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ISOLATIONISM:
ASSUMPTIONS AND EVOLUTION
by
JAMES HAROLD MILLER, JR., B.S.
A THESIS
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Approved
Accepted
December, 1981
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This writer wishes to express sincere appreciation to the members
of the graduate committee, Dr. S.M. Kennedy, Dr. Ros Simowitz, and
Dr. Richard Vengroff, for their guidance, counsel, and assistance in
the preparation of this thesis.
Special consideration and appreciation
is due Patsy Sue Dudley for her time and constructive consideration,
and to Charlotte Barnett for her patience and expert typing skills.
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ii
CHAPTER
I
II
THE HISTORICAL BASES OF AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM
1
POST-WORLD WAR I - 1920s
13
THE ISOLATIONISTS' ASSAULT
25
IV
LIMITED WAR
67
V
CONCLUSIONS
97
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
107
III
111
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL BASES OF AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM
Since America's beginning as a nation, a controversy has developed
over the term used to describe American foreign policy in relation to
European affairs.
This debate is centered around the term "isolationism"
and the disparate groups that formed in opposition to American involvement in foreign wars.
Isolationism, while not an experience peculiar to
America, is vastly different from that form practiced by China and Japan
in the nineteenth century.
While China and Japan practiced a total
political, social, and economic isolation from the rest of the world,
America's isolation dealt mainly with political self-sufficiency.
America's brand of isolation was an attempt to avoid involvement in any
European conflict, and they welcomed the social and especially the
economic advantages offered through foreign trade.
Seliq Adler in a
discussion of isolationism stated:
We can begin by saying that American isolationism has never
meant total social, cultural, and economic self-sufficiency.
Such a concept has had few rational advocates and the very
idea is nullified by the history of the United States."^
The term "isolationism" and those who advocate its principles have
provided the American political system with an on-again, off-again
Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America 1933-1941, (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1966) p. 5.
Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, (New York: The Free
Press, 1957) p. 30.
debate since this nation's beginning.
From President Washington's
Farewell address, Americans have developed a concept which has become
known as isolationism.
Throughout this country's history, especially
during periods of extreme international conflict, there have been those
individuals and groups who have advocated returning to earlier times to
escape
the pressures and threat of war.
After each withdrawal,
when America returned to reality, there have been corresponding pronouncements of the death of isolationism.
After 1919 President Wilson
announced that the issue of neutrality could now be laid to rest because
American power made this country a determining factor in the history of
mankind.
Isolationism developed its most powerful and popular form between
the two world wars.
Of special interest, are those groups that consti-
tute the isolationists of the 1930s.
The material written about this
group is immense, and in addition, the bases of the concept can be reduced to only a few major points.
These points or values will be used
to attempt to prove that the basic beliefs of isolationism are still
present in the American political system.
The bases of the 1930 isolationism can be reduced to three major
assumptions.
The first consisted of the belief in the evils of inter-
national affairs—an isolationist is one opposed to alliances or agreements with any foreign nation that does not involve American territory
or vital interests; the second assumption was that peace-loving nations.
Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds.. The Public Papers of
Woodrow Wilson, (New York and London: 1926-1927) Vol. VI, PP • 18-19.
such as the United States, become involved in war because of a few
selfish, greedy individuals, who manipulate the country for their own
profits; the third assumption—that isolationists were convinced that
since all other countries are amoral, war-like, or vulnerable, it is
necessary for the United States to stand behind a doctrine of unilateralism in its foreign policy.
The purpose of this paper is an attempt to prove that isolationists'
beliefs and concepts are still active in American politics. To do this,
the basic assumptions will be used to demonstrate that those ideas are
still alive, and they seem to appear each time America faces a major
threat of war.
The main thrust of this paper is to trace the evolution
of this concept, beginning with Washington's advice to his nation,
through the strongest period of the 1930s up to the present time. The
1930 group will be used to compare and contrast with other individuals
who fit into the isolationist mold.
Through public opinion polls,
newspapers, and articles, the general mood of the American people will
demonstrate their support or opposition of world affairs. The Congressional Record will be used to ascertain if a trend in voting pattern
and issues can be determined for individual congressmen
of foreign affairs.
on the subject
The two major periods of special interest and
study will be the Korean and Vietnam wars.
It is not the intent of this paper to deal with a complete history
of isolationism, as this has been the subject of numerous authors. The
4
Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 100-105-
interest is in determining if the tenets of isolationism emerge during
the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The period covered, from 1930 to
1973, has collected an immense amount of material, too immense in fact
to allow a definitive research of the material. Another factor that
limits this paper is that not all of the research material is available
locally.
Woven into American political thought, from the very beginning of
this nation, was the desire to divorce the new world from the older
countries of Europe. America's Forefathers also expressed their desire
to avoid those old regional and national jealousies that were so prevalent in the old world.
The American war for independence was an echo
of this thought, and a withdrawal from England meant that the United
States was free from any alliances made with Britain.
Many isolationists point with pride to President Washington's
Farewell Address as the justification for, and the beginning of, the
isolationist spirit.
nent alliances."
In this appeal Washington warned against "perma-
Adler reported.
In 1776, Washington's Farewell Address was published in the
newspapers. This valedictory was destined to be enshrined
beside the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
as a national classic. The President warned against 'permanent alliances,' pointing up the perils of taking sides in
Europe's chronic squabbles and invited his countrymen to
capitalize upon their 'detached and distant situation.' With
characteristic realism, however, he added that 'we may safely
trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.'
Future generations, neglecting to consider his qualifying
Adler, Impulse, p. 16.
Felix Gilbert, To The Farewell Address, (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1961) appendix, pp. 138-139; Adler,
Impulse, p. 16.
phrases, read new meaning into his words, added corollaries to
his propositions, and tailored his doctrine to meet their own
needs. . . Was Washington speaking only to his contemporaries
or to generations yet unborn? No matter how one answers this
debatable question, it is safe to say that the Father of our
^
Country made neutrality and non-intervention national fixations.
An illustration of Washington's speech can be traced back to his
actions, or rather his lack of action, during the French Revolution.
Although an alliance had been signed with the French Government,
Washington did little to honor its terms in the interest of preservation of freedom and democracy.
Adler emphasized "that Washington's
decision not to pay too much attention to the literal terms of our
pact with France added something new to the concept of isolation—we
g
must be neutral in wars not impinging upon our vital interests."
The clear indication of continuing squabbles and wars in Europe
served to reinforce American Resolve to remain neutral and avoid all
entanglements with the belligerents. There were various reasons for
America to stay out of Europe's problems, but primarily it was because
the United States was in a position of weakness, unable to defend
ourselves against the British and French Navies. Adler underscores
this disadvantage with:
We blundered into the War of 1812 and despite our ocean moats,
a British fleet sailed up the Chesapeake Bay to burn the
Capitol and the White House . . . . Prior to 1815 it was
clearly evident that the security of the United States was
at the mercy of events beyond our borders.
In the early 1820s, Russian encroachment in Alaska prompted a
doctrine that would become a cornerstone for the isolationist cause.
President Monroe warned the European nations that they were not welcome
Adler, Impulse, p. 16; Gilbert, Farewell, pp. 138-139.
o
Adler, Impulse, p. 17.
9
Ibid., p. 17.
to expand into the America's, to extend their existing colonies.
This
"hands off," message was delivered to Congress on December 2, 1823 and
would later be expanded to include Latin America.
The President, in
his declaration, divided the world into two spheres of influence, and
warned that our new world must remain free from old world interference.
The Monroe Doctrine became a rallying point for those opposed to
America's entry into World War I and after the war was used by opponents
of the League of Nations. For the remainder of the nineteenth century
the major thrust of American foreign policy was directed toward expan12
sion.
Giving comfort and encouragement to those countries desiring
freedom, America was able to do so without any direct involvement.
America was content to give "lip service" without providing direct political or military intervention.
The industrial revolution brought about technological changes that
threatened America's geographical isolation from European problems.
These advances, especially in transportation and communication, brought
the nations of the world relatively closer together.
This closeness,
a shifting balance of power away from Britain, and the creation of new
rivalries became a threat to world peace. As the twentieth century
approached America, Germany, and Japan became world powers. America
preferred to ignore the war sounds heard across the Atlantic, believing
^%.5. Congress, Senate, Annuls, 18th Cong., 1st Sess.,
2 D e c , 1823, Vol. 1: 12-24.
^"""Ibid., Vol. 1: 12-24; S.M. Kennedy, The Monroe Doctrine Clause of
the League of Nations Covenant, (Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech Press, 1979)
p. 9.
12
Adler, Impulse, p. 23.
that the ocean would insulate and protect this country, and after all,
America had the British Navy standing guard.
At the turn of the century the American mood was self-complacent,
refusing to accept the reality that world peace and security were being
threatened.
Twentieth century isolationists believed that by avoiding
any long-term political ties with other nations Americans could best
serve their own national security.
Adler makes a similar point:
They (referring to isolationists) opposed our entry into
both world wars on the ground that our privileged continental position allowed us to risk the defeat of potential
allies. Isolationists have persistently opposed prior
commitments of American military aid to any league or association of nations designed to keep the peace by using
force against recalcitrant nations. In other words the isolationists have been willing to gamble on the destruction of
friendly nations preferring to fight only when confronted
by immediate danger.-'--^
Prior to the end of the nineteenth century Alfred Thayer Mahan,
through his historical studies on sea power, preached a thesis contrary to the basic premise of isolationism,
Mahan advocated a strong
and powerful navy in order to protect America's growing commercial
trade, and above all underlined the need for a new foreign policy which
broke away from the idea of isolated America.
Mahan believed that any
nation wanting real world power must establish overseas bases in order
to maintain command of the seas.
14
"Expansionism" best describes America's foreign policy at the close
Ibid., p. 32.
"""Voster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power 1898-1934,
(New York: Harper (^ Brothers, 1954) pp. 32-33.
8
of the nineteenth century.
Men such as Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge,
Theodore Roosevelt, and Josiah Strong urged overseas expansion, each from
differing motives but all were thinking in terms of national honor and
glory.
The United States in its spirit of expansionism turned away
from its previous stand of offering only moral support to others in
their struggle for freedom.
Actual intervention in Cuba and the result-
ing Spanish-American War, to most Americans, seemed to justify this
country's position as a world power.
Emotionalism fanned by imperialists and a less than conscientious
press appealed to the freedom and liberty-loving instincts of the
American people. Under the guise of "manifest destiny," the United
States flexed its muscles on July 7, 1898, with the annexation of
Hawaii.
The peace treaty signed at the end of the Spanish-American
War required that Spain give up her sovereignty over Cuba and cede the
Phillipines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to the United States.
These acqui-
sitions and the naval strategy to protect them agreed perfectly with
Mahan's thesis of mercantile imperialism.
There were isolationist voices that appealed to the past and tradition, recalling the warnings of Washington and Jefferson, but the general
mood of the country supported the imperialists.
Opponents of American
expansion engaged imperialists in the Senate over the ratification of
the Spanish peace treaty, but in the end it was approved by a narrow
-^^Ibid., p. 39.
Fred L. Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties of Modern History:
1648-1967 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967) pp. 851-853.
margin of only two votes.
Just as America staked its claim to colonial
possessions, so too did other new colonialist nations, such as Italy,
Germany, and Japan.
According to Schapiro, colonial rivalry was an
important cause of the two world wars that devastated the world during
the first half of the twentieth century.
In the presidential election of 1900, expansionism and its policies
formally became a partisan subject.
The Republicans accepted the neces-
sity of overseas expansion while the Democratic party opposed any policies
that pushed America toward imperialism.
It appears America was prepared
to accept its new role as a world power and the corresponding responsibilities inherent in that role.
Such was not the case:
in fact, the
United States made no associations or agreements binding them to world
obligations.
Americans felt free to follow their own separate course.
Never entirely abandoning its isolationist tradition, America refused to
accept
its share of responsibility in the twentieth-century world.
From Porter and Johnson's National Party Platforms; 1840-1956;
Democratic platform; We hold that it is the duty of the United
States to use its power, not only to make itself safe at home,
but also to make secure its just interests throughout the world,
and, both for this end and in the interest of humanity, to
assist the world in securing settled peace and justice . . . and
we believe that the time has come when it is the duty of the
United States to join the other nations of the world in any
feasible association that will effectively serve those principles,
to maintain inviolate the complete security of the highway of the
seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations (1916, p. 196).
Republican platform; We desire peace, the peace of justice and
right, and believe in maintaining a strict and honest neutrality
J. Salwyn Schapiro, The World in Crisis, (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1950) p. 172.
10
between the belligerents in the great war of Europe. We must
perform all our duties and insist upon all our rights as neutrals
without fear and without favor . . . we believe in the pacific
settlement of international disputes, and favor the establishment
of a world court for that purpose (1916, p. 204).
This curious dichotomy, America expanding its overseas colonies
while still trying to maintain an isolationist base, is one factor that
distinguishes American isolationism from that of others.
Dulles dis-
cusses this same contradiction;
The United States was in fact assuming far-flung responsibilities
whose real significane the American people again sought to ignore
by denying their existence. Although theory and practice could
hardly be reconciled, they appeared to believe that their traditional foreign policy could be upheld by a reassertion of principles which the new commitments directly violated. Unwilling
to go any further than the exercise of a moral influence in
world affairs, they blinded themselves to the realities of the
,„
power politics in which the country was now so unavoidably enmeshed.
America's pursuit of imperialism and the resulting necessity to join
in the game of power politics finally found justification in the doctrine
of "manifest destiny."
The American people have always believed in their
country, its uniqueness, and its institutions, and to them manifest
destiny implied that American expansion was a natural course—inevitable
and providential.
With this doctrine they were able to perceive expan-
sion as a morally-just cause.
This same moral attitude carried this
country into the first world war.
Stupak, referring to Woodrow Wilson's
ideals, comments;
The moral imperative of United States foreign policy found its
Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National Party Platforms;
1840-1956, (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1956)
pp. 112-116, 121-124, 196, 204; Dulles, America's Rise, p. 58.
19
Dulles, America's Rise, p. 60.
11
strongest expression in Wilsonian internationalism. Wilson's
ideals were in fact a projection of American nationality into
universal terms. To Wilson American ideals were in perfect
harmony with the principles of liberated mankind and were
applicable to any society at any time, Americanization of the
world appeared to be the ultimate ideal of Wilson's vision.
Therefore, even entry into World War I was voiced in strident
terms. In Wilson's concern with internal stability of nations
along with their international harmony, he adhered to his
belief that the foreign and domestic policies of a country
could not be separated- Therefore in his mind, peace and
democracy were linked as related goals in American foreign
policy—and a hint of America's need to intervene in the
^ internal affairs of other nations became a latent tenet of
United States foreign policy.20
During this period of power politics, especially Theodore Roosevelt's administration, the image of the "big stick," the building of
a larger navy, and the concept of America's world role all cast doubt
that isolationism would be capable of survival, but survive it did.
Even though Roosevelt succeeded in increasing the size of the American
Navy, it was not accomplished without stiff opposition.
than
foreign interests were the major concerns.
Domestic rather
The Progressive Move-
ment was in full bloom, leaving the country little time to worry about
the threats in Europe.
Dulles emphasizes what most concerned the
Progressives at that time:
The Progressives believed that America was entirely safe in
her relative geographic isolation, and that her all-important
mission—both to herself and for the world—was to make
democracy work at home . . . .
In their concern with freedom
and justice, they were determined to keep the lamp burning
brightly on this western shore as a light to all nations.2'
Internationalists were hard-pressed to convince Americans what
being a world power really meant, and for all practical purposes their
20
Ronald J. Stupak, American Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper
& Row Publishers, 1976) p. 16.
21
Dulles, America's Rise, p. 84.
12
efforts failed.
Americans would not believe that collective security
in concert with other nations could possibly maintain their own safety
and democratic principles.
Until America's entry into the first world
war, the isolationists' belief had not been put to the test.
Most
Americans felt that foreign commitments meant the sure road to war.
The American mind was indeed naive when it was confronted by foreign
affairs, but the great foreign policy debate would begin in earnest
after the war.
CHAPTER II
POST-WORLD WAR I—1920s
President Wilson, after failing to maintain American neutrality
in the First World War, put his faith for collective security into the
formation of the League of Nations. Wilson's vision of world peace
through the concerted efforts of all nations settling their disputes
through the peaceful negotiations of the League was consistent with
his high ideals, and he enumerated these hopes in his famous "fourteen points."
Wilson's support of the League and America's participa-
tion in that organization sparked a foreign policy debate that would
provide a link between the diverse groups known as the 1930 isolationists.
With America as a member of the League of Nations, Wilson
hoped to reverse the old tradition of neutrality with the concept of
collective security.
Opposition to American participation in the League stiffened in the
United States Senate over the interpretation of two articles, X and XVI,
of the League's Covenant. Article X which contained a mutual guaranty:
. . . against external aggression the territorial integrity
and existing political independence of all members of the
League. In case of any such aggression the Council shall
advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be
fulfilled.2
"'"Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality, (Chicago; The
University of Chicago Press, 1962) pp. 1-2.
^Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties, p. 1278, U.S. Congress, Senate,
Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 July 1919, 58:2342;
Hamilton Foley, Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations, (Port
Washington, New York; Kennikat Press, Inc., 1923) Appendix F, p. 256.
13
14
Article XVI was opposed by Congress because it detailed and bound members
to the economic, diplomatic, and military actions against any nation
breaking the Covenant, thereby disrupting American unilateralism.
When Wilson submitted the Treaty of Versailles to the Senate on
July 10, 1919, that body was split into approximately four groups:
One group was in favor of the Treaty without reservation, and
composed of one Republican and forty-three Democrats. A
second group, the mild reservationists, had some reservations
but generally were in favor of the Treaty. The third group
also favored ratification, but had extensive reservations.
Finally the fourth group, known as the 'irreconcilables,'
consisting of twelve Republicans and three Democrats who were
opposed to ratification of the Treaty under any conditions,'^
This latter group, led by Senator William E. Borah of Idaho
objected to the idea that Article X would do anything but mean American
involvement in one European war after another.
The matter of the
United States joining the League became a partisan affair, with the
Republican party predominantly favoring neutrality and the Democrats
mainly in favor of internationalism.
While difficult to prove such
blanket statements, the record does support the generalization that
isolationism between the two world wars was partisan in nature.
The
reservationists were primarily concerned with Article X of the Covenant,
and its strict commitment to the collective measures of the Council
rather than allowing Americans freedom of independent action.
They
argued that Congress be allowed to decide America's course rather than
^Ibid., p. 1278; 58:2342; pp. 261-262.
^Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation, (Chicago; University
of Chicago Press, 1944) p. 7.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess., 25 July 1919, 58:3094-3095, 3143, 3145, 3148; Divine,
T 1 1 I ic3i o n
n
9
15
be bound to the collective decisions of the League.
Reservationists were quick to recall Washington and Jefferson's
words warning against entanglements and alliances with foreign nations,
and expressed the fear that the League might pose a threat to the
Monroe Doctrine.
Other groups in America were, in the meantime, busy
searching for other alternatives in their quest for world peace. Some
pacifist groups, anxious for some form of collective security, turned
toward disarmament as an answer. Although some efforts were made to
limit the export of arms, they were unsuccessful, and in the 1920s a
third approach was tried—to have war declared illegal under international
law.
Eventually the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed on August 27, 1928,
Q
that outlawed war as an alternative to national policy.
In 1921, President Harding extended invitations for a conference
on the limitation of armaments to Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan,
China, Belgium, Netherlands, and Portugal. The agenda for the Washington
Naval Conference encompassed navy limitations, new weapons, land
armament, and Far Eastern questions. The Conference was greeted warmly
by those opposed to the League, to pacifists looking for alternatives,
9
and even to those who favored joining the League.,
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.,
15 July 1919, 58:3144, 3146-3147; Johnson, The Battle, p. 11. For party
platform see pp. 9-10 above.
C.J. Bartlett, The Rise and Fall of the Pax Americana, (New York;
St. Martin's Press, 1974) pp. 44-45; U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional
Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 July 1919, 58:3143-3145, 3148.
o
Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties, p. 2395, Article I; Divine,
Illusion, pp. 6-9.
9
Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties, pp. 2277-2299; Bartlett,
Pax Americana, p. 50; Adler, Impulse, pp. 133-139.
16
Harding faced a difficult problem with the Naval appropriations
bill before Congress at this same time.
He thought that it would be
next to impossible to obtain an increase in budget appropriations necessary to strengthen America's Navy and its bases.
The other nations were
ready for the talks because of budget considerations, and Japan also
welcomed the thought that limitations might mean less Western influence
in Asia.
The treaties resulting from that conference—seven treaties
and twelve resolutions—were completed in February, 1922.
America won
parity with Britain and a five-to-three superiority over Japan in the
naval limitations of capital ships.
Realistically, Japan won dominance
of the Far East even though the British were allowed to develop Singapore as a base for its eastern empire.
The Washington Treaties were a
step in the right direction, as far as the isolationists were concerned,
but only a beginning.
As Bartlett emphasizes:
Critics have made much of the absence of 'teeth' in the Four
Power Non-Aggression Treaty that replaced the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance. This provided only for consultation between the
signatories, the United States, Britain, Japan, and France,
in the event of a crisis. But in the Senate debates on the
treaties, no clause received so much support as that ensuring
that the United States would be entering no commitments of any
kind . . . . The Washington Treaties were, of course, no more
than a start in arms limitations and in the creation of stability in the Far East,-'-^
Some of the soon-to-be staunch isolationists were in a conversion
period during the 1920s,
One of these men was historian Charles Beard,
who had become disillusioned by the lack of ideal results after the First
World War,
Another was Senator Gerald P. Nye, who became convinced
Israel, ed,. Major Peace Treaties, pp, 2279-2280, Article IV
Bartlett, Pax Americana, p. 51; Adler, Impulse, pp. 133-139.
17
that his constituents' problems in North Dakota were the result of
greedy businessmen and bankers.
Those who were still not convinced
of this thesis would only have to wait until the Wall Street Crash of
1929 for their final conversion; the financial collapse caused
World War I creditors to repudiate their debts.
In late 1927, Representative Theodore E, Burton introduced a resolution in the House to embargo the export of arms to aggressor nations.
The resolution called for a radical change in American foreign
policy, which had before, based American neutrality upon the impartial
12
and equal treatment of all belligerents.
On February 11, 1929,
Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas introduced an embargo resulution which
gave the president power to embargo the export of arms or other articles
of war to the aggressor nation and refused protection to American
citizens who violated the Kellogg Pact.
The largest stumbling blocks to these resolutions were American
hostility to collective security and the deep distrust of the League of
Nations.
Most newspapers were less than enthusiastic and were quick to
point out that the Capper plan, especially, would hand over too great a
power to the President in deciding when a nation had violated the
antiwar treaty.
This controversy over neutrality, begun with the Burton and Capper
Bartlett, Pax Americana, p. 54,
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.,
5 Dec. 1927 57:2045, Part 2; Divine, Illusion, pp. 7-13.
13
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 11 Feb. 1929, 67:3198, Part 3.
^^New York Times, 12 Feb. 1929, p. 21, "To Keep Guns from
Warring Nations."
18
resolutions, brought about little in the way of immediate results.
The
fear of war could and did take many forms, including the implied threat
to American democracy.
The disputes were mainly academic, having little
effect upon the conduction of American foreign policy, for the majority
of the American people remained opposed to involvement in any European
wars.
Before turning to the activities of the 1930 isolationists, the
leaders of the movement and some of the more active organizations
should be identified.
Any study of isolationist organizations between
the two world wars, reveals the existence of a wide divergence of policies and goals that these groups advocated.
They did not completely
agree upon any associated effort to ensure that America remained neutral.
As a matter of fact, there was never any serious effort toward unity of
voice until 1940 with the foundation of the America First Committee,
and even those efforts were unsuccessful.
Because there were numerous
organizations, not all will be mentioned, but it is necessary to list
the major groups and those individuals in leadership roles.
It is difficult to place everyone into one specific category, not
only because of their differences in ideology, but also because some
were constantly shifting their positions.
Manfred Jonas has suggested
a reasonable grouping of five categories that most isolationists will
fit into;
The first category consists of those most easily distinguished
from the others, foreign-oriented isolationists, they were
those individuals who were sympathetic to the Axis Powers or
the Soviet Union; the second group, the belligerent isolationists,
believed in a vigorous defense of American rights, reliance upon
international law, and strict adherence to the unilateral policy
of the nineteenth century; thirdly the timid isolationists were
19
those prepared to surrender some traditional rights in order to
minimize direct contact with foreign nations at war and thus avoid
entanglements; the fourth group, radical isolationists, sought to
keep out of the war at all costs in order to facilitate the
establishment of a new social order in America; and finally, the
conservative isolationists, those who saw war as the final blow
to the old order whose institutions and traditions they were
desperately attempting to save. All of these groups, except
for the foreign-oriented, shared the assumptions that provide the
bases for American isolationism before World War 11.^^
These divisions, while not providing a sharp distinction between each
other, do serve to demonstrate some of the major differences between
isolationists.
Many isolationists varied their positions and might be
included in several groups.
Others, who at one time or another were
spokesmen for the isolationists, later came to support FDR's foreign
policy.
Foreign-oriented individuals were very interested and active in the
isolationists' movement throughout the 193Qs.
One of those acting in
the interest of Germany, his home of birth, was the poet-propagandist
George Sylvester Viereck.
During the thirties Viereck was employed by
the German Consul in New York.
During the same period Ralph Townsend,
a former member of the United States Consular Service in China, was the
public relations agent for the Japanese Government.
Townsend was allied
with the isolationist movement, and in 1941 he was an editor for the
isolationist Scribners Commentary.
Father Charles E. Coughlin of the Shrine of the Little Flower in
Royal Oak, Michigan, began with his own self-designed brand of Christian
socialism.
An early supporter of FDR's New Deal, he abandoned the
Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 34-35.
Ibid., pp. 35-37.
20
capitalist bandwagon to form a political pressure group in 1934, the
National Union for Social Justice,
Coughlin was in the isolationist
camp, but his motivation for American neutrality was a desire that
America do nothing to prevent the Axis Powers from winning the war.
From 1929 to 1939, the American Communist Party was at odds with
isolationists, charging that they were all fascists.
favored aid to the Spanish and Chinese Governments.
The party
When Germany and
Russia signed a nonaggression pact on August 22, 1939, the party immediately became opponents of American involvement in the war.
This
commitment to isolationism lasted only until Germany invaded Russia on
June 22, 1941.
Communist and pro-fascist organizations were on the
extreme edge of isolationism, but they did have the issue of neutrality
as a common base with the movement.
After the neutrality issue, their
interests and ideas divide.
The major contributors to the isolationist movement, however, were
not foreign-oriented.
If anything they were nationalists, concerned
with keeping America free and on an independent course.
There were
three major leaders in Congress during the thirties who belong in the
category of belligerent isolationists.
Two of these were Senators
William E. Borah of Idaho and Hiram W. Johnson of California.
Both men
were nearly seventy and each had served in the Senate for many years.
Although they nearly always arrived at the same conclusion in relation
to isolationism, their foreign policy approach differed.
Johnson thought
of America exclusively, completely disliking and distrusting foreign
•^•^Ibid., pp. 37-42.
21
nations and their citizens,
Borah was the opposite, with an interest
and preference for foreign policy he sought membership on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee,
Borah believed in America as did Johnson,
but Borah welcomed intercourse with other nations as the means to
advance United States interests.
Both men advocated neutrality legis-
lation, but not if it meant protection for the interests of Britain and
France,
The third leader of the belligerents was Representative Hamilton
Fish; born in 1888 he represented another generation from Borah and
Johnson.
Unlike the other two men. Fish counted George Viereck among
his friends, and even went so far as to allow the use of his franking
privileges for the mailing of Nazi speeches and pamphlets.
Fish did not
believe in giving up American rights or curtail trade in order to avoid
involvement in world affairs.
Other belligerent isolationists include
Representatives Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts and John M, Robsion
of Kentucky.
The major basis for the belligerents was the firm belief
in international law supplied by two authorities in the field, John
Bassett Moore and Edwin M. Borchard,
The seventy-five-year-old Moore
and his former student, Borchard, had distinguished teaching careers at
Columbia and Yale, and practical experience in international affairs.
Moore's public statements were frequently quoted and read into the Congressional Record to support the arguments of Borah, Johnson, and Fish,
For more information on these men see Jonas, who devotes two
chapters to a brief, but good biography of the leaders in the isolationist movement. Isolationism in America, pp. 32-99.
22
They stressed that the United States must remain neutral in spirit and
depend upon international law to defend its rights.
19
Opposed to dependence on international law to preserve American
rights from the dangers of war was the third group, timid isolationists.
In 1935 the National Council for the Prevention of War argued that the
attempt to preserve neutral rights was the cause of American entry into
three wars.
Working on the same assumption was Republican Senator
Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, who subsequently introduced legislation
that would have forfeited traditional neutral rights. Democrats
Maury Maverick of Texas and Frank L. Kloeb of Ohio made similar proposals
in the House. Nye gained prominence through his committee investigations
of the munitions industry.
Nye's conversion and belief in isolationism
stems from his mistrust of business and banking interests. Maverick and
some of his other colleagues were generally motivated by their horror of
war and its detrimental effect upon domestic reform.
20
Some of the other active members of this group were Senators Homer
T. Bone of Washington, Bennett C. Clark of Missouri, and Arthur H.
Vanderberg of Michigan; and also Representatives Jerry Voorhis of California, John A. Martin of Colorado, John Luecke of Michigan, Herbert S.
Bigelow of Ohio, Fred H. Hildebrandt of South Dakota, John Coffee and
Knute Hill of Washington, and George J. Schneider of Wisconsin. Outside
of Congress, additional support for timid isolationism came from Donald
19
Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 42-52.
Ibid., pp. 57-63.
23
W. Stewart, past commander of the Kansas Department of the American
Legion; the Jesuit periodical America, who felt that the best way to stay
out of war, was to stay out of the profits of war.
The fourth category, the radical isolationists, were composed of
liberals and radicals who believed that the New Deal offered the chance
for a much-needed domestic reform, and feared that the reform might be
damaged or delayed if America became involved in a war. One notable
proponent of this position, Charles A. Beard, added an academic and
intellectual component to isolationism.
Beard advocated that the pur-
pose of this country was to design a continental policy toward establishing a democratic cooperative commonwealth.
Other intellectual supporters
were Phillips Bradley of Amherst, Harry Elmer Barnes of Smith, Robert
M. Hutchins of Chicago, and Henry Noble MacCracken of Vassar.
22
Norman Thomas, a prolific writer and a dynamic speaker, whose appeal
transcended the socialist party was a convinced pacifist.
Thomas became
the chief spokesman for the isolationists of the left. Others holding
radical isolationist views were Alfred M. Bingham, editor of Common
Sense; Jerome Frank, once a New Deal lawyer who later became a judge of
the United States Court of Appeals; Bertram D. Wolfe who co-authored a
book with Thomas, Keep America
Out of War; labor economist Stuart
Chase; and Oswald Garrison Villard, active in numerous minority causes.
23
The final group, the conservative isolationists, feared that American involvement in foreign affairs would eventually lead to the elimination
^•^Ibid., pp. 64-69.
Ibid., pp. 71-77.
^^Ibid., OD. 77-87.
24
of the free enterprise system in the United States. They worried that
the President's interest in Asia and Europe, and his preoccupation with
domestic reform would lead, in the end, toward a dictatorship.
President
Roosevelt's requests for more power and discretion led them to believe
that the President was leading the nation toward the creation of a
socialist dictatorship, which would be impossible to dispose of after
the war.
Senators Robert A. Taft and Herbert Hoover were key figures
in this group, and both were convinced of the possibility of a dictatoru- 24
shipThe Saturday Evening Post produced a series of editorials, appearing
in 1939, claiming that after 1937, a relationship existed between the
failure of the New Deal and a corresponding shift in Roosevelt's foreign
policy.
Others who advocated the conservative theory were William J,
Goodwin, leader of New York's Queens County; Amos Pinchot, an antiNew Deal progressive, and later a member of the national committee of
America First; Robert E, Wood, chairman of the board of Sears; and
Colonel Charles A Lindbergh, aviator and American hero.
25
This is a brief listing of some of the more prominent Americans
involved in the isolationist movement of the thirties. It is not meant
to be a definitive list of all isolationists and their goals, but only
a brief description.
It may be more apparent now why these groups were
unable to arrive at a consensus of opinion.
^^Ibid., pp, 87-90,
25
Ibid,, pp, 91-99; For a more detailed discussion of the America
First organization see: Wayne S, Cole, America First, (Madison,
Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1953).
CHAPTER III
THE ISOLATIONISTS' ASSAULT
President Hoover, already involved in the domestic crisis of the
stock market collapse, next was confronted with the Manchurian situation.
Hoover immediately made the decision to concentrate all his energies
upon the financial collapse and attempt to avoid any American involvement
in the foreign war.
The League of Nations, facing its first major
international crisis, was slow to act.
The League Council, after consi-
deration, decided against the use of sanctions and ended by creating the
Lytton Commission to investigate the Japanese aggression.
The isolationists' assault against the interventionists was waged
in the 1930s to prevent American entry into another disastrous war.
The
individuals and groups associated with the isolationist cause, advocated
certain basic assumptions.
These beliefs consisted of avoidance of
alliances with foreign nations without a clear-cut example that the
agreement involved American interests or territory.
Secondly, isola-
tionists believed that a conspiracy existed among a small elite group,
whose profits were dependent upon war, and that they were responsible
for involving the United States in war.
Finally, the third tenet,
isolationists demanded that America retain the freedom of choice in its
foreign policy, that is, a unilateral course completely independent of
Divine, Illusion, pp. 24-25.
25
26
other nations. Of course there were other assumptions of these 1930
isolationists, but these are the three basic beliefs used to determine
if they are present in the political system of the 1950s and 60s.
In the interim Japan was in the process of occupying all of
Manchuria.
Hoover preferred to use non-recognition of Japan's conquest
as a protest, refusing to cooperate with the League in any way. Hoover's
Secretary of State Stimson believed, and suggested to his boss that the
United States should cooperate with the League in taking economic
sanctions against Japan.
Some members of Congress were in agreement
with Stimson that non-recognition of Japanese aggression was too mild
under the circumstances.
In December, 1931, Representative Morton Hull
of Illinois introduced a resolution calling for an embargo of all trade
2
against any nation violating the Kelogg-Briand Pact.
After Stimson advised Hull that it would be an inopportune time for
a congressional debate on such a delicate subject, the Congressman
withdrew his resolution.
In April of the next year Senator Capper intro-
duced another resolution to embargo arms, quickly followed by one by
Senator Clarence C. Dill which would embargo arms going to both China
and Japan.
Representative Hamilton Fish presented his resolution in
the House to embargo arms to all belligerents in time of war.
All but
the Fish resolution were rejected in their respective chambers. Public
hearings were scheduled for February 7, and Fish had gained the support
2
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
13 Feb. 1932, 75:3891,
U,S, Congress, Senate, House, Congressional Record, 72nd Cong.,
1st Sess., 6 Apr. 1932, 75:660, 7529.
27
of Dorothy Detzer, lobbyist for the Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom, who brought thirty-two witnesses to testify in favor
of the resolution.
Because of the large crowds attracted to the hearings, the State
Department asked the committee to cancel, fearing that open debate on
the subject might offend the Japanese.
Regardless of the cancellation.
Fish was determined to have the embargo issue debated openly and suggested that the American representatives, presently attending the Geneva
General Disarmament Conference, propose a multilateral treaty banning
the export of arms and munitions to any foreign country.
Fish believed
that the shipment of munitions was the first step toward war and that
an arms embargo was absolutely essential if America was to remain
neutral.
In the public hearings eventually held in March, the witnesses
labelled the arms manufacturers as those most responsible for wars, and
the committee reported favorably on the resolution.
Secretary Simpson
was placed in the most difficult position of opposing all embargo
proposals introduced into Congress.
Stimson's action was necessary in
light of Hoover's adamant stand of avoiding any alignment with the League
in its restrainment of Japan.
Consequently, the arms embargo proposals
failed to win sufficient support to pass Congress,
Although those who
Divine, Illusion, p, 28,
Ibid,, p, 28.
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 1st Sess.,
6 Apr. 1932, 75:3561.
'^Ibid., 75:3561-3562.
28
favored isolation still opposed American involvement in the League and
the World Court, Japanese aggression gave the 1930 isolationists another
rallying point.
In the 1930s isolationists took the offensive:
instead of the
watchword "keep out of the League," the cry became "keep out of the
Q
war,"
Adler believes that two factors brought about this glorified
isolationism:
The impact of the great depression—perhaps no single result
of the depression bred more isolationists than the repudiation of the war debts; and the second factor precipitating the
new dynamic isolationism was the wave of aggressions that
undermined and then destroyed the Versailles Peace Settlements.
Meanwhile Stimson worked diligently to change American foreign
policy toward world peace, asking Hoover to support an amendment to
the 1922 Embargo Act which would give the President authority to embargo
arms to any nation where war was threatened or actually existed.
How-
ever, the information was leaked to the press, and the administration
was besieged by arms manufacturers protesting their loss of business if
the proposal was passed.
After so much pressure Hoover refused to sup-
port the proposal, without some revision.
On January 10, 1933, Hoover
urged ratification and recommended that the arms embargo be limited to
control, only if all other arms-producing nations acted together in the
embargo.
Final passage of the resolution, formally sponsored by Senator
g
Adler, Impulse, p. 224.
^Ibid., pp. 224-246.
Divine, Illusion, pp. 33-41.
29
Borah, seemed almost assured after he gained unanimous consent for its
transition without debate. However, Senotor Hiram Bingham of Connecticut who was absent during the first vote, asked for reconsideration of
the resolution.
Under the rules of the Senate, Bingham's request pre-
vented adoption of the measure without a full debate. The major opponents
of the arms embargo appeared to be the arms manufacturers expressed
through their lobbying of the War, Navy, and Commerce Departments. Most
of the major peace organizations in America publicly expressed their
approval of such legislation. While the majority of the Senate were in
favor of the resolution, Bingham threatened a filibuster which would
interfere with important domestic legislation, and he eventually gained
enough support to block Borah from bringing up his embargo resolution.
The State Department then decided to move the proposed embargo to
the House, enlisting Representative Sam D. McReynolds of Tennessee as its
sponsor.
Representatives Maas and Fish charged that if the resolution
passed, that the administration would have America at war with Japan in
a very short time. Further Japanese aggression in China completely
convinced Fish that the embargo would be used specifically against Japan.
Isolationists in the House led by Fish, along'with help from the munitions
12
industry, managed to prevent passage of the embargo in the House.
In 1933, the League accepted the Lytton Commission's report which
condemned Japanese aggression Manchuria.
Japan promptly rejected their
findings and withdrew from the League Covenant.
In the same manner that
"'"•'"U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 2nd Sess.,
11 Jan. 1933, 76:1551; 19 Jan. 1933, 76:2096; 20 Jan, 1933,
76:2134-2135.
^^Ibid., 30 Jan. 1933, 76:2943.
30
the depression aided the Japanese radicals to overcome their more
moderate opponents. Hitler and his Nazi supporters were taking advantage
of Germany's economic problems to gain power. On January 30, 1933,
President Paul Von Hindenburg was forced to invite Hitler to become
Chancellor of a coalition cabinet. At the same time Italy's Mussolini
was carefully watching and waiting for the first opportunity for
expansion.
In America Hoover was facing the 1932 elections with its strong
favor of internationalism.
A near dead-lock at the Democratic convention
between Roosevelt and Alfred E. Smith was broken when William Randolph
Hearst promised the California delegates to FDR. Hearst had been concerned with FDR's previous support of Woodrow Wilson's internationalism
and demanded a public repudiation.
Roosevelt complied with the demand
14
and was rewarded with the Democratic Presidential nomination.
Roose-
velt, after striking such a bargain, would be required to walk a very
narrow foreign policy path in order to work with the isolationist group
in Congress and still maintain his legislative reform program.
FDR accepted the oath of office on the fourth of March, 1933, the
last President to do so on that date. The new President was confronted
with an economy that had deteriorated severely for the past three and
one-half years. Millions were unemployed, banks were closed, glutted
markets forced farm prices down, causing bankruptcies, and many factories
stood empty.
The Democratic Party returned to power after twelve years
Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant, (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1965) p, 146,
Ibid., pp. 148-149; See also Divine, Illusions, pp. 41-42.
31
of Republican rule, promising sweeping changes through Roosevelt's New
Deal economic reforms.
World affairs were also rapidly disintegrating, and some internationalists optimistically recalling FDR's career hoped for the promise
of changing patterns in America's role in the world. Although Roosevelt
had given assurance otherwise, his education, upbringing, previous
support of Wilson and his entire political career seemed to mark him an
internationalist.
Others viewed FDR's first term in a completely
different light, possibly because he concentrated almost exclusively
upon the domestic crisis and allowed his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull
to attend to the details of foreign affairs. One author has labeled
Roosevelt's first term as his "isolationist phase," Dulles remarks
that:
Throughout his first term, Roosevelt concentrated on these vital
domestic issues, leaving his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull,
as the latter has testified, almost in full charge of foreign
policy. Moreover the President's ideas on the role that the
United States should play in world affairs appeared to have
undergone a definite shift since his four-sguare support for
collective security as a loyal Wilsonian in 1920, He was
generally content to have America stay at home. It was not
until almost the eve of the European war, and his realization
that everything that might have been accomplished by the New
Deal on the domestic front and the very security of the nation
were threatened by events abroad, that Roosevelt returned to his
original internationalism.I^
It is not the intent here to argue this point with Dulles or the
isolationist title placed on FDR.
Too many writers have already
attempted to determine the President's motives without any apparent
Divine, Illusions, p. 40.
Dulles, America's Rise, p. 168.
32
success.
The facts do bear out that FDR was concerned and deeply
involved in the domestic crisis, and he did need those isolationists'
votes in Congress if his New Deal reform package was to succeed. Most
do agree that Roosevelt possessed a high degree of political skill, and
this may just have been a case of political expedience to push his
New Deal through a sometimes reluctant Congress.
Roosevelt's first administration inherited the World Disarmament
Conference, begun in 1932, and the London World Economic Conference of
1933 from the Republicans. Both Conferences were failures, in part
because the United States still refused to make any commitment to positive action.
Other nations feared cutting back on armaments, without
additional guarantees from Britain and America, because of the recent
Japanese aggression and German resurgance.
At the economic conference
the big stumbling block dealt with the moves to stabilize world curio
rencies,
America was unwilling to tie itself to other nations' economy,
preferring that its government be allowed the freedom to guide its own
19
economic future,
Adler underscores this belief with:
No nation was ready to make tariff sacrifices on the altar of
general recovery, and if the dollar had been tied tightly to
world exchange, it might well have impeded the New Deal's
efforts to bring immediate relief to American debtors. In
retrospect, the tragedy lay not in Roosevelt's message which
undermined the conference, but in an all-pervading selfish
nationalism which ruled a mutual recovery program out of the
realm of political possibilities.20
Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 151,
1g
Dulles, America's Rise, pp. 169-170; Adler, Uncertain Giant,
pp. 150-152.
19Ibid., pp. 169, 152.
20
/ \ m c«r«
I lt->OQT»'f-o-i t-t C-iorft-
ry^
153
33
Early in Roosevelt's first term, Hull expressed interest in
attempting another arms embargo resolution.
On March 10, 1933,
Roosevelt agreed, and the State Department sent letters recommending such
action to Representative McReynolds and Senator Key Pittman. A week
later McReynolds introduced an arms embargo resulution identical to
the one he had sponsored in the previous Congress. Opponents labeled
the resolution an act of war, and that if passed, it would be unconstitutional because it would allow the President to assume the war-making
powers reserved to Congress,
Hamilton Fish led a small minority of Republicans in the House
who feared that it was an attempt, by the Administration, to join the
League of Nations in sanctions against Japan. This fear of any European
involvement is a strong vein running through isolationist thought. The
very vocal minority were, in the end, incapable of preventing its passage.
The House vote on the embargo demonstrated a partisan split,
with only nine Republicans supporting the resolution and twenty-three
21
Democrats opposing it.
The resolution now faced the much stronger
isolationist Senate before becoming law.
Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
held no strong views on world affairs, but he was jealous of the Senate's
22
independence in developing foreign policy.
Within the Committee, two
members frequently challenged his control—William E. Borah of Idaho
^^U,S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
13 Apr. 1933, 77:1690, 1695-1700; 17 Apr. 1933, 77:1849; Divine,
Illusion, p. 47.
22
Divine, Illusion, p. 51.
34
and
Hiram Johnson of California; both men were ultra-isolationists.
When the committee met, Johnson offered an amendment to the embargo
resolution which specified that any embargo levied by the President had
to apply equally to all belligerents.^^ Pittman later advised the
President that without the Johnson amendment the resolution would not
move out of committee. FDR quickly decided to approve it without
consulting with his Secretary of State. Hull was devastated by
Roosevelt's decision and urged defeat of the proposal rather than giving
in to compromise. Divine believes that Roosevelt only agreed to the
compromise to prevent a debate on foreign policy which might have
stalled his domestic reform presently in Congress.25
If nothing became of the resolution, at least it caught the attention
of the peace groups, and their agitation against the arms industry
bore fruit with the appointment of a Senate investigating committee. The
findings of the Nye Committee and the reconsideration of World War I by
international lawyers provided grist for the isolationist mill. Divine
explains;
. . . This new concept of neutrality was quickly reinforced
by historians, who now claimed that the economic ties between
the United States and the Allies had led directly to American
entry into World War I. These various groups beginning from
different premises, all arrived at the same conclusion—the
United States, instead of cooperating to prevent the outbreak
of war, as the internationalists contended, should adopt a
23
Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 157.
2A
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 73rd Cong,, 1st
Sess,, 22 Apr. 1933, 77:2141; Divine, Illusion, p. 53.
Divine, Illusion, p. 55; Dulles, America's Rise, pp, 176-177.
35
stern policy of neutrality designed to insulate the nation
from the wars of the future. And above all else, they
advocated an impartial arms embargo which would deny the
munitions makers their sordid profits and at the same time
avoid American economic involvement in foreign conflicts,^^
The investigation and a spate of articles and books all aided in
giving credence to the assumption that the arms manufacturers were
guilty of a huge conspiracy to instigate and extend wars, and to
destroy efforts toward peace.
The Committee later expanded its inves-
tigation to determine what part Wall Street and the White House had played
in this plot.
In May of 1934, the President signed the Chaco War
resolution, which called for a ban on the sale of arms and munitions
to both Bolivia and Paraguay, where hostilities had begun in June of
1932 over a border dispute.
27
In 1933 an international lawyer, Charles Warren, who had served
as Assistant Attorney General before World War I, spoke before the
American Society of International Law.
Warren voiced his views on
neutrality, arguing against the traditionalist approach, who favored
one-sided action against aggressors.
He advanced the thesis that it
would be better to abandon all rights and secure whatever trade concessions either belligerent would be willing to permit.
Warren advocated the adoption of a strict neutrality code which
would insulate the United States from commercial and financial
contact with foreign wars. Among other things, Warren suggested
an impartial arms embargo on all belligerents, a ban on loans to
warring governments, and a declaration by the United States
warning all citizens that they traded with belligerents at their
own risk , , , .2°
26
Divine, Illusion, pp, 57-58.
27
Ibid., p, 31.
^^Ibid., pp. 68-69.
36
On the heels of the Nye Committee findings came a book. Road to War
1914-1917, which gave validity to Nye's work.
Written by Walter Millis,
an editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune, the book argued
that America's entry into the war was due to a combination of rashness,
emotionalism, and the desire for profits.
The author made the point
also that lack of a neutral policy and a distortion of Allied propoganda
were also important reasons for America going to war.
29
Divine has
this to say about the Millis book and its effect upon Americans:
. . . Vividly written, the book appealed to a generation that
was repelled by the horrors of war and was searching frantically for policies that could guarantee American abstention
from future conflicts. The growing feeling that American
entry into the war had been a tragic mistake now had a historical sanction, and increasingly Americans came to believe that
by learning from the errors of the past, they could secure
immunity from the contagion of war.^0
Up until 1935, most Americans were not overly concerned about the
concept of neutrality.
The subject had been discussed primarily between
international lawyers, concerned politicians, and State Department officials.
At that time the nature and climate of the European crisis was
becoming more serious.
The Nye Committee findings and the rash of books
and articles all threatened American security, unless the foreign policy
course was changed.
Early in 1935 Adolf Hitler announced that Germany would begin military conscription in an effort to raise an army of half a million men.
Benito Mussolini had begun, late in 1934, to create incidents along the
29
Bartlett, Pax Americana, p. 58; Divine, Illusion , p. 77;
Adler, Uncertain Giant, p, 165.
Divine, Illusion, p, 78.
37
Ethiopian-Somaliland border that would eventually culminate in an
Italian invasion.
All of the factors mentioned above were invitations
for Americans to move toward neutrality.
The plan advocated by Charles
Warren was widely discussed and ran along the same lines expressed by
the popular mood of the country. Warren's solution for neutrality
stressed an impartial arms embargo, a ban on loans to belligerents,
restrictions against traveling in wartime, and making all trade with
combatants subject to the risk of the buyer.
32
Roosevelt's administration had previously drafted neutrality legislation.
However a disagreement developed within the State Department
over whether the embargo should be discriminatory or impartial, and the
NaVy Department's opposition to the surrender of traditional neutral
rights delayed the submission of that draft. In the meantime, Roosevelt
suggested that the Nye Committee prepare its own neutrality legislation.
If the President was intent upon bringing the issue of neutrality before
Congress, his idea was successful. Within three weeks a flood of proposals were introduced into both Houses of Congress. Nye and Bennett
C. Clark co-sponsored a resolution in the Senate. Representative Frank
Kloeb of Ohio introduced one in the House dealing with the prohibition of
loans, and Maury Maverick of Texas, advocating rigid neutrality, introduced another to the House.
Peace groups, although rigid neutrality was not compatible with
32
Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 172.
^^New York Times, 11 Apr. 1935, p. 3; U.S. Congress, Senate,
Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 Aug. 1935, 79:696-708,
5283, 10463, 10998, 13795.
38
their avowed goals, began exerting pressure upon Congress to force the
passage of such legislation.
On August 20, Senators Bone, Clark,
Nye, and Vandenburg joined in a filibuster to force the Foreign Relations
Committee to bring a neutrality bill before the full Senate.
These
gentlemen called upon the Senate for the passage of rigid neutrality
legislation, evoking the memories of the American blood shed and the
excessive profits garnered by the arms manufacturers of World War I.
Senator Pittman arrived a few hours later with a neutrality resolution
approved by his Committee.
The bill was approved by the Senate the
next day and sent to the House for consideration.
Roosevelt, after some
thought, agreed to the resolution, provided that the embargo be limited
to a six-month period.
The House voted to accept the compromise and
passed the resolution on August 23, and the following day the Senate
accepted the amendments.
It is interesting to note that Senator Hiram
Johnson of California, declared that the day was a triumph for isolationists and the downfall of the internationalists.
The Neutrality Act passed by Congress gave the President the power
to proclaim an embargo of arms, munitions, and implements of war in the
event of hostilities between two or more foreign states.
The Act also
created a National Munitions Control Board to license and oversee all
arms shipments and prohibited the carrying of munitions in American ships.
Additionally, it gave the President the discretion to prevent the shipment
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,
20 Aug. 1933, 79:13775-13793.
^^Ibid.; House, Congressional Record, 23 Aug. 1935, 79:14362.
39
of supplies from American ports to belligerents, a ban on entry of
submarines of countries at war into American territorial waters, and
the warning to American citizens that travel on belligerent ships was
at their own risk.
On February 29, 1936, Congress sent a replacement bill which
extended the neutrality provisions for fourteen months. The second
document also provided for a ban on loans to belligerent nations, and
Congress directed the President to extend the arms embargo to new belligerents.
At this time it is important to pause at the year 1935, and discuss
the assumptions made by those who advocated isolationism.
Some writers
utilize 1935 as "isolations triumph," or its golden year, the year that
38
Americans woke up to the isolationist cause.
Isolationism during the
1930s is of interest because the movement attracted such diverse groups.
Although their goals were not identical and there was frequent disagreement among them, they combined to fight Roosevelt's administration
over the threat of American participation in World War II. Those identified as "isolationist" would surely disagree with the label, and in
the basic meaning of the word as applied to China and Japan, they were
not isolationists.
However, the term was used, and still is used today,
to identify those who strongly opposed America's entry into World War II.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,
23 Aug.1935 , 79:14282; 24 Aug. 1935, 79:14430-14434; Adler, Uncertain
Giant, p. 173.
U.S, Congress, House, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
28 Feb. 1936, 80:3445.
3R
Adler, Uncertain Giant, pp. 173-175.
40
The defenders of isolationism were quick to recall and quote the
Founding Fathers, agreeing that it was more desirable for America to
retain its freedom of unilateral action.
To the isolationist this
meant the avoidance wherever possible, of any alliance or agreement that
bound the United States to another nation in the defense of common
interests.
Manfred Jonas provides an explanation of Washington's Fare-
well Address that may help explain this assumption;
Washington merely drew hardheaded inferences from two circumstances; the United States was too weak to induce any major
powers of which it might become an ally to consider American
interests more than incidentally; and this country's favorable
geographic position did not require it to join defensive alliances . . . . 3^
This use of Washington and later of Jefferson to provide a basis
for isolationism in the thirties was taken out of context.
In 1935,
the United States was a world power. The rapid development in transportation and communication suggested problems that were nonexistent in
Washington's day, and World War I had demonstrated how far the science
and technology of weapons and war had advanced.
Isolationism demands that America must retain its freedom of choice
in foreign policy decisions, and yet insists that the United States
avoid war at all costs. If America has freedom of choice, then war must
also be one of those choices. The isolationist of the thirties opposed
both wars and entanglements as if they were synonymous.
In this manner
they were able to attract support from the nationalist and the pacifist.
This inconsistency became more difficult for the isolationist to defend
39
Jonas, Isolationism In America, p. 9.
^°Ibid., pp. 15-17.
40
41
as the war drew nearer.
Another assumption involved the reassessment of war guilt from the
First World War. As previously mentioned, there was a flood of revisionist articles and books clearing Germany of any war guilt and charging
the responsibility for the war to everything from Wilson's internationalism. Allied propoganda, unwise economic management, or to the arms
industry.
American entry into the war had neither solved the threat of
further war nor had it made the world safe for democracy. Without
looking at the differences between the two periods, isolationists used
these charges as proof that unilaterialism was the only way to insure
41
against the reoccurrence of the war,
Jonas emphasizes how revisionism
aided the isolationist cause:
The spread of revisionist thinking, combined with the effects
of the Depression and the threat of war in Europe and Asia,
produced a climate of opinion in America that made all dealings
with foreign nations suspect. An isolationist policy appealed
not only to those who had always questioned the wisdom of increased American participation in world affairs, but also to
the disappointed idealists who had earlier supported internationalism . . . ,^2
While isolationism appealed to many different groups, and there
were numerous anti-war organizations, there was little clear concensus
of goals between these groups.
There was one exception, however; the
majority agreed that a strict embargo was needed.
Isolationists rejected international cooperation as a means to
solve the war crisis, working on the assumption that a war in Europe or
^-•"Ibid., pp. 27-31.
^^Ibid., p. 31.
42
Asia did not threaten the vital interests of the United States. Again
they were falling back on the words of the Founding Fathers; it did not
matter to America which nation won or lost a particular war. Senator
Borah defended the Monroe Doctrine Clause as a necessary part of the
League Covenant if America were to join that organization. Borah maintained that the United States could not share the Doctrine with any
other nation either in the Western Hemisphere or elsewhere.
They also
assumed that if war came in Asia, it would not involve the same dangers
as would one in Europe,
Isolationists also attempted to justify German and Italian action,
suggesting that since Great Britain and France were the ones who had
plundered the other two, it was only just for them to use aggression in
return.
Isolationists viewed the European conflict as an attempt by
the League to preserve the boundaries set up by the Versailles Treaty
and, as such, were not related to the question of morality.
Jonas re-
inforces this thought with:
The isolationists' failure to see a fundamental moral issue
in the European struggle led them to regard the conflict as
a jockeying for power among nations who did not deserve the
sympathy or support of the United States.'^^
It was not difficult, once one has resigned oneself to this idea, to find
many instances in which Britain and France took over a country in much
the same manner as Italy.
This is related to the assumption that isolationism refused to
consider the reguirement that America assume a world role.
Kennedy, Monroe Doctrine, p. 17.
Jonas, Isolationism in America, p. 111.
If there
43
was nothing America could do to solve the European problems, then the
United States did not have any moral duty to join the war. Therefore,
America did not have any direct reason for fighting a foreign war.
Another concept that isolationists assumed was the long held belief
that America's geographic isolation, with its natural barriers and
oceans, made the country impregnable. They believed that this country
was safe from war, that even if war spread further, America could not
be successfully attacked if an adequate Army and Navy were maintained.
The American people and especially isolationists wanted to believe
Hitler when he stated that Germany was not contemplating an attack on
America.
Military preparedness was advocated by most isolationists,
and those in Congress demonstrated their willingness to increase the
military in order to attain an impregnable defense.
Jonas provides a good summary of the assumptions that have been
discussed:
The isolationists of the thirties built much of their
position on the belief that the United States lacked a
substantial motive for going to war but had vital reasons
for remaining at peace. Like all Americans, they knew
this country desired no additional territory. They believed the world situation offered no more requirement
for American intervention because they saw no struggle
of good against evil and believed the United States to
be powerless to bring about a just solution to international problems. They were sure the United States could
not and would not be attacked and had no need, therefore,
to forstall the rise of a possible aggressor.^^
The second Neutrality Act of February 29, 1936, reflected the
^^Ibid., p. 129,
^^Ibid., p. 134
44
increasing popularity and strength of isolationism.
The League of
Nations Council was still vacillating over whether or not to add oil
to the embargo list against Italy.
As mentioned earlier. Congress
changed the wording of the new Neutrality Act. The old law gave the
President the discretion in extending the arms embargo to new belligerents, and under the new act the President was "directed," to embargo
all new belligerents.
The year 1936 was not a good year for President Roosevelt. The
first embargo act in 1935 had been a compromise that he thought would
deny aid to Italy in its war against Ethiopia. After the beginning of
the war, FDR found that Italy needed raw materials rather than arms,
and that the embargo instead worked against the Ethiopians, who
desperately needed munitions. Now the passage of the 1936 act tied his
hands even further by taking away the discretion allowed to him by the
1935 bill.
As America attempted to withdraw from events in Europe, and the
faltering diplomacy of the Western Europeans was drying up. Hitler took
an enormous gamble and marched his troops into the Rhineland. Hitler
ran a tremendous bluff with his invasion, for if France and Britain had
faced that challenge with force, they would have found Germany at its
weakest moment.
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
28 Feb. 1936, 80:3445.
48
Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 176; Dulles, America's Rise,
p. 172.
45
The age of conflict and crisis was only just beginning.
On July
17, 1936, the revolt of an army garrison in Spanish Morocco, led by
Francisco Franco, soon spread to the Spanish mainland, and a civil war
was added to an already threatened world.
The outbreak of Spain's
civil war did not appear, at the outset, to involve or affect American
neutrality.
The following month both Germany and Italy offered
Franco's Rebels aid, and in response the Soviet Union stepped in to
lend support to Spain's Loyalist government.
What had begun as a civil war quickly presumed an ideological
discord between Communism and Fascism.
American neutrality legislation
had failed to mention the possibility of civil war; therefore, the
administration was unable to invoke the embargo. Officially the American government did not join Britain and France in their efforts to
prevent war materials from reaching either side. Although administration officials were sympathetic toward a formal embargo, they instead
49
relied upon a public announcement of a moral embargo.
This moral
embargo, which asked citizens to avoid anything that might be construed
as interference in the Spanish Civil War, was at first widely observed.
Isolationists favored the embargo as a safeguard against American
involvement, and collective security supporters saw the embargo as a
method of cooperation with Britain and France in their efforts.
The Spanish conflict caused some isolationists to stop and reflect
upon the wisdom of an arms embargo.
One such individual was Norman
49
Adler, Uncertain Giant, pp. 176-181; Divine, Illusion, pp.
168-172.
46
Thomas, the Socialist party leader, who had originally favored neutrality
legislation, but now had doubts, Thomas made written appeals to the
President and to Chairman McReynolds of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, opposing the application of neutrality laws to the Spanish Civil
War,
Thomas favored allowing arms for the Loyalist government, even at
the expense of allowing Americans to make a profit from the civil war.
Other liberal and radical isolationists realized that under international
law, it was proper and legal for the United States to bar trade with the
fascist rebels, while continuing to supply the legal government of Spain
with munitions. Roosevelt disagreed with these arguments, believing that
an arms embargo would be both a popular and painless method of cooperating
with Britain and France; it would also be advantageous to the Spanish
Loyalists.
FDR insisted that since the rebels held more control over
shipping than did the loyalists, the rebels would benefit more from any
American shipments.
In January of 1937, after several requests to ship war materials to
the Spanish government, the administration decided to ask for congressional action on a civil war embargo.
In compliance with this reguest.
Senator Pittman introduced a joint resolution on January 6, calling for
an embargo of arms to both sides of the Spanish Civil War, McReynolds
introduced the resolution in the House at the same time, stressing the
need for speedy passage because the State Department had been forced to
50
Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 186-188.
^"^Ibid., p. 187.
47
grant several licenses to individuals for shipment of arms to Spain.52
The resolution was quickly passed in both Houses of Congress, and
in the House there was but one dissenting vote.
In February, Represen-
tative Voorhis presented a statement to the House, signed by thirty-one
fellow supporters, who favored neutrality legislation and pointed out
that if the embargo is enforced against Spain, but not against those
nations who were supplying arms to the rebels, then the United States
was, in effect, a cobelligerent with those attempting to overthrow the
Spanish government.
The Spanish Civil War resolution gave the Presi-
dent authority to rescind the embargo only if the war should end.
Some isolationists were guided by their desire to follow the American tradition of aid and recognition to a duly elected government. The
liberals and radicals among them also acted out of sympathy for the
Loyalists, which affected their judgement on neutrality.
1937, debate began on a
new neutrality bill.
In March,
In the Senate, isola-
tionists attempted to block the provision that contained discretionary
cash-and-carry.
Senators Borah and Johnson tried to discredit the
provision by labeling it a "British measure," but when the vote was
counted, only four other isolationists joined the two senators in
52
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., 6 Jan. 1937, 81:86; Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 180; Divine,
Illusion, pp. 170-171; Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 189-191.
53
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 75th Cong,, 1st
Sess,, 2 Feb, 1937, 81: app. 130; Divine, Illusion, pp. 169-171.
Robert Cuse, a New Jersey scrap dealer, was granted permission on
December 28, 1937, to sell $2 million worth of airplane parts and
engines to the Loyalists. Congress was acting upon the legislation
just as a Spanish ship loaded with six airplanes and one engine left the
New York harbor. The ship eventually fell into Spanish Rebel hands.
48
.,
54
opposing the cash-abd-carry provision.
The House debate was more spirited.
of cash-and-carry completely un-American.
Hamilton Fish called the idea
The House did manage to
place a two-year limit on this provision, then voted heavily in favor
of the resolution.
the resolution.
Further attempts were made in the Senate to block
This time complaints were made against the greater
discretion given to the President, but finally most isolationists voted
for the measure in the interest of maintaining American neutrality.
The largest fear that isolationists had of the new legislation was that
it favored those nations with large merchant navies, notably England
and Japan.
Americans in general, seemed to agree with Isolationists when it
came to the idea of keeping America out of the war. Gallup polls taken
during this period reflect the thinking that American foreign policy
should be directed toward efforts at keeping America from entering the
war, and that idea held true even up to the time the United States
actually entered the war.
Most of the peace organizations worked dili-
gently for mandatory legislation.
They assailed the President and the
State Department with letters and telegrams, pleading for the embargo
of all war materials and a rigid control over other trade. A few
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., 3 Mar. 1937, 81:1791-1807.
^^U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., 12 Mar, 1937, 81:2162-2168,
^^George H. Gallup, Public Opinion 1935-1971, (Random House,
New York, 1972) pp. 1-311.
49
pacifist groups favoring international cooperation, such as the League
of Nations Association, sent every congressman a pamphlet urging
discretionary legislation allowing the President to embargo arms to
nations violating the Kellogg pact.
The neutrality bloc, after two years of heated debate in Congress,
succeeded in combining its isolationist assumptions into permanent
legislation.
As each aggressive world crisis occurred, Americans began
to discover that the application of neutrality also meant a shared
relationship with the totalitarian nations.
58
The outbreak of undeclared war between Japan and China posed certain
problems for the conduct of American foreign policy.
Roosevelt delayed
any final decision to invoke the embargo, preferring to wait for further
developments.
Since there had been no declaration of war by either
side, nor had diplomatic relations between the two nations been broken,
FDR could maintain that a state of war did not exist, and therefore the
neutrality law did not apply.
China relied upon America entirely for
their munitions; Japan did not, therefore, to invoke an embargo would
greatly benefit Japan.
As the China crisis continued, isolationists in Congress, the
peace movement, and the press began to criticize FDR's administration
59
for its inaction.
Senators Nye and Clark issued a public statement
on August 18, reminding the President that the purpose of the neutrality
Divine, Illusion, p. 182.
^^Ibid., p. 200.
^^New York Times, 18 Aug. 1937, p. 4.
50
act was to insure American abstention from war.
Isolationists were
convinced that as long as the United States supplied arms to any of the
participants, eventually America would be drawn into the war.
In a
radio interview two days later, Nye repeated his statement, and to
support his argument, stated that the law would hurt Japan as well as
China by preventing loans to finance Japanese purchases of raw
materials.
The editors of the Christian Century and the New Republic
demanded that the President invoke the neutrality law, warning that not
to do so would lead to disaster for the nation.
Internationalists strongly endorsed Roosevelt's policy.
The New
York Times lauded Roosevelt's inaction, declaring that to implement
formal neutrality at this time would reduce the chanc^ of a peaceful
62
settlement of the crisis in China.
Most Americans, outside of the
isolationists' circles, gave their unspoken approval to the administration's policy as there was no general public demand for employing the
neutrality act.
A Gallup poll, in early August, asked Americans which
side they favored in the Chinese crisis.
Fifty-five per cent favored
neither side; 43 per cent named China; and 2 per cent selected Japan.
A group of congressmen that included Koppleman, Voorhis, Southoff,
Amlie, Ludlow, Fish, and Knutson pressed FDR to declare China and Japan
^°U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., app., 19 Aug. 1937, 81:2187; 21 Aug. 1937, app., 81:2257.
^"^"Apply the Neutrality Law," Christian Century, LIV, 11 Aug. 1937,
989-991; "Scuttle or Bluster," New Republic, XCII, 15 Sept. 1937,
243-244.
62New York Times, 19 Aug. 1937, p. 18.
^^Gallup, Public Opinion, 9 Aug. 1937, p. 69.
51
at war.
They insisted that invoking the neutrality act would make the
situation more equal for both nations.
Additionally, to continue
shipments of war materials to China might involve the United States in
war.
64
Jonas explains isolationists' feelings and the dilemma they
found themselves in:
The isolationists' response to the crisis in Ethiopia, Spain,
and China, and their acceptance of the cash-and-carry principle
not only demonstrate the existence of isolationist beliefs that
were unrelated to admiration or hatred for a given country;
they also throw considerable light on a basic isolationist
dilemma: measures designed to disentangle the United States
from world affairs brought results running counter to that
aim whenever they were applied to a specific situation. In
every existing conflict, and in all those that could be foreseen, American neutrality legislation had the effect of aiding
one side or the other. Since isolationists had tried to eliminate this dangerous contingency through Congressional action,
their efforts to promote true neutrality through legislation
must be considered a failure.^^
The appearance of one crisis after another, during the thirties,
tested the American Neutrality Law, and each new crisis undermined the
isolationists' position and drifted the United States closer to a
world war.
The continuing Japanese aggression in China and the persis-
tent pressure from Chinese authorities caused the State Department to
reevaluate their policy.
By the end of September, 1937, a final
decision had still not been reached on a forthright stand on the
Chinese crisis.
On October 5 in Chicago, Roosevelt delivered a major
64
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., 19 Aug. 1937, 81: app. 2196-2197.
Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 202-203.
52
address on foreign policy.
In this address, Roosevelt blamed 10 per
cent of the world's population for the present reign of terror. The
President observed, "When an epidemic of physical disease starts to
spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients
in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of
disease,"
This address was guickly dubbed, "the quarantine speech," and
although the President failed to specify what measures he advocated or
the aggressors by name, most of his contemporaries saw the speech as
a change in his outlook on world affairs.
Isolationists were guick
to condemn Roosevelt's speech, while internationalists perceived it as
a welcome move toward collective security.
When Congress returned in
November, Hamilton Fish led other Republicans in attacking the President
for his failure to proclaim American neutrality toward the war in China,
Fish recalled the charge levelled at FDR in the past, that his refusal
68
was a "step toward fascism,"
Representative Everett M, Dirksen of
Illinois asserted that the President was influenced by an unneutral
policy toward China, Dirksen reminded the President that he himself was
willing to confine his thinking to the democracy that exists between
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
69
^^U.S. Department of State, Press Releases, XVII, 9 Oct, 1937,
pp. 276-279.
^^Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech." Political
Science Quarterly, LXXII (Sept., 1957) 405-433.; Borg argues that
Roosevelt was only attempting to find some means of forestalling war, and
not the vital change in foreign policy that others saw.
^^U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess., 17 Nov. 1937, 81:8156-8158.
^^Ibid., 18 Nov. 1937, 81:144-145.
53
Although isolationism seemed stronger than ever, by 1938 a
vigorous attack against rigid neutrality legislation was begun in the
winter and spring.
Members from both houses of Congress introduced
over twenty resolutions, ranging from the repeal of the 1937 act to
amendments which would allow discriminatory embargoes against aggressive nations.
The internationalist wing of the peace movement renewed
its demands for a more flexible policy, and the Committee for Peace
Through World Cooperation demanded immediate revision of the arms
embargo so that it applied solely to aggressors.
Although these
drives and persistent pleas for repeal of the Neutrality Act ended in
failure, it did bring the wisdom of neutrality into question.
In September, 1938 Hitler, encouraged by his swift seizure of
Austria, threatened war over his demands that Czechoslovakia withdraw
from the Sudeten area.
A last-ditch appeal by Mussolini resulted in
the Munich Conference, in which Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier,
Prime Ministers of Britain and France, surrendered the Sudetenland in
return for Hitler's promise to end his expansionism.
This "appeasement"
of Hitler and the aversion of war was welcome news for many Americans.
In a Gallup poll taken early in 1939, the people were asked if they
believed there would be a war between any of the big European countries
this year, and 44 per cent responded with a yes; 44 per cent with a no.
In a companion guestion asking if they thought America would be drawn
into that war, 57 per cent replied yes, and 43 per cent no.
Most
70New York Times, 22 Jan. 1938, p. 4; 5 Apr. 1938, p. 11
"^-^Ibid., 22 Jan. 1938, p. 4.
54
Americans seemed concerned that if war continued in Europe that the
United States would eventually become involved.
77
The move for revision of the neutrality law began in the State
Department in the fall of 1938, but the administration remained silent
on the subject.
When Congress assembled on January 4, 1939, both
isolationists and internationalists eagerly awaited for Roosevelt's
address.
The President's "measures short of war" speech brought an
instant response from Congress and the nation's press.
The New York
•7-7
Times called his statement a turning point in American foreign policy.
Robert A. Taft of Ohio stated that "the logical conclusion is another
war with American troops sent across the ocean."
John Rankin, Democratic
Representative from Mississippi, charged that FDR's new policy was the
product of foreign influence, which he explained were Communist agitators
and greedy arms manufacturers.
Roosevelt, worried over the intense reactions to his speech,
accepted a suggestion from Senator Pittman to allow his committee to
hold public hearings in the movement for the revision of neutrality
legislation.
The hearings had just begun when Pittman announced its
adjournment.
The reason for the postponement was the reintroduction
of the arms embargo issue involving the Spanish Civil War.
Roosevelt,
because of opposition from Congress and general public opinion, was
forced to play a waiting game on the revision of neutrality.
^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (Jan, 12, 1939) p. 137,
^•^New York Times, 5 Jan, 1939, pp. 1, 22,
^^Ibid., 11 Jan. 1939, p. 13.
55
Adolf Hitler's aggression finally forced FDR's hand and pushed
Congress to act on neutrality revision.
On March 15, 1939, the German
army marched into Czechoslovakia, and in a very short time had taken
over the government, in violation of Hitler's pledge at the Munich
Conference,
Pittman quickly introduced a bill in Congress giving the
President sweeping discretion and repeal of the Neutrality Act of
1937,
The isolationists in the Senate,, led by Borah, strongly
condemned the proposal to repeal the arms embargo.
Instead of selling
war materials, Borah wanted the United States to proclaim to the
world, "We will not contribute in any way to mass murder."
After receiving protests from the Chinese on the subject of
repeal, Roosevelt reversed his original stand and effectively withdrew
his support from the repeal efforts.
In a Gallup poll taken on May
20, 1939, 72 per cent of those polled expressed their approval of a
ban on the sale of war materials to Japan.
Despite public hearings,
and a large number of witnesses who supported repeal, in the end, no
consensus was reached by the committee.
During the hearings the debate
had spread to the nation's press, and not unlike the committee, their
efforts also ended in confusion.
The expiration of the cash-and-carry
provisions of the neutrality bill on May 1 produced a pressing need for
some sort of decision.
Further efforts were made with a resolution
introduced in the House by Sol Bloom of New York, who had replaced
the ailing McReynolds on the Foreign Relations Committee.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess., 20 Mar. 1939, 84:292'5-2926.
•^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (20 May 1^39) p. 160.
56
In the House debate of Bloom's bill. Fish stated, "It is utterly
impossible to sell arms to any belligerent without being involved in
war ourselves within a very short time."
Near the end of his statement
Fish ridiculed the Bloom resolution with, "A rose by any other name
smells as sweet, but the Bloom bill without the embargo on arms is
just as bad, and that is the issue before us."
In early July the debate shifted to the Senate, and Senator Pittman
after delaying committee action for several days, finally convened the
meeting to consider the question of neutrality.
In the meantime, both
the State Department and the neutrality bloc applied intense pressure
upon the committee members.
Secretary Hull and other cabinet officers
met with the Democratic members pleading for repeal of the embargo law,
and even Roosevelt used his personal influence to persuade individual
committee members to repeal the legislation.
78
At the same time,
isolationist leaders Nye, Hiram Johnson, and Bennett C. Clark began
organizing a solid bloc of senators to support the arms embargo, A
group of thirty-four senators threatened to filibuster if the Senate
Committee reported favorably on the administration's proposals.
79
On July 11, when Pittman called his committee to order. Senator
Clark made a motion to postpone consideration of the neutrality
legislation until 1940,
The vote to postpone was carried by a margin
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.,
27 June 1939, 84:7983-7984,
7R
New York Times, 9 July 1939, p. 1.
79
Divine, Illusion, p. 277.
57
of 12 to 11, thereby ending six months of intense work by the administration.
The New York Times called the Senate action "an invitation to
an
aggressor nations to use war to achieve their conquests,"
A Gallup
poll taken in June showed that 80 per cent of those interviewed still
favored the sale of arms to England and France in a general war. Yet
a month later, 51 per cent of those questioned indicated that they
thought Congress was right in retaining the arms embargo, with 37 per
81
cent disagreeing and 12 per cent expressing no opinion.
Americans
were only slowly beginning to understand that the United States could
not escape from the events abroad by withdrawing.
Hitler's invasion of
Czechoslovakia and his increasingly brutal persecution of Jews inside
of Germany, slowly but surely sickened Americans. The question of neutrality was becoming a stalemate both inside and outside of Congress.
Roosevelt had attempted to remain outside of the congressional
debate over repeal of the arms embargo, realizing his support for repeal
might in itself bring failure. FDR's strategy backfired; his opponents
fought against the administration's proposal despite his low profile.
Divine suggests that since the opposition defeated FRD's efforts anyway,
that a bolder, more active role might have been better. Roosevelt might
still have lost the fight, but he might have won.
87
On September 1, 1939, Roosevelt received the news that the frontiers
of Poland had been crossed by the German army, Roosevelt was convinced.
^°New York Times, 12 July 1939, p. 9; 20 July 1939,
p. 18,
81Gallup, Public Opinion, (June 13, 1940) p. 230.
""^nivz-ino
niiiG-inr.
o
9flS.
58
more than ever, that the United States must repeal the arms embargo in
order to aid England and France.
The setback in Congress the previous
spring made him more cautious of isolationist strength, but FDR was
determined to push for repeal.
Backing up this determination was a
Gallup poll conducted just after the outbreak of war which revealed that
public opinion on the arms embargo was changing.
Fifty-seven per cent
favored repeal of the arms law, while 43 per cent disagreed.
83
Checking with administration leaders in Congress, FDR learned that
approximately sixty senators would now vote for repeal of the neutrality
act.
All the signs looked favorable toward repeal, and Roosevelt called
a special session of Congress on September 21.
This time FDR personally
supervised a campaign to win back the support he needed in Congress.
Roosevelt addressed Congress, stressing his determination to keep the
nation firmly on the path of peace, and concluded with an appeal to the
desire to stay out of the war;
Destiny first made us, with our sister nations on this
hemisphere, joint heirs of European culture. Fate now
seems to compel us to assume the task of helping to
maintain in the western world a citadel wherein that
civilization may be kept alive. The peace, the integrity,
and the safety of the Americans—these must be kept firm
and serene.^^
Isolationists launched an appeal to public opinion in a fight for
the embargo and for their very existence.
Using radio, newspapers.
^"^Gallup, Public Opinion, (Sept. 13, 1939), p. 181.
gA
U.S. Congress, Joint Session, Congressional Record, 76th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 21 Sept. 1939, 85:10-12.
59
pamphlets, mail campaigns, and mass rallies, isolationists began an
intense effort to persuade the American people to reject the President's
program.
There was a corresponding deluge of mail which fell upon
85
Washington's congressmen.
Americans, assaulted by pressures from
both the isolationist bloc and the supporters of neutrality revision,
slowly began to swing into line with the President's program.
In a
Gallup poll taken after the President's address to Congress, 62 per
cent favored repeal, and by October those who favored repeal leveled
off to 60 per cent. Regional breakdowns indicate that every section
favored repeal, with the strongest backing coming from the South, and
86
the least, 55 per cent coming from the Middle West.
As the debate
continued, the administration won valuable support from international
lawyers.
Prominent Republicans then began announcing that they would support
repeal.
Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio and Wallace M. White of Maine
announced their support. The Republican Club voted 46 to 6 in favor
of the administration's neutrality program.
A week later. Senator George
W. Norris of Nebraska, who had voted against war in 1917, asked for
revision of the embargo on a national radio broadcast.
On September 26, Pittman presented a bill that repealed the arms
^^New York Times, 21 Sept. 1939, p. 16;22 Sept. 1939,
p. 15; 27 Sept. 1939, p. 24; "Peace Blizzard," Newsweek, XIV, 2 Oct. 1939,
29.
^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (Sept. 21, 1939) p. 183; Ibid., (Oct.
5, 1939) p. 186.
^'^"U.S. is Made Rigidly Neutral," Newsweek XIV, 18 Sept. 1939,
28; New York Times, 27 Sept. 1939, p. 16.
60
embargo, but in every other aspect it embodied the philosophy of
mandatory neutrality, and the Senate bill limited Presidential authority
to a minimum.
The measure was considered by the full Senate on October
2, with Pittman and Borah making the opening statements for their respective side. Borah claimed the real demand for repeal, "came from
the war hounds of Europe." Claiming that the true motive of the
administration was to aid England and France, he called repeal, "an
act of intervention."
Turning to cash-and-carry, he denounced that
provision as a clever subterfuge designed to stimulate a vast war boom
in the United States. When the allies ran out of money, the administration would induce Congress to end the ban on loans, and once again
the United States would find itself drawn into a bloody European
-, . ,88
conflict.
Senator Vandenberg, in support of Borah, delivered a speech in
which he declared, "In the long run, I do not believe we can become an
arsenal for one belligerent without becoming a target for another."
Almost every senator who spoke against the Pittman bill repeated this
89
charge, calling repeal "the first step toward war."
While the Senate
moved slowly in its deliberations, American commercial interests began
a lobbying effort to force a liberalization of the cash-and-carry
gg
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 2 Oct. 1939, 85:66-73.
89
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 4 Oct. 1939, 85:9598; 10 Oct. 1939, 85:250-252; 12 Oct. 1939,
85:325.
61
provision.
Pittman finally bowed to the pressures from the business
community, and amendments were prepared for their purpose.
Isolationists also offered a series of amendments which were
heavily defeated, and on October 27, the Senate voted 63 to 30 to pass
the Pittman bill.
After four weeks of intensive debate, the adminis-
90
tration had achieved its longed-for goal.
All that then remained
for the administration was to work toward influencing the outcome of
the bill in the House. On October 31, the House began consideration,
and for the next three days, engaged in a fierce, outspoken, and bitter
debate over the neutrality issue. House opponents used much the same
arguments expressed in the Senate, but in the end, they too accepted
repeal.
The final votes, after a conference committee, passed the
Pittman bill by a margin of 55 to 24 in the Senate and 243 to 172 in
91
the House.
Roosevelt and his administration were overjoyed with the
news of final passage. The repeal of the arms embargo and the adoption
of a limited cash-and-carry formula gave England and France their
brightest news in some time.
Neutralist legislation, as the hope of isolationists to prevent
America from becoming embroiled in the European struggle, was over.
The legislation, developed by a small neutrality bloc in Congress, was
designed to prevent the nation from becoming involved in a number
of
world conflicts, each with its own basis and each under its own set of
^°Ibid., 27 Oct. 1939, 85:1022-1024.
^^Ibid., 3 Nov. 1939, 85:1352-1356, 85:1381-1388.
62
peculiar circumstances.
Yet world events had convinced most Americans,
by the end of 1939, that the moral causes, for which the European
democracies were fighting, were also the causes which were important to
the United States. Neutrality legislation had been repealed, and the
loss was felt deeply by the isolationists, but that loss did not bring
an end to isolationism itself.
Americans still favored supplying Britain and France with aid, but
they stopped short of advocating United States intervention. Gallup
polls in October and November showed 60 per cent favored aid to the
Allies, but 95 per cent responded that America should not send its army
92
and navy abroad to fight.
The success of Hitler's Blitzkrieg cast
further doubts upon the concept of American impregnability.
Poland fell
in only twenty-seven days, and in April, 1940, Germany began the rapid
conquest of Denmark, Holland, Norway, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The
surrender of France after only six weeks of fighting brought many
Americans to the realization that after Europe it might be America's
4
93
turn.
The decline in sentiment toward the isolationist concept was reflected in changing Congressional attitudes, when a large number of
Congressmen who originally supported the arms embargo, later voted for
its repeal.
The changing mood in public opinion further reduced isola-
tionist support.
Hardcore isolationists, although slightly less in
97
p. 188.
GalluD, Public Opinion. (Oct. 23, 1939) p. 186; (3 Nov. 1939)
93Jonas, Isolationism in America, p. 215
63
number, still clung to their basic assumptions and employed the same
arguments that, in the course of world events, were unrealistic. In
answer to the charges of aggression and atrocities blamed on the Axis
Powers, D. Worth Clark of Idaho countered with the same charges against
Britain's policies in Ireland, pointing out that it was "ten times as
bloody in the 500 years of British destruction, pillage, rape, and
bloodshed in Ireland."
Senator Rush Hold of West Virginia added the
French bombing of Damascus in 1925 to the list of "crimes" perpetrated
by the Democracies.
94
Isolationists continued their fight against American entry into the
European war with numerous books, pamphlets, newspaper and magazine
articles, radio broadcasts, and rallies, stressing the same points over
and over again. Members of Congress also did their share by expressing
these sentiments in the Congressional Record.
Nye alone, filled ten pages
of the Record just to catalog the sins of the British Empire. Repudiation of the war debts from the First World War was freguently criticized.
War in Europe was still considered of no vital interest to the United
States.
In their desperate search for justification of their positions,
isolationists were moving further and further away from reality. In
94
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess,,
12 Oct, 1939, 85:332.
95
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,
5 Feb, 1941, 87:543, 598, 560; 20 Feb, 1941, 1412; 24 Feb, 1941, 1295,
1296; 26 Feb. 1941, 1414, 1432; 4 Mar. 1941, 1724-1733.
64
January, 1941, in the Congressional debate over the Lend-Lease bill,
isolationists argued that this measure, designed to help Great Britain,
would not solve the problems facing Europe. Most isolationists expressed
the view that they hoped that Britain would win the war but were still
reluctant to grant Lend-Lease.
96
When the Lend-Lease bill was introduced in the House, isolationists
offered another proposal.
The proposal was for extending a credit of
two billion dollars to Britain for the purchase of war materials in
the United States. Fish made the motion to send the bill back to the
committee to prepare a bill for the loan, but the motion was defeated
160 to 263.
In the Senate, Taft proposed the loan as a substitute in
97
the form of an amendment, and it too was defeated 29 to 62.
The sug-
gestion of a loan was something of a compromise for the isolationists,
but given the mood of the country, refusal to aid Britain would not
be favorably received by the electorate.
In a Gallup poll taken in
January, Americans approved of the concept by 68 per cent, while 26 per
no
cent disapproved and 6 per cent were undecided.
Isolationists, even up to the attack at Pearl Harbor, insisted
that an Axis victory was not detrimental to the well-being of the
United States.
Their justification for this argument was the absence
of moral issues and the impregnability of the Western Hemisphere. The
^^Ibid., 4 Feb. 1941, 87:547.
^•^Ibid., 6 Feb. 1941, 87:711; 8 Feb. 1941, 815; 8 Mar. 1941,
2079-2082.
98Gallup, Public Opinion, (Jan. 11, 1941) p. 262
65
Congressional Record is filled with these assertions, and Representative
Knute Hill of Washington observed:
"Hitler with all his power cannot
cross twenty miles of English Channel and penetrate England.
How can
he possibly cross the Atlantic and land troops in the Western Hemis99
phere?"
In 1941, isolationists made two desperate attempts to further their
cause.
One attempt involved a drive toward some kind of war referendum,
but all such efforts failed.
The other venture was an attempt, through
private investigations, to establish that the American movement toward
war was the result of well-organized groups representing a small minority
of the people. The "Devil theory of war," earlier suggested by Charles
A. Beard, gained new prominence. Charles A. Lindbergh, the aviator whose
speeches were highly beneficial for the America First Organization,
delivered a speech in Des Moines, Iowa on September 11, 1941. In that
speech Lindbergh named the three most important groups who have been
pushing America toward war—the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt
Administration."
Because of these inopportune remarks and the re-
sultant criticism, Lindbergh's effectiveness as a speaker was seriously
damaged.
War, the great bugbear of isolationism, was closer than most
realized, but because of their assumptions, isolationists were largely
immune to world events. Most Americans no longer shared their views
99
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3 Feb. 1941, 87:487; 4 Feb. 1941, 528-529; 5 Feb- 1941, 590, 620.
^"^New York Times, 12 Sept. 1941, p. 1.
GG
after 1939. The remaining isolationists continued to assert their
principles even more vigorously as December 7, 1941 approached.
The isolationists of the thirties, the model selected here for
comparison, consisted primarily of the belief that aversion of international affairs and the impregnability of the United States made
intervention in a foreign war unnecessary; the United States became
involved in war through the manipulations of a few selfish, greedy
men; and since all other countries are amoral, warlike, or vulnerable,
the United States must cling to a policy of unilateralism in foreign
policy,
Jonas states:
Fear of war exists to some extent in all men,
and the desire for unilateral action is common to
most individuals and all nations. The universality of these basic emotions, which combined to form
the isolationism of the thirties, makes isolationism
permanently attractive and produces at least a nostalgic yearning for it whenever world events become
too unpleasant to contemplate with equanimity ,-'-^-'As defined, the isolationism of the thirties, is deficient of
political, economic, or social bases. It cannot be labeled strictly
liberal nor conservative, capitalist nor socialist, fascist nor communist, democratic nor republican.
Now it is time to turn to Post-World
II, and the changes in foreign policy, toward the cold war with Russia,
and the ideas of globalism and containment.
Jonas, Isolationism in America, p. 275.
CHAPTER IV
LIMITED WAR
Chapter I presented the general purpose of the paper and the
intent of using the 1930 group of isolationists to compare and contrast with the individuals who would later oppose the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Chapter II established the basis of isolationism and the
efforts toward neutrality legislation.
American opposition to the
League of Nations and the World Court, and the individuals and groups
of isolationists.
In Chapter III, the isolationists' movement was
traced, following the assumptions through the world events of the
thirties, and their reactions in each crisis. Chapter IV will look
for the 1930 assumptions in those who opposed American involvement in
Korea and Vietnam.
The major assumptions employed by isolationists were the belief
in the evils of international involvement and their opposition to
alliances or agreements with any foreign nation that did not involve
American territory or vital interests; that the United States became
involved in war because of a small group of selfish, greedy individuals;
and finally, that the isolationists were convinced that America
required freedom of choice, unilaterialism, in its foreign policy.
Soon after its victory the grand alliance of World War II broke
up, and the world community, calling itself the United Nations, fell
Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 100-105.
67
68
into a pattern of hostility.
The world was about to experience periodic
crisis and "limited" war that would characterize the period from 1945
to the present.
In the thirty-five year period since World War II,
America has become involved in two limited wars, Korea and Vietnam.
The study of these two engagements will aid in the attempt to determine
if the assumptions of isolationism are still a part of the American
political thought.
There have been other threats to American security, both before
and after, the two police actions mentioned.
Russian interference in
the Middle East began early in 1946, in an effort to increase Soviet
influence in Iran and Turkey,
The inability of Britain to continue
subsidizing the pro-western factions in the Greek Civil War, and their
inability to afford to modernize the Turkish army, provided further
encouragement for the Russians. The already grave economic situation
that made Britain re-evaluate its support in the Middle East was intensified to near collapse by the winter of 1946-47. The Truman Administration was faced with the realization that these two incidents
threatened the balance of power in Europe.
In 1947, America was the
only free world power capable of meeting this Soviet challenge.
The United States had no choice but to act in this situation; it
must either take over Britain's responsibilities or lose Greece and
Turkey to the Communists.
In response to this crisis, President Truman
went before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, to deliver
a message outlining what would later become known as the Truman
Doctrine,
Truman asked for $400 million for economic aid and military
supplies for Greece and Turkey, and stressed the importance of such
69
7
aid if American democracy was to survive.
Close on the heels of the Truman Doctrine came the idea of
economic aid for the rest of Europe, As mentioned above, the
economic chaos in Europe at the time was critical. The plan's purpose
was to help the European nations get back on their feet, so they could
eventually help themselves. Congressional critics of the Marshall
Plan saw nothing but American money poured down a bottomless European
pit.
With the development of these two policies, America began the
application of what has been termed the "containment" policy. The
Russian threat to the balance of power in Europe had evoked a counter
response from America, and this policy of countering each Russian
threat would be the key to the containment of the Soviet Union. The
United States would answer each probe that the communists attempted
with a counter policy aimed at neutralizing their influence.
Europe was not alone in being confronted by communist-inspired
problems:
China.
there were also two Chinas—Nationalist China and Communist
In 1945, Russian troops had entered Korea two days after Japan
surrendered.
In an agreement between Russia and the United States,
Korea was temporarily divided at the 38th parallel for the purpose
of disarming the Japanese. America was in charge south of the parallel, and the Soviet army supervised disarmament of the Japanese in
the north.
A communist government developed in the north as a result
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess.,
12 Mar. 1947, 93:1980-1981.
John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II,
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973) pp. 41-44; See above, p, 68.
70
of Russian occupation.
In Indochina, the French were having difficul-
ty with the continuing progress of the Vietminh.
American aid was
sent to South Korea and was considered for the French in Indochina,
but for the time being, direct intervention was ruled out.
By the fall of 1949, Mao Tse-tung had proclaimed the People's
Republic of China, and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists had withdrawn
to the island of Formosa.
The fear that all of southeast Asia might
fall under the control of communism was increased even more by this
loss of China.
However, the American public was unconvinced, according
to a Gallup poll taken in September, 1949. The pollsters asked
Americans, "Do you think the United States should or should not try to
help Chiang^Kai-shek?"
Forty-four per cent answered that Americans
should not, 25 per cent felt America should help, and 31 per cent had
no opinion.
The Truman administration announced the end of aid to
Chiang's Nationalist government, but did not officially recognize Red
China.
In a poll conducted a month later the public was given the chance
to answer the question on the recognition of Communist China. Qf
those familiar with the Civil War, only 20 per cent favored recognition, 42 per cent opposed, and 14 per cent had no opinion.
Congres-
sional discontent with the Truman foreign policy was also growing.
Israel, ed,. Major Peace Treaties, pp, 2641-2656; Bartlett, Pax
Americana, pp. 115-119; Spanier, American Policy, p. 85.
John Foster Dulles, War or Peace, (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1950), p. 231.
^Gallup, Public Opinion, (Aug. 14, 1949) p. 853.
"^Ibid., 1 Nov. 1949, pp. 880-881.
71
Immediately after the Second World War, Republicans had joined with
the administration in a bipartisan foreign policy, but as 1950 began,
the partnership began collapsing.
Mainly as a result of Senator
Vandenberg's minority leadership, a period of approximately four years
of bipartisan effort had created a sense of national solidarity.
Critics of this policy in the Republican party had warned, for several
years, that this compromise defeated the purpose of the opposition
party—that of criticism and exposition.
The Chinese Nationalist loss
in the civil war brought this partisan friction to its highest pitch
g
since 1945.
It was in this spirit of bipartisanship that the Truman Doctrine,
Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Security Pact, later the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, were approved.
Spanier comments:
It seems a cruel twist of fate that this very success of
American foreign policy in Europe should have brought
about a shift of Communist pressure from Europe to Asia—
a shift which in June, 1950, led to the outbreak of the
Korean War. The Truman Doctrine had prevented a Russian
breakthrough in Southeast Europe and the Middle East and
established Western Europe's flank in the eastern
Mediterrannean. The Marshall Plan had set Europe on the
path to economic recovery and health. NATO had guaranteed
Europe its security. The lesson of two world wars had been
absorbed, and the NATO commitment was the proof of this.^
Public opinion also supported these measures:
in March, 1949, 76
per cent of those polled favored NATO, and in another poll in May,
^Ibid., (Nov. 1, 1949) pp. 880-881.
Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism, (New York: The Ronald
Press Company, 1956) pp. 13-14; Bartlett, Pax Americana, p. 119;
J. William Fullbright, The Crippled Giant, (New York: Random House,
1972) pp. 23-24.
9
Spanier, American Policy, pp. 69-70.
72
67 per cent thought the Senate should ratify the treaty; and in May,
1950, 74 per cent still thought that the Pact was a good idea.-'-^
According to Norman Graebner:
. . . the combination of the loss of China to the communist;
a failure by the administration to provide positive aid to
Chiang; the defeat of the United States at Tehran, Yalta,
and Potsdam, had been engineered in the State Department and
the foreign service; the Korean War, and Truman's decision
to remove General MacArthur; and finally the entry of Red
China into the fighting in Korea, all contributed to the loss
of bipartisan support and the creation of neo-isolationism.H
The administration's policy toward Korea made that country
dispensable from the standpoint of American security, since in a
global war the nation could be neutralized by air and sea power.
American troops had, with this concept in mind, been withdrawn from
South Korea in 1949.
The United States' preoccupation with a global,
all-out war caught this country by surprise when on June 25, 1950,
12
North Korean soldiers attacked the South.
The entire issue of containment was on the line in Korea. The
attack on South Korea illustrates that the Russians did not believe
that the United States would risk massive retaliation to save Korea.
The invasion left Truman but one choice: in light of his containment
policy he must meet force with force.
The President then was con-
fronted with the lack of a standing army large enough to fight a
conventional war.
After World War II, the cry for rapid demobiliza-
tion and the subsequent policy of global wars, the reguirement for a
-^°Gallup, Public Opinion, (Mar. 20, 1949) p. 800; (May 18, 1949)
p. 815; (May 1, 1950) p. 912,
Graedner, New Isolationism, pp. 42-55.
12
Spanier, American Policies, pp. 34-86.
73
large army was unnecessary.
Consequently, the army had been reduced
to skeleton levels. General MacArthur's small Japanese occupation
forces, sea and air power, and later troops from other countries
under the shield of the United Nations, were committed to aid South
Korea.
Before continuing with the subject of limited wars, a treatment
of how isolationism adapted to the new world conditions, and who
these isolationists were, is necessary.
The isolationism of the fifites still exhibited some of the
prejudices of radical nationalism: the deep feelings of mistrust, suspicion, and withdrawal from the world. This continued with the conviction that America could live in this
world without allies, commitments, or military preparedness.
These isolationists, like those of the thirties, believed
that negotiation which resulted in compromise was identical
to appeasement and a sign of weakness.I^
Graebner, in the above statement, is describing a much smaller
group of people in the fifties, compared to those of the thirties.
The thirties group had a larger following in Congress, the press,
and among the public
However, World War II
had destroyed the
relevancy of isolationism for the vast majority of Americans by
mid-century.
In a Gallup poll conducted in March, 1950, in answer
to the question, "What is the
most important problem facing Ameri-
cans?", domestic issues were the preoccupation of most. Unemployment,
-^-^Spanier, American Policies, p. 88; Bartlett, Pax Americana,
pp. 121-122; Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 53-54.
Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 22-23.
74
housing, strikes, economic problems, farm problems, and race problems
were mentioned in their order of frequency.
The traditional isolationist thought was still supported by
the McCormick and Hearst press, and several columnists. Extreme
right organizations, such as Merwin K. Harts National Economic Council,
had opposed the Marshall Plan as the means to finance European
socialism; the United Nations as an octopus that would propel America
toward a "collectivist" world; and NATO because United States involvement meant abandoning traditional foreign policy aimed at avoiding
permanent alliances. The American Coalition of Patriotic Societies,
was a merger of approximately 85 organizations. Some of these groups
were the DAR, American War Mothers, the Dames of the Loyal Legion, and
the Sons of the American Revolution.
Led by John B. Trevor, the coali-
tion agreed that the greatest threat to American security was those
"socialist" planners in the federal government.
It was those indivi-
duals who must be identified and removed from positions of authority."
Isolationist members in Congress included Senator Robert A. Taft
of Ohio, Senator William Knowland of California, Senator James P. Kem
of Missouri, and Representative John E. Rankin of Mississippi. While
there were other supporters in Congress, Taft and Knowland were the
acknowledged leaders of the new opposition. Arthur Schlesinger
maintained:
The queer complex of feeling, fear, and prejudice was too
15Gallup, Public Opinion, (Mar. 26, 1950) p. 905.
Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 20-22.
75
deep to be repealed in a decade. The emotional core of
the new isolationism survived - the hatred of Europe and
its age-old troubles; the belief in an American purity
which should not risk corruption in contact with outsiders;
the agoraphobic fear of a larger world; the old cherished,
wistful hope that we could continue to live of ourselves
and by ourselves. And underground, these emotions have
continued to exercise a paralyzing effect on policy. More
than anything else, perhaps, they have kept America a
slumbering giant, unable to export its deomcratic faith
to the peoples of other nations, unable to play a full
and affirmative role in the world.17
Schlesinger may be attributing more power and influence to the new
isolationists than is actually warranted.
In this article, Schlesinger
announced the probable end to isolationism, and in the above paragraph
stated, that isolationists " . . . are exercising a paralyzing effect
upon policy."
18
In his book, A Foreign Policy for Americans, Taft suggested four
measures to meet the threat of communism without going to the extreme
costs that Truman's policy called for:
(1) the continued use of the
Voice of America for the iron-curtain countries, and the use of local
press and radio facilities in other countries. He also suggested
that the propaganda concern should be moved away from the Department
of State; (2) use the same methods of infiltration that Russia uses
against America; (3) encourage and build-up the support of friendly
nations or neutral countries who believe in liberty and oppose communism;
(4) the elimination from the government of all those who directly or
•'"^Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., "The New Isolationism." Atlantic,
May, 1952, pp. 34-38.
-^^Ibid., p. 38.
76
19
indirectly are connected with the communist organization.
Basically
his major differences with the administration were the staggering
costs of Truman's policies. Taft ended his book with the conclusion:
"In short, a war against communism in the world must finally be won
in the minds of men."
20
Both Schlesinger and Graebner stated that the new isolationists
reject the classification of "isolationism."
21
Taft explained:
Our traditional policy of neutrality and non-interference
with other nations was based on the principle that this
policy was the best way to avoid disputes with other
nations and to maintain the liberty of this country without war. From the days of George Washington that has been
the policy of the United States. It has never been isolationism; but it has always avoided alliances and interference
in foreign quarrels as a preventative against possible war,
and it has always opposed any commitment by the United States,
in advance, to take any military action outside of our
territory. It would leave us free to interfere or not interfere according to whether we consider the case of sufficiently vital interest to the liberty of this country. It was the
policy of the free hand.22
Taft did admit that he was against the United Nations because
of its failure to keep peace.
" . . . because it was organized on
an unsound basis with a veto power in five nations and is based, in
fact, on the joint powers of such nations, effective only so long as
23
they agree."
Taft believed that "No nation can be constantly prepared
to undertake a full-scale war at any moment and still hope to maintain
any of the other purposes in which people are interested, and for which
Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1951) p. GG, 117-120.
Ibid., p. 121.
21
Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 24-25; Schlesinger, The New
Isolationism, p. 34,
22
Taft, A Foreign Policy, p, 12.
77
nations are founded,"
The Congressman from Ohio did not wish to see
the American economy over-burdened by a huge military budget, which
he felt, was the direction that the Truman administration was taking.
24
The reduction in military spending, called for by Taft, evidently
has been a priority of others, as the military budget and personnel
have been reduced after each major crisis. Americans have supported
and sometimes demanded rapid demobilization of the armed forces following each conflict since World War I. This reduction to a small,
sometimes too small, force was especially acute prior to World War II
and Korea. Military preparedness for the conflict in Vietnam,
while insufficient, was not as urgent because of the gradual escalation
of the war.
However, after the compromise in Korea, military personnel
and budgets were significantly reduced.
Taft suggested that the government should set itself a budget limit
based upon the possible tax revenue it had available. Disagreeing
with those who believed in "fortress America," the Senator stressed
the importance of air and sea power which could provide effective worldwide defense.^^
Taft admitted that he voted against the Atlantic Pact,
"because it committed this country to the policy of a land war in
Europe."
Yet public opinion in May, 1950, approved of the Atlantic Pact
(76 per cent) and thought that the Senate should ratify the treaty.
Therefore, while the Senator objected to American alliances, such as
26
NATO, he was not in step with the majority of the public.
Once again.
^^Ibid,, pp. 68-69,
^^Ibid., p, 77.
26Ibid., p, 89; Gallup, Public Opinion,(May 14, 1950) p. 912.
78
this aversion to commitments and alliances is demonstrated, especially
when they involved Europe, Avoidance of agreements, and the insistence upon retaining a unilateral foreign policy for America, was
reported by Taft,
Taft's views on foreign aid were shared by a few others in
Congress.
In January, 1950, while the House was debating a bill that
would provide $150 million in aid to South Korea, Representative John
E. Rankin expressed his thoughts on foreign aid:
You talk about chaos in Korea. If we keep pouring the
money of the American taxpayers down the rat holes of
Europe, Asia, Israel, Africa, and Japan, how long will
it be before we will be in economic chaos?27
Shortly after the debate. President Truman remarked that he was looking
forward to the up-coming Congressional elections, and hoped for a more
internationalist Congress. Senator Knowland addressed his remarks to
the President's earlier statement with:
If it is the intent of the President of the United
States to have a rubber stamp Congress, a Congress
which will rubber stamp agreements such as those at
Yalta and at Potsdam, by which we surrendered the
liberty of literally millions in Poland, in Hungary,
in Bulgaria, in China, and in North Korea, then I
say I do not believe the President will get that type
of cooperation from this side of the aisle.28
Two of the three assumptions advocated by isolationists, have
been shown in the discussion so far, as those advocated by Senator
Taft and his followers. The third point, that of a conspiracy of a
small group of individuals, is handled by Graebner through the
accusations of Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. According to
77
U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 81st Cong.,
2nd sess., 19 Jan. 1950, 96:631-633.
^^Ibid., 13 Apr. 1950, 96:5152.
79
Graebner, McCarthy played upon American fears of communism, and
charged that there were communists working and shaping American
foreign policy inside the State Department.^^ What the motives were
of the Senators who approved of the McCarthy "witch hunt," can only
be guessed at.
It does appear that Taft and others of his party
gave at least tacit approval of the investigations conducted by the
McCarthy Committee, and their efforts to purge the federal government
of alleged communist sympathizers.
The opposition to American intervention in Korea was evident in
the press and Congress, although it was never large enough, nor
organized enough, to influence foreign policy to any great extent.
Polls show that Americans were dissatisfied with the Truman administration, mainly because of political corruption.
In the Presidential
election of 1952, General Eisenhower, the Republican candidate,
captured the White House. Despite the rhetoric of the Eisenhower
administration, the policies of the Truman years remained the basis of
American foreign policy for most of the 1950s. Eisenhower appointed
John Foster Dulles to the post of Secretary of State, and Dulles,
always conscious of public opinion and support, supplied the moralistic
rhetoric for the voicing of the administration's foreign policy
. . .
30
decisions.
29
Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 28-30.
^°Stupak, Foreign Policy, pp. 122-127, 138-139; Bartlett, Pax
Americana,pp. 127-129; Spanier, American Policy, p. 102; Gallup,
Public Opinion, (Oct. 14, 1951) p. 1020, (Jan. 20, 1952), p. 1040,
TTune 15, 1952) p. 1071.
80
Eisenhower, early in his first term, announced his policy of
globalism, stating that nations would not be written off only
because they were small or already captive.
Since the communist
attack was a global one, then the free world's defense must be global
as well.
The administration faced a formidable task in introducing
globalism and the attending expense, while promising to lower taxes
and government spending and balance the budget. Taft and other costconscious Congressmen continually applied pressure on the administration in the effort toward economy in the military budget. These considerations and pressures forced Eisenhower to reexamine Dulles' theory
of massive retaliation.
Thus by upgrading the role of nuclear
weapons, the costs would be less than in maintaining a large conventional force.
Spanier had this to say about the Republican campaign
promises;
The Republicans thus appeared not only to promise
an eventual end to the Cold War - they also pledged
themselves to do it at less cost. For they claimed
that the Democrats' foreign policy of indefinite
coexistence, with its vast outlay for armaments and
economic aid, would undermine the nation's economy . . . . The Republicans in brief, promised the
nation at one and the same time an offensive strategy, a balanced budget, and reduction of taxes. They
pledged a rollback of Soviet power on the one hand
and, on the other, a cut in the appropriations for
America's defense,^2
On April 19, 1953, a poll was conducted and the guestion was
asked:
"At present there are about 3.5 million men in our armed
^^Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 129-134; Stupak, Foreign Policy,
p, 126,
32
Spanier, American Policy, p. 103-
81
forces, both in the United States and overseas. If a truce is reached
in Korea, do you think we should cut down on the size of our military
or not?"
Seventy-four per cent thought the United States should not
reduce the size of its military, while 22 per cent thought America
should, and 4 per cent had no opinion.
However, the administration
did manage to bring the Korean War to an end in 1953 with the permanent separation of Korea at the 38th parallel, the original starting
point just after World War II. The administration also drew a clear
"frontier" line around the entire Sino-Soviet bloc. Eisenhower
extended the frontier line, begun by the Democrats from Norway to
Turkey, into the Middle and Far East, The President, with the deterrent power of the Strategic Air Command, believed that the free world
could preserve this global boundary around the communist world.
President Eisenhower had proclaimed that if Indochina should fall,
the loss would be an important threat to American security. With this
thought in mind, the administration began supplying France with economic
and military aid.
Just prior to the French defeat at Dienbienphu, the
United States was providing over 75 per cent of the cost of the war.
The French, after Dienbienphu, agreed to end the war, and on July
20, 1954, an armistice agreement was reached that divided the country
^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (19 Apr, 1953) p. 1140.
Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties, pp. 2657-2688; Spanier,
American Policy, p. 105.
^^Ibid,, pp, 106-110; Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 132-133;
Melvin Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis, (New York; Columbia University
Press, 1967) pp, 24-25,
82
at the 17th parallel.
The communists then were in complete control of
north Indochina, and it seemed only a matter of time until they would
take over the southern government of Ngo Dinh Diem.
In addition to
extending aid to Diem, the administration also included Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Lao under the protection of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty.
In Congress a number of Senators and Representatives took a firm
stand against unilateral intervention in South Vietnam.
was also against American involvement in Indochina.
Public opinion
In a poll taken,
even before the fall of Dienbienphu, 85 per cent disapproved of sending
American troops to help the French, while only 8 per cent approved of
such action.
For the time being, since Congress, the public,
America's allies, and Eisenhower himself, were opposed to intervention;
38
economic and military aid would have to suffice.
Eisenhower was destined to have other critical situations arise
during the remainder of his Presidency.
In the summer of 1954, a crisis
developed over the Communist Chinese shelling of the Nationalists'
islands of Quemoy and Matsu, just off the coast of China.
In 1956,
trouble developed between Britain and Egypt over the Suez Canal, and
shortly afterward the Israel-Egypt war was precipitated.
In the summer
of 1958, a group of nationalist officers successfully seized thegovern-
^^Spanier, American Policy, pp. 111-113; Bartlett, Pax Americana,
p. 130; Gurtov, First Vietnam, pp. 134-145; Ronald Steel, Pax Americana,
(New York: The Viking Press, 1967) pp. 146-148.
^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (15 Aug. 1953) p. A1185^^Gurtov, First Vietnam, pp. 145-147.
83
ment of Iraq. Meanwhile, Lebanon and Jordan, threatened by revolution, asked for military support. Britain and American troops
were sent to the two countries to help stabilize the situations.
39
President Kennedy, who took office in January, 1961, inherited
a plan from the Eisenhower administration to attempt an overthrow of
Fidel Castro in Cuba.
The exercise, using Cuban exiles, failed through
poor planning and the lack of support, and later became known as the
"Bay of Pigs fiasco."
The recurrent crisis in West Berlin continued
to plague America from 1958 to 1962. In late 1962, United States
intelligence suddenly discovered that the Russians were building
launching sites for missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev, emboldened by
America's previous failures to use force, apparently believed that he
held another winning hand.
In a confrontation between Kennedy and the
Soviet leader, Khrushchev finally backed down.
Kennedy, in the early 1950s, had been a critic of American intervention in Indochina, but by the mid-1950s he thought that Vietnam
might have a chance under the leadership of Diem.
However, by 1963,
Buddist discontent broke out in a dispute nearing civil war, and in
November, Diem was assassinated by his own army. President Kennedy
preferred to use military advisors, rather than combat troops, to
ensure that the South Vietnames should fight their own war. Even
^^Spanier, American Policy, pp. 113-127; Bartlett, Pax
Americana, pp. 137-142.
^°Ibid., pp. 129-134; pp. 149-153.
84
with Kennedy's caution, the American commitment and involvement in
the war steadily increased.
This momentum, once begun, was difficult
to slow down, and after Kennedy's assassination in 1963, President
Johnson increased America's role in Vietnam.
In August, 1964, the Johnson administration used the clash
between North Vietnamese and American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin
to gain discretionary war powers from Congress. The year, 1965,
witnessed an ever increasing number of American troops commited to
Vietnam and an escalation in the bombing of the Vietcong and North
Vietnam.
The same year, the first protests against the Asian war
began in the universities. J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, became one of the most distinguished
critics of administration policies. Public opinion
was lagging behind
this criticism, still favoring the Johnson policies in Vietnam by
almost a two-to-one margin. After 1965, because of public opinion
and the increased war protests, the Johnson administration attempted
to conceal facts relating to the military situation in Vietnam and
42
the degree of American participation.
The Communist Tet offensive of February, 1968, was the beginning
of the end for Johnson's hopes and policies. Public opinion made it
difficult for the President to seek another term in the White House.
The disengagement from Vietnam was left to the incoming President,
Richard M. Nixon.
The new President, after initially escallating the
Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 134-159.
^•^Ibid., pp. 139-160; Gallup, Public Opinion , (14 Oct. 1967) p. 1618
85
war, finally decided upon the policy of gradual Vietnamization. A
plan to train and equip South Vietnamese troops to replace American
combat forces was developed.
One additional point needs consideration before concluding the
Vietnam conflict. The assumption was that there existed a small group
of individuals who profit from war. During Vietnam, that charge was
made against the military-industrial complex who were aided by a few
influencial congressmen.
The thirties group of isolationists saw
the arms manufacturers as those who directly benefit from war, and
in the sixties the military establishment was added to the war industries as a powerful coalition that decided the foreign policies under
44
which America operated.
Negotiations between the United States and Hanoi were finally
concluded in January, 1973, after North Vietnam agreed to allow the
Southern government to continue. As the last Americans were leaving
45
Vietnam, communist troops were attacking Saigon. Americans have
alternated between the extremes of isolationism and internationalism
since the birth of this nation without producing a satisfactory solution to the problem of a consistent foreign policy.
The threads of
Washington's Farewell Address seem to linger on in the American political
^^Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp, 167-169; Spanier,. American
Policy, p. 252.
Spanier, American Policy, p. 277,
"^^Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 170-171; Spanier, American
Policy, pp. 255-261.
86
system.
As previously discussed in the text, revisionist historians have
re-evaluated America's role in the conflict after every major war.
These revisionists have followed certain themes: (1) the conflicts in
which the nation became involved in, did not in fact, threaten United
States security;
(2) the United States became entangled in war
because the politicians saw a menace where none existed, and this
illusion had been touted by propagandists who manipulated public opinion, by soldiers with bureaucratic motives, and by bankers and industrialists in the 1930s; the communist sympathizers in government
service during the 1950s; and the "military-industrial complex" of
the 1960s—whose interests benefited from the conflict.
American involvement in both world wars as well as the two limited
conflicts that followed, so the revisionist argument goes, were miscalculations that were unnecessary or immoral, or both.
The revi-
sionists contend that the real enemy, did not in actual fact, represent
a threat to American security at all. Conversely, they believed the
threat turns out to be from within America's own system rather than
from any outside aggressor.
This school of revisionists also contend that President Truman
and a band of "cold warriors," led by Dean Acheson, were responsible
for the Cold War that precipitated Korea and Vietnam.
They charged
Stupak, Foreign Policy, pp. 87-89; Spanier, American Policy,
pp, 20-21.
47
Ibid., pp. 87-89; pp. 20-21.
87
Truman with deliberately sabotaging Yalta and creating a violently
anti-communistic United States because of pressures from the militaryindustrial complex, and a national anti-communist neurosis. The
United States was also charged as having failed to accurately assess
Soviet military capabilities and intentions."^^
Before concluding this chapter a review of the antiwar movement
is necessary to determine if it conforms to the isolationist assumptions.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s college students across the
nation became aware of and joined in the civil rights struggle. As
the number of students participating in the civil rights movement
increased, so too did their awareness that their own freedom to engage
in these activities was limited by college policy.
This latter dis-
covery created the struggle for student academic freedom with a
49
special emphasis on civil rights.
In a study by E.G. Williamson and John L. Cowan, conducted in
1963-64, the authors found evidence that on a few campuses students
initially became concerned with their own freedom, and later became
involved with the civil rights issue. Whatever the historical relationship between the two movements, the authors believe that their
study clearly show that students were concerned with both issues.
Student protest in America has not been confined to this period as
^^Ibid., pp. 87-89; pp. 20-21,
49
E,G, Williamson and John L. Cowan, The American Student's
Freedom of Expression, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of
Minnesota Press, 1966), pp. v-viii, 103-195; James Wechsler, Revolt
on the Campus, (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press,
1973) , pp. v-x.
Ibid., pp. 103-105; p. v.
88
there have been other organizations on university campuses both
before and after.
The reason for examining the 1920-1970 period is in order to
compare and contrast the student anti-war activities to the previously discussed isolationist movement. Student activism in America has
generally been confined to the events mirrored in the larger society.
The student movement of the twenties and thirties was mainly concerned with the problems of peace and war with a strong undercurrent
of radical politics.
American student activism has had a long history, but not until
the 1960s, with its coverage by the mass media, has there been any
extensive analysis of the anti-war movement.
In May, 1971 The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science devoted one
52
volume to the subject of "Student Protest."
The special editors of
this volume, Philip G. Altbach and Robert S. Laufer, believe that the
history of student protest demonstrate the continuity of issues in
each phase of the student movement from 1920-1960. These issues are
primarily civil rights, civil liberties, war and disarmament.
Of
course, interest here is confined to the American student movement in
light of its relationship, if any, to the isolationist assumptions
Williamson and Cowan, American Students, pp. 39-40; Irwin
Unger, The Movement. (New York: New York University, 1974), p. vi;
Philip G. Altbach and Patti Peterson, "Before Berkeley: Historical
Perspectives on American Student Activism," The Annals, The American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 395 , May 1971, pp. 1-14.
^^Lambert, Richard D., ed.. The Annals. Philadelphia: The
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1971.
Ibid., pp. ix-xiii.
89
established earlier in this paper.
The following then is a brief,
historical observation of the phases of student activism from the
1920 organizations and their goals to the greater publicized groups
in the 1960s.
In the 1920s a number of groups were formed which strongly
favored the League of Nations and world disarmament. The National
Student Committee for the Limitation of Armaments (NSCLA), was active
in supplying anti-war speakers for other colleges. In 1922 it merged
with the Intercollege Liberal League (ILL), to form the National
Student Forum (NSF).
Emerging also during this period were organi-
zations such as, the National Student Federation of America (NSFA),
and the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID).
The NSFA,
founded in 1925 was the forerunner of the present-day National
Student Association (NSA), and was primarily interested in international cooperation and understanding among student groups. The SLID
actively campaigned against ROTC and American involvement in
Nicaragua and Mexico.
The 1930s witnessed the growth of a mass student movement within
the United States. Altbach and Peterson emphasize that those "politically active" students were generally affiliated with adult political groups and usually took their cues from the adult movement. The
Edward Suchman, Rose K. Goldsen, and Robin Williams, Jr.,
"Attitudes Toward the Korean War," Public Opinion Quarterly,
17 (Spring 1953) pp. 173, 182.
90
authors state that " . . . even the antiwar movement was stimulated as
much by conservative isolationists as by radical students."^^ The
radical group they were referring to was the emergence of the left-wing
campus groups of the Socialist and Communist parties. In 1931, the
National Student League (N5L), was formed under Communist support and
eventual domination. NSL and SLID worked together in organizing antiwar campaigns on campus and in the American Student Union (ASU), in
^^^1-^2.
The anti-war issue was the most volatile question on Ameri-
can campuses during the 1930s. The American Student Union, basically
a union of the Communist NSL and the Socialist SLID, plus other unaffiliated liberals, functioned between 1935 and 1939. National
student peace strikes were organized between 1935 and 1939 and attracted the public attention.
The movement of the thirties involved large numbers of students
in impressive demonstrations but they failed to sustain any viable
movement.
The factional politics of the Left provided little appeal
for many students who were more interested in campus issues. With
the advent of World War II, the American student movement simply collapsed.
The forties and the early fifties are in stark contrast with
the previous active movement.
In 1943, the American Youth for
Democracy (AYD), composed of Communist activists, was organized.
The
United World Federalists (UWF), formation was brief, urging Americans
Altbach and Peterson, "Before Berkeley," pp. 4-5.
^^Ibid., pp. 6-8; Philip G. Altbach, Student Politics in America,
f^ ujstorical Analysis. (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974)
pp'. 92-93.
91
to give up their national sovereignty in favor of world government.
The Students for Democratic Action (SDA), founded in 1947, was affiliated with the liberal anti-Communist Americans for Democratic
Action (ADA).
The development of the Cold War, the Korean War, the
Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia, and the increasingly antiCommunist stance of the United States government, combined to make
57
radical and liberal student organizations unpopular.
One major
national student organization founded in 1948, was the National
Student Association, which early declared itself anti-Communist.
Although a large organization, the NSA made little impact on its
student members.
The Students for Democratic Action (SDA), also founded in 1948,
was a liberal political organization whose members were violently
anti-Communist.
A small national organization, the SDA was dependent
upon its parent group, the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), for
its financial support and guidance until its merger with the ADA in
1959.
The SDA favored a strong United Nations and a strong American
military.
It opposed universal military training, which was suggested
»
at the time as an alternative to the Selective Service System, The
group also involved itself with civil liberties and civil rights
58
issues on the campus, Altbach views the fifties as a transitional
^^Ibid,, pp, 8-9.
eg
Altbach, Student Politics, pp. 132-138.
92
period for campus activity:
With the early part of the decade resembling the
thirties in terms of organizational forms of political
concerns, and the latter marking a change in campus
radicalism and a move toward both the styles and
issues of the New Left. The late fifties saw a resurgence of campus social concern, which paved the
way for the more active sixties.^^
A poll taken in 1953 indicated that 36 percent of students had
strong reservations and 26 percent were strongly opposed to the war,
yet no group took advantage of these feelings to mobilize the
students.
Despite the repression of the Cold War and McCarthyism,
left-wing student groups managed to survive the fifties, preserving
the radical thought for the next decade.
In the early fifties radical student groups were able to
continue operating within the framework of the other student groups.
During the era of McCarthyism radical activity was literally brought
to a standstill.
The end of the Korean War and the easing of tensions
along with a greater degree of tolerance in the United States made
political activism a little easier and more popular.
The peace movement, which had been dormant in the late forties
and early fifties, was revived through two groups. The Fellowship of
59
Ibid., p. 141; Altbach and Peterson, "Before Berkeley,"
The Annals, pp. 10-11; Unger, The Movement, pp. 10-16; James P.
O'Brien, "The Development of the New Left," The Annals, 395,
May 1971, pp. 15-18.
Edward Suchman, Rose K. Goldsen, and Robin Williams, Jr.,
"Attitudes Toward the Korean War," Public Opinion Quarterly 17
(Spring 1953) pp. 173, 182.
Altbach and Peterson, "Before Berkeley," The Annals, p. 10;
Altbach, Student Politics, pp. 142-144, 174.
93
Reconciliation (FOR), and the American Friends Service Committee
(AFSC), who in cooperation with socialist and religious groups,
began speaking and staging periodic demonstrations against war in the
mid-fifties.
These two groups were pacifists in ideology, and dealt
mainly with the fears associated with nuclear weapons. In 1957, the
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), formed a student
affiliate.
The Student Peace Union (SPU), which operated as a formi-
dable campus force between 1959 to 1963, was organized largely by
socialist students.
The student SANE, composed of radicals and
liberals lost most of its effectiveness by 1960 because of clashes
with the more conservative parent group.
62
Another radical peace group which organized in 1959 was the
Student Peace Union (SPU), placed special emphasis on the futility
of war.
The College Peace Union (CPU), also founded in 1959, merged
with the SPU in 1960. The SPU, while being actively supported by the
FOR and AFSC groups, retained much of its autonomy because it had no
parent organization which could dictate policy.
Primarily the SPU
was concerned with the dangers of nuclear war and criticized both the
Soviet Union: and the United States for the Cold War and the arms
race.
63
In 1961, the SPU sponsored the Washington Action Project, a
demonstration against atmospheric nuclear testing, and were actively
^^Unger, The Movement, p. 13; Altbach, Student Politics,
pp. 182-183.
^^Altbach, Student Politics, pp, 186-190.
94
engaged in the civil rights movement.
Originally the SPU boasted a
large membership, but as the sixties continued and the issues changed,
this group, unwilling to change its ideological position, gradually
lost its appeal to the students.
the dominant issues through 1965-
Civil rights and freedoms remained
Two groups took over the leadership
from the peace movement in the early sixties.
The Student Non-
violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), provided guidance for the civil rights and the
anti-war movements.
Organized in 1960 by black and white students,
the SNCC helped organize sit-ins and freedom rides to dramatize the
effects of segregation.
SDS was comprised of socialists, liberals,
and radicals.
Originally SDS Was liberal in philosophy, but by mid64
1962, it began a drift to the Left.
By 1965, student activists began paying closer attention to
America's increased involvement in Vietnam.
In the same year the
civil rights movement was taken over by black militants and groups
such as SDS turned leftward to neo-Marxist ideas and the New Left
movement.
Sit-ins, teach-ins, and anti-draft registration protests
became the standard methods of protest.
As the war in Vietnam
escalated, the tactics of the anti-war movement also increased in
its radicalization.
Campus unrest and take-overs began at Berkeley,
Columbia, Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin, and other
Unger, The Movement, pp. 52-53, 57-64; Altbach, Student
Politics, p. 155; O'Brien, "The Development," The Annals, pp. 20-21.
65
Unger, The Movement, pp. 97-9.8.
95
universities across the nation.
The movement took on an anti-war,
anti-establishment flavor and its leaders were young middleclass,
well-educated students. Other radical groups were formed during the
sixties, such as the Movement for a Democratic Society (MDS),
Radicals in the Professions (RP), and several other groups who were
unsuccessful in their efforts. A more successful group was the New
University Conference (NUC), founded in Chicago in 1968. This group's
focus was on faculty and graduate students' concerns.
The anti-war protest of the sixties appears to be ideologically
different from the major isolationist group of the 1930s. This difference is similar to the group discussed in Chapter II, under the
category of radical isolationists.
The 1960 left-wing movement was
interested in foreign agreements and alliances, but from the standpoint of civil rights, civil freedom issues rather than the motivations of the earlier group, who required American interests and
territory as the major factor.
68
The anti-war protestors were advocates of the second assumption
that blamed the military-industrial complex for our involvement in
Vietnam.
Their major targets, after 1965, were protests against the;
R.O,T,C, on campus; military system in general, especially the
draft; any of the war supply producers; and the military research
programs on campus.
Therefore the evidence available does indicate
^^Ibid,, pp. 103-105; O'Brien, "The Development," The Annals,
p, 24,
67
Ibid., p, 24,
68
For a more detailed discussion of this matter see p. 23 above.
96
that the 1960 anti-war movement ascribed to this isolationist
..
69
assumption.
The third assumption, the demand for a unilateral foreign policy,
is more difficult to assign to the anti-war movement.
Their emphasis is
upon civil rights and civil freedom, and consequently this might bind
the movement to this assumption.
Unfortunately the available evidence
is not strong enough to support this contention.
The student movement of the sixties and early seventies had some
impact upon the general society, but the society at large remained
stable and mainly unaffected by the student protests.
The activity
on campus was performed and led by a very small minority of students
who did shape the orientation of the universities.
The protest move-
ment involved mainly civil rights and freedoms, and anti-war protest.
It is curious, that while there were some protests on the campus
against Korea, the intensity of that protest was slight in comparison
with that against the Vietnam conflict.
Perhaps it was the result
of the intensive media coverage during the Vietnam war that made the
difference, yet. the latter anti-war protest was more pronounced than during Korea.
Samuel Lubell, in a study of opinion
over several years in the 1960s, concluded that the draft was the
single largest cause of family concern and protest in 1967.
What-
ever the attendent reasons, popular criticism of the Vietnam conflict
continued to build.
^^Ibid., p. 91 above.
Samuel Lubell, Hidden Crisis in American Politics, (New \ork
W.W. Norton, 1970) Chapters 6 and 8.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
The debate over the direction of American foreign policy has
been a source of conflict since the birth of this nation. Primarily
this debate has been conducted between the two extremes of isolationism and internationalism.
Isolationism suggests that American
foreign policy be based upon the doctrine of unilateralism.
That
is, America should remain unencumbered from agreements and alliances
with foreign nations. This nation should be free to decide its
foreign policy based upon that which is in the best interests of
the United States. There has been no intent, in this paper, to
argue with the merits or the deficiencies of this movement.
It is
instead, to determine if, and the extent to which,these three basic
assumptions of the 1930 isolationists are still accepted by some
Americans.
The first of these assumptions is the isolationists' opposition
to alliances and agreements with foreign nations. This opposition
was greatest when individuals and groups believed that an agreement
did not involve American territory or vital interests. This was the
case after World War II with Congressional opposition to American
membership in the League of Nations and later the World Court. Those
opposed to these two world bodies felt that American interests were
not in accord with the League's Covenant and the jurisdiction of
97
98
the World Court.
The 1930 Isolationists were disillusioned with the
power politics employed by the victors of World War I, and believed
that America might be pulled into the characteristic European jealousies and wars.
The 1930 isolationists believed in the need to avoid European
involvement so strongly, that members of Congress attempted to legislate American neutrality.
The Isolationist coalition was composed of
five basic groups, each with differing ideologies, but all of them
were firmly against American involvement in another war.
In the
late 1930s, these groups combined behind the promise of the Neutrality
Act, and fought the Roosevelt administration as the United States
2
moved closer to World War II.
After the Second World War, Congress lost the majority of
its isolationist leaders, either through death or attrition. Senator
Taft retained his seat in Congress, and the conservative isolationist
sentiments of the 1930s remained alive. Taft was able to establish
a small following in Congress, but the stronger, more belligerent
group was gone. Post-war isolationist strength in Congress was insufficient to prevent the passage of foreign agreements presented
by the Truman administration.
Taft's group voted against such pro-
posals as: American membership in the United Nations; the Marshall
Plan; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The
American public agreed with the Truman administration that these
For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 18-20 above.
2
Ibid., pp. 18-66 above.
99
agreements were in the best interests of the United States.^
One of Taft's followers. Senator William Knowland, while opposed
to the majority of Truman's policies, was convinced that the health
of Europe, the United Nations, and NATO were in the best interests
of American security, and therefore voted for these agreements:
I will say that I supported the United Nations,
I supported the North Atlantic Pact, I supported
the arms implementation bill, I supported the
Marshall Plan and EGA, and I defy the Senator
from Texas to point out a time during the five
years I have been a member of the Senate of the
United States, since I came back from overseas,
when I have not recognized the fact that we live
in the age of the airplane and the atom, and that
we can no more return to isolation than an adult
can return to childhood,^
Ronald Steel explains some of the changes that had occurred in the
"neo-isolationists" thought since World War II:
These neo-isolationists do not want to turn the
clock back to 1938 and retire to Fortress America
while the rest of the world goes up in flames.
These neo-isolationists are, for the most part,
convinced internationalists, supporters of foreign
aid, NATO, and the Alliance of Progress. What they
seek is not a denial of American responsibility
but a retrenchment of American commitments to
those areas which they consider vital to the
national interest; more specifically Western Europe
and the western hemisphere. They believe that
American military power should be used only to
defend the vital strategic interests of the United
States, and not to save non-communist governments
in Asia and Africa,^
Ibid,, pp, 75-76 above,
U,S, Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Cong,,
2nd sess., 26 June 1950, 96:9159,
Steel, Pax Americana, p. 313.
100
Thus, it can be seen, that the new isolationism has changed
from being anti-Europe (Knowland and Fulbright appear to be good
examples of this change), into an anti-Asia/Africa bias referred to
by Steel. Another difference between the 1930 group and the later
groups can be seen in the 1930 idea of American insularity because
of a geographic isolation from Europe and Asia. To the neoisolationists, such as Knowland, the idea of geographic isolation
was no longer viable or realistic.
Additionally, neo-isolationists
rejected the concept of Fortress America, realizing that the interests
of American security sometimes exist outside of the United States.
The post-war technological changes and improvements in communication, transportation, munitions, and the onset of the Cold War
completely destroyed any suggestion of American geographic insulation.
America had turned away from isolationism to the concepts of
globalism, massive retaliation, and containment of the Communist world
In the 1950s, the McCarthy era repression made dissent during
the Korean War difficult and costly.
nents.
Still, the war had its oppo-
The general public found it difficult to understand why
America was involved in an Asian country that the administration had
previously considered expendable.
The Taftites in Congress were
concerned about the cost of the war and how it detracted from the
more important domestic issues; in other words America was fighting
in a country that was devoid of vital interests to this nation.
For a more detailed discussion of this matter see p. 99 above
101
Although Taft was very vocal in his opposition, his group lacked
sufficient strength to influence American foreign policy.
After
Taft's death in 1953, the "movement" lost its major spokesman.
While there are examples of opposition to the administration's
foreign policy after Taft's death, evidence of isolationist sentiment
is not apparent.
Anti-war sentiment was in evidence during the Korean
War, but it was confined to the larger universities, and was mild in
comparison to the protests of the sixties.
There was a resurgence
of the peace movement in the late-fifties against war and nuclear
weapons, but there is little evidence to connect these groups to the
first isolationist assumption.
Until the end of the fifties,
liberals and radicals were not outspoken, preferring to work quietly
within the peace movement.
7
The protests of the sixties, as mentioned earlier, rested
primarily upon three major issues:
and anti-war activities.
civil rights, civil freedom,
The student movement, including the New
Left, were occupied with the first two causes until 1965, when their
interest turned to the escalating war in Vietnam.
Their opposition
appears to be aimed at the government in general, and its use of
the war, rather than to any specific agreements this country might
have made with Vietnam.
The major target of these protests were
the draft system; the military, especially the presence of the
ROTC groups on campus; and President Johnson and his administration.
For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 75-76 above
102
There is some evidence that would link this movement to the first
g
isolationists' assumption.
The conspiracy theory supported by the revisionist historians
is the second isolationist assumption to be measured.
The belief
that the cause of American involvement in war is determined by a
small group of individuals, intent upon profiting by the war.
This
second assumption was frequently used by the 1930 group to explain
the cause of World War I, and provided the reason to avoid making
the same mistake in the 1930s.
This fear prompted the Nye Committee
investigations of the arms industry in the early thirties.
This in-
vestigation and the revisionist articles all suggested that the arms
manufacturers were guilty of a huge conspiracy to instigate and
extend wars.
All of the 1930 group of isolationists publicly
subscribed to this theory.
This kind of feeling resulted in the
arms embargo and the neutrality legislation passed by Congress during
the thirties.
Their justification for limiting arms was that if the
profits of war could be limited, then the war might also be avoided.
9
In the fifties, there is also evidence of the conspiracy theory,
but here the major culprit is viewed as the "socialist planner,"
and communist sympathizers in the federal government.
The National
Economic Council and the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies,
both extreme right organizations, agreed with this idea.
^For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 87-90 above
^Ibid., pp. 51-56, 84 above.
lOlbid,, p. 74 above.
103
Taft and his followers demanded that all those directly or indirectly
connected with the communist organization be removed from government.
This kind of thinking inspired the McCarthy era, providing a period
of repression, especially for liberal and radical individuals and
groups.
In the late fifties, through the sixties, and into the early
seventies, the guilty parties in the "war conspiracy," changed again.
During this period, the military-industrial complex became the culprit.
The military instigated war because that was their livelihood, and
the industrial complex did so because of profits.
Vietnam, so the
argument goes, was the result of a conspiracy between the elites of
the military-industrial complex in their efforts to influence American
foreign policy.
Pacifist organizations actively engaged in demonstra-
tions against the military and the manufacturers of nuclear weapons
throughout this period.
The Student Peace Union (SPU), the College
Peace Union (CPU), the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and the
American Friends. Service Committee (AFSC), were actively engaged in
protests against nuclear war and nuclear weapons during the sixties.
12
Therefore, the evidence indicates that some of the anti-war groups
of the sixties believed in the conspiracy theory.
The third, and final assumption of 1930 isolationist thought,
is the desire to retain America's freedom of choice in foreign
For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp.75-76 above
^^Ibid., pp. 93-94 above.
104
policy decisions.
The doctrine of unilateralism would insure that
America would not be confined in its foreign policy decisions by a
prior commitment to another nation.
The thirties group was worried
about the Roosevelt administration allying its foreign policy with
the needs and requirements of Europe.
detriment of the United States.
They believed this was to the
They fought Roosevelt's every move
to aid Britain, France, and later the Soviet Union with money and
material, which they felt should be used to build up America's defense
first.
The policy of helping Europe in its war with Germany, would
out of necessity, restrict the President's foreign policy decisions.
The lessons learned from the First World War, with its secret
agreements and power politics might happen again if FDR did not change
his priorities.
Likewise the arms embargo and isolationist opposition
to "lend lease," were examples of their demand for unilateralism.
In the fifties, Taftites continued to oppose foreign aid for
Europe and Asia.
Taft believed that these argreements and commit-
ments were not of vital interest to American security, and would
limit this country's freedom of choice in its foreign policy decisions.
Peace groups were also concerned, because the greater the number of
agreements made with other nations, the greater the chance of war.
Evidence does not support the contention that the peace organizations
advocated a unilateral policy, since their primary concern was with
For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 44-47 above.
105
war and nuclear weapons.
There is little evidence to demonstrate that the student movement of the sixties was, or was not, interested in the United States
maintaining its freedom of choice in foreign policy.
There is evi-
dence that they were dissatisfied with all of the administration's
policies dealing with the Vietnam conflict.
As mentioned earlier,
the anti-war movement was aimed at the government in general, and
the military-industrial complex, in particular.
Of the three isolationist assumptions only one appears to
carry-over, to any great degree, into the Korean and Vietnam periods.
The conspiracy theory is evidenced in all groups and the general
public, albeit with some differences.
The first assumption, dealing with the opposition to alliances
and agreements with foreign nations, also appears in the Korean era
group, but after this period the opposition to agreements appear to
be in the form of opposition-party differences.
Likewise the third
assumption, that of unilateralism, is not supported beyond the Korean
period.
It is possible that the main tenets of isolationism were only the
products of the generation of the 1930s, and as soon as those individuals left the scene, the ideas associated with their cause lost
its appeal.
It is possible that the assumptions were all proven
unrealistic by the changing technology, and a steadily shrinking world.
14
For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 89-91 above.
106
It is also possible that these views were shared only by a minority
of congressmen in key positions, and condoned by the majority of
Americans.
It will depend upon future events and additional study
to determine if this phenomenon will occur again under similar circumstances.
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