oram’s insistence, Buttinger met with editors and publishers from a wide variety
of newspapers and news magazines and successfully reversed the tide.97 Buttinger and his
colleagues in the Vietnam Lobby were concerned with portraying Diem as a viable leader
whose heroic resistance to Communism made him a valuable U.S. ally.
Like many Americans, members of the Vietnam Lobby believed that the
unification elections imperiled Diem and jeopardized South Vietnam’s status as a “Free
World” nation. In the press, they called attention to North Vietnam’s violations of the
Geneva Accords to show that the necessary conditions for free elections did not exist
96
Joseph Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: the American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 20.
97
Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in
Southeast Asia, 1950-1957 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 233.
35
north of the 17th parallel. Some members of the Vietnam Lobby recounted their
experiences in Operation Passage to Freedom, where thousands of Vietnamese refugees
fled the North. The 1954 Geneva cease-fire explicitly gave Vietnamese civilians the
freedom to move across either side of the 17th parallel after the agreement went into
effect. This provision allowed nearly 900,000 refugees to cross the border southward in
the months after Geneva, providing South Vietnam with what historian Robert Scigliano
has called a “great human and propaganda victory.”98 Although many Vietnamese left
North Vietnam voluntarily, the U.S. Navy aided them in their journey. During Operation
Passage to Freedom U.S. Navy vessels transported refugees from North Vietnam and
resettled them in South Vietnam, providing them with shelter at the end of the journey.
Though extolled as a great accomplishment for the “Free World,” the mass
exodus involved the Catholic Church and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
committing acts of coercion. For example, Catholic priests invoked slogans such as
“Christ has gone to the South” and the “Virgin Mary has departed from the North” to
spur their congregations to emigrate.99 Additionally, CIA agents informed Catholics that
they would be a targeted minority under a Communist regime. In a more sinister act, the
CIA told Vietnamese civilians that the United States was considering dropping nuclear
weapons on North Vietnam.100 The members of the Vietnam Lobby chose not to include
98
Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 133.
99
Chester C. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (New York: Dodd & Mead, 1970),
130.
100
George McTurnan Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 77.
36
these details in documenting their experiences in the American press. Instead, they
highlighted the dire circumstances in North Vietnam that prompted the refugees’ exodus.
Before arriving in Vietnam to assist with Operation Passage to Freedom, Leo
Cherne headed the International Rescue Committee, an organization dedicated to
relocating civilians in areas that totalitarian regimes were threatening. In Vietnam,
Cherne helped Diem resettle refugees in the fall of 1954, finding the premier an able
leader.101 Cherne judged Diem’s earliest press coverage reprehensible and in December
1954, he penned a letter to the editor of the New York Times, castigating correspondent
Peggy Durdin for her pessimistic portrayal of the South Vietnamese regime. In his letter,
Cherne challenged Durdin’s conclusion that Diem lacked popular support. Diem, he
claimed, stood at the forefront of a “democratic force” capable of defeating
Communism.102 In January 1955, Cherne wrote an article for Look magazine in which he
described the recently arrived refugees as “too weary to resist the Reds without us.”
Cherne’s article revealed nothing about the overwhelmingly Catholic composition of the
refugees or the CIA’s disinformation campaign. However, it did promote greater
American involvement and stepped up technical assistance. According to Cherne, greater
aid remained vital to building resistance to the Viet Minh and preventing a Communist
victory in the 1956 elections.103
Joseph Buttinger, co-founder of the IRC and close associate of Leo Cherne,
shared both Cherne’s enthusiasm for American involvement in Vietnam and his distaste
101
Aaron Levenstein, Escape to Freedom: The Story of the International Rescue Committee (New
York: Freedom House, 1983), 104.
102
Leo Cherne, “The Saigon Picture,” The New York Times, December 12, 1954.
103
Leo Cherne, “To Win Indochina We Must Win These People,” Look, January 25, 1955.
37
for the press’s coverage of Diem. In a June 1955 edition of the New Leader, Buttinger
criticized columnists Joseph Alsop and Peter Schmid for using French propaganda to
smear the nationalist Diem. According to Buttinger, the French insisted on nationwide
elections because they sought coexistence with North Vietnam. Accordingly, he urged
that “America’s position on the election issue be entirely different from that of the
French.” Buttinger called for the United States to support the elections in principle, while
acknowledging that a truly free election was impossible in North Vietnam. He claimed
that the South Vietnamese, if left to their own devices, would choose freedom.104
Buttinger’s views coincided very closely with those of the U.S. State
Department. Washington did not wish for the elections to take place, but it also did not
want to reject the elections outright and upset U.S. allies France and Britain. To bide
time, Secretary of State Dulles suggested that Diem publicly express his support for the
elections, while also demanding that they meet standards of freedom he knew would be
unacceptable to Communist authorities.105 In July 1955, in violation of the Geneva
Accords, Diem failed to consult with the North Vietnamese about the elections. As the
deadline passed without a resumption of hostilities, the French became much less
concerned about enforcing the elections provision.106 The American press also ascribed
little importance to the lack of consultations and lent credence to Diem’s objections.
In a radio broadcast aired in South Vietnam on 17 July 1955 that the foreign
press promptly picked up, Diem announced his refusal to hold pre-election consultations
104
Joseph Buttinger, “Are We Saving South Vietnam,” New Leader 38 (27 June 1955): 511.
105
Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, May 27, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 1, 421.
106
Statler, Replacing France, 164.
38
with North Vietnam. In defending his stance, Diem noted that the Republic of Vietnam
did not sign the Geneva Accords and cited Communist restrictions on freedom of
movement to South Vietnam.107 Diem’s supporters at Time and Newsweek joined him in
highlighting alleged Communist violations of the Geneva Accords to justify their stance
in opposition to the election. Time editor Henry Luce supported direct American
intervention in Asia and had used his publication to champion the U.S.-backed Diem
since Geneva.108 In a 1 August 1955 article, Time defended Diem, noting that he did not
“feel bound by a pledge his government did not sign.” It also charged North Vietnam
with providing the Communist Pathet Lao with supplies across the Laotian border in
violation of the Geneva Accords.109 Newsweek, whose publisher Malcolm Muir would
later join Luce as a member of the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV), took the same
editorial position on the consultations. In a 1 August report, it cited the large population
disparity between North and South as a compelling argument against implementing the
elections provision.110
Diem’s opposition to the 1956 plebiscite gained more legitimacy following
the formal creation of the AFV. The AFV, which included members of the informal
Vietnam Lobby along with a diverse group of journalists, politicians, judges, and
humanitarians argued for greater U.S. involvement in Vietnam. According to the AFV’s
statement of purpose, which it released in December 1955, the group aimed to educate
107
Tillman Durdin, “Diem Stand Held Bar to Elections,” New York Times, July 17, 1955, 7.
108
Robert Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, Time, and the American Crusade in Asia (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 194.
109
“South Viet Nam: The Wreck of the Majestic,” Time, 1 August 1955, 22.
110
“Out on a limb,” Newsweek, August 1, 1955, 33.
39
the American people on the North Vietnamese government and its repeated violation of
the Geneva Accords.111 Additionally, the AFV sought to promote support for the Diem
government and warn the public about the consequences of a Communist takeover in
South Vietnam. To this end, the AFV focused much of its early work on dissuading the
Eisenhower administration from supporting the 1956 elections.112
Senator Mike Mansfield’s name appeared on the group’s letterhead, although
he was not an officer in the AFV. In July 1955, Mansfield came out against the
unification elections, citing Viet Minh restrictions on freedom of movement and its
support of the Pathet Lao.113 In a January 1956 edition of Harper’s magazine, Mansfield
seconded Diem’s contention that the 1956 elections could not truly be free. In his article,
he claimed that “the iron-clad Communist dictatorship in north Viet Nam” needed to be
“modified” before free elections could take place. He defended Diem’s decision to avoid
consultations with North Vietnam, claiming that the Geneva Agreement was not “binding
on his government.”114 Due to his lobbying in the press and Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, historian Greg Olson claims that Mansfield “played a role in the denial of the
1956 elections.”115 He did not act alone however. Other AFV members, including the
wildly popular Dr. Thomas Dooley, dramatized the plight of the northern refugees to
argue in 1956 that South Vietnam could not afford to fall to Communism.
111
Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby, 32.
112
Ibid., 31.
113
Gregory Olson, Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation (East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1995), 62.
114
Mike Mansfield, “Reprieve in Viet Nam,” Harper’s, January 1956, 46.
115
Olson, Mansfield and Vietnam, 73.
40
Dr. Thomas Dooley, a Navy medical physician, arrived in Vietnam in August
1954 to assist in Operation Passage to Freedom. He earned wide recognition for his
medical work and his “situation reports” which were widely read among his fellow navy
officers. While in Vietnam, Dooley met William Lederer, co-author of the famous book
The Ugly American. At Lederer’s insistence, Dooley began documenting his experiences
in preparation for a book he would write about the American-led efforts to help northern
refugees flee south.116 The resulting book, Deliver Us From Evil, released in January
1956, provided a sensational account of Operation Passage to Freedom and embellished
stories describing Viet Minh atrocities. The book succeeded in bringing Vietnam to the
consciousness of the average American, who largely had been unaware of the tiny
Southeast Asian nation. Accompanying the release of Dooley’s book was unanimous
praise from the press. Various publications showered Dooley with accolades and
uncritically repeated his claims about Communist war crimes.117 In April 1956, Reader’s
Digest reprinted a portion of Deliver Us From Evil. Dooley’s emotionally charged
account placed the Vietnam conflict in a larger battle across the globe between good and
evil, appealing to a religiously sensitive public.
The Reader’s Digest excerpt of Dooley’s work skillfully combined
autobiography with propaganda to portray the refugee exodus from North Vietnam as a
flight from a godless regime bent on eliminating Catholicism. Dooley wrote of his time
building refugee camps in the port city of Haiphong where he cared for Vietnamese that
116
117
Diana Shaw, “The Temptation of Tom Dooley,” Los Angeles Times, December 15, 1991.
James T. Fisher, Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1997), 90.
41
the Viet Minh had “horribly maimed.” Dooley recounted his experience treating disease
in the congested camps and also wrote in vivid detail about torture techniques that the
Communists used specifically against Catholics. The U.S. Navy doctor also weighed in
on the Geneva Accords. In the beginning of his account, Dooley calls them “shameful.”
Later, he documents the Viet Minh’s violations of the armistice, citing for instance, the
Communist efforts to prevent residents from fleeing the village of Cua Lo. Dooley also
criticized the ineffectiveness of the International Control Commission, which was
charged with ensuring freedom of movement for North Vietnamese villagers.118 Later
investigations proved that many of Dooley’s allegations of Communist terror either were
greatly exaggerated or flatly false.119 In April 1956, however, they impressed upon the
American public the serious nature of the struggle in South Vietnam and the need for
continued U.S. intervention.
The publication of Dooley’s account in Reader’s Digest appeared as the AFV
was intensifying its effort to turn the press against the 1956 elections.120 Dooley’s
depiction of North Vietnam undoubtedly heartened his fellow lobbyists, but the thorny
issue of the Geneva Accords remained on the table. In March 1956, following a popular
election where citizens chose from a field of pro-government candidates, a South
Vietnamese National Assembly met for the first time. In one of its opening acts, the new
legislative body publicly denounced the 1954 Geneva Accords and rejected the all-
118
Thomas A. Dooley, “Deliver us From Evil,” Reader’s Digest, April 1956, 167.
119
David Patrick Johnson, “Selling ‘Operation Passage to Freedom’: Dr. Thomas Dooley and the
Religious Overtones of Early American Involvement in Vietnam,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis,
University of New Orleans, 2009, 32.
120
Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby, 37.
42
Vietnam elections provision.121 The National Assembly’s decision to stand with Diem
against the elections convinced the Viet Minh to abandon its political strategy for
unifying Vietnam.122 The American press again deemed Diem’s actions legitimate and
raised no concerns about his actions sparking a larger conflict. In the 13 March 1956
issue of the Christian Science Monitor, an editorial about the National Assembly
elections claimed that the South Vietnamese “would be on stronger logical and moral
ground if they declared themselves willing to vote,” but acknowledged that since France
negotiated the Geneva agreement, South Vietnam had no obligation to honor it.123 A
Time magazine article claimed that the March elections “indicated Diem’s basic
popularity,” adding that “South Vietnam rightly argues that no free election could
possibly be allowed in the more populous north.”124
Not all American commentators, however, blindly supported the narrative
emanating from Saigon and Washington in the spring of 1956. Hans J. Morgenthau, a
foreign policy expert and one-time Department of State official advanced a realist
critique of U.S. policy during the Cold War. Morgenthau objected to its moralistic
approach to foreign affairs, arguing against viewing the world through the lens of
American exceptionalism. Instead, he argued that the United States had to judge each
situation independently with respect for the realities on the ground. With respect to
121
Robert Alden, “Saigon Casts Off ’54 Geneva Pact,” New York Times, March 9, 1956, 5.
122
Scigliano, 137.
123
“Vietnam Won’t Vote,” Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1956, 18.
124
“South Viet Nam: Victory for Diem,” Time, March 19, 1956, 40.
43
Vietnam, Morgenthau distanced himself from other experts in the 1950s when he claimed
that Vietnamese Communism was fundamentally different than the European variety.125
In March and April 1956, Morgenthau’s criticism of U.S. policies in Vietnam
appeared in the New Republic. On 12 March, he challenged two widely held assumptions
about Vietnam. First, he called the Viet Minh victory a triumph for anti-colonialism, in
which Communism played only a complementary role. Second, he claimed that most of
the refugees left North Vietnam not of their own volition, but at the insistence of their
priests.126 In April, Morgenthau argued that, by “doing too much” in Vietnam, the United
States would earn the label of colonizer, rather than liberator.127 In June of that year,
Morgenthau expressed his support for implementing the 1956 elections provision of the
Geneva Accords, claiming at an AFV gathering that he would “defend the legal validity
of that agreement to the last drop of my blood.”128 Morgenthau notwithstanding, most of
the voices in the American press supported U.S. policies in Vietnam during the spring
and summer of 1956. When the election deadline came and went neither the American
press nor the Western governments who signed the Geneva cease-fire raised protests.
In November 1955, representatives from Britain and the Soviet Union, cochairs of the 1954 Geneva Conference, began meeting to discuss the elections issue. In an
April discussion, British Minister to Saigon Sir Hubert Graves noted that Diem’s
125
Jennifer See, “A Prophet Without Honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 19551965,” Pacific Historical Review, 70, no. 3 (August 2001): 422.
126
Hans Morgenthau, “The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy-1: Ideological Windmills,” New
Republic 134 (12 March 1956): 22.
127
Hans Morgenthau, “The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy-2: The Danger of Doing Too Much,”
New Republic 134 (16 April 1956): 15.
128
Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby, 41.
44
resistance to elections had grown stronger as the AFV’s public opposition grew more
vocal.129 The Soviet Union, which at the time valued “peaceful coexistence” with the
West more than the 1956 plebiscite, decided to placate Diem and his allies in the United
States.130 Washington thus had no reason to change its position opposing the elections. In
a February 1956 paper that the Office of Intelligence Research prepared, the State
Department confidently declared the “absence of any real prospect that the nation-wide
election. . . will be held.”131 By July 1956, the U.S. policy of stalling on the elections had
proved successful. The Saigon regime had gained in strength and foreign pressure had
completely subsided. When the 20 July deadline passed without a vote, U.S. officials
voiced approval.132 Some American newspapers speculated about the consequences of
Vietnam’s partition, while other publications praised Diem for resisting French and
British pressure to uphold the elections provision.
The Geneva Accords received their particular composition largely due to the
influence of the British. While the Americans refused to recognize the Viet Minh and the
French were primarily interested in withdrawing from the region with dignity, the British
believed that all parties stood to benefit from the peace a diplomatic agreement would
engender. Having endorsed the Geneva Accords, the British stood by the elections
stipulation even as the United States attempted to undermine it. By 1956, broader AngloAmerican considerations forced London to concede that the elections would not take
129
Statler, Replacing France, 168.
130
George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 67.
131
Intelligence Brief Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, February 7, 1956, FRUS,
1955-1957, 1, 637.
132
Anderson, Trapped by Success, 126.
45
place. Unwilling to admit openly the death of the agreement, the British continued to
promote the accords publicly, suggesting that South Vietnam remained open to future
consultations on the elections.133
London’s insistence that the armistice remained intact reassured the New York
Times. The Times cited the British Foreign Office when claiming that “North and South
have agreed to continue respecting the armistice between them despite a breakdown of
the political provision.”134 Unlike the Times, the Christian Science Monitor struck a
pessimistic tone. “It is the case of Korea all over again,” the paper avowed, “but more
dangerous.”135 Time magazine, on the other hand, cheerfully reported that the passing
deadline did not result in rioting or Communist violence. Time called the elections
provision a “moral low for the British and French,” and celebrated Diem’s consolidation
of power as a victory for democracy.136
The resolution of the election issue allowed Diem to take steps toward
improving the popularity of his regime, while also giving it greater legal standing. To
accomplish this, Diem ratified a South Vietnamese Constitution in October 1956. The
document provided for three branches of government-legislature, executive and judiciary.
However, it also granted the executive broad powers to suspend laws and resolve disputes
133
Arthur Combs, “The Path Not Taken: The British Alternative to U.S. Policy in Vietnam, 19541956,” Diplomatic History 19, no. 1 (January 1995): 53.
134
“Vietnam Armistice Remains in Effect,” New York Times, July 15, 1956, 15.
135
Ronald Stead, “South Vietnam: Two Years of Geneva,” Christian Science Monitor, July 20,
136
“Viet Nam: All Quiet on the 17th Parallel,” Time, July 30, 1955, 24.
1956, 4.
46
between the separate branches. Additionally, the Constitution allowed the executive to
revoke individuals’ civil liberties in the name of national defense.137
The mainstream press greeted the Constitution as a progressive, if imperfect,
document. The Washington Post provided the most critical analysis of it, noting that the
executive branch enjoyed the right to suspend nearly every liberal provision contained in
the document. However, the article also explained that the Constitution guaranteed
freedom of expression “along with life, liberty, security and the integrity of the human
person.”138 In a more positive article, Egon Kaskeline of the Christian Science Monitor
wrote that the Constitution contained provisions “vital to a functioning democracy.” He
alleged that Diem planned on “ending his present one-man regime as soon as
possible.”139 “A new democracy has joined the international family,”140 the New York
Times declared in a celebratory editorial. It even defended the authoritarian nature of the
Diem regime, citing the continuous threat of Communist subversion in South Vietnam.
The academic journals followed suit. While some observers criticized Diem, others
argued that his ends justified his means.
Like the American press, academic journals in the United States promoted a
vigorous effort to stem the expansion of international Communism in the 1950s.
American intellectuals believed in the containment strategy that the U.S. government
articulated, sharing official concerns about the consequences of a Communist victory in
137
Ellen Hammer, “Progress Report on Southern Vietnam,” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 3 (September
1957): 226.
138
“Constitution Proclaimed by Diem in So. Vietnam,” Washington Post, October 27, 1956.
139
Egon Kaskeline, “South Vietnam Set to Proclaim New Constitution,” Christian Science
Monitor, October 18, 1956, 11.
140
“Vietnam Constitution,” New York Times, October 26, 1956.
47
South Vietnam. For example, Foreign Affairs, the main publication of the Council on
Foreign Relations, provided a prominent platform for concerned Cold Warriors.141
Typically, in an October 1956 edition of Foreign Affairs, French intellectual
and former politician Jacques Soustelle argued that Diem’s rise to power had hampered
Franco-American efforts to curb Communism in East Asia. He criticized the French
government’s attitude toward the Geneva Accords, suggesting that Pierre Mendes-France
had delegitimized the settlement because he had allowed Diem to assume power. Diem’s
“dictatorship,” according to Soustelle, had carried out “hostile acts” against France in
addition to irreparably damaging relations between the Western powers in Vietnam.142 In
a January 1957 edition of Foreign Affairs, William Henderson took a more sanguine view
of Franco-Vietnamese relations, but nevertheless acknowledged that Diem “ruled
virtually as a dictator.” Henderson, an AFV officer, argued that Diem needed the
extensive powers the new Vietnamese Constitution allotted to him due to the “presentday political and economic realities in South Vietnam.”143 Henderson’s rationale would
become increasingly common as criticism mounted against Diem from 1957-1960.
By early 1957, Diem had created successfully a one-man government heavily
dependent on intimidation and coercion to maintain power and lacking in widespread
support.144 Diem’s heavy-handed tactics, often aimed at his non-Communist rivals, raised
141
Robert Tomes, Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954-1975
(New York: New York University Press, 1998), 43.
142
Jacques Soustelle, “France Looks at Her Alliances,” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 1 (October 1956):
143
William Henderson, “South Vietnam Finds Itself,” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 2 (January 1957):
118.
292.
144
Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam
(New York: Random House, 2012), 680.
48
increasing concerns about the authoritarian nature of his regime. From 1957 to 1960,
members of the AFV and the Michigan State University Group nevertheless defended
Diem, arguing that harsh measures remained necessary to defeat Communism in South
Vietnam. Other observers, however, warned that Diem’s repression emboldened the
Communists and deprived his regime of the popularity necessary to achieve victory.
American press coverage of events in South Vietnam remained almost
exclusively dependent on sources who endorsed the theory of containment in foreign
affairs during the years immediately after the Geneva Conference. Thus, while journalists
often raised serious concerns about Diem, their articles never questioned the wisdom of
American support for his regime.145 Moreover, the American press rarely blamed Diem
for persistent and mounting instability in South Vietnam, preferring to shift the blame to
Hanoi. By suggesting that Diem shouldered little responsibility for deteriorating
economic and political conditions in South Vietnam, the American press failed to press
Washington to seek alternatives. While news reports on the 1954 Geneva Accords
encouraged the United States and Diem to bypass international law, press coverage of
Vietnam from 1957 to 1960 allowed the United States to keep an unpopular dictator in
power, ultimately paving the way for direct U.S. intervention.
145
James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press), 190.
CHAPTER IV
PURVEYORS OF PESSIMISM,
1957-1960
Ngo Dinh Diem’s assertion of power earned him the adoration of many
American journalists who considered his leadership as necessary for maintaining a free
South Vietnam. In the early months of 1957, the American press showered Diem with
praise and gloated about his accomplishments after Geneva. As time passed, however,
questions arose about Diem’s governing style, which borrowed heavily from the practices
of the Communist government he swore to oppose. Most writers in the American press
and academic journals rationalized his authoritarianism, stressing patience, while
reminding readers that South Vietnam did not have a history of democracy. Although
Diem’s harsh policies largely evaded media criticism, they created massive popular
resentment in South Vietnam. As villages increasingly embraced Communist insurgents,
the U.S. government and press investigated its aid program and found it unable to win
popular support.
By 1960, the optimism that pervaded press coverage about Vietnam in the
prior decade had vanished as internal pressure mounted against Diem. Instead of heeding
foreign calls to reform, Diem redoubled his oppressive tactics, losing much of the support
of the American press. Diem’s relationship with journalists worsened as more
correspondents arrived to cover the intensifying war in South Vietnam in the early 1960s.
49
50
While American newsmen eventually lost faith in Diem, they failed to question the
efficacy of American involvement. The Cold War consensus, which initially had created
the justification for Diem’s brutal policies, later provided the rationale for direct
American military intervention after his ouster late in 1963.
In 1957, many onlookers credited Diem with finally bringing stability to
South Vietnam. Beneath the façade of security, however, the nation remained embroiled
in political disputes that often erupted into violence. In February 1957, an assassin’s
bullet narrowly missed Diem during his ceremonial visit to a village north of Saigon.146
Three months later, Diem left Vietnam for a heavily publicized visit to the United States.
During his stay, the American press heaped compliments on South Vietnam’s president,
while ignoring the growing instability in Vietnam. Publications such as the Boston Globe,
Washington Evening Star, and the Saturday Evening Post celebrated Diem’s resiliency
and depicted him as a valiant cold warrior and “miracle man” of Asia.147 The New York
Times declared that Diem “injected hope where formerly there was despair” in
Vietnam.148 Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post, who would later emerge as a
vocal antiwar journalist, described Diem as the “Symbol of Vietnamese democracy.”149
Ensuring the glowing reception the American press gave Diem were the diligent efforts
of the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) which urged publishers to provide positive
editorial comment about his visit. Thankful for the tone of his press coverage, Diem
146
Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution: The U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966 (New York: Harper &
Row, 1966), 141.
147
Frederik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s
Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012), 676.
148
“Visitor from Saigon,” New York Times, May 12, 1957, E2.
149
Chalmers Roberts, “Diem-Symbol of Free New Asia,” Washington Post, 8 May 1957, A1.
51
personally thanked media mogul Henry Luce among others during a banquet at New
York’s Ambassador Hotel prior to departing back to Vietnam.150
While Diem’s
popularity soared in the United States, it remained low in South Vietnam, where a
growing insurgency thrived off popular suffering and the people’s animosity toward the
central government for creating it. To maintain power and create the anti-Communist
state the American press and the U.S. government so desired, Diem relied upon
dictatorial techniques that alienated the population and drove them towards supporting
the Communist insurgency. Because he lacked a broad political following, Diem
orchestrated propaganda campaigns that resembled those the Communists used to glorify
Ho Chi Minh.151 As part of the propaganda drive, Diem arrested suspected Communists
and forced them to renounce their ties to the Communist Party in front of large audiences.
All told from 1955 to 1958, Diem jailed 40,000 political prisoners and had 12,000
individuals killed for their alleged subversive activity.152
While the mainstream American press remained largely silent about the
suppression campaign, other media sources raised the alarm about Diem’s repressive
methods. For example, even Henry Luce’s Life magazine reported how Diem relied on a
“machinery of security” including concentration camps and re-education centers to root
out political opposition. But Life also praised the “Miracle Man” Diem for saving his
150
Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in
Southeast Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 260.
151
152
Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 91.
Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical
Experience (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 89.
52
people from the consequences of a Communist victory in the July 1956 elections.153
Writers who published articles in American academic journals showed a greater
willingness to question Diem’s commitment to democracy. However, they generally
argued that his policies were only temporary measures to counter the Communist threat.
Although Diem spoke generally about his commitment to democracy, he did
not believe in representative government based on the Western model. In fact, Diem
subscribed to the political philosophy of Minh Mang, an early 19th Century Vietnamese
emperor who claimed to rule by divine right and made decisions after consulting a small
group of elite advisors.154 For advice, Diem relied almost exclusively on his brother Ngo
Dinh Nhu, who served as his political counselor and ran the Can Lao, the most influential
political party in South Vietnam.155
Nhu’s influence became the source of increasing concern in American
academic journals. In March 1957, political scientist Roy Jumper in Pacific Affairs
claimed that the breakdown of French rule in Vietnam had given rise to a new class of
Mandarin rulers whose selection derived from personal loyalty and family ties to Diem.
According to Jumper, under Diem, “nepotism . . . has now become rampant at all levels
of the public service.”156 In a September edition of Pacific Affairs, Ellen Hammer
conceded that under Diem, South Vietnam had come under “over-centralized and
153
John Osborne, “The Tough Miracle Man of Vietnam,” Life, May 13, 1957, 164.
154
Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (New
York: Vintage, 1972), 109.
155
P.J. Honey, “Progress in the Republic of Vietnam,” The World Today 15, no. 2 (February
1959): 70.
156
Roy Jumper, “Mandarin Bureaucracy and Politics in South Viet Nam,” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 1
(March 1957): 51.
53
authoritarian rule.” While Hammer expressed reservations about Diem’s family
oligarchy, she maintained that over time a liberal regime would develop “as the
leadership of the Republic of Viet Nam acquires greater self-confidence.”157 Although his
tactics resembled those the Communists used, Diem’s nationalism was unquestioned.
This made foreigners, especially the Chinese, living in South Vietnam targets of
government repression.
Chinese in South Vietnam, who comprised nearly one-tenth of the population,
were traditionally passive and concerned mainly with running businesses and trading
goods. In August 1956, Diem demanded that Chinese residents Vietnamize their names
and surrender their property to the state. His actions frustrated the normally apolitical
Chinese and led them to freeze rice exports and stop lending to farmers, sabotaging the
Vietnamese economy.158 Writers in American academic journals, concerned chiefly about
the looming threat of Communist China, criticized Diem’s measures. In the December
1957 issue of Far Eastern Survey, Roy Jumper noted that the Chinese responded to
Diem’s policies with protests and refusals to accept Vietnamese citizenship. “Politically,”
Jumper concluded, “the measures may well make the Chinese community more
vulnerable to Communist penetration.”159 In a rare scathing critique of the Diem regime
appearing in American Opinion in February 1958, World War II veteran and historian
Hilaire du Berrier argued that Diem’s restrictions on the Chinese had produced
157
Ellen J. Hammer, “Progress Report on Southern Viet Nam,” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 3
(September 1957): 227.
158
159
Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 89.
Roy Jumper, “Problems of Public Administration in South Viet Nam,” Far Eastern Survey 26,
no. 12 (December 1957): 190.
54
widespread unemployment, trade deficits, and bankruptcy. Du Berrier believed that the
measures inflamed tensions between the West and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC).160 Historian and Southeast Asian expert Bernard Fall agreed. In Fall’s view,
Diem’s Chinese crackdown had fractured relations between Saigon and China’s
Nationalist government in Taiwan. Forced assimilation, according to Fall, disrespected
the Chinese community and brought ethnic tensions to a “boiling point.”161
The Chinese population was not the only group to suffer under Diem’s
repression. Diem and his ruling clique proved equally intolerant of opposition journalists.
Although Diem abolished formal censorship of the press in 1956, he only tolerated
articles that reflected well on his government. His Presidential Decree no. 13 allowed the
government to fine or jail publishers suspected of supporting communism. Acting on this
edict, in March 1958, he shut down the opposition newspaper Thoi Luan for printing a
critique of the South Vietnamese constitution.162
While writers scrutinized Diem’s hostile treatment of the press in the
academic journals, they also argued that a truly free press was a luxury South Vietnam
could not afford. In the American Political Science Review, J.A.C. Grant suggested that
press censorship and government intimidation prevented the rise of opposition parties in
South Vietnam. However, he then proceeded to defend Diem, claiming that “democracy
in South East Asia cannot be expected in a period of three years.”163 Francis J. Corley
160
Hilaire du Berrier, “About South Vietnam,” American Opinion 1 (February 1958): 11.
161
Bernard Fall, “Viet-Nam’s Chinese Problem,” Far Eastern Survey 27, no. 5 (May 1958): 67.
162
Scigliano, South Vietnam, 83.
163
J.A.C. Grant, “The Viet Nam Constitution of 1956,” The American Political Science Review
42, no. 2 (June 1958): 462.
55
justified Diem’s actions on similar grounds in Thought magazine. Corley acknowledged
that the South Vietnamese government controlled the press and stifled opposing
viewpoints. But he also warned that it would be a “grave risk to jeopardize what stability
has been secured thus far for the sake of a democratization that for the present seems
unattainable.”164 Diem’s authoritarian rule, whether temporary or not, agitated both
Vietnamese intellectuals and villagers and provided new recruits for the Vietnamese
Communists.
Diem’s popularity in the countryside, which had never been widespread, took
a severe blow when he decided to abolish village elections. According to Roger Hilsman,
an Asian expert in the U.S. State Department, the decision to replace popularly elected
provincial chiefs with hand-picked government officials “did more than anything else to
convince the Vietnamese that Diem was ‘antidemocratic’.”165 Government bureaucrats
proved incapable of responding to the needs of villagers and they often resorted to
arbitrary arrests to impose order.
Despite growing unrest in the villages, Hanoi remained committed to using
peaceful means to achieve reunification largely because party leaders feared American
intervention. In defiance of their superiors, local cadre often attacked government
outposts and assassinated provincial chiefs on their own. In 1957, Communists and their
supporters killed 452 village chiefs, sparking great concerns in Washington about Diem’s
164
165
Francis J. Corley, “Viet-Nam Since Geneva,” Thought 33, no. 4 (Winter 1958-1959): 561.
Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of
John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 418.
56
popularity.166 In 1958, Le Duan, a veteran of the First Indochina War and dedicated Viet
Minh officer, secretly inspected South Vietnam. He found that Diem’s campaign against
communism had decimated party ranks in the villages. After consulting with southern
cadre, he decided that armed struggle was necessary to offset Diem’s Communist
purge.167 In January 1959, at the Fifteenth Plenum of the Central Committee, Hanoi
authorized its southern operatives to use violent methods in combination with political
subversion to overthrow the Saigon regime.168 The growing upheaval in the South
Vietnamese countryside and the renewed Communist offensive raised questions about the
effectiveness of U.S. aid in the American press.
As early as February 1958, George V.H. Moseley, in the New Leader called
for “reassessment of the American aid program in the three Indo-Chinese states.”
Moseley, who visited Indochina on a two-year tour of duty with the U.S. Army, focused
particular attention to Vietnam, where American aid, he argued, supported a government
that “adopted virtual totalitarian tactics in the name of fighting Communism.” Moseley
claimed that South Vietnam’s ruling classes used U.S. assistance to repress the people,
driving some into the communist camp.169 At that time in Washington, Congress was
debating the merits of the American aid program. During Congressional hearings,
Senator Mike Mansfield, previously a vocal defender of Diem, argued that the United
States should consider curtailing military and economic assistance to the Republic of
Vietnam.
166
Logevall, Embers of War, 684.
167
Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 103.
168
Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (New York: Harper-Collins, 1991), 66.
169
George V.H. Moseley, “U.S. Aid to Indo-China,” The New Leader, February 24, 1958, 14.
57
Congressional deliberations on the subject of aid to South Vietnam led Albert
M. Colegrove of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain to investigate the aid program
himself.170 His findings reflected poorly on both the U.S. and South Vietnam
governments, revealing exorbitant waste, inefficiency, and corruption within the aid
program. Although the U.S. embassy quickly rebutted these charges, Colegrove’s claims
represented the greatest threat to the official Vietnam narrative the U.S. government
promoted in the 1950s.171 Press scrutiny remained a bothersome issue for the American
mission as Diem tightened controls on both his Communist and non-communist foes in
1959.
In response to the renewed Communist offensive of 1959, Diem secured
legislation to subdue his political opponents. The 10/59 law that the National Assembly
passed in May 1959, allowed the government to arrest and put to death suspected
Communists without appeal. Not only did the law contravene the right of habeas corpus,
its use also violated the Geneva Accords, which outlawed retribution against individuals
whose only offense was fighting against the French in the First Indochina War.172 In
addition to subjecting his enemies to arbitrary arrests, Diem prevented his opponents
from participating in the democratic process. To ensure government control of the
National Assembly during August 1959 elections, Diem and his inner circle distributed
propaganda through the controlled press, manipulated ballots, and relentlessly smeared
170
David L. Anderson, Trapped By Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 195361 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 180.
171
Clarence Wyatt, Paper Tigers: The American Press and the Vietnam War (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1995), 65.
172
Young, The Vietnam Wars, 62.
58
opponents. Only two opposition candidates won, who then quickly surrendered their seats
in response to fabricated charges of campaign fraud.173 American Ambassador to
Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow worried that damning revelations about Diem’s draconian
policies would reduce the president’s international standing. In anticipation of the
elections, Ambassador Durbrow cabled the State Department his concerns that stories
about Diem’s undemocratic practices would “feed Hanoi propaganda” if written by
western correspondents.174
The Ambassador had no need to worry. The press largely ignored the August
elections and Diem’s most vocal proponents rationalized his blatant civil rights abuses.
Preoccupied by the Congressional investigation into Albert Colegrove’s allegations and
the ongoing civil war raging in Laos, neither the Washington Post nor Newsweek offered
any assessment of the 1959 elections. Time printed a brief summary, noting that the
elections benefitted primarily pro-government candidates.175 In less mainstream
publications, Diem’s supporters came to his defense. Wesley Fishel, in the New Leader,
depicted Diem as a conscientious reformer, driven by Confucian idealism and concern for
the common good.176 In another contribution to the New Leader, Fishel suggested that the
controversial 10/59 law that Diem persuaded the legislature to pass was necessary to
provide villagers with “confidence in the Government’s ability and determination to
173
Scigliano, South Vietnam, 95.
174
Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow to State Department, 28 August 1959, Foreign Relations of the
United States (hereafter FRUS, with appropriate year), 1958-1960, Vietnam (Washington, DC, 1986), 1:
228.
175
“South Viet Nam: The Mixture as Before,” Time, September 14, 1959, 31.
176
Wesley R. Fishel, “Vietnam’s Democratic One-Man Rule,” The New Leader, 2 November
1959, 13.
59
protect them.”177 In a December 1959 issue of the Reporter, Wolf Ladejinsky questioned
whether South Vietnam could “be expected to fashion truly democratic arrangements
overnight?” A land reform expert under contract with the U.S. government, he claimed
that in Vietnam “free competition for power must develop gradually . . . in the midst of a
life-and-death struggle against the Communist conspiracy.”178 Ladejinsky’s and Fishel’s
efforts to distract attention from the unsavory aspects of Diem’s policies would become
increasingly difficult as concern grew in Vietnam and the United States, elevating
pressure on Diem and his principal American advisors.
Both Wesley Fishel and Wolf Ladejinsky worked as part of the Michigan
State University Group (MSUG), a technical assistance project started in May 1955 to
help the Diem regime create a modern constitution, police force, and system of
administration. The MSUG employed fifty-four professors who specialized primarily in
police administration and political science.179 Among other accomplishments, they turned
South Vietnam’s Civil Guard into a security force capable of policing the countryside and
helped create the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation. In addition to their field work,
MSUG members became trusted sources of information about Vietnam for both the
academic journals and the mainstream press.180 Although partially successful in bringing
Western administrative techniques to Vietnam, bureaucratic disputes with other U.S.
agencies and language and cultural barriers hampered the MSUG’s efforts. In 1959, the
177
Wesley R. Fishel, “Vietnam’s War of Attrition,” The New Leader, December 7, 1959, 20.
178
Wolf Ladejinsky, “Vietnam: The First Five Years,” The Reporter, December 24, 1959, 21.
179
Robert Scheer, How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam (Santa Monica CA: Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1965), 34.
180
Ibid., 38.
60
MSUG came under critical examination in the mainstream media when Jack Steele, a
writer for the Scripps-Howard chain, alleged corruption in MSUG’s communications
program.181 The so-called Rundlett affair discredited the MSUG and caused many within
the organization to reassess the program. In the early 1960s, controversy continued to
haunt the MSUG and support for Diem became a subject of debate within the group.182
Even Diem’s most ardent supporters, including Fishel and Ladejinsky, urged the
president to consider reforms as South Vietnam’s villages fell increasingly under
Communist control.
In the waning months of 1959, Communist Party cadre and their sympathizers
assumed greater control of South Vietnam’s villages, as rising discontent pushed peasants
into Communist ranks. South Vietnam’s rural population particularly resented the
government’s agroville program, which forced villagers to abandon their ancestral homes
and live in heavily fortified communities with strangers. Sensing a prime opportunity,
Communist organizers promised villagers free land in return for their cooperation.183 In
Ben Tre province, where peasant dissatisfaction with local landlords was high,
Communist cadre armed civilians and launched an uprising in January 1960. During the
Ben Tre uprising, cadre redistributed property to landless tenants, attacked government
posts, and executed government supporters. In its effort to suppress the rebellion, the
Saigon government often relied on extreme brutality, increasing tensions between
181
John Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University and the Vietnam War (East
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998), 75.
182
Ibid., 115.
183
Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 103.
61
villagers and officials in the process.184 The deteriorating situation in South Vietnam’s
countryside alarmed Diem’s American confidants, especially Wolf Ladejinsky. In a
March letter to Wesley Fishel, Ladejinsky suggested that the uprisings resulted at least
partially from the president’s oppressive policies.185 Diem’s political opponents already
had drawn the same conclusion. On April 26, they gathered at the Caravelle Hotel in
Saigon and demanded that the president liberalize his regime.
The protesters who signed the so-called Caravelle Manifesto in April 1960
included former cabinet ministers and members of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects.
Calling themselves the Bloc for Liberty and Progress, the group demanded greater
political freedoms for opposition groups and constitutional guarantees of civil liberties.
They also called for Diem to make military appointments based on merit rather than
loyalty, echoing complaints from South Vietnamese officers who thought that the Can
Lao had gained too much influence over the army.186
Wesley Fishel, greatly concerned about Diem’s faltering image, promptly
wrote the president just days after the manifesto’s appearance. He decried the
“Communist propaganda stressing the authoritarian character of your government,” while
claiming that Diem’s critics misunderstood the leader’s political philosophies. To deflect
criticism from the press, Fishel merely recommended that Diem have his public relations
184
William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder CO: Westview Press,
1996), 205.
185
186
Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance, 116.
Edward Garvey Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South
Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 206.
62
counsel pre-approve his public statements.187 To defame the Caravelle protesters, Fishel
also told Diem to provide the foreign press with incriminating evidence about the group’s
ties to former Emperor Bao Dai and the French.188 Fishel’s fears about Diem’s media
coverage proved overblown. While the American press carried news of the protest,
journalists offered only mild criticism of the regime in Saigon, while also maintaining
that Diem remained better than any alternative.
New York Times correspondent Tillman Durdin acknowledged the “growing
dissatisfaction among non-communists with the Diem regime.” However, he also
defended the president’s methods: “Tough political and security controls . . . are
necessary if the country is to survive.”189 Newsweek listed the Caravelle group’s
demands, but insisted that Diem’s oppression grew primarily in response to “stepped up .
. . terrorist activities in the South Vietnamese countryside.”190 While Time characterized
Diem’s reaction to the protests as “stubborn,” the newsmagazine also suggested that the
president’s removal would only invite a communist take-over.191 Only Robert P. Martin
of the U.S. News and World Report challenged the standard narrative. “The manifesto
issued in Saigon,” he argued, “is the first open warning that a strong man apparently must
be more than anti-Communist to win full support against the Reds.”192
187
Professor Wesley R. Fishel to President Diem, 30 April 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, 1, 431.
188
Joseph Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 67.
189
Tillman Durdin, “In Asia: The Response is Generally Favorable Despite Concern in
Authoritarian Regimes,” The New York Times, May 1, 1960, E3.
190
“Vietnam-Free to Fight,” Newsweek, May 9, 1960, p. 44.
191
“South Viet Nam: Problem of One Man,” Time, July 11, 1960, 40.
192
Robert P. Martin, “Where Danger Threatens Another U.S.-Backed Country,” U.S. News &
World Report, May 16, 1960, 120.
63
Meanwhile, the academic press continued to take pains to justify Diem’s
authoritarianism. Robert Scigliano, an MSUG member, admitted that Diem’s policies
prevented the rise of true opposition in South Vietnam. He stressed patience, however,
adding that “it should not be expected that representative institutions and practices will
develop in Vietnam as they have in the United States.”193 Like members of the American
press, U.S. officials were aware of Diem’s faults, but unwilling to consider alternatives
more deserving of support.
Following the highly publicized release of the Caravelle Manifesto, the
Eisenhower administration called for an interdepartmental assessment of the situation in
South Vietnam. On the subject of Diem, officials found themselves split. Ambassador
Durbrow, for instance, called for reforms on the part of the central government, while
Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, the Military Assistance Advisory Group Chief,
gave whole-hearted support for Diem and his policies. Ultimately, the State Department
heeded Durbrow’s advice and pressed Diem to send his brother Nhu abroad and remove
constraints on the press and opposition parties.194 Diem refused to initiate the reforms,
however, and even his most ardent defenders voiced doubts regarding his staying power.
In September 1960, Lloyd Musolf, Chief Adviser of the MSUG, regretfully informed
Michigan State University President John Hannah about Diem’s refusal to liberalize his
regime. According to Musolf, Communist successes resulted mainly from Diem’s
unwillingness to delegate authority in the army and government. While Musolf claimed
193
Robert G. Scigliano, “The Electoral Process in South Vietnam: Politics in an Underdeveloped
State,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 4, no. 2 (May 1960): 161.
194
Michael R. Adamson, “Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy: Elbridge Durbrow, Frederick
Nolting, and the U.S. Commitment to Diem’s Vietnam, 1957-61,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 2
(June 2002): 237.
64
that South Vietnam lacked “a real leader who could replace Diem,” he also
acknowledged the ever-present possibility of a coup d’etat.195 In October, after Diem
flatly refused to abolish the Can Lao, Ambassador Durbrow accepted a coup attempt as
inevitable.196
Musolf’s and Durbrow’s suspicions were correct. On 11 November 1960,
South Vietnamese paratroopers under the leadership of Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi
surrounded Diem’s presidential palace demanding his resignation. Besieged and unsure if
he had U.S. support, Diem initially negotiated with the paratroopers and agreed to
dissolve his government. When loyalist troops arrived at the palace, however, Diem
reneged on his concessions and ordered the military to attack suspected coup
sympathizers.197 In many cases, the American press proved sympathetic to the rebels.
One day after the coup attempt, the Washington Post proclaimed that “the realities in the
southern half of bisected Viet-Nam had begun to cry for a type of leadership that Ngo
[sic] seemed unable to offer.”198 A 13 November New York Times editorial hailed Diem’s
victory, while also expressing concern about his “repressive rule, nepotism and
corruption.” The editorial called for Diem to meet his people’s “justifiable grievances”
with necessary reforms.199 Similarly, Newsweek urged Diem to negotiate with his
political opponents to avoid splitting South Vietnam’s anti-Communist forces.200 Time
195
Chief Adviser of the Michigan State University Group Lloyd Musolf to President of Michigan
State University John Hannah, 23 September 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, 1, 587.
196
Michael R. Adamson, “Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy,” 237.
197
A.J. Langguth, Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 110.
198
Don Frifield, “Saigon Coup Seemed Inevitable,” Washington Post, November 12, 1960, A6.
199
“Failure of a Coup,” New York Times, November 13, 1960, E10.
200
“Stand at Saigon,” Newsweek, November 21, 1960, 49.
65
claimed that the revolt turned Diem “more dictatorial than ever” predicting that “another
revolt was only a matter of time.”201 Time’s analysis was prophetic.
After the coup attempt, Diem became less tolerant of criticism and more
inclined to suppress his opposition. His unwillingness to institute reforms even as South
Vietnam’s security steadily deteriorated led many of his proponents in the American
press to change their tune. Members of the MSUG, for example, no longer rationalized
Diem’s authoritarianism. MSUG economists Milton Taylor and Frank Child blamed
Diem’s police state tactics for the rising tumult in South Vietnam and welcomed a
successful coup against the embattled president. Their articles, which appeared in the
New Republic in 1961, led Diem to terminate his government’s contract with the
MSUG.202 The American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) initially rallied behind Diem after
the coup, with Leo Cherne and Wesley Fishel penning positive articles about the
president. Privately, however, the AFV pressed Diem to institute reforms, who in
defiance soon cut ties with AFV public relations consultant Harold Oram.203 Diem’s
fracture with the MSUG and AFV combined with his own repressive policies accounted
for the appearance of more negative articles about his regime.204 These commentaries
became more prevalent and Diem’s relationship with foreign correspondents grew more
contentious as American involvement in Vietnam escalated.
In November 1961, under the leadership of President John F. Kennedy, the
U.S, government agreed to provide Diem with helicopters, light aircraft, and more
201
“Southeast Asia: Double Trouble,” Time, November 28, 1960, 26.
202
Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance, 121.
203
Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby, 80.
204
James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 189.
66
American advisers to assist the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).205 With
Vietnam quickly evolving into a war story, the New York Times, United Press
International, and the Associated Press established press bureaus in the increasingly wartorn nation in January 1962.206 Foreign correspondents quickly grew frustrated with the
indeterminate nature of the war, and placed the blame squarely on Diem. Diem responded
to the criticism with predictable heavy-handedness. In August 1962, he expelled Francois
Sully from Vietnam after the Newsweek correspondent claimed that the war could not be
won with Diem at the helm.207 In early 1963 Diem’s government-controlled press
attacked journalist Neal Sheehan after he criticized ARVN’s performance during the
battle of Ap Bac.208 Considering themselves targeted, the newsmen took advantage of a
precious opportunity to bring Diem’s failed policies before an international audience in
the summer of 1963.209 Western photojournalists, who had received tips beforehand from
Diem’s opponents, captured Thich Quang Duc as the monk set himself ablaze in protest
against Diem’s repression of the Buddhist community. The event set off a Buddhist
protest movement that ultimately would bring down the Diem regime.
While tensions between Buddhists and Catholics had plagued Saigon for
years, the 1963 Buddhist revolt benefited from the presence of Western newsmen.
205
Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time For War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 112.
206
Wyatt, Paper Tigers, p. 81.
207
Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from
the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 414.
208
David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era
(Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 92.
209
Malcolm Browne, “Viet Nam Reporting: Three Years of Crisis,” Columbia Journalism Review
3, no. 3 (Fall 1964): 6.
67
Browne’s photo, in particular, forced officials in Washington to confront Diem’s
religious intolerance.210 According to then Ambassador Frederick Nolting, “the American
media played a major role in undermining U.S. confidence in the Diem government”
during the Buddhist crisis.211 John Mecklin, a former journalist and then head of the U.S.
Information Agency in Vietnam, supported this notion, claiming that “American news
coverage of the upheaval contributed directly to destruction of a national U.S. policy of
direct importance to the security of the United States.”212 When U.S. Ambassador Henry
Cabot Lodge endorsed the coup that unseated Diem in November 1963, many journalists
approved of the action, as well as remaining supportive of U.S. intervention generally.
Like their predecessors, correspondents who increasingly had been critical of Diem, such
as David Halberstam, Charles Mohr, and Neil Sheehan, were fervent believers in the
American crusade against communism in Vietnam and would remain so until the late
1960s.213 Prior historians have failed to emphasize how the American press, by remaining
faithful to the Cold War consensus in its Vietnam coverage for over a decade, occupied
the role of willing accomplice when the U.S. government chose to approve direct military
intervention in Vietnam.
For those expecting Diem’s successors to bring peace and stability to South
Vietnam, the November 1963 coup proved a false dawn. Under the military dictatorships
210
Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 221.
211
Frederick Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick Nolting,
Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1988), 86.
212
John Mecklin, Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam (New
York: Doubleday, 1965), 162.
213
Knightley, The First Casualty, 417.
68
of Generals Duong Van Minh and Nguyen Khanh, the Viet Cong made great gains in the
Vietnamese countryside, while in Saigon the religious tension between Buddhists and
Catholics continued unabated.214 With South Vietnam careening toward collapse,
Washington sought a reason to justify direct retaliatory action against North Vietnam,
and found it in the summer of 1964. After two U.S. destroyers, the Maddox and C.
Turner Joy, reportedly came under fire from North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf
of Tonkin, the Johnson administration authorized American air strikes against North
Vietnam.215 The first U.S. Marines would land in March 1965.
After the Tonkin Gulf Incident, the press relied almost exclusively on press
releases from the president’s office and Defense Department for its reporting, and
avoided printing contradictory information. New York Times columnist Tom Wicker later
admitted that his own concerns about Communist expansion in Southeast Asia led him to
uncritically accept President Lyndon B. Johnson’s response to the Tonkin Gulf attacks as
legitimate.216 As the preceding pages have shown, the press supported an active U.S. role
in Vietnam from the start. From 1954 to 1960 journalists approved policies that
ultimately made American military intervention inevitable because they viewed South
Vietnam as a critical front in the fight of the “Free World” to defeat communism.
Through the French withdrawal, the non-observance of the 1956 elections and the rise
and fall of the Diem regime, American journalists presented the Vietnam story through
214
William J. Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1995), 165.
215
George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 143.
216
Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1986), 41.
69
the lens of the Cold War consensus, setting a precedent the news media would follow in
subsequent years.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom attributes U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War partially to
criticism in print and televised reporting that undermined public support. A profound
irony of the conflict is that from 1954 to 1960, the American press acted as a promoter of
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The great majority of American journalists believed in the
Cold War consensus, which held that Communist movements in Southeast Asia took
orders from both the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Believing that the
loss of Southeast Asia to communism threatened the fate of the “Free World,” American
journalists supported efforts to prevent the Viet Minh from gaining control over all of
Vietnam. Initially the press approved measures, such as the creation of the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO), that designated Vietnam as a vital security interest of the
United States. When SEATO proved an ineffective deterrent to Communist expansion,
the American press charged France with hindering the rise of a strong anti-Communist
regime in South Vietnam.
Although the American press raised serious concerns about Premier Ngo Dinh
Diem’s regime in South Vietnam at first, many journalists praised his nationalism and
criticized the French for obstructing his government and appeasing Hanoi. Diem’s victory
against the political-religious sects in May 1955 helped him to consolidate power.
Significantly, the American press applauded his subsequent election as president, largely
70
71
ignoring the patently undemocratic nature of his “victory” against former French puppet
Emperor Bao Dai in the October 1955 referendum. In his opposition to the unification
elections that France and North Vietnam had agreed upon at the 1954 Geneva
Conference, Diem also found support from the American press. Due to the fact that the
Republic of Vietnam did not formally sign the Geneva Accords, Diem denied that he had
to honor the nationwide elections provision in the document. The U.S. government,
which was providing direct aid to Diem in 1956, endorsed his position, against the
protests of the French who thought that elections would prevent a resumption of
hostilities in Vietnam.
The American press feared a Communist victory at the ballot box. Most media
and academic commentators, with the exception of Professor Hans Morgenthau, agreed
that the vote should not take place. American journalists and their editors, some of whom
belonged to the American Friends of Vietnam and thus had a vested interest in the
survival of the Diem regime, claimed that North Vietnam’s repeated violations of its
conditions had nullified the Geneva Accords. Others emphasized the exaggerated
accounts of Communist atrocities to suggest that a North Vietnamese victory was simply
unacceptable. With U.S. approval, the elections ultimately did not take place and, in
1957, Diem emerged as the undisputed leader of a South Vietnam. As president, Diem
lacked popularity and owed his position largely to U.S. aid. Despite this fact, the
American press hailed him as a “miracle man” who had saved Vietnam from Communist
domination. When Diem created a family dictatorship and refused to initiate liberal
reforms, the press found ways to rationalize his authoritarian behavior. All this
contributed to deepening the U.S. commitment to preserve the survival of South Vietnam.
72
Although South Vietnam’s urban areas had achieved remarkable security by
1957, the countryside remained vulnerable to Communist political domination. To
strengthen the Saigon government’s support in the villages, Diem initiated a “denounce
the Communists” campaign that relied on arbitrary arrests and the use of concentration
camps. Diem also abolished village elections and forced villagers to relocate their
families in heavily guarded agrovilles. In many cases, Diem’s draconian policies turned
otherwise passive peasants into Communist recruits. Nevertheless, the mainstream and
academic press, with notable exceptions such as journalist Bernard Fall, overlooked
Diem’s faults and argued that his measures were necessary to contain the Communist
threat.
For political guidance, Diem relied principally on his close family and
prevented true oppositionists from holding power in South Vietnam’s National
Assembly. While some American journalists criticized Diem’s transparent nepotism, they
stressed patience, arguing that Western standards should not be the yardstick observers
used to judge his government. In most cases, they suggested that establishing security
came before achieving political freedom in besieged South Vietnam. Despite limited
foreign criticism, however, domestic opposition grew and presented a formidable
challenge for Diem, who nearly lost power during an abortive coup attempt in November
1960. The failed revolt brought increased scrutiny to the Diem regime, and the American
press proved less willing to tolerate his authoritarian style. More important, despite their
increasing opposition to Diem, the press remained faithful to the Cold War consensus
even after his ouster and tacitly supported direct American military involvement in
Vietnam in 1964.
73
American journalists uncritically accepted the Cold War consensus in the mid1950s and early 1960s. As a result, they often approved of developments that increased
the likelihood of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. For example, the American press
in general supported the creation of SEATO, although North Vietnam’s government
interpreted it as an act of war. When the Western powers placed South Vietnam under
SEATO’s protection, the People’s Army of Vietnam promptly began reinforcing its
guerrilla forces in the South in preparation for armed conflict.217 Non-observance of the
1956 nationwide elections, which aroused no protests in the American press, convinced
Communist cadres that peaceful unification was impossible. Indeed, when Hanoi began
openly supporting an armed rebellion against Diem, it did so at the insistence of
operatives in the south distressed about their inability to enforce the mandate for
elections.218 Further hurrying descent into war was Diem’s repressive policies that the
American press largely ignored or rationalized until 1961. Diem’s issuance of the 10/59
decree led southern insurgents to dramatically escalate their activities, forcing
Communist party leaders to reassess their strategy in South Vietnam.219 When Hanoi
opted to place military above political objectives in late 1960, they set in motion a
conflict that ultimately would witness the deployment of U.S. troops on Vietnamese soil.
This thesis has examined American press coverage of South Vietnam from
1954 to 1960. During these critical years of early U.S. involvement, the American press
217
Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, trans.
Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 20.
218
Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces, trans. Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael
(New York: Random House, 1966), 54.
219
Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 45.
74
viewed Vietnam as a pivotal outpost in the U.S. battle to combat international
communism. A steadfast belief in the geopolitical consensus regarding the Cold War
inspired American journalists to support the U.S. government actions designed to bolster
the newly created anti-Communist state in South Vietnam. While press coverage in this
period resulted largely from writers’ close ties with the U.S. government and the Diem
regime, it also sprang from journalists’ genuine faith in the American mission abroad.
Reporters in the 1950s believed that only an interventionist U.S. foreign policy could
counter the Soviet threat, and patriotism colored their stories.220 This consensus
informing reporting endured, even as correspondents lost confidence in the Diem regime.
Ultimately, in their earnest support for an anti-Communist state below the 17th Parallel,
the American press endorsed policies that would lead to U.S. embrace of a disastrous war
in Vietnam.
220
1963), 75.
Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
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