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Back to Westphalia? The International System of States and the Backlash on International Cooperation in the Field of Migration Mgr. Clarissa do Nascimento Tabosa Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University Fakulta sociálnych a ekonomických vied UK Mlynské luhy 4 821 05 Bratislava [email protected] Back to Westphalia? The International System of States and the Backlash on International Cooperation in the Field of Migration Mgr. Clarissa do Nascimento Tabosa1 Abstract Discussion upon international cooperation in the field of migration has been gaining space not only in the academic sphere but also among policy-makers and different stakeholders. Yet, as argued by Newland (2010), global governance of international migration although necessary is often portrayed as an impossibility. In the article I raise key questions and introduce main discussions in the field of international cooperation on migration whose content require further analysis. Does global governance, especially regarding migration, undermine sovereignty? Is global governance in the field of Migration attainable? Has migration been changing the meaning of politics – beyond the limits of national boundaries, or migration issues have rather brought backlash on international cooperation turning states back to the Westphalian idea of state sovereignty? The article looks at key approaches taken by world leaders regarding migration to search for answers to these questions. My main argument is that although global governance may not pose direct challenge to the meaning of state sovereignty, and although the meaning of sovereignty itself has been changing, securitization of migration, the lack of common norms, principle and values, jointly with the limited scope of global governance in this field show that the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty is back in fashion in world leaders discourse. Key words: cooperation, migration, sovereignty, global governance Clarissa do Nascimento Tabosa, 25, from Caruaru, Pernambuco (Brazil) received her Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in “European Studies” at the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University in Bratislava in 2014 and 2016, respectively. She is currently a PhD. Student at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, FSES, Comenius University. Her dissertation is focused on systemic and internal factors that underline and determine immigration policy (towards openness or towards policy of control) in different European Union member states. 1 2 Introduction The Westphalian principle of state sovereignty is grounded on the idea that states’ parties have the monopoly over decisions regarding territory (and its borders). The discourse on migration is inevitably linked to this principle and has been, for a long time but more intensely nowadays, closely linked to national security. While decision-making regarding migration is still seen as a matter that belong exclusively to the national realm, the current stage of world affairs seems to be calling for a different approach based on cooperation and development of common approaches towards migration. This may be posing direct challenges to the concept of state sovereignty itself. Discussion upon global governance in the field of migration has been gaining space not only in academic sphere but also among policy-makers and different stakeholders. Yet, as argued by Newland (2010), global governance of international migration, although necessary, is often portrayed as an impossibility. In the article I raise key questions and introduce main discussions in the field of international cooperation on migration whose content require further analysis. Does global governance, especially regarding migration, undermine sovereignty? Is global governance in the field of Migration attainable? Has migration been changing the meaning of politics – beyond the limits of national boundaries, or migration issues have rather brought backlash on international cooperation turning states back to the Westphalian idea of state sovereignty? The article looks briefly at approaches taken by world leaders regarding migration. My main argument is that although global governance may not pose direct challenge to the meaning of state sovereignty, and although the meaning of sovereignty itself has been changing, the securitization discourse, the lack of common norms, principle and values, jointly with the limited scope of global governance in this field show that the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty is back in fashion in world leaders discourse. 3 1. Global Governance and State Sovereignty Thomas Weiss places global governance as “a half-way house between the international anarchy underlying Realist analysis and a world state” (2013, 25). He claims that the Realist current of thought in International Relations tend to portray a dichotomy between anarchy on one side and world government in another side, disregarding there can be something in the between - a world order without world government: global governance (Ibid). Global governance appears, therefore, as one mechanism that may be able to constraint states’ behavior. Governance acquires different meaning depending on whether we look at it from a national or global perspective. In the national level there has governance plus government while in the global level there is governance but no government in order to ensure compliance with decisions taken (Ibid). Cooperation through global governance is, therefore, relevant in creating these mechanisms to coordinate and constraint states’ (but also non-state) behavior. According to liberal institutionalists, international cooperation and creation of regimes help to decrease transaction costs and to overcome some obstacles posed by the anarchical structure of the international system. This explains why states are willing to engage in international cooperation – because it provides states with an environment in which some level of organization, and consequentially trust, can be attained. With the absence of a world-hegemon (Gilpin 1986), Keohane (1984) argues, for instance, that in order to coordinate world economy, the focus must be shifted to multilateralism and the creation of institutions and regimes that create an environment for cooperation and collective actions. It seems, indeed, impressive that daily a huge number of transnational activities (not only in the economic field) occur in different areas – political, economic, technical, cultural – and all in the absence of a central international political authority. These transnational activities in place have been putting in question, or maybe even changing the meaning of what we know as state sovereignty. Stephen D. Krasner (1999) sustains that sovereignty can be understood in four ways: international legal sovereignty - related to mutual recognition and jurisdiction; Westphalia sovereignty - relating to non-interference in internal affairs; domestic sovereignty - monopoly of the use of force, in the Weberian sense; and interdependence sovereignty – which “refers to the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state” (Krasner 1999, 4). The author poses a critic towards the commonly accepted 4 understanding of the international system as being a Westphalian System of states, and to the centrality put in the principle of sovereignty. A leading voice among the critics, Krasner sought to demonstrate the Westphalian model is not a scientifically accurate description of the international system of States. He proposes adjustments to the use of the Westphalian sovereignty concept, and considers the terms of the 1648 peace as an “organized hypocrisy” (Ibid). For him, the principle of sovereignty of states has always been breached: states have long intervened in each other affairs for a long time with great intensity. Hardt and Negri (2004) argue a new form of sovereignty is emerging along with global market and global production of goods. They call this new form of sovereignty Empire and define it as “the sovereign power that governs the world” (Ibid., xi). Empires act in changing the meaning of political sovereignty, beyond national boundaries. State sovereignty has progressively assumed new forms, Hardt and Negri claim, “composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule” (2010, xii). These views that state sovereignty is an “organized hypocrisy” or at least the consideration that an erosion of states sovereignty is occurring has increased its force especially after 1990’s: with the strengthening of the process of globalization (which is not new [Weiss 2013]) - states have been losing the capacity to exercise control over their territories. Transnational trade, globalization, and human rights issues can also be said to have been challenging state sovereignty, as a concept, and changing the role sovereignty has played in world politics in practice. Arguing in a different direction, Neumann and Jacob (2010) show how the creation of new categories of statehood, such as fragile or failed states, by IOs – therefore, an indicator of global governability – actually strengthens state sovereignty. Neumann and Jacob build a sophisticate argument that points out that global governance discourse, at least in the cases they present, instead of challenging the meaning of politics and the authority of sovereignty states actually strengthens it. They specifically claim Global governance discourse increasingly conceptualizes states as entities that are “licensed” to survey, regulate, and discipline their territories and populations in such way as to avoid instability and risks (2010, 155) 5 Although the World Bank sets standards that many times can be seen as authoritative, it strengthens state sovereignty also by justifying actions being taken by state actors as well as by providing measurement tools. Functioning robust states are essential for reaching the main objectives of the Bank (Ibid.). For the purpose of this paper, this is relevant to the extent that we need to overcome the tendency to see global governance as something that poses challenges to state sovereignty. When it comes to migration, however, the tendency seems to be for policy-makers and leaders alike to argue this is a matter of national security and that cooperation in this field could indeed undermine state’s sovereignty. However, it is relevant to stress that although following different lines of argumentation and different position towards state sovereignty and global governance, Neumann and Jacob (Ibid) or Hardt and Negri (2004) focus is, both, on economic and cultural exchange – and this is relevant to understand the main argument of this paper. Global governance may be developing successfully in certain fields, yet, the current state of world affairs regarding migration seems to indicate that global governance in the field of migration may be slowing down and that we may be experiencing backlash regarding supra-nationalization, or globalization, of sovereignty – we may be seeing a return to a Westphalian model of sovereignty in which states are to be seen as the sole actors entitled to shape and determine migration policies based mainly on internal affairs and national interest. Hardt and Negri (Ibid) idea of Empire, for instance, is not built upon a territorial center of power and boundaries – the fact itself that for them a global means of sovereignty is detached from any territorial center of power, directly clashes with the concept of migration that usually cannot be understood without the idea of a territorial center of power . The authors claim the “concept of Empire is characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries: Empire’s rule has no limits.” (2004, xiv), yet, there are limits to Empire’s rule, and the authors themselves recognize later in their book: Empire is unable to restrain flows of economic migrants – what they propose, therefore, is papier pour tous (Ibid, 400) or full rights of citizenship. They put forward an idealistic ideal of the development of a cosmopolitan world. When I argue that international cooperation in the field of migration has been slowing down and supranational forms of sovereignty may be facing backlash, it is clear that I see Hardt and Negri’s idea of residency papers for all with skepticism. 6 2. Global Governance in the Field of Migration Global governance in certain fields has been particularly successful. Neumann and Jacob, for instance, have looked at the role that international organizations (IOs) play in economic global governance and claim IOs have become more powerful as they function as “sites for negotiation and formalization of universal categories of practices of rule” (2010, 136). They draw their argument upon the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), an instrument of the World Bank used to evaluate countries that receive development aid from different aspects, and argue this instrument not only set guides to eligibility for international development aid, but it also shapes the way these economies and societies are governed. Although there are strong arguments to support the effectiveness of global governance in promoting cooperation, in assisting to establish world order, and to restrain the behavior of states, there is also a recognition that such effectiveness may be compromised or simply do not apply when the matter into discussion is migration. Weiss, for instance, argue that globalization has not changed the fact that the movement of people is still restricted (and has been since the creation of passports in the 19 th century) and “is likely to remain highly controlled or perhaps become more restricted” (2013, 12). Practitioners such as Sergio Marchi (2010) argue global governance in the field of migration can be attainable by finding ways to look at migration more with analytical tools that reflect the reality and trying to find common migration principles that would guide global governance measures (instead of locating migration in a securitizing discourse based on fear, I argue). Neumann and Jacob stresses the role played by international organizations exactly “in producing and disseminating universal grids (…) for the evaluation, rating, and discussion about how societies should be governed” (2010, 133). In this way, international regimes can contribute by being a sphere in which some level of governability in the field of migration can emanate based on development of common principles, based on human rights and on international law. Another way to booster global governance in the field of migration found out by Marchi (Ibid) based on discussion among people involved in the field may be the use of a more neutral expression instead of global governance. The author found out that the term itself tend to be misinterpreted and could be viewed as “intimidating by some government and agencies” (2010, 326). His focus, therefore, is on top-down initiatives of global governance. The main issue, however, is to define “universal categories and practices of rules” (Neumann and Jacob 2010, 136) 7 in relation to migration policies in a scenario comprised by different actors in times when migration issues are many times framed within a discourse based on securitization of migration and by portraying migrants and refugees as threats to national security. Kathleen Newland recognizes the difficulties in finding common principles in this area, or of setting supranational institutions to deal particularly with migration. She points out that “global governance of international migration is portrayed simultaneously as a necessity and an impossibility” (2010, 331). Accordingly, Newland divides global governance in the field of migration into top-down and bottom-up approaches. While the former is difficult to be attained the latter, argues the author, is not impossible to be achieved. By top-down initiatives of global governance in the field of migration we can place the creation of a supranational body to deal with international migration issues, the creation of binding mechanisms to enforce migration international law, or the development of common principles. Binding international mechanisms that address migration have not been received with much support, especially by major immigration countries – an example is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Family Members that took 13 years to enter into force due to the lack of signatories. On the other hand, Newland argues bottom-up initiatives of global governance can take form as platforms for different stakeholders to coordinate their work, to develop best practices and guidelines, and to formulate non-binding instruments (Ibid), for her these measures can be achieved in a global level. Bottom-up global governance in the field of migration can be seen as being not only a necessity but also a possibility. What makes it possible is the diversification of channels through which global governance in this particular field can occur as well as the diversification of actors involved in this process. Bearing all this in mind, if we go back to one of the questions raised in this article “Is global governance in the field of Migration attainable?” we could most likely answer that yes. If we look at global governance through Thomas G. Weiss lenses, that I myself find to be one of the most accurate, as a process instead of a global entity, we will see that global governance is not the opposite of state sovereignty and they do not need to be treated as opposite approaches; as the author himself claims (…) global governance does not constitute a new international relations ‘paradigm’ to replace state sovereignty (…) global governance is less a worldview and more a half-way house that provides additional and necessary insights as we attempt to understand the contemporary world and identify new way of approaching ongoing and future threats (2013, 41) 8 By half way house, we can imply that a bottom-up global governance in the field of migration actually comprise cooperation in the field of migration, and not governance in the strong sense of the word in which there is a institutionalization of practices that are sets standards and limits the actions of different actors, but especially states, in the international arena. However, in migration issues sovereignty in Westphalian terms still plays a central role. Migration is still seen as being a matter in which decision-making is to belong to the national structures, hence the idea of the creation of international regimes or the involvement of different actors in migration governance in order to facilitate agreement among the parties is seen with skepticism. The question of sovereignty may be one plausible explanation on why the development of international regime in the field of migration has not evolved in the pace required in order to “facilitate the making of substantive agreements by providing framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures for negotiation” (Keohane 1982, 337). I place the revival of the focus on discourse of national interest, securitization of migration, and the return to old Westphalian idea of state sovereignty as key barriers for development of international regimes on migration. When we take into consideration Keohane’s inverted Coase theorem that points out three conditions, in which at least one must apply, in order for regimes to be seen as effective in facilitating agreement among state parties, we can see that international regimes on migration seems to be an appropriate measure to be taken: (a) lack of clear legal framework establishing liability for actions; (b) information imperfection (information is costly) (c) positive transaction costs (1982, 338) The lack of clear legal framework for establishing international legal responsibility for actions regarding migration processes is a reality – the majority of the legal instruments available addresses questions of refugees and trafficked people but not of migrants per se. Information imperfection is also a reality. It is costly, it is diffuse and due to irregular movements the numbers are many times inaccurate or they simply do not exist. The creation of a framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures for negotiation seems appropriate, especially when we consider the important role of global governance also in structuring “long-term processes of interactions that shape state preferences, and ultimately identities” (Weiss 2013, 26). However, there is not much research in place to 9 explain states’ approaches toward migration phenomena from within the scope of international relations’ theories neither approaches that focus on determinants of migration policies that originate in the systemic level. When we look at empirical evidence on how states have been shaping migration, but especially immigration, policies it is not certain that further development of global governance in this field will be achieved in the near future. Although key issues whose effects can be felt in global scale moved state towards the need for international cooperation and although global issues called upon global engagement in seeking for solutions, migration and the securitization of it on the other hand seems to be reinforcing the concept of state sovereignty that for some time seemed to be losing its strength. Neumann and Jacob (2010) call for the inclusion of an account of how sovereignty is reconstructed in the context of global politics is very valid. Migration, I argue, may be an interesting issue through which we can try to analyze this process of transformation, challenging, and renewing of the concept of sovereignty. It gives rise also to the question on under which contexts sovereignty is not transformed in the context of global politics. We are then required to question if migration has been changing the meaning of politics – beyond the limits of national boundaries, or migration issues have rather brought a backlash on international cooperation turning states back to the Westphalian idea of state sovereignty? 10 3. Back to Westphalia? For some time the meaning of state sovereignty in the Westphalian sense has been put into question. As we saw in the first session, some authors argue new forms of sovereignty are emerging and these include new poles from which sovereignty can be exercised – from NGOs to supranational units. Other authors such as Krasner (1999) go even further to claim the Westphalian idea of sovereignty as being the lack of external interference in internal affairs was never a reality. The loosening of the Westphalian idea of state sovereignty made possible for new actors to engage in the governing process in a way that trespass national borders and in a broad range of issues – it is in this scenario that global governance emerged. It is indeed impressive that nowadays there exists global governance and that daily a huge number of transnational activities occur in different areas even in absence of a central international political authority. On the other hand, the ideas that have been gathered throughout this paper serve to sustain the argument that although affective in some areas, global governance in the field of migration does not seen to be a reality at any time soon, although there have been attempts lately to address the issue more effectively (the incorporation of the International Organization for Migration to the UN structure in 2016, for example). Global governance in particular areas, especially in the economic field, seems to be effective when there is a polarization of sources of sovereignty, and international regimes can be formed when actors have shared long-term interests and objectives and seek to institutionalize their relationship in a way to attain mutual benefits (Keohane, 1982). Although migration itself is not a new phenomenon, portraying migration as a threat to security has become increasingly common since 9/11. In the post-9/11 context politics of control have prevailed and immigrants in general, but also refugees and asylumseekers have been central actors in the security debate (Edwards and Ferstman 2009). Public opinion has been shaped towards fear of migrants and securitization of migration has become common. Goodwin-Gill points out that The already restrictive, hostile and generally repressive measure which States were already taking towards refugees and asylum seekers (…) have been give spurious justification by the terrorism agenda. For some States (or rather, for some governments), that has been the opportunity to introduce yet more stringent laws and policies, often in the aftermath of a terrorist incident, but also generally under a carefully constructed cloud of fear. (2008, 7). 11 The election of Donald J. Trump for president of the United States accentuates the discourse of border and the need for the creation of walls (physical or not) and the necessity for turning attention to national security – downplaying international cooperation in the field of migration. Donald Trump’s inaugural discourse continuously reiterating “America first, America first” exemplifies the downturn of politics of cooperation and the centrality national security and sovereignty in the Westphalian terms in the years to follow. In the European context, Robert Cooper (2000) classified the European Union as a post-modern institution. Among the characteristics of post-modern institutions is the lack of emphasis on state sovereignty, as compared to modern states, the lack of division between domestic and external affairs, mutual interference in internal affairs along with mutual surveillance, rising irrelevance of borders, and security based on interdependence. Hitherto, Cooper recognized that post-modern states would be dealing with a challenge We need to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era (...) among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we also must use the laws of the jungle. (2000, 37-38) The EU could, then, be seen as a post-modern entity. Nevertheless, this argument seems to be losing its strength. The current migration and refugee crisis in Europe may also have contributed the increase of support for right-wing parties in Europe which inevitably leads to the promotion of politics of control. In the European context a series of events in the years 2015 and 2016 seems to support this argument. In the midst of the chaos generated by the great number of people arriving at once the European Union common mechanisms in place to deal with migration, which were not many, collapsed. The Dublin regulations proved to put a very strong weight on the countries that make the European Union border and proved unfeasible. The idea that the Union is a post-modern entity can now be contested: emphasis on state sovereignty revived, even when operating among ourselves – many EU member states saw the quota system proposed by the Commission as being beyond its area of competence and a breach of State’s sovereignty2. Open cooperative security, another characteristic of post-modern world also failed in the EU context. The lack of commitment to the principle of solidarity was promptly 2Many EU countries say “no” to immigration quotas http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-homeaffairs/news/many-eu-countries-say-no-to-immigration-quotas/ 12 shown by the Visegrad countries that denied any attempt coming from the Union to apply a temporary quota system. Not only the four countries reject the quota system, But Hungary and Slovakia also went further and filled a lawsuit against the EU over the mandatory quota system at the European Court of Justice3. Poland, after establishment of a new government in November, expressed the continuity in aligning with the V4 and did not change its position regarding the quota system (Strážay 2016, 61). The Schengen zone was further put into question when, without coordination in the Union level, some states opened its borders – disregarding the fact that the migrants would have to pass through other states’ territories in order to reach their final destination – while other closed it temporarily. Goodwin-Gill’s observation regarding the use of terrorist actions and construction of fear in order to introduce more strict migration laws have never seen so accurate when we look to the main discourse of key European (but not only) leaders – especially in the Visegrad group. In Slovakia the securitizing discourse and the association of migration with terrorism was carried out by mainly, but not only, the Prime Minister, Robert Fico, especially after the terrorist attack in Paris, 2015. In reaction to the attack, Fico spoke to a main television channel, Markiza I respect that there is a migration crisis. Before the rights of migrants, with the need to take care of them in the first place must be a citizen of the Slovak Republic and the security of the country4 Statements of this kind can be clearly associated to the Westphalian norms of sovereignty over one’s territory, non-intervention on domestic affairs, and focus on national interest above the principle of solidary (in the EU level) and of human rights protection in a broader international scope. In the apex of the migration and refugee crisis in Europe one of the few measures taken by Slovakia was to sign a memorandum and to agree to receive temporarily in the city of Gabčikovo a limited number of people applying for asylum in Austria. The memorandum was signed by the minister of interior, Robert Kaliňák – SMER –SD, from the same party as Robert Fico, that during electoral campaign repeatedly stated there is no place for Islam in Slovakia5. With the signature of the memorandum, the Slovak 3 Hungary and Slovakia file lawsuit against EU’s mandatory refugee quotas: http://hungarytoday.hu/news/hungary-slovakia-file-lawsuit-eus-mandatory-refugee-quotas-75815 4 Fico: Útoky v Paríži potvrdili riziká spojené s migračnou vlnou: http://spravy.pravda.sk/svet/clanok/373948-fico-utoky-v-parizi-potvrdili-rizika-spojene-s-migracnouvlnou/ 5 13 National Party’s (SNS) leader, Andrej Danko, during a press conference also spoke on the subject stating the memorandum breaches the sovereignty of Slovak Republic. In the V4 context, it is also important to stress that these countries had little experience with high flows of irregular migrants and, similarly to other EU countries, they were not prepared to deal with the situation. However, this is not the main problem, the main issue here is that in the European context peculiarly regarding relations among member states, the discourse based on state sovereignty, in the Westphalian terms, have not been as apparent as it is now. The coordinate actions of the V4 countries in opposing to the proposed quota system and the revival of a strong discourse based on sovereignty by mainstream parties in these countries put in question the idea that the EU is a post-modern institution, in Cooper’s term. The Visegrad group now has (four) voices, in the plural, that speak the same message. The group aligns against measures taken in the EU but the reasons for doing it seems not to be done based on genuine cooperation towards a common goal, but based on the interest of the mainstream political parties that seems to converge in these countries. One may argue that sole fact that the Visegrad four align their policies as a response to the quota system proposed by the EU is an indication that states continue acting taking into consideration external forces. I assume a more neo-realist perspective in which I believe these states act and form alliances regarding migration in the international arena pushed not by an interest in genuine cooperation, but because cooperation itself aligns with national interest. The Visegrad four aligned their position based on a common interest: of securitizing migration in order to fulfill the political agenda of leaders such as Viktor Orban in Hungary or Robert Fico in Slovakia. Slovakia’s leader said Islam has ‘no place’ in his country. Now he’s taking a leadership role in the E.U.: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/21/the-next-e-u-president-saysislam-has-no-place-in-his-country/?utm_term=.8bb479cbd60a 14 Conclusion We may see the existence of Hedley Bull’s (1977) international society in a broad range of issues in international relations. Global governance has indeed contributed to the creation of a sense of shared interests and values and to the sense that actors in international relations are bound by certain goals and institutions – required to the existence of Bull’s international society. Nevertheless, when the matter in question is migration, although there are modest attempts to create an international society, the current stage of world affairs seems to indicate that the relations among states form not an international society, but an international system in Bull’s terms. States are more and more acting based on their own principles and interests and do not share this sense of being bound by a common set of goals and institutions. Furthermore, although the meaning of sovereignty have been changing from the Westphalian idea to a more loose understanding in which sovereignty can emanate from different actors, the discourse on migration has led to a revival of the use of the term in the Westphalian sense – as states having the supreme sovereign power over its territory. Donald J. Trump discourse, similarly, the discourse and actions taken by Visegrad leaders in reaction to the Union’s attempt to regulate migration based on the principle of solidarity may point towards this direction. Securitization of migration, instead of the existence of shared norms and values and the sense we are bound by common rules and institutions, seems to the bounding force behind collective actions regarding migrations in the cases briefly presented in the paper. In conclusion, very few academic have dedicated their efforts to scrutinize the underlying systemic reasons behind decision-making processes of migration policies, even fewer have dedicated their effort to look at these issues through the lenses of international relations theories. Questions such as how to conciliate global governance in the field of migration and state sovereignty, two seemingly opposite approaches or how to foster cooperation in the field of migration while still keeping in place one of the key pillars in which the United Nation system was built, sovereignty, still need to be answered. It is not clear how international cooperation in the field of migration will develop within the next years or decade. What is clear is that there is a lack of research on the legal and political features that emanate from the systemic level that affects decision-making process towards migration policies in the national level. It is important for academics to focus on these issues and to understand the limits of international cooperation in this field as well as the 15 systemic mechanisms that can effectively influence in migration policies not only to fill existing gaps in the literature of migration but mainly with the ultimate purpose of alleviating human suffering resulting from uncoordinated and irregular migration processes. 16 References Bretell, Caroline B.; Hollifield James F. (2015): ‘Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines’, in Caroline B. Brettell & James F. Hollifield (Eds.), Migration Theory – Talking Across Disciplines. Third Edition. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 1 – 36. Bull, Hedley (1977): The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan Cooper, Robert (2000): The post-modern state and the world order. 1st ed. London: Demos. 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Marchi, Sergio (2010): ‘Global Governance: Migration’s Next Frontier’. Global Governance 16. pp. 323 – 329 17 Neumann, Iver B.; Jacob, Ole Sending (2010): Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality. University of Michigan Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.371804 Newland, Kathleen (2010): ‘The Governance of International Migration: Mechanisms, Processes, and Institutions’. Global Governance 16. pp. 331 – 343 Strážay, Tomas (2016): ‘V4 2015 Neľahké hľadanie odpovedí na európske výzvy’ in Peter Brezáni (Eds) Ročenka zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky 2015. Výskumné centrum Slovenskej spoločnosti pre zahraničnú politiku, n.o. Available at: http://www.sfpa.sk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/R2015.pdf Weiss, Thomas G. (2013): Global Governance – Why? What? Whither? Cambridge: Polity Press. 18