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AMERICANSPIRIT:
THEYANKEEDIVISIONINTHEFIRSTWORLDWAR
CadetEricW.Koch
MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
ArmyROTCPaulRevereBattalion
12April2016
Koch1
AttheonsetofitsinvolvementintheFirstWorldWar,theUnitedStatesstruggledto
proveitsabilitytofieldacompetent,professionalarmycapableoffacinganexperienced,
proficientGermany.GeneralPershingfoughtpassionately,andultimatelysuccessfully,to
preventpatronizationoftheUSmilitaryforces.Ratherthanallowthemtobemerely
incorporatedintohaggardFrenchandBritishdivisions,hedemandedtheopportunityfor
theUStoformitsowndivisionsandactasanindependentstrategicplayerintheconflict.1
Amongthesedivisions,onedivisionemergedasamodelforAmericanforces:the26th.
BetterknownastheYankeeDivision,theAmericanExpeditionaryForce’s26thInfantry
Divisionwasthefirstfully-formeddivisiondeployedinFrance,anditplayedalargerolein
theAmericanoffensive.TounderstandtheimpactoftheYankeeDivisionanditsbattlefield
actions,however,onemustfirstexaminetheenvironmentunderwhichitacted,anditsrole
intheAlliedhigherstrategyof1917-1918.
AmericanparticipationintheFirstWorldWarcamefarlaterthantheAllieswould
haveliked,butearlyenoughtochangethetideofthewar.AsU-Boatscarriedonan
“unrestrictedcampaign”todestroyAmericanshipscarryinggoodstoEngland,tensions
betweentheUnitedStatesandGermanysteadilymounted.2Overatwo-monthperiodatthe
beginningof1917,theGermanssankmorethan500ships.3CoupledwithGermany’s
attempttopersuadeMexicotodeclarewarupontheUnitedStates,widespreadsympathy
fortheAlliedcausequicklyarousedawilltofightamongmanyAmericans.OnApril6,
1917,theUnitedStateswasatwar.
Americaninvolvementdidnotcomeamomenttoosoon.1917provedatreacherous
yearfortheAllies,witnessingthefalloftheRussianmonarchyandmassmunitiesamong
FrenchandItalianarmies.JustastheUnitedStatesenteredthewar,turmoiland
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revolutionbrokeoutinRussia.BreadriotsinPetrogradquicklyledtheImperialparliament
toseizeleadership,establishingtheRussianProvincialGovernment.WhiletheProvincial
GovernmentcontinuedtowagewaronGermany,Russiaremainedembroiledininternal
conflict.TheBolsheviks,dissatisfiedwiththeprovisionalgovernment,ledtheOctober
Revolutionlaterthatyear.ThisSovietgroup,uninterestedincontinuingafailingwarwith
theGermans,signedtheTreatyofBrest-LitovskwithGermanyinMarchof1918,effectively
endingwarontheEasternfront.
Duringthistime,theFrenchandBritishcommanders,RobertNivelleandDouglas
Haig,maintainedanoffensivestrategythatcausedobsceneAlliedcasualties.IntheNivelle
AssaultofApril16,1917,CommanderNivelleaimedtoquicklypenetrateGermanlineson
theAisne.However,duetostrongGermanfortificationsandresistance,theattackbecame
farmorecostlythaneverexpected.JustlikeattheBattleoftheSomme,machinegunsand
gunnerssurvivedtheinitialbombardmenttomowdownadvancingforces.4ByApril25,the
Frenchhadtaken118,000casualties5,andtheBritishtook160,000.6TheBritishhigh
commandmadesimilarmistakes.IntheThirdBattleofYpress,duringanattempttogain
controlofaGermanrailway,“Haig’sunbendingcommitmenttooffensiveaction…andhis
beliefthatadecisivebreakthroughwaspossible”ledtorepeatedAlliedassaultsthat
wastedtroops’lives.7Overthecourseofslightlymorethanthreemonths,250,000British
soldierslosttheirlivesinthebattle.8Severewarwearinessborderingondespairtriggered
countlessmutiniesinFrenchdivisions.OnlythenewleadershipofPhilippePétainandhis
troop-friendlypoliciescoupledwithastrictresponsetotransgressionsendedthepanic.
Nevertheless,majorFrenchoffensiveswereoverfortheremainderofthewar.
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Bytheendof1917,theAllieswereexhausted.Alliedforceshadlostnotonlythe
means,butalsothewilltofight.Nevertheless,theAxiswassimilarlyweary.Economicwoes
hithardathomefortheGermans,astheshifttoheavyindustrytookatollonthenational
economyandfoodbecamescarce.9Eachsidehopedforaswiftendtothewar,and,wereit
notfortheimminentarrivalofAmericansoldiers,thissentimentmighthaveledtoapeace
beingstruckinGermany’sfavor.Instead,GermanyneededtoquicklydefeattheAllied
forcesinthespringof1918.Ifitcouldnot,AmericandeploymentinEuropewouldsurely
spellitsdoom.
Atthebeginningof1918,theAmericansplayedalargeroleinbluntingGerman
offensivesanddefendingtheAllies’southernflank.However,Americanforces’military
contributionswerenotnearlyassignificantastheireffectonalliedandenemyperceptions
andmorale.AstheGermanspressedtheAllies,theAllies’resilienceandenduringfaiththat
theAmericanforceswouldturnthetideofthewarpreventedanoverwhelmingGerman
victory.UpthroughAugustof1918,Germanyexecutedaseriesof“ferocious”offensiveson
Alliedlines.10Manyoftheseassaultswerenominallysuccessful.Nevertheless,theheavy
lossesthattheGermanarmysustainedwereirreplaceable,whiletheAlliedforcesmerely
hadtowaitforUStroopstoarrive.Inthespringandsummerperiodof1918,“thearrivalof
AmericantroopsboostedAlliedmoraleand…shooktheGermanspirit.”11Bythefallof
1918,theGermanarmywasexhausted.Itsunitshadalreadylargelylosttheirwilltofight.
TheleadingcommanderoftheGermanarmy,GeneralLudendorff,recalledthat“whole
bodiesof[German]menhadsurrenderedtosingletroopers…Theofficers…hadlosttheir
influence.”12Asaresult,thestrategic-militaryandstrategic-politicenvironmentsofthe
timewereintertwined.Thewarwouldnotbewonorlostinasinglevaliantmilitaryact,
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butratherasconsequenceofalongwarofattrition.AstheGermanmilitarylosthopeof
overcomingsuchamassiveopposingforce,theGermanpoliticalstructurebecamemore
willingtonegotiateforpeace.Theonsetoflarge-scaleoperationsbyAmericandivisions
thereforeessentiallybrokethebackoftheGermanarmy.
Inaccordancewiththestrategicenvironmentofthefallof1918,Pershingpursueda
strategyofcrushingGermanmoraleandconvincingtheGermansthatfurtherresistanceis
vain.AshistoriansBernadotteSchmittandHaroldVedelerwrote,theGermanswere
“beaten,”butnotyet“routed.”13Toillustrate,inhisorderofmissionintentfortheSt.Mihiel
battleofSeptember1918,Pershingcommandedcorpsanddivisioncommandersto“push
troopsforwardwhereverresistanceisbroken,withoutregardforfixedobjectivesand
withoutfearfortheirflanks.”14HewrotethattheAEF’simmediateobjectivewas“the
completedestructionoftheenemy’sarmedforces.”15
Forthemonthsofspringandearlysummer,theAmericantroopsservedasafirm
pointatthesouthernendofthealliedflank.AstheGermancapabilitytopressforward
waned,theAlliestransitionedtoamoreaggressiveapproach.ThebroaderAmerican
objectivesontheirsectionoftheAlliedfrontweretoreclaimstrategicallyimportant
German-controlledterritoryanddiminishthemoraleoftheGermandefenders.
Inthe26thDivision’ssectorintheSaint-Mihielsalient,theYankees’objectives
includedrecoveringthesalienttoeliminateaGermanbuffer,claiminganessentialtrackof
rail,andgainingtheironreservesoftheBriey-Metzregionalongwiththecoaldepositsof
theSaar.16AftertheAlliedAisne-MarneoffensiveinlateJulyrecoveredtheterritorythat
GermanyhadblitzedthroughintheChampagne-Marneoffensiveearlierthatmonth,the
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Allieswereprimarilyontheattack,andbattleswithinthe26th’ssectorfocusedon
disruptingtheGermansupplyline.
Theothermajorassaultinwhichthe26thDivisionwouldplayarole,theMeuseArgonneoffensiveintheVerdunsector,heldasimilargoalofdisruptingGermanrailways
andtakingkeyterrain.17Whilethe26thDivision’sso-called“Neptune”sectorliedatthe
fringesofAlliedlines,controlofitwascriticaltobothcombatants.18Germanfortifications
intheareaprotectedcrucialrailroads,and,fromitsvantage,artillerycouldbombardthe
rightflankoftheAmericanlines.19IftheAmericanforcescouldpiercetheGermandefenses
andcutsupplylines,theymightforceawithdrawalofsomeGermantroopsonthe
Southernendoftheirfront.
ContemporaneousAmericancommandersandhistoriansalikehavemalignedthe
YankeeDivisionasunprofessional,incompetent,anddisorganized.WhentheYankee
Divisionattemptedtorelievethe1stDivisionintheToulsectoronApril4,1918,the
movementwasconductedpoorlyandGermanartilleryrainedfiredownonthetravelling
troops,especiallythemedicalunits.20AninvestigationbyAEFinspectorsconcluded,“the
26thDivisionandtheFrenchweremoreculpablethanthe1stDivisionintheturnoverof
position.”21ThenatureoftheoperationraisesquestionstotheGeneralHeadquarterssupervisedinspectionthough,astheoutgoingdivisionisprimarilyresponsiblefor
conductingasmoothtransfer.22Nevertheless,theallegationsandresultinginquiriesledto
furtheracrimonybetweentheleadershipofeachdivision,ultimatelycontributingtothe
schismbetweenthe26thDivision’scommandingofficersandtheAEFhighercommand.
Pershingmaintainedhisdistasteforthegeneralofthe26thDivision,MajGen.Clarence
Edwards,throughoutthewar,beginningwiththe26th’slossofthetownofSeichepreytoa
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Germanraidingpartylaterinthesamemonth.23ThepenetrationofAmericanlineswasa
“lossofface”forGeneralPershing,andthegeneralwouldneverforgiveEdwards.24Inlight
ofthisvendetta,onemustcriticallyanalyzereportsofoperationsthattookplaceoverthe
nextfewmonths.Manyhistoricaltextsneglectthe26thDivision,evenasthedivisionplayed
acrucialroleinoverallAmericaneffortsanditscommanddemonstratedaneffective
leadershipapproachthatremainsvaluabletoday.
Thestoryofthe26thInfantryDivisionisnotoneofingenious,Cannae-esquemilitary
maneuvers.Theunitdidnotachieveanyheroicvictoriesthatwillbestudiedbymilitary
leadersforyearstocome.Infact,thenatureoflarge-scalewarfareintheFirstWorldWar
gavedivisionsandtheircommanderslittlelatitudetoexecutetacticallybrilliant
maneuvers.Linedupside-by-sideonanextendedfront,thedivisionscoulddolittlemore
thanadvanceorretreat.Thus,aunit’sabilitytoexhibitexceptionalperformancewas
determinedmoresobyitstrainingandfightingspirit.
ThestoryoftheYankeeDivisionisinsteadoneofauniqueAmericanspirit,injected
intotheEuropeantheatertorallyallthosearoundthem.Throughthecourseoftheir
deployment,theYankeeDivisiondisplayedaprofoundespritdecorpsthattransformed
theirdivisionfromamerecollectionofmentoanidealthatallofitssoldierslivedupto.
Throughoutthewar,the26th’stroopsdemonstratedgreatcourage,positivity,andeven
light-heartedness.InthefinalmonthsofSeptemberthroughNovember,theycontinuedto
fightwithafierceoptimismuncommonnotonlyintheFrenchlines,butalsoamongother
Americandivisions.
Initially,theUSArmymerelyneededaneffectiveoffensiveagainsttheGermansto
demonstratetotheworldthatitwouldbeadecisiveplayerintheEuropeantheater.TheUS
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Armyhadnotyetproventhatitcouldactasanindependentfightingforcetoachieve
strategicallyimportantobjectives.Onlyinmid-SeptemberattheBattleofSaint-Mihieldid
theAmericansfinallygaintheopportunitytodoso,aftermuchinsistencetotheFrench
MarshalFochfromGeneralPershing.25TheYankeeDivisionwasassignedtheWesternface
ofthesalientandintendedtoflanktheposition,simultaneouslyreducingtheareaof
GermancontrolandsealingofftheretreatofGermanforces.26
Inpractice,theYankeedivision(alongwiththemuchoftherestoftheAEFforces)
frequentlyviolatedthefundamentalprinciplesofwar.IntheSt.Mihieloffensive,obstacles
likewire,rain,andfogforcedmentoviolatetheprincipleofmass,breakingup“tightattack
formations”infavorofamore“spreadout”advance.27Granted,inthisinstance,the
violationallowedthemtoachievevictory.Thisexpandedformationendedupallowing
themtooutflankmachine-gunnestsand“overcome…lethalresistancemoreeffectivelyand
withfewercasualties.”28Mostly,though,theviolationsonlycausedmoreproblems.Higher
commandconsistentlysentthedivisionon“futileandcostly”attackswithlittleregardfor
offensivedoctrine.29IntheirassaultonBoisd’HaumontoftheMeuse-Argonneoffensive,
YankeetroopsweresentforwardinheavyrainandwithouttheexpectedsupportofFrench
tanks.30The“twistingandturningtrenches”preventedtheinfantrycaptainsfromeven
knowingwheretheirownmenwere,thwartinganyeffortsatapplicationofeconomyof
force.31Finally,thedivisionexperiencedamajorriftbetweentheirbelovedcommander
MajGen.EdwardsandhigherArmyofficersuptoandincludingPershing.Unityofcommand
wasgreatlythreatenedbyPershing’spersonalhatredofEdwards,andmagnifiedbyits
effectonlowerofficers’sentiments,asPershing“cultivatedtheextremeloyaltyofagroup
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ofyoungerofficersbyseeingtotheirpromotions.”32Thesedisagreementsculminatedin
theuntimelyremovalofthedivision’scommanderjustbeforetheendofthewar.
TheYankeeDivisionexemplifiedtruebraveryinitsassaultonSt.Mihiel,butwas
alsoassistedbypureluck.IntheSt.Mihieloffensive,theAmericanFirstArmygloriously
claimedthesalientandimpressedtheFrenchofficerswiththeircompetenceinovertaking
a“reinforcedandimproved”Germanposition.33However,theirsuccesslargelyarosefrom
Germanyexecutinganorderlyretreatatthesametimeastheirassault.GermanGen.Erich
Ludendorffhadalreadygiventheordertowithdrawbeforethebattle.34Whilestill
encounteringscatteredheavyresistance,the26thwasabletoadvanceforwardwithonly
onethirdoftheexpectedcasualties.35Thedivisionstillmadegreatstridesinapplying
lessonslearnedfrompastengagements.Inpastbattles,theYankeeshadfoundthat,asthey
advanced,theyquicklylostthechancetoemployheavyweaponry,eitherfrommarchingin
theguns’lineoffireorexceedingtheirrange.AtSt.Mihiel,theyYankeesselectedacouple
75mmgunsfromthe101stFieldArtillerytoadvancewiththeattackingbattalions.36Even
thoughthegunswerescarcelyused,theefforttochangetacticsrepresentedawillingness
tothinkcreativelytoconstantlyimprovebattlefieldtactics.
IntheMeuse-Argonneoffensiveontheotherhand,the26thInfantryDivision
overcamesignificantobstaclestoachieveitsobjectives.TheYankeeDivisionjoinedthe
offensive“wellunderstrength”andwithan“appallinglackofbothjuniorandsenior
officers.”37Asacorporalinthedivision,HarryWrightwrotethat“onlytheindomitable
spiritofthe‘YANKEEDIVISION’”keptthemgoing.38Furthermore,whenLt.Gen.Hunter
LiggettreportedthatEdwardsallowedfraternizationbetweenhisdivisionandGerman
troops(whichhadprovidedhimwithvaluableintelligenceaboutGermanmorale),
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PershingfinallyrelievedEdwardsofcommand.39Accordingtothedivision’slastchiefof
staff,thereplacementdivisioncommander,Brig.Gen.FrankBamford,never“lead,inspired,
orguided”themenofthedivision.40SoonafterEdwardsremoval,the26thDivision’s
attacksbecamemuchmorerashanddangerous.ThoughBamford’snewleadership
“revitalized”41astalledefforttopressforwardtheYankee’sattack,itledtopoorlyplanned
offensiveswithfriendlyfireand“terrible”casualties.42Inspiteofsuchturmoiland
adversity,theYankeedivisionmaintaineditsspirit.InthemidstoftheoffensiveonOctober
25,Lt.Col.Hobbsnoted:“Youneversawsuchgritandcheerfulnessinspiteofgreat
hardships.”43
NomatterwhattheGermansthrewatthem,theYankeeDivisionmaintainedtheir
ferventoptimismandboyishexcitement.ThedivisioncapturedtheAmericanspiritatits
finest,possessingitsgreatestqualitiesoffreedom,hope,andcourage.TheAmerican
officerswerefearlessinthefaceofbothbulletsandbureaucracy.Liggettoncepulled
Edwardsasideandmadeclearthathehadissuewiththecommander’sinabilitytofollow
orders,suggestingthathe“neverobeyedhisordersormadehisofficersobeytheirs.”44
WhiletherigidAEFcommandstructureexpected“exactobedience”ratherthanofficers’
ownjudgmentandabilitytoexerciseindividualideas,theYankees’resistancetothat
obedienceprovedacentralfactorintheirsuccess.45DuringtheMarchéville-Riaville
diversionaryraidimmediatelybeforetheMeuse-Argonneoffensive,Yankeemedicsrefused
toclosetheirmedicalstationevenafterreceivingadirectordertodoso.Capt.JosephDunn
determinedthat,whiletheinfantrywasfallingback,fartoomanywoundedwerestill
streamingin.46Heandhisfellowofficersvolunteeredtocontinueoperatingthestation“at
allcostsuntiltheykneweverymanhadbeencaredfor.”47Acommitmenttotheirfellow
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AmericansbondedtheYankeeDivisiontogether,andpushedthemforwardthroughthe
hardshipsofEurope.
Maj.Gen.ClarenceEdwardslayatthecoreofthisorganization,havingearnedthe
deepestrespectfromhistroops.Withhisespeciallypersonalcommandstyle,Edwards
fosteredthegrowthoftheunit’sespritdecorps.Hobbstheorizedthathigherofficers
treatedEdwardssopoorlybecausetheyviewedhimasapossiblerival.48Hedidnotbelieve
thatEdwardswasdeservingofsuchanimosity,asthe“calmandresoluteandunbroken”
manwas“lovedbyeveryofficerandmanofhisDivision.”49Edwardsfacilitatedavery
intimatecommandstructurewithinthedivision:“Officersknewalltheirmen;knewwhere
theylived,hadtalkedwiththeirmothers.”50Edwardsadditionallyknewhisjuniorofficers
well.Hepersonallysearchedforpositionsfortheseofficersthatbestsuitedtheiruniqueset
ofskills.51MajorEmersonTaylorwrotethatEdwardstaughthismentoalwaysbe
prepared,keepinggoodcareoftheirequipment,remainingalert,andquicklyfollowing
orders“withasmile.”52Hewouldvisitbattalionsandtalktomeninformally,instillingpride
intheirdivisionandtrustintheircommander.AstudentattheMassachusettsStateNormal
ArtSchoolwhofoughtwiththedivisionoverseasrecalledinhisartworkthatuponthe
deathofEdward’sdaughter,thedivision’sChaplinO’Connortoldthegeneralthatanyman
underhiscommand“wouldfeelitanhonorifhislifecouldrestoreherstoyou[Gen.
Edwards].”53Edwardswasmuchlikethefatherofthistight-knitgroupofsoldiers,andhe
inspiredinthemthehigheststrengthandconfidence.
ThetaleofMaj.Gen.ClarenceRansomEdwardsandhisYankeeDivisionteaches
futureofficerslittleoftacticsandstrategy.Instead,itremindsthemoftheunique
characteristicsoftheAmericanmilitaryandnationalspirit.TheAmericanmilitaryisnot
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definedbyacrushingdisciplineenforcingblindobedienceofpeons,butratherarespectfor
theinherentequalityofmenthroughouttheranks.Whileadherencetoformalitiesand
commandingofficers’ordersisrequired,eachsoldierdowntothePrivateisexpectedto
understandthemissionandcontributehispart.Atthemostbasiclevel,Edwardstreated
hissubordinateslikehumanbeings;whereashissuccessor,Bamford,believedthattroops
werelike“eggs”thatmustbebrokentomakean“omelet.”54Byconvincinghistroopsthat
eachoftheirliveshassignificancetothegreatermissionandwillonlybeexpendedif
absolutelynecessary,herousedinthemaconvictiontofighttowardstheirpurpose.
Edwardsdidnotviolatetheprincipleofseparationofofficersandsubordinates.Hedidnot
becomehistroops’friend;hebecametheirfather.Thelessonofhiscommandsuggeststhat,
asanofficer,onecancreateinaunitaforce-multiplierthatlastslongbeyondone’stenure
ascommander.
Theespritdecorps,whiledifficulttodevelop,canbeinvaluableinafightingforce
andeventuallybecomeembeddedatthecoreofaunit.OnelearnsfromEdwardsthatto
buildsuchafighting-spirit,anofficermustsethighgoals,expectinghismentoachieve
them.Bydoingso,theunitwillbuildasenseofpride,purpose,andpotential.Furthermore,
thetroopsmustalwaysbelievethattheircommanderhastheirbestinterestsatheart.So
longastheyarefightingfortheircountryunderthewatchfuleyesofacommanderwho
intendstoprotectthem,theywillknowthatanycostsorcasualtiesareabsolutelyrequired
forvictory.Thus,theywillapproachcombatwithaneagerheartandstrongresolve.The
26thInfantryDivisionintheFirstWorldWarremainsamodeltodayforthepassionand
valorwithwhichAmericansoughtapproachcombat.Theleadershipofitscommander
shouldsimilarlyinspirefutureofficerstoencouragedisciplinedinitiativeamong
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subordinates,andrecognizethat,sometimes,thecreativityandpersonaljudgmentofmany
canbemoreeffectivethanrigorousadherencetoone.
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Notes
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 UnitedStatesArmy.UnitedStatesArmyintheWorldWar1917-1919:Trainingand
UseofAmericanUnitsWiththeBritishandFrench,vol3.(Washington,D.C.:Centerof
MilitaryHistory,1989),8.
2 Mead,Gary.TheDoughboys:AmericaandtheFirstWorldWar.(NewYork:The
OverlookPress,2000),4.
3 Ibid.4
4 Heyman,NeilM.WorldWarI.(Westport:GreenwoodPress,1997),45.
5 Pierrefeu,Jeande.LesCahiefsdelaVictoire.L’offensivedu16Avril.LaVéritésur
l’affaireNivelle.(Paris:Renaissancedelivre,1919),147.
6 Hayes,CarltonJ.ABriefHistoryoftheGreatWar.(NewYork:TheMacmillan
Company,1920),276.
7 Heyman28
8 Edmonds,JamesEdward.MilitaryOperations,FranceandBelgium,1917.(New
York:BatteryPress,1948),361-363.
9 Chickering,Roger.ImperialGermanyandtheGreatWar1914-1918.(Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),141-142.
10 Heyman30
11 Ibid.31
12 Ibid.31
13 Ibid.31
14 Patterson,J.S.Commander’sIntent:ItsEvolutionintheUnitedStatesArmy.(Fort
Leavenworth:UnitedStatesArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,1995),15.
15 Ibid.15
16 Sibley,FrankP.WiththeYankeeDivisioninFrance.(Boston:Little,Brown,1919),
149.
17 AmericanBattleMonumentsCommission.“TheMeuse-ArgonneOffensive,a
WorldWarIOnlineInteractive,Released.”(24Jun2015).
18 Shay175
19 Ibid.175
20 Ibid.69
21 Heller,CharlesE.andStofft,WilliamA.America’sFirstBattle’s:1776-1965.
(Lawrence:TheUniversityPressofKansas,1986),164.
22 Shay70
23 Mead226
24 Ibid.226
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
25 Shay143
26 Ibid.149
27 Ibid.160
28 Ibid.160
29 Ibid.179
30 Ibid.179
31 Ibid.181
32 Ibid.184
33 Ibid.148
34 Ibid.160
35 Ibid.160
36 Ibid.149
37 Ibid.177
38 Sirois,McGinnis,andHogan.Smashingthrough“TheWorldWar”WithFighting
BatteryC.(Salem:TheMeekPress,1919),112-113.
39 Shay183
40 Taylor,EmersonGifford.NewEnglandinFrance,1917-1919:AHistoryofthe
Twenty-SixthDivision.(Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1920),182.
41 Mead323
42 Shay188
43 Ibid.191
44 Ibid.185
45 Ibid.185
46 Ibid.170
47 Ibid.170
48 Ibid.182
49 Ibid.182
50 Mead225
51 Shay,MichaelE.ReveredCommander,MalignedGeneral:TheLifeofClarence
RansomEdwards,1859-1939.(Columbia:TheUniversityofMissouriPress,2011),183.
52 MassachusettsStateNormalArtSchool.TheYankeeDivisionCalendar.(Brooklyn:
MergenthalerLinotype,1921).
53 Ibid.
54 Shay(ReveredCommander)182
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