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Transcript
05/11/2015
Economic backgrounder: Brazilian waxing and waning | The Economist
Graphic detail
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Economic backgrounder
Brazilian waxing and waning
Oct 30th 2015, 16:26 by the Data team
IN THE past few years Brazil’s economy has
disappointed. It grew by 2.2% a year, on
average, during President Dilma Rousseff’s
first term in office in 2011­​
14, a slower rate of
growth than in most of its neighbours, let
alone in places like China or India. Last year
GDP barely grew at all. It contracted by 2.6%
in the second quarter, compared to the same
period last year, and is expected to shrink by 3% in 2015. Household consumption has
registered the first drop, year­on­year, since Ms Rousseff’s left­wing Workers’ Party (PT)
came to power in 2003. At the same time, public spending has surged. In 2014, as Ms
Rousseff sought re­election, the budget deficit doubled to 6.75% of GDP (the bill has since
swelled by another 2.5 percentage points). For the first time since 1997 the government failed
to set aside any money to pay back creditors. Its planned primary surplus for this year, which
excludes interest owed on debt, of 1.2% of GDP is now expected to turn into a 0.9% deficit.
Brazil’s gross government debt of 66% may look piffling compared to Greece’s 175% or
Japan’s 227%. But Brazil’s high interest rates of around 14% make borrowing costlier to
service. Debt payments eat up more than 8% of output. To let businesses and consumers
borrow at less exorbitant rates, public banks have increasingly filled the gap, offering cheap,
subsidised loans. These went from 40% of all lending in 2010 to 55%.
As the government loosened fiscal policy, the Central Bank prematurely slashed its
benchmark interest rate in 2011­​
12. This pushed up inflation, which is now well above the
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bank’s self​
­imposed upper limit of 6.5%, and
way above its 4.5% target. The interest­rate cut
has since been reversed. On October 21st the
Bank's monetary policy­makers kept the rate
at 14.25%, nearly two percentage points higher
than before the decision to cut. With inflation
near double digits they cannot afford to loosen
policy anytime soon. Alongside the lack of
macroeconomic rigour, there was a lot of microeconomic meddling: the government pursued
a clumsy industrial policy and shortchanged the private sector, for example by insisting on
absurdly low rates of return on concessions to run infrastructure projects. Small wonder
confidence slumped among businessmen.
Red tape, poor infrastructure and a strong
currency have rendered much of industry
uncompetitive. So consumers have been the
main source of demand. A low unemployment
rate pushed up wages. In the past ten years
wages in the private sector have grown faster
than GDP (public​
­sector workers have done
even better). That allowed consumers to
borrow more, which encouraged still more spending. Now the virtuous circle is turning
vicious. Real wages have been falling since March, compared with a year earlier, mainly
because Brazilian workers’ productivity never justified the earlier rises. People are returning
to seek work just as there are fewer jobs to go around: unemployment, which has long been
falling and dipped below 5% for most of 2014, increased to 7.6% in September. Economists
expect it to reach 10% next year.
To improve its finances the government is cutting spending on unemployment insurance
(which had risen even when the jobless rate was falling) and on other benefits. Taxes,
including fuel duty, are going up. So, too, are bills for water and electricity (two­thirds of
which is generated by hydropower). The point is to reduce demand following a record
drought in 2014 and to correct a policy of holding down regulated prices to keep inflation in
check (and voters happy). But these increases have stoked inflation.
All this is hurting disposable incomes, a big
portion of which are spent paying back
consumer loans taken out in the good times.
Consumer confidence has fallen to its lowest
level since Fundação Getulio Vargas, a
business school, began tracking it in 2005. The
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government has no money to boost investment.
Petrobras, the state­​
controlled oil giant and Brazil’s biggest investor, is in the midst of a
corruption scandal that has paralysed spending: the forgone investment may reduce GDP
growth this year by one percentage point. It is hard to see where growth will come from. Worst of all, Ms Rousseff’s policy levers are jammed. Failure to rein in spending already
prompted Standard & Poor's to strip Brazil of its prized investment­grade credit rating. Now
economists fret that is may render monetary policy powerless: as interest bill balloons, the
Central Bank could be forced to set rates to make it manageable rather than to keep prices in
check. The hawkish finance minister, Joaquim Levy, has slashed 70 billion reais off the
discretionary spending planned for this year (on top of the modest welfare reforms). But that
is trimming around the edges: roughly 90% of government spending is ring­fenced and
needs congressional approval (or sometimes constitutional change) to curb. Nor can the
Central Bank ease monetary policy: that would once again undermine its credibility and risk
de­anchoring inflation expectations. If that were not enough, a depreciating real, which is
oscillating around an all­time low, is adding to price pressures; it also makes Brazil’s $230
billion dollar­denominated debt dearer by the day. Ms Rousseff cannot bring Brazil’s animal
spirits back to life with more spending and lower interest rates. She was hoping a return to
economic orthodoxy would do the trick. Unfortunately, she lacks the political capital—and
possibly conviction—to embrace it more fully in the teeth of congressional opposition to
austerity. As a result, Brazil's economy may take a while to heal.
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