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Books A Philosophical Look at Gaia The Gaia Hypothesis: Science on a Pagan Planet. Michael Ruse. University of Chicago Press, 2013. 272 pp., illus. $26.00 (ISBN 9780226731704 cloth). A generation ago, the Gaia hypothesis was simultaneously met with both an explosion of public popularity and an implosion of rejection by many in the scientific community. This rare occurrence is explained by Michael Ruse, professor of philosophy at Florida State University, in his entertaining and highly readable book The Gaia Hypothesis: Science on a Pagan Planet. The action centers on the 1970s and 1980s, but Ruse traces the underlying reasons for this schism back to Plato and two traditions of thought that began with the ancient Greeks. His aim is to show how our thinking today is deeply influenced by the past. Gaia was the brainchild of James Lovelock; the idea was born in the mid-1960s out of the observation that Earth possesses a thermodynamically remarkable atmosphere that is also surprisingly stable in both its composition and its climate. Developed in the early 1970s in collaboration with the late Lynn Margulis, the Gaia hypothesis postulated that life and its planetary environment on Earth form a single system that self- regulates in a habitable state. To many, the Gaia hypothesis represents a modern scientific incarnation of a very old idea that the Earth is, in some sense, alive—or at least that it behaves, in some ways, as an organism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the main scientific objections to Gaia came from evolutionary biologists, who feel a strong sense of ownership over the concept of what defines an organism. How, they asked, could the Earth self- regulate like an organism when it is not the product of evolution by natural selection among a population of reproducing planets? http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org Ruse’s aim in The Gaia Hypothesis is to show that the heart of this disagreement was not a simple case of a new hypothesis’s appearing to be at odds with established theory. Instead, it stretches back to the foundations of Western philosophy. The Gaia hypothesis, he explains, belongs to a long tradition of organicism, the philosophical position that the behavior of whole systems cannot be explained by the properties of their parts alone. By contrast, modern science has largely been a triumph of the tradition of reductionism (i.e., the idea that complex systems are no more than the sum of their parts), along with mechanism (i.e., natural wholes are essentially complicated machines). Ruse expertly traces these two philosophical traditions from Plato through the scientific revolution to the time that Gaia hit the intellectual scene. He argues that the sturdy plant of organicist science has always been growing under the shadow of reductionism and that Gaia is simply a recent flowering of this. But the flowering of the Gaia hypothesis occurred at a particularly bad time, when evolutionary biologists were in the middle of trying to ensure that their theory did not imply that natural selection could act for the good of a group or of a species, let alone for the good of life as a whole. The arrival of Gaia in the popular consciousness, however, fell on fertile ground. The embrace of Gaia by sectors of the public was, according to the author, part of a long history of hylozoism—the position that all matter, including the Earth, has life and value in its own right. This is the “pagan planet” of Ruse’s subtitle, although he is careful to point out that the Gaia hypothesis does not go this far, except in the hands of some of its New Age devotees. He is curious enough, however, to have visited Oberon ZellRavenheart, cofounder of the Church of All Worlds and a writer and speaker on the subject of neopaganism, to find out more. This is typical of Ruse’s chatty and engaging style of writing. He treats his central characters with a healthy mixture of playfulness and respect. Perhaps Ruse’s boldest proposition is that his two main protagonists, Lovelock and Margulis, actually belong to two different intellectual traditions. Lovelock, he claims, is a mechanist at heart, whereas Margulis was a true organicist. Ruse suggests that this can be seen in the way that each responded to the early criticisms of Gaia from evolutionary biologists: Lovelock produced a model—Daisyworld—to illustrate that a self-regulating mechanism could emerge automatically from life interacting with its environment, without any appeal to teleology. Daisyworld operates through a crude form of natural selection. Indeed, Lovelock has always been eager to demonstrate that Gaia is consistent with evolution by natural selection, whether his critics believe him or not. Margulis, however, loved nothing more than to goad evolutionary biologists. She argued that natural selection alone is not enough to explain the emergence of higher levels of biological organization. She believed that symbiogenesis was a crucial creative force and that Gaia was symbiosis as seen from space. Computer models such as Daisyworld left her unmoved. May 2014 / Vol. 64 No. 5 • BioScience 455 Books Ruse’s analysis has a ring of truth about it, but it would be wrong to infer that Lovelock is not an organicist. In my experience, Jim has a keen ability to intuit the behavior of whole systems, even if he cannot (at least at first) explain how they work in a mechanistic sense. This was true of his most famous invention, the electron capture detector, and is also true of Daisyworld. He conceived the model but only later wrote it in mathematical form with the help of Andrew Watson. The value of Ruse’s book is in how he captures the wider importance of the debate triggered by the Gaia hypothesis. Like all good philosophers, he makes the reader think about how we think. For example, when is it permissible to think in terms of parts having a purpose for the whole? We are not ridiculed for asking, “What is the purpose of the eye for the whole animal?” So, why is asking the purpose of nitrous oxide gas for the biosphere a laughing matter? If I missed something from this work, it was a look at Gaia from a more contemporary scientific perspective. Ruse is writing as a historian of science, with the aim of understanding events that happened a generation ago. Unfortunately, this can create the erroneous impression that the Gaia hypothesis is a historical footnote that has led nowhere scientifically. Many of the evolutionary biologists that Ruse discusses seem to be interested only in what can be explained through evolution by natural selection. Having convinced themselves that Gaia cannot be a product of natural selection, they have long since dismissed it. But climatologists and geochemists, for example, do not expect natural selection to explain how the planet functions. The Gaia hypothesis triggered them to think about the Earth as a system and about how life is intimately involved in feedback mechanisms that govern its behavior. As a result, a whole field of Earth system science has emerged. Even the reductionist triumphs of molecular biology have led in some 456 BioScience • May 2014 / Vol. 64 No. 5 distinctly holistic directions. The genomics revolution is continually broadening our perspective on the mechanisms of life and of evolution, and those in the field of systems biology are attempting to understand the emergent properties of biological systems. Even one of Gaia’s most insightful critics, W. Ford Doolittle, has argued that natural selection can happen through survival alone and, therefore, that Gaia and evolutionary theory could be reconciled (Doolittle 2013). Now that the controversy that arose over the Gaia hypothesis is understood, we need to take a fresh look at it from a twenty-first century perspective of flourishing systems science. Has Gaia lost her relevance? I don’t think so. Reference cited Doolittle WF. 2013. Natural selection through survival alone, and the possibility of Gaia. Biology and Philosophy. (27 February 2014; http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/ s10539-013-9384-0) doi:10.1007/s10539-0139384-0 TIM LENTON Tim Lenton ([email protected]) is a professor of Earth system science at the University of Exeter, in the United Kingdom. He is the coauthor with Andrew Watson of Revolutions that Made the Earth (Oxford University Press). doi:10.1093/biosci/biu041 THE PROMISE AND PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS ECOLOGIES Ecology and Religion. John Grim and Mary Evelyn Tucker. Island Press, 2014. 280 pp., illus. $35.00 (ISBN 9781597267083 paper). J ohn Grim and Mary Evelyn Tucker are two of the most wellknown figures advocating religious ecologies—the bridging of scientific and religious worldviews. In their book Ecology and Religion, they argue that the religious component is a “missing link” (p. 27), “an important lens whereby humans can understand and reenvision their roles as participants in the dynamic process of life” (p. 63). In the last decade, this husbandand-wife team has been pivotal in the Yale-based Forum on Religion and Ecology. Before that, they edited a multi volume series at Harvard, and most recently, they produced an Emmy Award–winning film called Journey of the Universe. Here, they set out “to retrieve, re-examine, and reconstruct these human–Earth relations that are present in all the world religions” (p. 42). This requires a survey with a mission, and they succeed at highlighting thinkers who have retrieved, reevaluated, and reconstructed their faiths in order to practice accentuating (with an added fondness from the authors for mnemonic alliteration) “reverence, respect, reciprocity, restraint, redistribution, responsibility, [and] restoration.” Their goal is to bring awareness to the possibility that “religions thus hold a promise of extending once again care and compassion to the planetary community of life” (p. 42). In volumes of this genre, their virtue must mirror their vice—that of being both sketchy and simultaneously insightful. “Painted in broad brushstrokes” (p. 44), the book is cosmopolitan in the original Greek sense, as in a citizen of the cosmos. Grim and Tucker find that the term anthropocosmic is better than anthropocentric (p. 43). The first chapter introduces a tension that characterizes the book through contrasting phrases linked by similarly contrasting conjunctions (e.g., on the other hand, however, yet at the same time, although, nonetheless, for the most part, whereas). This grammatical tension reflects a certain historical accuracy and, to their credit, Grim and Tucker are honest about it. Complex affairs resist simplification: “The response of religion to environmental concern will be immensely varied around the planet because these traditions are far from univocal” (p. 20). The narrative has an “often paradoxical and problematic http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org