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The Treaty of Lausanne and the Creation of the Turkish nationstate: An International Relations Analysis
Neil Muscat
PLSC 14U
Professor Lemke
March 30, 2014
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“Gentlemen, I don’t think it is necessary any further to compare the principles
underlying the Lausanne Peace Treaty with other proposals for peace. This treaty is a
document declaring that all efforts, prepared over centuries, and thought to have been
accomplished through the Sevres Treaty to crush the Turkish nation have been in vain. It is a
diplomatic victory unheard of in the Ottoman history!” Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, President of
Turkey, declared a few years following ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.1 The Treaty of
Lausanne, ratified in 1923, was a major victory for Turkey, which had recently seen the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire and the loss of much of its’ territory. What made the Turkish victory
particularly remarkable was the wide range of forces arrayed against the Turks. Following
World War I, the Allies sought to partition the Anatolian Peninsula and the Middle East. To
Turkey’s east, the Armenians sought to set up their own state, including parts of current Turkish
territory. The Greeks wanted Istanbul and Izmir, along Turkey’s west coast. Nor were Turkey’s
immediate neighbors the only parties interested in limiting Turkish independence. The most
powerful empires in the world, Britain and France, had partitioned the former Ottoman Empire
and were seeking to add Anatolia to their sphere of influence. French and British troops even
occupied Istanbul, the traditional capital of the Ottomans, to cement their dominance of the
Middle East. The French attempted to extend their Syrian colony into Turkey. Additionally, the
Italians had designs for a colonial empire in Anatolia. 2
The Allies initially tried to implement their demands through the Treaty of Sevres and
the Tripartite Agreement. In addition to ceding Thrace and Izmir to Greece and Eastern Anatolia
1
Author Unknown. Lausanne Peace Treaty. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved March 30,
2014 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr
2
Macfie, A.L (1994). Ataturk (pp 99-101). New York: Longman Publishing.
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to Armenia, the Allies sought to impose further restrictions on the sovereignty of the Turkish
state. There was a proviso that allowed the future possibility of a Kurdish state, which would
likely consist of lands the Turks considered their national territory. The treaty was ratified by
the Ottoman government on August 10th, 1920. Additionally, the Tripartite Agreement between
Britain, France, and Italy sought to restrain Turkish sovereignty. Anatolia was divided into
spheres of influence in which the three empires would “enjoy exclusive rights of commercial
exploitation.”3 Although the Ottoman government lost legitimacy ratifying the Treaty, they
were compelled to do so by the Allies. The Turkish delegation noted that under the terms of the
Treaty that “more than two-thirds of the territory of the Ottoman Empire” had been lost.
Furthermore, Turkey’s remaining territory would suffer “the gravest injury to the sovereignty of
the state.” A commission of the straits, controlled by the Allies, “was to exercise its authority in
complete independence of the local authority.”4 Along with the occupation of Istanbul, these
terms were considered to be the de facto end of Turkish independence. Turkish nationalists
opposed the treaty, and rebelled against the Ottoman government. The civil war further
divided Turkish forces. With the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1918, the Turks
lacked any allies and appeared to be at the mercy of the victorious Allies.
With hindsight, however, the Treaty of Sevres can be seen as a major miscalculation by
the allies. Previous partitions of the Ottoman Empire involved Europeans seizing control of the
Arab world. While the Ottomans valued control of the countries that would later become Iraq,
Israel, Syria, and Lebanon; the Turks did not consider these nations their home country.
3
4
Macfie, A.L (1994). Ataturk (pp 99-101). New York: Longman Publishing.
Howard, Harry (1931). The Partition of Turkey (pp 244-245). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
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However, the Anatolian Peninsula was of much greater value to the Turkish people. Anatolia
was not just another part of the Ottoman Empire, but its’ heart. As the traditional Ottoman
government lacked power or legitimacy, a new nationalist government was established at
Angora (Ankara). The occupation of Istanbul and an Allied crackdown on Turkish nationalists
rejuvenated the nationalist movement and increased its’ popular support. The nationalist
government took a hardline position on the Allies and demanded the reversal of Ottoman
concessions in Anatolia. At the head of this new government was the father of modern Turkey,
Mustapha Kemal Ataturk.
The importance of Ataturk in the eventual Turkish victory is difficult to exaggerate.
Ataturk could be considered one of those rare individuals who by themselves are a major actor
in International Relations. Ataturk managed to make the nationalist movement a unitary actor,
dedicated to maximizing Turkish power and sovereignty. In the beginning of 1920, it seemed
probable the Ottoman government would destroy the fledgling nationalist movement. Damad
Ferid Pasha, the head of the Ottoman government, had declared Ataturk and the other
nationalist leaders to be traitors and sentenced them to death. Pasha also assembled an Army
of the Caliphate to oppress the nationalist forces. After a period of chaos, the nationalists
emerged victorious. The nationalist movement itself, however, was not originally a single force.
Left-wing groups, including Communists, threatened the unity of the nationalist movement.
Ataturk managed to succeed in marginalizing the Communists. Although the Ottoman
government didn’t formally dissolve until 1923, Ataturk assumed effective control of the
Turkish forces during this period. The Treaty of Sevres and the Greek occupation of Smyrna
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galvanized the Turks into supporting Ataturk, who was seen as the most consistent and
powerful opponent to foreign intervention.5 6
Although the Turks lacked sufficient soldiers and supplies due to the civil war, the other powers
involved were overextended. Other than the Greeks and the Armenians, the major powers did not view
Anatolia to be a particularly important front. Henry Wilson of the Imperial General Staff declared that
that the British should place priority on “the theatres vital to us viz: England, Ireland, Egypt, India,
Mesopotamia: in that order.” 7 Since Britain, France, and Italy had suffered heavy losses in World War I,
and were occupied in other theatres, their commitment to the war in Turkey was limited. Furthermore,
the Allies had priorities in the region which outweighed the Treaty of Sevres. The rise of the Soviet
Union worried the Allies, and some factions in the Allied nations viewed a strong Turkey as a potential
buffer against Russian expansion.8 This left only the Greeks and the Armenians fully committed to
defeating the Turks. The Armenians, however, had suffered immense losses in the Armenian genocide,
and faced the opposition of the Soviet Union. Isolated from Allied support, the Armenians were quickly
defeated, and the Turks reversed the concessions given to Armenia in the Treaty of Sevres as early as
1920. Thus Greece, seeking to protect Christians in Anatolia, bore the bulk of the fighting.9
The failure of the various Allied powers to unite in military or diplomatic action behind the
Treaty of Sevres displays the problems with collective security and multiple actors. Thirteen Allied states
had ratified the Treaty of Sevres; so nominally, thirteen states were opposed to the nationalist
government and supported the Ottoman government in carrying out the terms of the Treaty.10 However,
few of these states were interested in the costs of giving significant support to the Allied effort in
5
Macfie, A.L (1994). Ataturk (Chapter 6). New York: Longman Publishing.
Howard, Harry (1931). The Partition of Turkey (pp 244-274). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
7
Macfie, A.L (1994). Ataturk (pp 113). New York: Longman Publishing.
8
Ibid
9
Ibid
10
The Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 1920.World War I Document Archive. Retrieved March 30, 2014 from
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu.
6
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Anatolia. Belgium and Japan, for instance, would have had little to no influence in the Middle East; and
had only signed the Treaty to formally end the state of war that had existed since 1914. Although these
states viewed the Allied terms as favorable, they were of little consequence to their economic and
military interest. Even the “Serbo-Croat-Slovene state” (Yugoslavia), which as a Balkan state was
presumably interested in limiting Turkish power, did not commit to the anti-Turkish struggle. The failure
of the Treaty of Sevres foreshadowed the future failures of the League of Nations. The Treaty of Sevres
envisioned a major role for the League of Nations in maintaining international relations in Anatolia. The
Commission of the Straits was to cooperate with the League, and the Council of the League of Nations
was to take a major role in protecting minority groups in Turkey.11 By not intervening in the Turkish war
and failing to protect Christian minorities from ethnic cleansing, the League showed itself to be
toothless. Thus the realist skepticism of international organizations, particularly those of a political and
not an economic nature, was proven early in the League’s existence.
Barring the inaction of actors without power or interest in the region, it might be expected that
the Allies actively involved in Anatolia would be able to enforce the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres.
The Turkish nationalist movement was the only serious opposition, and they were forced to fight
invaders on three fronts (Armenia, Greece, and French Syria). Additionally, the Turkish nationalists were
involved in a civil war at the same time. Multilateralism devoid of international organizations, however,
proved just as incompetent as the League of Nations in implementing Allied goals. The competing
interests and commitments of the Allied powers limited any effective collective action. The United
Kingdom, France, Italy, Greece and Armenia each had different desired outcomes that conflicted with
each other. Britain had almost no territorial stake involved in Anatolia, and was committed to balancing
and limiting any potential threats against their influence in the Middle East and India. The United
Kingdom, being a naval power, was further committed to freedom of transport through the Bosporus
11
Ibid
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straits. France was primarily interested in securing or expanding the northern border of their colony in
Syria. The Italians and the Greeks competed for territorial and commercial advantage in Western
Anatolia. Their differing interests lead to the Greek representative in negotiations, Venizelos,
“threaten[ing] not to sign the Treaty of Sevres.”12 Thus the Italians were probably reluctant to support
the Greeks in Smyrna. The only two nations fully interested in defeating the Turks and securing their
territorial ambitions were Greece and Armenia. Neither of the countries were major powers, and the
fledgling Armenian state was particularly weak. Geographical distance, furthermore, prevented any
meaningful collective action, with the Turks isolating Armenia from any allies. In general, geography can
prevent collective action even when the interests of actors converge.
The bilateral agreements between Turkey and the Soviet Union during this period, however,
showed that international cooperation in Anatolia was not entirely a doomed prospect. Neither nation
trusted the other. The Soviets sent emissaries to Turkey to spread communist influence among the
nationalists. Curiously, these emissaries were never heard from again. Despite this distrust, Turkey and
the Soviet Union were able to establish a de facto alliance through the Treaties of Moscow and Kars in
1921. Russia absorbed the remaining Armenian state, as well as the nation of Georgia. Thus Turkey was
able to secure its’ eastern border, which the Russians agreed to respect. Furthermore, the Soviet Union
became the first major power to recognize Turkish sovereignty. The Russians also supplied military and
financial aid to the nationalist regime in order to defeat their mutual European enemies. Thus the Turks
“succeeded in completely altering her international position.”13 While Turkey and Russia each prioritized
their own national interest; wary cooperation benefited both countries.
Turkey’s other diplomatic offensives were aimed at exploiting divisions between the Allied
powers. The Turks recognized that collective action among the Allies was difficult to coordinate.
12
13
Howard, Harry (1931). The Partition of Turkey (pp 240). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Howard, Harry (1931). The Partition of Turkey (pp 264). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
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Therefore, the Turks approached some of the lesser Allied power separately in order to further divide
them. The Italians were the first Allied power to reach an agreement with Turkey. The Italians were not
as interested in territory as they were with commercial and financial advantage. The Italian tensions
with Greece also left them amenable to recognizing Turkish claims to Smyrna and Thrace. Italy and
Turkey therefore ratified an agreement that recognized Italian economic influence in South-Western
Anatolia. In return, the Italians decided to support the return of territory occupied by Greece to the
Turks. By June of 1921, Italian forces were withdrawn from Anatolia, further reducing the forces of the
Allied powers.14 The Italians later ratified the Treaty of Lausanne, under the government of territorially
ambitious Mussolini. Mussolini, who appeared personally at Lausanne, wanted to limit Turkish influence
in the Balkans, where he sought to expand Italian influence. Although the Turks and Italians remained
distrustful of each other, (throughout Mussolini’s regime the Turks feared he would seek to expand the
Italian Empire to Anatolia) they mutually benefitted from a cessation of hostilities.15
The Turks followed their diplomatic success with the Italians with a separate agreement, the
Ankara Agreement, with the French. In the aftermath of World War I, the Franco-British alliance was
showing some strains. Outside of the Middle East, the French were irritated at the British refusal to
support France’s policies in demilitarized Germany. French and British territorial ambitions in the Middle
East conflicted as well. The French therefore made territorial concessions to Turkey in exchange for the
security of Syria. The British were deeply angered and viewed the Ankara Agreement as a major
betrayal.16 In this instance, France decided to adopt a realist perspective. The French viewed their
national interest and securing territory they viewed as French as more important than fully coordinating
with their European allies. Power was more important than cooperation and maintaining alliances.
14
Ibid
Barlas, Dilek (May, 2004). Friends or Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923-36.
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36(2), 231-252. Retrieved March 30, 2014 from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3880033?seq=3.
16
Howard, Harry (1931). The Partition of Turkey (pp 261-263). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
15
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With their diplomatic successes, the Turks could now afford to focus on the Greek presence in
Smyrna. The Greeks could not easily be bargained with as they viewed Smyrna as essential parts of
Greek territory. Ceding this territory to the Turks was an unacceptable point in their bargaining range.
Thus only military defeat would convince the Greeks to leave Anatolia. Ataturk therefore ordered total
mobilization and forced the Greeks to retreat by September 1922.17
After the defeat of the Greeks, British occupied Istanbul and the Straits was the last remaining
area of foreign influence. The Turks threatened to attack the British, while simultaneously negotiating an
armistice. This period is known as the Chanak Crisis. The British were internally divided as to whether
surrender of the Dardanelles was more acceptable than war. Prime Minister David Lloyd George
believed that the Dardanelles were worth the risk. Other than Winston Churchill, Lloyd George had
virtually no support for his position. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, stated that a Turkish
attack on Istanbul would be a disaster for the British; threatening relations with the other Allied powers
and resulting in the end of British influence in the region. The majority of the British people were
unwilling to suffer the costs of war for apparently little political gain. Lloyd George’s refusal to negotiate
resulted in the collapse of his government and his removal from office.18 The new British government
was of a more cautious and realist bent. They had managed to avoid major military battles with the
Turks since the Treaty of Sevres; and didn’t want to further reduce British power. Soon afterwards, the
Mudanya Armistice effectively ended hostilities, although the Greek government declined to ratify it.19
The Armistice was eventually followed by the Treaty of Lausanne.
The many actors of the Allies lost the Turkish War of Independence due to a lack of internal
cohesion and conflicting goals. In contrast, the Turkish nationalist movement had quashed any
17
Macfie, A.L (1994). Ataturk (pp 123). New York: Longman Publishing.
DARWIN, J. G. (1980), THE CHANAK CRISIS AND THE BRITISH CABINET. The Journal of the Historical Association,
65: 32–48. Retrieved March 30, 2014 from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com
19
Author Unknown. Mudanya Armistice. MUDANYA ARMISTICE MUSEUM. Retrieved March 30, 2014 from
http://www.mudanyamutarekeevi.org.
18
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dissenters and became a unitary actor with a clear, accomplishable goal- a sovereign Turkey with certain
borders. In short, the Turks were fully committed to maximizing their power. The Allies sought to
promote their national interests while still maintaining a broad front against the nationalists. These
goals naturally conflicted. The Allied failure to coordinate their diplomatic efforts resulted in their
“defeat.” Some of the Allies, however, gained more from the Treaty of Lausanne than others. The British,
seeking to act multilaterally, only achieved freedom of the straits and lost credibility and influence. The
French, by seeking to promote their national interest over that of the alliance, achieved most of their
aims. French control over Syria was now secure. Thus the Treaty of Lausanne was considered “a victory
of French over British policy.”20Greece, by seeking to protect all the Greek people, including those in
Anatolia, ended the war significantly weakened. The Greek State failed to prioritize its own interests,
and was thus embroiled in a disastrous conflict. The Treaty of Lausanne thus forced many Greek
Anatolians to vacate their homes and leave the newly independent Turkey in an act of ethnic
cleansing.21
Although the Turks made minor concessions in the border of Thrace, recognized freedom of the
straits, and offered financial concessions to the Allies, they achieved nearly all of their goals. The Treaty
of Lausanne was considered particularly significant since it ended centuries of Ottoman “capitulations”
to the powers of Europe. Turkey was required to pay reparations, but Ismet Pasha successfully lowered
the number to fifty million dollars.22 This was significantly less than the reparations required by the
Treaty of Sevres. They were certainly better the reparations that Germany was forced to pay the Allies.
More importantly, the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne eventually lead the Turkish state to establish
financial independence. The Allies, who for centuries had imperialist and financial influence in the
20
Howard, Harry (1931). The Partition of Turkey (pp 270). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Ibid
22
Turlington, Edgar (1924). Settlement of Lausanne. American Journal of International Law, 18, 696-706. Retrieved
March 30, 2014 from http://heinonline.org.
21
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Ottoman Empire, were forced to recognize the new Turkish state as an equal. In this respect, the new
Turkish state was actually more powerful than the Ottoman Empire.
Other than the notable exceptions of Greece and the now stateless Armenia, the Allies managed
to protect some of their national interests in the Treaty of Lausanne. This outcome was preferable to a
war with the now unified Turkey which would further strain their resources. Prior to World War I, the
British largely had a free hand in the Middle East. The entry of the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the
central powers had come as a shock. The losses Britain suffered during World War I made them
reluctant to participate in further conflicts, particularly when it did not involve British territory. This
mentality would continue with appeasement in the 1930s. The French too, had suffered major losses in
World War I. Having received Syria, the French were unwilling to make further sacrifices in another war.
The Italians were undergoing a period of domestic instability. Although the Allies had won World War I,
the human costs were severe. Post-war governments were therefore reluctant to engage in likely
damaging military conflict beyond their newly acquired borders. Lloyd George failed to recognize this
sentiment and thus fell from power. Greece, having lost both diplomatic support and military control,
had no other choice but to sign the Treaty of Lausanne.
The Turkish War of Independence showed that a single nation-state, fully united in maximizing
its power, could defeat a multilateral alliance of major empires with competing interests. In this respect,
the Turkish War of Independence showed the weaknesses of the Inter-war international system, and
was a predictor of its failure in the 1930s. In both Germany and Turkey, the League of Nations proved to
be irrelevant. In both Germany and Turkey, a charismatic leader expanded military power and seized
territory he believed rightly belonged to his nation. Britain and France failed to protect small nations and
ethnic minorities in both Central Europe and Anatolia. The inability of the major powers to realize the
problems with the Post-War peace revealed by Turkey would eventually lead to greater tragedy and loss.
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Even in the 21st century, the lessons of the Turkish War of Independence can be applied. The
war of the major powers in Turkey bears resemblances to later interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Multilateral alliances seeking to occupy or control an individual country will often suffer backlash. This
backlash is particularly intense when the goals of the invading powers are viewed as a threat to national
sovereignty or pride. Alliances should therefore avoid attempting to occupy or partition distant
countries, especially when vital national interests are not at stake. In an age of nationalism, this maxim
is particularly relevant.