Download IMPORTANT SUPREME COURT CASES Gibbons v. Ogden (1824

IM PORTANT SUPREM E COURT CASES
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) – Congress' power over interstate com m erce
NY gave Ogden a m onopoly to operate a steam boat between NY and NJ. Gibbons obtained a perm it from Congress to
operate a steam boat in the sam e region. NY courts ruled Ogden could keep the m onopoly. Under Marshall, the
Suprem e Court ruled com m erce included navigation and that only Congress had the right to regulate com m erce between
states.
The case protected Congress' right to regulate interstate com m erce and established the federal govt as the power to
control the whole country. One state could not m ake laws that interfered with another state, this once again put the
federal governm ent above state governm ents and m ade clear this held throughout the nation.
Dartmouth College v. W oodw ard (1819) – Contracts
The president of Dartm outh college tried to revoke the school’s charter and declare Dartm outh a public institution. The
Suprem e Court under Marshall decided that while the school’s charter was issued bu the King of England, it still
constituted a contract. The charter could not be changed without the consent of both parties. This lim ited the power of
state governm ents to control the corporation.
This decision m ade it clear a contract was a contract and could not be broken (also stated in Fletcher v. Peck). Contracts
are legally protected under the constitution and can only be broken with the consent of all parties that entered them . This
could be interpreted that when the South talked about leaving the union they were breaking the law, because the
constitution is a m aster contract that all states agreed upon by ratification. Therefore no state could nullify a law or leave
the union without the consent of all parties.
Charles River Bridge v. W arren Bridge (1837) – business charters
The MA legislature authorized the Charles River Bridge Co to build and operate a toll bridge and later extended the
charter for seventy years. A later charter to the W arren Bridge Com pany was issued to build a bridge a short distance
from the Charles Bridge. The Charles Bridge Co. Sued alleging the construction of the W arren Bridge constituted an
im pairm ent of obligation of contracts. The Suprem e Court (under Roger Taney) disagreed holding that a legislative
charter m ust be construed narrowly and no im plied rights could be claim ed. This was a very different interpretation from
earlier court decisions under Marshall by encouraging com petition and new industries.
Prigg v Pennsylvania (1842) – state and federal powers
In 1828 Pennsylvania passed a law banning forcible seizure and rem oval of a fugitive which Prigg alleged violated a
federal fugitive slave law passed in 1793. The Suprem e Court said the PA law was unconstitutional but went on to say no
state was obliged to enforce the federal fugitive slave law. Enforcem ent of a federal law was to be done by federal
authorities.
As a result of this case, several states passed “personal liberty” laws forbidding state authorities from assisting in the
return of fugitive slaves.
Scott v Sanford (1856)
Dred Scott was originally owned by Peter Blow, a planter who m oved to MO to open a hotel. W hen Blow died Scott was
sold to Dr John Em erson, an arm y doctor. W hen the arm y stationed Dr Em erson in Illinois and later in W isconsin, Scott
traveled with them as Dr Em erson’s slave despite these areas being em ancipated by the Northwest Ordinance. W hen
Em erson was subsequently returned to Missouri, Scott sued for his freedom holding he had becom e a free m an due to
his stay in a free state and a free territory. The case began in the Missouri courts and worked its way into the federal
court system . By this tim e Dr Em erson had died and passed ownership of Scott to his wife. The executor of Em erson’s
estate was John Sanford of New York, Mrs Em erson’s brother (hence Scott v Sanford).
The case centered on three issues: 1) was Scott a citizen of Missouri, IE could he sue; 2) whether Scott’s stay on free soil
m eant he was a free m an upon his return to Missouri; and 3) the constitutionality of the Missouri Com prom ise. The
Suprem e Court, under Roger Taney found Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, did not becom e a free m an by living in free
territory and the Missouri Com prom ise was unconstitutional (only the second tim e in US history the court found a law
unconstitutional. The decision satisfied no one and, if anything, m ade sectional differences worse.
The Slaughter-House Cases (1873) - state and national citizenship
In these cases, the Suprem e Court basically killed off the 14th Am endm ent by declaring that state and national citizenship
were two different things and that federal law only dealt with a few particular rights. Most civil rights were determ ined to
be state rights,; therefore, the national governm ent did not have the authority to oversee civil rights issues in the states.
The court further held that the equal protection clause applied only to state laws which discrim inated against Negroes.
Bradw ell v. Illinois (1873) - 14 th Am endm ent and wom en
The case arose when Myra Bradwell’s application for license to practice law in Illinois by virtue of her status as a United
States citizen was denied. She sued arguing the right to obtain a license to practice law was guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Am endm ent to all citizens of the United States. W hile the Suprem e Court agreed that all citizens enjoy certain
privileges and im m unities which individual states cannot take away, it did not agree that the right to practice law in a
state's courts is one of them . In his opinion, Justice Miller wrote that Bradwell’s argum ent the right to practice law was
predicated on citizenship was void. In his concurrence, Justice Bradley went above and beyond constitutional
explanations of the case to describe reasons why it was natural and proper for wom en to be excluded from the legal
profession. He cited the im portance of m aintaining the "respective spheres of m an and wom an," with wom en perform ing
the duties of m otherhood and wife in accordance with the "law of the Creator."
US v. Cruikshank (1876) - citizen rights and states
In this case, the Suprem e Court opted for a careful reading of the Fourteenth Am endm ent and refused to expand federal
jurisdiction, even though the outcom e clearly denied justice. At issue was a situation in which an arm ed white m ob in
Colfax, Louisiana, attacked and killed over one hundred blacks during a hotly contested gubernatorial election. Three
white ringleaders were brought to trial and convicted under the federal Enforcem ent Act of 1870. The defendants then
appealed what they felt to be faulty indictm ents.
All nine justices agreed the indictm ents in Cruikshank were faulty as they failed to allege the denial of specific federal
rights and that the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Am endm ent protected citizens only from
state action, not from the actions of other citizens. Because the indictm ents did not allege that the defendant's actions
were based upon race, interference with the victim s' right to vote was also not federally actionable.
Ultim ately the Court placed the responsibility for trying and punishing the offenders in the Colfax Massacre back on the
state of Louisiana -- where such punishm ent was unlikely. The outcom e of Cruikshank did nothing to stem racial violence.