Download PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES
Case Studies in the Nixon, Carter and Reagan Administrations
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Masters of Arts in
Diplomacy and Military Studies
Spring 2009
By
Steven M. Devitt
Abstract
The atomic bombings of the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United
States in 1945 brought a dramatic conclusion to World War II (WW II) and signaled the
beginning of the Cold War. While the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to the United
States in the decades which followed, the military advantage America possessed
heading into the second half of the twentieth-century ensured its status as the
undisputed leader of the free world and enabled it to conduct affairs from positions of
power. Regardless of the situation of circumstance, American diplomatic efforts were
always enhanced by the conventional and nuclear capabilities of its military.
However, the United States rarely exploited or abused its decisive military advantage
during the Cold War. In nearly every instance, the American response to threats made
against it national security were deliberate, measured and responsible. Choosing to
lead by example, the United States was hesitant to employ its full arsenal of weapons in
international conflicts. While this was a noble venture that limited the potential for a
third world war, it also created situations where American leaders decided to operate in
gray areas. Initially desiring a diplomatic solution, yet soon realizing that military
intervention was the only viable course of action, these leaders were forced to make
controversial decisions which had profound consequences.
Responsible for navigating the country through both good and bad times, every
President of the United States (POTUS) has made decisions affecting not only America,
but the entire world. Although this has always been the case, as the nation grew and
the world evolved, so did the responsibilities of the president. By the end of WW II, it
was clear that the demands placed on the POTUS warranted an expansion of the
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existing presidential support system. Recognizing the enormity of the task at hand in
the years immediately following the war, the American government approved funding for
increased presidential staffing and the reorganization of government agencies in order
to better assist the president.
Created in 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) was intended to serve as a
fusion center for policy development and decision-making among the key members of a
presidential administration. Due to the complexities of the twentieth-century, the role of
the NSC – and in particular the National Security Advisor (NSA) – began to grow in the
decades which followed. Accompanying this growth has been an increased visibility for
the NSA and the NSC he/she manages. Like any organization, the NSC has had its
share of both high and low points, and with the promulgation of mass communication in
the latter part of the twentieth-century, its failures have been on full display for the world
to observe.
Every presidential administration in the United States from WW II forward has
experienced an international crisis that tests the mettle of its leaders. More times than
not, the president and his NSC have performed remarkably well, as victory in the Cold
War and the title of the world‟s lone superpower attest. However, while infrequent,
there have also been setbacks which damaged American standing and prestige
throughout the world.
While ultimate power and responsibility rests with the POTUS, in instances of failure,
the NSA is usually next in line when blame and culpability are assigned by historians
and political scientists. Therefore, using the NSC as the baseline, this professional
paper will examine decision-making during international crises in three presidencies:
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Nixon, Carter and Reagan. Examining the key players, their operating environments
and the external pressures each faced at the time, the paper will assess the role and
influence of process and personality in the decision-making apparatus of each
presidential administration.
4
We Certify that we have read this professional paper and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope
and quality for the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies.
Committee
Approved, Russell A. Hart, Ph.D., Associate Professor of History,
First Reader, 15 April 2009
Approved, Patrick Bratton, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Studies,
Second Reader, 15 April 2009
Table of Contents
Figures
2
Preface
3
Chapter One: Introduction
6
Chapter Two: History of the National Security Council
24
Chapter Three: President Richard M. Nixon & the Vietnam War
31
Chapter Four: President James E. Carter & the Iran-Hostage Crisis
54
Chapter Five: President Ronald W. Reagan & the Iran-Contra Affair
76
Chapter Six: Conclusion
101
References
114
1
Figures
Figure I: The Size of the NSC Staff
30
Figure II: The Nixon NSC
37
Figure III: The Carter NSC
60
Figure IV: The Reagan NSC
83
2
Preface
In the years following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City and
Washington D.C., there has been much discussion as to what the United States
government did to identify, prevent and defeat the emerging terrorist threat. In
particular, much blame has been cast upon President George W. Bush and the
members of his administration, as they have been labeled by critics as everything from
naive to incompetent in their handling of the War on Terror (WOT). Large numbers of
American casualties, astronomical amounts of money spent and the acknowledgement
by administration officials that national intelligence services were incorrect in many of
their pre-war assumptions has led to outrage in many American households. Many
Americans can simply not understand how a country as powerful, as well resourced and
as technologically advanced as the United States could have mismanaged the WOT to
the extent that the Bush administration has done. As a result, the president left office
with one of the lowest approval ratings in the history of the presidency, a dramatic
descent from the position of power he once maintained.
American faith in its government and leaders stood at record highs in the period
immediately following the attacks, and were no doubt raised in the knowledge that the
president‟s administration and inner circle was filled with long time politicians and
officials who had navigated the United States through difficult periods of time in the
recent past. The members of the president‟s National Security Council (NSC)
underscored this fact, as it was staffed with individuals who had played key roles in the
United States victory over the Soviet Union during the Cold War, regarded as the
greatest threat to American security in the modern era. The NSC was highlighted by a
3
Secretary of Defense who had experience as a former White House Chief of Staff and
Secretary of Defense in previous republican administrations, as well as a Secretary of
State who was a former National Security Advisor (NSA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and war hero from the first war with Iraq – Army General Colin L. Powell. To
most observers, the Bush NSC was staffed with precisely the individuals needed to
assist and advise the president in matters involving the security of the United States and
its people.
Although historians and political scientists will be unable to assess the effectiveness
or quality of decision-making during the Bush NSC until the release and declassification
of administration documents, it appears that Bush administration has been led by a
president who favors personalities over process. In spite of inherent organizations and
systems within the presidency that were created to provide the president with wideranging points of view, promote debate and ensure policy review(s), it seems many of
these systems were marginalized and that the advice and counsel of select individuals
within the president‟s inner circle dominated decision-making.
In this regard, President George W. Bush is no different than many of his
predecessors, who have reduced the role of government agencies and “outsiders” in
times of crisis, and instead turn to trusted advisors in the final decision-making process.
While at the end of the day, each president must be assessed upon eventual outcomes,
the road which led to ultimate decisions often provides clues as to the factors which led
to success or failure. The study of presidential decision-making in international crises
has proven that more times than not, the personality of the president – often influenced
by those in closest proximity to him – triumphs over process.
4
This paper will examine the presidential administrations of Richard M. Nixon, James
E. Carter and Ronald W. Reagan and assess the decision-making process for each in
the premiere international crisis of their presidencies. Using the NSC as the baseline
for comparisons of each administration, the paper will consider the contributing factors
to the final decisions each president made during the course of the event. Objective
criteria such as organizational models, management structures and the role of routine
and process, paying particular attention to system(s) discipline, will form the start point
to the analytical methodology. Additionally, subjective criteria such as personality,
background, experience, leadership style, learning style, ideology and operating
environments for – but not limited to – the president will complete the progression. The
combination of the two evaluation criteria will provide a broad picture of each president‟s
approach to policy development, and by doing so, identify the root causes,
commonalities and contradictions of presidential decision-making in international crises.
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Chapter One
Introduction
On October 14, 1962, an American U2 spy plane took reconnaissance photos of
what appeared to be Soviet missile emplacements under construction in Cuba.
Immediately convening his National Security Council (NSC), President John F. Kennedy
and his inner-circle of advisors developed, analyzed and compared possible response
options. Over the course of the next 72 hours, three courses of action emerged. The
first option was to engage Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev diplomatically, the second
option was to launch a massive invasion of Cuba which would involve upwards of
100,000 combat troops, and the final option was a “hybrid” approach that called for a
blockade of the island.1
Attempts to settle upon an appropriate response proved difficult to achieve, as there
was intense division within the NSC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that
a full-scale invasion was the proper course of action, as anything less than that would
be perceived as weakness by the Soviets. Under-secretary of State George Ball
argued in support of a diplomatic resolution, feeling that the Soviets were unaware of
the position they had put the United States in and could be persuaded to remove the
missiles. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara took a pragmatic approach, backing
the blockade because he felt that the other options were either too ineffective or too
dangerous. National Security Advisor (NSA) McGeorge Bundy was non-committal,
1
“The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: Chronology of Events,” The National Security Archive.
(www.2.gwu.edu/~nsaarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/cheon/htm)
6
stating that while a first strike had strategic advantages, it did not ensure a successful
outcome.2
In the end, Kennedy made the decision to establish a blockade, the Soviets backed
down, and an international crisis was averted. Although it was not evident at the time,
the Cuban Missile Crisis was a high point in presidential decision-making amid
international crises, as the NSC functioned as its creators intended. Meeting thirtyseven times over the course of the crisis, the president received wide-ranging points of
view from each of his small group of advisors, the advice was carefully weighed by the
president, and the ultimate decision was made through the formal NSC structure.3
Indeed, the president‟s adherence to process and the discipline displayed by senior
administration officials in the give-and-take of course of action development was critical
in ensuring Kennedy had access to all points of views, and was able to make the best
possible decision based upon all available information. However, while the Cuban
Missile Crisis confirms the importance of routine, structure and organization in
presidential decision-making, the unfortunate reality is that it does not always guarantee
successful outcomes. Later asked how close the two superpowers had come to nuclear
war, Kennedy estimated that the odds had been “somewhere between one-out-of three
and even.”4
One of the unsung heroes of the Cuban Missile Crisis was Bundy, who as the
president‟s NSA, served his primary role of advisor flawlessly, carefully avoiding the
2
Natfali, Timothy and Zelikow, Philip, eds., The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Vol. 2:
September – October 21, 1962 (New York, New York: W.W Norton, 2001).
3
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power (New York, New York: Public Affairs, 2007), pp. 92-95.
4
Sorensen, Theodore, C. Kennedy (New York, New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 295.
7
temptation to become an advocate. Unquestionably, being able to balance the duties
and responsibilities of the NSA has proven difficult for the individuals who have held the
position in the time since, as the power that comes from the proximity of the NSA to the
president has proven intoxicating for some, and intimidating for others. The relationship
between a president and his NSA is truly unique, as unlike cabinet appointees, the NSA
is not subject to congressional review. NSAs are responsible to president alone, and
have been central to foreign policy development since the creation of the NSC they
oversee in1947. Some have served administrations ably, while others have fallen short,
but all have operated in a spotlight that has made the NSA one of the most high-profile
individuals in presidential administration.5
The power granted NSAs comes at a cost, however, as their primary function of
serving as a facilitator often places them in the middle of bureaucratic turf wars. In their
service to the president, they must balance their allegiance to him with a commitment to
managing an effective and efficient policy process that includes government agencies,
rather than excluding them. They must provide confidential advice to the president, but
be careful not to stray into the role of advocate. Doing much of the heavy-lifting while
allowing others to receive the glory, NSAs should be indispensable to the process (and
the president) while operating in the shadows. Most importantly, they must ensure that
the president and his senior officials give careful and thorough consideration to the
handful of critical issues that will make or break the administration.6
5
Daalder, Ivo and Destler, I.M. “In the Shadow of the Oval Office:”The Next National Security Advisor,” (Foreign
Affairs-January/February 2009), pp. 114-15.
6
Ibid.
8
Historiography
The study of presidential decision-making and the role played by the president‟s
inner circle of advisors became extremely popular in the 1970s and 1980s. The Cuban
Missile Crisis and performance of the members of the Kennedy NSC inspired many
scholars to investigate the techniques and procedures used by other administrations
during the course of international crises. The 1940s and 1950s provided an abundance
of material for academics to review in the 1970s, as studies of World War II, the atomic
bomb, the Berlin blockade and the Korean War during the Roosevelt, Truman, and
Eisenhower administrations gave historians one of the first behind-the-scenes glimpses
into the processes, influences and considerations which had to be managed by the
Commander in Chief in a rapidly modernizing international community.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, scholars focused much of their Cold War attention to
the Vietnam War and the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet
Union during the administrations of Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. While the détente of
the 1970s eased international concerns and improved relations between the
superpowers, it also introduced new actors into the Cold War: in particular the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Beginning with the Iran-Hostage Crisis and concluding with the IranContra scandal, the administrations of president‟s Carter and Reagan found themselves
embroiled in international affairs that changed the dynamic of presidential decisionmaking, as seemingly inconsequential groups of non-state actors and obscure dictators
paralyzed the American government.
The shocking developments proved to once again be of great interest to scholars,
and with the declassification of the majority documents during the presidencies of Carter
9
and Reagan, never before seen accounts of the behind-the-scenes activities during
each crisis have proven extremely popular. The combination of materials from the early
years of the Cold War, recent publications and increased interest in the NSC – due in
large part to Nixon NSA Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s – has resulted in an
extensive amount of material covering foreign policy development and decision-making
in international relations. Some of the most important and readily accessible
publications were used in support of this paper.
One of the most widely referenced books concerning organization and structure of
presidential administrations is Tanner Johnson‟s Managing the White House: An
Intimate Study of the Presidency. Assessing management styles of every president
from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Richard M. Nixon, Johnson asserts that there are
three models. The first model is the formal system, characterized by the delegation of
authority by the president and funneling of information through a hierarchical pyramid,
the second is the collegial system, which is more open and fuses the strongest
elements of divergent points of view (the president sits at the hub a large wheel), and
the final is the in the competitive system the duties and responsibilities of presidential
advisors overlap, with the president encouraging creativity and internal rivalry. 7
A more recent study of presidential management is John P. Burke‟s The
Institutional Presidency: Organizing the White House from FDR to Clinton. Providing a
broad overview of White House governance, Burke provides a historical look at the
presidency and the manner in which different presidents have arranged their staff‟s.
7
This paragraph is drawn from Richard Tanner Johnson’s Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the
Presidency (New York, New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 236-41.
10
Comparing their chosen management style to their personality and style of leadership,
Burke highlights both the successes and failures of modern president‟s and determines
whether they were able to take advantage of the resources available to them in their
decision-making process and formulation of policy.8
Managing the Presidency by Philip G. Henderson examines the role of the NSC in
various presidential administrations during times of crisis. Viewing the presidential
administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower as the high-point for policy formulation and the
NSC, Henderson considers the series of international setbacks the United States
suffered during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, culminating with the Iran-Contra Affair.
The author assesses that the primary causes of bad policy that have plagued recent
presidents is a failure to adhere to prescribed structures and processes, which results in
uninformed decision-making.9
Comparing two of the most popular president‟s of the twentieth-century, Paul
Kowert‟s Groupthink or Deadlock, is an analytical look at the presidency. Kowert looks
at the role of group dynamics in the White House, where relationships, personalities and
leadership styles can often short circuit a president‟s decision-making process. In the
Eisenhower presidency, the potential for this was reduced due to the president‟s
insistence upon formality, process and deliberation which fit his leadership style and
personal experience. In the Reagan presidency, the potential for this was increased
8
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton
(Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 13 - 17 (for more information refer to Chapter 1 –
“From President to Presidency: FDR’s Legacy”).
9
Henderson, Philip G. Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 2-3 (for more information refer to “Introduction: Management and
Mismanagement of the Modern Presidency”).
11
due to the president‟s ad hoc governing style and his inability to manage members of
his inner-circle.10
Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council by Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch
K. Johnson provides a history of the NSC, and the president‟s they served, as well as
profiles of NSAs and their overall performance. The book is a series of articles written
by scholars and journalists, and is particularly useful in providing background and
insight into the NSC from Vietnam until Iran-Contra. Its assessment of the NSAs that
have served in crises over the same period of time is helpful in establishing the proper
role that individual should play in policy formulation.11
Richard K. Betts‟ Soldiers, Statesman and Cold War Crises looks at the relationship
between civilians and senior military officers in presidential administrations. These
individuals (or groups of individuals) often very have different points of view on policy
development. One of the more interesting facts of the book is that more often than not,
civilian advisors are more prone to use force in crises than military advisors in crises.
While no the focus of the book, the challenges experienced by policy makers in
decision-making provide show the importance of the NSC process and structure.12
Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to
Bush, by John Prados, is an extensive and detailed look into all facets of the NSC and
the president‟s they served. Prados shows the rise in importance of the NSC in
10
This paragraph is drawn from Paul A. Kowert’s Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from their
Advisors? (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 28-30.
11
This paragraph is drawn from Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson’s Fateful Decisions: Inside the National
Security Council (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. xiii - xix.
12
Betts, Richard K. Soldiers, Statesman and Cold War Crises (New York, New York: Columbia University Press,
1991), pp. 209-12.
12
American government, where in some administrations the NSA has possessed more
clout than the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, as his grasp of issues and
day-to-day interaction with bureaucratic officials make the president extremely
dependent upon him.13
Christopher C. Shoemaker‟s, The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, provides an all
encompassing view of the NSC. Highlighting the origin and history of the NSC,
Shoemaker goes on to outline the functional requirements of the staff, identifies features
of the staff decision-making process, and most importantly, identifies the international
and domestic environment in which the NSC operates. One of the most important –
and valid – assertions Shoemaker makes is that the role of the NSA is highly dependent
upon the psychological make-up of the president.14
Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the
Architects of American Power, by David J. Rothkopf, examines the role of the NSC from
Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. Considering the relationship between the
president and his NSA in international crises, Rothkopf scrutinizes management styles,
leadership abilities and idiosyncrasies of key players within each presidential
administration. Despite the partisan tone maintained by the author, the book is
13
Prados, John. Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York,
New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), pp. 23-24.
14
This paragraph is drawn from Christopher C. Shoemaker’s The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 7-9.
13
insightful and informative in describing the events, personalities and processes of each
crisis.15
John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein‟s, How President’s Test Reality: Decisions on
Vietnam 1954 and 1968, is a comprehensive at the decision-making processes and
personalities of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson during the run-up and
conduct of the Vietnam War. The book compares and contrasts the management styles
of the two presidents and shows the benefit of Eisenhower‟s independent thinking and
policy review, as opposed to the compartmentalization and micromanagement of
Johnson.16
The White House Staff
One of the most important decisions a president will make occurs before he ever
sets foot in the Oval office. Selecting and organizing the White House staff is one of the
first orders of business for a new administration, as it will serve as the mechanism
through which policy will be developed and implemented during the president‟s term in
office. Most importantly, history has shown us that the individuals within the staff will
play a large role in the decision-making process of the president in times of international
crises.
Created almost 70 years ago during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration,
the Executive Office of the President (EOP) was originally a small group of presidential
advisors who were charged with assisting the president in the daily administration of
15
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 20 -21.
16
This paragraph is drawn from John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein’s How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on
Vietnam, 1954 & 1968 (New York, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989), pp. 4-5.
14
government affairs. Not surprisingly, as the demands on a president in the modern
world have grown in the time since its inception, so has the staff – in 1941 the staff
numbered 52, peaked at a high of 464 in 1977, and as of 1990 numbered 366. These
individuals reside in one of the eleven major units which compose the EOP – the official
title of the White House staff – and have a combined operating budget of over
$150,000,000:
1 – The White House Office
2 – The National Security Council
3 – The Office of Policy Development
4 – The Office of Management and Budget
5 – The Council of Economic Advisors
6 – The Office of Science and Technology Policy
7 – The Council on Environmental Quality
8 – The Office of the United States Trade Representative
9 – The Office of Administration
10 – The Office of National Drug Control Policy
11 – The Office of the Vice President17
17
This paragraph is drawn from John P. Burke’s The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White
House from FDR to Clinton, p. 13.
15
Organizational Structure and Systems
Managing an entity as diverse and complex as the EOP is of course a monumental
task. It is for this reason that the organizational structure a president employs while in
office is so critical to the ability of his administration to effectively govern. Although there
are constraints placed upon the size and budget of the EOP by Congress, presidents
have great discretion over how most units are organized and especially what role they
play in the day to day workings of the presidency. In particular, even when statutory
constraints are present, president‟s can choose whether to convene a specific group of
advisors or to what extent to heed their advice. Therefore, the individual management
style of the president plays a decisive role in determining not only who has access to
the president, but more importantly, the amount of influence units within the EOP
maintain.18
Acknowledging the importance of presidential management styles, many studies
have been conducted in order to identify similarities and trends in separate
administrations. In 1974, Professor Richard Tanner Johnson of Stanford University
provided an influential classification of the presidential management systems that had
emerged from Roosevelt through Nixon. In it, he concluded that three general patterns
of White House organization were identifiable:
- The Competitive Advisory System
- The Formalistic Advisory System
- The Collegial Advisory System19
18
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton,
p. 54 (for more information refer to Chapter 3 - “Through A Managerial Lens”).
19
Johnson, Richard Tanner. Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency, p. 238.
16
According to Johnson, President Roosevelt employed a competitive advisory
system, one in which advisor‟s responsibilities overlapped and the president
encouraged rivalries among them. In this system, the president sits in the center of the
flow of information, generates “creative ideas” and is more open to “ideas from the
outside.” One of the strengths of competitive systems is that they tend to favor policy
options that are politically feasible and bureaucratically “doable” rather than analytically
optimal. However, there are weaknesses associated with the competitive system, chief
among them that it places large demands on the president‟s time, requires his vigilant
attention, promotes jealousy and hostility among the staff, and may lead to high attrition
in personnel.20
Employing a formalistic system, President Dwight D. Eisenhower delegated much of
his authority to top advisors where information that reached the president had been
funneled through a hierarchical structure of clearly designated organizational channels.
While conserving the president‟s time and encouraging an orderly process of policy
issues, formalistic systems may distort information that a president receives by
undervaluing political pressures and/or responding slowly to crises in their search for
optimal policy choice.21
The third and final system is the collegial. Established by President John F.
Kennedy, this system involves building a team of colleagues who work together to staff
out problems and generate solutions, intending to fuse the strongest elements of
divergent points of view. In the collegial model, the president serves as a hub and sits
20
Burke, John P. and Greenstein, Fred I. How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 & 1968, pp. 5-6
(for more information refer to Chapter 1 - “Analyzing Presidential Decision-making”).
21
Ibid.
17
at the center of his advisors. This system is essentially a combination of the competitive
and formalistic systems, however, while maintaining many of the strengths of the other
systems, it also carries with it many of their weaknesses. Collegial systems seek to
achieve optimality and involve the president in the information network, but in doing so
place great demands on his time. Additionally, this system only works with a president
that is skilled in dealing with associates and maintaining a collective ethos that is
conducive to effective decision-making - a quality that is often beyond the grasp of
many leaders.22
Learning Systems
Johnson‟s analysis and categorization of White House organization models provide a
general framework in which president‟s can be examined by historians and political
scientists, but falls short in attempting to categorize each administration solely within the
confines of one particular system or another. While most presidential administrations
since Roosevelt fall into either the formalistic or collegial models, many have
incorporated elements of each (particularly in recent presidencies) and none have
employed Roosevelt‟s competitive model.23
Acknowledging this reality, Paul Kowert, in his book Groupthink or Deadlock: What
Do President’s Learn from Their Advisors states that decision makers can be
categorized into two groups according to their learning style: open individuals and
closed individuals. Open individuals desire a great deal of diverse information and
22
Burke, John P. and Greenstein, Fred I. How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 & 1968, pp. 5-6
(for more information refer to Chapter 1 - “Analyzing Presidential Decision-making”).
23
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, p.
56 (for more information refer to Chapter 3 - “Through A Managerial Lens”).
23
Johnson, Richard Tanner. Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency, p. 238.
18
advice, while closed individuals rely primarily on their own instincts and on a much
smaller quantity and variety of information to make decisions. According to Kowert,
open and closed leaders react differently to stress, with open decision makers able to
handle higher levels of stress than closed decision makers. The implication is, of
course, that whether a president is an opened or closed decision maker will play a large
part in his arrangement of staff and chosen organizational model. Further, by linking the
two groups of decision-making styles with their chosen organizational model, historians
and political scientists are able to determine what presidential administrations have
fallen victim to either of two decision-making pitfalls in international crises – excessive
conformity (groupthink) and diminished cohesion (deadlock).24
Influences
While the role of the chosen system and particular learning style of a president play
are significant factors in decision-making, history has shown scholars that even in the
best of circumstances, the line between success and failure in times of international
crises is extremely fine. In How President’s Test Reality, by John P. Burke and Fred I
Greenstein, the authors identify the factors that they feel are decisive in predicting
outcomes:
-The President‟s Advisory System. Comprised of members of the institutional
bureaucracy, as well as advisors and confidantes the he chooses to consult. The
personal properties of these individuals – the president‟s principal associates –
can be as significant as the properties of the president himself. While intelligent,
24
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from their Advisors?, pp. 17-18 (for more
information refer to Chapter 2 - “Who Learns and When”).
19
experienced, politically sophisticated and congenial do not guarantee desirable
policy outcomes, when used in combination with good processes, they drastically
reduce the likelihood of fiascoes.
-The Personal Properties of the President. The most important of these
properties are the personality, leadership style and belief system of the president.
In terms of psychological character, the majority of president‟s have been
motivated by emotional, cognitive and social needs, as well as an overriding
sense of duty.
-The President‟s Environment. The efforts to shape policy are fostered or
inhibited not only by the personal strengths and weaknesses of the president and
his advisory group, but also by forces external to the president. The prime
environmental forces that inhibit or enhance the influence of president‟s and their
associates are interest groups, public opinion and the leaders and significant
actors in allied, neutral and enemy nations.25
Taking the observation and assessments of Burke and Greenstein a step further,
David J. Rothkopf in Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security
Council and the Architects of American Power, states that there are five main factors
which shape how the United States foreign policy apparatus works (listed in descending
order of importance):
25
This paragraph is drawn from John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein’s How President’s Test Reality: Decisions on
Vietnam, 1954 & 1968, pp. 5-9.
20
-Personality and “Sociology” of the Administration. This factor begins and
emanates with the president, but is strongly influenced by the community of
decision-makers with which he surrounds himself, most notably his “inner circle.”
-Domestic Political Context. Policy is best enacted from a position of power, and
every key decision in the history of the United States foreign policy apparatus
has been shaped in important ways by domestic political considerations.
-International Context. Despite the unchallenged supremacy of the United States
militarily and economically, America is nothing more than the leading member of
the international community. Understanding this international dynamic is
essential to understanding options, actions and consequences.
-Ideology and/or Governing Philosophy. The ideologies of key players and their
political factions, and the underlying governing philosophies of individuals,
groups and their eras are because they constrain or inform behavior in subtle
and powerful ways.
-Structure and Process. The decision as to who is on a particular committee,
what committee makes what decision, who makes recommendations and who
implements policy has a profound impact on events.26
National Security
As popular as the term “national security” has become in recent years, there is no
widely accepted definition as to what the phrase encompasses. In The NSC Staff:
26
This paragraph is drawn from David J. Rothkopf’s Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security
Council and the Architects of American Power, pp. 15-16.
21
Counseling the Council, by Christopher C. Shoemaker, states that the definition is of
great importance because it is difficult for people to agree on who should manage
national security if they cannot unanimously agree on a characterization.27
In the 1940s, national security was seen primarily as protection from external
invasion, an attitude driven primarily by World War II. As a result, the original concept
had a strong military component, with the charter for the NSC “enabling the military
services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving the national security.” However, over the years the
military dimension of national security has declined, with the domination of the military in
policy formulation and decision-making coming to an end during the Kennedy
administration.28
Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, national security has come to be seen as an
overarching interdisciplinary, dynamic paradigm embracing the elements and
responsibilities of numerous government departments, with the White House emerging
as the focus for the national security system. To that end, Shoemaker defines national
security as “the protection of the United States from major threats to its territorial,
political or economic well-being.”29
Protecting the United States from these threats were the objectives of President
Nixon, President Carter and President Reagan during each of their presidencies.
Employing the NSC as the case study, the paper will determine whether mechanisms or
27
Shoemaker, Christopher C. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, pp. 3-6 (for more information refer to Chapter
1 - “The Rise of the NSC”).
28
29
Ibid.
Ibid.
22
individuals have been the most effective, ineffective and/or influential in the presidential
decision-making process during international crises. In the coming chapters, the
development and implementation of foreign policy in each administration, as well as the
president‟s use of the NSC created to assist in course of action development and
ultimate decisions, will be examined. Starting off with an overview of the NSC itself in
Chapter Two, the Nixon administration during Vietnam will be assessed in Chapter
Three, the Carter administration during the Iran-Hostage crisis will be assessed in
Chapter Four, and the Reagan administration during the Iran-Contra scandal will be
assessed in Chapter Five. Finally, a cross analysis of each administration will be
conducted in Chapter Six, searching for commonalities that led to ultimate decisions, as
well as individual peculiarities that played a role in the outcome of the crisis.
23
Chapter Two
History of the National Security Council
The National Security Council was established as part of the National Security Act of
1947. The function of the NSC is to advise the President with respect to the integration
of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable
the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to
cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. 30 In other words,
the objective of the NSC was the streamlining of interagency operations through
improved communication and coordination among government agencies and the
military.
Although the United States had been on the winning side two world wars during the
first half of the twentieth century, it was apparent to military leaders and government
officials that unity of effort had been lacking in policy development. Recognizing that
they had emerged victorious often in spite of themselves, these individuals began the
process of establishing a system which would provide a more formally structured
process for the consideration of foreign and military policies.31 Following the death of
President Roosevelt in 1945, Vice President Harry S. Truman assumed the presidency
and became one of the leading advocates for a new coordinating body, which would
become a realization just two years later.
President Truman‟s interest in the establishment of a new coordinating body had
been influenced by his experience working at the Potsdam Conference with the State –
30
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnston, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, p. 24.
Ibid, p.2.
31
24
War – Navy Coordinating Committee in 1945. He had been impressed with the
cooperation between the (American) State, Army and Navy Departments, where
“through a coordinating committee they had worked out a way of tackling common
practices without the usual jurisdictional conflicts.”32 In support of this effort, Truman
was assisted by Secretary of the Navy James F. Forrestal, who would be instrumental
in developing an organization that would allow the Army and Navy to coexist with
civilian agencies, without usurping either branches‟ influence or authority.33
Wary of a proposal that could potentially unify the Army and Navy into a combined
Department of Defense, where the Army would dominate policy development at the
expense of the Navy autonomy and independence, Forrestal suggested the creation of
a high - level planning and coordination agency as a substitute for the consolidation of
the War and Navy departments. Backed by Navy supporters in Congress, Forrestal
won approval for a study prepared by his close friend and associate, Ferdinand
Eberstadt – the report was completed three months later. Stating that the unification of
the Army and Navy would not improve national security, the Eberstadt Report
concluded that “in order to afford a permanent vehicle for maintaining active, close and
continuous between the departments and agencies of the government concerning
foreign and military policies and implementation, the creation of a National Security
Council is recommended.”34
32
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The inside Story of the national Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 52-56.
33
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnston, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, pp. 2-4 (for more
information refer to Chapter 1 - “Origins”).
34
Shoemaker, Christopher C. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, pp. 8-10 (for more information refer to
Chapter 1 - “The Rise of the NSC”).
25
Much to the chagrin of Forrestal, the eventual National Security Act did in fact unify
the Army and Navy with the creation of the Department of Defense – although in the
final format, the Army and Navy would have equal standing and representation on the
council. However, the Eberstadt Report was an essential component of the final draft of
the bill sent to Congress. In addition to establishing the eventual name of the body, the
report also recommended the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the
founding of a Central Intelligence Agency, which would become subordinate and
responsible to the NSC.35
Signed into law by President Truman on July 26, 1947, the National Security Act
represented a compromise between most of the key players involved in the
negotiations. The president himself was forced to give ground during negotiations, as
he was unsure of the role the Commander in Chief should play in the council. Favoring
a panel that would advise him on the integration of foreign and military policies, he was
strongly opposed to the creation of a formal entity that would undercut his authority as
president – concerns similar to those of Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. Initially
recommending that the council exclude the president as one of its members in order to
avoid the trap of establishing a council that could not be refused by the president
because he had been part of the decision-making process, Truman later reconsidered
and approved the inclusion of the president on the council as its chair – however, he
35
Shoemaker, Christopher C. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, pp. 8-10 (for more information refer to
Chapter 1 - “The Rise of the NSC”).
26
made it clear that the role of the council was to advise the president and not to make
policy.36
While the National Security Act was a significant accomplishment in support of the
stated objective of improving communication and coordination, the absence of one
important government body played a surprisingly small role in the development and
negotiation process: the State Department. Unfortunately, this lack of involvement has
appeared to manifest itself in the continual friction between the State Department and
other (if not all) government agencies in the time since.37
Implementation
In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC is composed of the
following members:
-The President;
-The Vice President;
-The Secretary of State;
-The Secretary of Defense;
- The Secretaries and Undersecretaries of other executive departments and of
the military departments; when appointed by the President by and with the
consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.38
36
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnson, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, p. 3 (for more
information refer to Chapter 1 - “Origins”).
37
Prados, John. Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush, pp. 29-32 (for
more information refer to Chapter 1 – “Creation of the National Security Council”).
38
“The National Security Act of 1947.” Available online at http://www.iwar.org.uk/sigint/resources/nationalsecurity-act/1947-act.htm.
27
Additionally, the 1947 Act states that “the council shall have a staff to be headed by
a civilian secretary who shall be appointed by the president” - this individual is the
National Security Advisor. As the NSC has evolved, the National Security Advisor has
become an increasingly important individual, and its members include a “who‟s who” of
Washington D.C. politics: Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert McFarlane,
John Poindexter, Brent Scowcroft and Colin Powell to name a few. Accompanying the
NSCs growth in status has been a growth in support mechanisms, and the NSC staff
maintains a membership of approximately 200 personnel – varying slightly from
administration to administration (see Figure I/Page 31). Considering the reasons for its
creation, the impressive language of the act and the rise in profile of the council and its
advisors, it is revealing to see the manner in which it has traditionally been managed
and utilized by president‟s.39
Created to serve him, each individual president has tremendous latitude to shape
both the institution of the NSC and its formal and informal mechanisms. In this respect,
the NSC is built differently than other parts of the United States government, in which
the Constitution provides for institutional structures to be more important than the
influence of any one person. Informal meetings between lower ranking members of
department staffs are far more common than formal meetings involving actual
department heads. In general, NSC meetings can be categorized in the following
manner:
39
Office of the Historian: U.S. Department of State, “History of the National Security Council,” August 1997.
Available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html.
28
-Principles Committee: Meetings of the sitting members of the council (cabinet
members and sometimes without the Vice President).
-Deputies Committee: Meetings of sub-cabinet members designed to prepare
policy choices for the principals.40
Beyond these meetings are the activities of the NSC staff, which although initially
envisioned as a tiny advisory team, have morphed into a government force with more
personnel than some cabinet level agencies and are more powerful than many major
bureaucracies. Finally, there are the “ad hoc” national security mechanisms in the
White House, the inner circles around the president, many with no formal standing other
than the favor of the Commander in Chief, who are often the last and most influential to
speak with him before he makes a decision. It is precisely this reality that is the
inspiration for this paper: to determine the extent to which three modern President‟s
have relied upon personalities as opposed to processes in the development and
implementation of policy in international crises.41
40
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 6-9 (for more information refer to Chapter 1 - “The Committee That Runs the World”).
41
Ibid.
29
30
Chapter Three
President Richard M. Nixon & the Vietnam War
Elected president in November of 1968, Richard M. Nixon was one of the most
controversial and polarizing figures in American history. His political career was a
series of highs and lows that ended with the Watergate scandal in August of 1974.
Extremely unpopular at the time of his resignation, his legacy was initially one of deceit,
corruption and failure. However, as time has passed, Nixon has become an
increasingly sympathetic figure for many Americans. While the stain of Watergate will
remain forever, it no longer completely obscures the accomplishments of a president
who successfully navigated the United States through one of its most turbulent periods
during the Cold War.
On the surface, there was perhaps no man better prepared for the presidency than
Nixon. A naval officer and veteran of World War II, he pursued a career in politics
immediately following the war. First elected as a United States Congressman1946, and
four years later as a United States Senator, the Californian ascended rapidly within the
ranks of the Republican Party, and in 1952 was chosen by Dwight D. Eisenhower to
serve as his running mate in the presidential election. The Eisenhower-Nixon ticket
easily won the election, as well as their reelection bid in 1956, and Nixon was the
obvious presidential choice of the party in 1960.
In one of the most controversial elections of all time, Nixon was narrowly defeated by
the Democratic Party‟s nominee for president, John F. Kennedy, and after a stunning
defeat in his run for Governor of the State of California in 1962, Nixon‟s political career
was presumed to be over. Moving to New York where he practiced law and lived in
31
political exile for two years, Nixon eventually regained his taste for politics, and by 1966
he began actively campaigning for Republican congressional candidates.42
Reenergized and encouraged by the support he received from the within the party,
Nixon was once again the Republican Party‟s nominee for president in 1968. This time,
he defeated the Democratic Party‟s nominee for president, Hubert H. Humphrey, and
became the 37th President of the United States.43
This chapter will examine the decision-making process of the Nixon administration
during the Vietnam War. Reviewing the management system employed by Nixon, the
political climate at the time of the crisis, and finally, the unique leadership style of the
president, the following pages will assess the administration‟s foreign policy apparatus.
The role of the NSA for Nixon‟s first term in office and architect of the eventual peace
accords will receive special attention, as Henry Kissinger had unprecedented influence
in Nixon‟s NSC, and established the “operational” role that has characterized – for
better and for worse – the NSC for many of his successors.
Policy Making in Nixon Administration
Nixon assumed the presidency during a time of extreme civil unrest in the United
States. The sitting president, Lyndon B. Johnson, was not seeking reelection, as his
unpopularity resulting primarily from American participation in Vietnam had eroded both
his public support and personal desire to campaign for another term in office. During
the presidential campaign, Nixon garnered much of his support from those who
resented the social upheaval perpetuated by the war. In fact, he had campaigned on a
platform which promised to end the war, stating that he had a “secret plan” which would
42
43
Drew, Elizabeth. Richard M. Nixon (New York, New York: Times Books, 2007), p. 18.
Ibid.
32
ensure an “honorable” cessation of hostilities. Winning election due in large part to the
faith the American people had placed in his ability to just this, Nixon was forced to
deliver on this critical campaign promise. Although it took over four years to complete
the withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam, the unpopular war came to an end
with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January of 1973.44
In contrast to his predecessor, Nixon was both interested and confident in his ability
to plan, develop and implement foreign policy. Nixon felt that the inability of the
Johnson administration to effectively deal with the war in Vietnam was due to their
failure to understand the North Vietnamese. Johnson felt that the way out of the war
was through compromise and moderation, a strategy which Nixon believed encouraged
resistance from Hanoi.45 In his estimation, one of the contributing factors to this
ineffective policy was a flawed decision-making process which failed to properly utilize
the NSC. During the campaign, Nixon had highlighted this fact and pledged to restore
the NSC to its prominent role in national security planning.46
After his election, Nixon quickly moved the NSC to the forefront of policy making,
and appointed Henry Kissinger as his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.47
Nixon desired a return to the role the NSC played during the Eisenhower administration,
where it was a centralized organization that met regularly and emphasized formality and
process – concepts undervalued in the Kennedy and Johnson presidential
administrations. Seeking to correct these and other perceived weaknesses in decisionmaking and policy development, he directed Kissinger to dramatically restructure the
44
Drew, Elizabeth. Richard M. Nixon, pp. 19-20 (for more information refer to Chapter 2: “The Rise and Fall and
Rise of Richard Nixon”).
45
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 661.
46
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnson, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, p. 67.
47
Henderson, Philip G. Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan, p. 134.
33
NSC system.48 Using the Eisenhower NSC as the model, the 130 member staff
became the largest in the history of the organization (see Figure II/Page 38), and
quickly achieved “top-dog” in the administration.49
While in theory, this revamped NSC was a return to the formal system employed by
Eisenhower, it quickly became apparent that personalities would play a large role in
policy-making during the Nixon administration. One of the unstated purposes of the
new NSC system was to centralize control over foreign policy-making, as Nixon had
very little confidence in certain departments within the government.50 As the size and
influence of the NSC grew to unprecedented levels, the roles of agencies such as the
CIA, Department of Defense and State Department were greatly reduced.51 In fact, this
was the desired intent of both Nixon and Kissinger in their development of the staff.
Nixon felt that the most important qualities of key staffers were intelligence, fortitude and
most importantly, loyalty.52
A career politician, Nixon brought the scars accumulated over 20 years of public
service with him to the White House, and was distrustful of outsiders. In particular, he
had very little confidence in the State Department, whose personnel had no loyalty to
him, and disdained the Foreign Service, who had ignored him the moment he lost the
1960 presidential election.53 In order to insulate himself from officials who he deemed
either unwilling or unable to assist in foreign policy development, Nixon appointed
trustworthy but ill-equipped department heads, or isolated outsiders by circumventing
48
Henderson, Philip G. Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan, p. 135.
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnson, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, p. 68.
50
Ibid.
51
Drew, Elizabeth. Richard M. Nixon, p. 63.
52
Nixon, Richard M. In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat and Renewal (New York, New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1990), p. 270.
53
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnson, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, p. 68.
49
34
established processes. His Secretary of State, William Rogers, was an affable but
unassertive former law partner who was cut out of foreign policy decisions, while his
Defense Secretary, Melvin Laird, was marginalized when Kissinger established a direct
line of communication from his office to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.54 Determined to run
foreign policy from the White House, Nixon and Kissinger proved largely successful in
the achievement of their objective.
Returning it to a status it enjoyed during the Eisenhower administration, the NSC
became the hub of all foreign policy implementation in the Nixon White House. It also
created the concept of the modern NSA, as aside from the president, Kissinger became
the most influential member of the administration. However, one of the consequences
of this consolidation of power between Nixon and Kissinger was the return of a
presidential decision-making process which considered increasingly limited external
perspectives. While resembling the structure and intending to prescribe to principles
fostered during the Eisenhower administration, in practice, the NSC under Nixon was
similar to that of Kennedy and Johnson.55
Over time, Nixon‟s NSC system became increasingly informal, as crucial issues were
maneuvered to committees chaired by Kissinger. Further, the frequency of full NSC
meetings diminished from thirty-seven in 1969, to twenty-one in 1970, and finally, to a
mere ten meetings in the first nine months of 1971. Circumventing processes and
marginalizing key figures outside of the NSC, Nixon made it more and more difficult for
dissenting views to get through to the White House. Although this was Nixon‟s desired
54
Drew, Elizabeth. Richard M. Nixon, p.63.
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, p. 137 (for more information refer to Chapter 6 - “America in Decline, the NSC Ascendant”).
55
35
end-state, the arrangement would be put to the test in priority number one for his
administration: ending the war in Vietnam. 56
56
Henderson, Philip G. Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan, pp. 134-39
(for more information refer to Chapter 6 - “The Deinstitutionalization of the Eisenhower NSC System”).
36
37
International Crisis: The Vietnam War
There is a saying in politics that a new presidential administration begins work on
their reelection campaign on the day of their inauguration. Narrowly winning the 1968
presidential election, Nixon realized that he had been “hired” by the American people to
accomplish what his predecessor could not: end the war. Out of public office for the
better part of eight years, he had watched from afar as Kennedy and Johnson steadily
increased the American footprint in Vietnam. Assessing their plans and decisionmaking process as flawed at best, and incompetent at worst, Nixon would call for a
drastic overhaul in the way operations were conducted at both strategic and operational
levels.
In the years following World War II, American foreign policy centered upon what was
known as “containment.” In their ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, the United
States proved willing to provide economic, political, and when necessary, military
assistance to nations opposed to communism. Proxy wars between the United States
and Soviet Union were fought throughout the Cold War, with each trying to expand its
sphere of influence throughout the world. During this time, the “Domino Theory”
became central to the principle of containment, as the prevailing view within the
presidential administrations as far back as Harry S. Truman was that if communism was
allowed to establish a foothold in just one nation, it would only be a matter of time
before it spread to neighboring countries.57
The domino theory had become conventional wisdom and was rarely challenged
during the 1950s and 1960s by foreign policy-makers. Along these lines, the United
57
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy, p. 625 (for more information refer to Chapter 25 - “ Vietnam: Entry into the
Morass; Truman and Eisenhower”).
38
States viewed Vietnam with increasing concern throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In
response to increased Soviet and Chinese support to North Vietnam, the United States
began to heighten its support to the South Vietnamese government. Beginning with the
introduction of military advisors, continuing with the deployment of non-combat support
personnel, and further escalating in 1965 with the deployment and direct participation of
ground forces in kinetic operations, Vietnam had become a slippery slope for the United
States and its leaders. Mounting death tolls began to wear on the American public, as
its citizens began to question the premise of the war and the manner in which it was
being conducted. Appearing to have neither a strategy for victory, nor a policy for
withdrawal, Johnson soon found himself fighting a war on two fronts: one at home and
one abroad. Following the Tet Offensive one month earlier, television anchorman
Walter Cronkite proclaimed the war lost in February of 1968. One month later, Johnson
would announce he would neither seek nor accept his party‟s nomination for reelection
in the fall.58
Nixon at War
Achieving an “honorable” end to the Vietnam War was the Nixon administration‟s
stated objective upon taking office in January of 1969, but the manner in which it would
be achieved proved complicated. One of Nixon‟s primary considerations were the
political implications of the way the war would end, as he questioned the merits of a
speedy withdrawal that would likely result in the fall of the South Vietnamese
government to communism.59 While it could be argued that a military victory was still
possible, that would require the renewal of bombing campaigns previously suspended
58
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy, p. 641 (for more information refer to Chapter 25 - “Vietnam: Entry into the Morass;
Truman and Eisenhower”).
59
Small, Melvin. The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999), p. 67.
39
by Johnson and an escalation of ground operations – this course of action was sure to
elicit outrage from the American public and media.60 The other option was the
continuation of the diplomatic effort between Washington D.C. and Hanoi - which Nixon
viewed as a mere continuation of the fruitless negotiations which had frustrated
Johnson and led to the current state of affairs. The new president sought original
thinking that would alter the course of the war and ensure its end.
One of Nixon‟s main criticisms of the Johnson administration in their attempts to end
the war was what he viewed as the timid nature of their military campaign. He felt their
graduated escalation strategy, designed to reduce North Vietnamese aggression
without excessive application of force, had been interpreted by Hanoi as inhibition rather
than resolve. Nixon believed could bring them to the negotiating table via brute force
and intimidation, that Johnson had not been tough enough, and that he could scare the
Communists into believing that he would exert enough force to compel an acceptable
end to the war for the United States. Ultimately, this “madman approach” was ruled out
due to the domestic opposition it would receive and the adverse effects it would have on
Nixon‟s prospects for a second term. This left Nixon in a quandary, as hesitant to
escalate the war, unwilling to “cut and run” and growing increasingly frustrated by the
unwavering political and military resolve of his adversary, he soon found himself fighting
the same two-front war that had plagued his predecessor and would threaten his own
presidency.61
The North Vietnamese proved to be a far more formidable foe than Nixon had initially
imagined. While the Nixon administration had developed a five-point strategy to win the
60
Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London, England: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978), p. 347.
Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger (New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), pp. 106-07 (for more
information refer to Chapter 5 - “Hope and Illusion”).
61
40
war – or more precisely, to end the war and win the peace – both Washington D.C. and
Hanoi realized that the strategy would need time to take hold. If the war heated up,
American casualty rates, and in turn, domestic pressure to get out of Vietnam would
increase dramatically. Sensing this reality, Hanoi wasted no time in testing the patience
of the American public and the resolve of the new president, when in February of 1969
North Vietnamese troops launched a new offensive into South Vietnam. The assault
occurred while Nixon was preparing for negotiations in Paris and preparing a new peace
initiative, and resulted in the death of 1,140 American‟s in three weeks. Enraged, and
barely a month into a term of office in which he promised the American public an
honorable end to the war, Nixon decided to show the North Vietnamese that they could
not push him around.62
The Ho Chi Minh Trail spanned several hundred miles and was the main supply
route for the movement of North Vietnamese supplies to its forces in South Vietnam.
Part of the trail snaked through Cambodia, a country considered neutral in the war, and
while the United States respected its non-combatant status, the North Vietnamese not
only used it as a supply channel, but also staged military operation against the United
States from within its borders. American military war planners had long desired a
campaign aimed at disrupting this vital enemy logistics line, and armed with further
knowledge that the most recent offensive in South Vietnam originated in Cambodia,
Nixon decided to approve covert military action in the region. However, while he
obtained the informal approval of Cambodian leader Prince Norodum Sihanouk, to carry
62
Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams (New York, New York: Arbor House, 1985), p. 104-07 (for more information
refer to Chapter 4 – “How We Won the War”).
41
out the proposed operation, he made it clear to the Americans that if they made the
bombing public, he would disavow it.63
This was in fact welcome news to Nixon, who felt that public knowledge of the
proposed bombings would weaken public support for his emerging Vietnam policy. 64
Nixon‟s decision to conduct the operation covertly was one of the first issues which
divided his NSC, as both Rogers and Laird worried about the possible repercussions if
Americans learned about the bombings.65 However, Nixon viewed Cambodia as the
perfect place to weaken the Communists and to demonstrate to them that he could
secretly escalate the war without suffering domestic political damage.66 Operation Menu
began in March 1969 and continued through April 1970 with Operations Breakfast,
Lunch, Dinner and Snack, resulting in the delivery of 108,823 tons of bombs by 3,875
sorties.67 As Johnson before him had learned, bombings brought Hanoi to the
negotiating table, and while Nixon continued to apply pressure on the military front, his
administration maintained a diplomatic dialogue.
Although the bombings, and eventual introduction of American ground troops into
Cambodia weakened Hanoi from a military perspective, they continued to possess and
exploit their most significant advantage of the war: time. Having waited hundreds of
years for their liberation from China, followed by decades of French rule, the North
Vietnamese were more than willing to engage in a test of wills. Hanoi considered
compromise the equivalent of surrender and understood that they held a clear edge in
63
Small, Melvin. The Presidency of Richard Nixon, p. 71 (for more information refer to Chapter 3 - “Ending
America’s Longest War”).
64
Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1988), p.127.
65
Small, Melvin. The Presidency of Richard Nixon, p. 71.
66
Ibid.
67
Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon’s Vietnam War, p. 131-37.
42
the guerilla war. Holding out and not surrendering was interpreted as success, and they
were certain that their breaking point was greater than that of the United States.68
Given time, they were confident they would prevail, and by 1972, time was exactly what
Nixon was running out of as the presidential election cycle loomed.
Hoping to shore up support for his policies, Nixon launched a propaganda blitz in
January of 1972. Coinciding with the announcement that he had approved the
withdrawal of an additional 70,000 troops - bringing the troop levels down to 69,000 by
May 1, 1972 – Nixon made public the previously undisclosed fact that since 1969
Kissinger had been engaged in secret negotiations with Hanoi on at least 12 occasions.
Anxious to show tangible progress in the war before the Democratic Party‟s national
convention later that summer, Nixon then directed Kissinger to return to Paris and
“settle or else.”69
However, while attempting to win favor with American public, the administration was
unintentionally creating dissent within the military and a worsening situation on the
ground. The troop withdrawals were the product of a military strategy referred to as
“Vietnamization” - the handover of responsibility for military operations by American
forces to their South Vietnamese counterparts. The good news concerning
“Vietnamization” was that it reduced American troop levels, while the bad news was that
it significantly decreased the amount of battle tested veterans remaining in theatre - at
the direction of the administration, seasoned soldiers and marines were being sent
home and replaced with raw recruits.70
68
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy, p. 671.
Small, Melvin. The Presidency of Richard Nixon, p. 88 (for more information refer to Chapter 3: “Ending
America’s Longest War”).
70
Ibid.
69
43
This inexperience, coupled with a much smaller overall presence, allowed the North
Vietnamese greater freedom of maneuver and combat effectiveness. The withdrawal of
American troops encouraged the execution of a long planned spring offensive by
Communist forces deep into South Vietnam in late March of 1972, as they overpowered
the well-equipped but poorly trained and motivated South Vietnamese forces.
Assessing that Hanoi had committed all of their major resources in the offensive, and
that he was dealing with a “very major crisis” of “do-or-die” proportions, Nixon decided
to commit all of his military assets (short of introducing more troops) and approved
Operation Linebacker - the first continuous bombing of North Vietnam since 1968.71
On May 8, 1972 Nixon announced the operation to the public and proclaimed that, in
addition to the air campaign, North Vietnam‟s ports would be mined. The military
objectives of the strikes were to, first, destroy war material already in North Vietnam,
second, to the extent possible prevent the flow of war material already in North Vietnam,
and third, interdict the flow of troops and materials from the North into combat areas. 72
Simply put, the goal of the Operation Linebacker was to compel Hanoi to cease its
offensive through destruction of North Vietnam‟s war assets and delivery system.73
The decision was a calculated risk on two fronts, as it not only enflamed the anti-war
protesters within the United States, but also jeopardized the administrations standing
within the international community. Nixon and Kissinger had just recently opened a new
diplomatic relationship with China, and the administration‟s first ever Soviet-American
summit was only two weeks away. However, to Nixon it was a risk worth taking, as he
71
Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon’s Vietnam War, p. 304 (for more information refer to Chapter 12 - “Fighting, Then
Talking: 1972”).
72
Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York, New York: Free
Press, 1989), p. 216.
73
Pape, Robert A., Jr. “Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War” (International Security-Fall 1990), p. 134.
44
felt confident that the goodwill from the American-Chinese meeting two months earlier
would withstand, and that in large part due to the new and improved American-Chinese
relationship, the Soviets would feel compelled to improve their relationship with the
United States. Nixon proved correct on both accounts, and the bombings, followed by
the summit, enabled the administration to leverage Hanoi in a manner not previously
possible. Fearing abandonment by one or both of their fellow communist governments,
the North Vietnamese would be forced back to the negotiating table.74
Operation Linebacker was carried out between May 10, 1972 and October 22, 1972,
with a total of 9,315 sorties flown in 141 air missions that delivered 2,346 strikes, in
which 17,876 bombs were dropped totaling approximately 150,000 tons. The operation
inflicted severe damage to the North Vietnamese rail and road network, truck and power
facilities, and petroleum-oil-lubricant system, while the simultaneous mining operation
effectively closed its ports to oceanic shipping. The operation set the conditions for
renewed talks between the two governments in late October of 1972, but a peace
agreement was still months away.75
Facing increased pressure from the Soviet Union and China to end the war,
sustaining staggering amounts of damage to their infrastructure and ability to sustain
the war effort, and finally, concluding that Nixon would likely be reelected the following
month, Hanoi began to compromise during negotiations. However, the process bogged
down after the South Vietnamese government objected to the proposed terms of the
settlement, and what was previously seen as a breakthrough in negotiations soon
regressed into an all familiar stalemate. Talks went on for another two months, until
74
Nixon, No More Vietnams, pp. 145-47 (for more information refer to Chapter 4 - “How We Won the War”).
Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon’s Vietnam War, p. 324 (for more information refer to Chapter 12 – Fighting, The Talking:
1972”).
75
45
December 12, 1972, when Kissinger formally broke off the talks due to what he
considered excessive stalling by Hanoi.76 Agreeing with Kissinger‟s assessment, Nixon
made the decision to resume full-scale bombing of North Vietnam, determining that
anything less would only make the enemy contemptuous.77
Operation Linebacker II began on December 14, 1972 and included B-52 strikes on
military targets in Hanoi and the reseeding of mines in Haiphong Harbor. Nixon stated
that the order to renew the bombing was the most difficult decision he ever made during
the war, but that it was also one of the most clear-cut and necessary ones.78 Intending
to bomb the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table, B-52s dropped over
36,000 tons of bombs over the course of 12 days – more tonnage than had been
dropped on the country during the entire 1969-71 period.79
The damage came at a price, as the North Vietnamese shot down at least fifteenB52s - up to that point in time they had only brought down one – and killed 120
Americans. In spite of these American losses, the bombing continued and the once
formidable North Vietnamese air defense system was eventually destroyed, enabling
the American pilots to bomb North Vietnam with relative impunity after December 26,
1972.80
In the face of the continued onslaught, Hanoi quickly agreed to the United States first
offer to resume peace talks, and on January 8, 1973, North Vietnam agreed to the
Americans basic terms within 48 hours. On January 27, 1973, the Paris Peace accords
were signed by representatives of each country, bringing the Vietnam War to an official
76
Small, Melvin. The Presidency of Richard Nixon, pp. 90-91.
Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 733.
78
Ibid, p. 734.
79
Small, Melvin. The Presidency of Richard Nixon, pp. 91-92.
80
Ibid, p. 92 (for more information refer to Chapter 3 – “Ending America’s Longest War”).
77
46
end. While Nixon achieved his personal objective of bringing the war to an “honorable”
conclusion, the human cost of the war proved to be extraordinary, as the United States
lost more than 58,000 military service members - 18,000 of those losses came during
Nixon first term in office.81
Analysis of Nixon’s Decision-Making Process
Serving as vice president in the Eisenhower administration, Nixon had observed firsthand the benefits of a deliberate decision-making process. Nixon had played a key role
in the formal and hierarchical structure that emphasized the centralization of power.
Attending and sometimes chairing NSC meetings, he was also keenly aware of the
many influences and pressures placed upon a president in matters of national security,
as rival agencies compete for the president‟s approval in the implementation of policy
which would benefit their individual organizations. In order to counter this bureaucratic
reality, Nixon relied upon a trusted circle of loyal advisors to limit his exposure to much
of this infighting, but in the process limited he denied himself access to the expertise
and valuable points of view of outsiders. Coming to office with the preconception that
intimidation and the employment of brute force would enable him to bring the war to an
“honorable” end in Vietnam, Nixon rarely considered, and as the years went on, rarely
granted access to those who maintained different beliefs.
Undoubtedly, Kissinger was the most influential individual within the Nixon White
House. The two had been thrown together during the 1968 republican presidential
campaign, when Nixon had chosen him to serve as his foreign policy aide in the run-up
81
Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams, p. 158 (for more information refer to Chapter 4: “How We Won the War”).
47
to the election.82 That Nixon reached out to Kissinger is surprising, as the two had
actually been political adversaries throughout the1950s and 1960s, and as such,
Kissinger would have seemed to reside outside Nixon‟s circle of trust. However, despite
his association with the more moderate wing of the Republican Party and his service as
an informal advisor to both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Kissinger was
considered to be one of the country‟s most thoughtful foreign policy critics and was
Nixon‟s first choice to serve as his NSA.83
More important, from Nixon‟s perspective, was the fact that the two men shared the
same view on the war in Vietnam. As part of his advisory role within the Johnson
administration, Kissinger had made several trips Vietnam and had become convinced
that the war was being conducted in an in an inappropriate manner. In fact, he shared
Nixon‟s opinion that the government had to put all of its military, political and economic
effort into “creating a situation favorable to negotiation” in order to ensure the credibility
of the United States was maintained.84 In the face of mounting political pressure to
withdraw American troops from Vietnam, Nixon‟s selection of Kissinger provided him a
respected and experienced foreign policy advisor who would enhance Nixon‟s own
credibility in prosecuting the war. In exchange, Kissinger would maintain a status never
again seen in the NSC, as he became the most powerful NSA in the history of the
organization, and commanded a spotlight that frequently surpassed Nixon‟s. In the
process, the two men would dominate foreign policy development and micromanage the
conduct of the war.
82
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, p. 114.
83
Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger, pp. 53-4.
84
Ibid, p. 58.
48
The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense are traditionally the most influential
members of the NSC, particularly in times of war. Given the unrest and division within
the United States concerning the Vietnam War at the time of his assumption to office,
and in light of the fact that his election was in large part a mandate for him to bring the
war to quick end, one would assume that each of these cabinet members would play a
large role in the development of policy in the Nixon administration. For that reason, it is
surprising that both Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird played exceptionally small roles in the Nixon NSC. Although the president had
known each man for many years, he was not entirely sure they were properly equipped
to execute their duties and responsibilities.85
Laird came from the congressional elite and Nixon felt he would be capable of doing
the kind of downfield blocking on Capitol Hill that would ensure healthy defense
appropriations and a free hand in Vietnam.86 Rogers, on the other hand, was one of
Nixon‟s law firm partners in New York who had been hand-picked as a result of his
extremely limited experience in foreign affairs, with Nixon telling Kissinger that “Roger‟s
unfamiliarity with the subject would be an asset because it would guarantee that policy
direction would remain in the White House.”87 The calculated selection of both men
enhanced the president‟s ability to promote his personal agenda and paved the way for
the creation of a closed decision- making process which circumvented outside agencies
and was dominated by the president and his NSA.
The national security apparatus designed by Kissinger was quickly put to the test
following the first crisis of the Nixon administration: the North Vietnamese offensive in
85
Ehrlichman, John. Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 88.
Ibid, p. 94.
87
Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger, p. 83.
86
49
February of 1969. The invasion of the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam had
provided Nixon his first opportunity to examine his theory that “American toughness”
would bring Hanoi to the negotiating table. While supported by Kissinger, Nixon‟s
inclination to escalate the war and begin bombing North Vietnam was opposed by many
NSC staffers, as well as Rogers and Laird.88 Nonetheless, the dissenting voices were
overruled, and the bombings commenced. In this instance, Kissinger and Nixon had
subverted the core principles of the formalistic system by undermining the authority and
credibility of top advisors, choosing to go-it-alone in pursuit of their personal beliefs and
establishing a dangerous precedent.
The following month, facing the decision of whether to introduce ground forces into
Cambodia, another NSC meeting was held, with Kissinger and Nixon once again the
lone voices supporting further escalation – initially opposed to the action, Kissinger
displayed his personal loyalty and support the president in the meeting. This time the
breakdown in the system and disregard for alternate points of view resulted in the
resignation of several NSC staffers. The decision to invade Cambodia was a watershed
moment in the war for the Nixon administration, as the president‟s inner circle and
advisory council on foreign affairs became smaller and smaller, until Kissinger stood
alone.89
Beginning in the spring of 1969, Nixon‟s relationship with both Laird and Rogers
weakened. Nixon began to view them, as well as others in the administration, as
untrustworthy and less than loyal. Laird proved to be particularly bothersome, as he
88
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, p. 140-44.
89
Ibid, pp. 144-46.
50
proved to be a “dove” that was unwilling to aggressively engage the North Vietnamese
with decisive military action. He soon became a direct adversary of Kissinger‟s in the
war effort, and Nixon frequently considered replacing him as the Secretary of Defense.
However, he was still of value to Nixon, as his popularity and ability to rally support in
Congress made him an irreplaceable member of the administration. Rogers,
meanwhile, was viewed by Kissinger as a threat to his status in the international
community, and their relationship was even worse than Kissinger‟s and Laird‟s. Nixon
was never a fan of the State Department, and Rogers was guilty by association with an
organization the president viewed as “soft” and disloyal.90
By the fall of 1970, it was clear to all within the White House that Rogers and Laird
sat outside of the president‟s circle of trust, as Kissinger began to deal directly with
State and Defense Department subordinates in order to keep both men uninformed and
unable to interfere with White House policy development. Their decision to respond to
the North Vietnamese assault into South Vietnam in March of 1972 with Operation
Linebacker I and II was the culmination of three years of frustration in dealing with
Hanoi. Facing the prospect of becoming the “first president to lose a war” as well as
uncertain prospects in the fall presidential election, the decision to bomb Hanoi and
mine the Haiphong harbor was essentially a unilateral decision made by Nixon. It would
also serve to distinguish himself from his predecessors, who he felt were unwilling to
decisively engage the North Vietnamese for fear of intervention by the Soviet Union or
China, and thus, validate his standing as Commander-in-Chief. Demanding a response
from the NSC that was strong, threatening and effective, Nixon personally directed the
90
Ehrlichman, John. Witness to Power: The Nixon Years, p. 297 (for more information refer to Chapter 16 – “Nixon,
Kissinger and Foreign Affairs”).
51
final course of action which brought an “honorable” end to the war.91 The decision was
the final abuse of the hierarchical decision-making model that had become standard in
his first term as president.
Conclusion
Adherence to formalistic system requires the delegation of authority to top advisors
and the funneling of information through organized information channels. However, one
of the potential pitfalls resulting from this hierarchical model is the screening of advice
which may distort the actual information the president receives. In dealing with the
Vietnam War, Nixon disregarded the key principles of his chosen system, yet still fell
victim to its inherent weaknesses. This was the result of his distrust of government
bureaucracies and his reliance on his “loyal” inner circle. Nixon‟s management
practices – his emphasis on formalism, his propensity to decide in private and his lowtolerance for conflict and face-to-face discussion – led to increasing centralization of
power in the White House. This centralization gradually turned onto isolation, where in
spite of his initial desire to rely on members of his cabinet, he soon grew tired of
“freethinking outsiders” and relied on his trusted circle of “political brokers” – of its
original members, only Kissinger survived and prospered in this system, as he was able
to skillfully blend the roles of power broker and original thinker, and in the process
develop a close personal relationship with the president.92
As a result of his chosen system, Nixon marshaled internal acceptance of
controversial policies and allowed power to become too concentrated, discounting the
91
Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, pp. 734-35.
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Organizing the White House from FDR to Clinton, p. 98 (for more
information refer to Chapter 4 - “Through an Organizational Lens”).
92
52
external “reality checks” which would have been provided by “disloyal” outsiders.
However, although an a president so given to isolation should have guarded against
choosing a system that permitted him to become remote from the people and forces
that a president must be in continuous contact with to govern effectively, it was the right
system for him: he could not have governed effectively with an open system. 93
Although it is clear that it was his intent to circumvent aspects of the formalistic of
presidential management prior to his assumption of office, Nixon‟s desire to
micromanage decision-making and policy implementation increased throughout the war.
His primal distrust of outsiders grew with repeated “leaks” that he determined originated
from within the NSC – in particular, Rogers and Laird. This distrust caused an already
obsessively suspicious individual to further withdraw from his top advisors. Fearing his
orders and decisions would be disregarded, he consistently turned to the most trusted
and loyal of his NSC: Kissinger.
His reliance upon Kissinger ensured that the course of action he felt certain would
end the war would be carried out. To Nixon, the Paris Peace Accords were the result of
his initial assessment four years earlier that Hanoi could be intimidated and brought to
the negotiating table through brute force – a concept previous administration‟s lacked
the will to implement. Although controversial, his decision to escalate the war brought
about its “honorable” end, an objective which had eluded both Kennedy and Johnson.
93
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from their Advisors?, pp. 159-163 (for more
information refer to Chapter 7 - “Conclusion”).
53
Chapter Four
President James E. Carter and the Iran-Hostage Crisis
James Earl Carter Jr. assumed the presidency of the United States in one of the
darker periods of American politics. The 1960s and early part of the 1970s had seen
the war in Vietnam tear the country apart and consume both the domestic and foreign
agenda of President Johnson and President Nixon. While Nixon was able to bring the
war to an end in 1973 with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, the triumph proved
to be fleeting. Forced to resign the presidency in 1974 as a result of the Watergate
break-in and cover-up engineered by members of his administration, Nixon left his
successor the unenviable task of picking up the pieces and restoring public confidence
in government. The challenge proved too much for President Gerald R. Ford, as the full
pardon he issued his predecessor within days of his assumption of power enraged the
American public and sealed his fate in the presidential election of 1976. It was under
these circumstances that one of the most unlikely of candidates - Jimmy Carter - came
to become the thirty-ninth president of the United States.
This chapter will review the individuals, personalities and decision-making dynamic
within the Carter administration. Focusing primarily on the Iran-Hostage crisis, the
following discussion will assess the effectiveness of the presidential management
system employed by Carter, determine if the principles of the model were generally
adhered to, and if the chosen system complemented his particular leadership style.
Special focus will also be placed on the NSC by reviewing the role and influence of keyplayers within the administration, and the effect each had on the eventual outcome in
the crisis.
54
Road to the Presidency
More than anything, the election of President Carter in 1976 was a rebuke by the
citizens of the United States of the Republican Party and Richard Nixon. In spite of the
scandals and controversies associated with Nixon and Ford, as well as a deteriorating
domestic economy, President Carter was elected by a very thin margin and came to
office well-short of a strong public mandate.94 Much of his appeal was due to his
standing as a “Washington-outsider” who stood in stark contrast to the corruption and
backhanded dealings that had become synonymous with the American government by
the mid-1970s. Indeed, Carter could rightfully campaign as the candidate of change, as
his experience rested predominantly at the local and state level.
Prior to his election to the presidency on 1976, Carter had served as the Governor of
Georgia for one term, preceded by two-terms of service in the Georgia State Senate.
Considered an extreme long-shot at the outset of the presidential campaign, Carter won
over voters with his southern-charm and easygoing demeanor. In choosing Minnesota
Senator Walter Mondale as his running mate, he seemed to acknowledge his lack of
experience in big government, and more importantly, balanced the Democratic ticket.
However, throughout the state primaries and into the national election, one of the
biggest concerns for voters was Carter‟s lack of foreign policy experience. Therefore,
choosing an experienced cabinet and foreign policy team was viewed by most pundits
as critical to the success of the president in the international arena. It was in this
context that President Carter selected the two individuals who would prove to be the
94
Wilson, Robert A. Character Above All (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 188.
55
most influential administration foreign policy members - National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.95
Policy Making in the Carter Administration
One of Carter‟s first objectives upon winning election was to avoid what assessed as
the excessive centralization of power and secrecy that dominated the White House
under Richard Nixon.96 A cerebral leader, Carter believed in building winning-teams
and encouraged consensus, but at the same time emphasized that ultimate decisionmaking authority rested with him. Carter was a hands-on president who immersed
himself in detail, and not surprisingly, selected the collegial advisory system of
presidential management. Hoping to avoid an administration that was strongly based in
the White House staff, Carter preferred a more decentralized arrangement that reached
beyond staff members for counsel, as he felt that cabinet officers and departments
should play a vital role in formulating presidential policies.97
Along these lines, and in his first day in office, Carter issued Presidential
Directive/NCS-2, which incorporated these management principles into a restructured
NCS system which placed more authority in departments and agencies while ensuring
that the NSC integrated and facilitated foreign and defense policy decisions.98 The
president‟s point man in this transformation would be Brzezinski, who Carter charged
with reducing the size of the NSC staff in order to emphasize cabinet-level involvement
in decision-making processes.99 The restructuring proved to be a success in the early
95
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 165-72 (for more information refer to Chapter 7 – “A Superpower in Search of itself”).
96
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnson, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, p. 71.
97
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, pp. 117-19.
98
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnson, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, p. 71.
99
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, pp. 123-24.
56
years of the administration, as although Carter dominated the team around him as he
conducted state affairs, its members were not relegated to the kind of secondary roles
on foreign policy that had become the standard under Kissinger in the Nixon
administration.100
One of the most important components of the NSC overhaul directed by Carter was
the creation of the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination
Committee (SCC) – see Figure III/Page 61. These organizations, which were
subordinate to the NSC, replaced the numerous committees established under previous
administrations and were intended to create a more streamlined structure within the
national security system. The PRC consisted of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
State, the Director of the CIA and chairman of the JCS - as well as other required
cabinet members - with a primary task of coordinating policy issues where basic
responsibilities fell within one department, but where the subject also had important
implications for other departments and agencies. The SCC maintained the same
membership as that of the PRC, but had a primary task of dealing with specific crosscutting issues requiring coordination in the development of options and the
implementation of presidential decisions. While well intentioned and fairly successful in
formulating policy in the early years of the Carter administration, this arrangement would
ultimately lead to the “turf wars” that it sought to avoid.101
One of President Carter‟s objectives in the formulation of his cabinet and staff was to
emplace individuals within the administration who had dissimilar backgrounds and
100
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, p. 169.
101
Shoemaker, Christopher C. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, p. 51 (for more information refer to Chapter 3
- “The NSC Structure”).
57
would provide opposing points of view in decision-making processes. It is therefore, not
surprising that he selected Vance as his Secretary of State, as Carter felt that he would
be an effective counterbalance to Brzezinski. Possessing an extensive background in
both military and foreign affairs, Vance was a true “Washington-insider” who had been
viewed as the front-runner for the Secretary of State position in a democratic
presidential administration regardless of who won the election. He had served as
Secretary of the Army under President Kennedy and was the Deputy Secretary of
Defense under President Johnson, earning a reputation as a “troubleshooter” for each
man. Carter had been impressed with Vance‟s quiet, but sound and pragmatic
approach to international relations in discussions he had with him during the 1976
presidential campaign, and in the process forged a personal friendship which sealed his
selection for the position.102
Brzezinski, on the other hand, was the anti-Vance and one of the more controversial
members of the Carter administration. Originally from Poland and an expert on the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Brzezinski was a college professor who Carter had
first met in 1973 while both men were attending conferences on foreign affairs. The two
had formed a friendship over the years, with Brzezinski serving as a volunteer and
unofficial counselor to Carter on foreign affairs during the 1976 presidential campaign.
Struck by his broad base of knowledge, astute analysis of historical trends, and belief in
strong defense and humanitarian principles, the president-elect had made Brzezinski
his national security lead during his transition. Although Carter was wary of his
reputation for aggressiveness and ambition, and was concerned that he might not be
102
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, New York: Bantam Book, 1982), pp. 50-51 (for
more information refer to Chapter 2 - “Lining Up My Team”).
58
adequately deferential to Vance, he ultimately appointed Brzezinski as his NSA - the
deciding factor in his selection was Carter‟s desire to have final foreign policy decisions
made in the White House and not in the State Department.103
In making the safe decision to select Vance as his Secretary of State and the risky
decision to appoint Brzezinski as his NSA, Carter‟s initial reservations would come to
fruition in the latter portion of his presidency, as the combination of the two corrupted
the decision-making process and destroyed cohesion within the administration. In the
end, as much as he tried to establish a NSC that differed in organization and
methodology from Nixon, one of the ironies of the Carter NSC is that it came to mirror
that of his predecessor in both policy and practice. In spite of his desire to maintain a
collegial system of presidential management, Carter and his system would ultimately
gravitate towards centralized control, with Brzezinski amazingly playing and even more
visible and prominent role than Kissinger.104 This reality would have catastrophic
effects in the Iran-Hostage crisis which would cripple the administration‟s foreign policy
apparatus and ruin Carter‟s bid for reelection in 1980.
103
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, pp. 51-53 (for more information refer to Chapter 2“Lining Up My Team”).
104
Shoemaker, Christopher C. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, p. 50.
59
60
Unrest in the Middle East
In the 1970s, Iran was perhaps the most important American ally in the Middle East.
Its leader, the Shah of Iran (Mohammed Riza Pahlvali), had ruled the country for over
25 years and maintained friendly relations with the United States throughout this period
of time. Iran was strategically important to the United States, as it not only provided oil
to the industrial west, but also separated the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf, and as
a result, the American government had an enormous stake in keeping the nation stable
and independent.105
In spite of the heavy-handed and controversial methods used by the Shah to sustain
his power base over the years - usually centering on human rights violations - American
government‟s overlooked the democratic shortfalls of the Shah‟s regime in order to
preserve the special relationship between the two nations and maintain the balance of
power in the region. However, by 1978, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the
Shah was losing the support of his people, and that his regime was on the verge of
collapse. Iran was in the midst of a revolution, and the stability of the region was being
threatened by a seventy-nine year old religious fanatic - the Ayatollah Khomeini.106
Sensing that his regime would be unable to hold onto power in the face of the growing
opposition, the Shah fled Iran in January of 1979.107
The drastic turn of events threatened the balance of power and American policy of
containment in the Middle East, and was particularly troublesome to Carter. While
understanding the need to continue the existing American relationship with Iran from a
105
Jordan, Hamilton, Crisis (New York, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1982), p. 27.
Ibid, pp. 27-28.
107
Morris, Kenneth E. American Moralist (Athens, Georgia: The University Of Georgia Press, 1996), p. 276.
106
61
political perspective, the lack of a true democratic process in the country had always
disturbed Carter. In fact, on a tour of the Middle East in December of 1977 in which
Carter publically praised the Shah‟s country as an island of stability in one of the more
troubled areas of the world, he went on in private to encourage improved emphasis on
human rights. Sensing the growing dissent within his country, and perhaps in an
attempt to leverage future American support in his attempt to maintain power in the face
of growing opposition, the Shah loosened previous government restraints. During 1978,
the Shah took the unprecedented step of granting amnesty to hundreds of radical
Islamists - including Khomeini – and began to terminate relations with Israel. However,
the effort proved to be too little too late, as instead of restoring order and harmony in the
country, it only aroused further dissatisfaction and unrest.108
Seizing upon the new liberties granted by the Shah, Muslim fundamentalists and leftwing militants tore the nation apart and created a power vacuum that would soon be
filled by Khomeini and his followers.109 Worse yet, the overthrow of the Iranian
government caught the Carter administration by surprise, as American intelligence
agencies failed to warn the president of the strength of the internal opposition to the
Shah.110 As a result, they were less than completely prepared to deal with the fallout,
and their handling of a key issue in the weeks and months following the takeover would
not only expose deepening divisions within NSC, but plant the seeds for the premiere
crisis of the Carter administration.
108
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, pp. 437-38 (for more information refer to Chapter 6-“Iran
and the Last Year”).
109
Lasky, Victor. Jimmy Carter: The Man & The Myth. (New York, New York: Richard Marek Publishers, 1979), p.
380.
110
Ibid, p. 382.
62
Status of the Shah
One of the central questions for President Carter and his advisors was the security
and well-being of American embassy personnel and their family members in Tehran. In
the immediate aftermath of the Shah‟s exit from power, Carter had decided to offer a
safe-haven for the leader who had consistently supported the United States in Middle
Eastern affairs. Despite this offer, the Shah had instead gone to Egypt, and then later,
to Morocco. By the time the Shah inquired in earnest about relocating to the United
States the following month, State Department officials had determined that granting him
asylum would pose a risk to American personnel in Tehran, with a hostage-type
situation being a real possibility.111 Therefore, with great reluctance, Carter made the
decision to revoke the original offer.
The decision to sever ties with the Shah was a difficult one for Carter, and was far
from unanimous amongst members of his inner-circle. Amongst his closest advisors,
Brzezinski argued forcefully for allowing the Shah to come to the United States,
believing that doing otherwise would be seen as a sign of weakness internationally. 112
Vance, meanwhile, opposed granting the Shah asylum, feeling that as long as he could
live safely and comfortably elsewhere, it made no sense to bring him to the United
States and destroy any chance at rebuilding a relationship with Iran.113 In the end and
in what would occur less and less in the months that would follow, Carter ultimately
sided with Vance. Central to his decision was his concern over the safety of the
111
Kreisberg, Paul H. American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 1985), pp. 58-59 (for more information refer to Part Two/Chapter 1 - “The Crisis Begins”).
112
Jordan, Hamilton. Crisis, p. 29.
113
Ibid.
63
remaining diplomats in Tehran, as well as improved diplomatic relations with the
emerging Khomeini government in the months since the takeover.114
The decision to deny the Shah amnesty in the United States was the safe course of
action, and reflected the deliberate decision-making process favored by Vance.
However, the dynamic of the situation would soon change, and Carter would face
increasing pressure to reassess the issue. Although Brzezinski accepted the
president‟s judgment regarding the matter, it did not dissuade him from frequently
revisiting the subject, and in the fall of 1978, a turn of events provided him an
opportunity to present Carter with the same argument, under a different pretext.
Learning that the Shah had developed a medical condition that could best be treated
in the United States, Brzezinski once again brought the subject up for review. 115
Reassessing the situation under these new circumstances, Carter dispatched the State
Department Medical Director to Mexico - where the Shah was staying at the time – to
examine the vanquished Iranian leader.116 The doctor confirmed the gravity of the
situation, and upon his return, recommended the Shah‟s evacuation to Cornell
University Medical Center in New York for treatment.117 As a result, on October 20,
1978 the president appealed to his conscience and made the formal decision at Camp
David to accept the Shah into the United States.118
114
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, pp. 446-54.
Prados, John. Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush, p. 442.
116
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, pp. 454.
117
Ibid.
118
Morris, Kenneth E. American Moralist, p. 276.
115
64
The Iran-Hostage Crisis
Upon learning of the American decision to accept the Shah into its country, the
Iranian government began a series of protests in Tehran, followed by an ominous radio
speech by Khomeini on November 1, 1978.119 Three days later, a mob of Iranian
students clambered over the gates of the United States Embassy in Tehran, beginning
the most devastating diplomatic incident in United States history.120 The crisis would
last until January 20, 1981 - 444 days - and would be highlighted by dissention within
the Carter NSC which resulted in failed diplomatic negotiations and an attempted
military rescue operation that would cost six American lives.
Convening within moments of the seizure of the hostages, the NSC weighed the
consequences of a myriad of diplomatic and military responses, and by November 6,
1978 had developed a number of guidelines which would serve as the basis for United
States policy throughout the crisis:
-The United States would attempt to increase the cost to Iran of its illegal actions,
until the costs outweighed whatever benefits it might hope to achieve.
-Peaceful means would be explored and exhausted before resort to violence.
-The United States would retaliate militarily if the hostages were put on trial or
physically harmed.
-The United States government would make no threats it was unable or unwilling
to carry out.
119
Prados, John. Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush, p. 442.
Sick, Gary. October Surprise: American Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan. (New York, New
York: Times Books, 1981), p. 15.
120
65
-No military action would be taken that was not reversible (Carter was
determined to avoid a situation where a limited military action would trap the
United States in an open-ended cycle leading to land combat in Iran).
These guidelines were never codified and were never intended as a declaratory
policy. Rather, they were articulated by the president as objectives and policy
boundaries for his advisors in developing United States strategy.121
In the beginning of the crisis there was clearly a desire on the part of the president to
resolve the crisis through non-forceful means, with an emphasis on negotiation and
diplomacy. This point of view was shared by Vance, as both men were encouraged by
the fact that new Iranian government, although strongly influenced by Khomeini, had
proven fairly moderate in their early months in power. Brzezinski, however, saw it
differently, as his hawkish views and concern with American prestige and honor led him
to conclude that military action was necessary.
As early as November 9, 1979, the NSA advised Carter of the dangers of letting the
situation settle into a state of “normalcy.” Fearing an eventual stand-off could paralyze
Carter‟s presidency, Brzezinski went further in arguing that it was the president‟s greater
responsibility to protect the dignity of the country and its foreign policy interests - at
some point in time this responsibility would become more important than the safety of
the American diplomats held hostage. Rejecting this mindset, Vance pointed out that
the crisis at that point in time was only in its fifth day and that the volatile and chaotic
situation in Tehran warranted a cautious approach. In the opinion of the Secretary of
121
Kreisberg, Paul H. American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, pp. 144-47 (for more information refer to
Chapter 3 - “Military Options and Constraints”).
66
State, the president would ultimately be judged by his restraint in the face of
provocation, and on the safe return of the hostages.122
While initially favoring the approach of Vance, Carter would find it increasingly
difficult to maintain the negotiating process through diplomatic channels. Although the
Iranian‟s had established three main conditions for the release of the hostages - the
return of the Shah‟s wealth, an American pledge against interference in Iran‟s internal
affairs, and an international forum in which Iran could air its grievances against the
Shah and the United States - they proved particularly difficult to deal with
diplomatically.123 Despite the best efforts of Vance, to include the addition of United
Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in direct negotiations, the revolutionary
mindset of Iranian officials was not conducive to compromise, as tentative agreements
would be reached, only to be followed by new and unacceptable conditions from the
Iranians.124 By the end of the month, it was apparent that Khomeini had no intention of
releasing the hostages.125
As time went on and the negotiating process stalled, the Carter administration
increasingly began to feel the mounting pressure of the American public and media.
Major media outlets increasingly devoted the majority of their news coverage to the
crisis, beginning as early as the first week of the stand-off, and the growing frustration of
American citizens began to affect Carter‟s popularity ratings in the face of a presidential
122
Jordan, Hamilton. Crisis, pp. 44-46 (for more information refer to “November 9, 1979”).
McFadden, Robert D., Treaster, Joseph B. and Carroll, Maurice. No Hiding Place: Inside Report on the Hostage
Crisis (New York, New York: Times Books, 1981), p. 194.
124
Kreisberg, Paul H. American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, pp. 3/49-52.
125
McFadden, Robert D., Treaster, Joseph B. and Carroll, Maurice. No Hiding Place: Inside Report on the Hostage
Crisis, pp. 194-95.
123
67
election less than a year away.126 Indeed, it appeared that Brzezinski‟s assessment of
the situation in the early days of the crisis had been accurate, and by the spring of 1980
Carter began to lean heavily toward a military driven resolution.
Rescue Attempt
Determining that continued attempts at negotiation and a peaceful resolution to the
crisis would be fruitless, on March 22, 1980, Carter chaired a NSC meeting in which
military leaders provided their plans for a rescue mission.127 Following the brief, Carter
gave the go-ahead for continued planning, later breaking diplomatic relations with Iran
on April 7, 1980.128 Two day later, Brzezinski stated in an official memorandum to the
president that “our policy of restraint has won us a well-deserved understanding
throughout the world, but it has run out, and the time to act is now.”129 Agreeing with his
NSAs assessment, on April 11, 1980, Carter convened a final NSC meeting – one not
attended by Vance - which concluded with the final go-ahead for the rescue
operation.130
Upon his return to Washington D.C. the next day, Vance made a final plea to the
president to reconsider his decision, warning him that the probability of success was low
and that the operation could result in a military confrontation with not only Iran, but
potentially, the Soviet Union.131 However, the die had been cast, and despite the fact
that Vance had told Carter he would resign if the rescue plan was carried out, Operation
126
Turner, Stansfield. Terrorism & Democracy (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), p. 83.
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, pp. 506-07.
128
McFadden, Robert D., Treaster, Joseph B. and Carroll, Maurice. No Hiding Place: Inside Report on the Hostage
Crisis, p. 89.
129
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 205-06.
130
Ibid.
131
McFadden, Robert D., Treaster, Joseph B. and Carroll, Maurice. No Hiding Place: Inside Report on the Hostage
Crisis, p. 90.
127
68
Eagle Claw was executed on April 24, 1980. A combination of bad weather, bad luck
and inadequate materiel preparations aborted the raid at a desert staging base
hundreds of miles from Tehran,132 but the real tragedy of the operation was the death of
six-American Special Operations Force service members when their helicopter collided
with a refueling plane in mid-flight.133 That morning, in what he calls one of the worst of
his life, President Carter informed the American public of the disaster, and officially
severed ties with Vance.
Analysis of Carter’s Decision-Making Process
The failed rescue attempt dealt a death-blow to whatever chances the Carter
administration had at negotiating the release of the fifty-two hostages held captive by
the Islamic fundamentalists in Iran, and in the process ensured the president‟s defeat in
the presidential election to be held six months later. It also exposed the immense divide
that had developed between Carter‟s chief foreign policy advisors - Vance and
Brzezinski. The Iran-Hostage crisis illustrated the ideological and philosophical
differences of two men who were the products of disparate backgrounds and
experiences, and proved too much for Carter to manage during the stand-off. Given his
limited background and understanding of foreign policy, the president selected
individuals and processes that he felt would provide him the best available information,
opinion and advice. This approach to leadership had served Carter well during his time
as a military officer, educator and state official, but fell victim to Washington D.C.
132
Prados, John. Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush, p. 442.
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 206-07.
133
69
bureaucracy, where inter-agency rivalries fueled by strong-willed personalities corrupted
Carter‟s chosen management style.
In selecting the collegial system as his model for presidential management, Carter
aimed to create an environment where advisors would have relatively unfettered access
to him at all times. Opting for this “spokes of a wheel approach” with the president
serving as the hub, Carter wanted direct contact with his primary advisors, and allowed
an additional two-dozen assistants and aides access to him through memorandums Carter even went as far as to serve as his own Chief of Staff for his first two years in
office in order to encourage uninterrupted information flow.134 However, there appears
to be another reason why Carter chose this model and adopted this personal approach,
as it also satisfied his affinity for detail and his tendency to micro-manage.135 These
qualities are generally counterproductive to decision-making at any level of operation,
and proved to be very damaging to a Carter NSC during the Iran-Hostage Crisis, as his
objective of maintaining a decentralized organizational model gave way to centralization
and reliance on one individual.
In choosing Brzezinski and Vance as his NSA and Secretary of State, Carter felt that
the different strengths each possessed would match the roles they played and foster a
natural competition between the organizations which promoted informed decisionmaking.136 In the early years of the administration, Carter‟s notion proved to be correct,
as both men worked relatively well together, highlighted by their roles in the brokering of
134
Henderson, Philip G. Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan, p. 34.
Morris, Kenneth E. American Moralist, pp. 108-13.
136
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, p. 54.
135
70
the Camp David Peace Accords in 1979137 - the crowning achievement for Carter in
foreign policy. Unfortunately, this willingness to work together and achieve compromise
would prove to be the exception rather than the rule in future endeavors, and was
visible to all in the Iran-Hostage Crisis.
Although Carter‟s intent was for the NSC to play a complimentary role to the State
Department - with Brzezinski being the “thinker” and Vance being the “doer” - their roles
and boundaries soon became blurred.138 While Carter genuinely intended to have
Vance take the lead and be the face of the administration while conducting foreign
affairs, the president eventually became disappointed in the lack of innovative ideas and
results from Vance and his staff in modifying existing policy in order to meet changing
conditions.139 This exact sort of thinking and approach was what Carter saw on a daily
basis with Brzezinski and his staff, as they proved to be particularly adept at incisive
analysis of strategic concepts and were prolific in the production of new ideas.140
Whether unintentionally or unknowingly, Carter‟s assessment of each man and
organization led to increased dependence by Carter on his NSA and staff, and resulted
in Brzezinski going “operational” in foreign policy affairs – the first of which was the
president‟s decision to dispatch Brzezinski rather than Vance in sealing negotiations
with China on the administration‟s normalization policy.141
137
Wilson, Robert A. Character Above All, pp. 193-96.
Jordan, Hamilton. Crisis, pp. 46-7.
139
This observation is drawn from Jimmy Carter’s “Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President”, p.53; and Christopher
C. Shoemaker’s “The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council,” p. 41.
140
Ibid.
141
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 189-93.
138
71
The consequence of Brzezinski‟s increased role in foreign policy development and
decision-making was predictable, as a rivalry developed between the two men which
resulted in a “turf war” that, instead of promoting the competition Carter sought, created
division within his administration and personal animosity between his chief foreign policy
advisors. In essence, Carter created a situation similar to that of Nixon and Kissinger,
where the NSA overshadowed all other members of the NSC. The difference in the
Carter administration was that Vance was much more aggressive than Rogers in his
opposition to the NSA, forcing the president to play “referee” between the two and
creating a morale problem in the White House.142 This lack of cohesion played a large
role in the stagnation and indecision that dominated the administration‟s decisionmaking process during the Iran-Hostage Crisis, as Brzezinski and Vance continually
pushed for opposing courses of action, rarely compromised and directly contributed to
the indecisiveness that plagued Carter.143 Indeed, a strong argument can be made that
it was not a coincidence that the April 11, 1980 NSC meeting in which the final decision
was made to conduct the rescue operation occurred when Vance was not present, in
order to avoid deadlock and ensure consensus among the attending principles.
Conclusion
One of the central components to the collegial system is teamwork, as staffs are
expected to work out problems, generate solutions, and fuse the strongest elements of
opposing points of view, thereby reserving the only the most important of decisions for
presidential attention.144 In the Carter administration, this was rarely the case, as the
142
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, p. 135-36.
Turner, Stansfield. Terrorism & Democracy, pp. 58-9.
144
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, pp. 56/117-18.
143
72
combination of two strong-willed and dissimilar individuals crippled the decision-making
process. Although Carter recognized the potential for this to occur when selecting his
NSA and Secretary of State, he severely underestimated the personalities involved and
the levels of destruction they would cause in the administration. Further, his inability to
resolve the differences between the two men resulted in an NSC which produced
fragmented policy proposals and left decision-making processes in disarray, both of
which were apparent in the Iran-Hostage Crisis.145
One of the byproducts of the collegial system is informality and lack of structure, as
what a president gains in access to his advisors, he sacrifices in routine. The system
places a heavy burden on a president‟s time and requires mediation skills that Carter
was unable to provide.146 Similar to previous presidents who employed the collegial
system, Carter relied upon informal meetings with groups of his closest advisors to
develop policy and finalize decisions. This aversion to hierarchy and formalization was
reflected in his initial decision to serve as his own chief of staff, resulting in an advisory
system that that lacked procedures of governance adequate to the tasks it was charged
performing.147 The weaknesses of the Carter presidential management model were
seen during the Iran-Hostage Crisis, where a system of checks and balances reinforced
by defined roles and boundaries for advisors could have minimized dissention and
encouraged the teamwork the president sought.
Plunging into the presidency with no experience and foreign affairs, Carter relied
almost exclusively on Brzezinski and Vance in the formulation of foreign policy, and the
145
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnson, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, p. 74.
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, p. 119.
147
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors?, p. 158.
146
73
inability of the two men to achieve consensus led to an administration that often said
one thing and did the other.148 Perhaps the most pronounced shortfall of the Carter
NSC was the rise in importance of Brzezinski. This is particularly surprising, given that
one of the stated aims of the president was to return the NSA to its traditional role of
laying out policies recommended by departments and agencies – something which had
not occurred during the Nixon administration.149 Allowing Brzezinski to go “operational”
and increase his profile on the international stage not only marginalized Vance, but
turned the NSA into an advocate rather than arbiter.150
In the months leading up to the Iran-Hostage Crisis, Brzezinski routinely halted
initiatives and worked to hold open options in hopes that Carter would change his point
of view, thus, creating obstacles to coordination and undermining the efforts of
Vance.151 Sensing the desperation of the president in the face of growing public
discontent, emboldened by Vance‟s unproductive diplomatic efforts, and capitalizing on
his absence from Washington D.C., Brzezinski was able to finally persuade Carter to
approve military action in order to bring the hostages home and restore American
honor.152
The decision proved disastrous, as Vance‟s reservations about the viability of the
operation proved prescient. While it is unclear if the Secretary of State would have
been able to convince the president to hold off on the covert military action, it is clear
148
Salinger, Pierre. America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1981), pp. 32-4.
149
Turner, Stansfield. Terrorism & Democracy, p. 59.
150
Ibid.
151
Prados, John. Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush, p. 444.
152
Rothkopf, David. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, p. 206.
74
that course of action recommended by Brzezinski had the exact opposite effect it hoped
to achieve. Not until January 19, 1981 would the hostages be returned to the United
States, with both American prestige and the prospects for a second-term in office for
Carter lost in the interim.
75
Chapter Five
President Ronald W. Reagan & the Iran-Contra Affair
Seeking and failing to win the Republican presidential nomination in 1968 and 1976,
Ronald W. Reagan earned both his party‟s nomination and the national presidential
election in 1980. Similar to the manner in which President Carter came to office four
years earlier, Reagan‟s victory was a rejection of his predecessor and a signal that
American‟s desired a fresh approach to governance and leadership. While on the
surface the Iran-Hostage Crisis paled in comparison to the Vietnam War in a tangible
manner, the intangible effect it had on the American public was significant. The 1970s
had witnessed a dramatic decline in American prestige throughout the world, and the
perceived impotence of the American government at the hands of a third world country
was the straw that broke the voting public‟s back in 1980.
The fortieth president of the United States, Reagan ran on the traditional republican
platform of small government, low taxes and a restoration of American defense and
military capability. Largely successful in each of these endeavors, the American people
voiced their approval for Reagan by providing him a resounding victory over the
Democratic nominee for president - Senator Walter Mondale - in the 1984 national
election. Carrying 49 of 50 electoral states - the lone state Mondale won was his home
state of Minnesota - Reagan entered his second term with one of the strongest
mandates in the history of the presidency. However, the popularity of the president
would sustain a dramatic hit during Reagan‟s second term in office, as his
76
administration would find itself embroiled in a presidential scandal rivaled only by
Watergate.153
This chapter will examine the actions and involvement of President Reagan and his
small group of advisors during the Iran-Contra Affair. The personal management style
of the president will receive special focus and consideration, as the hands-off approach
favored by Reagan in governance is truly unique when compared to the other
president‟s of the twentieth-century. Finally, an assessment of the key players in
Reagan‟s NSC and White House staff will be conducted, with an objective of
determining the extent to which the president‟s leadership style encouraged - or merely
shielded - him from the covert operations and backroom dealings that dominated the
crisis.
The Reagan NSC
Similar to Nixon and Carter before him, Reagan had come to office in 1980
determined to differentiate himself from his predecessors. Assisting him in achieving
this goal were a small group of advisors that would come to be known as the “Troika” –
Chief of Staff James Baker, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver and White House
Counselor Edwin Meese. This group of individuals ran the White House for the first
term of the Reagan administration, as they controlled the president‟s schedule, set
cabinet and NSC meetings, and most importantly, controlled access to Reagan.
Indeed, with the exception of Nancy Reagan, the power and influence of the troika was
153
This paragraph is drawn from Robert A. Wilson’s Character Above All, pp. 213-14.
77
unrivaled within the administration, and the roles of other administration officials were
reduced to secondary status, particularly the NSA.154
In his campaign for the presidency in 1980, Carter‟s mishandling of national security
was a consistent theme for Reagan. Promising to restore leadership to United States
foreign policy by organizing it in a more coherent manner, Reagan quickly implemented
the campaign promise by directing a major restructuring of the NSC (see Figure
IV/Page 84). One of the casualties of the reorganization was the NSA, who in Reagan‟s
estimation had become too powerful during the Nixon and Carter administrations.
Stripping it of the cabinet-level rank it had previously enjoyed, the NSA under Reagan
was to serve as the point-man for interagency coordination and long range planning,
with no mandate to engage in policy advocacy or formulation as Kissinger and
Brzezinski had done. In fact, the NSA did not have direct access to Reagan, as he was
made subordinate to Meese and reported through the White House Counselor.155
Placing emphasis on cabinet-led government, Reagan gave his Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of State and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency the primary
responsibility for managing national security affairs. The responsibilities for each of
these administration officials were outlined in Reagan‟s National Security Decision
Directive Number 2/National Security Council Structure:
-The Secretary of State is my principal foreign policy advisor. As such he is
responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and for the execution of approved
policy.
154
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 213-15 (for more information refer to Chapter 8 - “Morning in America, Twilight at the NSC”).
155
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnson, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, pp. 74-75.
78
-The Secretary of Defense is my principal defense foreign policy advisor. As
such, he is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy, policy
related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the Department of Defense,
and for the execution of approved policy.
-The Director of Central Intelligence is my principal advisor on intelligence
matters. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of intelligence activities,
policy and proposals, as set forth in relevant executive orders.156
While this directive followed through on Reagan‟s campaign promise to downgrade
the position of the NSA, it also perpetuated rivalries between cabinet members that
were often counterproductive to the president‟s stated objective of establishing an
“administration that would speak with one voice.” This emasculation of the NSC was
magnified by the appointment of generally weak-minded NSAs that were unable to
control the feudal bickering between cabinet principals, as their non-forceful
personalities and reduced base of power in the administration rendered them obsolete.
In fact, the president and his top aides had such low regard for the position of NSA, they
paid little attention to who held the post. In the 38 years that the post of NSA was
created in 1953, ten people held the job, with each averaging nearly four years of duty.
During Reagan‟s two terms in office, there were six total NSAs: Richard Allen, William
Clark, Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter, Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell. This lack
of continuity and oversight – particularly from 1980 to 1986 – would result in NSAs left
156
National Security Decision Directive Number 2: National Security Council Structure (Washington D.C.: The White
House, 1982).
79
to their own devices, and in the years to come would nearly destroy the Reagan
presidency.157
Policy Making in the Reagan Administration
Employing a formalistic system of presidential management, Reagan believed in
centralized planning and decentralized execution. Issuing general guidance or
directives and then allowing his subordinates to execute their tasks, Reagan provided
administration officials large degrees of latitude in developing and formulating policy,
and his leadership style was the polar opposite of the micromanagement favored by
Carter and the paranoia that consumed Nixon. Displaying the utmost confidence in the
decision-making capabilities of his subordinates, Reagan described his approach in the
following manner: “The way I work is to identify the problem, find the right individuals to
do the job, and then let them go do it. I‟ve found it invariably brings out the best in
people.” 158
Painting in broad strokes and requiring his staff to handle the minutia, Reagan
entrusted the members of his inner-circle with the management of daily presidential
operations. In fact, in the Reagan staff system, there was relatively little direct
presidential involvement in decision-making processes, with most issues solved at the
lowest possible level(s). Reagan emphasized teamwork and sought consensus among
his subordinates,159 which was the president‟s expectation in exchange for the
considerable discretion he provided cabinet members and staff.160 One of the
byproducts of Reagan‟s disdain for friction in policy development was restricted access
157
Speakes, Larry. Speaking Out: Inside the Reagan White House (New York, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1988), pp. 264-65 (for more information refer to Chapter 16 - “Seeds of Catastrophe”).
158
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors?, p. 53 (for more
information refer to Chapter 3 - “Eisenhower and Reagan: Comparing Learning Styles”).
159
Burke, John P. The institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, p. 146.
160
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors?, p. 55.
80
to the president for “outsiders” who were not members of the president‟s inner circle,
resulting in the accumulation of power by those in closest proximity to the president.
As with most presidential administration‟s that earn a second term of office, there
was a reorganization of officials within the Reagan White House. When the dust settled
in early 1985, the troika that had dominated the first four years of the Reagan
presidency no longer existed. The most significant of the various changes to the
administration structure occurred between James Baker and Donald Regan, who
exchanged titles during the second term, with Regan becoming Chief of Staff and Baker
becoming Secretary of the Treasury. The Chief of Staff in any presidency derives his
power from presidential delegation, and Regan soon realized – and ensured – that he
would play the leading role in all aspects of governance during Reagan‟s second
term.161
Regan enthusiastically embraced his new job, as it brought him closer to the “real
power” in the executive branch. Overhauling the entire domestic, economic and foreign
policy apparatus created by the troika in Reagan‟s first term, Regan reduced the
number of cabinet councils as well as the number of assistants to the president in an
attempt to streamline Reagan‟s White House advisory system. The cumulative effect of
these changes was the diminishment of the president‟s already infrequent interaction
with advisors, and created a situation in the White House described by two journalistic
observers as “a two-level world where conflict went on at a layer the president never
saw.”162 This restructuring ensured Regan‟s domination of the president‟s inner circle
161
Mayer Jane and MacManus, Doyle. Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984-1988 (Boston,
Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), pp. 22-4 (for more information refer to Chapter 2 - “The NoHands Presidency”).
162
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors?, p. 137.
81
by controlling access to the president, and as was the case with many initiatives
throughout his presidency, done with Reagan‟s tacit approval.
Reagan‟s casual acceptance of the shake-up involving two of the most sensitive
positions in his administration, as well as the restructuring of the staff system by Regan,
was emblematic of the president‟s operating style. However, his preference for
delegation should not be confused with disinterest or total disengagement, as when
Reagan cared deeply about an issue he was outspoken and stubborn. Reagan‟s
ideological vision and deep concern for humanity resulted in strong - sometimes radical
- views that knew no limits. It was exactly this insistence on doing what is “right” that,
combined with his hands-off leadership style and delegation of responsibility, led to the
Iran-Contra Affair.163
163
Mayer, Jane and MacManus, Doyle. Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984-1988, pp. 24 (for more
information refer to Chapter 2 - “The No-Hands Presidency”).
82
83
Key Objectives and Players in Reagan’s Second Term
Halfway through his second term in office, Reagan‟ popularity among the American
public stood between 62 and 68%.164 His first term in office had seen him deliver on a
large number of campaign promises made in 1980, particularly on the domestic front.
At the time of his reelection in 1984, the Reagan administration had overseen programs
that cut inflation from 12% to 4%, reduced unemployment from 7.4% to 5.4%,
dramatically cut tax rates for individuals and businesses and lowered interest rates to
half of what they were at the end of the Carter administration.165 Reagan had also
delivered upon his campaign promise to restore military strength and honor
internationally, as he modernized his armed forces and aggressively pursued a
Strategic Defense Initiative that forced the Soviet Union to the negotiating table - and
would later result in the elimination of their intermediate range missile in Europe.166
The threat posed by the Soviet Union and communism in general had always been a
concern for Reagan, and he made that clear to his new Chief of Staff in January of
1985. Discussing his principal goals on the international front for his second term of
office, Regan was advised by the president that one of his primary objectives was to
continue their engagement of the Soviets concerning arms reduction, improve American
relations with their Latin neighbors while continuing to resist the Communist penetration
of Central America, and finally, to do the best they could to unsnarl the continuing mess
in the Middle East. Achieving the first objective of continued arms control negotiations
164
Edwards, George C. Presidential Approval: A Sourcebook (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press,
1990), pp. 153-56.
165
Wilson, Robert A. Character Above All, pp. 213-14.
166
Ibid, p. 216.
84
and reductions with the Soviets, despite their best efforts, the Reagan administration
would be far less successful in their pursuit of the final two objectives. 167
As the administration entered into its fifth year in office in January 1985, the key
members of the Reagan NSC were Secretary of State George Schultz, Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey - this was in accordance
with NSDD-2 that Reagan had signed in January of 1982. There were, however,
changes to the role of the NSA, as by the time Robert McFarlane became Reagan‟s
third NSA in 1983, the title now granted the individual direct access to the president and
the freedom to operate independent of the president‟s inner circle.168 The final key
member of the administration was Regan - the Chief of Staff - who controlled nearly
every aspect of the president‟s daily schedule in his attempt to centralize power in the
White House.
Similar to the presidential administrations of Nixon and Carter, the Reagan innercircle was plagued by turf wars and in-fighting among all of these men, with the rivalry
between Schultz and Weinberger especially ferocious - the two men were vociferous
and rarely in agreement on policy issues. In fact, it is one of the true ironies of the IranContra Affair that on the subject of selling arms for hostages, the two bitter rivals were
for once in complete agreement.
The Iran-Contra Affair
In Ronald Reagan‟s opinion, the Soviet Union had twice violated the Monroe
Doctrine of 1923, which stated that the United States would stand against interference
167
Reagan, Ronald. An American Life (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 488-89 (for more
information refer to Part V – “Iran-Contra”).
168
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 224-26.
85
by European nations in the affairs of the Americas. The first time was in 1959 with the
overthrow of the Cuban government by Fidel Castro, and the second time was with the
Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua in 1979. From Reagan‟s point of view, the Soviets
had gotten away with their covert actions scot-free, resulting in two principle
consequences for the United States. First, the Soviets possessed two satellite nations
within clear military striking distance of the United States, and second, each satellite
provided a potential staging area for terrorists planning to conduct operations in the
United States. In spite of his opposition to the presence of the Soviet satellites, Reagan
understood that dealing with the matter would be complicated, and as a result was
extremely discreet in developing a course of action to deal with the threat.169
Although by 1981 the Vietnam War had been over for seven years, the memory of
the controversial war was still fresh in the minds of the American people. Reagan
realized that the American public would turn on him if he immersed the country in
another conventional war and was unwilling to risk negative public opinion with a
potentially dismal outcome in Nicaragua. However, he also believed that most
Americans would support him if he openly backed surrogates or “freedom fighters” –
known in Nicaragua as the “Contras” - in their attempts to liberate their country.
Although his closest advisors were not as sanguine about the reaction of American
voters and the attitude of Congress to a potential entanglement in a Central American
nation, Reagan was certain of its virtue and decisive in directing action.170
Sensing that the poverty, social inequities and abuses of human rights made
Nicaragua and other Latin American countries ripe for revolution, in late 1981 Reagan
169
Reagan, Ronald. An American Life, pp. 471-74 (for more information refer to Part V - “Iran-Contra”).
Astor, Gerald. Presidents at War (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2006) pp. 201-206 (for more
information refer to Chapter 14 - “Beruit, Central America and Iran”).
170
86
directed CIA Director William Casey to initiate covet operations in the region. Later
determining that covert operations would not be enough in turning the tide in the region,
in early 1982 the Reagan administration launched the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which
provided direct aid and assistance to Central American nations. However, gains proved
to be minimal and by late 1982 congressional opposition began to develop against
American support of the Contras and other evolutionary groups in the region. Among
the most ardent of those opposing the initiative were Democratic Speaker of the House
Tip O‟Neill and his friend and fellow congressman from Massachusetts, Edward P.
Boland.171
O‟Neill and Boland began battling to limit virtually everything the Reagan
administration attempted to do in Central America, and eventually drummed up enough
support in Congress and among the American public to limit funds to the Contras in
1983 and 1984, with statutory provision - the Boland Amendment - cutting off all funds
by 1985.172 Although the president signed the amendment into law in October of 1984,
Casey ignored the ban and continued to assist the Contras covertly, capitalizing on
confusing language in the original amendment and directing further operations under
the guise of American intelligence operations.173 This continuation of support, however,
ended with the passing of Boland II one year later, which expressly prohibited any
government agency involved in “intelligence activities” in support of any “military or
paramilitary” operation in Nicaragua.174
171
Reagan, Ronald. An American Life, pp. 476-77 (for more information refer to Part V - “Iran-Contra”).
Brinkley, Joel. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (New York, New
York: Times Book, 1988), p. 12.
173
Astor, Gerald. Presidents at War, pp. 207.
174
Brinkley, Joel. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, pp. 12-13.
172
87
While Boland II should have signaled the end of administration support to the
Contra‟s, that proved to be far from the case. Instead, Boland II served as the trigger
which would see the NSC not only shape policy - as had occurred in the Nixon and
Carter administrations - but run covert operations. Finding a loophole in Boland I and II
upon which to establish the foundation for continued aid and assistance to the Contras,
White House aides determined that organizations affected by the statutes did not
specifically include a domestic office - the NSC. Armed with this controversial
interpretation, Casey recruited a small group of trusted members of the NSC staff to
serve as agents in the operation: Robert McFarlane (NSA), Vice Admiral John
Poindexter (Deputy NSA) and United States Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North (NSC Staffer).175
Between June of 1984 and January of 1986 the three men secretly raised over $34
million dollars for the Contras through donations from American-friendly countries as
well as private contributions. Although the CIA and other government agencies knew
that support to the Contras was a violation of Boland I and II, the NSC operation
received logistical and tactical support from personnel throughout the government. The
extent of the operation was so large that it ultimately began to draw attention from the
press, who claimed that members of the NSC staff were engaged in raising money and
furnishing military support to the Contras. These allegations were denied both in person
and writing by McFarlane, as well as Reagan, who assured the American public that his
administration was following the law.176
175
Astor, Gerald. Presidents at War, pp. 207-09 (for more information refer to Chapter 15 - “Iran-Contra”).
Brinkley, Joel. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. p. 12 (for more
information refer to Part I - “Executive Summary”).
176
88
Until the fall of 1985, North had been used chiefly by McFarlane as the “principal
action officer for holding the Contras together “body and soul.” Working endless hours,
attending numerous meetings and looking after the needs of the Contra leaders, North
proved to be the driving force behind the operation. However, McFarland began to feel
as though North was too invested in the operation. Stating that he wanted to spend
more time with his family, McFarlane resigned as the NSA in December of 1985, and
suggested that he and North work together outside of the government. Nothing came of
this proposal, however, and North would take on an even larger role in the operation
serving McFarlane‟s successor, Poindexter.177
Under Poindexter, the nature of the operation changed drastically, further corrupting
what had previously been a dangerous malfunction of the NSC. Poindexter‟s style of
was one of extreme secrecy, as he deliberately changed the NSC routine from constant
meetings to one-on-one negotiations where only he saw the cards. While McFarlane
had believed in “compartmentalization” to protect covert operations - routinely cutting
Schultz and Weinberger out of decision-making processes - Poindexter saw secrecy as
proper modes for pursuing virtually all foreign policy. This preferred method of
conducting operations would be a critical factor in the months following his promotion to
NSA, as a lack of communication, accountability and transparency within the
administration created an international crisis for the administration.178
While combating the spread of communism in Latin America was one of Reagan‟s
primary stated objectives to his Chief of Staff in January of 1985, attempting to stabilize
affairs in the Middle East was of equal importance. Iran had been an enduring problem
177
Draper, Theodore. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affair (New York, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), p. 174
(for more information refer to Chapter 9 - “Horror Story”).
178
Ibid.
89
for the administration since day one of the Reagan administration. Although the 52
Americans that had been held hostage by Iranian fundamentalists for 444 days during
the Carter administration had been released just minutes after his swearing in January
of 1980, for Reagan, the terrorist threat against Westerners in the region remained.179
He later assessed the Carter administration‟s handling of the hostage situation in this
manner:
‘Iran’s seizure of American hostages in Teheran and America’s frustrated response to it had given the barbarian Hezbollah an idea. They
had turned the systematic kidnapping and torture of innocent Americans into an instrument of war that was meant to persuade the United
States to abandon their policies in the Middle East.’180
At the beginning of 1985, Iran held five American hostages, including the CIAs
station chief in Beirut, William Buckley. Several days into the New Year, they added a
sixth, Father Lawrence Martin Jenco, head of Catholic Relief Services in Lebanon. No
problem, in either of his two terms in office, was more frustrating than attempting to get
the hostages home, and Reagan would leave “no stone unturned” in his quest to bring
them back to the United States in the fastest manner possible.181
Reagan stressed the importance of bringing the hostages held by Iranian radicals
back to America on numerous occasions in the early part of 1985, to the point where
members of the NSC staff began to openly question the American policy of prohibiting
arms sales to Iran. New intelligence suggested that the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini
was imminent and that factional fighting within the country would take place immediately
after – if not just prior – to his death. Further, the intelligence indicated that the Soviets
179
Secord, Richard. Honored and Betrayed (New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1992) p. 163.
Reagan, Ronald. An American Life, p. 490 (for more information refer to Part V - “Iran-Contra”).
181
Ibid.
180
90
were positioned to take advantage of the potential chaos resulting from the death of the
Ayatollah and the collapse of the Iranian government. Realizing that Iran was in
desperate need of arms to continue their war with Iraq, and seeking to maintain the
existing balance of power in the region, NSC staff members lobbied for Western military
support to Iran in order to “fill a military gap and blunt Soviet influence.” However, not
all members privy to the assessment agreed with the proposed course of action, as both
Schultz and Weinberger “objected sharply to the suggestion of selling arms to Iran.”
Both men argued that arms sales to Iran would violate the Arms Export Control Act, as
well as the United States Arms Embargo against Iran, which had been imposed after
the taking of hostages by Iran in 1979, and the proposal never made it to the
president.182
Despite the firm dismissal of the idea by both Schultz and Weinberger, the proposal
did have support within Reagan‟s inner circle, with CIA director Casey and key
members of the NSC staff strong advocates. These supporters once again tabled the
proposal in the summer of 1985, when they were able to circumvent the fine print of the
weapons embargo by bringing a third party into the equation. Courting American
support for their own proposal to sell weapons to Iran in their war with Iraq, the Israeli
government suggested the American government approve the Israeli sale of TOW and
HAWK missiles to Iran, on the condition that the sale would ensure the release of the
American hostages in Lebanon by the Iranian government. On July 14, 1985 the
proposal was presented to Reagan, who gave the go-ahead, and on August 30, 1985
the Israeli‟s delivered 100 TOWs to Iran, followed by an additional 408 TOWs on
182
Henderson, Philip G. Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan, pp. 154-55
(for more information refer to Chapter 7 - “The Reagan Administration and the Iran-Contra Affair: Prologue to
Reform”).
91
September 14, 1985. Failing to live up to their end of the bargain, the Iranian‟s released
just one of the seven American hostages - Reverend Benjamin Weir - the following day.
Two additional shipments would be made by the Israeli‟s in November, but no further
hostages would be released.183
Although the first attempts to ransom the hostages had achieved limited results,
initiatives to liberate them - motivated by the president‟s concern - percolated within
some areas of the administration. There were also warnings that unless Iran received
arms, hostages would be executed, and Reagan became increasingly concerned that
the “the American people will never forgive me if I fail to get the hostages back.”
Therefore, in January of 1986, Poindexter was able to persuade the president in
approving a plan that would remove Israel from the equation and enable the CIA to
acquire weapons from the Department of Defense, and then sell them to the Iranian‟s
through a private organization. These direct arm sales continued for the next several
months, but received results similar to the ones involving the Israeli‟s – only one
hostage, Father Lawrence Jenco, was released.184
While the sale of arms to the Iranian‟s was not as successful as the president had
hoped it would be, Poindexter and North nonetheless felt that the sales were useful, as
they were the perfect way to have two of the president‟s policies work together –
proceeds from the arms sales would be used to fund administration support to the
Contras.185 Indeed, while both men had become skeptical that the sales would result in
the release of all the hostages, the prospect of generating funds for the Contras was an
183
Kornbluh, Peter and Byrne, Malcolm. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York, New York:
The New Press, 1993), pp. 243-44 (for more information refer to Part Two/Chapter VI - “Dealing in Arms and
Hostages”).
184
Astor, Gerald. Presidents at War, pp. 212-13 (for more information refer to Chapter 15 - “Iran-Contra”).
185
North, Oliver. Under Fire: an American Story (New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), p. 20.
92
attractive incentive for continuing arms sales to Iran.186 Indeed, this line of thinking
drove the train for the two men, as their covert operation would go on to secure over
$16.5 million dollars worth of the funds through the Iranian arms sales which were
diverted to the Contras.187
The problem, of course, was that both the sales of weapons to Iran and the funding
of the Contras were in direct violation of administration foreign policy and American law.
Despite repeated denials of wrongdoing by administration officials all the way up to the
president himself, it would soon become apparent that the activities of members within
the Reagan NSC were unprecedented in both scope and illegality. While the sale of
weapons to Iran by the American government was first uncovered by the Lebanese
magazine Al Shiraa in November 3, 1986, unknowing administration officials soon
discovered they had the added problem of explaining the diversion of funds to the
Contras. The resulting investigation by the Tower Commission not only exposed the
criminal activity of rogue members of Reagan‟s administration, but also implicated
senior officials in the NSC and brought intense scrutiny upon Reagan and a presidential
management system that alarmed many Americans.
Analysis of the Reagan Decision-Making Process
The fallout from the Tower Commission investigation and subsequent report to
Congress in the summer of 1987 was extensive. For Reagan, it saw his public approval
rating in the United States drop from 62% just prior to the breaking of the scandal, to
41% in August of 1987.188 For others, their punishment was more palpable, as Regan,
Schultz and Weinberger were forced to resign in the aftermath of the scandal,
186
Brinkley, Joel. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, pp. 15-16.
Ibid, pp. 18.
188
Edwards, George C. Presidential Approval: A Sourcebook, pp. 153-56.
187
93
MacFarlane attempted to commit suicide, and Poindexter and North were convicted on
multiple felony counts.189 While most of the central figures in the investigation denied
culpability and all attempted to minimize their role in the affair, they all agreed – directly
and indirectly – that the presidential management and leadership style of Reagan
played a decisive and debilitating role in both the conduct and outcome of the operation.
Like most president‟s, Reagan wanted to do big things and had a vision of a freer
and more peaceful world, and presided over an administration that shared his broad
ideological agenda.190 Loyalty was a value that Reagan held in the highest regard, and
he was careful to establish an inner circle of appointees and career government officials
whom he trusted personally and professionally. 191 While the desire to surround oneself
with lifelong friends and trusted agents was not unique to Reagan and his
administration, it is clear that he carried it too far in his decision-making process and
policy development. In creating an impermeable barrier between himself and
administration “outsiders” Reagan deprived himself of dissenting opinions and
perspectives.192
Compounding this problem was the fact that although Reagan‟s policy agenda was
bold, it pursued few policy objectives. While Reagan‟s vision for America and its leading
role within the international community was grand, the path to be followed was riddled
with potholes. Reagan staffers and cabinet officials were handcuffed by a presidential
agenda that lacked sufficient detail and proved to be a series of themes and theories
189
Kornbluh, Peter and Byrne, Malcolm. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, pp. 327-32 (Director of
Central Intelligence William Casey died of brain cancer in May of 1987 and did not testify before congress due to
his failing health).
190
Wilson, Robert. Character Above All, p. 203.
191
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, p. 217.
192
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When DO Leaders Learn from Their Advisors?, p. 56.
94
that were not viable in application. The broad nature of Reagan‟s agenda was
counterproductive to policy development, as even his inner circle found it difficult to
identify and establish benchmarks in pursuit of overall objectives. Regan noted that the
administrations deliberative processes were unable to produce concrete policies
required for implementation – the president seldom spoke in meetings while his
advisors proposed measures that contradicted his own ideas and promises, creating
uncertainty.193
This passive approach and inability to issue clear and concise directives forced
administration officials to make educated guesses as to what the president‟s intent was
on any given issue. Not surprisingly, this uncertainty and deadlock manifested itself in
disagreement between members of the president‟s inner circle which eventually evolved
into bitter and enduring rivalries. This in turn, further inhibited decision-making and
policy development in the administration, as although Reagan liked to have argued out
in front of him, at the end of the day he expected a consensus among his advisors. 194
Preferring an arrangement where he would merely “ratify” a proposal that his
advisors brought to him after a lengthy and deliberate debate, Reagan found dealing
with anything less than that troublesome. Indeed, on the most pressing issues in both
of his terms of office, division among members of his inner circle would have a
paralyzing effect on the president. Direct appeals to Reagan in the Oval Office by
administration officials would often only exacerbate the problem and deepen the
deadlock – the more controversial and varied the opinions presented to him, the less
193
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, p. 148 (for more
information refer to Chapter 6 - “Ronald Reagan: The Travails of Collegial Formalism”).
194
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 216-17 (for more information refer to Chapter 8 - “Morning in America, Twilight at the NSC”).
95
likely Reagan was to gain anything from the presentation. Essentially, if the harmony
and routine Reagan desired was sufficiently disturbed, the decision-making process
ground itself to a halt.195
Reagan disdained confrontation and would go to almost any length to avoid it in the
White House, and this would prove disastrous in his handling of the Iran-Contra
Affair.196 The closed learning style that Reagan employed – where a limited number of
administration officials had access to him – intensified during his second term in office,
when Regan became Chief of Staff and began a process of further centralizing authority
in the White House.197 The combined effect of the president‟s passive leadership style,
aversion to confrontation, closed learning style and centralization of authority in his
second term in office created a situation in the NSC where the NSAs primary role was
to implement policy rather than provide advice.198 The result of these realities were
catastrophic, as McFarlane nor Poindexter ultimately found themselves in a spotlight
and under circumstances that no NSA before them had ever experienced, and in doing
so brought shame and dishonor to the organization.
Conclusion
The Iran-Contra Affair marked the low point in the history of the modern NSC, as in
the Reagan administration‟s attempt to downgrade the role of the NSA and his staff –
following the high profile tenures of Kissinger and Brzezinski – they brought about an
195
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors?, pp. 56-7 (for more
information refer to Chapter 3 - “Eisenhower and Reagan: Comparing Learning Styles”).
196
Regan, Donald T. For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington (New York, New York: Saint Martin’s, 1988),
p. 109.
197
Ibid, p. 132.
198
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors?, pp. 54-5.
96
NSC that was irrelevant and dysfunctional at key periods of the administration. 199 It
was in this context that that the Iran-Contra Affair occurred, as their loss of clout within
the administration encouraged the NSC staff to conduct special presidential missions no
other agency was willing to accept.200 Placing a premium on circumventing perceived
obstacles in pursuit of the president‟s stated – or implied – policy objectives, the NSC
under the leadership of McFarlane and Poindexter spiraled out of control in the absence
of adult supervision.201
Concluding that the common ingredients of the Iran and Contra policies were
secrecy, deception and disdain for the law, the Tower Commission went on to state that
a small group of administration officials believed that they alone knew what was right.
Viewing knowledge of their activities by others in the government as a threat to their
objectives, they told neither the Congress nor the American people of their actions.202
Further critiquing the breakdown in the administration, specific to the role of the
president and his decision-making process, the commission stated that the “NSC
system will not work unless the President makes it work” and that “the President did not
force his policy to undergo the most critical review of which the system is capable, the
President did not insist upon accountability and performance review and that if the
President had chosen to drive the NSC system, the outcome could well have been
different.”203
199
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 210-11.
200
Shoemaker, Christopher. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, p. 62.
201
Prados, John. Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush, p. 538.
202
Brinkley, Joel. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, p. 27.
203
The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President’s Special Review Board (New York, New York:
Times Books, 1987), p. 79.
97
This fairly harsh – yet accurate – accounting of the President was tempered,
however, by also declaring that “the President‟s intense compassion for the hostages
appeared to motivate his steadfast support for the initiative” and that the president “did
not seem to be aware” of the conduct of the operation. Finally, the report stated that
“the President‟s expressed concern for safety of the hostages may have been conveyed
in a manner so as to inhibit the full functioning of the NSC system” and that “the
President‟s management style is to put the principal responsibility for policy review and
implementation on the shoulders of his advisors.”204
Indeed, the President‟s inclination to delegate both authority and responsibility was
the root cause of the Iran-Contra Affair, as in the absence of precise guidance,
administration officials were forced to interpret the president‟s intent and make
assumptions based upon generalities. In the critical December 7, 1985 meeting in
which Reagan gave the go-ahead for the sale of Israeli arms to the Iranian‟s – attended
by Weinberger, Schultz, Regan, and Poindexter – Reagan stated that in the event that
the operation was exposed, “he could answer charges of illegality but could not answer
the charge that „big, strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages.‟”205
Following the meeting, it was apparent that there was a decisive split between key
members of his inner-circle: Schultz and Weinberger were against the deal, while
McFarlane and Casey supported it. Not swayed by the fact that Schultz and
Weinberger were in agreement for one of the few times in the administration, Reagan
sided with Casey and McFarlane as a result of his obsession with the fate of the
204
The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President’s Special Review Board (New York, New York:
Times Books, 1987), p. 79.
205
Kornbluh, Peter and Byrne, Malcolm. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, p. 216.
98
American hostages.206 As a result, from that point forward the president was deprived
of his two most senior and capable cabinet members who knew the most about the
issues, as both Schultz and Weinberger opted out – or more to the point – were cut out
of the process when the secretive and paranoid Poindexter took the reins of the NSC
from McFarlane later that month.207
The Iran-Contra Affair is the classic example of “the ends justifying the means”
approach to decision-making. Given President Reagan‟s genuine concern for both the
Contras and the American hostages in Iran, it is easy to see how the sale of arms to the
Iranian‟s could be rationalized by NSC members. Perhaps further muddying their
thought process was the fact that many other countries were assisting the Iranians at
the time, as in the 1980s, more than 41 countries supplied Iran with military weapons in
their war with Iraq.208 However, what makes the Iran-Contra Affair so disturbing to most
observers is the fact that two of the most important Reagan administration policy
initiatives were planned and executed in such a random manner.
It is ironic that the man regarded as the “great communicator” by historians was so
ineffective in communicating with members of his administration. Although it may never
be clear whether an excessively ambitious NSA misinterpreted Reagan‟s vague
guidance throughout the process as a sign to “do whatever was necessary to get the
hostages back” or if the White House “was overrun by a cabal of zealots who took
advantage of the president and disregarded clearly defined standards of conduct” in
206
Speakes, Larry. Speaking Out: Inside the Reagan White House, p. 267.
Ibid.
208
Kornbluh. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, p. 243.
207
99
pursuit of his objectives, either way, the ultimate responsibility for the affair lies with
Reagan.209
An old adage in the military states that “you can delegate authority, but not
responsibility” and to his credit, Reagan admitted after the scandal that “when it came to
managing the NSC staff, let‟s face it, my style didn‟t match its previous track record.”210
Sadly, the Iran-Contra Affair exposed a disengaged president and reckless NSC that
not only shamed the country, but tarnished the presidency of one of the most popular
individuals to ever hold the office.
209
Cohen, William. Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings (New York, New York: Viking
Penguin Inc., 1988), pp. 208/234.
210
Prados, John. Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush, p. 538.
100
Chapter Six
Conclusion
Analysis of the Nixon, Carter and Reagan presidential administrations reveals the
complex nature of presidential decision-making in the twentieth-century. As the world
has evolved, so too have the considerations and influences that a president and his
inner-circle of advisors must evaluate while developing policy. It was in this context that
the NSC was established in 1947, an acknowledgement of the enormity of the job of the
president, and an attempt to improve the unity of effort between the defense and foreign
policy establishment in Washington D.C. Responsible only to the president, the NSA
and the body he/she oversees has grown in stature and significance over the course of
the past 50 plus years, with the NSA often playing the lead role in foreign policy
development. While their duties and responsibilities are enormous, the most important
task for a NSA is to ensure that the president has access to – and gives thorough and
careful consideration – to the handful of critical issues that will make or break the
administration.211
The study of presidential decision-making in international crises is interesting
because it allows the researcher to form his/her own conclusions in regards to the
factor(s) that ultimately led a particular president to settle upon his chosen course of
action. Since the balance between successful and unsuccessful presidential decisionmaking is precarious, and the political stakes so enormous, there is utility in determining
the role that personality and process play in outcomes.212 In the case of the Nixon,
211
212
Daalder, Ivo and Destler, I.M. “In the Shadow of the Oval Office” (Foreign Affairs-JAN/FEB 2009).
Burke, John P. and Greenstein, Fred I. How President’s Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 & 1968, p. 5.
101
Carter and Reagan NSCs, it is clear that personality trumped process in decisionmaking during the Vietnam War, Iran-Hostage Crisis and the Iran-Contra Affair. In two
of the three crises, this reality led to entirely unsuccessful outcomes (Carter and
Reagan), while in the other (Nixon), it achieved moderate success.
While each president organized his administration differently, each man ultimately
turned to his NSA for policy development and implementation. This is not surprising, as
each took advantage of the organization‟s bureaucratic independence, as well as its
sensitivity to presidential perspective. Indeed, nowhere else in the government does
the president have a staff upon which he can rely for national security advice that is
tailored to suit his philosophy, as the NSA is the creation of the president himself. This
provides the NSC a distinct advantage over the parochial Department‟s of State and
Defense, as it alone can provide advice and recommendations that consider all
elements of power available to the Commander in Chief. At the end of the day, only the
NSC can fully meet the demands of a presidential system in the formulation of national
security policy.213
This dependence upon the NSA by the president predictably generated friction
between the NSC and other government agencies, but in particular, the State
Department. In the case of Nixon, this was of little consequence, as he embraced the
autonomy provided by the NSC and went a step further in ensuring the NSC played the
lead role in foreign policy by appointing a strong NSA (Kissinger) and a weak Secretary
of State (Rogers). In the cases of Carter and Reagan, however, the friction between the
two agency heads was unanticipated, as it ran counter to both administration structure
213
Shoemaker, Christopher. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, pp. 40-43 (for more information refer to
Chapter 2 - “Functions of the NSC Staff”).
102
and stated policy, and in the process hindered their decision-making apparatus. In the
end, the influence of the NSAs for both Carter and Reagan grew as a result of their
development of policy proposals more in tune with the president‟s overall agenda. This
rise in importance of the NSA in the three administrations is in fact one of the few
commonalities amongst each administration, as the NSA for each president acquired
power rivaling that of cabinet officers, diplomats and generals.214
Personality and Process in the Nixon Administration
Although Richard Nixon professed a desire to establish a formalistic presidential
management system, he abandoned the model early in his first term of office. A closed
leader that often withdrew from members of his inner-circle, Nixon was not comfortable
with face to face contact and disdained deliberation. Preferring to work privately and
rarely inclined to discuss policy options in a collective setting – a closed leader – Nixon
at times would exclude staff members who he suspected might disagree with his views.
Thus, while his mode of decision-making fit his personal needs, it did not ensure that his
policy choices were well researched or reviewed. No mechanisms of presidential
oversight were present in the Nixon White House, no procedures were established that
ensured those entrusted with authority came to the right decision, and most importantly,
there were no informal means to encourage teamwork and unity of effort in policy
development.215
One of the few administration members who earned the trust – albeit guarded – of
Nixon was Kissinger. Promising to restore the NSC to its prominent role in national
214
Prados, John. Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush, p. 8.
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, pp. 67-72 (for
more information refer to Chapter 3 - “Through a Managerial Lens”).
215
103
security planning, Nixon had chosen Kissinger as his NSA after careful consideration.216
Kissinger shared the president‟s opinion that the best way deal with the North
Vietnamese was to “create a situation favorable to negotiation” – bringing the full weight
of American military, political and economic power to bear on Hanoi.217 Empowering
Kissinger to reorganize the NSC, the two men ran the war from the White House, rarely
considering dissenting points of view on the few occasions cabinet meetings were held.
This is evidenced by the fact that although Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of
Defense Laird – as well as numerous NSC staffers – opposed the invasion of Cambodia
in 1970 and the bombing of Hanoi in 1972, the support of Kissinger ensured that Nixon
could carry out his prosecution of the war with a clear conscience.
The presidential management system employed by Nixon was a unique arrangement
that placed unprecedented power and influence in the hands of his NSA. In selecting a
domineering personality to serve as his NSA, Nixon was able to circumvent processes
and ensure that policy proposals and decision-making were driven from the White
House and subject to little interference from government bureaucracy. This of course,
was the precise arrangement Nixon desired upon taking office, as his disdain for debate
and interaction with staff members left little room for group interaction and legitimate
policy development. In the Nixon White House during the Vietnam War, the
domineering personalities of the president and his NSA were the decisive component to
policy development and decision-making.
216
217
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Johnson, Loch K. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, p. 67.
Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger, p. 58.
104
Personality and Process in the Carter Administration
Assuming the presidency as an idealist, Jimmy Carter utilized a collegial presidential
management system that would incorporate the views of large segments of
administration officials. An open leader, Carter felt compelled to immerse himself in
detail and sought direct input from subordinates positioned outside of his staff. Seeking
to tear down the wall that Nixon had constructed between the president and his
advisors, Carter even went so far as to serve as his own Chief of Staff. However, this
initial approach to governing was short lived, as the overload endemic to collegial
processes overwhelmed the Carter White House. Eventually finding cabinet meetings
unproductive, the president was forced to work with cabinet members individually, and
in doing so, placed increasing authority for coordinating the policy process on a White
House staff that was ill-equipped to handle the task. It was in these circumstances that
the two most dominant personalities of the Carter administration emerged, causing a rift
within the administration and placing the president in the center of a power struggle he
was incapable of managing.218
Desiring a return to cabinet-led government, Carter gave his appointees increased
responsibility and authority, but unknowingly undermined their authority – particularly
that of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance – by establishing a committee that was chaired
by his NSA (Brzezinski). Capitalizing on the opportunity to wield greater power in policy
development, Brzezinski became more advocate than advisor as the NSA, and found
Carter increasingly open to his original and innovative thinking that called for the
218
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, pp. 118-20 (for
more information refer to Chapter 5 - “Jimmy Carter: The Travails of Centralized Collegiality”).
105
modification of existing policy in order to meet changing conditions.219 During the IranHostage Crisis, Carter became disillusioned with diplomatic process, and with the
November 1980 presidential election less than a year away, felt enormous pressure to
end the ordeal. Disregarding the advice of Vance – and making his final decision in a
meeting not attended by his top foreign policy official – Carter authorized the rescue
operation proposed by Brzezinski.
Although Carter had a stated goal of returning cabinet-led government to the White
House, during his presidency the role of Brzezinski in policy development and decisionmaking rivaled that of even Kissinger. The Iran-Hostage Crisis is the classic example of
the maxim in Washington D.C. that that proximity is power, for while Carter potentially
had access to a range of advisors and policy views, the NSA often had the final word.
Whether controlling information which reached the president, preparing periodic NSC
reports filled with his personal insight and opinion , or excluding potential participants
with opposing points of view from meetings, Brzezinski obstructed the management
system and processes favored by Carter in developing policy, and in doing so ensured
that he won his personal battle with Vance.220
Personality and Process in the Reagan Administration
Like Nixon, a closed learner who employed a formalistic system of presidential
management, Ronald Reagan took a decidedly different approach to the role that the
NSA would play in his administration. Not wanting a “lone ranger” – what he considered
Kissinger and Brzezinski to have been – that dominated foreign policy development,
Reagan was deliberate in downgrading the role his NSA. Surrounding himself with
219
Shoemaker, Christopher C. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, pp. 41-2.
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, pp. 126-27 (for
more information refer to Chapter 5 - “Jimmy Carter: The Travails of Centralized Collegiality”).
220
106
ideologues and longtime supporters from California – a closed leader – the president
instilled a sense of commitment and personal loyalty among members of his
administration. In his first term, Reagan leaned heavily upon the troika in administering
his policies, and they proved fully capable in establishing an ideological network for
agenda enforcement.221 In fact, they were so successful that they probably provided
the president a false sense of confidence in his own leadership abilities, and contributed
to the casual manner in which he presided over his second term in office.
While Reagan had initially stripped the NSA of the authority he had enjoyed in
previous administrations, by 1985, many of those powers had been returned. In
McFarlane, and later Poindexter, the Reagan NSC was headed by individuals who
preferred to operate under the cover of secrecy. Running roughshod through an
administration no longer under the watchful eye of the troika, McFarlane and Poindexter
interpreted broad presidential guidance and the lack of institutional control measures as
signals to increasingly engage in activities that ran counter to both administration policy
and congressional amendments signed into law by Reagan himself. It is clear that
during Reagan‟s second term in office, conflicts over policy took place at a level
beneath the president.222
Similar to the divisions between NSAs and cabinet members in other presidential
administrations, the Reagan NSC was marked by rivalries and disagreements in policy
development. The difference in the Reagan administration is that although the
processes of decision-making were circumvented by the NSAs throughout the Iran-
221
Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, p. 157 (for more
information refer to Chapter 6 - “Ronald Reagan: The Travails of Collegial Formalism”).
222
Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors?, pp.147-49 (for more
information refer to Chapter 6: “Deadlock”).
107
Contra Affair, these men were not the dominating personalities of the administration, as
had been the case previously. Receiving what they perceived as tacit approval from the
president – “keep the Contra‟s together body and soul” and “do whatever it takes to get
the hostages back” – they operated in grey areas that were immune to review by top
officials in the administration.223 Once again, personality prevailed over process during
an international crisis. However, in the Iran-Contra Affair, it was the introverted and
withdrawn personality of a president that played the decisive role, as opposed to the
personal ambition and brinksmanship that marked the Nixon and Carter presidencies.
Final Thoughts
The study of the Nixon, Carter and Reagan administrations reveal: one, a president
who intentionally created an organization and environment which he dominated policy
and decision-making (Nixon); two, a president who unintentionally created an
organization and environment that resulted in his micromanagement of policy and
decision-making (Carter); and three, a president whose ambivalence towards governing
created an environment that took him completely out of the decision-making process
(Reagan).
Despite the challenges they created for themselves and others during their
presidency, each man led administration‟s which achieved remarkable successes, and
can be pointed to by supporters as evidence of their ability to lead and govern.
However, it is often in failure or controversy that the most important of lessons learned
are identified. It is in this light that analysis of presidential decision-making in
international crises for Nixon, Carter and Reagan has been observed. The analysis and
cross-analysis of their presidential models, NSC structure, selection of cabinet members
223
Henderson, Philip G. Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan, pp. 164-67.
108
and administration officials, and overall leadership styles has confirmed one thing: the
human component and interpersonal dynamic between presidents and their group of
advisors are the most important factors in decision-making processes.
In considering the role of personality and process for each administration, it is
apparent that personality of the president will determine the presidential management
system he selects. However, the adherence to the chosen model is subject to numerous
influences that shape policy development and final decision-making. Approval ratings,
ideology, current events, religion and morality all contribute to a complex and often
unpredictable operating environment. Therefore, it is not surprising that in times of
indecision most presidents‟ turn to trusted advisors whom they have a personal
relationship with – or share the president‟s original inclination and/or instincts – rather
than outsiders whom provide information and recommendations based upon years of
government service, but whose processes the president does not fully trust.
Virtually every administration in the past 60 years has had a moment in which the
true nature of the president and his closest advisors is revealed. These crises not only
reveal the character of leaders, but also shape public perception worldwide of the
character and reputation of the United States. For the George W. Bush administration,
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks – and their subsequent prosecution of their
War on Terror – were such an event. While it will take many years to make final
determination regarding America‟s ultimate success or failure in the war, it has become
increasingly apparent that in the Bush administration “turf wars” and power struggles
within the president‟s inner circle strongly influenced policy development and decision-
109
making. In this regard, they are no different from the vast majority of their
predecessors.224
Employing a formalistic presidential management system, Bush chose two political
heavyweights to serve as his Secretary of Defense – Donald H. Rumsfeld – and
Secretary of State – Colin L. Powell. These individuals, combined with Vice President
Richard B. Cheney, provided the president with nearly 100 years of combined military
and political experience in United States government. Although these men were among
the most influential members of the Republican Party, Bush was unfamiliar with them on
a personal level, and they were essentially chosen to provide sage counsel to the young
president. Seeking a familiar face and trusted ally that he could turn to in times of
uncertainty, Bush tabbed Condoleezza Rice as his NSA.225
Rice and Bush had clicked since they had first met at a spring 1998 gathering
organized by former Secretary of State George Shultz, for the then Texas Governor and
several academics at Stanford University.226 During the 2000 presidential campaign,
she had served as Bush‟s top foreign policy advisor and had earned his trust and
confidence as an extremely loyal and capable staffer.227 However, as NSA during the
first term of the Bush administration, it appears that she was not quite up to the task as
the manager of policy formulation and decision-making before, during, or after the
September 11, 2001 attacks.
224
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 31-32 (for more information refer to Chapter 2 – “Washington’s Choice”).
225
Daalder, Ivo and Destler, I.M. “In the Shadow of the Oval Office” (Foreign Affairs-January/February 2009), p.
125.
226
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, pp. 31-32.
227
Ibid, pp. 393-94.
110
Not unlike the administrations of Carter and Reagan before them, where “turf wars”
between the Secretaries of Defense and State cascaded to nearly every corner of the
government, in the Bush administration the power struggle between Rumsfeld and
Powell was further complicated by the presence of Cheney, who had a longstanding
personal relationship with Rumsfeld that dated back to the Nixon administration.228
Seeing the world through extremely similar lights, the two friends became the central
figures in the Bush White House, with the often dissenting voice and overall influence of
Powell steadily diminishing during the administration‟s first term in office. As the case
studies of Nixon, Carter and Reagan illustrate, this type of closed learning system and
limited accessibility to opinions of “outsiders” is often a recipe for disaster. In the case
of George W. Bush – a leader who relied upon an instinct rather than intellect and took
a less deliberate approach to decision-making processes – the result was inadequate
planning that contributed to the “quagmire” that became the War in Iraq from 20032007.229
While much of the blame for the difficulties experienced by the Bush administration
in their preparation for the stability and support phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom lies
with Cheney and Rumsfeld, the president was also done a disservice by his NSA.
Lacking the experience, reputation and confidence of the titanic figures of the
president‟s inner circle, Rice routinely deferred to them on matters of policy or process.
Attempting to maintain power – or at the very least viability – within the administration,
the NSA relied upon her personal relationship with Bush. Realizing that the president
trusted and liked her more than any of his other advisors, Rice attempted to channel
228
Woodward, Bob. State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 43.
Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of
American Power, p. 402.
229
111
Bush by focusing on his instincts and translating them into policy. In the process, she
did not put the president‟s instincts and desires to the analytical test, neglecting to probe
assumptions, look for alternative courses of action and examine probable
consequences.230
While there is indeed much blame to share within the Bush administration‟s inner
circle concerning their handling of the WOT, this paper shows that the systems they
managed and processes they incorporated in their decision-making apparatus were not
drastically dissimilar to that of the Nixon, Carter or Reagan. As each of these
administration‟s has proven, there is no secret formula that ensures successful
outcomes in times of international crises, as the best laid plans of an administration
often wither under the crucible of presidential politics. The past 40 years has illustrated
the importance of routine and process in presidential decision-making, yet this reality is
often forgotten or ignored by president‟s and advisors as they navigate their way
through the fluid and unpredictable world of politics.
Created to ensure the president is as well informed as possible concerning matters
of national security, when properly utilized, the NSC has proven to be a valuable asset
to numerous president‟s during times of crises – as far back as the Cuban Missile Crisis
and as recently as The Gulf War in 1991. The best mechanism within the United States
government to reduce bureaucracy and eliminate departmental power struggles which
have derailed effective policy development and decision-making, the NSC is only as
good as the members of the administration who empower (the president) and manage it
(the NSA).
230
This paragraph is drawn from Ivo H. Dalder’s and I. M. Destler’s “In the Shadow of the Oval Office: The Next
National Security Advisor,” Foreign Affairs-(January/February 2009), pp. 125-26.
112
While the confluence of a strong willed and fully capable president and NSA has
been a rarity, the administrations that have come closest to achieving and maintaining
this balance have been the most successful. Given the choice, President Barack H.
Obama and current NSA United States Marine Corps General (Ret.) James L. Jones
would be wise to lead and manage a NSC that stresses teamwork and maintains the
discipline required to emphasize process in policy development and decision-making.
The lessons learned of the Nixon, Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations show the
consequences of a personality driven NSC and should be avoided in times of
international crises. However, history has demonstrated that maintaining the discipline
required by a process driven decision-making apparatus is extremely challenging –
much easier said than done – and that the Obama administration will be the exception
to the rule if they are able to adhere to it during the defining moment of their presidency.
113
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