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SEEING RED: PARANOIA, POLITICS, AND MCCARTHYISM IN THE 1950
FLORIDA DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY FOR THE U.S. SENATE
________________________________________________________________________
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
Florida Gulf Coast University
In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirement of the Degree of
Master of Arts in History
________________________________________________________________________
By
Paul Kenneth Chartrand
October 11, 2013
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts
____________________________
Paul Kenneth Chartrand
Approved: October 24, 2013
____________________________
Michael Epple, Ph.D.
Committee Chair / Advisor
____________________________
Irvin D. S. Winsboro, Ph.D.
____________________________
Erik Carlson, Ph.D.
Abstract
In 1950, Senator Claude D. Pepper and Representative George A. Smathers faced off in
the Florida Democratic Primary for U.S. Senate in a battle that is deemed as one of the
dirtiest campaigns in U.S. History, and for the first time in Florida history, resulted in the
defeat of the incumbent. White Floridians supported and upheld the Southern traditions
of Jim Crow racial discrimination and segregation. Meanwhile, the United States was
adjusting to its role as a world power in the postwar era, attempting to introduce civil
rights reform, and began formulating policies and strategies to deal with the perceived
threats posed by the Soviet Union where both sides were capable of conducting war with
nuclear weapons. This paper examines the background of each candidate, their
upbringing, circumstances, environment, education, and life experiences as to how these
influences contributed to the formation of each candidate’s character and political
philosophy. Further, how their character and political philosophies, combined, with the
important issues and events of the postwar and early Cold War era (1945–1950), to
influence their decision making and the conduct of their individual campaigns during the
primary, thus contributing to Smathers’s victory and Pepper’s defeat in 1950.
© 2013 Paul Kenneth Chartrand
ii
To my Parents
The late Jack K. Chartrand and Delcie McGowan Chartrand,
for all your love, understanding and everything else you gave me.
You live on forever in my thoughts, my words and in my heart.
To my Wonderful Wife,
Rebecca Lynn LeRoux Chartrand
You have made all the high–points possible and every low–point bearable.
I thank you and I love you.
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“Offices are as acceptable here as elsewhere, and whenever a man has cast a longing eye
on them, rottenness begins in his conduct.”— Jefferson
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Contents
Acknowledgements .… v
Abbreviations …. viii
Preface …. xi
Introduction …. 1
Part I Pepper and Smathers: The Pathway to Politics
Claude Denson Pepper: The Alabama Plowboy …. 4
George Armistead Smathers: The Judge’s Son …. 25
Part II McCarthyism, Communist Paranoia, and the 1950 Democratic Primary
Shifting Sands: The Cold War and the Dawn of a New World Order …. 46
Communism, Race, and the Changing Landscape of the American Polity …. 66
“Red Pepper” “Gorgeous George “and the 1950 Primary Campaign in Florida …. 88
Conclusions …. 115
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Acknowledgements
It is impossible to mention everyone who assisted me in developing this thesis from a
notion to fruition, and equally impossible to ignore their contributions to my research
efforts. To all of the library staff who did the laborious task of retrieving and returning
numerous boxes of papers, and volumes of books to and from the shelves, I thank you for
your hard work that helped make this project possible.
The bulk of my research took place at the Claude Pepper Library in the Claude Pepper
Center at the Florida State University in Tallahassee, Florida, Special and Area Studies
Collections of the PK Yonge Library of Florida History in the George A. Smathers
Libraries at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri, and the Library–Archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society in
Madison, Wisconsin. My appreciation goes to Robert Rubero, Supervisor of Operations
Claude Pepper Library, John R. Nemmers, Assistant University Librarian, Dept. of
Special and Area Studies Collections, Dr. James Cusick, Curator of the P.K. Yonge
Library of Florida History at the George A. Smathers Libraries, Richard L. Pifer, Director
of Reference and Public Services, Helmut Knies, Archives Collection Processing and
Preservation, and to Harry Miller, Archives Reference Services at the Wisconsin
Historical Society for all of their insight and expertise in assisting in my research and
making me feel welcome during my visits. I wish to thank Dr. Randy Sowell, Head
Archivist and James Armistead, Archivist at the Harry S Truman Library for their
knowledge, expertise, and valuable assistance during my visit. I also wish to
acknowledge the contributions of Rachel Tait, Senior Library Technical Assistant, and all
of the staff at the Florida Gulf Coast University Library for their assistance in procuring
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books, newspapers, dissertations, and journal articles necessary to the research of this
project.
I am most grateful for the cooperation, assistance, guidance and patience of my
advisor, Dr. Michael Epple, for allowing me to overcome a great deal of personal
adversity to make this project successful. To Dr. Irvin D. S. Winsboro for his inspiration
to look at Florida history with greater appreciation, to explore the depth of possibilities
for historical research that Florida history has to offer, and for his passion and willingness
to push students to achieve their greatest potential—I give my most profound thanks. To
Dr. Nicola Foote, who helped me overcome the numerous hurdles of bureaucracy and
challenged me to broaden my historical horizons, I thank you for your help and guidance.
I wish to thank Dr. Paul R. Rivera for his confidence in my abilities as a budding scholar
and his providing me with the confidence and inspiration to continue forward. I wish to
thank Dr. Eric Strahorn for helping me to understand the importance of the philosophical
roots of the discipline and to prepare me and others to meet the challenges of the
profession beyond the classroom. I sincerely thank Dr. Michael Cole and Dr. Erik
Carlson for encouraging and stimulating my intellectual curiosities while helping me to
develop the skills necessary to be a historian. To Dr. John Cox for his mentoring, honest
evaluation, and critique of my writing toward increasing the level of professionalism and
scholarship in my work, I give my gratitude. I wish to thank every member of the
History Department at Florida Gulf Coast University for their dedication, passion, level
of professionalism and scholarship, and for setting a standard of excellence not only in
the classroom, but more importantly, in the quality of their professional work.
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Finally, I wish to acknowledge Leonard and Tina Robbins, Peter and Suzanne
Chartrand, Edward and Susan Chartrand, Victor and June LeRoux, Lorraine LeRoux, Ted
Sutton, my wife Rebecca, and my parents, the late Jack K. and Delcie Chartrand—their
constant love, encouragement, and support, made this project possible.
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Abbreviations
AAA — Agricultural Adjustment Act
ACL — Atlantic Coast Line
ADA — Americans for Democratic Action
AFL — American Federation of Labor
CAA — Civilian Aeronautics Administration
CCC — Civilian Conservation Corps
CIO–PAC — Congress of Industrial Organizations Political Action Committee
CWA — Civil Works Administration
DSH — Division Subsistence Homesteads
EBA — Emergency Banking Act
ERP — European Recovery Plan (The Marshall Plan)
FBI — Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDIC — Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FDR — Franklin Delano Roosevelt
FEC — Florida East Coast Railway
FERA — Federal Emergency Relief Administration
FEPC — Fair Employment Practices Committee
FEPC — Fair Employment Practices Commission
FHA — Federal Housing Administration
FLSA — Fair Labor Standards Act
FRG — Federal Republic of Germany
FSA — Federal Security Agency
FSRA — Federal Surplus Relief Corporation
GDR — German Democratic Republic
HOLC — Homeowners Loan Corporation
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HICCASP — Hollywood Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and
Professions
ICCASP — Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions
JAG — Judge Advocate General
KGB — Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
NAACP — National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCPAC — National Citizens Political Action Committee
NIRA — National Industrial Recovery Act
NKVD — Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (The People’s Commissariat for
Internal Security)
NRA — National Recovery Act
NWLB — National War Labor Board
OPA — Office of Price Administration
PCA — Progressive Citizens of America
PKWN — Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego (Polish Committee of National
Liberation)
PRRA — Puerto Rican Recovery Act
PSF — President’s Secretary’s Files (Truman Papers, Truman Library)
PWA — Publics Works Administration
RFC — Reconstruction Finance Corporation
SMOF — Staff Members and Office Files (Truman Library)
SSA — Social Security Administration
TVA — Tennessee Valley Authority
UDA — Union for Democratic Action
UN — United Nations
USHA — United States Housing Authority
USSR — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
x
VE Day — Victory in Europe Day
VJ Day — Victory over Japan Day
VMB — Volar Marine Bomber
WPA — Works Progress Administration
WPB — War Production Board
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Preface
I, as many graduate students do, labored in search of a worthy thesis topic that is
original, timely and is supported by a wealth of credible primary sources. My interest
lies within the origins and early years of the Cold War. So I narrowed the scope of my
topic to the beginning of the Cold War in the United States and the communist paranoia
of the 1950s, now known as McCarthyism. However one of my mentors, Dr. Irvin D. S.
Winsboro, by example of his own research and writing on Florida’s role in the Civil War,
inspired me to examine how Florida impacted or was impacted by the this critical period
in U.S. history and, thus led to my decision to further explore the role that Florida played
in early days of the Cold War and the era of McCarthyism. So began my search to find a
suitable topic that involved Florida during that uncertain period in U.S. history.
During my preliminary research, I came across a reference to The Red Record of
Senator Claude Pepper, a booklet complied by Jacksonville Attorney and former Federal
Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Lloyd C. Leemis, that was widely distributed
during the 1950 Democratic U.S. Senatorial Primary in Florida between the incumbent,
Sen. Claude D. Pepper, and his challenger, Rep. George A. Smathers. A cursory
examination of the 1950 Florida Democratic primary showed that Smathers successfully
portrayed Pepper, a New Deal Liberal, as sympathetic to the Soviet Union and to
communist elements within the United States. The 1950 Florida Democratic primary was
even more intriguing due to Wisconsin Sen. Joseph McCarthy’s role in the successful
campaign to defeat his political enemy, Maryland Democrat Sen. Millard Tydings and the
similarity in the accusations and tactics used against Sen. Pepper in Florida. Sen. Tydings
chaired the Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees
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in February 1950 to investigate charges made by Sen. Joseph McCarthy regarding the
presence of Communists and Soviet operatives in the U.S. State Department. The
Tydings committee denounced McCarthy and repudiated the charges of Soviet operatives
and communist elements in the State Department. The findings of the Tydings
Committee infuriated McCarthy. The office of Senate historian notes,
McCarthy retaliated by concentrating efforts and money toward Tydings defeat in the
1950 general election. The complaints centered on reports of excessive campaign
expenditures, massive out-of-state contributions unlisted in the required financial
reports, and attempts to eradicate records of questionable expenses. A highly visible
campaign activity involved the distribution of cheap tabloids, published under false
statements of sponsorship and filled with half-truths and doctored photographs that
smeared the patriotism and loyalty of Millard Tydings. Earlier that year, when
Tydings had chaired a subcommittee investigating the Wisconsin senator's charges
that Communists had infiltrated the State Department, his report described the
allegations as "a fraud and a hoax." In retaliation, McCarthy entered the Maryland
campaign on behalf of the Republican challenger, John Marshall Butler, and, after a
vicious contest, Butler upset Tydings on November 7 by more than 43,000 votes 1
.
The campaign against Tydings was found to have been unfair and McCarthy was
scrutinized for his role in the underhanded tactics used. However, according to Pepper’s
own account, McCarthy had no direct involvement in the Democratic primary in Florida
and, in fact, in his own campaign against alleged communists in the State Department did
not take place until February 1950, one month after Smathers’s Orlando announcement.
2
Yet, lack of direct involvement by McCarthy in Florida does not dispel the influence
McCarthy’s accusations had on public opinion in creating a climate of paranoia within
1
Anne M. Butler and Wendy Wolff, United States Senate Election, Expulsion, and Censure Cases,
1793-1990, S. Doc. 103-33, Washington, GPO, 1995. (486 1793-1990. S. Doc. 103-33. Washington, GPO,
1995, adapted for The Election Case of Millard Tydings v. John M. Butler of Maryland (1951), United
States Senate website: Accessed April 24, 2011,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/130Tydings_
Butler.htm.
2
Claude Pepper and Hans Gorey, Pepper, Eyewitness to a Century, Large Print ed. (Boston: G.K. Hall,
1988; San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 263; Pepper wrote that, “Joseph McCarthy had not
yet surfaced in a major way…The climate was perfect for a demagogue to pin labels on decent, honorable
people, and soon Joe McCarthy came along to fulfill that role… McCarthyism, however, preceded Joe
McCarthy.”
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American society regarding the “Communist menace” that allegedly was permeating the
government and promulgating fears of a threat to American safety and way of life.
McCarthy and Smathers were elected to the Congress in 1946. The “class of 46” was a
group mainly composed of young, ambitious veterans of World War II that came to
Washington with a sense of purpose forged by their wartime experiences, and would
eventually produce two future presidents in John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon.
Their spirit was summed up by Kennedy in his 1960 inaugural address, “… the torch has
been passed to a new generation of Americans born in this century— tempered by war,
disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage—and unwilling to
witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always
been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.” 3
Postwar America faced new challenges at home and abroad. President Roosevelt’s death
in 1945 signified the beginning of the end for the Great Depression era liberal agenda,
and a war weary nation, concerned with jobs for returning servicemen, and a stable
economy, sought to move forward while facing the challenges of transition to a
peacetime economy and leadership in a new world order.
President Truman offered a different style of leadership from FDR. The necessity of
expanding the social welfare programs of the New Deal seemed less important as
returning veterans with growing families faced severe housing shortages, unemployment,
higher prices at home, and the threat of a growing influence of Soviet power abroad as
the Iron Curtain descended and Europe became divided, East and West, both physically
and ideologically. As Arthur Herman notes, “the experience of war and military service
3
Quoted in, Theodore C. Sorensen, ed., “Let The Word Go Forth”: The Speeches, Statements and
Writings of John F. Kennedy (New York: Delacorte Press, 1988), 12.
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seemed to reinforce a sense of populist mission and a forthright attitude toward foreign
enemies that would crystallize in a hatred for international communism.” 4 Having been
first–hand witnesses to the failure of appeasement to stop the Fascist onslaught and its
destructive and bloody costs, this “new generation” vowed not to make the same mistakes
with Communists. It was this mindset that would come to bear upon Claude Pepper as he
ran for reelection to the U.S. Senate in 1950.
The 1950 Florida Democratic Primary continued the growing trend of young,
ambitious and energetic politicians, fresh from service in the Second World War,
achieving high office and charting a new course in American politics and foreign policy.
On the surface, the outcome of 1950 Democratic Senate primary appears to be the result
of successfully linking Senator Pepper to the rampant communist paranoia of the era.
However, there are several more elements that lie below the surface that contributed to
Smathers’s victory. The primary focus of this study is to examine the events that shaped
the tone and the eventual outcome of the 1950 Florida Democratic Senate primary,
including the climate of fear created by the communist hysteria, and further prove that the
defeat of the incumbent, Senator Claude D. Pepper, was the result of a culmination of
several factors—factors that include Pepper’s core beliefs, his record, legislative agenda,
personal ambitions, and his continual shift to the far left of the Democratic Party. The
candidate’s positions on civil rights and racial issues were a key factor in the outcome of
the election. The perception of Pepper’s stand on the Fair Employment Practices
Commission and how each campaign embraced and endorsed white supremacy and
segregation issues unique to Southern politics of the era, and Florida as well.
4
Arthur Herman, Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated
Senator (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 49.
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Pepper’s liberal views, put him at odds with most Southerners’ of the era. Although
support for Negro civil rights was slowly growing in the North and becoming an issue on
the national political front—it was this very same issue that inflamed a bitter and solitary
South and was viewed by many Southern politicians and their constituents as a threat to
their right of self–determination and way of life. The impact of Pepper’s growing
contentious relationship with large business interests within Florida as the state and
nation adapted to the adjustments from wartime to a peacetime economy, including
Pepper’s proclivity toward antagonizing DuPont financier Ed Ball leading the latter to
mount a concerted and concentrated effort to achieve the defeat of Pepper in 1950.
This study will also examine the changing nature of the American political climate in
the postwar era and how these changes impacted the 1950 Florida Democratic primary.
Finally, that the 1950 Florida Democratic primary was both complex and dynamic, and a
major event in the political history of Florida. The campaign was recognized for its
importance and significance on a national scale by the political pundits of the era, and is
worthy of such a detailed and comprehensive analysis of its impact upon the history of
Florida. It also serves as an example of the powerful changes occurring within the social,
moral and political strata of the United States.
The research methodology for this study relied heavily on primary sources, and the
bulk of source material comes from archival documents. These documents include
correspondence, personal and public, memorandums, press releases, speeches, pamphlets,
advertisements, executive orders and news clippings. Documents relating to the
campaign, personal and public communications and government service of Pepper and
Smathers are contained in their respective papers. The repositories for these collections
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are found at the Claude Pepper Library at Florida State University, and the George A.
Smathers Libraries at the University of Florida. Documents relating to Pepper’s personal
and public life shared with confident Raymond Robins, include copies of speeches, letters
and Pepper’s personal thoughts on pressing issues of the day. The repository for the
Robins Papers is the Special Collections and Archives at the Wisconsin Historical
Society in Madison. Documents relating to the end of World War II, the postwar
development of U.S.—Soviet foreign policy, the beginning of the Cold War, the Civil
Rights program and others pertaining to the Truman Presidency—are found in the papers
of Truman, cabinet members and advisors, Tom C. Clark, Clark Clifford, Rose Conway,
George M. Elsey, and Joseph M. Jones. These collections are located in the Harry S.
Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri. A wealth of presidential
documents used for this study, including State of the Union Addresses, Addresses before
Special Sessions of Congress, and Executive Orders were accessed online at the
American Presidency Project, John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, researchers. The
Truman Library website and the National Archives online added valuable contributions
of presidential documents as well. Oral history interviews and transcripts for Pepper,
conducted by Jack Bass, online at the Southern Oral History Program; and for Smathers
at the United States Senate Office of the Historian website, conducted by Donald A.
Ritchie, provide insight from the candidates themselves on the issues, motivations and
actions leading up to the 1950 primary showdown. A key resource for Pepper is his
autobiography — Pepper: Eyewitness to a Century, written with Hayes Gorey (1987) 5,
and the newspaper and periodical articles of the era enhances the understanding of the
5
Claude Pepper and Hans Gorey, Pepper, Eyewitness to a Century, Large Print ed. (Boston: G.K. Hall,
1988; San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 396p.
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issues and events. 6 Eyewitness to a Century details the early life of the senator from his
childhood growing up in rural Alabama through his education at the University of
Alabama and later Harvard Law School. It also provides a retrospective of his career in
the Senate and later in the House of Representatives — including detailed accounts of his
1945 trip to Moscow, his meeting with Stalin and involvement in the “dump Truman”
movement at the 1948 Democratic convention. Herein, Pepper discusses his position on
vital issues, including the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), European
recovery, relations with the Soviet Union, and the 1950 campaign. 7
Numerous scholarly works from the body of secondary literature were consulted to
provide insight, comparison and contrast to the persons, events and outcomes from
scholars of the candidates, campaign, McCarthyism, and the issues and events of the
day—the Great Depression, World War II, and the origins of Cold War, that helped to
shape perspectives and positions of Pepper, Smathers, and major decision makers. The
6
Contributions made to a better understanding of the events, decisions and perceptions of the early Cold
War era, Claude Pepper’s record and the national visibility of the 1950 Florida Democratic Primary came
from the following: George F. Kennan’s, Memoirs, 1950-1963 Vol. 2,(Boston: University of Chicago
Press, Little Brown & Co., 1967) and Harry S. Truman’s, Years of Trial and Hope: Memoirs, Vol. 2, (New
York: Doubleday, 1956) provided a wealth of background information on the end of the war, the rapidity of
change in U.S.-Soviet relations postwar and firsthand accounts of events leading to the recommendations
and decisions made leading to the outbreak of the Cold War. Newspaper articles providing valuable
background on Pepper’s record and the growing concern over Soviet relations and communism, but not
cited, were found in the New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Star, and the Chicago Tribune.
Articles of the national interest in the conduct and content of the primary campaign providing insight into
national perceptions of the Florida race include the Nation, “Exit Senator Pepper,”; Newsweek, “Fire in the
Everglades,” April 3, 1950; New Republic, “Smathers Blathers” January 30, 1950 and “Lessons of the
Primaries,” May 1, 1950; Time, “Feud in the Palmettos,” April 3, 1950, “Florida: Anything Goes,” April
17, 1950, and “First Lame Duck,” May 15, 1950. The transcripts of an oral history interview of Claudia
“Lady Bird” Johnson were used to verify the identity of a recipient of a letter, from George Smathers to the
office of Attorney General Tom C. Clark.
7
The Fair Employment Practices Commission was a proposal based on the wartime Fair Employment
Practices Committee that was enacted to support the rights of women and African–American workers in
employed in the war effort. President Truman as part of his civil rights program proposed that a permanent
FEPC be established to protect the rights of minority workers. FEPC faced severe opposition Congress
from the segregated South. Southern senators successfully filibustered and the measure failed to pass.
However, on 26 July 1948 President Truman signed Executive Order #9980 establishing Fair Employment
Practices in Federal hiring and several states initiated their own FEPC legislation.
xviii
major works germane to this project include Brian Crispell’s Testing the Limits: George
Armistead Smathers & Cold War America (1999), Tracy Danese's Claude Pepper & Ed
Ball: Politics, Purpose, and Power (2000), James Clark's Red Pepper and Gorgeous
George Claude Pepper’s Epic Defeat in the 1950 Democratic Primary (2011), and
Patricia Wickman's The Uncommon Man: George Smathers of Florida (1994). A
valuable examination of Pepper’s life before politics is contained in Ric Kabat’s article,
“From Camp Hill to Harvard Yard: The Early Years of Claude Pepper,” (1993).
8
Unlike Claude Pepper, George Smathers did not write an autobiography and Crispell's
Testing the Limits provides the most comprehensive biographical overview of Sen.
Smathers’ early life and career, including his education at the University of Florida, his
service in the Pacific as a Marine Corps officer during World War II, and as a prosecutor
and U.S. attorney in Miami. Testing the Limits discusses Smathers prowess in conducting
his 1946 campaign against Pat Cannon for the U.S. House of Representatives as well as a
detailed examination of the 1950 Democratic primary campaign. Danese's Claude Pepper
& Ed Ball discusses the tumultuous relationship that existed between Claude Pepper and
DuPont family financier Ed Ball, who invested enormous sums of money in Florida, thus
increasing the wealth of the DuPont family and making a personal fortune in the process.
It reveals the deep resentment and animosity that existed between Pepper and Ball. As
the size and scope of Ball's investments in Florida grew—so did his influence on Florida
politics. Pepper’s deliberate and acerbic attacks on Ball’s business interests on behalf of
8
Brian Crispell, Testing the Limits: George Armistead Smathers & Cold War America (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1999), 234p, Tracy Danese, Claude Pepper & Ed Ball: Politics, Purpose, and
Power (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000), 300 p, James Clark, Red Pepper and Gorgeous
George Claude Pepper’s Epic Defeat in the 1950 Democratic Primary (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 2011), 206 p, Patricia Wickman, The Uncommon Man: George Smathers of Florida (Panama City,
Florida: n.p., 1994), 178p, Ric Kabat, “From Camp Hill to Harvard Yard: The Early Years of Claude
Pepper,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 72, no. 2 (October, 1993), 153-179.
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the DuPont Trust and Ball’s contempt for Claude Pepper’s New Deal liberalism came to
a head in 1949 as Ball vowed to do everything in his power to defeat Pepper in the 1950
Democratic U.S. Senate primary. In addition, Alexander R. Stoesen, “Road From
Receivership: Claude Pepper, the DuPont Trust and the Florida East Coast Railway,”
(1973), proved invaluable in understanding the relationship between Pepper and Ball.
Articles useful to understanding the political landscape in1950 include, Jonathan
Bell’s “Conceptualizing Southern Liberalism: Ideology, and the Pepper–Smathers 1950
Primary in Florida,” (2003), William G. Carleton, “The Southern Politician—1900 and
1950,” (1951), James C. Clark, “Claude Pepper and the Seeds of his 1950 Defeat, 19441948,” (1995), and Hugh Douglas Price, “The Negro in Florida Politics, 1944-1954,”
(1955). 9
Wickman's The Uncommon Man was originally written as a companion to a
production in the Florida Department of State's Great Floridian Film Series. According to
Wickman, in a personal communication with the author, the content was expanded and
the book was privately published at the request of George Smathers and intended for
friends and family. Despite the limited scope intended, The Uncommon Man provides a
unique perspective of the life and career of George Smathers based on the author's
conversations with the senator, his son Bruce A. Smathers, from an unpublished
9
Alexander R. Stoesen, “Road From Receivership: Claude Pepper, the DuPont Trust and the Florida
East Coast Railway,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 52, no. 2 (October, 1973), 132-156, Alexander R.
Stoesen, “Road From Receivership: Claude Pepper, the DuPont Trust and the Florida East Coast Railway,”
The Florida Historical Quarterly 52, no. 2 (October, 1973), 132-156,
Jonathan Bell, “Conceptualizing Southern Liberalism: Ideology, and the Pepper–Smathers 1950 Primary in
Florida,” Journal of American Studies 37, no. 1 (April, 2003), 17-45, William G. Carleton,
“The Southern Politician—1900 and 1950,” Journal of Politics 13, no. 2 (May, 1951), 215-231, James C.
Clark, “Claude Pepper and the Seeds of his 1950 Defeat, 1944-1948,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 74,
no. 1 (Summer, 1995), 1-22, Hugh Douglas Price, “The Negro in Florida Politics, 1944-1954,” Journal of
Politics 17, no.2 (May, 1955), 198-220.
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biography written by Bruce Smathers and this serves to complement Crispell's Testing
the Limits. Clark's Red Pepper and Gorgeous George: Claude Pepper’s Epic Defeat in
the 1950 Democratic Primary, in 2011, the most recent scholarship examining the 1950
Democratic Senate Primary is a follow up to Clark's Ph D dissertation, “The Road to
Defeat: Claude Pepper and Defeat in the 1950 Florida Primary.” Red Pepper, is a
narrowly focused discussion of the 1950 primary campaign provides a detailed account of
Pepper’s political missteps and miscalculations, in contrast to the campaign savvy and
resourcefulness of Smathers, when combined with his blinding ambition, created a
blueprint for success in defeating Pepper in the 1950 primary.
The Great Depression era redefined liberal politics, ushering in the greatest
commitment to, and development of, social welfare programs in the nation’s history
while attempting to rescue the nation’s economy from the brink of disaster. Roosevelt’s
response to meeting the challenges of the Great Depression resulted in the creation of an
ideology that shaped the minds of liberal thinkers and defined the political career of
Claude Pepper and many others. Two works that proved to be valuable sources of
information into the background of the Great Depression are David M. Kennedy’s
Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (1999),
and Eric Rauchway, The Great Depression and the New Deal: A Very Short Introduction
(2008). 10 The war years of 1941-1945 helped to define a generation and brought the
nation into a position of world leadership that forever changed the political landscape at
home. To achieve a basic understanding of the impact of the war on the period and the
10
David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945
(New York: Oxford Press, 1999), 936p. Eric Rauchway, The Great Depression and the New Deal: A Very
Short Introduction (Oxford Press, 2008), 144p, James C. Clark, “The Road to Defeat: Claude Pepper and
Defeat in the 1950 Florida Primary” PhD diss, University of Florida, 1998, 260p.
xxi
generation it fostered the following works proved invaluable. Simon Berthon and Joanna
Potts, Warlords: An Extraordinary Recreation of World War II: Through the Eyes of
Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin (2006), Wm. Roger Louis and Robert Robinson,
Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization,
Collected Essays 2nd ed. (2006), and, Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars from World War to
Cold War, 1939-1953, (2006).
The events surrounding the 1948 presidential campaign played a pivotal role in
sharply defining the direction of and the division within the Democratic Party,
illuminating differences between Pepper, Truman, and Smathers and highlighting
Pepper’s decisions during this critical period. Decisions, that would greatly impact his
1950 reelection bid. The following works helped to provide background and insight into
the dynamics involved during this crucial year: Clifton Brock, Americans for
Democratic Action: Its Role in National Politics (1962), Kari Frederickson, The
Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South (2001), Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the
New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (1973). 11
T.H. Watkins, Righteous Pilgrim: The Life and Times of Harold L. Ickes, 1874-1952
(1990), and Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and
Political Risks (2002) provides perspective into the impetus behind Truman’s civil rights
program and desegregation of the military in 1948.
11
Simon Berthon and Joanna Potts, Warlords: An Extraordinary Recreation of World War II: Through
the Eyes of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2006), 386p, Wm. Roger
Louis and Robert Robinson, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and
Decolonization, Collected Essays. 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 1065p, Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s
Wars from World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 468p, Clifton
Brock, Americans for Democratic Action: Its Role in National Politics (Washington: Public Affairs Press,
1962), 229p, Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 311p, Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S.
Truman and American Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 635p.
xxii
By 1950, the Cold War was beginning to be entrenched in the political, diplomatic,
and military structures of the United States. Accusations and fear of communism,
communist subversives, and infiltrators would greatly influence and impact the daily
lives of U.S. citizens throughout the decade. The year 1950 was also the year in which
Sen. Joseph P. McCarthy thrust himself into the spotlight and accused the U.S. State
Department of harboring Communists in high–level positions within the department.
Literature useful in an understanding of the period includes Arthur Herman’s Joseph
McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator, (2000),
Ted Morgan’s Reds: McCarthyism in 20th Century America, (2003), and Athan
Theoharis’ Seeds of Repression: Harry S Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism,
(1971). 12 Each provides a unique perspective and useful insights into the motivations,
consequences and impact of the senator’s accusations upon the American public and as a
promoter of the fear and paranoia of communist infiltration and subversion within the
government and influential private sectors.
Irvin D.S. Winsboro and Michael Epple’s, “Religion, Culture, and the Cold War:
Bishop Fulton J. Sheen in America’s Anti-Communist Crusade of the 1950s,” (2009),
demonstrates how the culture of fear and communist paranoia grew and soon invaded
mainstream America through the medium of television through Bishop Sheen and his
strong anti-communist views. Literature helpful in understanding the Cold War era
includes John Lewis Gaddis’ The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 194112
T.H. Watkins, Righteous Pilgrim: The Life and Times of Harold L. Ickes, 1874-1952 (New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 1990), 1010p, Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage
and Political Risks (Carbondale, Illinois: University of Southern Illinois Press, 2002),276p, Arthur
Herman, Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator, (New
York: Free Press, 2000), 404p, Ted Morgan’s Reds: McCarthyism in 20th Century America,(New York:
Random House, 2003), 685p, Athan Theoharis’ Seeds of Repression: Harry S Truman and the Origins of
McCarthyism, (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 238p.
xxiii
1947, (1972), The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (1987), and
Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of
Communism, 1941-1945, (1979). Major articles providing a better insight into issues and
events surrounding the origins of the Cold War include Gary Hess’s “The Iranian Crisis
of 1945-46 and the Cold War,” (1974), and George F. Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet
Conduct,” (1947). 13
The Pepper–Smathers campaign received a great deal of media attention and
generated numerous articles in Florida newspapers and national publications. These
articles provide a glimpse of analysis of the campaign, public opinion and sentiment at
the time and contribute valuable insight and information to the study of the campaign.
Newspapers and periodicals providing extensive coverage of the 1950 Florida
Democratic Primary include The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Christian
Science Monitor, The Miami Herald, The Miami Daily News, The Tampa Tribune,
Daytona Beach Morning Journal, Orlando Morning Sentinel, Life, Time, Newsweek, The
Nation, and The New Republic. The goal here is to examine the changing dynamics
within the social and political climate in the United States brought on by the pressures of
the postwar world, both domestically and abroad, especially the growing tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union at the outset of the Cold War. Further, to
provide a concise and cohesive analysis of how these dynamics influenced the campaign
13
Irvin D.S. Winsboro and Michael Epple’s, “Religion, Culture, and the Cold War: Bishop Fulton J.
Sheen in America’s Anti-Communist Crusade of the 1950s,” The Historian 71, no. 2 (Summer, 2009), 209233, John Lewis Gaddis’ The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1972), 396p, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 344p, Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy,
Warfare and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 409p,
Gary Hess, “The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 89, no. 1 (March
1974), 117-146, George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, 25 no. 4 (1947),
566-582.
xxiv
for U.S. Senate in the1950 Florida Democratic primary and examine how the campaign,
and its outcome, reflected the core values of the “G.I. Generation” destined to lead the
United States throughout the Cold War era and over four decades impacting the political
landscape of Florida and the nation.
1
Introduction
From 1945–1950, the rapidity of change by the United States from an isolationist
nation to a major international player was staggering. The United States and the Soviet
Union continued to become more ideologically polarized, as tensions continued to mount
as the Cold War deepened. The Truman administration adopted a policy of containment
designed to keep the USSR in check and curtail the spread of communism around the
world, and toward that goal the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Plan
(ERP), or Marshall Plan, provided economic aid to Western and Southern Europe and the
NATO alliance was thus formed. The Soviets countered with the formation of the
Eastern Bloc and the signing of the Warsaw Pact. The final collapse of the war time
alliance occurred in June 1948, when the Soviets blockaded Berlin’s sectors occupied by
France, Great Britain and the United States. The “trizonal coalition” countered the siege
with a massive airlift of food, water and other necessary supplies. In 1949, the Soviets
obtained nuclear capabilities thus escalating the tensions of the Cold War and deepening
fears of communism and the threat of Soviet world domination.
At home, the euphoria of the allied victory and the return of service personnel were
short lived as the Truman administration embarked upon its domestic agenda and created
tensions surrounding the issue of civil rights. Beginning in 1941, the U.S. House of
Representatives attempted to pass anti–poll tax and anti–lynching legislation. In 1944, the
Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwright (1944) 1 ruled that the all white primary in Texas
was unconstitutional. On 5 December 1946, Truman issued Executive Order 9808,
establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights. All of these measures drew the
1
Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
2
ire of Southern Democrats in Congress. On 26 July 1948 Truman issued Executive
Order’s 9980 and 9981, ordering the federal government to implement fair employment
practices for all federal employees and desegregation of the Armed Forces. Meanwhile,
Progressives, made up mainly of New Deal liberals led by Henry Wallace and supported
by Claude Pepper, favored a more conciliatory and friendly stance in relations with the
Soviet Union. Progressives disagreed with Truman’s “get tough” policy toward the
Soviet Union as detrimental to advancing the cause of world peace. These elements
created a schism in the Democratic Party and threatened the prospects of a Democratic
victory in 1948.
When Truman chose to run in 1948, he found as much opposition within his own
party as he did from the Republicans. This included a move by Progressives who
supported a “dump Truman” campaign that included a failed attempt to draft General
Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Democratic nominee, and at the eleventh hour, draft Claude
Pepper. The result was two factions of the Democratic Party breaking off and forming
third party efforts. When a comprehensive civil rights plank was added to the Democratic
Party’s platform, the hard–line right wing Southern Democrats formed the States’ Rights
Party, more commonly known as the Dixiecrats, and ran Governor Strom Thurmond of
South Carolina for President. After failing to dislodge Truman from the Democratic
ticket, the Progressive Party chose Henry Wallace as its standard–bearer. As Schmidt
noted, “The presidential campaign of 1948 was not exceptional in that it witnessed new
minor–party challenges to Democratic and Republican supremacy.” 2
2
Karl M. Schmidt, Henry A. Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948 (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1960), 19–40, Ibid., vii.
3
The five–year period between 1945 and 1950 was one of both change and uncertainty.
During this period, Claude Pepper and George Smathers played a role in decisions
affecting the course of action on policy, both foreign and domestic, while defining their
stand on vital issues. Pepper came to the senate in 1936. He represented the old guard,
New Deal liberals that advocated a more pro–Soviet stance, greater social welfare, and a
continuation of the liberal status quo. Smathers had served in the Marines during the war
and represented a new wave of thinking. Smathers personified the new generation of
battle–hardened veterans that advocated a tough stand on the Soviet Union in order to
check Soviet promulgation of communism around the world. The cordial relationship
between the two men that existed before the war began to slowly dissipate, as differences
in political visions became apparent, and as Smathers political ambitions broadened. In
1950, a battle for the direction of the nation began with the first salvo having been fired
in Orlando, Florida on 12 January when George Smathers declared his candidacy for the
U. S. Senate in the Florida Democratic Primary, challenging his former mentor and
supporter, Florida’s senior senator, Claude Pepper.
4
Claude Denson Pepper: The Alabama Plowboy
Claude Denson Pepper was born on 8 September 1900 in Chambers County, Alabama.
Pepper, in the opening line of his autobiography, Pepper, Eyewitness to a Century, wrote,
“On a bright September day in the twentieth century’s first year, Lena Talbot and Joseph
Wheeler Pepper knew visitors would be calling… anxious to see Lena’s new baby, a
boy.” 1 Pepper’s words displayed a cheery optimism that belayed the circumstances into
which he entered this world. As Kabat noted, “Claude D. Pepper was born into
economically deprived and socially humble circumstances… He grew up acquiring the
traditional values of hard work, delayed gratification, Christian moral teachings, and,
most importantly, a belief in cooperation and communitarian responsibility.” 2 At the
time of his birth his father owned and operated a farm outside of Dudleyville, Alabama.
For the first ten years of his life Pepper was an only child, the Peppers lost three children
before him.
In 1904, Joseph Pepper moved his wife and son to Texas in hopes of a more
prosperous life, but after a year and no prosperity, the family returned to the Dudleyville
Alabama farm. In 1910, they moved to Camp Hill so young Claude could attend a better
school. 3 That same year his brother Joseph was born; a sister Sara and another brother,
Frank, soon followed. During young Claude’s formative years, the search for a more
Note: The page numbers of the large print edition of Pepper, Eyewitness to a Century used by the
author; do not directly correspond with the 1987 edition published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich in 1987.
1
Claude Pepper and Hans Gorey, Pepper, Eyewitness to a Century, Large Print ed. (Boston: G.K. Hall,
1988; San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), ix.
2
Ric A. Kabat, “From Camp Hill To Harvard Yard: The Early Years of Claude D. Pepper,” The Florida
Historical Quarterly, 72, no.2 (October, 1993): 153.
http://digitool.fcla.edu/view/action/singleViewer.do?dvs=1350864924923~150&locale=en_US&VIEWER
_URL=/view/action/singleViewer.do?&DELIVERY_RULE_ID=7&search_terms=fhq%20vol%2072%20n
o%202&adjacency=Y&application=DIGIT. Accessed August 21, 2010.
3
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 6.
5
prosperous life sought by J.W. Pepper never materialized despite numerous and valiant
efforts toward that goal. The elder Pepper tried his hand at business, failing in both the
furniture and grocery businesses he opened. He then went on to hold several jobs in law
enforcement. In 1922, J.W. Pepper ran for Sheriff of Tallapoosa County, Alabama,
losing the election. As Kabat notes, “After 1922 his father moved through a variety of
low paying jobs and often depended upon his son for support.” 4
So it fell upon young Claude’s shoulders to help support the family and he took on the
responsibility dutifully and willingly. In April 1917, just before Pepper’s graduation from
high school, the U.S. entered World War I. After graduation from high school in
May1917, he spent the summer traveling around Alabama cleaning and blocking hats.
The venture was less successful than Pepper had hoped for, and soon he was searching
for new employment. In regard to his situation, Pepper wrote, “Despite tragic aspects,
war sometimes opens up opportunities for people, and thus it was with me in the early
fall of 1917.” 5 The war had brought about an acute shortage of teachers in Alabama and
presented the opportunity for Pepper to obtain a job teaching fifth grade for the Dothan,
Alabama school system just before his seventeenth birthday. After a year of teaching,
Pepper returned briefly to Camp Hill before taking a job at the Tennessee Coal and Iron
Company in Ensley, Alabama. Pepper wrote about his experience in the steel mill,
noting, “I straightened rails, lifting one end of a 273–pound billet with a co–worker,
twelve hours a day, seven days a week. There was no union. Anyone who complained
about the hours was told to get out.” 6 The work was dangerous and demanding and the
conditions less than ideal. This experience had a profound impact upon the future
4
Kabat, “Camp Hill to Harvard Yard,” 157-58.
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 21.
6
Ibid., 23.
5
6
senator. His own exposure to the realities of the extreme hardship endured by the
industrial working class was brief; but the lessons learned stayed with him and influenced
his views on labor issues throughout his political career. As Kabat noted, “Pepper’s
tough steel mill experience introduced him to the plight of industrial workers. His
memories of the poor working conditions, low pay and general helplessness of the bluecollar laborers remained vivid…. As a senator, Pepper supported virtually all of the New
and Fair Deal labor legislation, including minimum wage.” 7 Pepper’s true ambition was
to attend college, and his desire was to go to the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa;
however, his family obligations left him short of the necessary funds to attend. Pepper
received a scholarship to Howard College but his heart was set on the university. With
the help of his mother Lena and E.H. Hill, president of the Bank of Camp Hill he was
able to borrow the necessary funds and in September 1918 was admitted to the freshman
class at the University of Alabama. 8
The second opportunity afforded Pepper by the circumstances of war was induction
into military service in the Student Army Training Corps. It was part of the War
Department’s efforts to train and prepare soldiers for service in the conflict while
allowing them to continue their college studies. Pepper wrote, “To me, the most
immediate benefit of being in the army was financial; all expenses were taken care of.” 9
However, financial relief and his army service were both short–lived, lasting just forty
days from October 7–November 11, 1918 when the Armistice was signed ending World
War I. As fate would have it, Pepper was destined to receive another unexpected
windfall from his brief military service. Kabat notes that, “Army service changed
7
Kabat, “Camp Hill to Harvard Yard,” 160.
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 24-26. Also see, Kabat, “Camp Hill to Harvard Yard,” 161.
9
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 28-29.
8
7
Pepper’s life. While doing some heavy lifting he developed a hernia. The painful injury
translated into disability money from the government. Designed to train disabled World
War I veterans, the federally funded vocational program enabled Pepper to enter law
school.” 10
Pepper’s ambitions for law school were lofty as he set his sights on Harvard and
fate had intervened in his favor once again. Pepper wrote,
And the law school I wanted was the one I judged to be the best: Harvard. To go to
Harvard was now miraculously within my reach. Amazing! When government lends
a hand, possibilities can be limitless. That is my philosophy, and my experience.
That hand even extends to former cotton pickers and plowboys from rural Alabama. 11
During his trip to attend Harvard he had the good fortune to meet another young
southerner, Wallace Walker of Atlanta, heading for the same destination. Walker became
his roommate and lifelong friend. During one rough period when his benefit checks were
delayed, Pepper could not pay his school obligations. However, Pepper writes, that, “I
would have had to drop out of school if not for Walker. His family was wealthy, so he
could lend me the money I needed until a half dozen or so checks arrived at once and I
was able to pay him back.” 12 Pepper, with the aid of loans from the Camp Hill bank, his
government disability, and a helping hand from his friend Walker, was able to pay for
Harvard tuition and living expenses without taking on a job, thus allowing him more time
to concentrate on his studies full time. As Kabat noted, “This turn of fate reinforced
Pepper’s sympathy for governmental activism. If federal money had not been available,
10
Kabat, “Camp Hill to Harvard Yard,” 162.
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 32.
12
Ibid., 33.
11
8
he could not have attended Harvard Law School. Pepper later cited this as contributing to
his political liberalism.” 13
Harvard exposed Pepper to some of the foremost legal minds of the era, and his
professors included future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who helped found
the American Civil Liberties Union. Pepper’s years at Harvard were formative in the
sense that it helped him develop the necessary skills to think critically and formulate
positions on the events and issues shaping his age. In 1950, when his opponent George
Smathers made reference to Pepper having studied law under the “crimson of Harvard,”
Pepper wrote:
An innuendo as contemptible as it is unanswerable. The truth is that Harvard’s
official color, crimson, far predated the association of red and pink colors with
communism. Also the truth is that Harvard did not provide me with a political
philosophy of right, left or middle. … What Harvard Law School tried to influence
was the thinking process, not the thoughts; the whole idea was to make students think,
not impose leftist ideology upon them. Harvard taught me the difference between a
broad and narrow mind; it freed me from many prejudices. 14
Pepper’s first involvement in national politics came while attending Harvard. In 1922,
Henry Cabot Lodge was running for re-election to the U.S. Senate against Democratic
challenger, William A. Gaston. Pepper took exception to Senator Lodge’s position on the
League of Nations. Lodge was able to lead the Senate against ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles and the result was the formation of the League of Nations without participation
by the United States. Pepper joined the Democratic Speakers Bureau in Boston making
speeches on behalf of Gaston. 15 Gaston lost the race; however, Pepper did gain valuable
experience as an orator.
13
Kabat, “Camp Hill to Harvard Yard,” 163. Pepper refers to this in the large print edition of Pepper,
Eyewitness to a Century, on page 32, page 24 of the standard edition referenced by Kabat.
14
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 34-36.
15
There are discrepancies in Pepper’s account of this event, claiming it took place in 1924, after his
graduation from Harvard and that Senator Lodge won easily, Pepper, 37-38. The election actually took
9
Pepper graduated from Harvard Law School in 1924 and headed to the University of
Arkansas to teach in the law school where one of his law students was William J.
Fulbright. Fulbright, a future senator from Arkansas, founded the Fulbright scholarships
and briefly served with Pepper on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949.
Pepper found the experience of academia pleasant but he was still unsettled and a strong
desire to enter into politics continued to haunt his thoughts and mind. Pepper had a great
belief in fate and believed that fate, for the most part, was kind to the former plowboy
from Alabama. Pepper, convinced that fate had intervened again, befriended a young law
student named Donald Trumbo. Trumbo married without permission of his family. His
father, Arthur Cook (A.C.) Trumbo, angered by the impudence of his son, stopped paying
his law school tuition. At the bequest of the younger Trumbo, Pepper interceded on his
behalf and in concert with the charm of Trumbo’s new wife, was able to mend fences.
Donald soon returned to law school and Pepper became a friend of the family.
A.C. Trumbo was a wealthy financier and banker from Oklahoma and he had interests
in more than one million acres of land near Perry in Taylor County, Florida, calling it,
“the golden age of the future.” Trumbo wanted his son to share in the future of Florida, so
he asked Pepper to accompany him to Perry to establish a law office that Donald would
join once he finished his law studies. While mulling over the elder Trumbo’s offer,
Pepper and Donald, in June 1925, were asked to represent A.C. at a meeting where the
Hoover Syndicate would become The Florida West Coast Development Committee. 16 At
that meeting Pepper met the syndicate’s attorney, former judge W.B. Davis, who was
place in 1922, Pepper’s second year at Harvard and according to the Senate Historian, the race was close
due to Lodge’s position on the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations and was not “won easily” as
Pepper recalled; see United States Senate;
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/People_Leaders_Lodge.htm.
16
Ibid., 44-45.
10
looking for an attorney to join him in Perry. Pepper accepted Davis’s offer and arrived in
Florida on 30 June 1925, Pepper noted, “Fate had pointed me in a new direction—to
Florida, ‘The Land of the Future’— Certainly it was the land of my future.” 17
Shortly after Pepper’s arrival in Florida, the great land boom which brought him to
Florida collapsed, due in part to an infestation of Mediterranean fruit flies that decimated
the citrus crop and to a major hurricane in South Florida in 1926. The prospect of great
wealth and prosperity for Pepper went with it. Pepper joined Judge Davis in practicing
law in Perry for the next two years and made enough money to support his family and
repay his debts. Clark writes, “Florida was a state of newcomers. Yesterday’s new arrival
could become an instant millionaire or be elected to office.” 18 While wealth, instant or
otherwise eluded him, Pepper did have the opportunity to enter politics in 1928 when he
ran for the Taylor County seat in the Florida House against incumbent W. T. Hendry.
Hendry missed voting on a bill requiring the mandatory dipping of cattle to kill ticks
causing disease that decimated cattle herds and was easily spread. While there was a
heated debate on both sides of the dipping issue, Pepper focused his campaign solely on
the failure of Hendry to vote on important issues. It proved to be a winning tactic with
Pepper upsetting Hendry and going to the Florida statehouse.
Pepper’s tenure in the legislature was short lived as he was defeated for reelection in
1930. Clark, referring to Pepper’s failed reelection bid, noted, “He refused to rule out
support for a retail sales tax, while his opponent stressed opposition to any such measure.
But Pepper later blamed his defeat on his failure to support a resolution censuring the
wife of President Herbert Hoover for inviting the wife of a black congressman to the
17
Ibid., 42.
James C. Clark, Red Pepper and Gorgeous George: Claude Pepper’s Epic Defeat in the 1950
Democratic Primary (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2011), 7.
18
11
White House.” 19 The event, a tea held for the wives of congressional members and First
Lady Lou Hoover, included Jessie De Priest, the wife of Congressman Oscar De Priest of
Illinois, an African–American. 20 The issue set off a firestorm in the segregated South
where Florida was one of three states to hold formal votes to censure Mrs. Hoover. 21
Pepper, recalling the issue, wrote:
a resolution castigating the First Lady for weakening the tradition of segregation and
endangering the concept of white supremacy, for encouraging the notion of racial
equality and ‘polluting the stream of Southern citizenship. By no means was I as
liberal on race as I since have become, but this resolution was more than I could
handle.… I said, ‘I am a Southerner and a Democrat like my ancestors before me, but
I consider this resolution out of place as an act of this body…. This was my first
conspicuous vote on a civil rights matter and it contributed substantially to my defeat
when I sought another term in 1930. 22
On 29 October 1929 the U.S. stock market crashed and set off a chain reaction of
financial disasters that contributed to the largest economic loss and decline in the nation’s
history—the Great Depression. When Pepper left office in 1931, Florida, like the rest of
the country, was reeling from the effects of the economic crisis that included numerous
bank failures, businesses and manufacturing closures, and widespread unemployment.
Pepper realized that given the economic circumstances, he could not return to his law
practice in Perry; and furthermore, his heart lay in being involved in the political process.
Thus, he decided to move from Perry to Tallahassee and open a new law firm with his
19
Clark, Red Pepper and Gorgeous George, 8.
Oscar Stanton De Priest was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois 1st District in
Chicago’s south and south west side. He served three terms from 1929–1935 and was the first African–
American elected to Congress in the 20th century.
21
Texas and Georgia were the other states voting for the censure of Mrs. Hoover.
22
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 54-55.
20
12
friend Curtis L. Waller. During this period Pepper would meet his future wife, Mildred
Wheeler, a legislative worker from St. Petersburg, outside the governor’s office. 23
The developing economic catastrophe was larger and more ominous than anyone
expected. The ensuing economic crisis was global in scale and it impacted the collective
citizenry of the United States of America, urban and rural, wealthy and poor; and for the
first time, caused a majority of Americans to wonder if capitalism and American
democracy could survive.
President Hoover was optimistic that the economic crisis was temporary and that it
could be corrected by voluntary measures from the private sector rather than through the
use of regulatory or legislative measures. By 1932, Hoover had come to realize the depth
of the depression and the failure of his voluntary measures to stop the cascading collapse
of businesses, industry, and financial institutions. In his final State of the Union message
on 6 December1932, Hoover said that, “The basis of every other and every further effort
toward recovery is to reorganize at once our banking system. The shocks to our economic
system have undoubtedly multiplied by the weakness of our financial system.” 24 Most
Americans came to believe that Hoover’s actions in 1932 were “too little, too late” and
fear came to grip the nation. In 1932, the Democratic challenger, Governor Franklin
Delano Roosevelt of New York promised Americans a “New Deal.” The nation ready for
change, looked to Roosevelt for direct, immediate action and sought solace and salvation
in his calm, commanding voice, as he spoke to the nation during his Inaugural Address
on 4 March 1933, “This great Nation will endure as it has endured, will revive and will
23
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 56-57.
Herbert Hoover, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” December 6, 1932, John
Woolley and Gerhard Peters, researchers, The American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=23376. Accessed November 9, 2012.
24
13
prosper. So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is
fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to
convert retreat into advance.” 25
Thus, FDR ushered in the New Deal, offering hope for
a better tomorrow and assurance that the nation can and will survive and gave rise to the
era of New Deal liberalism.
Claude Pepper said, “I was a New Dealer before there was a New Deal.” 26 This is true
in the ideological sense, in that he embodied the belief that government intervention can
provide opportunities, allow many to overcome obstacles, and achieve a better quality of
life than their normal station or circumstance would allow. In a letter to Roosevelt on 22
December 1928, Pepper outlined his belief that the Democratic Party should become the
champion of liberalism in the nation and his belief that Roosevelt should lead the party
toward that goal. Pepper wrote,
I am convinced, however, that we shall not have our greatest success until we make
more perfect in the public mind, the concept of what our party is and what it aims.
For one, I want the Democratic Party genuinely to become the Liberal Party of the
Nation. I want it not to compromise upon that matter, because we cannot go to the
people with conviction in our eyes unless we are sincere in our liberalism…. 27
This was four years before Roosevelt would win the White House and eight years before
Pepper’s own arrival in the nation’s capital. As the New Deal began to unfold, it was
evident that Roosevelt shared this liberal vision with Pepper and giving credibility to
Pepper years later when he said that he and FDR were “ideological soul mates.” In 1934,
Pepper launched an unsuccessful campaign for the U.S. Senate against incumbent Park
25
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “First Inaugural Address,” Washington, D.C., March 4,1933, National
Archives, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-inaugural/images/address-1.gif. Accessed
November 12, 2012.
26
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, xvii.
27
Claude Pepper to Franklin Roosevelt, December 22, 1928, George A. Smathers Papers, Special and
Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.
Hereafter referred to as the Smathers Papers.
14
Trammell. Regarding his loss, Pepper wrote, “The 1934 election left a bitter taste and
generated an enormous wave of goodwill for the loser. When the vote totals were
published, it became clear that the Trammel forces had beaten me with what was known
as the ‘hot vote’ in the Tampa area. Eleven precincts in West Tampa and Ybor City were
populated by naturalized Spaniards and Italians, who ordinarily would not vote but did
when powerful, monied interests paid the poll tax for them.” 28 Pepper’s vote against the
censure measure of Mrs. Hoover in 1929 became, an issue and he was disappointed with
losing. However, Pepper was encouraged by his own showing in the hotly contested race
and by the “goodwill for the loser” he received. Clark noted that, “Around the state,
Pepper’s popularity increased as a result of his gracious acceptance of defeat. The
Orlando Morning Sentinel editorialized that ‘someday, in some election, the people of
Florida are going to give Pepper another break, or rather a new deal.’” 29 This reinforced
Pepper’s belief in providence, that the fortunes of fate would again smile upon him and
that faith would be rewarded in 1936.
Pepper’s path to the Senate was ironic. On 8 May 1936, his 1934 opponent, Senator
Park Trammell died while in office and on 17 June, Florida’s other U.S. Senator, Duncan
Fletcher unexpectedly died in office as well. Regarding the opportunity this created for
Pepper, Clark wrote,
On May 8, 1936, Trammell died in Washington, creating an opening for Pepper.
Newspapers also speculated that Judge Charles O. Andrews of Orlando and former
governor Doyle Carlton of Tampa might be candidates. The State Democratic
Executive Committee was responsible for deciding on whether or not to hold an open
primary or have the committee select the nominee.
28
29
Ibid., 65.
Clark, Red Pepper and Gorgeous George, 11; Orlando Morning Sentinel, August 7, 1934.
15
Before they could decide, the state’s other senator, Duncan Fletcher had died. Pepper
announced his candidacy for Fletcher’s seat while Carlton and Andrews competed for
Trammell’s seat. Pepper went to the Senate without opposition. Andrews upset
former governor Carlton 67,387 to 62,530. 30
In November 1936, Pepper finally realized his boyhood dream of becoming a U.S.
Senator, running unopposed in the special election to fill the remainder of Fletcher’s
term. Pepper claimed his decision was based on an “unwritten rule” that Florida’s
senators would be split, with one from the northern and one from the southern part of the
state. However, it is more than plausible that Pepper saw an opportunity for political
success and took advantage of the unique situation to assure his election to the senate
rather than face a three way race for Trammell’s vacant seat, considering that Pepper
violated that same “unwritten rule” when he ran for Trammell’s seat in 1934. In addition
to his political prosperity, Pepper’s good fortune included a measure of personal success
as well. On 30 December Pepper married Mildred Wheeler and soon the couple would
embark for Washington. Pepper’s Senate term expired in 1938 while his Senate career
was still in its infancy. Nevertheless, he faced the task of getting reelected. Pepper had
the attention of President Roosevelt for his staunch support of the President’s New Deal
programs in the Senate. Freshman members traditionally refrain from making speeches
on the senate floor. However, Pepper’s belief in the necessity of these New Deal
programs, and his faith in FDR as a leader, ignored this unwritten rule and took to the
floor in support of the president. His tenacity in support of the New Deal gained Pepper
recognition in Washington as well as nationally. During his campaign for reelection, the
2 May 1938 issue of Time magazine did a story in the National Affairs section about the
30
Clark, Red Pepper and Gorgeous George, 11.
16
1938 primary race for U.S. Senate in Florida and Pepper appeared on the cover with the
line, “Florida Fighting Cock will be a White House Weather Vane.” 31
Pepper’s victory in the 1938 primary election was indeed viewed as a litmus test for
FDR and the New Deal. Pepper pushed for anti–poll tax legislation, even though Florida
had repealed its poll tax, and came out in support of a New Deal measure close to
Roosevelt’s heart–the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). This act called for a mandatory
twenty–five cent minimum wage and with the anti–poll tax legislation, drew the ire of the
majority of conservative Southern Democrats. Pepper made support of the New Deal in
general, and, the FLSA in particular, a part of his reelection campaign platform. For his
support on FDR’s attempt to “pack” the Supreme Court in 1937, the president offered to
help Pepper’s reelection efforts in 1938. However, when the time to deliver came around
Pepper received little to no help from Roosevelt. When James Roosevelt, FDR’s son and
political advisor, came to Florida, Pepper went to remind him of FDR’s pledge of
support. James Roosevelt indicated that the president did not wish “to appear to be telling
the people of Florida how to vote.” “We certainly hope Senator Pepper is reelected.”
Several days after the meeting with James Roosevelt a similar statement appeared in the
Florida newspapers but fell short of a direct endorsement. 32 With the help of the
president’s coattails, Pepper was able to win on the first ballot with 100,000 plus votes
more than Congressman James M. Wilcox, former Governor David Sholtz, and two other
opponents. 33
The victory was impressive for a liberal Democrat in, for the most part, a Southern
conservative state. Pepper noted that his triumph was interpreted as a mandate for FDR
31
Time. May 2, 1938, cover.
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 92-93.
33
Ibid., 97.
32
17
and the New Deal, writing, “and the president could hardly wait to get me to the White
House to talk about it. My diary entry for May 18, 1938: “When I walked in the president
said, ‘Claude, if you were a woman I’d kiss you.’” 34 Pepper’s margin of victory alarmed
other Southern congressmen and the stonewalling of the FLSA in committee ended three
days after the Florida primary results were in and a discharge petition, numbering 218
signatures, took only two hours and twenty minutes to execute. FLSA passed in the
House before the end of May. Once language suitable to both the House and Senate was
worked out, the bill was sent to Roosevelt who signed it into law on 25 June 1938. 35
Pepper returned to the Senate and continued to be the standard–bearer for the New Deal.
In1939 political tensions grew and war broke out in Europe with the invasion of
Poland by Nazi Germany on 1 September, plunging the continent into war when Britain
and France entered into the conflict on the side of Poland. Italy and Japan aligned with
Germany to form the Axis Powers. FDR aided the British and French war effort through
the cash and carry program allowing the allies to purchase necessary supplies and war
materiels with hard currency. By 1940 Great Britain had run out of enough hard currency
to purchase materiel from the United States. Churchill sought assistance from Roosevelt.
Roosevelt came up with the idea of lend–lease, in which the U.S. would lend necessary
goods in exchange for an agreement to provide U.S. military access to specifically named
British bases. Pepper introduced the Lend–Lease bill when it came before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. In a 4 March 1941 letter to one of his constituents and a
frequent confidant, Raymond Robins, Pepper wrote, “It is unfortunate that the opposition
34
Ibid., 96-97.
Roger K. Newman, “Fair Labor Standards Act (1938),” in, Major Acts of Congress, vol. 2 Brian K.
Landsberg, ed. (Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), Gale Virtual Reference Library e
book, 8.
35
.
18
is so militant to the Lease–Lend Bill. I am always saying to them what the Master said
about his crucifiers, ‘Father forgive them, for they know not what they do’.” 36 Robins
had a more optimistic outlook on the prospects of Lend–Lease. On the topic of Lend–
Lease, Robins, writing to a friend in England, noted, “So soon as this —largely
propaganda — delay in the passage of the Lend–Lease Bill is over, which I am hopeful
may be in the next ten days if not earlier, supplies of all kinds, military and civil, will be
enroute to England in better quality and greater quantity than ever before in the history of
the two countries.” 37
Robins’ calculations proved to be astute, as the Lend–Lease Bill was signed into law
by President Roosevelt on11 March 1941. Pepper demonstrated that he was not only an
avid New Dealer but a loyal advocate of the president and that he supported Roosevelt on
a host of domestic and foreign affairs issues, including the 1941 Lend–Lease Act that
provided planes, ships and munitions to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. One
problem that plagued Pepper throughout his early political career was the issue of civil
rights. Pepper wrote, “We are all molded by region, era, antecedents, and chance…. In
the postbellum rural South into which I was born, poverty, disdain—even hatred—for the
Negro were the pervasive forces.” 38 In Alabama, as with the other states of the South,
white Southerners clung to segregation with pride and institutionalized it in the romantic
myth of a traditional and moral way of life embraced by all Southerners, white and
Negro, living in harmony with each “knowing their place.” As Kabat noted, “In race
relations Pepper showed few liberal convictions. The young Alabamian, like many white
36
Claude Pepper to Raymond Robins, Letter, March 4, 1941, Box 30, Folder 1–3, Raymond Robins
Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, Madison, Wisconsin. Hereafter referred to as the Robins
Papers.
37
Raymond Robins to Octavia Wilberforce, Letter, March 4, 1941, Box 30 Folder 1–3, Robins Papers.
38
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 1.
19
Southerners, believed in the inferiority of blacks.” 39 A fervent belief in the inferiority of
blacks, a physical and psychological segregation of black–white society that was
permeated with hatred, injustice and violence best describes Alabama at the beginning of
the twentieth century, the region and era that molded Claude Pepper.
According to a record compiled by the Tuskegee Institute in 1921, during the
formative years of Pepper’s life, 1900–1920, a total of 108 lynchings occurred in
Alabama. 40 Pepper appeared ambivalent, perhaps even ignorant, to the ills and
vicissitude of segregation, and was willing to accept the injustice and violence as a part of
Southern life. Pepper carried these beliefs with him to Harvard Law School in 1921,
prepared to vigorously defend Southern honor and tradition. Pepper wrote:
I knew all about the Civil War having heard firsthand from my grandfathers about
Yankee treachery and having read every book I could lay my hands on. When those
Harvard Yankees started arguments over which side was right and which side was
wrong I would be ready…. At last I was in a position to hoist a banner in Yankee
territory. But nobody was interested. What was still a bitter pill in the vanquished
South was, by 1921, a closed chapter in the victorious North, which moved on to
other matters. I was all primed to defend but no one attacked. 41
Pepper’s predisposition in his racial attitudes eventually came into conflict with his
liberal ideology. His New Deal liberalism and support of the president increased his
exposure to a more urbane group of liberals while in Washington, like his Harvard
classmates, had moved beyond the antiquated thinking still prevalent in the segregated
South. However, during his senate career, on issues of civil rights, he demonstrated
duplicity in his thoughts, words and actions. In 1938, Pepper joined fellow Southerners
39
Kabat, “Camp Hill to Harvard Yard,” 169.
“Record of Lynching’s in Alabama from 1871 to 1920,” Alabama Department of Archives and
History, http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/cdm/singleitem/collection/voices/id/2516/rec/7, accessed
October 30, 2012.
41
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 34.
40
20
in the filibuster to prevent anti–lynching legislation from coming to a vote, although he
later wished that “he could expunge this sorry chapter of his record and his life.” 42
He continually supported anti poll–tax legislation, because he was concerned with
how the law served to disenfranchise poor white voters while giving little, if any,
consideration to the impact upon African–American voters. His vote against the censure
of First Lady Lou Hoover during his term in the Florida House is an example of Pepper’s
ambiguousness on racial issues. Pepper recalled his reasoning for his nay vote on the
measure as he took to the floor of the Florida House, writing, “I consider this resolution
out of place as an act of this body.” 43 Pepper’s concern centered more on a procedural
faux pas rather than any indignation regarding the plight of Negroes. However, Pepper’s
actions despite his suspect motives gave the appearance of a pro–civil rights stand and
many understood the compromises Southern candidates had to make regarding racial
issues in order to be elected.
Pepper would continually battle the demons of his racial prejudice throughout his
years in the senate and his conflicting views provided his opponents with an issue to
attack in campaigns. Pepper, for the most part, was able to appease both liberal
supporters and more conservative voters. However, the internal struggle to compromise
his Southern heritage with his liberal ideology remained difficult and influenced his
stance on civil rights matters. In 1944, both FDR’s third term as president and Pepper’s
first term in the Senate ended. FDR would seek an unprecedented fourth term, while
Pepper looked to return to the Senate. The war continued to rage on and the allied forces
were beginning to advance. The Red Army advanced into the Ukraine and later to
42
43
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 87.
Ibid., 55.
21
Poland. The British and American forces began the invasion of Italy in January. On 6
June, Operation Overlord, the largest invasion force in history, landed on the Normandy
beaches with the objective of liberating occupied France. In August 1944, a meeting was
held at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of creating the United
Nations. The production of war materiel was at a peak and had revitalized the American
economy. The recovery programs of the New Deal were beginning to lose significance
in the minds of American voters. However, the American public still looked to Roosevelt
for leadership in defeating the Axis and ending the war victorious. Yet, there was grave
concern by the Democratic Party over Vice President Henry Wallace and the chances of a
fourth term with Wallace on the ticket. FDR was convinced that he had to make a change
and the replacement on the ticket was a little known senator from Missouri, Harry S.
Truman. In the Florida U.S. Senate campaign, Pepper’s liberalism left him open to
criticism from conservatives. As Clark noted:
Pepper’s opposition also came from some business interests who were opposed to
regulations and controls instituted by the New Deal. For many conservatives Pepper
symbolized the New Deal and they attacked his progressive stand on labor, farm
supports, higher taxes on business, relief programs for the needy, and the creation of
additional government agencies. The anti–Pepper faction in Florida was led by
Associated Industries, a branch of the National Association of Manufacturers, but the
opposition was not united. 44
Pepper, as a stalwart of the president and the New Deal, received the full backing of FDR
in his reelection bid. Both men campaigned for each other and both won another term in
Washington.
44
James C. Clark, “The 1944 Florida Democratic Senate Primary,” The Florida Historical Quarterly,
66, no.4 (April, 1988): 368.
http://digitool.fcla.edu/view/action/singleViewer.do?dvs=1351704136551~121&locale=en_US&VIEWER
_URL=/view/action/singleViewer.do?&DELIVERY_RULE_ID=7&search_terms=fhq%20april%201988&
adjacency=Y&application=DIGITOOL-3&. Accessed October 10, 2010.
22
Pepper continued in his support of the president even when it was to his own
determent. This was the case regarding the Revenue Bill of 1944, which put him at odds
with Ed Ball, administrator of the DuPont Trust and a powerful and influential force in
Florida politics. Ball managed numerous business and investment holdings in Florida
and had given Pepper financial support in his campaigns for the U.S. Senate. In 1944
Ball was continuing his attempt to acquire the Florida East Coast Railroad for the DuPont
Trust. The Revenue Bill, if enacted, would provide Ball with a substantial tax advantage
in the acquisition of the railroad. However, the bill ended up becoming a bitter point of
contention between FDR and Congress when a large number of provisions to the bill
were added before passing it. Roosevelt was livid and moved to veto the measure much
to the ire of Congress. The House overrode the veto on 24 February and sent it to the
Senate where majority leader Alben Barkley called for an override of the president’s
veto. Regarding Pepper’s assessment of the situation, Danse writes:
Predictably he sided with Roosevelt, although not immediately sure he would vote to
sustain the veto. Referring to Barkley in a diary entry of the period, he said,
‘Bumbling Barkley has bumbled again’. The next day, almost with tones of pettiness,
Pepper wrote, ‘FDR did not regard him [Barkley] as a strong enough leader to be
fully trusted’. Contrary to that assessment, Barkley was widely viewed as a tried and
faithful administration loyalist, one who subordinated his own political standing and
well being to White House Directives. This is a good example of Pepper’s tendency
to judge a situation wholly on the basis of his unswerving fidelity to Roosevelt and
what he deemed to be the liberal cause. 45
On February 25 the override measure came to a vote in the Senate. Barkley resigned
as majority leader in protest of Roosevelt’s comments that the bill “provided relief for the
greedy and not the needy,” responding that it was, “a calculated and deliberate assault
45
Tracy E. Danese, Claude Pepper and Ed Ball: Politics, Purpose and Power (Gainesville, Florida:
University of Florida Press, 2000), 144; for excerpts from Pepper’s diary quoted in Danese, see, Claude
Pepper, “Claude Pepper Diary Transcripts, 1944,” Series 439, Box 2, Folder 1, Claude Pepper Papers,
Claude Pepper Library, Tallahassee, Florida. Hereafter referred to as the Pepper Papers.
23
upon the legislative integrity of every Member of Congress.” Pepper returned to
Washington and against the counsel of his colleagues and advisors, he supported
Roosevelt, voting to sustain the veto. In support of Barkley, the majority of the Senate
voted to override the veto 72–14. 46 Pepper’s failure to support the body of which he was
a member would have a lasting, negative impact upon Pepper’s reputation in the Senate.
Moreover, his increasingly liberal position was creating political enemies for him in
Florida. Danese noted, “It illustrated how his ideological blind spot and almost slavish
loyalty to the president clouded his assessment of the collective attitudes of his
colleagues and, increasingly, the public as well.” 47 In the process, Pepper’s support of
the Revenue Bill veto threatened Ed Ball’s Florida East Coast Railroad deal and created
an animosity that would cost Pepper in 1950.
Pepper returned to the senate in 1945 confident that Roosevelt would lead and the
nation would support the continued expansion of the New Deal social welfare programs.
However, the rapidity of change over the next five years faced by the nation and its
leaders was daunting. When Roosevelt died in April 1945, the New Deal liberalism that
marked the previous fourteen years lost its leader. Pepper, Wallace and other
progressives in the Democratic Party saw in Truman someone who was changing the
direction of the party and, in their opinion, lacked the ability to be the standard–bearer for
the liberalism they represented. The end of the war saw a decline in the relations between
the United States and the Soviet Union as both sides postured for a leading role in the
postwar world. Truman’s distrust of Soviet motives, intentions and actions was contrary
to the pro–Soviet beliefs held by Wallace and Pepper at the end of the war, leading them
46
Office of the Clerk, http://artandhistory.house.gov/highlights.aspx?action=view&intID=110, accessed
October 31, 2012.
47
Danese, Claude Pepper and Ed Ball, 144-45.
24
to mount a “Dump Truman” campaign at the 1948 Democratic Convention. Pepper’s
ideological philosophy continued to shift farther left while the party, the nation, and the
voters of Florida shifted more to the right as the Cold War intensified. Pepper’s continued
support of advancing and expanding New Deal policies, his public support for a more
cooperative stand with the USSR, and his participation in the unsuccessful “political
coup” to unseat Truman in 1948 created numerous political enemies. Politically, the
death of Roosevelt left him more vulnerable and without major support for the1950
campaign.
After the war ended a number of returning veterans entered the political arena,
bringing with them a deep–seated disdain for communism combined with a mistrust of
Soviet intentions postwar, and their contempt blurred party lines. One of these young
veterans was George A. Smathers of Florida. Smathers was handsome, intelligent and
ambitious. He coordinated the Alachua County campaign for Pepper in 1938 while
attending law school at the University of Florida. Smathers was a highly successful
Federal prosecutor before the war and he emerged from the war seasoned and ready to
make his mark. He returned home in 1945, and by 1946 had defeated the Democratic
incumbent Pat Cannon for the seat in Miami’s 4th Congressional district. In 1949 he
planned to engage yet another incumbent, Sen. Claude Pepper. From Camp Hill,
Alabama to the floor of the U.S. Senate, Pepper had openly displayed his ideology, his
Southern character, and had forged a record; each of these would be called into question
as Pepper battled for his political life in 1950.
25
George Armistead Smathers: The Judge’s Son
George Armistead Smathers was born in Atlantic City, New Jersey on 14 November
1913. He was one of four children born to Frank and Lura Jones Smathers. A brother
Frank, Jr. was born in 1909, sisters Virginia in 1911, and Lura in 1920. Lura died in an
automobile accident in 1930.
Smathers ancestors were early settlers in western North Carolina dating back to
colonial times. Their roots lie in the small mountain community of Waynesville, in
Haywood County, and the Smathers family had established a distinguished pedigree. As
Crispell writes, “The Smathers family had long been grounded in the professions. Frank
Smathers grew up the son of a medical doctor, the grandson of noted Methodist preacher,
Dr. D. Collins Howell, and the great–grandson of a member of the North Carolina
colonial assembly, Joseph Howell.” 48 Political ambitions and aspirations also ran deep in
Smathers’ ancestry. His father’s uncle, George Henry Smathers, a Republican, was a
state senator representing Haywood and Jackson Counties. Wickman notes:
George had no son of his own, so he invited his favorite nephew, Frank (1881–1970),
to accompany him and work as a Senate Page during the winter of 1896. Frank’s
father, Benjamin Franklin, chose medicine as a profession, but young Frank was
especially fond of his Uncle George and was excited at the opportunity to share
personally in the powerful world of lawmaking. The young man fell in love with
politics that year, and he never really got over it. 49
Frank Smathers was a committed Democrat despite his uncle’s best efforts to change
that inclination. Like his Uncle George, Frank earned a law degree from the University
of North Carolina. He was also an exceptional athlete and excelled at baseball. After
graduation in 1903, he left North Carolina for New Jersey in pursuit of a professional
48
Brian Lewis Crispell, Testing the Limits: George Armistead Smathers and Cold War America
(Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 1.
49
Patricia R. Wickman, The Uncommon Man: George Smathers of Florida (n.p., 1994), 3-4.
26
baseball career. However, as Crispell notes, “Chasing his dream to Newark, New Jersey,
Frank met with the disaster of many a ballplayer— the slow curve.” 50 With his fledgling
baseball career over, Frank Smathers concentrated on getting his law career in motion.
After fulfilling a mandatory three year residency requirement, he took the bar exam,
passed, and established a law practice in Atlantic City. After establishing his
professional life in New Jersey, Frank returned home to Waynesville where he wed Lura
Jones in 1908. Smathers’ mother, Lura Jones Smathers, also came from strong Southern
pioneer stock. Her mother, Nannie Honaker, was born in Virginia and as a young
woman, traveled to the Florida frontier and met her husband, Silas Armistead Jones, in
Barstow. They moved to Abingdon, Virginia to raise their family, Lura was one of seven
children. Lura’s father, S.A. Jones was a Florida pioneer. As Wickman notes:
‘S.A.’ was a quintessential entrepreneur in the fashion of the nineteenth–century
America. He had fought for the Confederacy, delivered mail, on horseback, on the
St. Louis–California run. He crossed the Florida wilderness in a covered wagon;
helped to build railroads in Florida and Georgia; became the first editor of the Tampa
Times newspaper; built the Tampa Terrace Hotel (now a part of the University of
Tampa) and discovered a gold mine in Dahlonega, Georgia. 51
Smathers came from a hardy bloodline on both sides of his family, filled with examples
of strong, successful, and adventurous men and women.
After the wedding, Frank and Lura returned to New Jersey to resume his law practice
and start their family. One of the main reasons that Frank Smathers established his law
practice in Atlantic City was due to the lack of a Democratic presence in the
overwhelmingly Republican stronghold of Atlantic County. 52 Frank’s zest for politics got
him interested in the 1910 gubernatorial race and the Democratic candidate, Woodrow
50
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 1.
Wickman, The Uncommon Man, 9.
52
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 1.
51
27
Wilson. Wilson spent a great amount of time campaigning in Atlantic County in an effort
to sway voters to cross party lines and support him; and Frank Smathers spent a great
amount of time with Wilson and forged a powerful political friendship.
According to Wickman, “Frank personally chauffeured the candidate around as he
made eight to ten speeches a day; sat on the platforms with him at the rallies; and
‘hopped up and down for two full days and a night,’ shouting, ‘34 votes for Woodrow
Wilson,’ as chairman of the Atlantic Delegation at the State Convention.” 53
When Wilson won the statehouse, he rewarded Frank with a district court judgeship.
Frank’s political aspirations proved to be short–lived due to his suffering from acute
rheumatoid arthritis. The cold, damp climate of New Jersey left him in extreme pain.
When Wilson became president, he remembered his old friend and hoped to appoint
Frank to a seat on the federal bench. However, Frank’s arthritis continued to worsen, and
he was unable to accept the appointment. He continued to serve on the New Jersey bench
until 1920. He recommended his brother, William Howell (Bill) Smathers, to replace him
on the district court bench. As Crispell notes, “Frank Smathers was advised by his
physician to move as far south as possible to combat a chronic arthritic condition. So in
January 1920 the Smathers family, including young sons Frank, Jr., George Armistead,
and his daughter Virginia, took Henry Flagler’s line as far south as it then went,
disembarking at the small community of Miami, Florida. George was six years old;
Miami, twenty-four.” 54 Bill Smathers would go on to serve New Jersey in the U.S.
Senate in 1937; he joined another senate newcomer and fellow Democrat, Claude Pepper
of Florida. Frank Smathers arrival with his family in Miami soon coincided with the
53
54
Wickman, The Uncommon Man, 7-8.
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 2.
28
great Florida land boom that brought the DuPonts, Ed Ball and Claude Pepper to Florida
in the mid 1920s. Frank took a year to rest and soothe the pain from his arthritis before
he established a law practice in Miami. When it came to their upbringing, Frank and Lura
had different approaches that complemented each other. Regarding the Smathers’
parenting approach, “George’s mother was a gentle nurturer…. ‘The Judge,’ on the other
hand, was a parent with strong ideas about the way in which children should be raised,
and his brand of parenting was both vigorous and stern.” 55
Frank Smathers wanted his children to be tough, smart and prepared to face the
daunting challenges of life. The Judge’s stringent parenting style alienated Smathers’
brother Frank, Jr. and his sister Virginia. However, George always sought compromise
and tried to mediate on behalf of his siblings, displaying negotiation skills and political
ability. The Judge instilled a rigorous daily routine into his children, a combination of
physically and intellectually demanding tasks to prevent them from developing, “big
strong necks but weak little heads.” 56 Judge Smathers was a demanding parent, but he
was also a brilliant, capable attorney and a shrewd and savvy investor. Wickman writes,
“Because of the Judge’s wise planning, however, the Smathers family was spared much
of the adversity which struck so many of their neighbors. Their livelihood, tied to
integral municipal services and some of the soundest banking interests in the state,
weathered the storm.” 57
Financial stability in difficult economic times afforded Judge Smathers more options
to better prepare his sons for the challenging days ahead. Frank, Jr. attended the Culver
Military Academy in Culver, Indiana and George would follow his brother for a summer
55
Wickman, The Uncommon Man, 14-15.
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 3, quoted in Wickman, The Uncommon Man, 15.
57
Wickman, The Uncommon Man, 18.
56
29
school session in 1929. Frank, Jr. enjoyed the structure and discipline of the military
lifestyle. George, however, could not stand the rigidity of the program. He detested life
at Culver so much that he admitted to have “cried himself to sleep every night,” and,
furthermore, he asserted that he would have rather left home before having to return to
the rigors of Culver. 58 Fortunately, Smathers never had to return to Culver, and remained
in Miami for the remainder of his secondary education.
In high school, Smathers was a proficient student and he was also talented athletically,
with the latter bringing him the most accolades and notoriety. Crispell, regarding
Smathers abilities, notes, “Maturing both physically and intellectually, Smathers—
growing to six feet two inches—excelled at basketball and track, boxed, and played on
the football team. His athletic pursuits won him Miami Senior’s Sigma Nu Trophy.” 59
Frank Smathers passion for politics had not waned even though his physical limitations
prevented him from directly participating. If Judge Smathers could not personally
participate, perhaps he could live vicariously through his son, George. In George, he
sought to instill his immense love for politics, and it appeared that he was successful.
Crispell writes, that, “Away from the field and court, Smathers won his first election as
president of the student body.” 60 George’s willingness to accept his father’s rigorous
teachings and advice even when contrary to his own inclinations motivated the elder
Smathers; he exerted all of his wisdom and influence into grooming George for a career
in either law, politics, or both. While Smathers deferred to his father’s wishes and heeded
his advice, the decisions he made occasionally came with great debate and difficulty.
This was most evident when the time came for young George to select a college to attend.
58
Ibid., 18-19, quoted in Smathers interview with the author.
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 3.
60
Ibid.
59
30
Due to his athletic prowess, Smathers had scholarship offers to several different
universities. The University of Illinois scholarship was the offer he wanted to accept.
However, Judge Smathers had a different choice for George’s education, and, like any
good attorney, he had prepared a strong argument to support his case against the
University of Illinois. In a 1989 oral history interview, Smathers, recalled how he arrived
at the decision of what college he should attend, saying:
I had an opportunity to go to the University of Illinois. Zepke was a very famous
football coach. He had come down and watched me play a game or two, and offered
what amounted to a scholarship. I really wanted to go. My ambition was to go to the
University of Illinois at Champagne, Illinois. But my Dad kept saying, ‘No, that’s not
the place to go.’ He said, ‘You will someday probably want to go into politics,
(because I’d already been elected president of the student body in high school and
that sort of thing). He said, ‘You’ll want to be in politics, and you’ll need to go to the
state university so that you will know boys from all over this state. I’m not going to
let you go to Illinois.’ Well we had quite heated discussions about that. I wanted to go
to Illinois so badly. It sounded so far away and glamorous. Finally, I had to yield to
my father’s insistent orders that I go to the University of Florida. So I went to the
University of Florida, and had a very wonderful time, as a matter of fact, and was a
pretty good athlete. I was captain of the basketball team, and was captain of the track
team, and I played football for awhile but kind of had to give that up because I kept
getting injured. I wasn’t very husky. I was elected president of the student body,
president of my fraternity, and that sort of thing. 61
Judge Smathers instincts regarding the importance of attending the University of
Florida to make influential connections were accurate. While at Florida, young George
became a member of the prestigious Blue Key Society and pledged the Sigma Phi
Epsilon fraternity, later becoming its president. His roommate was a fellow fraternity
brother named Phil Graham, who later became the publisher of the Washington Post and
Newsweek. In 1938, while attending Florida Law School, Smathers had the opportunity to
get his first experience in a political campaign after attending a stump speech by the U. S.
61
George A. Smathers, United States Senator, 1951-1969, “Oral History Interviews, Interview no. 1,
August 1, 1989,” transcripts, interview by Donald A. Ritchie. Senate Historical Office, Washington, D.C.,
3, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Smathers_interview_1.pdf. Accessed
November 3, 2011.
31
Senator from Florida who was running for reelection—Claude Pepper. In his 1989
interview with Ritchie, Smathers recalled,
I went down to the county court house along with a whole bunch of other students to
hear this rather famous senator. He made a brilliant speech…. Well, it so happened
that the next day he came out to the campus at the university and I was introduced as
president of the student body. He asked me, would I manage his campaign on the
campus for reelection? I was so flattered that I immediately accepted his invitation. I
was so involved that I began to take over the whole county, not only the city of
Gainesville, where the university was, but the whole Alachua County. 62
After graduating from law school, Smathers joined his father’s law firm in Miami.
Shortly after he began practicing in Miami, Smathers received a call from a former
classmate, Charlie Andrews. He was the son of the other senator from Florida Charles O.
Andrews. Senator Andrews went to the U.S. Senate with Claude Pepper in 1937 when he
defeated former governor Doyle Carlton in the special election for the vacancy following
Senator Park Trammell’s death. Charlie Andrews called his classmate to gage his interest
in an appointment as an assistant federal prosecutor in the Miami district. Smathers
recalled the conversation, “I got this call from Charlie, and he said, ‘George, would you
be interested in becoming assistant United States district attorney at Miami?’ … I said,
‘I’d love to take it.’ He said, ‘There is just one caveat. Can you get Senator Pepper to
okay it?’ ‘What we do,’ he said, ‘is we take turns whenever there is a vacancy in a
judgeship or in a U.S. attorney’s office.’… I said, ‘Surely, I can get him. I’m confident
that I can.’ I called Senator Pepper and he very graciously and very kindly said okay.” 63
Attending the University of Illinois may have made Smathers happy, but, as his father
had predicted, the University of Florida provided him with a foundation for his
professional and political future. In fewer than two years after his graduation from the
62
63
Smathers, “Oral History Interviews,” no. 1, 3.
Ibid., 3-4.
32
University of Florida Law School, Smathers used two of his influential connections to
secure a position as an assistant U.S. district attorney. His experience and record while
serving in that capacity helped put Smathers on the path to a career in politics, as well as,
introduce him to other political allies that would help to further his career. The university
also provided him with a network of friends and connections throughout the state, a
network that would prove handy in mounting a statewide campaign. Smathers used these
connections to further his political career, and his Florida network would prove
invaluable in the 1950 primary campaign. By 1940 Smathers had already began his
journey into politics; and, most ironically, it came in part with the help of Claude Pepper
himself. Smathers was handsome, athletic, intelligent, and personable. Crispell writes
that, “Through his achievements, he established a statewide collection of loyal men who
supported him as their leader in Gainesville, as well as female acquaintances made on
forays to Tallahassee and the Florida State College for Women. They did not forget
him.” 64 However, in the summer of 1938, Smathers made acquaintance with Rosemary
Townley.
At the time of their meeting in 1938, Townsley lived in Atlanta and was visiting her
brother and sister in Miami. Her father, John Townley was a speculator who chased
dreams of wealth in the oil fields of Oklahoma and the citrus groves of central Florida
before settling in Miami. An early pioneer of Miami, Townley, purchased vast amounts
of real estate and even established the first drug store in 1896. His arrival in Miami
predated Henry Flagler, whose railroad and hotels helped to grow Miami’s population as
well as its economy. John Townsley’s business ventures expanded beyond Florida and as
a result, he had to move his family. First to Ashville, North Carolina and then he settled
64
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 4.
33
in Atlanta, which was more central to his business interests. However, Townsley retained
his vast real estate holdings in Miami which provided him with wealth and financial
security for his family. He died of heart disease when Rosemary was thirteen, but he did
leave her well provided for financially. 65 Smathers, while smitten with the heiress, did
not have plans for a commitment to anyone in the near future. Regarding their
relationship in the summer of 1938, Crispell writes:
During their ensuing courtship, Smathers informed her of his plans to delay marriage
until age thirty and after accumulating five hundred dollars in the bank. Rosemary
listened, then acted. Leaving on another cruise, she wrote Smathers letters, describing
her experiences, including a new acquaintance made through a mutual friend—Cary
Grant. George read, and then made up his mind: he married Rosemary on 10 March
1939. He was twenty–five and had yet to begin a career. 66
Shortly after his marriage, Smathers was offered and took the appointment as the
assistant U.S. district attorney, beginning his career in the prosecutor’s office in 1940.
Miami of the 1940s experienced phenomenal growth. As Crispell points out, “By
1941 the city of Miami had recovered from a collapsed real estate bubble in the mid
1920s as well as the disastrous hurricane of 1925. Rather than disintegrating as some
feared it would, the community rebounded strongly, shifting into a period that witnessed
a doubling of its population every ten years. This expanding population necessitated
construction, resulting in Miami growing from just eight square miles in the 1920s to
forty–eight square miles by 1950.” 67 The economic boom brought with it its share of
criminal enterprise. Smathers would prosecute hundreds of cases during his two years as
assistant federal district attorney; however, two cases brought him notoriety and a
reputation for being a hardnosed prosecutor. Both cases involved white slavery and
65
Ibid.
Ibid., 5. This is from an unpublished interview with Rosemary Townley Smathers by Crispell on
August 8, 1996.
67
Ibid., 5-6.
66
34
human trafficking across state lines. The first case took place in Key West and involved
Alice Reid Griffin, accused of bringing young girls into Florida from Georgia for
“immoral purposes.” Smathers faced noted Miami defense attorney Bart Riley. Smathers
presented a well argued case, resulting in the successful prosecution of Griffin. His
success in the Griffin case received a great deal of press and would lead to another
opportunity in another high–profile, human trafficking case and another chance to
enhance his reputation and his public image. The second case involved the prosecution
of Miami nightclub owners Al and Evelyn Youst. Like Griffin, they were charged with
conspiracy to violate the white slave act by bringing girls, in this case, five, from
Tennessee and Georgia to Florida for “immoral purposes” while employed at Youst’s La
Paloma club. Also involved in the case was the Dade County Solicitor, Fred Pine, who
was also charged with conspiracy to violate the white slave act. There was an almost
circus–like atmosphere in the court room with Al Youst arriving to court on a stretcher
due to suffering from tuberculosis and Evelyn constantly feeding her infant. However,
any attempts to gain the sympathy of the jurors failed, and they were convicted on ten
counts of conspiracy to transport minors across state lines for immoral purposes. Evelyn
received four years in prison, Al eight years. Pine received a separate trial and the case
resulted in a hung jury. Pine would be retried in 1942. 68
However, there was a twist of irony involving Al Youst and his arrival in Miami
where he opened the La Paloma. Crispell writes, “Speaking to the press immediately
after his conviction, Al Youst revealed that he had originally come to Florida at the
behest of a New Jersey judge. Youst, convicted for breaking and entering, larceny, and
68
Crispell, Testing the Limits,7-8; “Fred Pine To Get Another Trial” Daytona Beach Morning Journal,
March 27, 1942.
35
threatening to kill, had served a partial prison term. The sentencing judge …released
him, declaring that Youst had “learned [his] lesson”…but I want you out of this state….
Go to someplace like Florida.” 69 The judge and future senator from New Jersey was
William H. Smathers, George’s uncle.
Despite his rather short tenure as an assistant federal district attorney, Smathers forged
his reputation as a tough, no nonsense prosecutor rooting out crime and corruption
throughout South Florida. He was young, ambitious, and powerful—determined to make
his mark. However, years later, Smathers would reflect on the course of his actions
during the two years with some measure of regret, saying,
It was the best job I ever had, just loved it. Putting everybody in jail. Nobody was
safe. You know, I had the FBI working for me, and I was in charge of the whole
South Florida. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Internal Revenue
Service, you name it, Alcohol Tax Unit, they all worked for me. And they were
always saying, ‘Hey George, we ought to prosecute this guy. We ought to prosecute
this…. They were putting everybody in jail…. To make a long story short, we
indicted people that I’ve thought about thirty years later, I think it was outrageous in a
way. It scares me to death to think about it. Now that I’m mellowed and older I don’t
know that I would have ever brought this kind of case against them. 70
However, from 1940–42, Smathers was more than happy to bring high–profile cases to
court, in part seeking justice for the people of the United States and South Florida, and in
part, to enhance his reputation and gain recognition with the voting public. Whether it
was due to youthful exuberance, naiveté due to lack of life experience, or simply blind
ambition that motivated him, Smathers had managed to earn a great deal of political
capital during this two–year period. He was enjoying a measure of professional success,
and, he and Rosemary celebrated the birth of their first child, John, on 2 October 1941.
Smathers would soon find his career and family life interrupted by an event destined to
69
70
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 8.
Smathers, “Oral History Interviews,” no. 1, 9.
36
change the world—December 7, 1941. It was indeed as President Roosevelt noted, “a
date that will live in infamy.”
Smathers, like many American males of his generation, believed that he had to
contribute in the war effort and enlist in military service. His office in the federal
building was next door to the Marine Corps recruiting station. Wickman writes that
Smathers recalled telling recruiters as he walked by, “You guys save me a real soft job,
and as soon as I get through with these prosecutions, I’m going to join up. Well, one day
about six months later, they stopped me and said, ‘Say, Smathers have we got a job for
you.’” 71 Smathers enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserves in July 1942, and was sent to
Officer’s Candidate School at Quantico, Virginia and then assigned to Marine Corps
Headquarters in Washington at the rank of lieutenant. Smathers, however, did not want to
spend the duration of the war as an administrative lawyer in Washington, and he
preferred a combat unit. Smathers recalled how he managed to get a combat assignment:
I stayed here, and it looked like they were going to try and make a desk guy out of me
and keep me here in Washington. But I thought as long as I’m going to be in the
service I’ll be damned if I’m going to sit around here pushing paper and being a
lawyer for the Navy. So I feigned an appendicitis attack. They took me to the Naval
Medical Center. They took my appendix out…. But it broke the umbilical cord with
the administrative section of the Navy and I was back in the Marines. 72
When Smathers left the Naval Medical Center he was reassigned to the new Marine Air
Station at Cherry Point, North Carolina and attached to the Marine Bomber Squadron
413. VMB 413 completed initial training at Cherry Point and then reassigned to Camp
Pendleton, California for deployment to the Pacific theater. 73 Smathers missed the birth
of his second son, Bruce, who was born on 3 October 1943. The squadron was deployed
71
Wickman, The Uncommon Man, 28.
Smathers, “Oral History Interviews,” no. 1, 10.
73
VMB is an acronym for Volar Marine Bomber, volar is a Spanish verb meaning to fly and is the
method used by the Marine Corps to designate bomber groups.
72
37
to the Solomon Islands and participated in the Bougainville campaign with newly
promoted Captain Smathers serving as the adjutant. Wickman notes, “George finally got
his fill of combat duty… on Guam and in the Solomon Islands, at Sterling Island, and
Bougainville, and in air raids on Vella Lavella and Munda. In one nearly fatal episode,
his plane was badly damaged by enemy fire.” 74 Smathers did two combat rotations in the
Pacific, serving a total of eighteen months. Smathers was the last of the original officers
remaining—everyone else had rotated back to the States. He began writing letters to
Senator Pepper, Senator Holland and Attorney General Tom C. Clark asking for help in
getting out. Regarding Clark, Smathers recalled, “I wrote him a letter and he’s the fellow
that I soon discovered was the guy who talked to the Navy and said, ‘Look, you’ve got a
guy out there, he’s got a family, he’s been out there a year and ought to be rotated.’ He
was the fellow who arranged for me, actually, to come back.” 75 Smathers arrived back in
the U.S. in San Francisco on 7 May 1945, VE Day.
Smathers said that he entered military service because he believed it was his duty to
defend his country. In the spring of 1945, it became more and more apparent that the
outcome of the war would be in favor of the Allied forces. Smathers used his influential
connections to return stateside, and he assumed he would be discharged from service.
However, the Marine Corps had different plans for Captain Smathers. Instead of being
discharged, he was, sent back to Cherry Hill in June 1945, greatly disappointed that his
plans for the future would be derailed. Immediately upon his arrival Smathers began
working his network of political friends in an effort to secure his release from active duty,
as Crispell notes, “Smathers capitalized on his political connections, appealing not only
74
75
Wickman, The Uncommon Man, 30.
Smathers, “Oral History Interviews,” no. 1, 11.
38
to elected officials like Sen. Claude Pepper but more importantly to the U.S. Attorney
General’s office. It had been in the service of the attorney general that Smathers had
begun to make inroads politically before the war, and it was his intention to again begin a
campaign in the courtroom.” 76
Smathers quickly reconnected with his friends in Miami who informed him that the
congressman from Miami’s 4th District, Pat Cannon, was ill and may not live. The
ambitious Smathers immediately began making plans for running for this seat at Cherry
Hill before he had secured his discharge from the Marine Corps; thus creating a sense of
urgency in getting his release from the military. In a letter to Pepper on 11 June 1945,
Smathers wrote, “Can’t possibly tell you how anxious I am to get out and start doing.’” 77
Smathers was anxious regarding his future political aspirations, but, he was restless for a
far more mundane reason—his job did not challenge him; and he was simply—bored.
Just two days later, on 13 June, Smathers wrote to Pepper again:
I have been assigned and much sooner than I anticipated, as assistant provost-marshal
of the Marine Corp Air Station here. It is equivalent to being 2nd Deputy Sheriff of
Collier County.—Only I can’t wear a star or high top boots. Despite any statement as
to my indispensability that may be forthcoming, the fact is, that it is now obvious they
can get along without me. My services would be better utilized in the Justice
Department. I thought possibly this fact may help Mr. Clarke, [sic] if when
requesting me, he is told how badly the Marines need me. —Let me assure you of my
gratitude in rescuing me from this mental Sahara. 78
Smathers continued his correspondence to Pepper. On 17 June 1945 he sent two letters,
one to Sen. Pepper himself and the second to Bob Fokes, the Senator’s administrative
assistant. He wrote Pepper regarding the 4th District Congressional race, that he
76
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 11.
George Smathers to Claude Pepper, Letter, June 11, 1945, Group 200, Series 201, Box 161A, Folder
7, Pepper Papers.
78
George Smathers to Claude Pepper, Letter, June 13, 1945, Group 200, Series 201, Box 161A, Folder
7, Pepper Papers.
77
39
“Received several telephone calls from Miami, yesterday and the day before, relative to
Cannon’s illness and the possibility of an election taking place in the immediate future. I
advised them all that if necessary, I would let my friends RUN me ‘in absentia.’ I wanted
the job and was determined to see it through. I would be glad for any news as to how
things are going with Mr. C.” 79 Smathers letter to Fokes revealed a note of frustration
and near desperation regarding his situation. In yet another attempt to expedite his
release from the Marines, Smathers asked Folkes to intervene with the senator on his
behalf, “Please, ask him to call Mr. C. I know both are busy as one–legged men in an ass
kicking contest, but I’m rotting on the vine here, and that one call might be the force that
clinches the whole deal. Trust I can return the favor someday.” 80
Smathers was reassigned to the Navy JAG corps in Washington on 4 July 1945.
Smathers never gave up his efforts to get out of active military service. He received help
from fellow Floridian, William Paisley, an attorney in the Justice Department. Paisley
remembered Smathers’s work while an assistant district attorney and recommended him
to his boss, Attorney General Tom C. Clark. Soon, Smathers would become one of “the
most valuable members of his office.” 81 Smathers perseverance paid off and in October
was placed on inactive duty and released from Marine Corps service. He returned to
Miami where he would serve Tom Clark as Special Assistant to the Attorney General and
put in motion his plan to defeat Pat Cannon in 1946. After securing the position of
special assistant, Smathers went to work in soliciting help in preparing for his campaign
for Cannon’s congressional seat. On 22 October 1945 Smathers sent a letter to Jim
79
George Smathers to Claude Pepper, Letter, June 17, 1945, Group 200, Series 201, Box 161A, Folder
7, Pepper Papers.
80
George Smathers to Bob Fokes, Letter, June 17, 1945, Group 200, Series 201, Box 161A, Folder 7,
Pepper Papers.
81
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 11.
40
Clements, a member of Senator Pepper’s senior staff regarding Cannon. The letter
describes Cannon’s success in getting himself in the newspapers on a daily basis and
prominently in the public eye. Smathers is upset that Cannon is obtaining the names of
servicemen about to be discharged and then sending notifications to the families with the
particulars and taking credit for their discharges as a way to garner votes:
He then, at government expense, wires the family and advises them that through his
efforts their son will be released on such and such a day and such and such a time.
Isn’t there some method by which you could get the war department to level a blast at
him or at least claim Pepper has had some hand in the securing of these discharges?
Smathers concluded, adding, All else down this way seems to be moving along in
good shape and if I am successful in getting assigned to the prosecution of a case
which is now pending down here, things will look very bright. 82
The case Smathers referred to was a prosecution involving the Office of Price
Administration, a war time agency that regulated rationing and price controls. Crispell
notes, “John Henry Colt stood accused of accepting bribes, as chairman of the OPA price
panel, in return for influencing ration board decisions.” 83
The case fell under the direct jurisdiction of Smathers former boss, U.S. District
Attorney Herbert S. Phillips. The case was sure to be high–profile and receive muck of
public attention. Smathers helped present the case before the grand jury and realized its
star making potential. Again, he looked to enlist the aid of Attorney General Clark and
Smathers wrote a letter to Clark’s assistant Grace Stewart 84— “I need advice and
82
George Smathers to Jim Clements, Letter, October 22, 1945, Group 200, Series 201, Box 161A,
Folder 7, Pepper Papers.
83
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 15.
84
The letter simply referred to Grace in the salutation. A source verified that Grace was Grace Stewart
an assistant to Attorney General Tom C. Clark in 1945, in an oral history where she was referenced by
name and title; see, Claudia "Lady Bird" Johnson, Transcript, Oral History Interview XXI, August10-11,
1981, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library, 33.
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/Johnson-C/CTJ%2021.pdf. Accessed
on November 7, 2012.
41
assistance! There is a case that I have just helped present to the grand jury that is exactly
what I need to get into a favorable position to do what is planned— come spring….
The U.S. attorney, Mr. Phillips I believe would let me handle the case but quite naturally
doesn’t want to offend his assistant, and so I think (Smathers’s emphasis) he would
welcome higher authority assigning the case.” 85 There appeared to be some reluctance
on the part of Phillips in assigning the case outside of his office, even after some gentle
prodding from another high–ranking justice official, T. Lamar Caudle. As Smathers
explains to Stewart, “M(r) Caudle wrote a nice note to Phillips and said, ‘Smathers would
like to try the case and I hope that meets with your approval.’ It was not strong enough,
although I appreciated it. Possibly nothing can be done. However, if I’m going to do
what the close friends in Washington want me to do (i.e.–win) next spring I’ve got to get
back in the public eye and quick. This case is tailor made for that. Can you help?”86
Smathers was assigned the case and won a conviction of Colt on the bribery charges.
During this period, Smathers began assembling his senior campaign staff. He asked
his friend, FBI Special Agent Dick Danner to be his campaign chairman. Wickman
writes, “Dick was ready for a new challenge. So were old friends from high school,
members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and other ex–military friends who quickly
became the George Smathers campaign staff. Cannon referred to them derisively as
Smathers’s ‘goons,’ but they chose to take it positively.” 87 In addition to Danner, the
core of Smathers “goon squad” was composed of Sloan Mc Crea, Bebe Rebozo, and
Grant Stockdale; and they began the task of getting Smathers elected. In addition to
Attorney General Clark, Smathers continued to call on Sen. Pepper and his staff for help
85
George Smathers to Grace Stewart, Letter, undated, Box 73, Tom C. Clark Papers, Truman Library.
Ibid.
87
Wickman, The Uncommon Man, 33.
86
42
in his campaign. In a letter dated 14 November 1945, he asked Bob Folkes to aid his
associate, Crehore, in getting access to Cannon’s voting record and attendance, writing,
“He is having a good deal of difficulty in getting the record of his attendance and stated
in a letter to me that a brother congressman or senator could get the information easily
whereas it was inaccessible to an outsider.” 88
There was an expansion of the Naval Air Station in Key West planned to take place in
1946. Smathers found out in late January that Cannon was preparing to announce the
expansion in Monroe County. Smathers immediately wrote Pepper, “I’ve decided to take
the plunge—In fact it’s made. Was in Munroe [sic] County over the week–end and if
things remain at the status quo it should fall into line in good style. Cannon has passed
the word that the populace there should look forward to an announcement about a new
Naval addition… If that happens it will ruin me there. Will you check into this and if
possible find out why it cannot be delayed at least until after May7th —?” 89 Pepper sent a
reply on 2 February, writing, “I am trying to obtain the information about Munroe [sic]
County and Key West so I can make some announcement about it.” 90 Miami’s 4th
congressional district in 1946 was expansive, encompassing all of Dade, Monroe and
Collier Counties, from Miami, south, to Key West and from Miami, east, to Naples. It
required a well organized network and, Smathers’ team was up to the task, as Wickman
writes:
The Goon Squad worked determinedly to carry its leader to victory in a district which
included all of Dade, Munroe and Collier counties and a voting age population of
88
George Smathers to Robert Folkes, Letter, November 14, 1945, Group 200, Series 201, Box 161A,
Folder 7, Pepper Papers.
89
George Smathers to Claude Pepper, Letter, undated, Group 200, Series 201, Box 161A, Folder 7,
Pepper Papers.
90
Claude Pepper to George Smathers, Letter, February 2, 1946, Group 200, Series 201, Box 161A,
Folder 7, Pepper Papers.
43
almost 300,000….In the end, driving determination and exhausting work of the
campaign paid off…. While politicians across the rest of the state were being returned
to office with minimal opposition, in South Florida it was the challenger who was
elected by almost a two-to-one margin over the incumbent. 91
On 7 May 1946, Smathers won the prize he had so coveted, a seat in the 80th Congress of
the United States, where he would join others of his generation, as they began to shape
the face of American politics for the next four decades.
In retrospect, George Armistead Smathers came from strong pioneer roots and a
family that was well educated and well connected. His parents provided him and his
siblings with a comfortable life amid one of the worst economic periods in the nation’s
history. Judge Smathers set forth a demanding course for his children that encouraged
them to be competitive while growing both physically and intellectually. Smathers was
infused with a love of politics by his father, who did all within his power to prepare his
son to be successful in politics. Smathers seemed to possess an innate ability to lead
others. He readily displayed his penchant for leadership at college, in law school, as an
assistant federal district attorney, and the military. Smathers also proved that he was
quite resourceful. He developed a vast and powerful network of political connections and
he proved he was unabashed in using these connections time and again to his advantage.
His abilities placed him in the 80th Congress in 1946 where he would serve with one of
his benefactors, Sen. Claude Pepper.
Yet, Smathers was not altruistic in his professional and political career. As a
prosecutor, he manipulated and exploited his superiors to assign him newsworthy cases
that garnered a great deal of publicity. His goal was to increase his political capital and
gain the public trust to enhance his electability for higher office. When he joined the
91
Wickman, The Uncommon Man, 34-35.
44
Marines his desire to contribute to the war effort was eclipsed by the “necessity” to get a
combat assignment in order to embellish his political resume. So much so, that he lied to
medical corps and underwent a medically unnecessary surgery in order to gain hi release
from his duties in Washington. Smathers recalled the event in an interview with Donald
Ritchie:
So I volunteered for the Marines and went through Parris Island, went through
Quantico. Then I came to Washington--they put me here for a little while. That's
when I saw Phil Graham, just before he was going overseas. I stayed here, and it
looked like they were going to try to make a desk guy out of me and keep me here in
Washington. But I thought as long as I'm going to be in the service I'll be damned if
I'm going to sit around here pushing paper and being a lawyer for the Navy. So I
feigned having an appendicitis attack. They took me to the Navy Medical Center.
They took my appendix out, just on my representation as to where it was, and how
badly it hurt. But that broke the umbilical cord with the administrative section of the
Navy and put me back in the Marines. 92
Smathers exploited his network of powerful friends and colleagues to advance his
political career and he ran over anyone who got in his way. He was a segregationist who
openly supported maintaining Jim Crow in Florida and throughout the South. With a
mixture of Southern charm, an affable personality and well honed oratorical skills,
Smathers managed to gain the voter’s trust, favorable press and a network of powerful
friends in Florida and Washington.
Smathers proved to be capable and resourceful, as well as a ruthless and self–serving
politician, and in Congress was a rising star. This was in contrast to Pepper, who had
reached the pinnacle of his political power by 1945 and was becoming vulnerable to
defeat. Pepper’s ideology was steadily moving left of center and his alienation of
Truman, the standard–bearer of the Democratic Party, weakened his national base. The
far more conservative minded Smathers found himself increasingly at odds with Pepper’s
92
Smathers, “Oral History Interviews,” no. 1, 10.
45
political philosophy, and Pepper’s vulnerability in Florida did not go unnoticed by
Smathers’ network. This set the stage for showdown, pitting Pepper’s increasingly
progressive liberalism versus Smathers, the “champion” of the new G.I. generation, in a
battle that would be waged in Florida’s Democratic Primary in 1950.
46
Shifting Sands: The Cold War and the Dawn of a New World Order
A long, costly fight brought many changes to the face and geopolitical landscape of
the European continent. Victory in many cases was bittersweet. The enemy had been
defeated and surrendered, but it came at a tremendous cost in life and property. The end of
the war created a power vacuum in Europe and Great Britain, which, like the United States,
had a changing of the old order. On 26 July, Clement Atlee, following his Labour Party’s
victory in the national elections, succeeded Winston Churchill as Prime Minister of Great
Britain. Atlee soon came to the realization that Great Britain could no longer maintain
control over its colonies and began the daunting task of decolonizing its vast empire. As
Lewis and Robinson noted, Atlee’s government faced devastating problems of economic
recovery in the period 1945–46, writing:
When American Lend–Lease ended, he protested that the very living conditions of
people in the British Isles depended on the continuous flow ‘both of food and … raw
materials’ from the United States…. There was no recourse but to go cap in hand for
a dollar grant or loan. With or without the American loan, ministers had to choose
between financing their domestic recovery and their imperial commitments. 1
The post–war collapse of the British Empire provided an impetus for the United States to
assume a more prevalent leadership role in global affairs. Yet, as John Louis Gaddis
observed, “The successful conclusion of the war had brought with it no guarantee of
lasting security…it was if the United States had finally assumed a decisive role in world
affairs and, we find that the price of preeminence is vulnerability.” 2 The Soviet Union
looked to become more of a force on the international scene as well. The war took a
devastating toll on the Soviet people, with an estimated twenty million people lost. The
1
Wm. Roger Louis and Robert Robinson, “The Imperialism of Decolonization,” in Ends of British
Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization, Collected Essays, 2nd ed., Wm. Roger
Louis (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 454-55.
2
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 21.
47
German invasion left the villages and cities in the western Soviet Union in ruins. The
Soviets, like the rest of Europe had to face the enormous task of rebuilding their war torn
cities and their postwar economy. The Soviets also sought to gain hegemony along their
borders with Eastern Europe and the Middle East. From 4 February to 11 February 1945
the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met in Yalta on the Crimea to
discuss the coordination and implementation of the allied war effort, and to plan for the
surrender of Germany and the reorganization of the political landscape of postwar
Europe. At Yalta, the “Big Three” debated the partition of Germany, zones of
occupation, and whether France would participate in the occupation. There was also a
discussion of the future of Eastern Europe. The Department of State Office of the
Historian notes, “The Americans and the British generally agreed that future governments
of the Eastern European nations bordering the Soviet Union should be ‘friendly’ to the
Soviet regime while the Soviets pledged to allow free elections in all territories liberated
from Nazi Germany. Negotiators also released a declaration on Poland, providing for the
inclusion of Communists in the postwar national government.” 3 However, Soviet
intrusions into Poland and Eastern Europe had already begun as early as August1939,
after the signing the Treaty of Non–Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union,
also referred to as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. While it was publically promoted as a
non–aggression pact between the Nazis and the USSR, it had a secret agenda as well.
The secret provisions of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact provided the Soviet Union
time to better prepare the Red Army for conflict, it also afforded them the opportunity to
gain hegemony in the border regions through the acquisition of territory, and control
3
Department of State, Office of the Historian, “The Yalta Conference, 1945,”
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/YaltaConf, accessed October 7, 2012.
48
through spheres of influence. Following the German invasion of Western Poland in
September 1939, the Soviet Union followed suit, invading and occupying Eastern Poland
several weeks later. In November 1939, the Soviets invaded Finland to acquire territory
for military bases along their borders. Stalin incurred more resistance from the Finns
than he had anticipated. The threat of intervention by British and French forces that
ostensibly would have interrupted a vital supply of iron ore for the German war effort left
Stalin in a perilous situation. So Stalin reached an accord, with Finland, allowing for the
presence of military bases in the border region while allowing the Finnish state to remain
independent and avoid entering the war. The Soviet NKVD invaded the Baltic States of
Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia in June 1940. The three small nations quickly capitulated
to Soviet demands to allow them to place military bases on their soil and each signed
mutual assistance pacts with the USSR. The Soviets also seized Bessarabia which was
included in the negotiation of the secret provisions of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with
Nazi Germany. 4
On 22 June 1941 Germany broke the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and launched
Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, which negated the gains in
Eastern Poland and put Stalin’s plans for hegemony on hold until the latter days of the
war. However, as the Red Army turned the tide in 1945, and began its push toward
Germany, the Soviets filled the void left by the Nazi defeat in the occupied nations of
Eastern Europe. While “liberating” these nations, the USSR established pro–Soviet
4
Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War-1953 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2006), 45, NKVD — Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (The People’s Commissariat for
Internal Security) was the predecessor to the Soviet KGB.
49
governments, like the PKWN in Poland. 5 This was in accordance with the agreement
struck at Yalta in February 1945, as Berthon and Potts noted:
The Big Three had agreed that the provincial government would be widened to
include all parties, including the representatives of the Polish government in exile in
London; once this had happened, Churchill and Roosevelt would withdraw their
recognition of the London Poles… However, Roosevelt instantly let Stalin off the
hook in a private letter, hand–delivered at the conference, that ‘the United States will
never lend its support in any way to any provisional government that would be
inimical to your interests. 6
However, the death of Roosevelt in April 1945, the ascension of his successor Harry
Truman, and Churchill’s defeat to Clement Atlee in July 1945 all changed the dynamics
of the Big Three alliance and the postwar world. Later that month American forces from
the west and the Red Army from the east would come face to face in Germany. As
Keylor noted, “But the convergence of American and Russian military power at the
center of the devastated continent of Europe in the spring of 1945 signified something of
critical significance for the future of the world beyond the immediate reality of
Germany’s defeat.” 7 When Truman joined the other members of the tripartite in
Potsdam in July 1945, Atlee was in attendance with Churchill. The allied victory in
Europe was complete—the decisions regarding how the postwar map of Europe was to be
drawn, both politically and geographically, however, were yet to be determined. Truman
kept personal notes of the events that transpired while attending the Potsdam Conference,
and after meeting with Stalin on the first day, he wrote, “I can deal with Stalin. He’s
5
PKWN — Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego (Polish Committee of National Liberation) was a
pro-Soviet provincial government established after the Nazi liberation that replaced the pre–war Polish
government exiled in Britain during the war.
6
Simon Berthon and Johanna Potts, Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through
the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo Press,
2006), 286.
7
William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World: An International History, 3rd ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 251.
50
honest—but smart as hell.” 8 However, Stalin proved to be far more difficult to deal with
than Truman had anticipated during this early assessment of the Soviet leader.
The two major points of contention were reparations and Poland. The Soviets and the
PKWN had set new borders for Poland with the Soviets controlling the eastern portion
and the PKWN the western portion. The Soviet Union also claimed a large portion of
East Prussia. Stalin was demanding reparations from Germany, and Truman continued to
reiterate throughout the conference that the United States would not finance repartitions
as they did after World War I and that Germans did not have the economic capacity to
pay repartitions. During the 25 July meeting the subject of Poland came up and Truman
noted, “Russia helped herself to a slice of Poland and gave Poland a nice slice of
Germany taking also a good slice of East Prussia for herself.” 9 Discussions on these two
issues continued, but to no avail. On 30 July Truman wrote, “We are at an impasse on
Poland and reparations. Russia and Poland have agreed on the Oder and West Neisse to
the Czecho [sic] Slovakian border. Just a unilateral arrangement without so much as a by
your leave. I don’t like it.” 10
Another matter discussed at the Potsdam Conference was the withdrawal of allied
troops from Iran. On 19 May 1945 the Iranian government under the terms of the 1942
Tripartite Agreement signed with Britain and the Soviet Union, called for the withdrawal
of allied occupation forces. However, the British and the Soviets were reluctant to
withdraw due to their own strategic interests in the oil rich region.
8
Harry S. Truman, “Personal Notes-Potsdam Conference,” July 17, 1945, PSF: 141, Truman Papers,
Truman Library.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
51
As Hess noted:
At the Potsdam Conference, President Harry S. Truman promised that the remaining
American troops (some 5,000 men servicing military instillations) would be
withdrawn within sixty days. The British and Russian governments, however,
committed themselves only to the immediate withdrawal of Teheran and postponed
further discussion until the foreign ministers’ meeting in late September. Before that
conference, the war against Japan suddenly ended. In the following months, a number
of questions, including the Allied occupation of Iran, became more pressing and
undermined the wartime coalition. Indeed the lines of the American–Russian over
Iran took more definite shape. The Soviets tightened their grip on northern Iran,
denying Iranian requests to dispatch gendarmes into the Soviet zone and ignoring the
ensuing Iranian complaints. 11
After Soviet assurances to withdraw on December 1945 and March 4, 1946 passed,
deadlines for withdrawal became arbitrary. The longer the Soviet occupation in the north
continued, the more tensions grew between all of the involved parties. On 5 March 1945,
former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke at Westminster College in Fulton,
Missouri delivering a speech called “The Sinews of Peace.” Churchill said:
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an ‘iron curtain’ has descended
across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of
Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade,
Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in
what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only
to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of
control from Moscow. 12
Churchill noted his respect for Stalin, his former ally, while bluntly and succinctly
summing up the situation in Europe and defining the rapidity of deterioration in the
relationship of the Tripartite Alliance.
Once again, the Soviets agreed to a withdrawal from Iran on 24 March, but failed to
do so. On 5 April 1946, General Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
11
Gary R. Hess, “The Iranian Crisis and the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 89, no.1 (March,
1974): 124-25, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2148118.
12
Mark A. Kishlansky, ed., Winston Churchill, “Sinews of Peace” Quoted in Sources of World
History, (New York, Harper Collins, 1995) pp. 298-302,
http://www.historyguide.org/europe/churchill.html, accessed October 16, 2012.
52
Union, met with Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to deliver a
letter from Truman and discuss the situation in Iran. Along with Stalin’s reply, Smith
reported his discussions with Stalin and Molotov in a telegram to President Truman. In
this telegram Smith wrote, “I asked directly why the Generalissimo thought that any
power or powers were a threat to the USSR. To this he replied, Churchill—He tried to
instigate war against Russia and persuaded the U.S. to join him in armed occupation of
our territory in 1919, and lately he has been at it again. I then asked him categorically if
he really believed that the U.S. and Great Britain were in an alliance to thwart Russia. He
replied that he did so believe.” 13 After continued pressure by the United States and the
United Nations, Stalin finally capitulated and removed the Red Army from Northern Iran.
Before the withdrawal, Stalin had negotiated with the Iranians for an agreement to control
the oil fields of Azerbaijan. Once the Red Army withdrew, the satellite communist
regime in Azerbaijan collapsed and so did his agreement with the Iranians, as Wettig
noted, “All Soviet attempts to extend power beyond the regions conquered by the Red
Army ended in failure.” 14 The fundamental change in dynamics and the hard line
positions taken by both Stalin and Truman since the Potsdam Conference revealed major
cracks in the alliance of the war time tripartite. The Iranian crisis brought forth a new
level of mistrust of the United States and Great Britain by the Soviet Union, and vise
versa.
13
Walter Bedell Smith to Harry S. Truman, Letter, April 5, 1946, PSF: 69; Truman Papers, Truman
Library.
14
Gerhard Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: The Emergence and Development of East-West
Conflict, 1939-1953 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 77.
53
Mastny, examining the Soviet perspective of coming events, writes, “Could elite armed
conflict ensue instead from the unbridgeable differences between socialism and
capitalism, that is, from the growing rivalry between the two superpowers? The
conclusion they eventually reached was characteristically ambivalent: there was not a
“danger of war” but rather a “threat of a danger of war” Or, in the similarly ambivalent
Western terminology, there was now a Cold War.” 15 With the line drawn in the sand, the
Iranian crisis was the first of many tests to come as war time allies became ideological
enemies, creating a bi–polar world and the ushering in the Cold War.
The events that unfolded in Iran created a greater mistrust of Soviet intentions by the
president and the State Department. On 22 February 1946, at the height of the crisis, the
charge d’ affaires in Moscow, George F. Kennan, sent to Secretary of State James F.
Byrnes his analysis of Soviet attitudes, goals, and agendas in the postwar world. This
analysis, destined to be known as the “Long Telegram,” essentially outlined what would
become the basic tenets of American Cold War policy adopted by Truman, and, executed
in one form or another by his successors up to George H.W. Bush. Kennan began by
examining the mindset of Stalin, as he understood it, and using Stalin’s own words as
evidence as to how it reflected Stalin’s perception of the socialist–capitalist world.
Kennan observed that:
USSR still lives in antagonistic “capitalist encirclement” with which in the long run
there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a
delegation of American Workers: In course of further development of international
revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center,
drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center,
drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these
15
Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and The
Politics of Communism, 1941 – 1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 305-306.
54
two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of
communism in entire world.’ 16
It is most likely that Stalin was speaking abstractly, in accordance with Lenin–Marxist
philosophy, but his words eerily foreshadow the development of bi–polar centers of
power at odds ideologically. This, in part, explains the Stalin’s desire to establish Soviet
spheres of influence.
However, according to Kennan, in the minds of the Politburo, a simpler reason existed
driving the Soviet’s to attempt to buffer and insulate its borders—anxiety. Kennan
writes, that, “At the bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and
instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” 17 The fear of foreign intruders invading the soil
of the motherland also helps to explain the terms demanded by Stalin at Yalta and the
subsequent establishment of satellite communist regimes along the eastern and southern
borders of the USSR and their reluctance to capitulate on Iran. Yet, Kennan believed that
the Russian sense of insecurity did not, in fact, have any sound basis in reality. In
January 1947, Kennan prepared a report for Secretary of Defense James Forrestal titled,
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Kennan analyzed Stalin’s perception of a capitalist–
socialist battle and the perceived threat of foreign invasion, writing,
all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents
of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic toward Soviet power. By the same token
emphasis has been placed on the original communist thesis of a basic antagonism
between the capitalist and Socialist worlds.
It is clear from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality…. But
there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting
Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not on the realities of
16
George F. Kennan to James F. Byrnes, Telegram, February 22, 1946, SMOF: 116, George M. Elsey
Papers, Truman Library.
17
Ibid.
55
foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of
dictatorial authority at home. 18
Kennan’s Long Telegram prompted President Truman to examine the Soviet
situation in even greater detail. In July 1946 he directed Special Counsel Clark Clifford
to gather information on the Soviet Union and to report back to him. Gaddis writes, “That
same day told his advisers that he was ‘tired of our being pushed around’, that ‘here little,
there a little, they're chiseling from us,’ and that, ‘now is [the] time to take[a] stand on
Russia.” 19 On 18 July Clifford wrote a letter to Admiral William Leahy of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to assess Soviet activities affecting the security of the United States and to
estimate the present and current military strength and present and future military policies
of the USSR. On 20 July 1946 Clifford wrote Soviet Ambassador William Bedell Smith
requesting him to review all agreements with the Soviets as to repartitions, violations by
the USSR of those agreements and recommend future U.S. policy in regard to
reparations. 20 Clifford sought input from numerous high–level officials and the
culmination of his efforts was sent to the president on 24 September 1946 in a report
titled, “American Relations with the Soviet Union” that became more informally known
as the Clifford–Elsey report. The opening paragraph of the introduction summarizes the
widely held belief of the contributors, “The gravest problem facing the United States
today is that of American relations with the Soviet Union. The solution of that problem
may determine whether or not there will be a third World War. Soviet leaders appear to
be conducting their nation on a course of aggrandizement designed to lead to eventual
18
X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” Foreign Affairs, 25, no. 4, (July 1947): 570. Note: X is the
pseudonym used by George F. Kennan when publishing “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Foreign
Affairs, in July 1947.
19
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace, 32.
20
Clark M. Clifford to Admiral William Leahy, Letter, July 18, 1946, SMOF: 116; George M. Elsey
Papers, Truman Library; Clark M. Clifford to Ambassador William Bedell Smith, July 20, 1946. SMOF:
116, George M. Elsey Papers, Truman Library.
56
world domination by the USSR. Their goal, and their policies to reach it, was in direct
conflict with American ideals. 21 The report surmised that the Soviet Union was a threat
to world peace and outlined three methods for dealing with the Soviets. The first is to
persuade the Soviet Union to actively and honestly participate in the United Nations to
foster a spirit of world cooperation, secondly to maintain military strength powerful
enough to restrain, if necessary, Soviet aggression and finally, to foster cooperation
through cultural, intellectual and economic exchange. 22 These methods were integrated
as part of the U. S. policy toward the Soviet Union and remained in effect throughout the
Cold War era. President Truman and many within his administration held a great deal of
mistrust of Soviet intentions, and it was reflected in the administration’s response as it
gradually developed its strategy in conducting Soviet foreign policy. As Gaddis points
out, “It was these manifestations of unilateralism that first set off alarm bells in the West
about Russian intentions; the resulting uneasiness in turn stimulated deeper more
profound anxieties.” 23 These anxieties eventually led to Truman’s policy of taking a
hard–line in relations with the Soviet Union and the development of containment to
prevent the spread of communism throughout the world. Truman’s angst was a result of
his personal observations of Soviet behavior during his talks with Stalin the waning days
of the war.
As Gaddis noted, “Soviet actions in Eastern Europe in 1945, together with change in
tactics by the international Communist movement, convinced them that Moscow had
21
Clark Clifford, “American Relations with the Soviet Union” September 24, 1946, SMOF: 1; Rose A.
Conway Papers, Truman Library.
22
Ibid.
23
Gaddis, The Long Peace, 32.
57
embarked on a program of unlimited expansion which threatened the very survival of the
United States and its Western allies.” 24
Even as the events of the Iranian Crisis were still unfolding, another threat appeared in
Greece and Turkey. There was a serious challenge by communists for control of the
governments in both nations. In Greece, the situation was serious as a civil war erupted in
March 1946, and after a year of fighting the situation in Greece became desperate. On 3
March 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall received a letter from Greek Foreign
Minister Paul Economou–Gouras requesting aid from the United States. EconomouGouras wrote:
The Greek Government and people are therefore compelled to appeal to the
Government of the United States and through it to the American people for financial,
economic and expert assistance…. The need is great. The determination of the Greek
people to do all in their power to restore Greece as a self–supporting, self–respecting
democracy is also great; but the destruction in Greece has been so complete as to rob
the Greek people of their power to meet the situation by themselves…. It is the
profound hope of the Greek Government that the Government of the United States
will find a way to render to Greece without delay the assistance for which it now
appeals. 25
Truman was quick to respond. After analyzing the situation, the president was set to
address a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947. Truman summarized the situation
in both Greece and Turkey and outlined his vision of “containment” while asking
Congress to appropriate four–hundred million dollars in economic and military aid to
Greece and Turkey. The address, titled, “Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and
Turkey,” served as the declaration of Truman’s foreign policy initiatives and came to be
more widely known as the Truman Doctrine. The President set forth to contain the
24
John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of The Cold War, 1941 – 1947 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972), 284.
25
Paul Economou–Gouras to George C. Marshall, Letter, March 3, 1947, Subject File: 6; Joseph M.
Jones Papers, Truman Library.
58
spread of communism in Europe by providing aid to the Greek and Turkish governments,
assist in their efforts to defeat communist uprisings, and restore strength and stability to
the established governments of both nations in particular and the region as a whole. In
his address, Truman states that:
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between
alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is
based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions,
representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of
speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is
based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon
terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the
suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work
out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily
through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and
orderly political processes. 26
Truman came to realize the totalitarianism that existed within the Soviet Union and was
determined to stop the USSR from spreading its influence and control any farther. As
Secretary of State Marshall observed during a Cabinet meeting, that, “Our policy, I think,
should be directed toward restoring a balance of power in Europe and Asia.” 27
Marshall knew that the devastation and destruction caused by the war left the peoples
of Europe and Asia in despair and without basic necessities such as food, clothing and
shelter, a sufficient number of operating manufacturing facilities, and working
infrastructure to repair the mechanisms of economy, the result would be an infinite
number of living causalities without hope for the future. On 5 July 1947 Marshall
outlined his plan for action in a speech titled “European Initiative Essential to Economic
26
Harry S. Truman, “Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey” March 12, 1947, SMOF:
17; George M. Elsey Papers, Truman Library.
27
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace, 57.
59
Recovery” at Harvard University. Marshall summed up his vision for aiding Europe in
its economic recovery, saying:
It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the
return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no
political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is not directed against any country
or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be
the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of
political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.28
Following Marshall’s speech in June, work on creating a viable plan for assisting
European recovery began in earnest in July. Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder
sought input from Maurice Frere, Chairman of the Bank for International Settlements,
and the State Department prepared a report analyzing the problems associated
implementing a plan. The White House was also debating the issue and trying to establish
Truman’s role in the development of the plan. In a memorandum sent by Under–
Secretary of State Joseph M. Jones to Francis Russell, Director of the Office of Public
Affairs discussing his meeting with White House Special Assistant Clark Clifford on 2
July, 1947, Jones writes, that:
We got talking about the major lines of foreign policy, and I mentioned that in my
opinion there was a great deal of confusion as to the relationship of the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan…. He felt strongly that the President should issue
some sort of clarification in an early speech or statement…. I detect on Clifford’s part
a desire to have the President take more of a lead in foreign affairs and to be the chief
spokesman in this field…. Perhaps it hasn’t gone as far as jealousy of the Secretary at
the White House, but certainly there are tendencies in that direction. 29
It took six months before a final draft of the bill was ready to be sent to Congress. On
19 December President Truman sent the bill to Congress for its consideration. On 3 April
28
George C. Marshall, “European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery,” June 5, 1947, The
Department of State Bulletin, Volume XVI, Number 415, pages 1159-1160.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?pagenum
ber=2&documentdate=1947-06-05&documentid=8-7.
29
Joseph M. Jones to Francis Russell, Memorandum, July 2, 1947, Subject File: 2, Joseph M. Jones
Papers, Truman Library.
60
1948, the president signed the European Recovery Act into law and the Marshall Plan
was implemented. One of the main provisions for participation was access and advisory
influence over the budgets of recipients to assure that funds were distributed as intended
and not diverted for military or political purposes. Thus the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation was created on 16 April 1948 to coordinate recovery efforts.
Initially, all of the nations of Europe, except Spain, were invited to participate including
the USSR.
However, the provisions proved to be too much for the Soviets. As Keylor writes,
regarding the Soviet objections to the plan, “But it was too much to expect of a victorious
great power, particularly one as secretive and suspicious as the Soviet Union, to open its
books to the prying eyes of American financial officials... the investigations of the
Marshall Plan administrators would doubtless have revealed how vulnerable the postwar
economy of the Soviet Union was, a circumstance the Kremlin was desperately trying to
conceal for reasons of Communist ideology as well as national pride.” 30
Initially the Soviet’s participated in the Paris Conference for Marshall Plan recipients
because Stalin believed that he could manipulate the terms of participation and receive
the loans without the necessity of capitulating to the terms set forth by the United States
for participation. However, before the conference concluded Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Union would not negotiate terms for
Marshall Plan assistance. Referring to Stalin’s response, Wettig notes that:
His confidence, however, that he would be capable of spoiling the enemy’s game was
shattered when Molotov reported from Paris that the Anglo–Saxons insisted that the
recovery program did not allow for major modification.
Another source of concern was the Czechoslovak eagerness to accept the U.S.
invitation, as well as indications of a similar Polish attitude. Stalin now suspected that
30
Keylor, The Twentieth Century World, 263.
61
the client countries were willing to defy him by accepting U.S. conditions. He
dreaded losing control of Eastern Europe more than anything else. On 7 July he
called Molotov back. 31
When the Paris meeting resumes on 12 July, the Soviet Union declined to attend and
pressured the Eastern Bloc into not attending as well. However, on 23 June the Soviets
took unilateral action that would serve to solidify the Cold War by initiating a blockade
of the western zone of Berlin. In January 1947 Great Britain and the United States
merged their individual zones of occupation into one to establish a common economic
zone. By March 1947 a central bank was established to service the Anglo–American and
French zones. After serious negotiations the French finally agreed to merge with the
Anglo–American zone on 18 June, and on 20 June they issued a new West German
currency, the deutsche mark. 32 This rapidly occurring consolidation of economic
resources was of grave concern to Stalin and the Politburo as it threatened their own
ambitions for Germany. Also, it is plausible that Moscow felt isolated as the other
former allies were uniting without the Soviets, thus widening the growing fissure
between the east and west even further. As Keylor points out:
This process of economic integration in western Germany—the removal of all
restrictions on the circulation of labor, capital, and products within the three zones,
the formation of German–controlled trizonal economic bodies with broad decision–
making powers, and the establishment of a trizonal central bank and currency backed
by the American financial power of the Marshall Plan—can only have been
interpreted by Moscow as what indeed it turned out to be: a prelude to the political
integration of the three western zones in the form of a West German state dependent
on and loyal to the United States. 33
Given this development in Germany it is understandable why Moscow felt suspicious of
the motivation behind the Marshall Plan and even more wary in allowing their satellite
31
Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe, 138.
Keylor, The Twentieth Century World, 270.
33
Ibid.
32
62
nations to participate. Therefore the Soviet Union ultimately decided to decline
participation as well. Keylor astutely notes, that, “Since the newly consolidated western
occupation zones of Germany contained three quarters of that country’s population as
well as the most productive industrial region of prewar Europe (the Ruhr–Rhineland–
Westphalia complex), the prospect of a unified, economically advanced West German
state associated with the United States produced predictable uneasiness in the Kremlin.” 34
As the western zone moved closer to creating a West German state in the summer of
1948, the Soviets fearful of the subversion of their East European clients and interruption
of their own goals in Germany withdrew from the Marshall Plan and looked for a way to
respond. Wettig writes that, “The Kremlin was determined to take no passive look at
economic and political consolidation of the Western zones. Given that the Germans had
failed to allow themselves to be persuaded by Eastern advocacy of unification and a
peace treaty, the Anglo–Saxon powers on whose backing they relied had to be exposed as
weak and unable to provide protection. This would teach people that they had no option
but to join the USSR.”35 Since Berlin lay one–hundred and ten miles inside the Russian
zone, their solution was to block off the western sector of Berlin from the western zones,
thus shutting off access by water, rail and roads. This would leave over two–million
inhabitants without a way to obtain basic necessities of life. The Soviets were willing to
induce starvation upon the inhabitants of West Berlin in a bold attempt to generate fear
and to force the capitulation of the United States, Great Britain, and France to abandon
the idea of a West German state and independent currency. In this game of international
34
35
Ibid., 271.
Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe, 166.
63
chess, the West made the first move and the Soviets countered, now the board belonged
to the Western allies and it was again their move.
The Soviets had effectively sealed off access to Berlin by land and water. Thus the
only possible avenue left to the West was the airways. The United States and Great
Britain coordinated efforts and began airlifting supplies into Berlin beginning on 26 June
1948, just two days after the Soviet blockade went into effect. The aircraft brought in
food, clothing, sundries, fresh water, and coal for heating. At the outset of the airlift
there were two airports in the western sector, Gastow in the British sector and Tempelhof
in the U.S. sector. On 5 August 1948 construction began on a third airfield, Tegel, in the
French sector that opened on 5 November. The massive number of flights created a
logistics nightmare as well as dangerous flying conditions based on the sheer number of
aircraft coming in and out. At one point, on 7 April 1949, Tempelhof control handled the
takeoff and landing of 100 aircraft during one six and a half hour period that is a rate of
one plane every four minutes. 36 The first month of the airlift operations a total of 1404
metric tons of supplies were flown in to Berlin on 500 sorties with the U.S. Air Force
flying 474 of those missions. At the airlift’s peak in July 1949 over 253,090 metric tons
was flown in on 27,592 flights. In total, 2,325,509 metric tons came into Berlin on 277,
569 flights. 37 The airlift foiled Stalin’s plan to demoralize the population of West Berlin
and to embarrass and expose the “Trizonal” coalition as weak and Stalin’s bold attempt to
take a strong stand was a failure.
36
“The Berlin Airlift,” PBS American Experience, timeline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/airlift/timeline/timeline2.html.
37
Roger G Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949 (College Station, Texas: A&M
University Press, Reprint, 2008), 201.
64
On 12 May 1949 Stalin reopened the road and rail access to West Berlin. The airlift
continued through 30 September when the final flight arrived in Berlin. Keylor notes,
that, “The Berlin Blockade accelerated the progressive involvement of the United States
in the defense of Western Europe that had begun on the rhetorical level with the
proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the adoption of the containment policy during
the Greek and Turkish crises in 1947.” 38 This was indeed the case as the United States
and Great Britain initiated talks that led to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 4
April 1949. The measure passed the Senate and was signed by Truman on 25 July. The
treaty pledged mutual defense of the other member nations should they come under
attack from an aggressor nation thus forming the NATO coalition.
On 23 May 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany was established in the western
occupation zones ending military rule. On 7 October the Soviets retaliated by
announcing the formation of the German Democratic Republic, effectively partitioning
Germany and dividing it east–west geographically, as well as ideologically and
politically. Both sides moved unilaterally, attempting to further their own security
interests while countering advances of their adversary. However, there were new
developments taking place resulting in a paradigm shift in East–West relations and the
Cold War. As President Truman announced on 23 September 1949, “I believe the
American people to the fullest extent consistent with the national security are entitled to
be informed of all developments in the field of atomic energy. That is my reason for
making public the following information. We have evidence that within recent weeks an
38
Keylor, The Twentieth Century World, 271.
65
atomic explosion occurred in the U. S. S. R.” 39 As the Cold War era became entrenched,
the nuclear era dawned on the horizon. However, there was opposition to the president’s
views and policy in regard to the Soviet Union. The opposition was vocal and much of it
came from the left within his own party—led by Henry Wallace and Claude Pepper. This
would create a political firestorm as battle for the hearts and minds of the American
electorate unfolded in 1948.
39
Department of State, Bulletin, October 3, 1949, 487; Subject File: 2, Joseph M. Jones Papers, Truman
Library.
66
Communism, Race and the Changing Landscape of the American Polity
Henry Wallace came to Washington in 1933 as FDR’s Secretary of Agriculture. In
1940, as Roosevelt was positioning himself for a run at a third term, he and Vice
President, John Nance Gardner disagreed over the direction of the New Deal and the
administration’s policies. 1 Roosevelt selected Wallace as his running mate on the
Democratic ticket in 1940, and following the election, he served as vice president during
World War II. Wallace was a loyal New Dealer and liberal. However, Wallace moved
farther left as the 1944 election approached and he made more conservative factions
within the Democratic Party nervous. Wallace, like his friend and fellow liberal Claude
Pepper, failed to take notice of the growing conservative tone within the party and the
nation at large. His increasingly idyllic views and his championing of a new world order
based on internationalism made him a liability, and forced FDR to remove him from the
ticket in 1944 in favor of Harry Truman. After FDR’s death, Wallace, along with other
New Deal contemporaries like Harold Ickes and James Roosevelt, became increasingly
disenchanted with the direction taken by President Truman, especially in regard to Soviet
foreign policy. In the August 1948 edition of The Atlantic, a ghost writer working with
Wallace described that being with him, “He gives me an eerie feeling that he really isn't
listening when I talk with him. He may be listening with his brain, but certainly not with
his guts. He doesn't seem to know how to have a belly–laugh—least of all at himself. He
gives me a strong impression of considering himself a man of destiny, a person
answering calls the rest of us don't hear.” 2 Wallace was appointed by President
Roosevelt to serve as Secretary of Commerce on 2 March 1945, and continued to serve as
1
2
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/VP_John_Garner.htm
Gardner Jackson, “Henry Wallace: A Divided Mind” Atlantic Monthly, 182, August 1948, 27.
67
Secretary under President Truman. The end of the war in Europe coupled with the
rapidity of deterioration in U.S.–Soviet relations as the Cold War developed revealed
deep convictions and differences held by Secretary Wallace and President Truman
regarding the course of American foreign policy. During the first year, the relationship
remained cordial with Wallace supporting the president and the Administration in public.
Privately, however, Wallace shared his disagreements with the direction of the
Administration’s foreign policy with the president in a letter dated 23 July 1946. Wallace
wrote, “Our basic distrust of the Russians, which has been greatly intensified in recent
months by the playing up of conflict in the press, stems from differences in political and
economic organization. . . . I am convinced that we can meet that challenge as we have in
the past by demonstrating that economic abundance can be achieved without sacrificing
personal, political and religious liberties. We cannot meet it as Hitler tried to by an anti–
Comintern alliance.” 3 However, that would change when Wallace accepted an invitation
to speak at a major political rally being held in Madison Square Garden in September.
Hamby, in discussing the topic of Wallace’s speech, noted that:
Early midsummer, Wallace accepted an invitation to speak at a major political rally
sponsored by the ICCASP and NCPAC and scheduled for New York on September
12. Since the meeting was to provide a major kickoff for the liberal effort in the
congressional campaign, Wallace initially planned to attack the way the conservatives
have blocked domestic progress in the 79th Congress. However, one of Wallace's
junior aides in the Commerce Department leaked a July 23 letter on Soviet–American
relations to Beanie Baldwin. Baldwin persuaded Wallace to switch his topic to
foreign policy and base his speech on the letter…. Perhaps he thought Wallace’s
enunciation of principles of Soviet-American friendship could reverse American
foreign policy. 4
3
Henry A. Wallace to Harry S. Truman, Letter, July 23, 1946, WHCF: OF 1585; Truman Papers,
Truman Library.
4
Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1973), 127-129.
68
Whether Wallace sought destiny, as Jackson suggests, or had destiny thrust upon him
is questionable; and to say that Baldwin “persuaded” Wallace to change tack and focus in
his address on foreign policy is generous. Wallace, by all accounts an intelligent man,
must have known that taking a public stand against Truman’s foreign policy while
serving in the administration would annoy the president and suggests that he had made up
his mind to abandon Truman and work toward undermining his credibility going forward.
Wallace brought a copy of the speech to the President for his review, but there was a
controversy surrounding what the President saw and approved and the speech that
Wallace actually delivered. According to Margaret Truman, “Henry Wallace had cajoled
him into this generous but inaccurate remark. I'm trying to be objective when I say this;
perhaps I'm being too hard on my father. When I discussed this bit of history with Matt
Connolly, only recently, Matt said bluntly: ‘it was nothing but a double cross. Wallace
showed the President one speech and made a different one.’ There's some truth to those
words. Listeners that night heard Mr. Wallace make a bitter attack on the foreign–policy
of the Truman administration.” 5
The speech Wallace delivered that evening was titled, “The Way to Peace: A Division
of World Between Russia and the United States.” Wallace’s words echoed the angst and
ire of many American liberals to the tone set by Churchill in his “Sinews of Peace”
Speech in Fulton, Missouri earlier in March. Wallace said:
Make no mistake about it—the British imperialistic policy in the Near East alone,
combined with Russian retaliation, would lead the United States straight to war unless
Note: Calvin Benham “Beanie” Baldwin, 1902-1975, served as assistant to Secretary of Agriculture
Henry Wallace from 1933-1940. In 1945, he became Executive Vice–Chairman of NCPAC which later
merged with several other liberal front organizations to form the Progressive Citizens of America, PCA.
The PCA was the foundation for the Progressive Party that ran Wallace for president in 1948.
5
Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1973), 316.
69
we have a clearly–defined and realistic policy of our own. Neither of these two great
powers wants war now, but the danger is that whatever their intentions may be, their
current policies may eventually lead to war. To prevent war and insure our survival in
a stable world, it is essential that we look abroad through our own American eyes and
not through the eyes of either the British Foreign Office or a pro–British or anti–
Russian press. In this connection, I want one thing clearly understood. I am neither
anti–British nor pro–British—neither anti–Russian nor pro–Russian. And just two
days ago, when President Truman read these words, he said that they represented the
policy of his administration. 6
Wallace spoke with impudence, expressing his own his own deep–seated convictions
regarding the future of world peace, diplomacy and the role of U.S. foreign policy in that
process.
In doing so, Wallace represented and expressed the mindset of progressive liberals. He
distanced himself from the administration’s foreign policy agenda, while positioning
himself to represent an alternative to President Truman in 1948. Wallace, in concluding
his speech, revealed his assessment of the current situation while outlining his vision for
the future, saying, “In brief, as I see it today, the World Order is bankrupt—and the
United States, Russia, and England are the receivers. These are the hard facts of power
politics on which we have to build a functioning, powerful United Nations and a body of
international law…. I believe that peace—the kind of peace I have outlined tonight—is
the basic issue, both in the Congressional campaign this fall and right on through the
Presidential election of 1948.” 7 In Wallace’s speech, there were no apparent ambiguities
as far as the White House was concerned and his views as well as his motives were clear.
Truman waited for the dust to settle and on 20 September 1946, eight days after the
speech, he asked for and received Wallace’s resignation as Secretary of Commerce. The
6
Henry A. Wallace, “The Way to Peace: A Division of the World between Russia and the United
States,” September 12, 1946, sponsored by the ICCASP/NCPAC, Vital Speeches of the Day (October 1,
1946), v. 12, n. 24, p. 738.
7
Ibid., 740-741.
70
stage was set for a showdown in 1948 with Henry Wallace as one of the star players in
the unfolding drama. However, Wallace was not alone in his stand against Truman’s
foreign policy, and the other major player to emerge was Claude Pepper.
Pepper, like Wallace, held pro–Soviet views. On 22 June 1944 at Madison Square
Garden in New York, Pepper spoke at a Russian War Relief Rally on the third
anniversary of the Soviet Union’s entry into the war. Pepper told the crowd on that
Thursday evening:
Upon the old lands of ancient Russia freedom has not only had a new birth but found
a new savior…. No tribute upon our landing from the West upon the coast of France
has been more gracious than that of Joseph Stalin, the world’s greatest general…
What is the meaning of the willingness of senators to denounce in this day, when we
are fighting shoulder to shoulder, Joseph Stalin a great enemy? Why do great
newspapers still disseminate vicious and false propaganda against the Soviet Union
and strive to fan the flames of prejudice against such an Ally, such a friend? 8
Pepper became an outspoken supporter of the Soviet Union before Truman took office.
Pepper confided in one of his influential constituents, Colonel Raymond Robins. Robins
was an economist and a social reformer. In 1917 he led an American Red Cross mission
to Russia, where he became a frontline witness to the Russian Revolution and a defacto
representative between the American ambassador and Lenin. Robins believed it was
crucial that the United States establish relations with the Soviets. Referring to Robins’
efforts in Russia, Salzman writes, that, “he tried to convince the Bolsheviks of the
wisdom of Soviet–American cooperation. Far more difficult, however, was his attempt to
persuade Washington that Lenin and Trotsky were not criminal agents in the pay of the
German enemy. Robins’s aim was to demonstrate that Russian–American cooperation
8
Claude Pepper, Speech, “In Observance of the Third Anniversary of the Soviet Union’s Entry Into the
War,” June 22, 1944, sponsored by Russian War Relief, Box 34, Folder 3-2, Robins Papers.
71
was critical, not only for long–range American self–interest but for the immediate war
effort as well.” 9
Robins continued to champion the cause of formal recognition of the Soviet Union
after returning to the United States and continually kept in touch with Soviet officials in
the United States—often attending various diplomatic events. He remained a friend of
the Soviet Union. Pepper forwarded a copy of his address at Madison Square Garden on
22 June 1944 to Robins, after receiving word of Robins’s enthusiasm for its content,
writing, that, “Colonel, you are one of the finest friends I have. I am not only immensely
grateful to you as a friend, and if I am not presumptive, a kindred spirit, and I implore
you not to desist from writing me and giving me from time to time the information and
inspiration of your great mind and spirit.” 10 Pepper, as Wallace did, shared Roosevelt’s
Wilsonian vision of a world body to promote peace and the necessity for a strong
international organization to arbitrate and mediate international disputes. He became an
outspoken supporter for the signing of the United Nations charter in the U.S. Senate.
Clark notes that, “Just seven weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Pepper
began to think about the postwar period. He wrote to his friend Raymond Robins, ‘I am
doing what I can to foster an appreciation of the necessity of some kind of a world
governmental structure to be built upon the Post War wreckage’.” 11 Pepper’s faith in the
UN was strong and a belief supported by his friends Robins and Wallace. However, after
9
Neil V. Salzman, Reform and Revolution: The Life and Times of Raymond Robins (Kent, Ohio: Kent
State University Press, 1991), 3.
10
Claude Pepper to Colonel Raymond Robins, Letter, June 26, 1944, Box 34, Folder 3-2, Robins
Papers.
11
James C. Clark, “Claude Pepper and the Seeds of His 1950 Defeat, 1944–1948” The Florida
Historical Quarterly, 74, no.1 (Summer, 1995): 2; also see Claude Pepper to Raymond Robins, Letter,
January 28, 1942, Pepper Papers, Series 201, Box 130, Folder 4.
72
Roosevelt’s death, Pepper came to view the signing of the UN Charter as a legacy to the
life and career of FDR.
In August 1945, the necessity for the United Nations took on a whole new meaning
for Pepper, for he believed it to be the only hope for the salvation of humanity itself. In
an informal press release titled “Very Truly Yours,” Pepper routinely dispensed his views
on important issues of the day. On 16 August, Pepper began this issue, writing, “The
Charter and the Bomb” as his opening piece. Just ten days after the second atomic bomb
fell on Nagasaki, Pepper wrote, “Instantaneously, terrifyingly, the atomic bomb has
smashed nationalism, isolationism, international war–making, into as fine a vapor of
nothingness as were the factories, the homes, and the human beings of Hiroshima. War
can no longer be thought of as an instrument of national policy. From this day on out, the
charter of the United Nations must work.” 12 Pepper, as did many of his liberal
contemporaries, came to view the rapid disintegration of relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union as a threat to their internationalist vision and laid the blame
directly on of President Truman. Without the leadership of Roosevelt to cohesively hold
the party together, the Democrats began to fractionalize among the ultra–liberal
progressives, moderates, and the more conservative factions of the party. Whether
blinded by his martyrdom of Roosevelt or his own hubris, Pepper overtly refused to stand
with Truman when he needed it most. Instead of supporting the new president during a
crucial period of adjustment, Pepper simply advanced his opinion that Truman was not up
to the task.
12
Claude Pepper, “Very Truly Yours: The Charter and the Bomb,” August 16, 1945, Box 36, Folder 13, Robins Papers.
73
When the Iranian crisis was at its peak, Pepper went to the senate floor in defense of
the Soviet Union. Time reported on Pepper’s speech in the 1April 1946 edition in the
Foreign Relations column, writing that, “Florida’s Senator Claude Pepper, fervent New
Dealer and able, if not popular, member of the potent Foreign Relations Committee, rose
in the Senate to make a cool defense of the Soviet Union and a fiery attack on Harry
Truman’s policy of getting tough with Russia.” 13 Pepper believed that the United States
should share its nuclear technology with the United Nations and like Wallace, looked
upon Great Britain as the root cause of the discourse between the U.S. and the USSR.
The Time article noted, that, “New Dealer Pepper had only praise and apology for Russia.
Said he, It comes with ill grace from certain world powers whose troops are stationed in
every nation from Egypt to Singapore to make a world conflagration out of the movement
of a few troops a few miles into a neighboring territory to resist an oil monopoly.” 14
Wallace and Pepper would continue to attack the president’s foreign policy.
Pepper would again be at odds with the president on the issue of the Truman Doctrine.
Pepper in a 9 April 1947 letter to Colonel Robins regarding an upcoming visit to Florida,
wrote that, “And there is considerable probability that I will have to cancel out the whole
trip on account of the imperative necessity of my being in the fight here against this
‘Truman Doctrine’. Colonel, I may have erred in the announcement that I would vote for
the bill in the final form, although I am going to do everything in my power to change it
and I am going to spare nothing in my attack upon it in the Senate.” 15
13
Time, “Red Pepper,” 47, no. 1(April 1, 1946), 21.
Ibid.
15
Claude Pepper to Colonel Raymond Robins, Letter, April 9, 1947, Box 38, Folder 6–1, Robins
Papers.
14
74
Wallace and Pepper formed the base for the emerging far–left tendencies of
progressive Democrats within the party. Both were staunch in their displeasure with the
course of U.S. foreign policy and Truman’s ability to lead. However, Wallace, albeit not
in any official capacity, was leaning toward becoming the candidate of a third party that
would be decidedly to the left. As Hamby noted:
The large crowds that greeted Wallace on his return to the United States led to talk of
a new political party, and he did nothing to discourage the speculation. Throughout
his subsequent speaking tours, he tossed out hints of a third party and even made a
couple of indirect overtures. Speaking in North Dakota on May 30, he warned that he
might ‘take a vacation’ in 1948. Then he added: ‘If the cause of peace can be helped,
I shall do more than take a vacation. The day is coming when labor will agree on a
real labor party. 16
The changing dynamics within the Democratic Party became more apparent heading into
the midterm elections of 1946 and this change was reflected within the various front
groups outside of the party proper. The largest and most influential of these groups were
the labor driven CIO–PAC, NCPAC, ADA and the ICCASP, which was comprised of
actors, artists, writers, performers, and musicians. Most formed to support FDR’s 1944
reelection campaign and remained active in supporting Roosevelt and liberalism
afterward. However, Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 shook the liberal factions of the
party to its foundations and the apparent liberal united front was more a mirage than
reality. Brock notes that James Loeb Jr., referring to the power of Roosevelt and his
ability to provide cohesiveness to the liberal factions, said that, “From March, 1933, until
mid–April 1945, American liberals clung to the illusion that they had ‘achieved power’…
throughout this long and significant era of the ascendency of progressive ideas in
16
Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, 199.
75
government, however, there never existed an authentic liberal coalition which could
survive the loss of Roosevelt.” 17
The progressives inside and outside the administration had been in a position of
influence and power for twelve years and were not looking to surrendering it in favor of
an “outsider,” whom they believed to be a pretender to the throne. When it became more
and more apparent that Truman was going in a different direction than the old New
Dealers, significant changes within the administration occurred. Brock writes that, “By
the fall of 1946 all… were gone, their places taken by men from outside the ranks of
liberalism. The liberals and progressives were leaving Washington as they had come in
1933—by the trainloads.” 18
The Democratic Party was in a state of flux and the political mystique of the New
Deal came and went with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The political landscape was in
transition. The American voters went to the polls with change in mind, and on 5
November 1946, the American electorate for the first time in over a decade sent a
Republican majority to the U.S. Congress. In the House of Representatives, the
Republicans’ gained fifty–five seats for a total of 256 and gained 12 seats in the Senate
for a total of 51. 19 The midterm election of 1946 weakened the liberal power base even
further.
After the 1946 election, the liberals became even further divided on what direction to
take. Two of the leading Democratic front organizations, the NCPAC and ICCASP were
17
Clifton Brock, Americans for Democratic Action: It’s Role in National Politics (Washington: Public
Affairs Press, 1962), 39.
18
Ibid.; 43.
19
William Graf and John Andrews, “Statistics of the Congressional Election of 1946,” (Washington:
United States Government Printing Office, 1947), 43-45, http://history.house.gov/Institution/ElectionStatistics/Election-Statistics/.
76
profoundly weakened and in early January 1947 they decided to merge and form the
Progressive Citizens of America, with founders Frank Kingdon and Jo Davidson serving
as co–chairs. The 6 January 1947 issue of Time noted the event in the National Affairs
section writing that former New York City Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia said, “I have never
been in any party more than 15 minutes… We [liberals] are just a bunch of political
prima donnas… If everything doesn’t go our way we bolt… let’s not fool ourselves—we
have more than 57 varieties.” 20 The other major front organization, the Union for
Democratic Action was also in turmoil meeting in January 1947 in Washington D.C. in
an effort to regroup and reorganize. The membership debating whether or not to disband
decided instead to try and create an organization that was independent of communist
influence and decided to inaugurate the new spirit of the organization by changing the
name to Americans for Democratic Action.
The ADA broke ranks with the PCA over the issue of communism and the role of
communists within the progressive movement. As early as 1944, Republicans began
accusing the NCPAC and the ICCASP of being dominated by Communist influence.
Brock writes that, “Hannah Dorner, publicity agent for the ICCASP, when asked about
communist influence within the organization replied, ‘Says who and so what? If the ICC
program is like the Communist line, that is purely coincidental.’” 21 However,
Republicans made communist influence a hot bed issue in the midterm campaigns. As
Brock notes, “In 1946, the Republican campaign orators hit this unwieldy coalition at its
most vulnerable point. Capitalizing upon growing public apprehension over the postwar
intransigence of Russia, they painted a picture of a liberal movement darkly shadowed
20
National Affairs, “Merger,” Time vol. XLIX, no. 1, March 6, 1947, accessed online at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0.971.853003.00.html.
21
Brock, Americans for Democratic Action, 44.
77
with overtones of communism or pro–communism.” 22 While the newly formed PCA and
its former incarnations did not object to communist participation within its ranks and
vehemently opposed Truman’s “get tough” policy with the Soviet Union, the ADA took a
different view. As Brock noted, “It was clear immediately, however, that the two groups
would clash directly over the question which had recently begun to agitate the whole
liberal front—what attitude liberals should take toward Russia and domestic
Communists… The liberal movement, under Roosevelt an essentially united political
force, was now divided… The leaders of the liberal movement had chosen sides, and ‘the
battle for supremacy in that movement’ was on.” 23
Truman entered his1948 bid for reelection with a divided liberal base and a Republican
controlled Congress. Truman, however, would take on an issue that would serve to
further divide his own party and that issue was the issue of civil rights. During the war,
African–Americans were called upon, albeit reluctantly, to contribute to the war effort.
As John Hope Franklin noted:
Thus did the United States struggle in the early days of the European war when it was
called upon by the enemies of the Axis powers to be the arsenal of democracy. It
experienced a major difficulty in attempting to serve as the arsenal of democracy and,
at the same time, hold fast to its pattern of a free economy in which labor had the
right to strike and management had the right to hire only persons of a certain color.
The inability of the United States to enunciate a strong position on democracy that
stemmed from honest practices doubtless had the effect of weakening its position as
the arsenal of democracy. 24
The United States could ill afford to waste any resources at their disposal if victory was
to be achieved.
22
Ibid.
Ibid., 55.
24
John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans, 5th ed. (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 427-428.
23
78
During the State of the Union Address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President
Roosevelt said that:
For there is nothing mysterious about the foundations of a healthy and strong
democracy. The basic things expected by our people of their political and economic
systems are simple. They are: Equality of opportunity for youth and for others. Jobs
for those who can work. Security for those who need it. The ending of special
privilege for the few. The preservation of civil liberties for all. I have called for
personal sacrifice. I am assured of the willingness of almost all Americans to respond
to that call. If the Congress maintains these principles, the voters, putting patriotism
ahead of pocketbooks, will give you their applause. In the future days, which we seek
to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human
freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere
in the world. The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms,
means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy
peacetime life for its inhabitants-everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from
fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of
armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a
position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in
the world. 25
The “four freedoms” became one of many rallying cries used to induce patriotic
sentiment, boost morale, and encourage support for the war effort. During the war
African–Americans contributed on the home front and the front lines, fighting for the
“four freedoms,” however, those basic freedoms outlined by FDR in 1941 would prove
elusive to African–Americans once victory was achieved. 26 African–Americans were
among the first to lose employment once the war ended. Many who migrated from the
South to the North suffered economic discrimination and segregation in jobs and housing.
Following the end of the war there was an eruption of violence directed at the African–
American population and included a number of returning African–American veterans.
25
Franklin Delano Roosevelt: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 6,
1941. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, researchers, The American Presidency Project.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16092#axzz2h40PsONM, accessed October 7, 2013.
26
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom 5th ed., 422-449.
79
These veterans came home changed by their experiences during the war; and they
discovered a world existed beyond the United States where they were treated with human
dignity and respect. They also witnessed the devastating toll in human life and suffering
at the hands of Fascist totalitarianism. Upon returning home, African–American veterans
were expected to abide, as always, by the status quo. Tyson writes that, “Though
unemployment in the late 1950s may have fed the Klan revival, black activism in the
decades following World War II had already infused the nightrider legacy with new
fervor.” 27
However, the majority of these veterans did not wish to return to the same old Jim
Crow segregation and second class citizenry that they left behind to defend American
freedom. As Watkins noted, “The Civil Rights Movement, fortified now by the injection
of veterans who believed that they had earned a new place in the American scheme,
showed signs for the first time of becoming a national force whose power would change
the face of politics and already was helping to disturb the always fragile alliance between
northern and southern Democrats.” 28 These veterans believed they were owed something
and were intent on collecting it. As resistance to Jim Crow mounted, mob violence
continued to escalate, prompting leaders from the NAACP, the Urban League, the A F of
L and others to form the National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence. On 19
September 1946, President Truman met with Walter White, Executive Director of the
NAACP, and members of the National Emergency Committee. White came to the White
House to inform President Truman about the heinous nature of the mob violence
27
Timothy B. Tyson, “Dynamite and “The Silent South’: A Story from the Second Reconstruction in
South Carolina” in Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Southern Politics from the Civil War to Civil Rights edited by Jane
Dailey, Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore and Bryant Simon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 278.
28
T.H. Watkins, Righteous Pilgrim: The Life and Times of Harold L. Ickes, 1874–1952 (New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 1990.), 838.
80
occurring across the South and asks the president to take some type of action to quell it.
It was at this time that Truman’s administrative assistant, David K. Niles advanced the
idea for a committee on civil rights. As Berman writes, “Here was an ingenious solution
that would serve Truman’s needs by allowing him through symbolic action to improve
his standing among northern liberals while, conversely, not alienating the South.” 29
On 5 December 1946 Truman issued Executive Order 9808, establishing the
President’s Committee on Civil Rights. This committee was instructed to study current
law and practices and look for methods and procedures to strengthen federal, state and
local governments’ ability to protect the civil rights of the citizens of the United States.
He included civil rights as the first of five goals he outlined for the nation in his State of
the Union Address on 8 January 1948. Truman told Congress:
The United States has always had a deep concern for human rights. Religious
freedom, free speech, and freedom of thought are cherished realities in our land. Any
denial of human rights is a denial of the basic beliefs of democracy and of our regard
for the worth of each individual. Today, however, some of our citizens are still denied
equal opportunity for education, for jobs and economic advancement, and for the
expression of their views at the polls. Most serious of all, some are denied equal
protection under laws. Whether discrimination is based on race, or creed, or color, or
land of origin, it is utterly contrary to American ideals of democracy. 30
The committee’s report titled “To Secure These Rights” had been delivered to the
president for his review in October 1947. The committee found that minorities were
discriminated against in nearly all sectors of society including hiring, education, health
care, and availability and use of public services and accommodations. The report
29
William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration (Columbus, Ohio:
Ohio State University Press, 1970), 51-52.
30
Harry S. Truman: “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 7,
1948. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, researchers, The American Presidency Project.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13005.
81
recognized the enforcement of legal segregation throughout the South but noted that
segregation existed in the North as well. 31
The legal segregation practiced in the South had been vigorously defended by
Southerners as an issue of states’ rights, while socio–economic segregation had been
tolerated in the North since the end of Reconstruction. The issue, except for a handful of
brave voices in the wilderness, had largely been ignored by the populace in general.
Thus, it was surprising that the committee provided such a frank assessment of
segregation as it existed in the United States, and noted the devastating toll that it claimed
upon American society at large. The committee gave this assessment of segregation
writing:
Segregation has become the cornerstone of the elaborate structure of discrimination
against some American citizens. Theoretically this system simply duplicates
educational, recreational and other public services, according facilities to the two
races which are “separate but equal.” In the Committee's opinion this is one of the
outstanding myths of American history for it is almost always true that while indeed
separate, these facilities are far from equal. Throughout the segregated public
institutions, Negroes have been denied an equal share of tax–supported services and
facilities. So far as private institutions are concerned, there is no specific legal
disability on the right of Negroes to develop equal institutions of their own. However,
the economic, social, and indirect legal obstacles to this course are staggering. 32
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) established the precedence of legal segregation under the
principle of “separate but equal.” 33 The Committee on Civil Rights concluded that
public institutions failed to meet the criteria of the law, because equal facilities were
simply a contrived fallacy of white society in order to maintain the status quo of
segregation and discrimination of the African–American population. By the report of the
committee’s findings there was a case to be made that segregation was unconstitutional.
Later this idea of constitutionally would be applied to education and lead to the landmark
31
“To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights,” The President’s
Committee on Civil Rights, October 1947, Chap 2, Truman Library,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/civilrights/srights2.htm#58.
32
Ibid.
33
Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
82
decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education (1954) that served to legally invalidate
the separate but equal doctrine. 34 Whether or not Truman was using the issue of civil
rights symbolically for political expediency or was genuine in his convictions can be
argued, however, he did move forward in advancing the committee’s recommendations
before the 80th Congress. Gardner writes that, “With legislation like the Marshall Plan
pending before the Congress, Truman’s antagonism of the Southern Democrats and
states’ rights GOP leaders in the Congress by insisting on the enactment of a
comprehensive federal civil rights bill was a high risk move.” 35
Truman actually had a firmer grasp of the political landscape than given credit for, and
as such knew to expect that the proposal would not be well–received by the majority of
Congress and that asking is not the same as receiving, knowing full well that it could
easily and most likely would become bottled up in committee and never see the light of
day. On 2 February 1948 Truman addressed a Special Session of Congress. In his address
he advanced his plan asking Congress to draft comprehensive civil rights legislation that
included creation of a permanent Civil Rights Commission and create a Civil Rights
Division in the Department of Justice, strengthen existing civil rights statutes, provide
federal protection against lynching, better protect the right to vote, establish a permanent
FEPC to prevent discrimination in the workplace, prohibit discrimination in interstate
travel facilities, allow home rule and suffrage rights to the citizens residing in the District
of Columbia, grant statehood to Alaska and Hawaii, and settle all Japanese–American
34
Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risk (Carbondale,
Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002.), 72.
35
83
evacuation claims. 36 President Truman outlined the most comprehensive civil rights plan
since the end of the Civil War, and it received the expected response—Southern–led
threats, hostility, and inaction. With threats to abandon the Marshall Plan and other
legislative initiatives key to Truman’s postwar strategy, the White House did not push the
measure further. Truman’s civil rights agenda had irritated and offended the sensibilities
of Southern Democrats. The seeds of dissention had been sewn and would come to bear
fruit in July 1948 at the Democratic National Convention.
If Truman’s motives for the civil rights agenda were for political expediency and an
attempt to pacify both the left and right factions of the Democratic Party—he failed.
When the Democratic Convention convened on 12 July 1948 the liberals made sure civil
rights was a major part of the Party’s platform much to the ire and angst of the Southern
delegations. Truman and his staff were aware of the tension created by the civil rights
program and set forth to appease Southern delegates by toning down the rhetoric and
attempting to water down the proposal. However, the die had been cast by the president
and now even he was powerless to stop the liberal enclave from pressing the issue. The
initiative led by Congressman Andrew Biemiller of Wisconsin and Minneapolis Mayor
Hubert Humphrey calls for more radical reform continued despite the best efforts of
Truman’s camp. As Gardner writes:
The battle lines were drawn on this volatile issue as it became clear that there was
growing support for the radical Biemiller plank—a plank that would further rupture
the already fragmenting Democratic Party. However, because Truman had already
36
Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights,” February 2, 1948, John
Woolley and Gerhard Peters, researchers, The American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13006.
84
publicly taken his party so far down the public policy road for radical federal civil
rights reform, the outcome of the fight over the civil rights plank was predestined. 37
The facade of a united party and all hopes for reconciliation were shattered the night that
Humphrey appeared before the delegates. The far–right faction of Southern Democrats
met in May in Jackson, Mississippi, led by Governors Ben T. Laney of Arkansas and J.
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina had rudimentary plans for a “Rump Convention” in
place as John N. Popham of the New York Times noted that, “The States Rights
Democrats, a group stemming largely from Southern disapproval of proposals to
eliminate racial discrimination, unanimously voted today to hold their own convention on
July 17 if the national convention nominated President Truman or failed to repudiate his
civil rights program.” 38 The pleas from the Truman campaign toward adopting a more
moderate civil rights plank were ignored while Southern Democrats, from the far–right,
came to Philadelphia looking for a duel with the liberals and waited for someone from the
left to throw down the gauntlet. Hubert Humphrey was more than happy to
accommodate them. As Frederickson noted:
Rising to address the hot and weary delegates on the last evening of the convention,
Hubert Humphrey, the young liberal mayor from Minneapolis, made an emotional
plea on behalf of racial equality. ‘I ask this Convention to say in unmistakable terms
that we proudly hail and courageously support our President and leader, Harry
Truman, in his great fight for civil rights’.… Suddenly rejuvenated, the Democratic
conventioneers overwhelmingly approved the civil rights plank put forth by the
party’s liberal wing. 39
The States Rights Democrats, more commonly referred to as Dixiecrats, refused to
accept any civil rights agenda and made good on their threat to walk out of the
convention. Gardner noted, “As Truman expected, immediately after the July 14 vote on
37
Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights, 98.
John N. Popham, “Southerners Set ‘Rump’ Convention If Party Backs Truman, Rights Plan,” New
York Times, May 11, 1948.
39
Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill,
North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.), 118-119.
38
85
the civil rights plank, protests from Southern delegations erupted on the crowded
convention floor, and walkouts were lead by members of the Mississippi and Alabama
delegations.” 40 However, it did little to interrupt the momentum of the convention.
Despite the efforts of Henry Wallace, Claude Pepper and Southern Democrats to dump
him from the ticket, Truman came away as the nominee, and civil rights reform was a
major plank in the Party’s platform. The Dixiecrats held their convention that August in
Houston nominating Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Fielding Wright of
Mississippi as their presidential ticket. Truman, with the nomination in hand, bolstered
by the addition of a solid civil rights plank to the Democratic platform and the extent of
Southern defections from the Party known, decided that the time to take action was
sooner rather than later. On 26 July, the president issued two executive orders, E.O. 9980
and E.O. 9981, designed to make the federal system more equitable in hiring and
employment practices and to desegregate the U. S. armed forces. Desegregation met with
a great deal of reluctance and resistance within the military establishment but was finally
completed before the end of Truman’s presidency. These orders established the federal
government as a leader by example, but still they fell far short of addressing the vast
problem of segregation and white supremacy, however, it was a beginning.
Truman recognized both the scope and depth of responsibility of the United States in
the postwar world. He saw the communist regime of the Soviet Union as a threat to free
peoples, and, if left unchecked, a danger to the security of the United States and its allies.
In this light, Truman realized that it was no longer permissible to champion the cause of
freedom and democracy abroad while the stigma of segregation restricted the freedom of
millions of American citizens at home. The liberals within the Democratic Party divided
40
Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights, 99.
86
over the issue of Soviet relations and the level of participation of known communists
within the progressive movement. The once “Solid South” fractured over the issue of
secession from the Democratic Party and the creation of a third party. Both sides
weakened their power base and as a result failed to build enough support to be successful,
leaving Truman with the ability to build a small coalition of support that in the end
carried him and the Democratic Party back to the White House.
Yet, the biggest loser was Claude Pepper. He conspired in a “coup d’état” and lost.
Pepper, like many of the progressives, failed to see the change coming. The liberal base
was shifting toward a moderate position, led by the G.I. Generation whom had
experienced the face of fascism first hand while forging a deep seated mistrust of
totalitarianism in any form. Liberals who advocated fiscal responsibility and a foreign
policy that took a hard–line in dealing with the Soviet Union. Democrats like George
Smathers, who supported the Taft–Hartley Act and called for fiscal restraint in social
spending. Pepper and Wallace misread the American body politic and stood steadfast in
advocating a more conciliatory approach to U.S.–Soviet relations. a position contrary to
that of a growing majority of the voting public. In but three years, Pepper had lost his
ideological soul mate, aligned himself with pro–Soviet factions, and alienated the
President of the United States along with the emerging power Truman’s base of his party.
In the process, he built a liberal record that would be hard to defend in his own state of
Florida where the political demographics were changing as the state became infused with
transplants from the North. Winsboro writes that, “A recent generation of historians, to
include Jason Soros, Joseph Crespino and Matthew D. Lassiter, has added insight to the
issue by establishing that the economic boom of the post–World War II South brought
87
both fiscally and socially conservative corporations and traditional suburban republicans
to Dixie—by relocating their segregated communities and schools with them, they
actually contributed to a tide of neo–conservatism in southern states like Florida.” 41 In
1950 Pepper would face a bid for reelection without the long coattails of FDR,
advocating an ideology that was quickly moving away from the mainstream, and with a
host of powerful enemies looking to aid in his political demise.
41
Irvin D.S. Winsboro, “Image, Illusion, And Reality: Florida And The Modern Civil Rights
Movement” in Old South, New South, or Down South? Florida And The Modern Civil Rights Movement,
ed. Irvin D.S. Winsboro (Morgantown, West Virginia: West Virginia University Press, 2009), 3.
88
“Red Pepper” “Gorgeous George” and the 1950 Primary Campaign in Florida
Entering 1950, Claude Pepper was struggling for relevance and to maintain his
grassroots political base in his own home state of Florida. Following Roosevelt’s death,
Pepper immediately began his campaign against his successor Harry Truman, in
challenging the president’s foreign policy by taking a pro–Soviet stand and, in 1948,
attempting to supplant him as the Democratic nominee. Failing in this attempt, Pepper
set his sights on returning to the senate. As Clark observed, “Pepper thought he could
advance his political career by advancing the issue of world peace. Unfortunately, for
Pepper, world events shattered his dream for world peace. Instead of political
advancement, Pepper endured five years of negative publicity that few politicians could
have survived.” 1
Pepper, for the most part, had singularly focused his energies on national and foreign
policy issues and given little more than lip service to issues within his home state.
Pepper’s 1945 fact finding trip to Europe caused controversy in Florida. The trip became
a political liability on several fronts. During this trip, he met with Stalin in Moscow and
began advocating a more cooperative approach to Soviet foreign policy, thus earning the
label, apologist for Stalin. Pepper had also engaged in an effort to block the DuPont Trust
from gaining control of the bankrupt Florida East Coast Railroad (FEC). Pepper had
requested a hearing to reverse the Interstate Commerce Commission’s support on the
basis that DuPont control would be detrimental to the public interest. The hearing was
scheduled during the period when Pepper would be in Europe. Despite advice from his
own staffers to abandon the trip and focus on matters in Florida, Pepper refused to cancel.
1
Clark, “Claude Pepper and the Seeds of His 1950 Defeat,” 1-2.
89
Clark writes that, “Pepper thought his trip could, ‘make a greater contribution to future
peace… and even if defeat should be the price still I would have no complaint.’ He said
he thought constituents ‘are going to complain always when I don’t devote my whole
time to their petty personal matters.’” 2 Pepper knowingly and willingly abandoned his
handpicked fight with Ed Ball and what he claimed to be contrary to the public interest of
Floridians in order to advance his own standing on the national and international stage. In
doing so, he risked achieving reelection to the U.S. Senate. Clark observed that, “Not
only had Pepper become a target for both conservative and mainstream newspapers and
magazines, but they began to make fun of him and see how many ways they could work
the word ‘Red’ into stories about Pepper.” 3 The opponent’s arsenal was becoming well
stocked, and there was one man eager and willing to fire the first salvo—George A.
Smathers.
In 1945, as the war was winding down, Captain Smathers, after serving eighteen
months in the South Pacific Theater, was reassigned stateside. Upon his return home,
Smathers planned to run for a congressional seat in Miami’s Fourth District, thus he was
anxious to return to civilian life. He sent several letters to Pepper and other officials in
Washington asking for their help in securing his release. Upon receiving his discharge
from active duty, Smathers, using contacts from his days at the University of Florida,
quickly put together a network and built an organization, referred to as the “goon squad,”
to take on the incumbent Congressman, Pat Cannon, in the Fourth District. Smathers
successfully attacked Cannon’s poor voting record and frequent absences during crucial
2
Ibid., 5-6.; excerpts from Claude Pepper to Moorman Parrish, Letter, Series 401B, Box 23, Folder 7
Pepper Papers, Moorman Parrish was a Gainesville, Florida realtor and supporter of Pepper.
3
Clark, “Claude Pepper and the Seeds of His 1950 Defeat,” 11.
90
votes. As a result, Smathers out–polled Cannon nearly two to one to win the Democratic
Primary and easily won election to Congress in 1946. During the course of his two terms
in the House of Representatives, Smathers developed a cordial relationship with Harry
Truman. As a member of the House Foreign Relations Committee, he supported the
president’s foreign policy initiatives and his “get tough” approach to the Soviet Union.
He broke ranks over parts of the Truman domestic agenda, opposing the civil rights
program, and in supporting of the pro–business Taft–Hartley Act. Smathers supported
Truman from the outset and he campaigned for Democratic ticket throughout Florida in
1948 contrary to Pepper’s efforts to “Dump Truman” at the convention and campaigning
for him only after he failed in removing him from the ticket.
Truman, following his victory over Dewey, travelled to Key West to unwind and
relax. He received a letter from Smathers’s mother, Lura, congratulating the president on
his victory. Smathers noted that Truman took time to reply to his mother’s letter and
stated that the president added a postscript to the letter, writing, “Had a good visit with
George at Key West. He’s the only public official I invited to see me. The others invited
themselves.” 4 The friendship continued to grow between Truman and Smathers.
Smathers noted that, “We began liking each other very much. That’s when I got called
over to the White House one day… This was 1949, long about the latter summer or early
fall, I go in, and Harry Vaughn says, ‘Go on into the Oval Office’…. Truman looks over
at me and says, ‘George, I want you to do me a favor…. I want you to beat that son of a
bitch Claude Pepper.’ Smathers said, ‘It was at that point that I really seriously began to
think about running against Claude…. I could see that somebody was going to beat him.
4
Smathers, “Oral History Interviews,” no. 1, 25.
91
So I thought, well I think I’ll just go ahead and do it.’” 5 Pepper discounted the Smathers
account believing he and Truman had gotten past their differences. Pepper wrote, “It
seems odd that Smathers would wait thirty three years to tell this story. To my face,
Truman always insisted that he did not hold my support of Eisenhower in 1948 against
me, and he even raised a little money for me in 1950.” 6 Whatever the truth is regarding
Truman’s alleged statement, it was apparent that the line was drawn in the sands of
Florida and the war for Pepper’s Senate seat would be declared in Orlando on 12 January
1950.
However, Smathers’s campaign began unofficially months earlier as he started
organizing and preparing himself for the upcoming showdown with Pepper. If Smathers
intended to keep his challenge clandestine, he failed. As Crispell noted, “After the
completion of the first session of the 81st Congress, it quickly became general knowledge
that George Smathers was an unannounced candidate for the U.S. Senate in 1950.” 7
Smathers began receiving letters of support as early as October 1949. A prominent Ft.
Lauderdale attorney, Norman Abbott, sent Smathers a letter on 25 October, “I was
delighted to learn that at long last you had, unofficially at least, finally decided to pitch
your hat in the ring against our esteemed senior Senator…. I want you to know that you
can count on me to aid your campaign in any way I possibly can.” 8 Around the same
time, Smathers contacted Tom Connolly at the White House requesting an urgent
meeting with the president and was invited to see Truman in the Oval Office, where he
received the nod to run against Pepper. By November, Smathers organization was at
5
Ibid.
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 221.
7
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 47.
8
Norman Abbott to George Smathers, Letter, October 25, 1949, Smathers Papers.
6
92
work trying to disrupt labor support for Pepper within the state. On 29 November two
members of Smathers University of Florida network corresponded to put the wheels in
motion. L.K. Walrath in a letter to Randolph Y. Matheny, wrote, “Allen Poucher, who as
you know is one of us, suggested to me the other day that if we could establish that any
CIO money was being furnished for Pepper that the AF of L people, who predominate in
Florida, particularly in Jacksonville would be against the idea and we might get a real
break with labor if the situation were properly handled.” 9 The wheels were set in motion
and the next stop was Orlando.
As Smathers set forth to Orlando to further his political ambitions, he knew he would
be facing a skilled orator and veteran politician with a national identity. On the surface it
appeared to be a bold and courageous move to run against an incumbent senator, for in
the previous one hundred and five year history of Florida, there had never been an
incumbent U.S. senator defeated for reelection. However, Pepper by virtue of his own
ideals and ambitions had created doubt, mistrust, and numerous enemies looking to help
anyone willing to exploit his political weaknesses and make a solid effort to unseat him.
Referring to Pepper, Crispell observed, “While he had handicapped himself through his
rigid ideological stands, effectively canceling support from either President Truman or
Florida business, Claude Pepper made an even more glaring error, allowing an attractive,
aggressive, and equally effective politician to attack first…. Claude Pepper never
recovered from the blows suffered one Thursday night in Orlando.” 10
Smathers was ready and willing to show Florida and the nation that he was up to the
task. Smathers’s campaign made sure its candidate’s arrival in Orlando was greeted with
9
L.K. Walrath to Randolph Y. Matheny, Letter, November 29, 2013, Smathers Papers.
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 51.
10
93
a great deal of fanfare. Crispell noted that, “The charged atmosphere in the Orlando
Coliseum on 12 January 1950 caused comparisons to a national convention, replete with
bunting, noise makers, and live music. Adding to this perception was the excitement of a
crowd three times what had been forecast, arriving motorcades from throughout the state
and an ensuing parade in the city.” 11 Smathers entered the Coliseum energized and
enthusiastic. He strode to the podium with conviction and possessed an air of confidence
befitting a man who was well prepared. Smathers spoke for thirty minutes with a direct
yet personable oratory and with a measured cadence that came from his experience as a
prosecutor and in a prosecutorial demeanor, set forth his opening remarks in “the trial of
Claude Pepper.” 12
Smathers’s address to the Orlando rally struck the chords of patriotic fervor and made
a call to the citizens of Florida and the nation to unite against the growing menace of
communism before it destroyed the very foundations of American society. The prevalent
and resounding theme was the danger presented by those politicians and fellow–travelers
whom as apologists for Stalin and Soviet Communism presented the greatest threat to
freedom and democracy at home. The question is why did this theme strike a chord
within both Florida and the national electorate? First, there was a historical precedent of
fear of communists and socialists dating back to the end of World War I. The success of
the Bolshevik Revolution and the advancement of the Marxist–Leninist theory of
worldwide revolution coupled with a strong socialist presence in the American labor
movement were equated with the violence perpetrated by anarchists following the end of
the war. This “Red Scare” gradually subsided in the mid–1920s but left a residual fear
11
12
Ibid.
Ibid., 54. The Trial of Claude Pepper is the title of chapter 5 of Crispell’s, Testing the Limits.
94
that remained for the most part an undercurrent in American society until the end of
World War II. The Soviet actions to establish hegemony at the end of the war coupled
with the growing animosity between the two former allies over Iran, Germany, and
Poland leading to the creation of the Iron Curtain; and these events re–ignited within the
American public old fears, serving to create new animosity toward the Soviet Union.
Many communists and socialists had joined the liberal progressive ranks of the
Democratic Party during the Great Depression, and given the renewed distrust of the
Soviets at the end of the war, fostered concerns that subterfuge and fifth column
activities. Such methods had been employed by the Nazis during the war and many
Americans were concerned that this tactic may be used by the Soviets to strengthen the
efforts of domestic communists and socialists toward communist revolution at home. In
fact, it led Smathers to define exactly what a “liberal” is. Smathers told the assembled
crowd in Orlando, that, “Unfortunately, the name ‘liberal’ has been adopted by the
radical left–wingers, and they have twisted and disgraced its meaning. We must reawaken
to the true meaning of liberalism. Liberalism comes from the word “liberty.” It means
the right to think, to work, to worship as one chooses so long as the rights of others are
not trespassed upon.” 13
Smathers’s definition of a “liberal” implied, even though he did not directly name his
opponent, that he meant Pepper defined the type of left–wing “radical” that usurped and
corrupted the “true” meaning of liberal. Pepper had virtually ignored the growing
criticism and believed he could overcome it where it mattered most, at home in Florida.
William G. Carleton, a professor of history and political science at the University of
13
George A. Smathers, Speech, “Announcing Candidacy for the U.S. Senate,” January 12, 1950,
Smathers Papers.
95
Florida was a friend of Pepper and a fellow liberal. In 1944, he was asked by a reporter
from the Miami Daily News to provide some insight into Pepper. Carleton wrote, that,
“Whatever one may say of Pepper, he has political imagination and a feel for the
masses.” 14 Yet, it appears that Carleton’s assessment of Pepper made in 1944 no longer
rang true by1950. Pepper’s shift farther to the left began as he returned to the Senate in
January 1945, became more pronounced after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 and
following his meeting with Stalin during his fact finding trip to Europe in September
1945. Even when the Soviet Union appeared to be less than cooperative he continued to
advance the pro–Soviet position. He failed to acknowledge the ever–growing sentiment
against the Soviet Union by the American public as evidenced in Time in the 3 March
1947 issue citing a Gallop Poll revealing that 70 percent favored a firm stand toward
Russia. Of those polled, Time reported, that, “19 percent of the people approved a
continuation of Jimmy Byrnes’s firmness–with–patience approach to Russia, but that an
additional 51percent hoped that Secretary Marshall would be even firmer. Only 5 percent
wanted softer tactics.” 15 Pepper became more obsessed with advancing his idealism and
ideology than with practicing practical politics, and Smathers capitalized upon this fact.
As Smathers spoke before the gathering of supporters, well wishers and curiosity seekers
he was tenacious in going for the political jugular of Pepper. Smathers told the large
crowd:
…talking with you the citizens, about the dangers to our democracy from those who
would assassinate Americanism, and I know that the false philosophy of communism
and socialism, the people of Florida utterly reject! … The people of our state will no
longer tolerate the advocates of treason. Never before in Florida’s political history
14
William G. Carleton to Phil Locke, Letter, March 14, 1944, William Grave Carleton Papers, Special
and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.
15
Time, National Affairs, “Firmer,” March 3, 1947, accessed on–line at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,854617,00.html.
96
has the issue been so clear–cut…. In the name of freedom, liberty and the democratic
principles of America, I George Smathers, join hands with you and pledge—with all
of the earnestness at my command—to give my utmost as your candidate for the
United States Senate. 16
Smathers did step away from his central theme and primary campaign issue to outline
the other major issues of his campaign, fiscal responsibility in government spending, civil
rights, and business and labor relations. Smathers highlighted some of his thoughts on
each topic with the promise to state his position in greater detail during the coming days
of the campaign. Smathers began by stating, “As a liberal Democrat I am opposed to
monopoly, either of big business, big labor or big government.” 17 He consistently
advocated a conservative approach to fiscal matters and government spending on social
welfare programs while advocating increased spending for the military. Smathers
eloquently stated his case to his supporters saying, “Let us feel, but let us also think. By
the adoption of the Hoover Commission recommendations, let us eliminate the waste,
duplication of services, and extravagance of a government whose hands are in your
pocket right this moment. Let us strengthen our system of economic opportunity and
individual freedom which has given us the best living ever experienced by any people on
the face of the earth.” 18
The issue of segregation and civil rights was a controversial subject since the end of
Reconstruction, and continued to be a dividing and festering problem; and gaining more
and more prominence due to the efforts of the NAACP in the nation’s courts, President
16
Smathers, “Announcing Candidacy,” Smathers Papers.
Ibid.
Note: The Hoover Commission or officially, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, was appointed by President Truman in 1947 and chaired by former President Herbert
Hoover. The purpose was to come up with recommendations as how to best streamline administrative
functions within the executive branch. It was dissolved in 1949 after a report of its findings were forwarded
to Congress.
18
Smathers, “Announcing Candidacy,” Smathers Papers.
17
97
Truman’s decision to desegregate the armed forces and to introduce a comprehensive
civil rights program in the Congress. Smathers was a true Southerner, and while
carefully choosing his words, let it be known where his sympathies lay, “We in the South,
of which I am proud to be a part, know it to be a peculiar and difficult problem. We have
made remarkable progress in recent years in the conditions of the Negro, and we must
strive to accelerate that process. All of us know that better relations will not be achieved
by the adoption of any laws which seek to coerce association between the races.” 19
Smathers was smooth and circumspect in letting the people of Florida know that he
favored maintaining the status quo of segregation and white supremacy and did not
support Truman’s civil rights program. Regarding the effort in Congress to deny FHA
loans to segregated housing subdivisions, Smathers added, “We must not allow the
misguided zealots who, by rulings such as this, seek to destroy the harmonious
relationship and leave in its place discord, strife and hate. What the problem of racial
relations needs is the best efforts of men who have the best interests of both the white and
Negro at heart, not politicians who demagogue the issue first from one side of the
political fence and then the other.” 20
Smathers lightly touched upon his position toward labor–management relations. A
great deal of tension existed between labor and management of American industry
immediately following the war—as the economy and industry made the transition from
war to peace–time production. There was a rash of strikes by various labor unions during
1946. The National Labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act, was passed in 1935
and provided labor with more freedom to initiate work stoppages. In 1947 Republican
19
20
Ibid.
Smathers, “Announcing Candidacy,” Smathers Papers.
98
Sen. Robert Taft and Republican Rep. Fred Hartley introduced a joint bill to amend the
Wagner Act and place restrictions on labor’s right to strike. The amended act became
known as the Taft–Hartley Act, and it was enacted when the Republican–controlled
Congress overturned President Truman’s veto. Pepper fought its passage in the Senate.
Smathers shared neither the president’s nor Pepper’s opposition to Taft–Hartley, saying,
“As for the question of labor and management relations, I believe in unions and in
collective bargaining. I think they have done a great good; I believe they have a useful
future…. I voted for the Taft–Hartley Bill as a temperate measure which would add
balance and fairness to labor–management relationships. It is a law which protects the
average laboring man as well as the general public.” 21
Smathers re–emphasized his theme of the dangers of communism and he concluded
his opening remarks with prosecutorial precision and pointed statements, though still
careful to avoid directly mentioning Pepper’s name.
Smathers stated emphatically that:
You will not find me a senator who would brazenly advocate the destroying our
atomic bombs and giving the secret to the Soviet Union. You will not find me an
apologist for Stalin nor an associate of fellow–travelers, nor a sponsor of Communist
front organizations. At a time when communism is the greatest of all threats to our
freedom and democracy, it does not make sense, nor answer the call of prudence, to
place in a position of power a voice that has defended Stalin, spoke out for fellow–
travelers and echoed the beliefs of communist front organizations. In the next few
months the entire trend of national events can be decided here in Florida, where the
leader of the radicals and extremists is now on trial. 22
It was evident that Smathers intended on running an offensive campaign. His
announcement address served to put forth his views on the issues while at the same time,
framing the issues in such a manner as to attack Pepper’s position and credibility. As
21
22
Ibid.
Ibid.
99
Crispell noted, “Smathers’s address in Orlando was inflammatory and provocative as was
its intent. Setting the tone for the race, Smathers succinctly and fully defined the issues
that separated him from Pepper in terms designed to draw a response as well as control
the debate in the campaign.” 23 Smathers’s strategy was to vigorously and relentlessly
challenge and attack Pepper—on his record, associations and his ideological
underpinnings without giving him time to figuratively “catch his breath”. It was evident
that Pepper was being persecuted and prosecuted on his record by Smathers—thus the
question became can Pepper mount an adequate defense to counteract Smathers’
prosecution?
Pepper, appeared to be surprised by the vociferous and ferocious attack by Smathers
in Orlando. Outwardly, he maintained a calm demeanor and had not gained any sense of
urgency to officially declare his own candidacy. However, privately, Pepper was
incensed at Smathers. He fired off a memo in which he angrily refuted Smathers charges
and accused Smathers of being the shrill of his enemies in order to defeat him. Pepper
wrote:
The George Smathers who, in his announcement speech at Orlando, without having
the courage to call my name, charged me with treason and belonging to the ‘Reds’
and being a friend of Stalin, and an advocate of Stalinism and Communism, knew at
the time he made such charges that they were untrue….and now he speaks the voice
of his masters who are the enemies of Claude Pepper. Charging, in effect, that I
would sell my country to Stalin, or turn over to Stalin the instrumentalities by which
this Government might defend itself, or that I would have destroyed all the
instrumentalities of war that would be our means of defense should we be attacked by
Stalin, is ridiculous, absurd and untrue as he well knows. 24
Yet, Pepper was caught in a web of his own creation and his own words were being used
against him. Although Smathers framed Pepper’s record in a context designed to provide
23
24
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 54.
Claude Pepper, Memorandum, undated, Series 204D Box 2, Folder 1A, Pepper Papers.
100
him the most political mileage, his statements were not untrue. In a speech before the
Russian War Relief, Pepper said in essence that Stalin and the Soviet Union were friends,
saying “What is the meaning of the willingness of senators to denounce in this day, when
we are fighting shoulder to shoulder, Joseph Stalin is a great enemy? Why do great
newspapers still disseminate vicious and false propaganda against the Soviet Union and
strive to fan the flames of prejudice against such an Ally, such a friend.” 25
Smathers was not the first to call Pepper an apologist for the Soviet Union, nor call
him to task on his statements toward U.S. policies and responsibilities in regard to the
atomic bomb. On 20 March 1946, Pepper made a speech on the floor of the Senate,
where he said he believed the United States should, “destroy every atomic bomb which
we have, and smash every facility we possess capable of producing only destructive
forms of atomic energy.” 26 The senator’s speech was noted in the Foreign Relations
section of the 1 April 1946 issue of Time. The article also noted that, “In all of his 10,000
words, New Dealer Pepper had only praise and apology for Russia.” Fellow Senator
Joseph Ball of Minnesota replied that, “The Pepper speech was right down the
communist line, he added, What the Senator from Florida proposes is that we strip
ourselves of the only real military power we still possess, the atomic bomb, and then
confer with Russia about security and peace.” 27
While the confidential memo showed the degree of angst, hurt and displeasure Pepper
felt toward the Smathers announcement, it became evident that the shock disoriented him.
Four days after his Orlando rally, Smathers met with his network of campaign chairmen
25
Claude Pepper, Speech, “In Observance of the Third Anniversary of the Soviet Union’s Entry into the
War,” Box 34 Folder 3-2, Robins Papers.
26
Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946, 92:2463.
27
Time, Foreign Relations, “Red Pepper,” 47, no. 1(April 1, 1946), 21.
101
from across the state to lay out the strategy for the next phase of the campaign. However,
Pepper appeared to be stuck in neutral, as Allen Morris of the Miami Sunday News,
observed, “Just as always, Sen. Claude Pepper has started his reelection campaign like a
man who doesn’t know a ballot from a bustle. A full week after his opponent, Rep.
George Smathers, had launched his campaign with a rousing Orlando rally, the veteran
Pepper had yet to assemble the essential elements of a statewide campaign.” 28 However,
Pepper had a unique ability to command and compel fellow Floridians to support him at
the polls. The same combination of fiery and eloquent oratory that he employed to draw
the angst of his opponents also had the ability to soothe and smooth over bruised egos
and bring Pepper back within the good graces of Democratic voters. The St. Petersburg
Times called it a, “uncanny knack for landing on his feet by showing up at the eleventh
hour to do and say exactly the right thing.” 29
However, Smathers put Pepper on the defensive and his typical slow to act and react
style of campaigning had never faced such a well organized and aggressive challenge. In
an article for the Saturday Evening Post, Ralph McGill noted that, “Senator Pepper’s
organization, while admittedly working harder than ever before and running a scared race
is confident their man’s genius for campaigning will pull him through.” 30 Pepper in his
autobiography, written thirty–seven years after the 1950 campaign, said that he knew that
there was an organized, concerted plot to defeat him and he continued to maintain that
others and not Smathers conspired, planned, and succeeded in ending his senate career.
Pepper noted, that, “The strategy was not devised by Smathers. Six years earlier, Ed Ball
and a group of Florida businessmen had determined to defeat me and had plenty of time
28
Allen Morris, “Pepper Lags In Campaigning,” Miami Sunday News, January 22, 1950.
St. Petersburg Times, January 14, 1950, n.p.
30
Ralph McGill, “Can He Purge Senator Pepper?” Saturday Evening Post, April 22, 1950, 143.
29
102
to do it.” 31 He underestimated the amount of dissention his positions on labor, civil
rights, foreign policy, nuclear weapons, and his lack of attention created within the
Florida political hierarchy. In addition, he grossly underestimated the ability of Smathers
to run a relentless onslaught on his record, tie him to support for the FEPC and just how
effective the “Red Pepper” strategy would resound with Floridians. Finally, he failed to
recognize how his ongoing feud with Ed Ball could impact his campaign and his political
career, as Tebeau and Marina noted, “Even before Smathers challenged Pepper for the
Democratic nomination, Pepper’s continued attacks on Ed Ball and the DuPont business
interests in the state since 1944 had motivated Ball to work behind the scenes to defeat
the incumbent regardless of who ran against him.” 32
Both Ball and Pepper arrived in Florida during the early 1920s land boom. Pepper on
borrowed money with the promise of a lucrative position as a lawyer for a land
development concern, and Ball arrived with his brother–in–law Alfred I DuPont, who
was looking to escape the corporate politics of the family business and increase his vast
personal fortune investing in Florida. When the boom went bust in 1926, Pepper found
himself out of a job and scrambling to make ends meet, while Ball, in charge of the
DuPont investments, began investing in foreclosed properties and bankrupt companies.
One of the companies acquired was the St. Joe Paper Company, which became his base
of operations. When Alfred DuPont died in 1935, Ball was placed in control of the
DuPont Trust, managing its assets. Ball had given financial support to Pepper in his 1938
reelection campaign. However, Pepper’s continued move to the left and support for labor
interests did not mesh with Ball’s business interests.
31
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 262.
Charlton W. Tebeau and William Marina, A History of Florida, 3rd ed. (Coral Gables, Florida:
University of Miami Press, 1999), 421.
32
103
Growing up poor and in financial distress most of his adult life, Pepper knew what it
meant to struggle. His experience working in an Alabama steel mill had left him a
certain disdain for wealthy business interests, like Ball, that exploited labor and whom he
believed put profits ahead of people. The division between Ball and Pepper occurred
when Pepper defended Roosevelt’s veto of a tax bill that would have provided tax relief
for investors engaged in speculation and purchasing bonds which was exactly what Ball
was doing with FEC. Ball immediately began raising money to try to defeat Pepper’s
reelection bid in 1944. However, he did not have enough time and opponents were not
strong enough to overcome Roosevelt’s coattails. The growing feud between Pepper and
Ball would erupt again over the DuPont Trust’s attempt to acquire controlling rights over
the bankrupt Florida East Coast Railroad founded by Florida pioneer Henry Flagler. The
rival Atlantic Coast Line (ACL) was also interested in gaining a controlling interest;
however, Ball had been purchasing FEC bonds to become the majority bondholder and
increase his leverage to gain control. Ball used St. Joe Paper as his front to acquire FEC.
The squabbling had been going on since Ball became involved in 1941. However, by
1945, Ball had worked to make a solid case for control of FEC and the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) held a hearing on the matter. On January 8, 1945 the ICC
conceded that DuPont would gain control of the reorganized FEC. 33
It appeared that Ball had won the day and the battle was over however the other player
involved, the ACL, refused to go down gracefully. Danese writes that, “‘Champ’ Davis,
as the ACL president was called, considered Pepper vital to exerting the necessary
33
Alexander R. Stoesen, “Road from Receivership: Claude Pepper, The DuPont Trust, And The Florida
East Coast Railway,” Florida Historical Quarterly, 52, no. 2, (October, 1973):137-139.
104
pressure to have the case reopened.” 34 Davis and the ACL found a willing ally in Claude
Pepper. Pepper spent the next several months in using the full scope and power of his
office to influence the ICC to have the FEC case reopened. Pepper had a chance to get
back at Ball and a rare opportunity to champion a liberal cause back home. In June 1945
Pepper announced in his serial press release, “Very Truly Yours,” that, “Some other
members of the Florida delegation in Congress and I have thought it in the public interest
to intervene in the Florida East Coast Railway reorganization…” 35 However, when
Pepper took his trip to Europe in 1945, his absence allowed the DuPont forces to gather
and concentrate their resources to go on the offensive without any defense from Pepper.
As Stoesen noted, “Absence was an error of considerable proportion on Pepper’s part,
and seemed to indicate that he had misjudged the ability of the DuPont interests to
marshal support. The matter was building up into a Pepper–Ball feud and the opposition
took advantage of every chance it had.” 36 The fight over the FEC injected venom into an
already cantankerous relationship. While Pepper may have advanced some valid
concerns over Ball’s control of the FEC, Pepper’s loathing of Ball and what he
represented was thinly veiled at best; and Ball’s animosity toward Pepper continued to
grow. Pepper’s involvement in the fight over control of FEC not only alienated him from
powerful business interests in Florida but it also interfered with part of his traditional
power base—labor. Danse points out, that, although Pepper had the support of the
broad–based Railway Labor Executives Association, “It was a far different matter with
34
Danese, Claude Pepper and Ed Ball, 174.
Claude Pepper, Press Release, “Very Truly Yours,” Box 35, Folder 6-1, Robins Papers.
36
Stoesen, “Road from Receivership,” 142.
35
105
the officials of the unions representing employees of the FEC in Florida. They
vehemently opposed the ACL takeover and Pepper’s support of it.” 37
The issue of Pepper’s involvement with the FEC case became a minor issue in the
1950 campaign. Smathers used it to illustrate Pepper’s willingness to put outside
interests ahead of the best interests of Floridians, saying, that, “It also seems strange that
this man—my opponent—who claims to be a champion of the little man should take time
off from his senatorial duties to make four appearances before the Interstate Commerce
Commission and other government bureaus, and submit briefs, all in behalf of the
world’s second largest railroad, the Atlantic Coast Line. 38 However, the firestorm that
erupted as a result of his attack against Ball would have major repercussions for Pepper’s
campaign and would ultimately aid Smathers in his, as Stoesen points out, “American
business was claiming a major share in winning the war and was offering promises of a
better life in the postwar era. However, Pepper refused to accept the idea that the
operations of the DuPont Trust, or any other large business organization for that matter
were beneficial to the people of Florida. He chose to attack the DuPont Trust with full
force at the peak of prosperity. It coincided with the beginning of his own political
demise.” 39 Ball’s connections to and within the political network of Florida were vast
and the influence of Ball’s deep pockets was immeasurable. While there is no tangible
evidence of Smathers and Ball conspiring to defeat Pepper in 1950, it was widely known
that Ball had been working to defeat Pepper since 1944, when Smathers was still serving
in the Marine Corps; however, it is certain that the resources Ball brought to bear upon
37
Danese, Claude Pepper and Ed Ball, 175.
“Foe’s Help to ACL Hurt Florida, Says Smathers,” Miami Daily News, April 1, 1950.
39
Stoesen, “Road from Receivership”, 138.
38
106
Pepper aided Smathers efforts and proved to be another in the continuing series of
miscalculations made by Pepper enroute to his 1950 defeat.
Besides the issue of communist ties two other issues in the campaign centered on race
relations and civil rights. Florida was a part of the “Solid South” and segregation was a
way of life. When President Truman desegregated the armed forces and put before
Congress his proposal for drafting and passing a comprehensive civil rights program, the
reverberations throughout the South were loud and clear. Ironically, the issue of race is
where Pepper and Smathers shared the most common ground. Smathers, in the veiled yet
succinct style of his Orlando address, used the word “peculiar” in referring to the society
of segregation and white supremacy and his desire to maintain the status quo. Peculiar, a
term mined from the antebellum South where slavery was often referred to as the
“peculiar institution.” He went on record as opposed to the Truman civil rights program.
Pepper frequently referred to himself as a true “son of the South.” Pepper in his
autobiography referenced the time he set out for Harvard and was prepared to “hoist a
Southern banner on “Yankee soil” but found that such a debate no longer concerned
Northerner’s whom had moved on to other pressing matters. Early in his political career,
Pepper, while a representative in the Florida House, had to vote on a bill to censure First
Lady Lou Hoover for having the wife of a Negro congressman as part of a group of
women to tea at the White House. When the measure came to the floor Pepper voted
against censure. Pepper referred to this gesture as proof of his stand on civil rights.
However, Pepper’s concern had been more about the dignity and character of Mrs.
Hoover and her rights as the official hostess of the nation than it was about the right of
107
the congressman’s wife to attend. When Pepper first arrived in the senate he made his
view on race well known when he stood in opposition to an anti–lynching bill, saying:
Whatever may be written into the Constitution, whatever may be placed upon the
statute books of this nation, however many soldiers may be stationed about the ballot
boxes of the Southland, the colored race will not vote, because in doing so under
present circumstances they endanger the supremacy of a race to which God has
committed the destiny of a continent, perhaps a world. 40
However, Pepper always managed to put a positive face on the racial issue, especially
in his later career when he became increasing leftward in his ideology. Pepper may never
have encouraged it, but he never rejected being photographed with persons of color. In
1944, he sponsored legislation to repeal the poll tax, a move that would seem bold and
indicate a shifting of position in terms of race. However, in reality, it served to bolster
Pepper’s liberal ideals in the North and did not harm him politically in Florida because
Florida had already eliminated the poll tax in 1938. Thanks to the efforts of Harry T.
Moore, a state organizer of the NAACP in Florida and founder of the Progressive Voter’s
League and Phillip Weightman, of the CIO–PAC, the number of registered Democratic
black voters grew exponentially, from zero in 1944 to 32, 280 in 1946, and to 106,420 by
1950. 41 The involvement of the CIO in the registration effort in Florida was not solicited
directly by Pepper, however, it was intended to give him a pool of votes likely to be loyal
to him, but Smathers was able to use CIO involvement against him. When it came to the
issue of race, Clark observed that, “Smathers was a racial moderate by the standards of
the 1940s. He avoided the whole Dixiecrat platform of 1948 by endorsing Truman
whole–heartedly, and he took the political middle ground by rejecting any call for civil
40
Claude Pepper, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., 1937, 8757, quoted in, Clark, Red
Pepper, 127.
41
Hugh Douglas Price, “The Negro and Florida Politics, 1944-1954,” Journal of Politics, 17, no. 2
(May, 1955): 200.
108
rights legislation with the argument that it was not a federal matter and should be left to
the states. Although Pepper was the more moderate of the two, he was constantly forced
to issue racist statements to defend himself.” 42 Smathers wanted to find one area where
he could distinguish his record on race from Pepper, and he was able to accomplish it by
connecting Pepper to support of the Fair Employment Practices Commission, (FEPC).
The FEPC began as a war time committee, instituted by Roosevelt, to help encourage fair
practices in labor strapped war industries; and Pepper supported the president in the
senate by voting for it in 1944. As part of his civil rights proposal Truman called for the
creation of a permanent FEPC to be instituted and Pepper voted against the measure. As
Crispell noted:
The FEPC, as Smathers cleverly couched it, was a matter of individual rights.
However, as the forensically talented candidate well knew, it was more exactly and
fully, a matter of federal intervention in race relations and the protection of all
individual rights involved….for surely Pepper and his staff were aware of the
politically fatal implications of a liberal record on any legislation threatening an
entrenched Jim Crow. Seemingly Pepper’s record on the FEPC was simply too
tempting for a challenger determined to hit as hard as possible and as early and as
often as possible…. 43
Pepper’s record on the FEPC was a political liability that Smathers was more than
happy to exploit. Despite Pepper’s votes against a permanent FEPC, Smathers was able
to use his support for the war time measure to make Pepper appear to be a traitor to the
South and its “peculiarities.” The continual attacks by Smathers over the FEPC, like his
Red Pepper accusations, kept Pepper on the defensive, and Pepper was finding it difficult
to overcome the perception that he supported FEPC, despite his fervent denials to the
contrary. Clark writes that, “The dangerous political game that Pepper played with the
race issue was coming back in 1950 to haunt him. He could not moderate his racial
42
43
Clark, Red Pepper, 133.
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 58.
109
views enough to become a national political candidate and still retain his seat as a
southern senator. As the rising tide of civil rights spurred both blacks and whites to
action, Pepper could no longer merely say he was against equal rights for blacks; white
voters expected him to come up with plans to battle civil rights.” 44 Smathers was able to
drive Pepper into a trap of his own making, caught between lofty national ambitions and
the political reality of a Southern politician; and it was looking more and more like there
would be no way to escape.
Pepper tried to set the tone for his own campaign by running on his tried and true style
of advancing and perfecting the New Deal, supporting President Truman and the Fair
Deal, and invoking the name of Roosevelt. In a Miami address, Pepper stated that, “The
issue in this campaign is whether this state and this nation will continue to drive toward
even more prosperity and toward a lasting peace, or whether we will turn back to the
dismal days of the depression.” He went on to add, “… I submit we have not yet realized
the American dream, even though we have come a long way toward it since that chill
March day in 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt was first inaugurated….This campaign is
simply the old Roosevelt fight all over again. The same selfish forces that fought him are
fighting me today.” 45 Pepper’s deep admiration and belief in Roosevelt and the New
Deal kept him in an idealistic rut. Americans have always been more inclined to be
forward thinking without dwelling too long on or in the past. The New Deal was
designed to provide hope and some relief to a nation in dire economic straits. In 1950,
the depression was over, the war had ended, and the United States was emerging as a
superpower, Roosevelt had been gone five years; and, as Crispell observed, “What
44
Clark, Red Pepper, 135.
Claude Pepper, Speech, Bayfront Park, Miami, March 30, 1950, Series 204D, Box 2, Folder 1A,
Pepper Papers.
45
110
Smathers did was pin Pepper down on the issues of FEPC and Soviet–American policy.
Forcing Pepper to explain his positions proved embarrassing enough to seek refuge
behind two administrations. Unfortunately, for Claude Pepper, the coattails of FDR were
worn indeed by 1950, and Truman acted as if the harried incumbent did not exist. Still
Pepper invoked the names of the Democratic tandem with limited effect.” 46
In addition, Smathers tapped into timely issues that concerned voters—fiscal
responsibility in managing labor, social welfare spending and support for a strong
military while opposing national health insurance and socialized medicine. He also
awakened predominant fears of forced racial integration and the threat of communism
both externally and internally and exploited these fears to his advantage. He used his
youthful looks, natural charm and poignant oratory, crafted in the federal courtrooms of
Miami, delivering a vociferous and relentless attack on Pepper’s character and record. On
14 April, in an address in St. Petersburg, Pepper reiterated his views on the issues; and
then addressing Smathers’s attacks, he, finally, tried to refute them. Addressing the
charges of supporting the FEPC, Pepper said, “The people know my background of birth
in Alabama, my unbroken Southern lineage for two centuries. The people know me.
They know my family. They know these attacks for what they are.” Regarding the
alleged ties to communists and fellow–travelers, Pepper replied, “Had I not wanted to
answer in every detail,…the charges made against me, I would have ignored what my
opponent has said and insinuated about my being a communist or sympathetic to
communism, as too despicable to require any public statement on my part.” 47 Pepper
tried to maintain the high road in his campaign but the power of Smathers message and
46
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 63.
Claude Pepper, Speech, St. Petersburg, April 14, 1950, Series 204D, Box 2, Folder 1A, Pepper
Papers.
47
111
his ability to sell it was getting a great deal of ink in the local press across the state; and
the nature of the campaign being waged and the clash of ideologies between the old and
new generation of American politicians had peaked the interest of the nation at large.
The campaign began heating up during March and April, the final two months before the
May 3 vote. Across Florida, coverage was found in about every newspaper, small and
large, from Pensacola, to Jacksonville and Jacksonville to Key West. Many of the
smaller papers would pick up stories from the wire services such as the Associated Press
or from the larger newspapers in Miami, Orlando and Tampa. One of the earliest pieces
of significance was written by Pepper’s friend William G. Carleton. Carlton writes, that,
“Florida’s spring primary, in which Senator Claude Pepper is a candidate for reelection,
is the most important election in the South this year and one of the most important in the
nation. The issues are taking shape in such a way as to make this an important test for the
Fair Deal.” 48 One article in the New York Times drew the angst of Sen. Pepper enough to
mention it in his speech in St. Petersburg. W.H. Lawrence noted that, “Paraphrasing that
old adage that an apple a day will keep the doctor away, Representative George A.
Smathers of Florida believes, that naming a ‘communist front organization’ a day will
keep Claude Pepper away from the United States Senate….Every day as Mr. Smathers
travels up and down the peninsula of Florida, in his campaign to win the Democratic
Senatorial nomination, he comes up with a new organization…” 49 The battle for the
hearts and minds of Florida Democrats was being waged on multiple fronts with
Smathers on the offensive and leaving Pepper little, if any, room for retreat.
48
49
William G. Carleton, “Can Pepper Hold Florida?” The Nation, 170, (March 4, 1950): 198.
W.H. Lawrence, “Smathers Echoes Dewey’s Campaign”, New York Times, April 8, 1950.
112
Some of the most vicious infighting took place in Orange County and in the county
seat of Orlando and the pages of the Orlando Daily Sentinel. Orange County was a
center of Ku Klux Klan activity that was often violent and sometimes fatal and served as
a textbook definition of the white supremacist, racially segregated Old South. Martin
Andersen, editor of the Sentinel, working from the Smathers campaign platform took
Pepper to task on a daily basis. He began referring to the senator as I, Claudius and
explained why, “Some of our friends have wondered why we branded the senior Senator
I, Claudius. Well he won that title hands down for himself….when he was kicking his
dear friend, the little necktie salesman, Harry Truman in the teeth.” Andersen continues
with a vicious attack of Pepper on the meaning of FEPC, writing, that, “It means Negro
clerks dictating to white stenographers. It means Negros and whites working in the same
restaurants and Negros applying for the same jobs, along with white men and white
women, and the job giver going to jail if he doesn’t give due consideration to both….We
may as well understand that I, Claudius, the man who would be president by his own
admission and even though he couldn’t find anyone to nominate him and had to nominate
himself, is the colored man’s friend.” 50
While Smathers’s attacks were scathing, the onslaught of attacks via the print medium
was especially venomous. One item that was particularly harsh was a forty–nine page
pamphlet titled, The Red Record of Senator Claude Pepper. Compiled by Jacksonville
attorney and former FBI Special Agent Lloyd Leemis, it received a fairly wide circulation
across Florida during the campaign. Leemis’s pamphlet reproduced photostats of
documents, articles, and a wide array of photographs as to make a case that Pepper
50
Martin Andersen, “Claude’s Next Job, Why The I, Claudius, Claude And The Negros,” Orlando
Daily Sentinel, March 15, 1950.
113
associated with known communists and fellow–travelers. The layout makes the
documents look ominous and the photographs of Pepper are unflattering and used to cast
doubt and suspicion; and it is presented in a manner that suggests a covert operation to
uncover the truth despite Leemis’s disclaimer that all of the documents and photographs
are of public record and within the public domain. Leemis noted in the forward that,
“However, the author’s sole purpose and only desire is to share with the people of Florida
certain indisputable facts and information in his possession which he believes the people
of Florida are entitled to have in order they may not be confused by the many charges,
denials, and countercharges now being hurled about in the heat of a political
campaign.” 51 Leemis took full credit for compiling, publishing, and distributing the item,
however, a more likely scenario is that Leemis was hired to create the pamphlet and the
identity of the person or entities responsible is based purely on conjecture. However, the
article judged by the local press to be the most damaging came in the form of an
endorsement for Pepper, published in the Communist Party newspaper the Daily Worker.
Charles Hessner, in the Miami Daily News, writes that, “Florida’ political waters were
still as ‘hot’ as Bikini lagoon after the second A–bomb test. As echoes of the article in
the Communist Daily Worker hit with the impact of an atomic bomb.” 52
In the final month of the campaign, both candidates traveled across the state speaking
to the people and making a final push for votes. Pepper, who had practically mastered the
art of eleventh hour campaign miracles, found his abilities lacking when he needed them
most. The Democratic voters of Florida went to the polls on 3 May 1950. Despite all of
the attention the campaign received approximately twenty–five percent of registered
51
Lloyd C. Leemis, “The Red Record of Senator Claude Pepper,” n.d., n.p., Smathers Papers.
Charles Hesser, “Red Endorsement Hit Pepper with the Impact of an Atom Bomb,” Miami Daily
News, April 11, 1950.
52
114
Democrats actually cast a ballot. Smathers received 387,215 votes and Pepper 319,719.
By 61,461 votes George Armistead Smathers had defeated, for the first time in Florida
history, an incumbent senator and for the first time in fourteen years, Claude Denison
Pepper would become a private citizen. Pepper had fallen victim to his own idealism, his
own words and most assuredly his own hubris; failing to recognize the changing political
tide and relying on the well worn and outdated New Deal. In the final analysis, his
actions resulted in making far too many enemies, underestimating the effectiveness of his
opponent and believing that, in the what have you done for me lately world of politics, he
could stand on his past accomplishments alone.
115
Conclusion
The 1950 Senate primary between George Smathers and Claude Pepper was one of the
most ruthless and dirty campaigns of the century. Crispell observed that:
Political campaigns often reveal quite a bit about both the candidates and the society
they seek to represent. This was the case of the 1950 Florida Democratic senatorial
primary. George Smathers and Claude Pepper participated in what was instantly a
vicious, bitter affair illustrating the dark heart of American society in the early 1950s, an
unreconstructed America still haunted by racial injustice and a Cold War America willing
to believe even a Joe McCarthy. 1
Indeed, the campaign revealed the scope and depth of racial tensions that preceded the
civil rights movement, but, at the same time, the campaign was influenced by the
growing sentiment within the U.S. to begin righting wrongs and to begin healing old
wounds. Moreover, it exposes the callousness of those ready and willing to defend the
legality and morality of the “peculiar” society as well as the cruelty of those willing to
commit violence and murder to maintain its existence. White Florida in 1950 embraced
segregation, demonstrated a willingness to resist change, and exemplified the alarming
ease in which one race of people believed they were endowed, by providence, with racial
superiority in all strata of American and, especially, Southern society. Winsboro notes
that, “…a generally recurring assumption in both academic as well as popular discourse
that Florida has always been more progressive in race relations than its southern
neighbors. Such finite views are no longer justified. In addition to violence…that white
Floridians fought as hard as their Dixie neighbors to maintain segregated schools,
communities, and unequal political and employment opportunities.” 2 The historical
1
Crispell, Testing the Limits, 56.
Irvin D.S. Winsboro, “Image, Illusion, And Reality: Florida And The Modern Civil Rights Movement”
in Old South, New South, or Down South? Florida And The Modern Civil Rights Movement, ed. I.D.S.
Winsboro, (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2009), 2.
2
116
legacy of both Smathers and Pepper has to bear the stigma attached to those believing in
the validity of a white supremacist segregated society and promoting its continuation.
There was a distinct, underlying fear of Marxist–Leninist world domination that had
been lying on the periphery of American society since the first days of the Russian
Revolution. The economic collapse of the 1930s followed by the rapidity in which the
Soviet Union gained in strength and position on the world stage following the war re–
awoke that fear. Mutual distrust of one another and postwar ambitions on both sides
fueled the Cold War, and, as Theoharis noted, “The changed rhetoric of postwar foreign
policy begat a popular obsession for achieving total victory over communism—or, what
was much the same thing in the eyes of most Americans, the Soviet Union.” 3
Progressives like Pepper and Henry Wallace advocated treating the Soviets as honest
brokers and establishing a more cordial tone in U.S. – Soviet relations. While pragmatists
like Truman and Smathers did not view the Soviets as honest brokers, distrusted Stalin,
and favored a foreign policy that took a hard–line approach in dealing with Stalin and the
Soviets. Pepper failed to comprehend that a growing majority of Americans, including
returning veterans like Smathers, agreed with the president. Smathers disagreed with
Pepper’s views on foreign policy, Soviet relations, as well as his views on business and
labor relations. Smathers’s political ambitions led him to challenge Pepper for his seat in
the U.S. Senate and he built his campaign upon his differences with Pepper regarding
these issues.
Pepper and Smathers came from different backgrounds. Pepper, grew up poor in rural
Alabama and knew firsthand the meaning of need, sacrifice, and hard work. His life
3
Athan Theoharis, Seed of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York:
Quadrangle Books, 1977), 98.
117
experiences taught him that with a little help and a great deal of effort could overcome
hardship and alter one’s destiny. Smathers grew up in a family of professionals that
included attorneys, judges, physicians and a U.S. Senator. Born in New Jersey, but with
deep roots in the North Carolina mountains, his family was well–to–do and thus afforded
him an easy path to an education and career. He was raised by a strict but loving father,
who demanded effort and excellence as well the improvement of both mind and body as
the path to a well–rounded life. Pepper’s primary goals were to earn enough money to
help support his family, attend college and become a U. S. Senator. Smathers always
admired his Uncle William, the senator, and he too envisioned a political career which his
father’s instincts helped him achieve. Both men were ambitious, and products of their
upbringing and life experiences. Pepper and Smathers first met in 1938 when Pepper
came to Gainesville to speak during his senate campaign.
As a young, wide–eyed student, Smathers was energized by Pepper’s oratory and
idealistic vision of the New Deal so much so, that he became Pepper’s campaign manager
in Alachua County. Pepper would later intervene on Smathers’s behalf when he sought a
job as the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Miami. However, over time, Pepper and Smathers
embarked upon divergent political paths and their differences, by 1950, appeared to
eliminate any common ground. The campaign of 1950 left both men disillusioned with
one another, and they did not speak to each other for nearly thirty years. Even after
“burying the hatchet,” both men held a residual resentment toward the other for the rest
of their lives. Pepper took a pro–Soviet stand from the end of the war until Stalin’s
actions and the deepening Cold War forced him to reevaluate his position. Smathers took
advantage of Pepper’s record and exploited it by sensationalizing Pepper’s rhetoric and
118
associations, while painting Pepper as Stalin’s apologist and a fellow–traveler connected
to both known communists and communist front –organizations. Yet, he drew upon the
vast amount of negative press that Pepper had been amassing since 1944 and while he put
“Red Pepper” on trial he did not give him that moniker. Smathers effective use of “red
baiting” predated McCarthy’s infamous list of 205 names. While there is no tangible
evidence, it is possible that McCarthy’s assault on the State Department in February 1950
may have drawn inspiration from Smathers tactics. Pepper wrote that, “Richard Nixon
had been elected to the House of Representatives by pinning the “Red” label on his
opponent, Jerry Voorhis.” 4 It is almost certain that Smathers friend, Nixon, revisited the
strategy in 1950 during his successful Senate campaign against Helen Gahagan Douglas,
whom he nicknamed the “Pink Lady,” in California. Pepper noted, “Anti–Communist
fervor had a grip on America. The fear was disproportionate to the threat. The words left
and liberal began to take on ominous connotations.” 5 The communist paranoia that was
to unfold during the 1950s unleashed a panic from within where everybody saw
conspiracies where none existed and communists peering around every corner, with
accusations, coming from and toward, people in nearly every walk of life—including
education, the entertainment industry, print and broadcast media, government, and even
religious leaders. As Pepper observed, “Citizens became leery of each other without
reason and watched what they said and wrote lest they be suspected of “leftist” leanings.
Liberal politicians scrambled toward the center or even to the right. The climate was
perfect for a demagogue to pin labels on decent, honorable people, and soon Joe
McCarthy came along to fulfill that role. McCarthyism, however, preceded Joe
4
5
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 262-263.
Ibid., 263.
119
McCarthy.” 6 One religious leader, Catholic Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen, took his anti–
communist views to the airways. Winsboro and Epple noted that, “Sheen effectively
interlaced religious themes in his broadcasts to attract millions of viewers in his quest to
cast communism as the epicenter of moral decay, un–American activities, and the major
foreign policy issues of the era. The record indicates that his message not only alarmed
Americans about Soviet–style communism, but also contained a popular ecumenical
thrust placing Bible–waving on par with the flag–waving mania of the times.” 7 Sheen’s
anti–communist message was a result of his own deep personal convictions about the
“evils” of the communist ideology. During the 1950s, Sheen had a bully pulpit that
allowed him to share his personal views with millions of Americans and thus contributed
to the promulgation of fear and anti–communist fervor in the United States during the
early days of the Cold War.
McCarthy also believed that communism would destroy American society and way of
life if given the chance. He used his position as a U.S. Senator to launch an
unprecedented assault on thousands of Americans in an attempt to “identify” and
eliminate communist threats from within and created a climate of paranoia among
millions of American citizens either fearing the “communist” hiding in their midst or
afraid they may be named next. Smathers’s use of “red baiting” as a campaign tactic
received a great deal of statewide and national media attention. While Smathers may not
have fanned the flames of this promulgation of fear, it is reasonable to believe that he
provided the spark that ignited it. Merriam–Webster defines McCarthyism as, “a mid-
6
Ibid.
Irvin D. S. Winsboro and Michael Epple, “Religion, Culture, And the Cold War: Bishop Fulton J.
Sheen and America’s Anti–Communist Crusade of the 1950s,” The Historian 71, no. 2, (Summer, 2009):
233.
7
120
20th century political attitude characterized chiefly by opposition to elements held to be
subversive and by the use of tactics involving personal attacks on individuals by means of
widely publicized indiscriminate allegations especially on the basis of unsubstantiated
charges; broadly : defamation of character or reputation through such tactics.” 8 Thus
Smathers, in the context of this definition, is guilty of McCarthyism. The 1950
Democratic Primary held significance beyond the borders of Florida. Bell observed that,
“Florida forms a useful case study for an examination the political landscape of the
United States at mid–century precisely because it formed a political meeting ground
between the South and the metropolitan locus of liberal thought in the north–east of the
country.” 9 Indeed, Florida experienced a significant growth in postwar population due to
retirees flocking to the state to enjoy their golden years, basking in the warm sun while
lying upon the sand–swept beaches.
The Smathers–Pepper campaign gained notoriety for the raucous mudslinging, red
baiting nature of the campaign. More significantly, it marked a shift to the right from the
New Deal progressive liberalism that had dominated the American political scene since
1932, and rejected one of its greatest standard–bearers, Claude Pepper. Pepper’s defeat
suggested that a paradigm shift in the American body politic had taken place, with the
American public looking forward, seeking prosperity and ready to lead the world in
business and industry, while maintaining security and fighting the scourge of communism
both at home and abroad. Politically, Pepper had “outlived” his time. Smathers
represented the new breed of American politician that drew from their experience in the
8
Merriam–Webster OnLine, s.v. “McCarthyism,” accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/mccarthyism.
9
Jonathan W. Bell, “Conceptualising Southern Liberalism: Ideology and the Pepper–Smathers 1950
Primary in Florida,” Journal of American Studies 37, (2003): 20. DOI 10.1017/S0021875803006984.
121
fight to save America and the world from fascist tyranny and believed they were destined
to continue the battle against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The election proved to
be a state–level bellwether for the changing tone of American politics and those of the
G.I. generation that would lead it for the next four decades.
The early post–mortem of the campaign in the press pointed a critical eye toward the
FEPC and the question of race as the deciding factors in the Smathers victory and decried
the demagoguery. Commonweal concluded, “Mr. Smathers made the most of these
issues in a rather nasty way. Mr. Pepper on the defensive all the way, replied in kind,
hitting Smathers as a reactionary and a tool of big money….A liberal candidate in the
South is most vulnerable to a ruthless opponent on the very issues that make his
candidacy worthwhile.” “The cry of the demagogue is shrill and deafening, but, blessing
in disguise, nobody’s nerves can stand it forever.” 10 James Lyons of the Christian
Science Monitor had a frank assessment, writing that, “The eyes of United States and the
world were focused on Florida this week for the windup of a highly significant senatorial
race. More than a clash of colorful personalities, the election in the nature of a statewide
showdown— and a trial balloon on the ideological concept of the welfare state….but the
central fact, no matter who the winner, is that a virulent political contest has cost Florida
heavily in the poise and progress of its social thinking—so fortuitously attained since the
betrayal of Osceola a century ago.” 11 The Christian Century surmised, “In large
measure, it became, before it was decided, a contest in demagoguery….Each tried to
outdo the other in proclaiming his devotion to white rule and his abhorrence of President
10
11
1950.
“Mr. Smathers and Mr. Pepper,” Commonweal, May 19, 1950, 142.
James Lyons, “Florida Upset: Half Proofs and Half–Truths,” Christian Science Monitor, May 6,
122
Truman’s civil rights program. We believe both Mr. Smathers and Mr. Pepper to be
better men than their campaigning indicated.” 12
The initial analysis from the early post-mortem of the campaign is essentially
correct—racial undertones and use of demagoguery were rampant throughout the
campaign on both sides. As Pepper noted,
From the moment I read Smathers’s first campaign speech, I had believed that his
tactics would boomerang, that voters would be turned off by his total lack of restraint.
After allowing themselves to be mesmerized by a Joe McCarthy for a few years the
American people finally saw though him. But in a brief political campaign, such
simple and easily understood labels as “Red” and “nigger–lover” caught on quickly,
in part because they were fortified by my visit to Moscow in 1945 and by half–page
newspaper photographs of me shaking hands with blacks. 13
The campaign exposed the baser instincts of politicians either seeking power or trying to
hold onto power and the rather seedy nature of political campaigning. However, the
perspective from the current view also reveals the toll in human suffering and loss that
occurred as a result of the fear mongering rhetoric of McCarthyism. Where a simple
accusation made without merit or any tangible evidence of subversion or of having
communist ties could destroy ones personal and professional reputation.
Even more shameful, was the willingness of white society to tolerate and perpetuate
the discrimination and violence of the Jim Crow South—and the role that both men
played in promulgating white supremacy, fear, and paranoia in 1950. The painful legacy
of the segregationist’s fears was an increase in Klan activity across Florida, and a wave of
violence perpetrated by those radical elements willing to commit murder and mayhem in
defending the “peculiar” society. The violence included a series of bombings, a total of
eleven across Florida in 1951, including the 25 December bombing of the home of
12
13
“Must Demagoguery Be the Price of Office?” The Christian Century, May 17, 1950, 605.
Pepper and Gorey, Pepper, 264.
123
former president of the Florida conference of the NAACP, Harry T. Moore—killing
Moore and his wife Harriette. Moore was the founder of the Florida Progressive Voter’s
League and organized attempts to register Negro voters throughout Florida. Lempel notes
that, “The Allwright decision and Truman’s election bid gave impetus to the massive
voter registration drive organized by the Florida Progressive Voter’s League (FPVL), a
statewide black political association. Major partners of the FPVL voter registration drive
included the Florida conference of the NAACP branches and the Florida Negro Elks
Association.” 14 The efforts of Moore and others produced a significant rise in the
number of registered Democratic black voters which grew exponentially, from zero in
1944 to 32, 280 in 1946, and to 106,420 by 1950. 15 Lempel using data from Daytona
Beach, illustrates this increase, noting that, “Albert Bethune’s involvement in the
Democratic voter registration drive, together with Moore’s close attachment to Daytona
Beach (he and his two daughters graduated from Bethune–Cookman College and the
Moore’s frequently visited the city) help to explain the nearly total conversion of
Daytona’s black electorate to the Democrats in 1948. The voter registration drive also
revitalized African–American political activity in the city.” 16 Moore and the FPVL’s
continued efforts and successes in registering black voters within Florida’s Democratic
Party threatened segregationists for whom the party served as their base of political
power. The number of black voters registering as Democrats between 1950 and 1954
only increased by 13,555, approximately a 92.8 percent difference from the previous four
14
Leonard R. Lempel, “Toms and Bombs: The Civil Rights Struggle in Daytona Beach” in Old South,
New South, or Down South? Florida And The Modern Civil Rights Movement, ed. Irvin D.S. Winsboro,
Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 93.
15
Hugh Douglas Price, “The Negro and Florida Politics, 1944-1954,” Journal of Politics, 17, no. 2
(May, 1955): 200.
16
Ibid.
124
years and may in part reflect the loss of Moore’s efforts in the registration of black voters
due to the racially motivated violence that resulted in his death and that of his wife.
George Smathers went on to serve the state of Florida in the U. S. Senate for three
terms, retiring to a quiet, private life in 1969. During his senate career, he continued
supporting the Southern racial position, by opposing the 1964 Civil Rights Bill as well as
Thurgood Marshall’s appointment to the Supreme Court. He also focused his attention on
U.S.–Latin American relations. Smathers died on 20 January 2007 at the age of 93.
Claude Pepper relocated to Miami from Tallahassee to engage in the practice of law. In
1958, he made another failed bid for the senate. Pepper managed a rebirth of his political
career in 1961, when he was successful in winning a congressional seat in Miami’s 3rd
District. As a congressman, Pepper championed the causes of senior citizens, helped to
strengthen Social Security, and served his district and the nation until his death on 30
May 1989 at age 88.
Of Smathers and Pepper, it can be said that they were both men of great passion and
great ambition. They were not great men, but men flawed by their acceptance and
promulgation of discrimination and segregation. However, they lived and served in one
of the most tumultuous and turbulent periods in American history. Both remained
steadfast in support of their individual positions and convictions. Both men should be
noted for their contributions, as well as be held accountable for their shortcomings. In the
final analysis, historians continue to analyze and debate the legacy of one of America’s
most sensational and controversial campaigns, and, in the annals of history, that legacy
has yet to be fully determined.
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X (Kennan, George F). “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4
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IV. Oral History Interviews
Johnson, Claudia "Lady Bird." Oral History Interview XXI, August10-11, 1981, by
Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library, 33.
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/Johnson–
C/CTJ%2021.pdf. Accessed on November 7, 2012.
Pepper, Claude. Interview by Jack Bass and Walter Devries, interviewA-0056, transcript
Southern Oral History Program Collection no. 4007, February 1, 1974,
http://docsouth.unc.edu/soph/A-0056/A-0056.html.
Smathers, George A. “George A. Smathers, United States Senator, 1951-1969.”
interview by Donald A. Ritchie, Oral History Interviews, Senate Historical Office,
Washington, D.C., Interview no. 1: “The Road to Congress,” August 1, 1989.
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Smathers_interview_1.pdf.
V. Periodicals
Carleton, William G. “Can Pepper Hold Florida.” Nation. March 4, 1950
“Must Demagoguery Be the Price of Office?” Christian Century. May 17, 1950.
“Mr. Smathers and Mr. Pepper.” Commonweal. May 19, 1950.
Jackson, Gardner. “Henry Wallace: A Divided Mind.” The Atlantic. August 1948.
Lyon, James. “Florida Upset: Half -Proofs and Half-Truths.” Christian Science Monitor
Magazine. May 6, 1950.
McGill, Ralph. “Can He Purge Senator Pepper?” Saturday Evening Post, April 22, 1950.
“The Effigy.” Time. September 2, 1940.
“The Still–Solid South.” Time. May 15, 1944.
“Red Pepper.” Time. April 1, 1946.
“Merger” Time. March 6, 1947.
“Firmer,” Time. March 3, 1947.
VI. Newspapers
Miami (FL) Daily News
New York Times
Orlando (FL) Morning Sentinel
Palm Beach (FL) Post
St. Petersburg (FL) Times
Washington Star
Washington Times
VII. Web Sources
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“The Berlin Airlift.” PBS American Experience. timeline,
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Butler, Anne M. and Wendy Wolff. “United States Senate Election, Expulsion, and
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______. Office of the Historian. “The Atlantic Conference & Charter, 1941.”
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Graf, William and John Andrews. “Statistics of the Congressional Election of 1946.”
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______. “Executive Order 9024.” The American Presidency Project. John Woolley and
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